A-738

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1997

THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY, et al.,

Applicants

v.

JAMES S. GILMORE, III, GOVERNOR OF VIRGINIA, et al.,

Respondents

RESPONDENTS' SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION

On April 9, 1998, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague "indicated" what are called "provisional measures," stating that the United States "should take all measures to ensure" that the execution of Virginia death row prisoner Angel Breard, now set for April 14, 1998, is not carried out pending final judgment by the ICJ in Paraguay v. United States. The Republic of Paraguay now has brought the ICJ's action to the attention of this Court and argued that it is thereby entitled to a stay of Breard's execution.

This Court must reject the thrust of Paraguay's argument which casts this Court in a role clearly inferior to that of the ICJ and which encourages this Court to act as the ICJ's enforcement arm. This Court's authority to stay the execution of a State prisoner is strictly limited, and simply does not include the power to grant a stay while a foreign country litigates a case against the United States before an international tribunal, a case which ultimately can have no effect on the validity of Breard's conviction or on Virginia's power to carry out the punishment for his crimes. See Committee of United States Citizens v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940-942 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (ICJ

judgment not binding because it "does not rise to the level" of a "norm from which no derogation is permitted").

Paraguay is asking this Court to stay a State prisoner's execution during the indeterminate number of years that Paraguay's action against the United States is likely to remain pending before the ICJ.[1] Such a far-fetched request must be denied because neither this Court, nor any other federal court, has the authority to stay a State prisoner's execution while he or someone else litigates a case in a foreign court. Once direct appeal has been completed, a federal court's sole authority to stay a State prisoner's execution is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251, in the context of ongoing federal habeas corpus proceedings.[2] See also Gomez v. United States District Court, 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (any request to stay a State prisoner's execution after he has litigated one federal habeas petition must satisfy the stringent rules governing successive petitions).

Moreover, even if this Court had the raw authority to grant a stay for such an inappropriate reason, the Court clearly should not take the extraordinary and unprecedented step of granting a stay of a State prisoner's execution for as long as an international tribunal – over which this Court

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[1] Virginia has been informed by the State Department that the typical ICJ action remains pending for more than five years prior to final decision. The fact that the ICJ has initiated what it regards as a "expedited" briefing schedule should be of no solace to the Court, and certainly is of no solace to Virginia. Requiring Paraguay to file its brief in June and the United States to file its brief in September hardly coincides with Virginia's view of "expedited." In any event, the ICJ has imposed no deadline on itself for decision and therefore a stay pending final judgment by the ICJ would be not only unauthorized, but intolerable. It simply makes no sense, moreover, to stay a State prisoner's execution pending the outcome of an international proceeding which ultimately can have no binding effect on the validity of his conviction or sentence. See Committee of United States Citizens, 859 F.2d at 940-942 (ICJ judgment not binding on United States).

[2] On direct appeal, this Court may stay a state court criminal judgment pending disposition of certiorari petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f).



has no supervisory authority – may choose to take in reaching a decision. ***Indeed, it would be difficult to overestimate the harm that such a decision would cause to the interests of federalism, comity and finality that this Court has sought to foster in cases dealing with State prisoners.*** This is particularly true where, as here, the Court is being asked to stay the execution of a State prisoner who never even raised the underlying treaty claim in state court.

Even if Paraguay merely were asking the Court (as it did originally) to stay Breard's execution based on Paraguay's pending certiorari petition, the ICJ's action simply is irrelevant. Nothing the ICJ has done, or may do, can affect the applicable law regarding whether Paraguay can seek or obtain a stay of Breard's execution, and, clearly, it can do neither. (See Respondents' original opposition to stay motion). Indeed, Paraguay's case continues to suffer from the same fatal defect that has afflicted it from the outset: under our system of government, the federal courts have no authority to stay Breard's death sentence on the basis of someone else's lawsuit, and no power to stay Breard's death sentence even at his own request, except within the limited confines of a federal habeas proceeding. Thus, the ICJ proceeding in which Paraguay has filed a complaint against the United States can have no bearing on the federal courts' limited authority to stay a Virginia prisoner's execution.

Paraguay's supplemental stay request also should be rejected because it inappropriately asks this Court, rather than the Executive Branch, to control and conduct this Nation's foreign policy. The United States vigorously opposed Paraguay's action in the ICJ, as well as Paraguay's request for "provisional measures." Indeed, the United States argued forcefully that the ICJ had no jurisdiction to issue the "provisional measures" or to grant Paraguay's request to void Breard's capital murder conviction and death sentence. (See attached transcript of United States' oral

presentation at ICJ at ¶¶ 3.9-3.13). The United States also has informed Paraguay that the alleged treaty violation in Breard's case had no substantial effect on his conviction or sentence.[3] (See respondents' original stay opposition at Resp. App. 8-10). Under these circumstances, the ICJ's "provisional measures" clearly constitute a non-justiciable "political question" and, while they may be dealt with by the Executive Branch, they certainly cannot serve as a basis for a federal court's stay of a State prisoner's execution. See generally Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (a treaty "depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations...[but] with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) ("when either of the parties [to a treaty] engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department").

Finally, even if Paraguay could overcome the insurmountable jurisdictional bar to the extraordinary relief it has requested, the Court nevertheless should reject Paraguay's incredible assertion that it somehow would be in "the national interest" of the United States for the federal courts to stay Breard's execution while the ICJ takes years to dispose of Paraguay's international complaint. (Supp. App. 10). Aside from the fact that Paraguay hardly is in a position to advise this Court or Virginia on the subject, it is impossible to see how it conceivably could be in this Nation's

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[3] The United States' presentation to the ICJ also made clear that, despite what Paraguay alleged, the trial prosecutor never offered Breard a plea bargain that would have spared him a death sentence. "Thus Paraguay's assumption that...Breard could have avoided the death penalty through a plea bargain does not withstand scrutiny." (See ICJ oral argument transcript at ¶ 2.24(8)).

best interest for the federal courts to stay Virginia's execution of an admitted capital murderer on the basis of a treaty-based claim that the State prisoner never presented to a state court. Under such circumstances, the "comity" which this Court owes is to the final criminal judgment of the Commonwealth of Virginia, ***not*** to the Republic of Paraguay or to the ICJ.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the respondent's original opposition to Paraguay's stay motion, this Court should deny Paraguay's request to stay Angel Breard's execution.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES S. GILMORE, III, GOVERNOR
OF VIRGINIA, et al.

By: _____
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of April, 1998, a copy of the foregoing Supplemental Opposition was faxed to Donald Francis Donovan. Debevoise & Plimpton, 875 Third Avenue. New York, New York 10022, counsel for applicants.

Donald R. Curry
Senior Assistant Attorney General

Uncorrected

Non-corrigé

CR 98/7

International Court of Justice
THE HAGUE

Cour internationale de Justice
LA HAYE

YEAR 1998

ANNEE 1998

Public sitting

held on Tuesday 7 April 1998, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,

Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President, presiding

in the case concerning the Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America)

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

VERBATIM RECORD

Audience publique

tenue le mardi 7 avril 1998, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous la présidence de M. Weeramantry, vice-président, faisant fonction de président

en l'affaire de l'Application de la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires (Paraguay c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique)

Demande en indication de mesures conservatoires

COMPTE RENDU

Present: Vice-President Weeramantry, Acting President
President Schwebel

Présents : M. Weeramantry, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l'affaire
M. Schwebel, président

Judges Oda	MM. Oda
Bedjaoui	Bedjaoui
Guillaume	Guillaume
Ranjeva	Ranjeva
Herczegh	Herczegh
Shi	Shi
Fleischhauer	Fleischhauer
Koroma	Koroma
Vereshchetin	Mme Vereshchetin
Higgins	MM. Higgins
Parra-Aranguren	Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans	Kooijmans
Rezek	Rezek,
Registrar, Valencia-Ospina	M. Valencia-Ospina, greffier

The Government of the Republic of Paraguay is represented by:	*Le Gouvernement de la République du Paraguay est représenté par:*
H. E. Mr. Manuel María Cáceres, Ambassador of the Republic of Paraguay to the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Brussels,	S. Exc. M. Manuel María Cáceres, ambassadeur du Paraguay au Royaume de Belgique et au Royaume des Pays-Bas, à Bruxelles,
as Agent:	*comme agent;*
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York,	M. Donald Francis Donovan, membre du cabin Debevoise et Plimpton, New York,
Mr. Barton Legum, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York,	M. Barton Legum, membre du cabinet Debevoise et Plimpton, New York,
Mr. Don Malone, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York,	M. Don Malone, membre du cabinet Debevois et Plimpton, New York,
Mr. José Emilio Gorostiaga, Professor of Law at the University of Paraguay in Asunción and Legal Counsel to the Office of the President of Paraguay,	M. José Emilio Gorostiaga, professeur de droi l'Université du Paraguay à Asunción et conseiller juridique de la Présidence du Paraguay,
as Counsel and Advocates.	*comme conseils et avocats*

The Government of the United States of America is represented by:	*Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amériq est représenté par:*
Mr. David R. Andrews, Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,	M. David R. Andrews, conseiller juridique d département d'Etat des Etats-Unis,
as Agent;	*comme agent;*
Mr. Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State,	M. Michael J. Matheson, conseiller juridiqu adjoint principal du département d'Etat des

explained his amendment as follows:

Further, Paraguay does not contest in any way the authority of the United States or its constituent entities to enforce its criminal laws with respect to this or any other crime committed within its jurisdiction.

