RARY COURT. U. S.

Supreme Court of the United States

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JAN 23 1969

JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

243

Docket No.

In the Matter of:

CITIZEN PUBLISHING COMPANY, ET AL.,

Appellants,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

January 15, 1969

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

300 Seventh Street, S. W.

Washington, D. C.

NA 8-2345

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1968

CITIZEN PUBLISHING COMPANY, ET AL., :

Appellants,

vs. : No. 243

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

Appellee, :

Washington, D. C.

January 15, 1969

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 10:40 a.m.

BEFORE:

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EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: No. 243, Citizen

Publishing Co., et al., Appellants, versus the United States

of America, Appellee. Mr. MacLaury?

ARGUMENT OF RICHARD J. MAC LAURY, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

MR. MAC LAURY: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court, my point of argument is to spend 25 minutes on the opening and then reserve, if the Court please, five minutes for rebuttal.

This case comes here from the District Court in the District of Arizona on direct appeal under the Expediting Act. It sets for the first time the validity under the antitrust laws of a newspaper operating agreement. The agreement binds the commercial assets and the functions of two newspapers in Tucson, Arizona, the MORNING AND SUNDAY STAR and the EVENING CITIZEN.

Agreements of this kind have become increasingly necessary to preserve competition between newspapers on the journalistic level. The reason the agreement was adopted is because Tucson cannot support two newspapers operating at both the journalistic and the commercial level.

Now, this situation is not peculiar to Tucson. Over the past 30 or 40 years there has been a drastic decline in the number of separately owned newspapers in the same city. In

In 1920 there were 552 cities having separately owned newspapers. Twenty years later, in 1940, there were only 181. By the mid-'60s there were 65, and of these 65 more than one-third operated under agreements such as the one under consideration here.

Same

Now, the Government claims that this agreement is a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the District Court on summary judgment held that it was in fact a violation, a per se violation of Section 1.

It is our contention that the agreement in substance and effect was a merger and that the court should have judged it under the rule of reason and, specifically, it should apply to this agreement the failing-company doctrine, because CITIZEN in 1940 was truly in a failing condition.

Now, we do not seek here to justify per se violations. The Government argued the law, and it argues in its brief here that all we seek to do is to justify per se violations. I would just like to emphasize to the Court that that is not our position. We feel the agreement is highly lawful and would have been found lawful had it been examined under the rule of reason rather rather than on summary judgment and under the per se rules.

This case involves a typical situation of the economic conditions experienced by newspapers throughout the country. In 1940 CITIZEN was in fact a failing company. It

had not paid dividends for many years. Its liabilities far exceeded its assets, and it had been kept alive and able to pay its bills only by contributions from the stockholders. In contrast, its competitor, the MORNING STAR, was in good financial condition. It was a strong competitor. It was selling more than 50 percent of the advertising in Tucson.

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Q What were the respective circulations?

A The respective circulations in 1939 were approximately 2,000 apart. The daily circulation of the STAR was approximately 12,000, the CITIZEN approximately 10,000. But, in addition, the STAR had a 12,000 circulation of its Sunday edition, which the CITIZEN did not have.

Those figures are approximations, but there has always been from 1932 on through 1939 a variation of 1,500 to 1,800 to 2,000 difference in its circulation.

Now, as I say, in contrast, the STAR was making a profit and sold 50 percent more advertising than the CITIZEN.

- Q But the STAR had a Sunday edition.
- A A Sunday edition.
- Q Because otherwise the circulations aren't really that far apart, are they? Except for the Sunday edition, why wouldn't you think one paper should do as well as the other advertising-wise?

A I think it was due in large measure to the Sunday edition, but not entirely, Mr. Justice. There was,

of course, available to the STAR a combination rate between Sunday and Monday and Saturday and Sunday. And Sunday being an attractive advertising day, it did give the STAR an advantage.

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Now, in these circumstances CITIZEN had several choices. It could have ceased publication and shut down its operation and sold its equipment on the second-hand market. Or it could have sold out or merged with the STAR.

The evidence was undisputed that CITIZEN in that failing condition could not have been sold to an outside competitor, because no outside competitor would have wanted to come in and place itself in the shoes of a failing company against an established newspaper such as the STAR.

Now, it took neither of these courses, but instead took the third course. That was to enter into an operating agreement with the STAR, which preserved for the citizens of Tucson and for these newspapers two separate rival, competing editorial voices. And it our contention here that was a far, far more preferable choice, far more preferable course of conduct than to have merged entirely and shut down this competing voice of the CITIZEN.

So they entered into this operating agreement, which was premised on the basic economic fact in the newspaper business that newspapers operate at two levels, at the journalistic and editorial level and also at the commercial

level. By "commercial" I mean running the mechanical equipment in the press and composing room, the pricing and sale of advertising, and the circulation and establishment of circulation prices, as well as the general business affairs of the two newspapers. That is what I refer to as the commercial level.

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The newspapers operated both these levels. The operating agreement recognized that and provided for what we refer to as in substance and effect a merger of the commercial assets, the assets devoted to the commercial functions, as well as the personnel, the records, and all of the material devoted and used at the commercial level of these two businesses.

On the other hand, the separate identities of the STAR and CITIZEN were retained, and the agreement specified that the STAR and CITIZEN would continue to be published separately. And the Court found that since the agreement, indeed, the STAR and CITIZEN have continued in rival composition of the news and editorial material and have developed into two high-quality newspapers.

The agreement was patterned after what we refer to as the Albuquerque Agreement, which was then in effect and which is still in effect. It was adopted in 1933.

The purpose of the operating agreement was to merge these commercial functions and assets so as to support two separate news and editorial voices. To do this the parties

really these three things.

First, each newspaper acquired a joint interest in the assets of the other newspaper necessary to produce newspapers.

