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Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1968

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JOHN F. DAVIS, CLERK

Docket No. 198

In the Matter of:

CHARD M. SMITH,

Petitioner,

vs .

ED M. HOOEY, JUDGE, IMINAL DISTRICT COURT HARRISS COUNTY, TEXAS,

Respondent.

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Place

Washington, D. C.

Date

December 11, 1968

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October

1968

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Petitioner,

Vs.

FRED M. HOOEY, JUDGE, CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT OF HARRISS COUNTY, TEXAS,

Respondent.

Washington, D. C. Wednesday, December 11, 1968

No. 198

The above-entitled matter came on for argument at 12:40 o'clock p.m.

BEFORE:

RICHARD M. SMITH,

EARL WARREN, Chief Justice
HUGO L. BLACK, Associate Justice
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, Associate Justice
JOHN M. HARLAN, Associate Justice
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., Associate Justice
POTTER STEWART, Associate Justice
BYRON R. WHITE, Associate Justice
ABE FORTAS, Associate Justice
THURGOOD MARSHALL, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES:

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, Esq. 2500 Red River Street Austin, Texas 78705 Counsel for Petitioner

APPEARANCES (Continued):

JOE S. MOSS, Esq.
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County
Houston, Texas
Counsel for Respondent

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PROCEEDINGS

MR. CHIFF JUSTICE WARREN: Number 198, Richard M. Smith, petitioner, versus Fred M. Hooey, Judge, Criminal District Court of Harris County, Texas.

THE CLERK: Counsel are present.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Wright.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court, the issue here is whether or not a State is excused from the duty otherwise put upon it to give a speedy trial to a person indicted on a State charge because that person is, during the pendency of indictment, in a Federal penitentiary on some other charge.

The Texas Supreme Court, in a consistent line of cases, has ruled it is not, that although it is bound to give a speedy charge to a person under Texas indictment who is in a Texas prison, that it is not required to have some other sovereign to produce a prisoner in order that it may try him.

I propose to spend, unless the Court has questions in the matter, very little time on the merits, in part because I do not think there is an issue as between my friends for the State and myself on the underlying constitutional principle. I do not find such an issue drawn in the brief, and I believe that Mr. Moss speaks for the respondent, that it will appear we

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And.

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agree on the basic constitutional point.

No.

of course, the agreement of counsel cannot point an authoritative instruction on the Constitution of the United States, but I would think on the substantive point, your decision last term spoken through Justice Marshall in the case of Page versus Barber is quite decisive that the problem decided in Page and Barber is really indistinguishable from the problem this case presents, that where someone who is needed for criminal proceeding is in the custody of some other sovereign, that at least the State has the duty to make a reasonable effort to endeavor to get him back from the prison in which he presently languishes. For reasonable effort is all Page and Barber requires, and that is all we contend for is the role in this case, since I think it is quite clear here that Texas has made no efforts to get this petitioner back from Leavenworth.

I want to call to the Court's attention a study of this matter that is not referred to in either of the briefs because it has become available only very recently, and that is the 63-page National Survey of Detainers prepared by the National Defender project of National Legal Aid and Defender Association.

That association made copies available to counsel for the respondent and myself, and I am sure would be glad to make copies of their very comprehensive survey available to the Court.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: We would like to have them if they are available.

A.

MR. WRIGHT: I am sure that they can be made available. I will see that that happens, Mr. Chief Justice.

There is an issue between my friends and myself. I

am not sure whether it goes to substance or procedure, and it
has to do with the effect of the solvency of a person under the
State charges. The State makes the argument that they do not
know when the present petitioner became indigent and that since
the indictment that they returned against him in 1960 alleged
he recently acquired by theft some \$42,000; that unless he
notified them he was indigent, they would have no reason to know
he was indigent and therefore no reason to think he could not
finance his own way to Houston in order to stand trial.

In the view the petitioner submits of that, the fact of his indigency is irrelevant; that the obligation to give a speedy trial extends as well to a prisoner or a person under indictment who is rich as it does to one who is without funds. It is a little hard to see what good it would have done the petitioner if he had had funds. The State says, "We would have given him a trial within two weeks, any time he showed up in Houston," and if he had the money to pay his way from Leavenworth to Houston and said to himself, "I think I will go to Houston to stand trial," I imagine the Federal prison authorities at Leavenworth would have taken a dim view of that. They would not

have allowed him to go unless the State had made an effort.

