BRARY COURT, U. B.

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1968

Office-Supreme Court, U.S. FILED

JAN 22 1969

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

In the Matter of:

ROBERT ELI STANLEY,

Appellant

VS .

THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Appellee

Docket No. 293

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

January 14, 1969

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1968

ROBERT ELI STANLEY, :

Appellant, :

v. : No. 293

THE STATE OF GEORGIA, :

Appellee. :

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Washington, D. C. Tuesday, January 14, 1969

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 1:45 p.m.

BEFORE:

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EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

WESLEY R. ASINOF, FSQ. 3424 First National Bank Bldg. Atlanta, Georgia Counsel for Appellant

APPEARANCES (continued):

J. ROBERT SPARKS, ESQ.
Assistant District Attorney
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
Fulton County Courthouse
Atlanta, Georgia
Counsel for Appellee

PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 293, Robert Fli Stanley versus Georgia.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF WESLEY R. ASINOF, FSQ.

ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT

MR. ASINOF: May it please the Court, I would like to request the martial to notify me when 25 minutes is up. I would like to save five minutes for rebuttal, if I may.

Q You will find a white light come up before you. That will be the five-minute warning.

A Thank you.

Mr. Chief Justice and members of the Court: This case involves the constitutionality of the Georgia obscenity statute. The questions raised by this appeal insofar as the constitutionality of the statute concerned are twofold.

First, we raise the question that the statute

violates the First Amendment because it punishes the mere

possession of obscene material without requiring any further

overt act on the part of the possessor or intent to do anything

with it.

Robert Eli Stanley had possession of three reels of motion picture film in a desk drawer of his upstairs bedroom of his home. There was no allegation in the indictment of any showing or attempt to exhibit or show these films or pander

them or show them to minors.

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The only question involved insofar as the indictment was concerned was that he possess them knowing them to be obscene or that he should reasonably have known them to have been obscene.

on this statute is the use of the language in the statute and in the indictment to the effect that he reasonably should have known of the obscene nature of the film removes the element of scienter from the definition of the offense and, thus, permits the State to secure a conviction for possessing these films on a showing less than actual knowledge on his part that they were obscene.

- Q Do you concede them to be obscene?
- A We do not concede them to be obscene and if we took that position with the trial court then under the First Amendment insofar as possession itself is concerned that there is no such thing as obscenity.

The reason that we took that position and now take that position is this: It would be a violation of the freedom of press clause of the First Amendment to restrict a person or to prohibit a person to possessing anything they want insofar as its claim of obscenity is concerned.

We take the position that where a person merely possesses an article alleged to be obscene and does not attempt

to distribute it or to show it to any other person as was
the case in this case and as was the indictment in this case,
and as to the holding by the Supreme Court that the mere holding
isn't an offense under the definition of Georgia law, that any
evidence in the case on the part of the State or any contention
on the part of the State to the effect that the evidence might
have circumstantially shown that he was about to have a party
and about to show these films to other persons would be
completely irrelevant for this Court to consider has no relevancy
here because of the fact that he was only charged with the
mere possession.

Now, to my knowledge this exact question has never been passed upon by this Court. The question of whether or not a person can be prohibited by the State from merely possessing obscene material or obscene writings or pictures clearly would seem to me that the mere possession — that anyone would have the right to say "Draw a picture" which might obviously be obscene to some other person and put it in his pocket or put it in his desk drawer or if he wanted to take a picture of himself or take a picture of himself and his wife in a sexual act, that this would be a matter that he could determine as long as he did not attempt to pander this material, attempt to sell it, distribute it or distribute it to minors.

- Q Where were these films?
- A These films were in the desk drawer. This,

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- Well, you couldn't tell what they were. 0
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- Could not. A
- What did the officers do?
- The officers -- I might as well mention this at the outset right here -- the second part of our contention is the officers were on with a Federal search warrant issued by United States Commissioner on a claim that the defendent was violating the Wagering and Tax Act.
- Since then, of course, this Court has held that the provisions of that law are constitutionally ---
- Excuse me, what I am trying to get to is, did the officers use the projector to see the films?
 - Yes.
 - Then and there?
- A Yes, sir. They went in on with the search warrant issued by United States Commissioner which did not call for the seizure for any obscene film but called for the seizure of gambling paraphernalia.
- No gambling paraphernalia was seized except some negligible things that I think the State concedes were not sufficient.
- But, during their search, they searched through this drawer and found three cans of film, eight-millimeter film, which they testified they could not discern or know from

their own knowledge that it was what it was.