Secondly, they organized a third corporation, called Tucson Newspapers, Inc. We refer to it as TNI.

Thirdly, TNI then took over the management and control of these assets. They operated the press room, composing room, the mechanical equipment. They sold advertising space in both newspapers. They established advertising rates. They circulated the newspapers, operated distribution trucks, and established the circulation rates.

The STAR and the CITIZEN each own equal shares in the third corporation, TNI. And the Board of Directors of TNI was five in number, three appointed by STAR, in substance, and two by the CITIZEN. But the management of TNI was completely separate from the management of the editors and the publishing people of the two newspapers. They had a separate management. They had a separate General Manager, a separate controller, and a separate man who headed the Advertising Department, with nothing to do with the editorial levels of the two newspapers. It was a separate operation.

We urged the District Court, because this was in substance and effect a merger or a consolidation, to judge the agreement under the rule of reason. But this it refused to do.

It was the District Court's view that the failing-company doctrine would have applied in this situation if STAR had acquired CITIZEN outright and published both newspapers as a single owner. Thus, the Court ruled, in effect, that the transaction would not have been unlawful if the newspapers had gone further than they did and eliminated all news and editorial rivalry.

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Now, we do not urge here that the fact this case deals with newspapers exempts the activities of the papers from the antitrust laws. But we do urge that the District Court consider the Sherman Act as requiring the elimination of a separate and effective editorial voice. And we do urge that the fact that there was a separate voice, that there were two editorial voices, in Tucson should have been a factor that the Court should have taken under consideration in deciding whether or not this agreement was unreasonable.

The benefit to the community deriving from separate editorial voices is a factor that the Court take into consideration.

We do not claim here that there was a violation of the First Amendment.

Q That argument should have taken into account that there was another effective editorial voice. Does that suggest that this is a First-Amendment consideration?

A Yes, it is a First-Amendment consideration,

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because the Court had the choice here of interpreting the Sherman Act so as to permit two separate editorial voices.

Q But you do not suggest that there was any pressure on it to interpret the First Amendment so as to prevent a violation of the First Amendment?

A We urge the law. We did urge the law that if

Q Did what it did, it would be violating the First Amendment?

A Yes, but our argument was that here the Court said it would be perfectly lawful -- you could have put these two newspapers together and took down one voice, and in that event the Sherman Act would not have been violated. But it would have interpreted the Sherman to have been violated if we kept one voice alive.

We argued below that the Court then was interpreting the Sherman Act so as to violate the First Amendment, or it deprived the citizens---

Q You really are just arguing the importance of the business to the community.

A That is correct.

Q You could make the same argument with respect to any other business if you thought it was very important to the community.

A I think that that is correct. We argue here

this is a factor that should have been taken into consideration under the rule of reason.

- Q It was decided on summary judgment, wasn't it.
- A Yes, sir.

Q Are there issues of fact?

A There was a serious and a genuine issue of fact on the motion for summary judgment. We filed numerous affidavits, and the intent of all of them was that this was a merger. That was the primary issue of fact, the disputed issue of fact, which the Court ignored on motion for summary judgment.

Thereafter, this case ---

- Q But technically this wasn't a merger. This was an agreement for a term of years, wasn't it?
- A It was an agreement for a term of years. In addition, the agreement could not have been dissolved except upon the consent of both parties.

absolutely correct. It was not technically a merger or a consolidation, but in terms of the economic realities, it was a merger. It was a merger. It had no different or no more effect or less effect upon the commercial market, the advertising market, than would a full and complete statutory merger have had.

Certainly, we all agree on both sides of this case

that the Sherman Act does deal with economic realities and with substance rather than form.

Now, the Government charged that this agreement constituted price-fixing and profit-pooling and market allocation and was therefore illegal per se. I believe that the complete answer to these charges is that the owners of STAR and CITIZEN are doing nothing today and did nothing after the agreement was entered into in 1940, did nothing than they would have been doing had there been a complete merger. And certainly if there had been a complete merger, both the editorial and commercial functions — the Government would be in no position to — it would be perfectly clear that the Government would be in no position to argue that that was a per se violation.

By "price-fixing" all the Government simply means is that this TNI organization established the price for its products and services.

Q Let's assume, though, that neither company was in favor of a merger. Had they merged, it may not be a per se violation. But do you think the Government would have a great deal of trouble showing a violation of Section 7?

A I don't think it would have very much trouble at all, Your Honor.

The very fact that CITIZEN was failing in 1940 and could not be rehabilitated and reconstituted after years of

abrogated today in the respects that the District Court's order would do so, would cause CITIZEN to fail again, is the reason we are here. That is the basis for our argument. Without that fact situation, I don't think we would have a case. It is because one newspaper would fail without our having taken this act that we believe the District Court committed error.

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Q Would it have failed eventually, or would it not have failed?

A In 1940, as I say -- I don't think there is any question about it -- CITIZEN clearly was a failing company within the meaning of international---

Q And the District Court just found to the contrary?

A I don't believe so, Mr. Justice. The District Court found in Finding 17 -- or I will say concluded in Finding 17 -- that CITIZEN was not in 1940 on the verge of going out of business and that it would not have ceased publication but for the opportunity offered in this operating agreement.

Now, I do not consider that to be a finding, that CITIZEN was not a failing company. The evidence was that Mr. Small, the majority owner of the CITIZEN, was prepared to finance the losses of CITIZEN for some little time out of his own pocket. That is in Finding 14.

But the evidence also was that he had to find another source or resources in order to keep CITIZEN alive.

Q At that time did he move to Tucson. Did he devote his full time and attention to the business for very long?

A He had moved to Tucson, I believe, in about September of 1939 and had given his full time and attention to the business without a salary for about six months.

The Court found---

Q Had the paper showed any improvement since he bought it?