We are told in a memorandum of Solicitor General that ordinarily the policy of the Bureau of Prisons requires a writ of habeus corpus ad prosequendum from the State court, and when that comes, the Bureau then is very cooperative and invariably will make the prisoner available.

But it is not the fact that Mr. Smith did or did not have funds that in my submission is significant. It is the fact that he was confined by the Federal authorities and that some request of the State authorities was necessary before the Federal authorities would let him out of the walls of Leavenworth to go to Houston to stand trial.

There are obvious problems in this case because the record is not a very thick one. I am aware of that from the outset of the case. And the State suggests in its brief, because of the skimpiness of the record that this court either should dismiss the writ as improperly granted or should remand the case to either the Texas Supreme Court or a State trial court for further fact-finding.

I submit, however, that the record, skimpy as it is, presents every fact that is necessary for decision of the comparatively narrow issue that the case presents, that it would be nice to have a good deal of background. To this day, though I am counsel, I do not know on what Federal offense my client was convicted, but I cannot think it makes any

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No.

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these are matters of color only, and the basic legal facts are perfectly clear in the record that he was indicted in April of 1960 in Harris County for a crime allegedly committed in May of 1959; that as of that time, he was a Federal prisoner; that the Sheriff of Harris County wrote to Leavenworth and was advised he would not be released until 1970; that beginning at least in March of 1961, the petitioner made repeated requests to have a speedy trial; that he has not been brought for trial at any time; that there is now a lapse of some eight years and that the time is long since passed when it is possible to give the petitioner the kind of trial to which he is constitutionally entitled.

granted and the record is ample to decide the matter that is before you. The record, in addition to being skimpy, is somewhat informal. The petitioner addressed his writ of mandamus in the State court to a nonexistent court, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals, and it was transferred by that court to the Texas Supreme Court, since the Texas Supreme Court has jurisdiction in these matters.

The Texas Supreme Court entered no formal order; instead, the Administrative Assistant of the Court wrote to the petitioner, saying that "Your petition has been denied," and referred to the Cooper case and the Lawrence case as authority

for denial. But the mere fact of informality in the State court proceedings does not mean we have any less a final judgment of the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had.

I refer to the case of N. Ray Sommers, for example, in 325 Fed. 2d, in which was a letter from the Chief Justice, Secretary of the Illinois Bar Committee, that was the definitive action of the Illinois court. This court held nonetheless that that letter was a sufficiently definitive act to permit review under Section 1257.

Q The record does seem to show that your client was told he could be tried within two weeks, any time he made himself available.

A The record certainly shows that.

Q As I read the response in this case from the Solicitor General here on pages 32 and 33 of your brief, it indicates that if the prisoner himself, as is your client, requests it, the Bureau of Prisons will make him available for a State court trial.

I am referring to the full paragraph in the middle of page 33, and he further says that the petitioner did not request any assistance from the United States Bureau of Prisons in this case. Is that all correct?

A To the best of my knowledge, it is correct,

Justice Stewart.

Q That would seem to indicate he could have at least tried to make himself available and probably would have succeeded, and then the Texas court said: If you do make yourself available, you will be tried.

A I read it somewhat differently, with respect,
your Honor. It seems to me what General Griswold said there is
that occasionally this has happened at the instance of a
prisoner, but that a prisoner, not lettered in law, can hardly
be expected to know that this procedure was available.

He was doing the obvious things. He was besieging the Harris County authorities with motions, letters of various kinds as was told in the response; that under the published rules of the Board of Prisons, the prisoner is not advised that "If you will ask us, we will come to your assistance." Instead, the rules speak only that a prisoner will be made available if the State authorities request it.

I think it would be asking a good deal to say that the peittioner has waived any right he had because he did not pursue a remedy that even a reasonably observant person would not know existed.

Q I have one other question. At the bottom of page 33, the final sentence of the Solicitor General's remarks, is there a "not" omitted?

A There is a "not" omitted there. You will see the "not" appears on page 25 of our brief, where we quoted it, but

here in the appendix it was omitted. Unfortunately, in indigent cases, counsel do not get to proofread the briefs.

Q So that should say: "It does not appear."

A That is what it should say, yes, sir.

Q Do the Federal authorities indicate that if the prisoner himself requests it, they would not only make him available but make him available at their expense?

A I do not gather that, but I do not think what is said here is definitive one way or the other. As I read this, what Solicitor General Griswold is saying is that if occasionally a prisoner asks us, we will write to the prosecutor and say:

If you get a writ of habeus corpus ad prosequendum from your State court, then we will make this prisoner available so that you may try him.