Paraguay does contend, however, that the competent authorities of the United States must enforce its criminal laws by means that comport with the obligations undertaken by the United States in the Vienna Convention.

That was not done in the case of Angel Breard.

Paraguay today requests that this Court indicate provisional measures to ensure that the possibility will remain for Paraguay to exercise its rights under that Convention in Mr. Breard's case.

Thank you.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you Dr. Gorostiaga.

The Court will now adjourn for ten minutes and resume again to hear the submissions of the United States.

The Court adjourned from 11.00 to 11.15 a.m.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The Court now resumes its sitting to hear the submissions of the United States of America.

Mr. ANDREWS: Thank you Mr. President, Members of the Court. Before I begin my presentation I would like to express the pleasure of the United States delegation at seeing Judge Kooijmans again sitting with the Court.

1.1. Mr. President, it is again an honour to appear before the Court, although I regret that it must be in a matter so hurried and involving facts so unhappy as those involved here.

1.2. As the Court well knows, Paraguay filed this case four days ago. Because of Paraguay's decision to file at such a late date, the Court decided to hold a hearing today on Paraguay's request for provisional measures. Out of our respect for the Court, we have of course come here urgently to participate in these proceedings. This morning, we will present our reasons why the Court should not indicate provisional measures. Given the extraordinary haste of these proceedings, however, our presentations will be less fully developed than we would like. We regret the unfortunate circumstances that have led to this expedited proceeding, which prejudices not just the United States, but the ability of the Court to consider the issues before it fully and fairly. We likewise regret the fact that Paraguay has chosen to disregard the two-month period provided in the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the possible resolution of such disputes through conciliation or arbitration.

1.3. The facts of the criminal indictment underlying this case are straightforward; indeed, we should all be clear that Mr. Breard unquestionably committed the offences for which he was tried. On 17 February 1992, Mr. Breard attempted to rape and then brutally murdered Ruth Dickie, a woman in Arlington, Virginia, a suburban jurisdiction across the Potomac River from Washington D.C. He was then arrested while attempting another rape. As we shall explain, genetic and other physical evidence

linked Mr. Breard to the murder and the attempted rape. Indeed, ample evidence independent of his own testimony existed to prove that Mr. Breard committed these crimes. Mr. Breard was also implicated in a third sexual assault committed before he murdered Ms Dickie.

1.4. The Arlington police took Mr. Breard into custody and charged him with serious offences. The Commonwealth of Virginia has stipulated in United States court proceedings that the "competent authorities" did not inform Breard that, as a national of Paraguay, he was entitled to have Paraguay consul notified of his arrest. Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the police were obliged to tell Mr. Breard that the consul could be so notified.

1.5. Mr. Breard had lived in the United States since 1986 and speaks English well, he was appointe experienced criminal defence counsel, and was able to maintain close and regular contact with friends and family. Given the circumstances and gravity of his crime, the jury recommended that he be sentenced to death, and the judge did so. Thereafter, Mr. Breard's attorneys brought a number of further actions in Virginia state courts and in United States courts seeking reversal of his conviction and sentence. This process has continued for almost five years, involving actions in different courts in the United States, including the United States Supreme Court, where Breard's request for certior — in other words, discretionary review by the Supreme Court — is still pending today.

1.6. As this Court knows, the indication of provisional measures is a serious matter which the Cou is cautious in exercising. That is especially true in this case, where the Court is being asked to take action that would severely intrude upon the national criminal jurisdiction of a State in a matter of violent crime. Under the Court's jurisprudence, an applicant may only obtain the indication of provisional measures of protection in narrowly-defined circumstances, which the United States submits do not exist here.

1.7. The United States principal submission to the Court is that Paraguay has no legal recognizabl claim to the relief it seeks and, for that reason, there is no prima facie basis for jurisdiction for the Court in this case, nor any prospect for Paraguay ultimately to prevail on the merits. Consequentl and in accordance with its jurisprudence, this Court should not indicate provisional measures of protection as requested by Paraguay.

1.8. Paraguay has no legally recognizable claim because Paraguay has no right under the Vienna Convention to have Mr. Breard's conviction and sentence voided. Paraguay in effect asks that thi Court grant Mr. Breard a new trial — a right which would then presumably accrue to any other person similarly situated in the United States or in any other State which is a party to the Vienna Convention. The United States will show in these proceedings that this is not the consequence o lack of notification under the Vienna Convention. The Court should not accept Paraguay's invit to rewrite the Convention and to become a supreme court of criminal appeals.

1.9. Before describing the manner in which the United States will proceed in its presentation, I obliged to make a few comments about the issue of the death penalty in the United States. In a majority of the states of the United States (thirty-eight), including Virginia, voters have chosen through their freely elected officials to retain the death penalty for exceptionally grievous offen Likewise, the United States itself authorizes the death penalty for exceptionally grievous federa offences. In practice, it is imposed, almost without exception, only for aggravated murder, as w the case here. In all cases, the death penalty may be carried out only under substantive laws in at the time the crime was committed. All convictions and sentences involving the death penalt subject to the extensive due process and equal protection requirements of the United States Constitution. They are also subject to exhaustive appeals at the state and federal levels, as has the case with Mr. Breard.

1.10. When carried out in accordance with these safeguards, the death penalty does not violate international law. Capital punishment is not prohibited by customary international law or by a treaty to which the United States is a party. We recognize that some countries have abolished death penalty under their domestic laws and that some have accepted treaty obligations to tha

We respect their decisions. However, we also believe that in democratic societies, the criminal justice system, including the punishments prescribed for the most serious crimes, should reflect the will of the people freely expressed and appropriately implemented by their elected representatives. Within the United States, legislative majorities nationally and in most of the constituent states have chosen to retain the option of capital punishment for the most serious crimes.

1.11. Many other countries likewise maintain capital punishment. On the same day that Paraguay filed this case, 3 April, the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva adopted a resolution that encouraged States that have the death penalty to establish a moratorium on executions. This resolution passed, but by a sharply divided vote of 26 in favour and 13 against, with 12 abstaining. This action reflects the diversity of views held in the international community concerning capital punishment.

1.12. Capital punishment is not the issue in the dispute between the United States and Paraguay. The actual issues are quite different. They are very narrow. They relate to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which both the United States and Paraguay are parties.

1.13. As is customary, Mr. President, the United States will not read the full citations that support our arguments, but they are included in the texts provided to the Court and to opposing counsel. Further, I wish to note that the United States reserves the right to make additional arguments regarding issues of jurisdiction or the merits of this case that are not made today for purposes of this proceeding. Our presentation will proceed as follows. Ms Catherine Brown, the Department of State's Assistant Legal Adviser for Consular Affairs, will discuss the nature of the consular function and the practice of States with regard to consular notification and the remedies when notification is not provided. She will also describe in some detail the underlying facts of Mr. Breard's case and the efforts of the United States once it became aware of the case.

1.14. Ms Brown will be followed by Mr. John Crook, the State Department's Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs. Mr. Crook will discuss the legal factors that should guide the Court in determining whether it should indicate provisional measures and will apply those factors to this case to show that provisional measures are not warranted. In doing so, he will discuss the text of the Vienna Convention, it negotiating history, and relevant subsequent practice.