A No, the newspaper did not, as a matter of fact.

It continued to fail, to deteriorate.

In December of 1939 the current liabilities of the CITIZEN were \$47,000, and its current assets were \$16,500.

Its total liabilities in December of '39 exceeded total assets by \$53,000. Its total assets were \$80,000.

By March of 1940 its total liabilities exceeded assets by \$81,000. And its total assets had declined to \$54,000.

By June of 1940, just before the opeating agreement went into effect, the total assets of CITIZEN had declined further from \$54,000 of the previous March to \$47,000.

Q Do you think it was in as bad a shape in '36 as it was in '40 and as bad in '40 as it was in '36?

A No, I think it was in worse shape in 1940 than it was in 1936.

Short

In 1936 Mr. Small and Mr. Johnson acquired the newspaper from the Hitchcock estate. They acquired it for \$100,000, which they paid over a period of time. At that time they put \$25,000 into new capital.

The debts of the corporation were at that time approximately \$7,500. By 1940 the debts of the corporation were \$109,000, and \$79,000 of this was due to its stockholders, which represented the new money put into the enterprise by the stockholders.

So, clearly, CITIZEN was steadily declining financially from 1936 through 1940.

Q There weren't any efforts after 1940 or any time to find any other buyer for the newspaper?

A There was an effort -- Small bought it as a losing operation in '36. He understood what its financial condition was in 1936.

Q But there weren't any efforts to sell it to anybody else?

A There was not an effort to sell outright,
Mr. Justice. There was an effort by Mr. Small to acquire new
financing from people interested in newspapers and in the
publishing business, people whom he knew. These efforts
failed. It was a very poor season to be investing in

newspapers in Arizona at the time.

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Having failed to attract new investment money, he then renewed his conversations with Matthews, owner of the STAR, to enter into or make some kind of an arrangement for this operating agreement.

I might point out here that the undisputed testimony at the trial was that CITIZEN could not have been sold in 1940 to an outside publisher who had any expectation of operating a newspaper at a profit.

Q Mr. MacLaury, what was the situation as to CITIZEN in 1965, which, as I understand, was the terminal date of the joint venture?

A In 1965---

Q Am I right about the year? In other words---

A You are not correct, Mr. Justice, on the termination date. 1965 was not the termination date. 1965 was the year that the complaint was filed. It still had some years to run.

But the evidence was, in the form of a pro forma statement prepared by a national accounting firm -- the evidence was that CITIZEN and STAR as newspapers were healthy companies making a profit.

Q What was the termination date?

A The termination date had been set forward in 1953 to 1993, I believe. But there was a provision that even

that was the termination date, it couldn't even have been terminated then except by agreement by both parties. So it really didn't have a specific termination date unless both parties at the end of each 25-year period would agree to terminate it.

The evidence was that in 1965 if this agreement should be abrogated, in the sense that the District Court ordered it, that CITIZEN would promptly again slump towards a failing company. For the years '62, '63 and '64, the test period, the evidence was -- and it was undisputed -- that CITIZEN would lose on the average of \$75,000 a year, that STAR was in a far stronger position and would have earned between \$450,000 and \$500,000.

I see my 25 minutes is up, and, if the Court please,
I would like to reserve five minutes for rebuttal.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Friedman.

ARGUMENT OF DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEE

MR. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the District Court found in this case, in Finding No. 23 at page 74 of the record, that it was the intention of the parties to the operating agreement to reduce costs and increase profits by eliminating commercial competition between the STAR and the CITIZEN, while retaining separate editorial and news departments.

And in the following sentence, Finding No. 24 on the same page, they speak of what they did in furtherance of their intent to eliminate competition between the two papers.

Moreover, both of the parties conceded at the trial that this was the purpose of the operating agreement.

Mr. Matthews, who is the owner of the STAR, stated that it was the purpose of the agreement to end commercial competition between the STAR and CITIZEN. This is at page 194 of the record.

Mr. Small, Sr., who was the owner of the CITIZEN, stated the same thing.

A Mr. Chambers, who had been the Business and
Advertising Manager of the STAR in 1940 and who had participated
in the negotiations leading to the joint operating agreement,
stated at page 155 of the record, when he was asked whether as
the result of this Tucson Newspapers, Inc., was there any

competition remaining between the STAR with respect to the business aspects, he said, "We tried to make it not so."

I don't think that there was.

And then he later, a few pages later, at page 158 of the record -- he was asked whether this arrangement could have worked if the revenues had been divided on some method other than a fixed formula, which I will come to in a minute. He said no, he didn't think it would. He said, "That would have defeated all of the idea we had for accomplishing this unification. We were trying," he said, "-- I guess that competition is a nasty word in this court. But we were trying to eliminate the competition between the two of us. That's all."

In addition to this testimony at the trial, we have in this record a rather unusual document, which is Government Exhibit No. 26, which was a submission that the STAR made in 1947 to the Internal Revenue Service in support of excessprofits tax relief for the war years. I would like to read to the Court a couple of things that the STAR said in this document about the purpose of 1940 agreement.

At page 409 they said: "It is obvious that the aim and purpose of the parties was to destroy every vestige of the competition that existed on January 1, 1940."

Then at pages 420 and 421 they said: "In order to preserve perpetual elimination of competition the operating

agreement provides that neither of these papers will engage in publication of any other newspaper in Tucson."

On the next page, in rather large type at the bottom of the page, they told what the purpose was, and they said:

"And these two papers, the ARIZONA STAR, did" -- in large

letters, underlined -- "did eliminate all competition from the local newspaper field on that day."

Q What page is that?

A 421, Mr. Justice.

Finally, I would like to invite the Court's attention to these little pictures at page 424 of the record, in which the STAR graphically displays what the result of this agreement was. At the top of the page we have two hogs, one labeled "THE STAR" and the other labeled "THE CITIZEN."