So they found, in the closet, a projector and they found a screen and they showed these films and looked at them --

- Q Then they set up the screen and ---
- A They set up the screen and they showed them.
- Q Is there any conceivable circumstance in which if you saw film that -- could it possibly be connected with gambling paraphernalia?

A I would think not. I would think not. I
wouldn't know that there was any connection between them, but
what happened, after they showed these films, not having a
warrant to seize the films, the evidence shows in the case and
in the record that the officer, the State Officer, called the
Solicitor General who is the prosecuting officer for that
circuit and told him they didn't find gambling paraphernalia
but they did find some films and it is in the record that the
Solicitor General then stated to him after you view the films
if, in your opinion, they are obscene, seize the films and book
the case and I will set a bond.

- Q Well, tell me, suppose, instead of these films, they had found counterfeit bills, couldn't this fellow have been prosecuted for possession of counterfeit bills?
 - A I think so.
 - Q Yes; how do you distinguish that?
 - A I distinguish that, and I concede, that where

evidence is seized or where contraband is seized, where it is not such as would be subject to a claim of the First Amendment, freedom of press or freedom of speech, that the States do have the right to prohibit the possession.

Ace.

Q I take it that Harrison would require that that be counterfeit money.

A I think that any case -- and we concede that in our brief and make that distinction -- that in this particular case, these were films alleged to be obscene from the very start. They weren't seized as gambling paraphernalia, but they were seized under a warrant issued by United States Commissioner under the Wagering Tax Act, under a contention that the defendent had not registered as a gambler.

Q Was this man a merchant, a distributor or anything like that?

A No, sir. There was no claim of any distributorship. He was an individual in his own home. The State, of
course, alleged and contended that he had a record for gambling
in the past and that the Federal agents and the State agents
were going in for that purpose, that they had probably cause,
one of the contentions in the affidavit being that he had not
registered as a gambler and paid his tax, which, of course
since then ---

A Well, in the prosecution and the actual trial for possession of these films was there any effort to produce

9 proof that possession of these films was for the purpose of 2 sale? 3 No, sir. A It was just naked possession of the films? 4 0 This is not a ---5 There was one other point. There were biscuits 6 in the kitchen. 7 This was brought up in the brief to this Court, 8 that there were biscuits being ready to put in the stove, that 9 there were well-dressed people who came to the house, that 10 this man was a bachelor and his girlfriend had come there 11 and that the officers had turned them away. 12 They said that the table was set for eight people 13 looking like they were fixing to have supper, getting ready to 14 have supper, and, for this reason, they said that apparently 15 he was going to have a party. 16 This is now the contention raised by the State, but 17 I want to call the Court's attention to this, that ---18 Where was this in Georgia? 19 Sir? A 20 Where was this in Georgia? Q 21 In Atlanta. A 22 Was there any claim that this party was going 23 to include the showing of these films? 24 That is what they claim. They claim A 25

circumstantially -- there is no evidence of that at all. The duc. defendent denied knowing anything about ---2 Q Well, as I understood you to say, neither 3 screen nor projector was set up? 4 That is right. 5 A And the films were in cans in the desk drawer. 6 7 Upstairs in the bedroom of the defendent in a desk drawer. 8 Was there any effort at the trial to show that 9 Q he was going to have a party, including showing these films? 10 A No, sir, none whatsoever. No testimony of 11 that at all. 12 What do you do with films nowmally? Q 13 Well, I would imagine that you would show them? 14 A Do you keep them as a souvenir, or show them? 15 Well, I think that an individual could do as 16 he pleases. But the point is in this case, and this is the 17 paramount thing in here, that the State did not contend, by its 18 indictment that he had any intention to show them and this was 19 one of our grounds of demurrer in the trial court in the State 20 court. 21 And he didn't show them to somebody else. 22 0 Whether there was any intent to do anything A 23 with them. 24 Or even to show them to himself? There was Q 25

nothing, as I understand you, there is nothing to indicate -except that he had them in a drawer and in the closet had
a projector and a screen?