1.15. Mr. Matheson, the State Department's Principal Deputy Legal Adviser and Co-Agent in this case, will address additional, prudential reasons for the Court not to issue provisional measures in this case, by noting the problems that would be created were the Court to assume the role asked by Paraguay.

1.16. After Mr. Matheson's presentation, I will return to the podium to provide a brief closing. Thank you, Mr. President. I ask you now to invite Ms Brown to the podium.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Andrews. I give the floor now to Ms Catherine Brown.

Ms BROWN: Mr. President, Members of the Court,

2.1. It is a privilege and honor to be appearing before this Court for the first time.

2.2. My task is to explain to the Court the factual background of this dispute. I will review how the United States has responded to the concerns expressed by the Government of Paraguay, including the results of our investigation into the facts of Mr. Breard's case. First, however, I will address the nature of the consular function and the practice of States with regard to consular notification, in so far as those facts are relevant to the issues of this case.

I. The Consular Function

2.3. The principal function of consular officers is to provide services and assistance to their country's nationals abroad. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which both the United States and Paraguay are parties, enumerates a wide range of general consular functions in Article 5. Article 36 addresses the specific issue of consular officers communicating with their nationals abroad.

2.4. Article 36, paragraph 1 *(a)*, provides that consular officials shall be free to communicate with their nationals and to have access to them. This case does not involve a deliberate interference with Paraguay's right to communicate with its national, Angel Breard. Moreover, since Paraguayan consular officials became aware of Mr. Breard's detention, they have been able to communicate and visit with him.

2.5. Article 36, paragraph 1 *(b)*, provides that a detained foreign national shall be permitted without delay to communicate with the relevant consular post and that competent authorities will advise the consular post of the foreign national's detention without delay if the detainee so requests. There is no serious question in this case that Mr. Breard could at any time have communicated with a Paraguayan consular official, either directly or through his family or his attorneys, had he known and chosen to do so.

2.6. Article 36, paragraph 1 *(b)*, concludes with the "consular notification" obligation that is at issue in this case: it provides that "the said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this paragraph". Virginia authorities apparently did not so advise Mr. Breard, at the time of his arrest, or at any time prior to his conviction and sentence, that he could communicate with a consular official. But that does not mean that he was impeded or dissuaded from obtaining consular assistance. He, or his family, or his attorneys, might at any time have enlisted the assistance of a consul, as is frequently the case. The option of calling one's embassy or consul for help is widely known, and many governments advise their own nationals to call their embassy or consul in an emergency abroad.

2.7. Article 36, paragraph 1 *(c)*, provides that consular officials may visit their nationals in detention, converse and correspond with them, and arrange for their legal representation. Again, there was no deliberate effort to interfere with this right, and since becoming aware of Mr. Breard's detention Paraguayan consular officials have been able to visit and communicate with him. With respect to legal representation, arrangements were made by the State of Virginia for two clearly competent lawyers to represent Mr. Breard. Thus a consul proved unnecessary to perform this function.

2.8. Finally, Article 36, paragraph 1 *(c)*, concludes that a consular officer shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison if he expressly opposes such action. This provision is of particular interest here because Mr. Breard did not accept — indeed he adamantly resisted and even rejected — the advice not only of his attorneys, but also of his mother a Paraguayan national.

2.9. Several additional points are noteworthy. First, neither Article 5 nor Article 36 imposes any obligations on consular officers themselves. A consular officer may or may not choose to undertake any particular function on behalf of his countrymen. Consequently, the practice of States — and even of individual consuls — in assisting their nationals varies widely. Some countries are very active, while others are passive or even quite frankly uninterested or unable to provide any significant consular assistance. A country may have just one or two consular officials in a capital city, and none at a more remote location. A country's consular officials may make frequent prison visits or visit only selectively, if at all. Each country decides for itself what it will do. This in turn creates expectations among its nationals as to whether seeking consular assistance would be worthwhile.

2.10. Second, nothing in these Articles elevates the rights of foreign nationals above those of citizens of the host country. A foreign national is expected to obey the host country's laws, and is subject to its criminal justice system. Consular officers assist their nationals within this context. Consistent with this, Article 5 *(i)* of the Vienna Convention limits the rights of consular officers to represent or

to arrange representation of their nationals before the tribunals of the receiving State. They may do so only "subject to the practices and procedures obtaining in the receiving State". The United States does not permit foreign consular officials to act as attorneys in the United States, nor may its own consular officers abroad act as attorneys for American citizens. We believe that this is the general practice of States.

2.11. Third, the Vienna Convention does not make consular assistance an essential element of the host country's criminal justice system. This is inevitable, given that consular officers have no obligations to act in any particular way vis-à-vis a host country's criminal justice system. A consul may do nothing at all, leaving the justice system to run its course. Or, the consul may visit the detainee; may ensure that the detainee's family is aware of the detention; may assist the detainee in securing counsel, if necessary; and may follow developments so that any questions about the fairness of the proceedings can, if appropriate, be discussed with host country officials. But the consular officer is not responsible for the defence because he cannot act as an attorney.

II. State Practice With Respect to Consular Notification

2.12. Two additional aspects of state practice are relevant: how faithfully do governments provide notification and what remedies, if any, are provided by governments for failures to notify? Because it is important that the United States respond appropriately to allegations of violations of consular notification, the Department of State recently made inquiries to all of our Embassies and, through them, directly to governments on these matters. While our information remains incomplete, we believe that it fairly reflects the range of state practice.

2.13. Practice with respect to notification: Compliance with respect to the obligation to notify the detainee of the right to see a consul in fact varies widely. At one end of the spectrum, some countries seem to comply unfailingly. At the other end, a small number seem not to comply at all. Rates of compliance seem partly to be a function of such factors as whether a country is large or small, whether it has a unitary or federal organization, the sophistication of its internal communication systems, and the way in which the country has chosen to implement the obligation. Countries have chosen to implement the obligation in different ways, including by providing only oral guidance, by issuing internal directives, and by enacting implementing legislation. Some apparently provide no guidance at all.

2.14. If a detainee requests consular notification or communication, actual notification to a consul may take some time. It may be provided by telephone, but sometimes a letter or a diplomatic note is sent. As a result there may be a significant delay before notification is received and, consequently, critical events in a criminal proceeding may have already occurred before a consul is aware of the detention. And, as noted previously, the consul may then respond in a variety of ways. For these reasons, and because of the wide variation in compliance with the consular notification requirement, it is quite likely that few, if any, states would have agreed to Article 36 if they had understood that a failure to comply with consular notification would require undoing the results of their criminal justice systems.

2.15. Practice with respect to remedies: Let me turn now to what our inquiries revealed about state practice with respect to remedies. Typically when a consular officer learns of a failure of notification, a diplomatic communication is sent protesting the failure. While such correspondence sometimes goes unanswered, more often it is investigated either by the foreign ministry or the involved law enforcement officials. If it is learned that notification in fact was not given, it is common practice for the host government to apologize and to undertake to ensure improved future compliance. We are not aware of any practice of attempting to ascertain whether the failure of notification prejudiced the foreign national in criminal proceedings. This lack of practice is consistent with the fact and common international understanding that consular assistance is not essential to the criminal proceeding against a foreign national.

2.16. Notwithstanding this practice, Paraguay asks that the entire judicial process of the State of Virginia — Mr. Breard's trial, his sentence, and all of the subsequent appeals, which I will review momentarily — be set aside and that he be restored to the position he was in at the time of his arrest because of the failure of notification. Roughly 165 States are parties to the Vienna Convention. Paraguay has not identified *one* that provides such a *status quo ante* remedy of vacating a criminal conviction for a failure of consular notification. Neither has Paraguay identified any country that has an established judicial remedy whereby a foreign government can seek to undo a conviction in its domestic courts based on a failure of notification.

2.17. In the United States today, foreign nationals and the Government of Paraguay are attempting to have our courts recognize such a remedy as a matter of United States domestic law. But if our courts do so, the United States will become, as far as we are aware, the first country in the world to permit such a result. A number of foreign ministries have advised us that this result would certainly or most likely not be possible in their countries.