At the edges of the picture we have two troughs, one labeled "Circulation" and one labeled "Advertising."

Q At what page is that?

A 424, Mr. Justice.

The two hogs are chained together at the rear, and they are pulling. Each one is pulling, one toward "Circulation" and one toward "Advertising." But, of course, neither can reach the trough.

Now, at the bottom of the page they tell us what happened after this agreement. We now have the two troughs again, "Circulation" and "Advertising," and both the STAR and

the CITIZEN are shown as rather fat hogs at this point, with their snouts down in the trough enjoying the benefits of this.

Q What was that exhibit as a matter of issue for this court. Was it for advertising or for the antitrust suit?

A No, this was in response to a provision under the excise profits tax that they could get relief if they showed that there was a limitation of competition resulting from a merger which distorted their earnings during the base picture.

But they have told us as plainly as they can what their purpose was.

Now, how did they accomplish this elimination of competition? They did it basically through three aspects of the joint operating agreement. And I want to make it clear that the Government is not challenging the joint operating agreement as such. It is only challenging these three aspects, and the District Court has not struck down the operating agreement. It has only struck out these three paragraphs.

The first thing they did was they turned over to this Tucson Newspapers, Inc., which they jointly controlled, the sole authority to fix prices, that is, to fix the advertising rates and to fix the circulation rates. Neither of them after this agreement could fix their own advertising or circulation rates independently.

Now, I would like to suggest to the Court a hypothetical situation, because I think it illustrates the basic argument that they are making here.

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Let us assume we had two newspapers in town and both of them were losing money and the publishers of both newspapers got together and said: "Things are terrible. We are both losing money. The best solution to this problem is for both of us substantially to increase our rates." They shook hands on it, and they said: "Fine. We'll do this the first of next month."

Then they decided themselves what the rate level would be and said: "Well, let's turn it over to a third person to fix the fix the rates."

It seems to me that two things are clear.

First, they could not possibly offer any defense to this as a per se violation. It is clearly per se.

Secondly, they could not attempt to justify this type of arrangement on the plea that this was necessary to preserve the companies.

- Q Was any plea of self-incrimination raised in regard to the picture?
 - A With regard to the picture?
 - 0 424.
- A No, Mr. Justice, there was no objection taken to the introduction of this document.

Now, there was the next thing that they did, which they said was essential to this arrangement. They had what we think was held correctly by the District Court to be a legal profit-pooling arrangement in here. The proceeds of the operations of the papers — what they did was that the Tucson Newspapers, Inc., received all the revenues, that is, the revenues from the sales of advertising and circulation.

Then after the expenses of putting out the paper, the revenues were divided between the two papers, not on the basis of what each one contributed but according to a fixed formula. That is, without regard to whether one contributed more or one contributed less, they divided it up according to a preordained formula.

- Q Do you mean they contributed it in the sense of gross---
 - A Of gross revenues, that's right.
- Q Did the managing company itself determine what circulation expenses would be?
- A Oh, yes. I mean, subject, of course -- these two companies obviously had basic control---
- Q Did any sales expenses, like pushing circulation or pushing advertising or pushing subscriptions -- was that determined by that company?
- A That was determined by Tucson Newspapers, Inc., because it took over for these two newspapers the circulation

and the advertising, the business effects of the thing.

Now, this, it seems to us, has the very obvious effect of deterring the incentive of each paper to take whatever steps might increase its circulation, because obviously if one paper decided to try to increase its circulation, a large part of that immediately flows over to the other.

Finally, although it is not terribly important in this case -- we are not stressing it -- the third agreement provision they had was an undertaking that neither of them would go into any publishing business in Tucson.

Now, the question as we see the case is whether these three restraints, which, it seems to us, are the type that this court traditionally has treated as per se and the purpose of which, as the Court found, and the effect of which was to eliminate all commercial competition between the two papers, somehow is taken out of the operation of these rules because of the claim that this was necessary to save a failing newspaper in 1940.

Q What wrong do you think that the antitrust laws leave for the common fact that newspapers all over this country as a result of competition are getting smaller and smaller in number? In New York City, through competitive factors, we have got a practical monopoly in the newspaper field, at least in the morning field.

Now, do you think that those hard economic facts find any room for play or recognition under the antitrust laws? Or does this case have to be judged in terms of ordinary and conventional antitrust doctrine?

A I would like to make two points in answer, Mr. Justice.

First of all, it seems to us -- and I think Your

Honor has put the case fairly -- but it seems it seems to us

what they are really suggesting in this case is that the

normal antitrust principles that apply to all industries

should somehow be treated somewhat differently because of the

peculiar characteristics of the newspaper business.

Q I am not talking law now. I am talking economics, I suppose, or practicalities.

Here, as a result of all this, you have got a strong newspaper, one strong newspaper in a small community, which through this device has preserved competition in ideas, competition in its editorial policies.

A I would like to make two answers to that.

First, there is a disagreement, as we have developed in our brief, among authorities as to the causes of the problems of the newspaper industry. Admittedly, there has been a tremendous failure — on the other hand, there are people who believe that perhaps with new technology things may improve.

My other answer is that it seems to me that if there is to be a special treatment of the newspaper industry, we think this is basically a problem for the Congress and not for the Judicial Branch of the Government.

Q But the whole antitrust development has been a judicial development. Everybody knows that.

A A judicial development, Mr. Justice, but I don't think a judicial development of providing special rules for particular industries.

Q What about baseball, for example? That is very special.