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- A That is right, they were for his own use.
- Q Or maybe he wasn't going to show them at all.
- A Maybe he wasn't going to show them at all. He contended by his ---
 - Q He was going to keep them as a keepsake.
- A He could. In his statement he said that I have never seen these films before, that a man brought them to my house on Labor Day which was about four or five days before this.

The point was, that the State at no time in its indictment charged this. We demur, on the grounds the vagueness of the Georgia statute, the Georgia statute did not specifically make the mere possession an offense.

We asked for interpretation by the State Court and got it. The Supreme Court construed the language to be sufficient to make the mere possession an offense and that is why we are in this Court, because of the fact that we are reinforced by the State Court decision holding that the mere possession is an offense and we say that isn't a constitutional interpretation.

Q The nub of this case, as appears on Page 69 of the appendix, doesn't it, right at the top of the page, that

one sentence.

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I believe so, yes. A

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"It is not essential to an indictment charging one with possession of obscene matter, that it be alleged that such possession was with intent to sell, expose or circulate the set."

> That is correct. A

And that is a clear holding by the highest court of your State that mere possession or, as my brother says, "naked possession" is sufficient to constitute a criminal offense.

That is correct. That is the holding of the Supreme Court, so the question is squarely before this Court, as to whether or not under that interpretation given to it by the Supreme Court of Georgia, whether or not that can be squared with the First Amendment, whether mere possession of material alleged to be obscene, pictures or writings, can be constitutionally made a criminal offense.

Does it say that naked possession, pictures of naked persons, cannot be kept in a person's house without his committing a crime?

Under Georgia law. Under the interpretation given by the Supreme Court of Georgia, that is correct.

What did this fellow get -- a year?

Yes, sir; he received a year's punishment. That A

was fixed by the jury, and it was under the charge of the

Court -- of course, under Georgia law, peculiarly, the jury

fixes the punishment -- the Court charged the mere possession

as being -- that that is all they had to consider, together

with either that he had knowledge that they were obscene, or

that he should reasonably have known of its obscene nature.

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Now, this gets to the scienter question. Whether er not a State can withdraw the element of scienter by permitting a conviction to rest upon less evidence than actual knowledge that it is obscene.

- Q Has your client been out on bail?
- A Yes, sir, he has been out on bail.

The second question involved in his case, as I stated, is that this Court has held in Grosso and Marchetti since this case was tried that the Wagering Tax Act is constitutionally unenforceable.

This holding by the Court we say renders the search warrant, that was issued in this case, invalid. We filed a motion to suppress in the trial court. In our motion to suppress ---

- Q When was the search warrant issued?
- A The search warrant was issued before Grossoor

 Marchetti decisions. It was issued in 1967 but it was about —

 it was some months before Grosso or Marchetti. But we filed a

 motion to suppress the evidence and in our motion the

allegation was made that the films were seized without a valid search warrant, particularly describing the articles to be seized.

That language, we say, is sufficient to now reach back as of that time and say that that was a sufficient attack upon the warrant itself.

Q Do you argue at all that even the warrant was valid and even Marchetti and Grosso weren't retroactive, that, nevertheless, the search was invalid because the warrant described gambling paraphernalia and they, nevertheless, seized the film which -- it isn't like just running across contraband that is lying out in plain sight, you have to actually look into the film to see what is in it?

- A Not only look into the film ---
- Q Do you make that argument?

A Yes, sir. Not only look at the film but there had been no -- this requires on the question of obscenity -- it would require at least the finding of a magistrate to determine that these films were obscene.

In this particular case the evidence is clear that this officer called the Solicitor General and asked the Solicitor General what to do and he told him: "If, in your opinion, they are obscene, seize the films and make a case and I will set the bond."