2.18. It is not difficult to imagine why such remedies do not exist. As noted, consular assistance, unlike legal assistance, is not regarded as a predicate to a criminal proceeding. Moreover, if a failure to advise a detainee of the right of consular notification automatically required undoing a criminal procedure, the result would be absurd. In particular, it would be inconsistent with the wide variation that exists in the level of consular services provided by different countries. But it would be equally problematic to have a rule that a failure of consular notification required a return to the *status quo ante* only if notification would have led to a different outcome. It would be unworkable for a court to attempt to determine reliably what a consular officer would have done and whether it would have made a difference. Doing so would require access to normally inviolable consular archives and testimony from consular officials notwithstanding their usual privileges and immunities. In this case, for example, one might wish to examine Paraguay's consular instructions and practices as of the time when Mr. Breard was arrested and inquire into the resources then available to Paraguay's consular officers. Surely governments did not intend that such questions become a matter of inquiry in the courts.

III. The United States Response To The Failure of Notification

2.19. Against this background, I would now like to advise the court of the steps taken by the United States relating to this case in an effort to be responsive to Paraguay's concerns.

2.20. The United States received official notice of Mr. Breard's case in April 1996 through a diplomatic note from Paraguay's Embassy in Washington. Significantly, the note did not allege a breach of the Article 36 consular notification obligation. It did not request consultations to discuss the case. It did not ask for any United States government intervention other than to facilitate efforts to obtain information from Virginia, which the Department of State did. The Department later learned, from Mr. Breard's attorneys, that those attorneys were attempting to challenge Mr. Breard's conviction based on an apparent failure of consular notification and litigation brought by Mr. Breard.

2.21. In September 1996, Paraguay filed suit against Virginia in a federal trial court. The suit sought to restore the *status quo ante* for Mr. Breard on the theory that only such action could vindicate Paraguay's governmental rights in consular notification.

The Department of State discussed the case with representatives of Paraguay in October 1996 and later received a request from the Paraguayan Ambassador for assistance in obtaining a new trial for Mr. Breard. That request failed to provide any evidence that consular law or practice would require such a result. Nevertheless, United States officials met with counsel for Paraguay about the matter and gave the issues raised by the suit careful consideration. Ultimately, the United States concluded that Paraguay's remedy for the consular notification failure lay in diplomatic communications with the Department of State. The United States so advised both the court in which Paraguay's case was

pending and Paraguay's Ambassador. The United States did not object to Mr. Breard's own efforts to raise the consular notification issues in the courts, but neither did it support them.

2.22. On 3 June 1997, the Department received another letter from the Ambassador. I note that this letter is not referenced in Paraguay's Application to this Court. In it the Ambassador advised that Paraguay thought that the dispute should be resolved in the domestic courts of the United States, and not by this Court, but that Paraguay nevertheless would agree with the United States to come to this Court. This proposal was conditioned: the domestic United States proceedings should be stayed and the United States should waive any jurisdictional objections it might have to the jurisdiction of this Court and the United States should agree to require Virginia to accept this Court's decision. Like Paraguay's previous correspondence, this letter again failed to offer any serious explanation of why the remedy Paraguay was seeking was appropriate.

2.23. The Department of State nevertheless then decided to undertake an investigation into the case. In our investigation, we received the full co-operation of Virginia and we reviewed all facts relevant to the consular notification issue. This included the critical portions of the transcript, including Mr. Breard's testimony and an affidavit from his defence lawyers concerning their efforts on his behalf.

2.24. Through this process, we learned the following relevant facts:

(1) Mr. Breard unquestionably committed the offences for which he was tried. He was arrested while attempting a rape. Genetic and other physical evidence linked him to the earlier murder and attempted rape of Ruth Dickie. Ample evidence existed to prove that Mr. Breard committed these crimes, entirely independently of his own testimony. Indeed, nothing in Paraguay's submission suggests that Mr. Breard did not commit the crimes for which he was sentenced. Paraguay instead suggests that a consular officer might have persuaded Mr. Breard to make different tactical decisions;

(2) Mr. Breard had almost immediate and thereafter continuing contact with his family. He testified that one of the first phone calls he made at the time of his arrest was to his uncle. His mother and a cousin were involved in his defence, and his mother testified at his trial. Contacting family members is normally one of the first and most important things that a consular officer does when a national is detained, but here consular assistance to accomplish this proved unnecessary;

(3) Mr. Breard first came to the United States 1986 and thus had been resident in the United States for about six years at the time of his arrest. He had been married briefly to an American. This made it difficult to accept Paraguay's contention that Mr. Breard did not understand American culture;

(4) Mr. Breard had a good command of English. His lawyers had no difficulty communicating with him in English. He testified at his trial in English and the transcript of his testimony attests to his command of the language. Mr. Breard told the judge that he had no problems with English and was comfortable speaking it. Moreover, the state would have provided an interpreter had one been needed. Thus, Paraguay's implication that Mr. Breard was tried unfairly in a language he did not understand is demonstrably false. While a consular officer might help interpret for a detained foreign national, such assistance was not needed by Mr. Breard;

(5) Mr. Breard was represented by two criminal defence lawyers experienced in death penalty litigation. They spent at least 400 hours — the equivalent of 50 days — on his case. United States courts subsequently concluded that their legal representation met the requirements of the United States Constitution for the effective assistance of counsel. These attorneys worked closely with Mr. Breard, his mother, a female cousin, and his religious counsellor from jail, who was of Bolivian origin, to prepare his defence. They communicated with Mr. Breard's personal friends to find witnesses who could testify

on his behalf. They communicated with persons in Paraguay to find evidence that would assist in his defence. They arranged for the court to appoint three experts to examine Mr. Breard's mental competence, and they obtained his medical records from Paraguay and from Argentina, so as to explore fully the possibility of an insanity defence and to develop mitigation evidence. Paraguay's assertion that it could have paid for witnesses from Paraguay appears irrelevant, because both his mother and cousin came from Paraguay to assist and there is no indication that there were other witnesses who were not used because of financial constraints;

(6) Mr. Breard decided to plead "not guilty" and to testify in both the penalty and sentencing phases of his trial contrary to the advice of his legal counsel and his mother — a strategy that was clearly unwise. This is the principal tactical decision Paraguay asserts it could have changed, but it is clear that Mr. Breard was advised against it by his own lawyers and his mother, yet rejected their advice. He was fully apprised of the risks of his strategy in the context of the American legal system. Access to a consular officer, who would have been less familiar with that system than his own lawyers, would not have made Mr. Breard's tactical decisions more informed;

(7) there is no credible evidence that Mr. Breard's decision to plead "not guilty" and testify was founded on a cultural misunderstanding. He was born and lived his early years in Argentina, he went to Paraguay for his secondary education and then he came to the United States to study English. As noted, he had been in the United States for six years and married to an American briefly. Significantly, as noted, his mother was also Paraguayan and yet she as a Paraguayan understood the error of his judgment well enough to advise him not to do what he did. And again, finally, his lawyers unequivocally explained to him that his strategy would not work. He signed a statement confirming that he was rejecting their advice and was not afraid of the outcome even if it resulted in a sentence of death;

(8) although Mr. Breard's legal counsel apparently thought that Breard had the opportunity to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence, at best only very general preliminary discussions were held on this matter and they were never seriously pursued. Virginia officials have advised us that no actual offer of a plea agreement was ever made and that none would have been made, because of the strength of the government's case and the aggravated circumstances of the crime. Virginia would not affirmatively have agreed to a life sentence because under Virginia law a life sentence would have permitted Mr. Breard's future release. Thus Paraguay's assumption that Mr. Breard could have avoided the death penalty through a plea bargain does not withstand scrutiny;

(9) objective evidence indicates that the jury and the judge could easily have decided on the death penalty even if Mr. Breard had not testified. There was evidence that the murder was "aggravated" within the meaning of Virginia law, both by the "vileness" of the particular circumstances surrounding it and by the continuing danger that Mr. Breard posed to the community. This evidence supported imposition of the death penalty under Virginia law and the judge, who had to approve the jury's recommendation, would have known that a life sentence meant the possibility of future release;

(10) finally, Mr. Breard had the full protection of the criminal justice system. In addition to competent court appointed counsel, he had full judicial review. His conviction and sentence were reviewed and sustained by the Virginia trial court and the Virginia Supreme Court, and subsequently by a federal district court and a federal appeals court. The consular notification issue was being raised only after these procedures had been completed, in yet two more entirely separate legal proceedings.