A Baseball is an application -- originally the baseball decision was not a special rule for baseball, but as the Court then viewed---

O Some years ago we made it into a special rule.

reaching the merits of whether baseball was code but on the theory that it was not appropriate in the circumstances to —

I would just like to stress here that pleas often made to the Court, of course, that rules of law should not be changed by the Court but should be changed by the Congress. But in this case Congress for two years has had this very problem before it. There has been pending now in the Congress for two years various bills that would specifically sanction this type of agreement for the newspapers.

connection between news policy and this joint commercial operation.

have in our brief that the likely tendency of this type of commercial operation may be to inhibit competition in news.

But we don't say that it has here, but there the tendency of it — in other words, the people who have this interrelationship on the business level and who have had removed some of the incentives for trying to increase their business——

Q What do you suppose the managing company would do if one of the papers because of its news coverage policy suddenly began to decline in its circulation seriously?

A I don't know what they would do. I suppose they would attempt to persuade that paper to improve itself, I would think.

I would like to come now to this whole question of the failing company, because that, of course, is the foundation on which their entire argument rests. They claim in 1940 the CITIZEN was a failing company. Of course, if that underpinning falls, it seems to us, so does their whole case.

Now, the District Court found -- and this is at page 72, the second sentence -- it said that at the time they entered into the operating agreement, Citizen Publishing was not then on the verge of going out of business.

Q Where is it?

A Page 72 of the Appendix, Finding 17, the second sentence.

They said at the time Citizen Publishing was not then on the verge of going out of business, nor was there a serious probability at that time that Citizen Publishing would terminate its business and liquidate its assets unless Star Publishing and Citizen Publishing entered into the operating agreement.

We think the record fully supports that finding. We also think that finding does properly embody the so-called "failing-company" defense in the International Shoe case.

Q What are the facts underlying that. Do you think that is sustainable on the evidence?

A Yes, we do, Mr. Justice. And I would like to refer to eight or nine specific items which we think support it.

But before doing that I would just like to say one thing, because they challenged this in the brief. The evidence to which I am going to refer was not admitted, of course, on the motion for the summary judgment. At the time of the summary judgment it was decided on affidavits. This evidence came in in course of the trial on the Section 2 issues. It was offered with respect to intent.

However, it seems to us that all the evidence that is relevant to the failing-company defense was introduced.

- Q Was there a later motion to set aside the Section 1 judgment?
 - A Yes, there was, Mr. Justice.
- Q Was it based on evidence that already at that time had been taken?
 - A Oh, yes. This was after the record was closed.
- Q So this is after all this evidence you are about to talk about was in the record.
- A It was in the record, and it was before the Court. It was before the Court, of course, when the Court made this finding, Finding 17.
- Q Was there a challenge to the fact that this was a summary judgment?
 - A Yes, they object. They do object ---
 - Q Did they object in the beginning?
- A Oh, yes, they objected all the way to our motion for summary judgment. They objected to that.
- Q I thought the Government had been taking the position, at least in some cases, that summary judgment was not proper in an antitrust case.
- A In some cases we have where we think there are disputed factual issues. On the other hand, in situations where we think that on the undisputed facts we are entitled to judgment, we have supported summary judgment. And Your Honor in his opinion in the Northern Pacific case upheld the grant

of summary judgment there on a tying agreement.

There have been a number of cases, of course, in which summary judgment has been upheld.

Q I think that your position is that in view of the course this case took, the fact that summary judgment was initially granted on one part of the case is rather unimportant.

A In view of all the evidence---

Q Because there was a trial on other issues and evidence was introduced which was very relevant to this summary judgment matter.

A There are only two items of evidence that they claim they should have had the right to introduce on the question of failing-company that was not introduced. We think neither of those is relevant.

First is some statistics to the financial condition of the CITIZEN in the 1920s. That, it seems to us, is too remote.

Secondly is some statements by various people in the Tucson area, which were printed in the record, as to the importance of having two papers in Tucson. Again, it seems to us, that is irrelevant.

Now let me come to the specific issues. I would like to start with something, because the argument is put in terms of failing-company is that it was a failing company, and

they say -- basically Mr. MacLaury says: "Just look at the balance sheet. That's enough."

Now, "failing-company" is really a shorthand phrase, we think. "Failing-company" is a shorthand phrase for the basic concept that when a company is in such serious condition and has such serious problems that it appears that it is about to go out of the market anyhow, then its acquisition by a competitor does not substantially lessen competition.

- Q But it is a viable economic unit?
- A That is correct, Mr. Justice.
- Q Which is a different question than asking whether it is viable in the hands of this management.

A But I think, Mr. Justice -- I suggest that this management is willing to keep it going. It is for that time a viable entity in terms of the purpose of the failing-company defense; that is, the entity is able to keep going. If the man is willing to keep it going for awhile, it seems to me that refutes the claim that its elimination through merger will not substantially lessen competition.

Now let me come to ---

- Q But even if he wasn't willing to keep it going, it would still---
 - A Surely. Surely. Yes, it would Let me come to these items of evidence.

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Q It is your position, then, that even though a corporation might be suffering substantial financial losses, with no prospect of any change in the downward curve, if all of its stock happens to be owned by a multimillionaire who just likes the idea of owning a corporation that publishes a newspaper and is willing to take those losses, perhaps offsetting them against other income of his own, that that is no sense a failing company?

A That is correct, Mr. Justice.

I would like to point out that there are many of these situations where the publisher may have hopes of rehabilitating the paper---

Q Your hypothesis, then, is that he has no hopes---

A No hopes.

Q He is just stubborn or eccentric or vain or something and likes to have editorials in the paper praising him, and even though it loses a million dollars---

A That is right, because it continuing as an operating entity in the market.

Now, if I may, I would just like to come to these items of evidence that we have here.

Q But did he contribute to it?

A He did, for many years.

First of all, the initial overtures about making this

arrangement came not from the CITIZEN, which allegedly was
the failing company, but from the other paper, from the STAR.

Now, this is directly in contrast to the International Shoe
case, where the overtures came from the failing company.