I do not think it is saying at all that the United States, acting simply at the request of the prisoner, would release a prisoner in Harris County and say to the State authorities, "Here he is; go ahead."

Q What if such a writ is issued at the instance of State authorities; what happens then?

A Then the practice is that the writ would be honored, the State is required to pay expenses of transporting him and guards.

Q That is precisely what Texas is not interested in doing.

Is it also true that the Federal officials first transfer to the nearest Government facility at their own expense?

A It says in some instances, to mitigate the cost to the State, the Bureau of Prisons has moved an inmate close to the site of prosecution.

Q Is this Federal procedure formalized in any way?

A There is a statutory procedure for it, Section 4085, and also there are rules of the Board of Prisons that are issued from time to time in a bulletin that comes out which is made available to State authorities, telling them exactly what the procedure is.

Q That contemplates that the State will make the application, does it not?

A Yes, sir.

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: Mr. Moss.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOE S. MOSS, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

MR. MOSS: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court, there is absolutely no issue here about the right of this petitioner to a speedy trial. I, as a representative of the prosecution in the concerned jurisdiction of Harris County of the State of Texas, have long thought it is absolutely outrageous to keep things like this hanging over the heads of prisoners who are incarcerated under the jurisdiction of other sovereigns, whether it be the State or Federal Government.

Likewise, I fully realize, as your Honors have noticed in some of your recent opinions, that it is a matter of common knowledge that people charged of a crime rarely want a trial at all and, if they must have one, they hardly ever want it to be speedy. Delay, as such, operates to the disadvantage of the prosecution and to the advantage of the defendant, petitioner here, because the memories of witnesses dull and that necessarily affects the burden that the prosecution must bear in establishing the guilt.

Bearing that in mind, we are here today concerned with a remedy. We are going to try to find out if the failure of this man to have a speedy trial has denied him his constitutional rights and, if it has, the next question is: Did he waive it, as we know is being done every day in cases generally.

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There is an illustration in Harris County, Texas,
where there are 40 or 50 arrests a day made on the basis of
searches and seizures without a warrant, where a person affected
gives his consent to the search and seizure, which, under the
Constitution of our country, he is not required to do. He
waived his rights. In this case, did he waive it?

Ewell, by this court some three years ago, said:

Whether the delay alone amounts to a constitutional deprivation of right is a matter to be determined in the first instance in the trial court. Any argument to the contrary in this court is premature and that this court would not pass on it until such time as the sentencing judge in the lower court had heard the facts.

In this case the record, let me say, has been prepared by stipulation only, and I certainly compliment the
gentleman on the great effort he made to get it here, and I
agree with him on every turn. Not one time have I disagreed
with any stipulation he wanted and not at one time has he disagreed with any I asked for, even as late as today, in order
to correct an understatement in the brief.

The prosecuting authorities of the State of Texas
never knew anything about this procedure in the Supreme Court
or in the misnamed Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas until
after the application for writ of certiorari was filed in this
court, the Supreme Court of the United States.

of the relief in the Supreme Court of Texas was on June 21, last year -- the petition was filed then and the denial was on the twenty-eighth, and I have a notice in my file here that I have shown counsel that it was not actually mailed down there until E. J. Johnson, a case worker from the penitentiary, sent it on June 22.

No.

Q What was the writ; what was the action? This was a petition for writ of mandamus?

A Yes, sir, to mandamus the trial judge to dismiss the indictment because he did not have a speedy trial, after seven years, which he, in truth, had not had and which he, in truth, in fact, was entitled to if he had not waived it.

Now, so we know that five or six days elapsed between the time this thing was filed in the Supreme Court of Texas and the decision came out and we had no notice of it. In August, in the same year, the petition was filed up here and we did get notice of it and also at that time of the former proceedings in the Supreme Court.

Let me say that in the appendix here prepared by eminent counsel, the petition itself as contained in the appendix does not show it is verified and it does not show it contains an affidavit of indigency, or poverty, as we call it in Texas.

The Texas court is open to indigents the same as to

anyone else. There is no price on the remedies down there, but he must make this oath, and in this particular case, he did not do so, even though, in my brief for the respondent, I invite attention of the Court to the fact that the copy furnished me in my office did contain this affidavit and did contain the verification of the fact. But that was not sufficient to put jurisdiction into the courts of Texas to prosecute him for perjury by merely giving me a copy; that it has to be filed in the court, which he studiously avoided doing, and that is significant. Because he knew if he had done that, that is exactly what we would have done to him, because we know of \$42,000 he had in greenbacks and other matters that are not in the record.