2.25. In July 1997, the Department reported the results of its investigation in a letter to the Ambassador. That also is not referred to in Paraguay's Application to this Court. Because it found no evidence of consular notification or access, the Department expressed deep regret that such notification apparently was not provided to Mr. Breard. The Department advised, however, that there was no basis for concluding that consular assistance would have altered the outcome. It further stated that it saw no appropriate role for this Court.

2.26. Significantly, the Government of Paraguay has never responded to that letter, either to contest its factual assumptions or to address the Department's conclusion that consular notification would not have made a difference. Even so, the United States has continued to have periodic communications and discussions about the case with Paraguay. These discussions included assurances given as recently as February of this year by senior Paraguayan government officials that they recognized that this case was unprecedented and unlikely to succeed. On 30 March, however, Paraguay unexpectedly advised the United States that it would file this suit unless the United States engaged in consultations and stayed Mr. Breard's execution. Still prepared to address in diplomatic channels any issues relating to consular notification, the United States agreed to engage in such consultations. The United States did so even though it was unable to stay the execution — which is in the hands of the United States Supreme Court and the Governor of Virginia — and even though it continues to believe that this Court is not an appropriate forum to address Paraguay's concerns.

2.27. In addition to these specific measures relating to Mr. Breard's case, the United States has also intensified its long-standing efforts to ensure that all federal, state, and local law enforcement officials in the United States are aware of and comply with the consular notification and access requirements of Article 36. Guidance on these requirements has been issued regularly by the Department of State for many years. Recently, however, the Department has issued a new and comprehensive guidance on this subject, along with a pocket-sized reference card for law enforcement officers to carry on the street. These materials have been personally provided by the Secretary of State to the United States Attorney-General and to the Governor of every state of the United States including, of course, Virginia. They have also been provided by the Department's Legal Adviser, Mr. Andrews, to every state Attorney-General, and they are being disseminated throughout the United States. In addition, the Departments of State and Justice have begun conducting briefings on these issues for state and federal prosecutors, and law enforcement officials, focusing particularly on areas with high concentrations of foreign nationals. Through these and other efforts, the United States is both acting to correct the circumstances that led to the failure of consular notification in Mr. Breard's case and acting in a manner consistent with state practice. Nothing more is required.

2.28. Mr. President, that concludes my factual presentation of the consular issues raised by this case. I thank the Court for its attention and invite it now to call upon Mr. Crook to speak.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you. Mrs. Brown. I call now on Mr. John Crook.

Mr. CROOK:

3.1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is again an honour and a pleasure for me to appear before you. My presentation will consider several important legal factors that should guide the Court in determining whether to indicate provisional measures in this case. I will show why, for a number of reasons, the Court should not indicate the measures requested by Paraguay.

I. The Significance of Provisional Measures

3.2. I must begin by underscoring the gravity and importance of the decision now before the Court.

As the Court well understands, the indication of provisional measures is a matter of serious consequence. The decisions of this Court clearly show the need for caution before taking such action. This reflects, first of all, the impact on the authority and the responsibility of sovereign States that such measures may have. It also reflects the fact that such measures may be indicated only after hurried and incomplete proceedings, and that is particularly true here where the Court is sitting to hear a case that was filed less than 96 hours ago.

3.3. It is for such reasons that the Court and commentators have stressed the exceptional nature of the Court's provisional measures power. I refer the Court, for example, to its Order in the case concerning *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece* v. *Turkey). Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, (I.C.J. Reports 1976*, paras. 32 and 11) and, as Mr. Andrews indicated, the citations in all these matters are contained in the transcript we have handed to the Registry. Thoughtful opinions by individual Judges have examined the point in greater detail. I refer you to Judge Shahabuddeen's opinion in the case concerning *Passage Through the Great Belt (Finland* v. *Denmark), Provisional Measures, Order of 29 July, 1991, (I.C.J. Reports 1991*, p. 29); Judge Lachs in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976, (I.C.J. Reports 1976*, p. 20); the dissenting opinions of Judges Winiarski and Badwi Pasha in the case concerning the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Interim Protection, Order of 5 July, 1951, (I.C.J. Reports 1951*, p. 97) where they observed that "[m]easures of this kind in international law are exceptional in character to an even greater extent than they are in municipal law; they may easily be considered a scarcely tolerable interference in the affairs of a sovereign State". Judge Lachs, I think, well summed up the consequences in his separate opinion in the *Aegean Sea* case: "the Court must take a restrictive view of its powers in dealing with a request for interim measures".

3.4. The basic factors guiding the Court's decision whether or not to use its exceptional power to indicate provisional measures are laid down in the Statute of the Court. Article 41 envisions that the Court will carry out two separate, although inter-related, examinations. In the interests of time, I shall not read Article 41 but I would refer the Court to it, in particular Article 41(1).

3.5. As the Court will see, that text envisions two separate lines of enquiry. First, the Court's decision whether to indicate provisional measures is to be guided by an assessment of the overall context or circumstances of the case before it. Second, any measures to be indicated are of a nature "which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party". I shall consider each of these aspects in turn.

II. Provisional measures are not warranted in these circumstances

3.6. I shall begin by showing how provisional measures are not warranted in these circumstances. Now Article 41 shows that the Court can and should consider the totality of circumstances involved in a case in deciding whether the indication of provisional measures is appropriate. Other members of the United States team are treating some particularly relevant circumstances. The Agent of the United States, Mr. Andrews, briefly addressed issues relating to the timing of this case. He noted the prejudice, both to the United States and to the judicial process, that follows from the Applicant's decision to file its case at the time it chose to do so. Ms Brown described the facts underlying Paraguay's claim, showing how it departs from the realities of international consular practice. She also showed how the failure to inform Mr. Breard of his right to consular access had no bearing on his trial, conviction and sentence. In our next presentation, Mr. Matheson will analyse yet other relevant circumstances, particularly the implications of this case for other States and for the Court.

3.7. My own discussion will be focused on two interrelated aspects of Paraguay's legal claim. First, I will show how the Court does not have jurisdiction to provide the remedy that Paraguay seeks in its Application. Then I will show how, in assessing whether to indicate provisional measures which may substantially prejudice the party against which they are directed, the Court must weigh the nature of

the legal claims before it. The Court should not exercise its exceptional power to indicate provisional measures that prejudice the target State, where the moving Party's claims are legally unfounded or are unlikely to prevail.

3.8. Now as I shall show, particularly given the drastic consequences of Paraguay's basic legal claim — that the lack of consular notification invalidates each and every subsequent conviction of any alien in any State party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations — that claim should not prevail. Neither the Convention's language, nor its history, nor State practice supports it.

No Jurisdiction.

3.9. Because of the fundamental flaws that undermine Paraguay's claim for relief, the Court has no jurisdictional basis for the measures now requested. Now admittedly, the showing of jurisdiction at the stage of preliminary measures is less substantial than is required at later stages of the case. As the Court recently summarised in its Application of the Genocide Convention Order

> "[O]n a request for provisional measures, the Court need not, before deciding whether or not to indicate them, finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case, yet it ought not to indicate such measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant . . . appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which jurisdiction of the Court might be established." (*Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993*, p. 11, para. 14.)

Although the burden of showing jurisdiction is lower now than it will be at later stages of this case, the Applicant still has a burden to meet. Paraguay has not met that burden.

3.10. Article I of the Optional Disputes Settlement Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations gives the Court jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the "interpretation or application" of the Convention. However, there is no dispute here about either the interpretation or the application of the Convention. The Parties do not disagree on what it means to "inform" a foreign national of his rights under Article 36, paragraph 1 *(b)*, of the Convention. Nor do they dispute that Mr. Breard was not so informed.

3.11. Instead, Paraguay's claim in this case, in essence, is that under the Vienna Convention the Court can void Mr. Breard's criminal conviction and sentence, and require that he be given a new trial. As I will show, the Vienna Convention does not provide for such an extraordinary form of relief. Paraguay may object to the appropriateness of a criminal conviction and sentence under United States law and practice, but this is not a dispute about the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention.