It seems to us that this is of some significance because
normally if a company feels that it can't go on, it would take
the initiative.

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Now, in the International Shoe case this court found that the controlling purpose of International Shoe in acquiring the McElwain Company, the failing company there, was to get additional plants for its business which it could not then quickly hope to make. And its discussion of what it was holding as to the acquisition of the company in those circumstances would not violate Section 7 it put in as a qualification, in the passage which the Appellant themselves quoted in their brief, at page 41, that the purpose of the competitor there was not -- and I quote -- "not with a purpose to lessen competition." And that, of course, is exactly the opposite of the purpose the District Court found was involved here.

Now, initially, in 1936, Small purchased only a 25-percent interest in the paper. Over the next three years he increased his share in the paper from 25 to 85 percent.

It has been suggested that he made attempts to finance the paper and that they were unsuccessful in this

interval. The record shows, at pages 205 to 206, that these attempts — here merely spoke to three people he knew, a retired man, a man who had just moved to Arizona and asked him wouldn't he perhaps like to put some money into the paper, and they refused. When those three people refused to do so, Mr. Small decided to move to Tucson from Chicago.

What the District Court found -- what he testified was that he decided to come out himself. At page 206 of the record he said: "I felt that I could carry the deficit for some little time."

There is nothing to indicate that when this operating agreement was entered into that Mr. Small had any intention of liquidating the CITIZEN. There is no indication he tried any steps to improve its financial condition. There is nothing to show he made efforts to try to sell it to others.

Now, as to the financial condition of the paper, it is true that the CITIZEN for a number of years had been losing money. However, between 1938 and 1939, just before the time that Mr. Small came out or during this period, the paper's condition improved. Its circulation between those two years went up 22 percent. Its deficit was reduced. Its advertising had gone up. And its operating revenues had gone up.

The Appellants chide us and say we have made an unfair comparison, because they say 1938 was the worst year of the CITIZEN and we shouldn't compare it with 1939. But, of

course, it seems not unlikely perhaps that this was the turning point in the CITIZEN. And this was the situation.

This was the situation that the CITIZEN was faced with when it decided to enter into this operating agreement.

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In other words, it was at this point that Mr. Small when these improvements seemed to be developing that he decided to come out to Tucson to play a more active role in the paper and, as he said, to carry it along for a little while.

And, finally -- oh, one other thing that I might mention, that there has been reference to the balance sheet, that a substantial portion of these liabilities, as Mr. McLaury has indicated, belongs to stockholders.

Finally, as to the present condition, as to the present the claim is a pro forma earning statement, in which, we point out, were some deficiencies. But it seems to us the answer to all of this argument, that the CITIZEN was equally certain to fail again if it was now required to terminate these profit-pooling, price-fixing and diversion-of-market provisions of the agreement, is the District Court's three findings at page 98 to 99, Findings No. 190 to 192, which says that the joint printing and distribution of the STAR does not depend upon these provisions, that the restoration of competition requires that they have separate advertising and circulation.

Finally, Finding 192 of the Court says: "It is impossible to predict with any substantial degree of completeness what the operating results of either newspaper will be in a competitive situation."

Q What does that mean? Does that mean that it is impossible to predict whether or not both newspapers may survive? Or do you think that the only question is it is impossible to predict which one of them will die?

A No, I think it is impossible to predict how well they will do. In other words, you cannot say---

Q Do you mean that it may be that the District Court contemplated that perhaps both could survive in the market?

A I think so. The District Court certainly said that he could not make a prediction, that if these provisions were cancelled---

Q At least the Government doesn't agree that in the Tucson market there was only room for one newspaper? The only question was which one was going out of business.

A That is right. We don't agree with that, Mr. Justice.

Therefore, it seems to us that this evidence to which I referred -- and I will declare one other thing. It is rather interesting that although the CITIZEN allegedly was failing in 1940 and, presumably, under their theory would have

gone out of business, the STAR was willing to give the CITIZEN a very substantial share of the operating agreement.

- Q What was the circulation of both newspapers in 1965 as compared with 1940?
 - A About 3-1/2 times as much.
 - O Each of them?

- A Each of them. They had roughly the same circulation in 1965, about 40,000 each.
- Q That roughly corresponded with the size of the community, with the growth in the community?
 - A I don't know that.
 - Q That's all right.
 - A I don't know that.

As I say, although the publisher testified that the reason he was so generous was that he wanted to preserve two operating voices in Tucson, it seems that one can legitimately ask whether perhaps he wasn't also anxious to avoid the possibility that this new man coming in might create a very serious competitor for him or might perhaps sell the paper to someone else who would be in a position to be a more vigorous competitor.

So what you have here is that these two people got together and attempted to solve the financial problems of the paper by eliminating all competition between them.

We think the District Court was fully justified in

out of business and there was not a serious probability at that time that CITIZEN would be liquidated and dissolved unless it entered into this agreement.

Now, I would like just very briefly -- we have developed it in our brief -- in my remaining time to say something on the claim if the Court disagrees with us and thinks that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence---

Q Which finding is that?

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A The finding that they were not a failing company.

In other words, if the Court were to think that the District Court was clearly erroneous -- and we think he was correct -- but if the Court should disagree with this, I would like just briefly to indicate or sketch to the Court the reasons we think the District Court still properly condemned these restraints as per se illegal.

The attempt is to analogize this to a partial merger.

Of course, as I have indicated, we are not challenging the operating agreement but only parts of it.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: You may have a few more minutes. Counsel may have the same additional time.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Thank you.

A merger basically is a single transaction which has

some obvious anti-competitive effects. That is, if competitors combine, it eliminates the competition between them.

On the other hand, it may have some benefits. It may lead to an improvement of the structure of the operating assets. It may lead to some useful economies.