Even the sentence he is serving at the present time, as counsel says, we do not know what that is. We are not concerned with what that is, but what are we going to do about it.

If this petitioner had been tried in Texas at any time, other than a mistrial only three things could happen: He could be acquitted, found guilty and his sentence run concurrently with the Federal sentence, or he could have been found guilty and the sentence be cumulative with the Federal sentence.

In the belief, as a member of the bar of this court,

I respectfully represent to this court accumulations is rarely

done by the judges in Harris County. It has to be an extreme

matter before it is done; but in Ewell, this court said they

would take that up later on and see what the judge does; so with

approximately five more years' jurisdiction of the custody of this prisoner vested in the Federal authorities, it could be he would receive a sentence that would be expired by the time the Federal Government gets through with him, and he would be released and have no more, even if we tried him.

Likewise, the converse is true: If we wait the other five years and then try him under the laws of Texas, if he received 10 years -- which is the maximum he could receive under the indictment -- the trial judge has the discretion to give him credit for the time he already served in some other penitentiary. If he did that -- which, I represent to this court, is almost always uniformly done -- then he has not suffered any loss of any right, constitutional or otherwise.

On the other hand, if it is cumulative, then the serious question comes up, and as we said in Ewell, that should be decided, whether that had any effect on it, should be decided after the trial judge has had a shot at it.

Now, as to when to get him tried, it can be only one of two occasions. It can be while he is in the custody of the United States, and let us see what that is going to entail. Expenses for two marshals, down there and back, exact words being "for the subsistence and shelter of the prisoner and deputy marshals during the entire time of their absence from headquarters."

As Mr. Justice White said, that is what the State of

Texas cannot afford to do. We just do not have the money, but I think, in all candor --

Q Is Texas broke?

- A Not Texas, your Honor. It is the County.
- Q Is Harris County broke, with all those skyscrapers?

A Yes, they went up on the taxes 4.7 last Friday, and now there is movement on to get that rescinded, but the checks are still good. I have not had to discount my scrip.

Q I suppose if you needed a witness or two from this same State to convict him, you would find the money to bring him there?

A The answer to your question is yes, sir.

Q If you wanted to extradite a rich prisoner from New York, you pay his expenses even if he had \$42,000?

A We went to Belgium and got one the other day.

We get them when we want them. We just don't want this fellow until we can get him.

Now, the day that warden says to us, "Come up here and get him; you can have him," we are going to be there with the money and pistols and handcuffs and we are going to take him back to Texas and do something with him; that is, unless your Honor says no. But you see, there, we don't have to feed his quards and we don't have to pay their expenses to and fro. We just can send an officer or two officers and they will bring him,

and that is, of course, much cheaper.

No.

It is often said there is no price on constitutional rights, but in this case, there is a question of "Who is going to do the paying?" That is to say, is it going to be the petitioner; is it going to be the State of Texas -- or, more properly stated, the County; is it going to be the United States Government; or is it going to be a combination of two or more?

The Congress says that these prisoners can be delivered by the Attorney General at the request of executive authority if he finds it in the public interest do do so. So if we brought him down there, I have serious doubts as to who would have jurisdiction of him, within the meaning of "jurisdiction." I do not believe there is a percentage of jurisdiction; you either have it or you do not.

If the Texas courts are down there trying to litigate with a prisoner in custody of Federal authority, I have a doubt that would constitute jurisdiction. It might be 90 percent jurisdiction, but apparently no such thing exists.

Now, if we are allowed at any time, now or later, to try this man at anybody's expense, it may well turn out, as I have shown, that he has not been deprived of a thing, and his sentence may well have been served.

Q I think his petition for mandamus in the court below, or in the Texas Supreme Court, asked in the alternative for a trial, for a prompt trial or dismissal of indictment.

A Yes, sir.

Q It made no allegation that as of that time he had ever been denied.

A That is right. And in the record here before you, you will find that the Solicitor General agreed with us that immediately upon notice of this procedure and that, which came simultaneously, three days' difference — I might say, in all fairness, it was a two-day delay because of the inefficiency in our own office, but we got them about the same time in August of '67.

We immediately responded to their petition and sent a copy to the Solicitor and Attorney General, with the thought that both of these people — bearing in mind this petitioner is jointly indicted with one of his codefendants, named Taylor, who has been in Atlanta Penitentiary and seeks no relief — the Attorney General would deal with both so we would not have to have two trials — try them all at the same time.