3.12. Paraguay tries to meet this difficulty by invoking the doctrine of *restitutio in integrum* (Paraguay's Application, p. 11, para. 25). Paraguay cannot, however, create a right that does not otherwise exist under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations — the Court's sole basis for jurisdiction in this case — simply by invoking a general principle of the law on reparation. Paraguay has failed to make a prima facie showing that the Court has jurisdiction to grant the exceptional relief it seeks here. Under the circumstances, under the Court's well-settled jurisprudence, there is no jurisdictional basis for the Court to indicate provisional measures.

3.13. In this respect, this situation is similar to that faced by the Court in the provisional measures phase of the *Lockerbie* case (case concerning *Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Order, 14 April 1992*, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, para. 43) There, the Court found, as a prima facie matter, that there was no legal basis for the Libyan claim under the Montreal Convention because of the adoption of a resolution of the Security Council. The Court therefore rejected Libya's request for provisional measures because "the rights claimed . . . under the Montreal Convention

cannot now be regarded as appropriate for protection by the indication of provisional measures". In a similar way here, there is no legal basis for the rights that are claimed by Paraguay. Those claims too are not an appropriate basis for the indication of provisional measures.

The Merits of Paraguay's Claim.

3.14. Obviously, the Court cannot consider the merits at this stage in a case that is 96 hours' old. Nevertheless, in addition to assessing whether it has jurisdiction to proceed, the Court must weigh the totality of circumstances bearing on Paraguay's request for preliminary measures. In so doing, the Court must consider the doubtful nature of the core legal proposition that Paraguay is advancing — that the Convention requires the invalidation of every conviction and sentence of any person who has not received consular notification required by the Convention.

3.15. The difficulties with Paraguay's legal position must be confronted at this stage, and this ought to be an important element in assessing the appropriateness of provisional measures. As Dumbauld wrote at the time of the Permanent Court, "if it is apparent that the applicant cannot succeed in his main action, preliminary relief will of course be denied" (Edward Dumbauld, *Interim Measures of Protection in International Controversies* 165 (1932).

A. Plain Meaning of the Text

3.16. What are the legal difficulties? To begin with, Paraguay's claim conflicts with the plain meaning of the text. Absolutely nothing in the language of Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (or in any other Article of the Convention) offers support for Paraguay's claim that failure of consular notification requires invalidation of any subsequent conviction and sentence of an alien.

3.17. Paraguay's claims follow from Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention, to which both the United States and Paraguay are parties. Article 36 establishes the basic régime for consular assistance to nationals who may be detained in the receiving State.

Article 36, paragraph 1, provides:

> "1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
>
> *(a)* consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
>
> *(b)* if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested . . . shall also be forwarded to the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph."

3.18. Mr. President, as was described by Ms Brown, when the competent federal authorities learned that Mr. Breard may not have been told when he was arrested that Paraguay's consul could be notified, the United States authorities investigated thoroughly. When they concluded that a violation of Article 36, paragraph 1, probably had occurred, they took action in co-operation with the Commonwealth of Virginia to try to prevent any recurrence. Senior United States officials apologized to Paraguay, and offered further consultations. As Ms Brown just noted, when Paraguay

recently proposed that the two sides enter into formal consultations, the United States promptly agreed to that proposal. Unfortunately, however, and notwithstanding Article II of the Optional Disputes Settlement Protocol to the Convention, Paraguay chose to bring its action here instead.

3.19. Thus, there is no legal dispute between the United States and Paraguay regarding the need to give notification as provided for under Article 36, that such notification was not given, and concerning the need to take effective steps to prevent recurrence. The sole issue concerns the consequences under international law if an arrested alien is not told that his consul can be notified. The United States contends that the solution to such a breach of the treaty's requirements is to be pursued through normal processes of diplomatic apology, consultation and improved implementation.

3.20. Paraguay, however, asks this Court to impose much more drastic consequences. Paraguay's Application maintains that the necessary legal consequence for any such breach is that the ensuing conviction and sentence must be put aside. There is absolutely no support for this claim in the language of the Convention. The Court should not read into a clear and nearly universal multilateral instrument such a substantial and potentially disruptive additional obligation that has no support in the language agreed by the parties.

3.21. Mr. President, there are very few situations in which States actually have agreed by treaty that the failure to observe specific standards can be the basis for appeal to an international tribunal for possible reversal of a conviction or sentence. I have in mind here, for example, regional instruments and institutions such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Strasbourg Court. Where States have elected to create such mechanisms, they have done so expressly and with great precision. They have not created such additional remedies by indirection or implication, as Paraguay asks the Court do here. Let me return to the negotiating history.

B. Negotiating History

3.22. Likewise, there is no support for Paraguay's claim there. We know of nothing in the history — and Paraguay has pointed to nothing — even hinting that the Parties intended failure to comply with Article 36, paragraph 1, to invalidate subsequent criminal proceedings.

3.23. The Vienna Convention was negotiated on the basis of draft articles prepared by the International Law Commission. The relevant ILC proposals do not contain the obligation to inform an arrested person that their consul could be notified. That was added at the Conference. We have found nothing in the debates of the conference supporting Paraguay's claim, but there are a number of indications to the contrary.

3.24. Article 36 was negotiated with great difficulty at the Vienna Conference. The final version was only agreed upon two days before the Conference ended. Some delegations supported the ILC's initial draft of Article 36, which would have required that receiving States automatically notify sending States' consuls if a national was arrested. A large number of other States strongly opposed this requirement. They argued, among other things, that it would impose an excessive administrative burden on the receiving State and that the national might not want his government authorities to know about his arrest. (Luke T. Lee, *Consular Law and Practice* (1990), pp. 138-139.)

3.25. Ultimately, a compromise had to be reached. The compromise involved a series of amendments to the ILC draft. I will not try to trace all of these for you, but I will mention one because it helps to show that States at the Conference clearly did not intend that failure of consular notification would invalidate subsequent legal proceedings. The negotiations began with the ILC draft providing for consular notification in the case of arrest. That was widely criticized as unreasonably burdensome and impractical. Accordingly, various narrowing amendments were offered by groups of countries.

3.26. One, offered by Egypt and accepted by the Conference, changed the initial language to state that the obligation to inform the sending State only arises if the national so requests. The delegate of

Egypt explained his amendment as follows:

> "The purpose of the amendment is to lessen the burden on the authorities of receiving States, especially those which had large numbers of resident aliens or which received many tourists and visitors. *The language proposed in the joint amendment would ensure that the authorities of the receiving State would not be blamed if, owing to the pressure of work or other circumstances, there was a failure to report the arrest of a national of the sending State.*" (Twentieth Plenary Meeting on 20 April, 1963, United Nations Conference on Consular Relations, Official Records, p. 82, at para 62. Emphasis added.)

The explanation of this amendment (which was adopted by the Conference) clearly suggests that the Conference saw the normal processes of diplomatic adjustment as the means to address failure of a notification requirement. The Conference did not foresee that defects of consular notification would result in the invalidation of subsequent criminal proceedings. Had the parties thought so, the many States that already expressed fears about the burden of the notification requirement would surely have voted down the text that is before you today.

3.27. Other statements during the Conference reinforce that the Parties did not intend the Convention to alter the operation of domestic criminal proceedings. The delegate from the USSR stated that "the matters dealt with in Article 36 were connected with the criminal law and procedure of the receiving State, which were outside the scope for the codification of consular law" (*ibid.*, p. 40, para. 3). The delegate from Belarus expressed similar views, noting that "the Conference was drafting a consular convention, not an international penal code, and it had no right to attempt to dictate the penal codes of sovereign States" (*ibid.*, p. 40, para. 8). Such statements directly conflict with Paraguay's claim today. Thus, the negotiating history does not support Paraguay's broad view of the consequences of non-compliance with Article 36, and a variety of statements made during the debate support a contrary view.

C. State Practice

3.28. Likewise, there is no support in state practice for Paraguay's position. As Ms Brown explained, after the Breard case initially came to the attention of the United States federal authorities, the United States Department of State surveyed the practice of the States parties to the Vienna Convention. That survey found no State — none — that adopted the position Paraguay urges on the Court here. Paraguay has referred to no such State practice here.

3.29. The few national court cases that we know have considered the matter have not reached the result urged by Paraguay. Lee's treatise *Consular Law and Practice* cites an Italian case where the Italian authorities failed to provide the required consular notice to Yater, a British national. According to Lee, the challenge to Yater's conviction was rejected.