So it is impossible in a merger to separate out the anti-competitive and the pro-competitive things. What we have to do is make an overall judgment as to whether or not the total effect of the merger may be substantially to lessen competition.

But this is a very different kind of a thing. This is a very different kind of beast. Here what we have is this agreement with separable provisions. You can just put your finger on these provisions and see the provision for price-fixing obviously eliminates competition, the provision for profit-pooling obviously eliminates competition, the provision that they will not engage in any other publishing business obviously eliminates competition. We think those can be tested under the traditional per se rules and found illegal.

Conversely, the provisions for joint printing, for joint distribution, these are things which can also be tested, and these are plainly not illegal. They do not restrain competition. Therefore, for that reason the Government has not challenged.

And it seems to us -- once again, if I may come back

to what I have said earlier, basically this is a plea by the Appellants for special rules for the newspaper business. I think if you had this kind of situation.

Q If this was a failing company, they are not asking for special rules, are they?

A They still are, I think, Mr. Justice, because they urge that this is a merger. It seems to me, even assuming if this were failing, we suggest this is not like a merger.

Q If this were a failing company in every full sense of that term, then these two companies could have legitimately merged?

A That is correct.

Q Then a fortiori, I suppose the argument runs they could do something less than that.

A That's where we part company with them,

Mr. Justice. We part company with them because we think that
in the merger field you have to look at the merger as a whole
body. You have to look at it as a whole body, whereas this
type of thing, we do not think can be analogized to a merger
because we think here you can separate out the good and the
bad and there are very different considerations which are
applicable.

Q Well, here you have got -- here you can look at the whole thing, too, and the result is that you have got a

stronger newspaper with the basic thing thing of competition in the things that newspapers are supposed to provide, namely, ideas.

A Except, Mr. Justice, the two are very interrelated. The two are very interrelated in that sence.

It is not, it seems to us, the same thing as though you had the two of them combining into one business.

Q The difference is that here as a result of what was done you have two newspapers. You have more competition provided here or left open than you have in the mergers.

A You have immediately more, but there are countervailing considerations, which we suggest---

O What are those?

A The effect of a combination leaving the market open for someone else to come in. Here what you have are these two papers being kept going with this agreement which restrains competition. This, in effect, is pretty completely occupying the market, and it has occupied the market by means of this elimination of competition.

It just seems to us, if the problems of the newspapers are such that there should be relief in this situation,
we think there is this bill which is before Congress. We
oppose the bill, but we think that that is the appropriate
place for redress in this situation.

Q What the Judge ordered, was it not, the separateness of the advertising department and the circulation department---

A Yes.

- Q Is that where they do their business?
- A That is where they do their business.
- Q Is that where they make or lose their money?

A In a sense, it is, Mr. Justice. That is where they make or lose their money. But, of course, how well they are going to do on advertising depends on circulation. How well they are going to don circulation depends on how good their paper is.

Q He ordered, as I understand it, the parts of the business where they do their business, which is what the Antitrust Law was aimed at.

A What he has done, Mr. Justice, is this. They have not appealed from the finding that the merger of the two papers -- they actually merged in 1965 -- they have not appealed from that. And they agree that divestiture is appropriate.

Now, what the Court did in addition to ordering divestiture of the two papers — the Court went on and said that in such divestiture they had to modify the operating agreement to eliminate these three provisions which resulted in the joint business activities.

Q What he actually found, as I read it, is that he let them combine in these two -- that the situation is wide open to effected as to whatever the policy of the paper is.

A I think that is right.

Thank you.

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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. MacLaury

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD J. MAC LAURY, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

MR. MAC LAURY: If the Court please, we do not ask here for a special rule for newspapers. We suggest here that where there has been a partial merger or a partial consolidation of the assets and the personnel of two firms which preserves to that community competition which otherwise would fail, that that rule should apply regardless of the business that we are talking about.

Q Competition in what?

A Competition, Mr. Justice, between the news and editorial composition between the two newspapers.

Q What about the competition in seeking advertising and selling advertising?

A The competition ---

Q And circulation.

A The competition in seeking advertising, circulation and pricing -- there is no competition under this

arrangement, just as there would be under any merger.

we suggest that the owners of STAR and CITIZEN are not doing a thing here in this operation that they wouldn't be doing under a complete and total merger. The only thing that they have done is that they have saved this benefit to the community of two rival, high-quality newspapers, as the Court found.

Q Does each one say what they want to, but if each one agrees with one another, there will be no competition between them in the circulation and the other departments.

That would be suppressed.

A That is the situation today. But, Mr. Justice,
I would not agree that it has been suppressed, because in
1940, although these witnesses testified, as laymen, the owners
of STAR and CITIZEN, that they intended to eliminate
competition — as I say, that was the testimony of laymen —
they were not thinking of testimony as an economist would or
an antitrust lawyer would. They were not thinking of effective
competition. What they were talking about was the end of a
long, hopeless struggle between these two newspapers, which
had finally ended in one of them being a failing condition.

Q I will ask this because I want to get the argument. How can you say it is not suppressed insofar as advertising and distribution are concerned when they are as one?

A I would like to answer that by first going to 1940 and then 1965, if I may, Mr. Justice.

Q All right, but you would still get to the question whether or not he made his findings, whether when they are one in their advertising and circulation, that you have not completely suppressed circulation in those two departments.

A There is no-

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Q The money coming in and going out---

A There is absolutely no question, Mr. Justice, that after this agreement there was no competition whatsoever on the circulation or advertising level.

I just simply want to add, Mr. Justice, that before 1940 there wasn't effective competition in the antitrust sense on that level, because the only thing that kept CITIZEN in the market was not the earnings that it derived from competing with STAR but the monies that were put into that newspaper out of Mr. Small's pocket out of his resources from other areas.