Now, we say that this would require, before a film

or picture or photograph or anything else can be considered to be obscene, there must be some judicial finding, some notice, some knowledge that these films have been declared to be obscene, at least that much.

We say that, for that reason, that even though officers would be authorized, under search warrant, to seize contrabands not named in the article, they would not be authorized to seize films alleged to be obscene.

If the Solicitor General, himself, had no judicial powers under the laws of Georgia, had no right to, himself, have seized the films, but in this case he delegated some sort of judicial power to the officer making the finding and told him: "If, in your opinion, they are obscene" ---

Q I take it you are relying on Marcus, are you?
You are relying on Marcus?

A Yes, sir.

Q Marcus involves, as I recall it, didn't it,
a warehouse full of books of which there were six or seven
that the police had purchased and there, on the basis of police
examination of the books, they issued the warrant.

A That was under the Missouri statute.

Q We said that they had to have a determination advance, but isn't this a little different? Here you have just a single item. Just how would you get the film to have a determination of obscenity before a search warrant is issued?

How would you get it?

A If the Solicitor General had instructed the officer, submit your facts to a magistrate and if he ---

Q What facts? He would have to take the films, wouldn't he?

A No, he could, by affidavit, submit to a magistrate who was authorized to issue a warrant, he could submit what these films revealed to him.

Q According to another argument, he wasn't even entitled to look at them.

A That is right. He was not even entitled to look at them, which, of course, is, again, the question. We say under either one of those theories, the seizure of the films was illegal.

Q Well, it wouldn't be obscene unless it lacked some social and redeeming value, as I understand it, and you couldn't tell that unless you saw it.

A Well, of course, Your Honor, that is true. But,

I think that is something that has been the subject of discussion

for many, many years, as to whether or not an item does have

redeeming social value or whether or not it could be classified

as obscene.

- Q Were these movies shown at the trial?
- A Yes, sir; the movies were shown at the trial.
- Q Did the jury see them?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are they here?

A Yes, sir; I think this Court has them and I would say this, that, of course, I think and I would concede to this Court that the pictures, the films, insofar as films are concerned, I think disgusting, but I don't know that disgusting makes them obscene.

I don't know that they would appeal. They wouldn't appeal to my prurient interests. I don't know whose prurient interests they would appeal to because I think that they are sickening. But I don't think that they would be any more sickening than to show a man being tortured to death and having his guts torn out of him. That wouldn't be obscene.

right to the point in this case, we say, that if they are
the vilest, the filthiest pictures that could ever be seen,
that a person has the right to possess them as long as he has
not -- and this is what this Court held last year in Redrup
and the other cases along with Redrup -- that as long as there
is no pandering, as long as there is no exhibition to minors,
and as long as there is no intrusion upon the privacy of other
persons who are unwilling to see them, then, of course, we
have nothing, and this is all we have in this case, unless you
want to accept the State's theory that because there were some
biscuits being prepared to put into the stove, because of the

fact that the table was set for eight where they were going to have dinner and against the statement of the defendent in the trial of the case, nothing to refute that, that a man had brought these films to him several days before and told him:

"I have some films that I would like you to see."

PL.

Now, we say this, if the Court please, that wherever we find that a question of obscenity is concerned or whether or not we know that something is obscene, if A tells P: "I have some pictures I want to give you and these pictures are obscene."

Does that say that B cannot determine or ascertain for himself whether they are obscene to him or does that mean that he would have the right to himself inspect those films and say: "I have a right under the First Amendment to determine whether"---

- Q Well, you don't have that case here. Why argue that case?
 - A Well, that is what it would actually ---
- Q All you have here, as I understand it, assuming any obscenity of these films, a question of whether the possession, and nothing more, not for sale or otherwise, but just the possession of itself constitutionally can be made a crime under the First Amendment; isn't that what it is?

A That is right. And that is why I say, if Your Honor please, that because of that a man has the right to

determine for himself if it offends him, if, to him, it is obscene, because it would violate the First Amendment to say that if a man handed me some film --
Q Incidentally, is there anything in this record

Plant.