> "The Supreme Court *(Cassazione)* held that the consular role in assisting the defence of his fellow nationals under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is of 'a complementary and subsidiary nature, and does not replace the right of the accused to make his own arrangements for his own defence'. Since Yater in this case had adequately defended himself during proceedings through a lawyer chosen by him, the plea was dismissed." (Luke Lee, *Consular Law and Practice* p. 150-151, citing *Cassazione*, 19 Feb. 1973, *re Yater*. Summary and Commentary in 2 *Italian Yb. Int'l L.* 336-9 (1976).)

The issue also has been energetically litigated in United States courts. Indeed, Mr. Donovan, the distinguished counsel for Paraguay, has been a prominent participant in litigation in the United States urging that this approach be adopted as a matter of United States domestic law. However, no United States court has found that the failure of consular notification, standing alone, constitutes a sufficient basis for invalidating a sentence and conviction.

D. No Injury to Mr. Breard

3.30. Finally, as Ms Brown has explained, the notion that Mr. Breard suffered injury because of any failure of consular notification is speculative and unpersuasive. Paraguay's Application asks this Court to indicate provisional measures largely on the basis of some bold assumptions about what Paraguay's consul might have done. In doing so, the Application presents an inflated and unrealistic description of a consul's functions in criminal matters. A consul is not a defence attorney. Consular protection does not immunize a national from local criminal jurisdiction. What a consul can do is help arrested persons arrange means for their own defence. A consul can notify an arrested person's family, or help to ensure that the defendant has local defence attorneys. A consul does not typically retain lawyers to defend her nationals; the United States does not do so, and Paraguay has not established that it normally does so either.

3.31. But, as we have shown, Mr. Breard was able to accomplish all these things quite effectively without the assistance of Paraguay's counsel without the assistance of Paraguay's consul. He spoke English and had lived in the United States since 1986. After his arrest, he was in regular contact with his family. He was defended by able attorneys throughout his trial and the many subsequent legal proceedings. A consul could not have done more to enhance the effectiveness of Mr. Breard's legal defence.

E. Conclusion

3.32. For all of these reasons — the lack of any textual basis in the Convention, the lack of support in the negotiating history and State practice, and the absence of injury to Mr. Breard — Paraguay's basic claim in these proceedings lacks legal foundation. Because there is no basis for the remedy Paraguay seeks in the Convention, the Court lacks jurisdiction. The weakness of Paraguay's legal claim is also a compelling reason for declining to indicate provisional measures.

III. Provisional Measures and The Rights of the Parties

3.33. Mr. President, my final section, will be relatively brief. I will first address the role of provisional measures in relation to the protection of the rights of the Parties. I will explain why such measures should not be indicated in a form that would create a selective or unjust balance with regard to the Parties. I will then show how, in deciding whether to indicate particular provisional measures, the Court must consider whether those measures improperly prejudge the outcome of the dispute.

3.34. Mr. President, the provisional measures sought by Paraguay amount to a determination on the merits of this case. If the measures sought by Paraguay are indicated and implemented, Paraguay will have won, at least for a period of however many years may be required for the Court to arrive with its final judgment. Paraguay will have advanced its key objective through a hurried and unbalanced proceeding that cannot adequately address the serious legal issues that are at stake.

3.35. This cannot be reconciled with the régime for provisional measures envisioned under Article 41 of the Statute. Article 41 says that the Court may indicate, where circumstances require, "any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party". Take note: "the respective rights of either party". Provisional measures should not protect the rights of one party, while disregarding the rights of the other. But that is precisely what is requested here. As Paraguay has made clear, its goal here is to prevent the operation of the criminal laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia. It seeks to do so where there is no doubt that the accused committed very grave and violent offences, and where there have already been five years of extensive appellate litigation in national courts. As Mr. Matheson will elaborate in our next presentation, this would significantly impair the rights of the United States to the orderly and conclusive functioning of its

criminal justice system.

3.36. Moreover, provisional measures should not be indicated in terms or in circumstances where they constitute a disguised adjudication on the merits. Professor Rosenne makes this point strongly in his remarkable new treatise:

> "The power to indicate provisional measures cannot be invoked if its effect would be to grant to the applicant an interim judgment in favour of all or part of the claim formulated in the document instituting proceedings." (Shabtai Rosenne, *The Law And Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996*. Vol. III. p. 1456.)

Nevertheless, this is precisely what Paraguay seeks. Paraguay is asking this Court for a concealed adjudication on the merits of this case through the guise of provisional measures.

3.37. This is exactly the type of case Judge Oda warned of in his recent essay on provisional measures. As he wrote:

> "In recent cases, the actual matters to be considered during the merits phase have been made the object of the requested provisional measures . . . [T]he applicant States appear to have aimed at obtained interim judgments that would have affirmed their own rights and preshaped the main case." (Oda, "Provisional Measures. The Practice of the International Court of Justice," *in Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings*, Lowe and Fitzmaurice, eds., p. 553.)

3.38. Judge Oda goes on to warns of the implications of this, and of the possibility that:

> "the Court . . . be tempted to deliver an interim judgment under the name of provisional measures . . . If the tendency is to be for the Court to arrive at a quick decision on matters relating to the merits, while reserving for the future other much more judicious consideration on the question of jurisdiction as well as the merits . . ., then the whole matter requires very careful consideration." (*Ibid.*, p. 554.)

3.39. Mr. President, Judge Oda is right to be concerned, this whole matter does require very careful consideration. Provisional measures should not be used as a vehicle for a hasty and legally unjustified decision on the merits of Paraguay's claim. And thus, for all of the reasons I have indicated — because of the lack of jurisdiction, because Paraguay's claim is unsound in law, and because the requested provisional measures are unbalanced and improperly prejudge the merits, the Court should reject Paraguay's request.

3.40. I thank the Court for its attention during a long presentation. I now ask that it invite Mr. Michael Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, to present the next section of our argument.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Crook. Mr. Matheson has the floor.

Mr. MATHESON:

4.1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is once again my great honour and privilege to appear before you on behalf of the United States. Mr. Crook has explained the basis for our contention that the provisional measures sought by Paraguay are not within the jurisdiction of the Court and lack any legal foundation. I will now explain the reasons for our view that the granting of the provisional measures sought by Paraguay would be contrary to the interests of the parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the international community as a whole, and the Court as well.

4.2. Article 41 of the Statute of the Court provides in part that the Court "shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken . . .". This language clearly indicates that the Court may or may not choose to exercise this power in a particular case, depending on whether it believes the circumstances require it and whether it believes the particular measures proposed ought to be taken. (See, for example. *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976*, separate opinion of President Jiménez de Aréchaga, p. 16.)

4.3. It follows from this that the Court should only grant provisional measures where it is satisfied that this would not only be fair and beneficial to the parties to the immediate dispute, but also would be consistent with the proper role of the Court, the interests of the Parties to the convention in question, and the good of the general international community.

4.4. In the present case, Paraguay has asked the Court to suspend decisions of the criminal courts of a State. To our knowledge, this is the first occasion on which the Court has been asked to do so. In its request for provisional measures, Paraguay has asked the Court, in a matter of a few days, to scrutinize and suspend for an indefinite period the considered decisions of the trial and appellate courts of Virginia and the United States — decisions that have been taken after extensive judicial proceedings over a period of years.

4.5. This would be a very serious step, and one which could threaten serious disruption of the criminal justice systems of the parties to the Vienna Convention, and of the work of this Court as well.

4.6. There are currently over 160 parties to the Vienna Convention, of which over 50 have adhered to the Optional Protocol on Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. The Parties to the Protocol include a number of populous States, such as France, Germany, India, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, where very large numbers of foreign nationals have immigrated or travelled for various reasons. It is inevitable that a significant number of crimes will occur in any population group of such a size, and in fact this has occurred. It is also to be expected that in a number of these cases, law enforcement authorities may commit, or be alleged to have committed, errors in the process of consular notification called for under the Vienna Convention.

4.7. The question is not whether such errors should be remedied. Rather, it is whether this should be left to the diplomatic process and to the domestic criminal authorities of the State in question, or whether this Court should assume the role of a supreme court of criminal appeals to deal with such cases by staying, reviewing and reversing domestic court decisions. Once the Court opens itself to this process, it can be expected that a great many defendants will press the States of their nationality to take recourse to it. This would include not only those who received no consular notification at all, but also those who may wish to claim that the notification received was deficient, incomplete, or tardy. It would include not only those who were genuinely prejudiced by the failure of consular notification, but also those who suffered little or no prejudice because they were nonetheless accorded full assistance of competent counsel and all the requirements of due process.