But our solution to this thing and our prayer is that this be remanded to the State court in some fashion, either to the Supreme Court to develop the facts and get him up here so he can understand what rights he may have been denied, whether it is the absence of witnesses or the unlikelihood of concurrent sentences or whatever it may be, or, if that is not satisfactory with the Court, that it be remanded back to the trial court, with the instructions to the State of Texas to try him

within a reasonable length of time, even if they do have to spend money.

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Now, he has not come into this court with clean hands. He did not file his affidavit of indigency down there in any court, nowhere; he did file it with me and I have it here, duplicate and original, but that does not give the State court authority to indict him and try him for perjury, which is what we would do, because that man has the money or did have it and we want to know under the law of Texas what has become of it.

Q What do you have to say about Mr. Wright's argument that he be entitled to this remedy whether he is a millionaire or whether he is a pauper?

A I agree with him 100 percent.

Q Then what is the relevancy of the argument you are just making, that he made no affidavit of indigency?

A The relevancy of the argument is that the sovereign State of Texas still has control of our courts and the amount of time that our judges and so on operate and work and perform their duties. One of the requirements of the State of Texas is that a man able to do so, pay the cost of his procedure -- I am talking about the mandamus procedure here -- and if he does not have the money to pay it, he can make an affidavit and still get the same relief; and in this case, this prisoner avoided that because he knew we could prove what he did with \$42,000.

That has no bearing on his guilt of the theft he is charged with. It has bearing on the fact he has committed a fraud upon the Supreme Court of Texas by sending a petition down there without an affidavit of indigency and then filing one here, where we clearly have no jurisdiction to prosecute him for perjury.

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Q Suppose he admitted he was a wealthy man and he made a demand for a speedy trial.

here." The prison authorities would say, "We have a benevolent attitude toward you" -- so says the Solicitor General -- "Any time you can pay the expense, we will take you down there."

They even use the words "private party" in the prison rules.

Certainly he is a private party if not absolutely indispensably necessary.

Counsel says we have ignored his request for a speedy trial. We have not. We notified him, every time, we would try him within two weeks, any time he would get here. Then when he said he was indigent, about a year ago, we undertook to get the Attorney General to deliver him to us.

The statute says the Governor or executive authority of the State must make the request. I don't know if the District Attorney's Office is the executive authority within the contemplation of Congress, but I did send it to the Attorney General and Solicitor General and asked them to give us both of

them so we could try them both and get it over with.

A SA

Description to brief, it says that since this record is unsufficient to permit decision, we should do one of three things: dismiss writ of certiorari; the request prayed for by petitioner be denied; and the third one, that the cause be remanded to the Supreme Court of Texas for proceedings therein or in the State trial court for the development of the facts. What are the facts?

A The facts are to decide whether or not he has been deprived of his asserted constitutional rights.

Q If you are going to bring him in for that kind of hearing, as Justice White pointed out, why not send him back to you and let him be brought there for the trial there?

A Bear in mind we do not have the United States

Government as a party to this suit. He filed a lawsuit against
the district judge that is going to preside over his trial.

Q It is made clear if you go to the United States
District Court in Houston and get a writ of habeas corpus, it
will be honored and he will be delivered. The only question is
your picking up the bill.

A I might go one step beyond, agree and go one step further: They will even honor one from a State judge.

Q You will pay the expense?

A Yes, sir; let me know and I will have that money up here in nothing flat. We will have that man back there and

tried in two weeks. We will try him quicker than that to save the money.

Q I suppose his first defense will be that he was denied a speedy trial.

A He will be entitled to a hearing on his motion to dismiss which he filed in the trial court which counsel said we ignored, and he is wrong; we are waiting to hear. The Constitution says he has to be present and confronted with witnesses. As soon as we can get him there, we will have a hearing on that, too, and the trial judge may well dismiss it.

Q Do you have any idea of how many other men are similarly situated?

A I believe counsel and I agreed there are 15,000.

Q Now, you say that you would bring this man back immediately and afford him a speedy trial.

A Yes, sir.

No. of

Q Does that mean that that principle you would apply also to all the 15,000?

A Not under our jurisdiction. I thought you meant throughout the Nation.

Q All of those under your jurisdiction, can you say to us the fact that you agreed to bring him back and try to get a speedy trial and pay the expenses incurred by him would lead to the same kind of treatment to other people who are similarly situated from the State of Texas?