Q But that wasn't all of it. They were getting some advertising money.

- A They were getting some.
- Q And some circulation money.

A They were getting some, but it was not sufficient to keep that company viable.

Q But then they didn't have the faculty or the

to control themselves with reference to that business, that part of the business.

A After this operation agreement, that is correct, Your Honor.

Now, I would like to address myself to another point here, and that is Solicitor General's contention here that the Court found that CITIZEN was not a failing company — we submit to the Court that the District Court made no such finding.

Such a finding under the theory on which this case was tried would have been entirely superfluous and irrelevant, because the Court eliminated from this trial any and all Section 1 issues, and at the end of the trial, Mr. Justice——

- Q Was there a finding on Section 7?
- A There was a finding on Section 7.
- Q Could there have been if there were a failing company in the case?

A The Section 7 issue, Mr. Justice, related only to the year 1965. It was an acquisition by CITIZEN of STAR stock in 1965. We do not contest---

- Q But didn't you claim -- if your claim was that, in effect, there was a merger in 1940---
 - A Yes.
- Q --- that merger would have been subject to Section 7?
 - A Yes, but it was not challenged under Section 7.

It was challenged only under Section 1. The 1940 transaction was challenged only under Section 1.

Q I know, but you would have to get by the failingcompany -- To claim that there was a merger in 1940, you would have to get by Section 7.

A If they had challenged it under Section 7, yes, but actually the burden on the Government in pleading this case under Section 1 was far greater than it would have been had they challenged it under Section 7. They did not challenge the 1940 operating agreement under Section 7.

So at the close of the trial, after we had had a great deal of testimony on the question whether there was a violation of Section 2 — and the primary issue there was one of intent to apply a power over the market and to relief. We put in a great deal of testimony, including testimony and evidence concerning the failing condition of CITIZEN, so as to show that these people really had no intention to monopolize but that their intent was to rehabilitate these two newspapers.

Now, Section 1 was not in the case at that time.

It had been eliminated by summary judgment. And at the close of the trial we moved, not quite in terms stated by the Solicitor General, but our motion was that the Court reopen the trial and set aside its summary judgment on Section 1 and permit the Government to adduce evidence on that issue and permit us to rebut that evidence and also to apply to that

evidence all of the evidence that we had adduced under Section 2.

Now, the Court denied that motion and refused to set aside its ruling on summary judgment that Section 1 was in violation. So it is not, I think, a proper statement of the record to say that the Court considered in a Section 1 context all of the evidence on the failing company doctrine.

Q Do you think that there was a necessity for the Court to conclude that in 1965 neither paper was failing in order to find that there was a violation of Section 7?

A No, I do not, Your Honor. I think this, that in 1965 the Court needed only to find that if the operating agreement should be abrogated, then one company would---

Q Yes, but there was a finding of a Section 7 violation.

A Yes, Your Honor. The Section 7 violation I haven't argued here at all. The Section 7 violation which was charged was an acquisition by CITIZEN of the stock in STAR in 1965.

- Q I understand that.
- A We do not contest that violation.
- Q But neither company was failing at that time.
- A No, neither company was failing at that time.
 We do not contest that rule.
 - Q Then if it is taken apart, if the companies were

separated right now, they wouldn't be failing companies.

and we have asked this court to reverse the Section 1 issue and permit us to sell, permit CITIZEN to sell STAR promptly, as we had always advised the Government that, in the first place, that was what we intended to do when we acquired it. CITIZEN has no intent and no desire to retain STAR. It was their intent at the time they acquired it to promptly dispose of it. So we raise no issue there. The only issue we raise on the 1965 transaction is that if this court should sustain the District Court's ruling on abrogating the main clauses of the operating agreement, so that CITIZEN then would be likely to go into a failing condition, that CITIZEN owners be given the option of disposing of either STAR or CITIZEN, because the whole game has been changed.

That is the same option that the Government recently gave in a consent decree to the Gannett Newspapers in Rockford, Illinois, where the Gannett Newspapers acquired a radio. And in consenting to dispose of one or the other the Government agreed that the newspapers could have their choice, to dispose of either the radio station or the newspaper.

In closing I would like to state again that I am satisfied and that on examination the Court will be satisfied that because of the conflict between the findings of fact in No. 14, Finding 14 and Finding 15 of the financial condition

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of CITIZEN that it could not have meant that by Finding 17, by its conclusion in Finding 17, that CITIZEN in 1940 was not a failing company. All it intended to do was to say that Mr. Small was willing to continue at that time to reach down deeper in his pocket to continue to finance that failing company.

Q Mr. MacLaury at what stage of the game were these findings made, after all the evidence was in on the Section 2---

A Yes, Your Honor, about one year after the case was tried, nine months afterward.

I might add to that that Finding 17 was not proposed by the Government and was not proposed by the defendants. It was a finding arrived at by the Court on which it heard no argument.

Q This was quite a bit litigated, the Section 2 claim.

A Just the Section 2 issue and the Section 7 issue.

Q Because there had been a summary judgment on the Section 1 issue?

A That is correct, Your Honor.

Q Mr. MacLaury, I didn't quite understand what you said. If the Court should sustain the District Court in abrogating those provisions to the operating agreement, then

this would be a new ball game, and there ought to be the opportunity afforded you either to dispose of CITIZEN or dispose of the STAR. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Now, if we sustain the District Court as to the provisions of the operating agreement, what now precludes your having that option, the divestiture?

A Because the District Court's Order orders the owners of CITIZEN to dispose of STAR and does not give them that choice, that they must dispose of STAR.

Q I see. Then what you are asking is that CITIZEN be afforded the opportunity to CITIZEN or of STAR?

A That is correct, Your Honor.

MR. MAC LAURY: Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 11:55, the hearing in the aboveentitled matter was concluded.)