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to show that he had any knowledge as to what these films were?

A None whatsoever except the fact that they

A None whatsoever, except the fact that they said — an expert testified that the films had been scratched, one of them was wound backwards, to show that someone had seen them at some time in the past, but nothing to show that he had seen them or he had viewed them.

There is nothing to refute or rebutt his statement that he had never seen them before.

Q Well, were they in his bureau drawer?

A They were in his desk drawer of his bedroom upstairs. And there was no setup, nothing set up, no screen set up to show or view these films.

Q The difference between this and the Wilkes case, which was tried a long time ago, is that there they found the paper in the bottom of his trunk. Here they found it in the desk drawer, and they turned him loose.

A I think that would be analogous.

So, I would like to reserve what time I have left,
I know the white light hasn't come on, I would like to reserve,
if I may, the time that is left for rebuttal.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Sparks.

That happened in the Mishkin case, another obscenity.

ON BEHALF OF APPELLEE

MR. SPARKS: May it please the Court: I am the trial counsel who prosecuted this case in the court below, Superior Court of Fulton County so the Court has the original trial counsel, Mr. Asinof was the defense counsel.

Now, I want to point out several things to the Court, which I think Mr. Asinof neglected to point out because he was so wrapped up in his own argument.

One is this: On the question of whether or not this Georgia statute contains the element of scienter, I want to point out to the Court that the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on that in this very case.

The Court said, I am just reading in part, just a line, "It is contended that being contended that the requirement of reasonable knowledge would withdraw the element of scienter from the definition of the offense and would render a person guilty without actual knowledge of the obscene nature of the matter."

This contention is without merit. Now, as we have pointed out in our brief the Court has consistently held that where a State statute is interpreted by the highest court of its State, that this Court is bound by the construction placed on it by that court.

case, which the Court, of course, is familiar with, and also in the last Ginsberg case. Now, in the last Ginsberg case, the New York statute, which you find knowledge is this, "the word knowingly possess obscene matter". The New York statute defined "knowingly" as "Having general knowledge of or reason to know," the exact same words that are in the Georgia statute, "or reasonably should know, or a belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or inquiry."

In other words, in the Ginsberg case, and that is a G-i-n-s-b-e-r-g case, there being two Ginsberg cases in the obscenity field, this Court accepted the construction placed on the scienter feature of the New York statute and said, as we are bound to do.

Now, the Georgia Supreme Court said, in response to Mr. Asinof's contention that the language of the Georgia statute, "If such person has knowledge or reasonably should know of the obscene nature of the matter," does not remove scienter from the offense, but is merely a statutory expression of the rule of evidence which has been in Georgia courts for many years.

That is the only way you can prove intent or knowledge of a person as to anything, as to whether goods are
stolen, or any element involving intent or knowledge, unless
he confesses by the circumstances as to whether a reasonable
man in the same position would know or would have knowledge

of the obscene nature.

Time.

So, we submit, respectfully, that by a long series of this Court's own decisions, that you cannot go beyond or reverse the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court on this question of scienter because that is a State Court interpreting its own statute.

I have cited a number of cases where this Court has said that "We are bound by such expression". This Court also said it in the Mishkin case, you said it in the Kingsley International Pictures Corporation case, in about eight cases, Aero Transit, all of which are listed in our brief.

So that moves us onto the second facet of the attack on the constitutionality of the statute. I submit, most earnestly, to the Court that scienter is an element of this offense as interpreted by the Georgia Court, by the judges of the Supreme Court, and that this Court cannot, unless you reverse your prior rulings, which are set out in our brief and which I have cited to you, unless you reverse that long line of cases, I don't believe the Court could, in keeping with its precedence, it said, "We think the Georgia Court was wrong when they said that this statute does not contain the element of scienter."

Q What was the State's evidence on scienter -- the State's evidence to prove scienter?

A It was circumstantial, Your Honor, but we think

it was sufficient.

No.

These officers went in with a Federal Search Warrant to seize wagering paraphernalia. This man was alleged to have been a notorious bookmaker, having a prior record of arrest and a conviction ---

Q What connection would that have?