A To the best of my ability the answer is yes, sir, and yes, your Honor, but let me qualify, the holder of the purse strings, tight under our system of government, is not the District Attorney and subject to their approval, which they have always given — as far as I know, they have always given us the money to get witnesses or prisoners or any other things, whatever we wanted that had to do with criminal prosecution, by asking for it.

But subject to that qualification, the answer is yes, sir, it will be done. I don't know of but two or three others in the same shape, and I know of one in reverse; we tried a fellow for robbery in Texas and he received 99 years, and Arkansas wanted him, to try to give him the death penalty, so we sent him to Arkansas with the agreement if they don't give him the death penalty they would bring him back.

Q So there is no issue left here for adjudication.

A No, sir; subject to that qualification, if they don't give us the money, I will promptly notify the clerk of this court.

I am authorized to state, based on previous experiences, they certainly will do it.

Q Based on your representation here in open court, if we just remanded the case for further proceedings, without any adjudication of constitutionality, what would you do?

A It could well be dismissed. I have every belief

that that trial judge is going to dismiss it on motion. I don't think he will be tried. I think it will be dismissed and he will be brought back to the Federal penitentiary.

Q Dismissed on grounds of delay?

A We have some pretrial stuff equivalent to Federal criminal rules.

Q Mr. Moss, I wonder if there are some further complications here. For example, here is a man who is under a Federal sentence and is serving time in a Federal penitentiary. He is also under a State indictment. He says, as I recall, that "Because of the pending State indictment, my treatment, what happens to me in the Federal penitentiary is affected."

He also says, "My possibilities of getting out on probation are affected." And I wonder -- this may affect, of course, Ewell -- but I wonder if there is not something to the point that, as you indicated when you started off, that Statecourt indictment hanging around for seven years does raise a substantial question which cannot be disposed of by saying that "Let the man wait until he gets out of the Federal penitentiary and then is brought to trial in the State."

A I agree with your Honor. It does affect his treatment in prison based on what I am told. I know from talking to other prisoners that it does and I know it has a bearing, from actual experience, I know it has a bearing with the Pardon Attorney. As to what other charges were pending as well

as what other he had behind him, it does have a bearing, but please don't penalize the State of Texas. They are not doing that to him. That is the Federal.

Q In any event, if you are going to give him a trial, you are giving him one of the alternative prayers in his petition to the State court. He wanted either trial or dismissal.

A I believe here he is just asking for dismissal.

Whatever he wants we are prepared to give him. If it should be reversed, which has an effect of putting it back in the Supreme Court of Texas, I am sure he would have a further opportunity to develop the record.

Q The only issue before us is the order of the Supreme Court of Texas as to issuing a writ of mandamum. That is the only order before us.

A Yes, sir. And it is signed by the Administrative Assistant, who has no such authority, but I am not raising that as a point. We see so many down there, they just turn it over to the Assistant and she mails them back with a letter attached to them. We get lots of writs down there in the way of habeas corpus and mandamus, lots of writs.

Thank you.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ESQ.

MR. WRIGHT: I think I should speak immediately to the question "What is the relief?" that has been asked. The only relief that petitioner asked for in the Texas court was that the indictment against him be dismissed. That is all that is before you in this proceeding.

I call your attention to the final paragraph for petitioner of mandamus on page 4. At prior times, since March 17, 1961, according to the record, he has asked for trial or for dismissal. At the present proceeding there is a request for dismissal only. That, of course, does not foreclose what this court may do.

- Q May I ask: What is it that is quoted on page 6? What is that?
 - A That is the case of Lawrence versus Texas.
 - Q That is not this case?
 - A No, that is not this case.
 - Q Why is it an issue?

A The letter from the Administrative Assistant of the Court says: "We cite you Cooper versus State and Lawrence versus State. We are enclosing a copy of the praetorian opinion in the latter case." I think, as a matter of personal privilege, I will state I did not include the Lawrence opinion as part of the appendix to be printed, but somehow it showed up in the printed appendix.

- Q Was it an enclosure?
- A It was an enclosure with the letter.
- Q So what we are talking about is what appears on page 4, right?
 - A Right.
- Q And there you did ask for dismissal of the charge, right?
 - A Yes, sir. Petitioner asked that.
- Q There is no showing of prejudice in this record; am I correct or not?
- A That is correct. In Klopper versus North Car, there is not a word in the opinion about prejudice.
- Q What happened to this man to bring this to Harris County's attention?
- A The allegation in the petition for mandamus is that on November 3, 1960, petitioner filed with the respondent court his motion for speedy trial which motion was completely ignored by respondent, County Prosecutor, and for a period of six years the petitioner attempted to get a speedy trial.