A That wouldn't have any connection with this case, but I point out the probable cause that we had.

Q No, I am interested in how you brought evidence and what evidence there was on which the jury could find that he knew the contents of these motion pictures?

A One of the cans bears the label "Young Blood" on it, which is certainly a suggestive title. It is a home-made label. I gather from what the Court has said that the Court hasn't viewed these films. They are here, and I have asked the Court ---

Q I would still like to know, if you don't mind, what the evidence was that brought home to him the knowledge of the contents of those movies?

A Well, the evidence showed, Your Honor, that in the upstairs living room there was a projector set up and a bunch of innocuous films, slides, travel logs, things like that.

These films were not found with the other films, the innocuous, though innocent type films, but they were found in a desk drawer underneath some papers in his private bedroom.

The officers ran them, threw them against the wall, and then went downstairs and told him, "We are arresting you for the obscene films which are found upstairs."

- Q Well, why did they show them? They were looking for what? The search warrant was limited to what?
- A I think that they wanted to look at the films for the reason that the films might have been record. They were authorized to look for book-making records. It is not inconceivable that ---
- Q Would he have them in a tin can marked "Young Blood"?
- A He could do that just like the old story by Edgar Allen Poe, the story about putting something in the most conspicuous place ---
- Q I am sure that the policeman read Edgar Allen Poe.

As soon as you saw the first frame you thought you were still looking for records?

- A No, sir, but there were three cans ---
- Q They ran through all three, I take it.
- A They didn't show all three of them. Your Honor, the record shows that they only showed a few feet of the second and third one. In fact, one of the films had been rewound backward which shows recent viewing, and the pictures were shown upside down.

Q Now, you were going to tell us that he went downstairs and, I gathered, you were going to tell us that he met the defendent -- the officer did?

A He went downstairs and met the defendent and told the defendent that "I am arresting you for those obscene films upstairs." The defendent said nothing. Of course, I don't claim that you can't use his right to remain silent against him. That is a constitutional right.

But it would still seem more logical to say "What films" if he didn't know he had any obscene films.

- Q But so far you have got that he said nothing.
- A Yes, sir.

- Q Now, what else have you got? The officer said "I am going to arrest you for those obscene films". The defendent said nothing.
- A He said, "Let me call Mr. Asinof", and he did call Mr. Asinof.
- Q Now, does the fact that he called his lawyer indicate that he knew what those films were?
- A No, sir, but there is his own statement -- he made a statement on the trial. Georgia has the unsworn statement law where a defendent can either be sworn or make an unsworn statement.

This is what he said, and while it is not in admission, it still is significant, I think; it is very brief.

He said: "I am a bachelor. I live by myself and I have a girlfriend. We planned a party for Labor Day. I invited several couples out. Later on in the evening a friend of mine came by and said, 'I brought you something I want you to see'. He handed it to me. It was three rolls of film. I took the film upstairs and put it in a desk draw, closed the desk drawer and came back downstairs."

Sale Sale

Then he goes on to say he never looked at it. However, there were two people in the backyard when the officers made the execution of the search warrant, two men; three women came over later that evening, well-dressed women. There was Justice Marshall's three dozen biscuits sitting on the stove.

a party. In fact, he told the jury that he was going to have a party and in the connection, the context of his statement telling about the party first and a friend by and saying, "I want you to see them", I think it is a reasonable deduction that the jury could have drawn that the films were to be shown at the party.

Q Well, is there anything in what you have told us that support an inference that he had looked at the films and knew what they were?

A Only one of the Federal agents was a former professional photographer, Your Honor, and he testified that the films were badly scratched, that they were dirty, that one

of the films had been wound backwards which caused the figures to project upside down on the wall when they showed it and he said that they had, obviously, been used before, been shown before, many times.

Q Many times, did you say?

A I am not certain whether he used the word "many" or not. I know that he said that they had, obviously, been shown before, at least that they had seen extensive use.

I could find that for you.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: We will adjourn now.

(Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m. the hearing in the aboveentitled matter was recessed to reconvene on January 15, 1969.)