The response on behalf of Judge Hooey to the petition for certiorari was that by letter dated March 17, 1961, the petitioner requested speedy trial and in reply thereto was notified he would be afforded a trial within two weeks of any date petitioner might specify on which he could be present.

Since that time, by various letters and motions, the

1 petitioner has asked either for a speedy trial or dismissal of 2 the indictment. 3 No formal action; just letters? 1 Letters and so-called motions. 5 What about the suggestion that they have a hear-6 ing to see if there is any question? 7 A hearing is required only if prejudice is an 8 element of the Sixth Amendment claim. I am perfectly prepared 9 to argue that it is not and that we do not want to entangle 10 speedy trial. 11 What about Mr. Moss's point, Mr. Wright, that 12 there ought to be a trial to ascertain whether there has been 13 a waiver? I suppose there could be a waiver of a right of speedy trial. 14 I am prepared to concede there can be, yes, sir. 15 As I understood Mr. Moss, he was suggesting that 16 trial is necessary here to, or a hearing is necessary here in 17 which a record can be made to test out whether there has, in 18 fact, been a waiver. 19 A Perhaps I misunderstood Mr. Moss's argument. I 20 certainly agree that his argument is, as you said -- it was 21 Justice Fortas -- but I understood that to be in the context of 22 his argument about indigency, that if Smith had funds and did 23 not make himself available, that then he had waived. 24 Now, if his solvency, or indigency is real -- and I 25

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agree there could have been a waiver and that would be a fact issue -- I submit as a matter of law that his solvency has nothing to do with it and that if that is correct, then there is no possibility of a finding of waiver on any other ground; when the respondent agrees that my client has repeatedly, for more than six years, been trying to assert his right to a speedy trial, we can hardly say there has been a known involuntary relinquishment of a right.

Q Would this mean that every Federal prisoner could have all State charges dropped against him?

A No.

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Q Why not?

A It would mean that any prisoner whose trial was delayed so long, it can be said it is no longer possible.

Q What would be the cutoff date on the number of years?

A I think that is something that can only be decided by case-to-case adjudication. Whatever number of years, this is too much.

Q On anybody that has been in seven years, all the State charges have to be dropped?

A That would be the effect if you held as I submit you should and if you further held that the decision was fully retroactive.

Q Is there any statute in Texas concerning the time

within which a man should be brought to trial?

A Not so far as I know.

Q Mr. Wright, if Texas were still refusing to try a man and said, "We are not going to try him as long as he is in custody," there might be some pretty solid basis for saying that he is being denied his right to a speedy trial; but if Texas is now willing to try him in order to dismiss the indictment, you would have to conclude he has been denied a speedy trial.

A In order to dismiss the inductment, we do.

Q And your argument is that seven years is just long enough in anybody's book?

A Yes, sir.

Q Hasn't he asked for a speedy trial -- didn't he ask for a trial a couple of years ago?

A Yes, sir.

Q This is a writ of mandamus?

A Yes, sir.

Q Suppose we agree with you. What would reversal mean? Do we order the Supreme Court of Texas to issue a writ of mandamus?

A I suppose what you would do, if you follow your usual prac@ice, reverse and remand for further action not inconsistent with your opinion. The question would be: What would you say in your opinion?

Q I wonder if this is a 2283 problem.

A It had not occurred to me that it was.

Q What is the effect of our ordering the Supreme Court of Texas to grant a writ of mandamus to a trial judge?

A You did that in the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of Heckman versus Deane, the only case I know of in which this court issued mandamus to a State court.

Q We would be, in effect, ordering that a criminal proceeding not go forward.

A This court does that all the time. It seems to me that is precisely what you do.

Q Well, you do in criminal cases all right. You do in criminal cases, but you normally don't in other proceedings, do you?

A That, I think, is a question, in the first instance, of Texas law -- what is the proper remedy? Texas law regards mandamus from the Supreme Court as the proper way to assert a right to a speedy trial in a criminal case. It is a rather confusing set of affairs, but that is the way it is.

I would think, in response to your question, Mr.

Justice Brennan, that what this court would do if it agreed with my brother and myself on the underlying issue, at a minimum you would say you would hold that the Texas Supreme Court is wrong in the proposition of law announced in Cooper and Lawrence; that the mere fact that a person is in Federal custody discharges any

obligation the State has.

This would be the minimum you would do, and then the State court, free from the compulsion of erroneous view of Federal law, might be free to decide for itself whether it wants to order dismissal or whether it wants to leave prejudice still in.

I don't think that is all that this court has the power to do or could do on this record. I think that the question of the proper remedy to vindicate the right to a speedy trial is ultimately a Federal question and therefore one on which this court can speak authoritatively, and I think whether or not a showing of prejudice is required or whether or not untoward delay at some point becomes so bad that simply by itself it requires dismissal is also a question that this court is competent to decide.

But any one of those things would still in form be a reversal of what the Supreme Court of Texas did, and it is simply a question of how much guidance this court choses to give Texas for its further proceedings not inconsistent.

I must say that the worse possible disposition of the case -- I submit this with the utmost respect -- would be to say that in the light of the very commendable statements from Mr. Moss here in open court, that the case could be dismissed without opinion.

I have no doubt, in the light of what Mr. Moss told

us, that thereafter persons in this situation in Harris County would be given a speedy trial. Mr. Moss is only one of 254 prosecutors in the State of Texas alone, and, as he properly said, he could not bind other prosecutors, he cannot bind the Texas courts.

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Indeed I remind you with some poignancy of the case of Busch versus Texas decided here in 1963 in which this court, in effect, remanded without deciding the merits of the issue on the basis of representation by Assistant Attorney General, and unfortunately the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to agree that the Assistant Attorney General had power to make the representation and Busch was vindicated only after long, elaborate litigation.

I think we have here a constitutional issue that is not going to go away. The number of prisoners so situated is very great. And it is disservice to the States if the issue is not decided. On seven different occasions, I myself have been appointed counsel by the Texas Supreme Court in cases raising this precise issue, with the hope that I could get them here and get them decided.

As it happened this time, the prisoner got the case here on his own and you appointed a man.

Q You won all of them?

A No; they all became moot before I could get a petition of certiorari to you.

Thank you.

Q Mr. Wright, would you care to say something about Mr. Moss's argument that we should wait until after the prisoner has been tried, has been brought to trial in Texas because the Texas court itself might at that time dismiss in response to a motion based on the absence of a speedy trial or something else that would dispose of the case?

In other words, the question is whether this, in effect, is not premature.

A I submit, Justice Fortas, that the guarantee of a speedy trial is not limited to giving you a trial at a time when you can be acquitted, when you could have your witnesses. It protects against other harms and that even if at the end of his Federal term, my prisoner were to be turned over to Harris County authorities and were successfully to move for dismissal because of a denial of a speedy trial, that he would have been adversely affected by the pendency of this charge, because that is all it is -- a charge against him during the time he has been in the Federal penitentiary.

Q I don't believe the suggestion was that we wait until the end of his Federal imprisonment but right now, forthwith, in the very near future, he be brought before the Texas court where the motion is lodged there to be heard and decided.

And according to Mr. Moss's prediction, he ventured a guess that the judge would dismiss the indictment.

A Perhaps he would, but if he were to do so without more, I think it would be a surprising action on the part
of the respondent judge when the law in Texas authoritatively
declared twice in the last two years that Federal imprisonment
is an adequate excuse for not giving speedy trial. It would be
a lawless act really of a Texas judge.

- Q They might dismiss it on other grounds.
- A There might be other grounds, yes, sir.
- Q It has been suggested there are other grounds.
- A It has been suggested, but I am not cognizant of what they might be.
- Q If we remanded this case to Texas courts without meeting the constitutional issue and they just dismissed the case, this constitutional question would go down the drain, wouldn't it, and we would never have it determined?

A It would be right back in some other case if it would not be determined in this case.

Q But we have it here and you say it is properly here, and if it is here, it would not be our function to just return it to the Texas court, where it could be dismissed without resolution of that issue, would it?

A That would be precisely my submission, Mr. Chief
Justice. I would not urge this court to decide a constitutional
issue prematurely, but at the same time I do not think the
Court can shrink from the responsibility of deciding

constitutional issues when they have been properly put before the Court.

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Q I suppose if the Federal Government declined to give the State the prisoner, that would be a good excuse, would it not?

A In my submission, it would be. We think the obligation of the State is to make a reasonable effort to get the prisoner.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN: I want to express appreciation of the Court to you for having accepted an assignment to represent this indigent defendant, particularly your many efforts to bring this issue to the Court before. We consider it a public service for lawyers to undertake this kind of assignment on this basis.

Mr. Moss, we are grateful to you for your fair representation of the State of Texas. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:45 o'clock p.m. argument in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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