4.8. In principle, if such a remedy were available for violations of the Vienna Convention, why would it not also be available for alleged violations of other conventions when committed against foreign nationals in detention for criminal offenses, such as bilateral treaties with provisions for consular protection, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or other agreements with provisions concerning rights to be accorded to aliens or to any person accused of criminal offences? If States may ask this Court to stay executions and nullify convictions on the basis of violations of the Vienna Convention, would they not feel able to do so under these other agreements as well?

4.9. It is difficult to believe that the parties to these conventions really intended that this Court serve as a supreme court of criminal appeals in this manner. It is difficult to believe that they intended to

subject their domestic criminal proceedings, which typically include both trial proceedings and one or more levels of appellate review, to yet another stage of review by an international tribunal. As Mr. Crook demonstrated, we know this was not the case with respect to the Vienna Convention. We also know that such a role was not contemplated by the framers of the United Nations Charter and the Statute of the Court.

4.10. Yet this is precisely the message that the Court would give in granting the provisional measures sought by Paraguay in the present case. Delay of the execution of Mr. Breard until the Court's final disposition of the case, as Paraguay requests, would in practice mean the suspension of domestic criminal proceedings for years, whatever the final outcome. Many other defendants in many States could be expected to demand the same treatment, whether the alleged violations were serious or minor, and whether or not those violations led to any significant failures of due process in their conviction.

4.11. In other words, the indefinite stay of execution requested by Paraguay would not be a minor measure that simply preserves the status quo. It would be a major and unprecedented intrusion by the Court into the domestic criminal process that could have far-reaching and serious effects on the administration of justice in many States, and on the role and functioning of the Court.

4.12. All States have compelling interests in the orderly administration and finality of their criminal justice systems, particularly with respect to heinous crimes of the type committed by Mr. Breard. All States have compelling interests in avoiding external judicial intervention that would interfere with the execution of a sentence that has been affirmed following an orderly judicial process meeting all relevant human rights standards.

4.13. We submit that the Court should not take a step having such potentially far-reaching consequences on the basis of a few days of hurried consideration of a suit filed at the very last moment. Before taking any action to intrude into the criminal process of a State, the Court should require Paraguay to show that it does indeed have a basis for its claim in accordance with the normal, orderly process of full proceedings under Part III of the Rules of Court. In this connection, the Court should go through the process called for by Article 63 of the Statute of the Court, which calls for notification of all States parties to the Vienna Convention so as to afford them the possibility of intervention or other submission of views to protect their own vital interests in the interpretation and application of the Convention.

4.14. Given these compelling reasons for refraining from the provisional measures sought, has Paraguay identified any basis for justifying such an extraordinary remedy? We maintain that this is not the case, since Paraguay has shown nothing to indicate that consular notification would have changed the result of the Breard case.

4.15. Neither Mr. Breard's guilt nor the heinous nature of his crime is at issue; he freely confessed in open court that he had committed the offence. In any case, his guilt was thoroughly established by compelling material evidence. Paraguay has not taken issue with this in its Application or in its argument this morning. There is no question of the execution of an innocent man.

4,16. Nor is there any evidence that Mr. Breard was prejudiced in any way by the apparent lack of consular notification. He had lived in the United States for six years and spoke English well. He understood the proceedings being conducted and participated actively in his own defence. He had full contact with his family and with persons in Paraguay. He had competent counsel well versed in the criminal law of Virginia. He was directly and strongly advised by his attorneys to refrain from the incriminating testimony which he insisted on giving. His conviction was reviewed and upheld by appellate courts of the United States and Virginia.

4.17. Paraguay's contention that the involvement of Paraguayan consular officials would have changed all this is nothing more than imaginative, but wholly unsubstantiated, and implausible speculation. The Court should not engage in an unprecedented intervention in the domestic criminal

proceedings of a State on the basis of such implausible speculation. What a domestic appellate court would not do, this Court *a fortiori* should not do. This Court should not serve as a supreme court of criminal appeals in derogation of the normal operation of domestic criminal courts.

4.18. On the other hand, we fully recognize that Paraguay has a legitimate interest in ensuring that the provisions of the Vienna Convention are properly observed and that there is not arecurrence of the apparent failure of consular notification in the Breard case. Therefore, as Ms Brown described, the United States has taken extensive measures to ensure future compliance by State and local authorities.

4.19. Further, when Paraguay requested bilateral consultations under the Convention, the United States promptly agreed to consultations on all issues raised by the Breard case. We were specifically ready to discuss the possible procedural steps provided for in Articles II and III of the Protocol concerning conciliation and arbitration. However, Paraguay insisted on an immediate stay of execution as a precondition to refraining from immediate recourse to this Court, which the United States was not in a position to grant. The United States nonetheless remains prepared to engage in bilateral consultations aimed at encouraging more effective implementation of this Convention by both Parties.

4.20. Mr. President, for all these reasons, we believe that the granting of provisional measures soug by Paraguay would have serious negative consequences for the Parties to the Vienna Convention, f the Court, and for the international community as a whole. We urge the Court not to take such a ste and certainly not after only a few days to consider the implications of such an action. We therefore encourage and urge the Court to exercise its power to deny the measures requested by Paraguay.

4.21. Once again, I thank the Court for its attention and consideration of these arguments. I now suggest that the Court recognize the Agent of the United States, Mr. Andrews, to conclude the argument of the United States and to present its Final Submission. Thank you Sir.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Matheson. I call on Mr. Andrews, Agent of the United States.

Mr. ANDREWS:

5.1. Mr. President, this morning the Court asked the Government of Paraguay to provide copies of two letters, one dated 10 December 1996 and one dated 3 June 1997. We would be pleased to provide the unanswered 7 July 1997 letter that the State Department sent to the Government of Paraguay, which was referenced by Ms Brown in her presentation. Mr. President and Members of the Court, this concludes the presentation of the United States. The submission of the United State is as follows: "That the Court reject the request of the Government of Paraguay for the indication provisional measures of protection, and not to indicate any such measures".

5.2. We thank the Court for its kind attention to our presentations and its consideration of our arguments.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Andrews. Both Parties have now concluded the first rou of their oral pleadings. The Court will adjourn now and resume at 3.00 p.m. to afford both Parties opportunity to reflect. The Court stands adjourned until 3.00 p.m.

The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.

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pleading of Paraguay and we will have a short adjournment to enable the United States to make its submissions.

The Court adjourned from 3.50 to 4.20 p.m.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Please be seated. We meet now to hear the second round of oral submissions of the United States, and I give the floor to Mr. Andrews. Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State.

Mr. ANDREWS: Mr. President, I would like to call to the podium Mr. John Crook to respond on behalf of the United States.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Mr. Crook, please.

Mr. CROOK: Thank you Mr. President. Members of the Court.

In our final presentation this afternoon we will make, I believe, six points, attempting to bring together and respond to a number of the considerations that distinguished counsel for Paraguay introduced in his rebuttal. I shall try not to be too long.

My first point is this, that it seems to me that throughout this case, and certainly in the rebuttal we have just heard from Paraguay, there has been a signal of voidance of the burden of proof that the Applicant here must bear. They have in fact proved very little, if anything. Now Mr. Donovan in his presentation this afternoon tried to make up some of the deficiencies by seeking to build upon the evidence and argumentation that we gave you this morning. As to his arguments, I would simply invite the Court to consider the sources and determine in its own mind whether our reading of them, or Mr Donovan's reading of them, is the better. But it does seem to me that it is an anomalous position; a peculiar situation where the burden of the Applicant's proof is that the Respondent did not disprove the Applicant's assertions to the satisfaction of the Applicant. I would certainly disagree with that characterisation, but it does seem to me unsound in relation to the burdens that the Applicant here must bear.

There is one key issue here that I think we should take note of and it is an issue to which counsel for Paraguay did not refer, and that is the key issue of whether in fact consular access in this case would have made any difference. Counsel for Paraguay ignored that point in his summation, and it seems to me that it is an important point and is one that cannot be ignored, because all of Paraguay's case here rests on the factual premise, the assumption, the belief, that things would have been different had a Paraguayan consul been involved. For all the reasons that we suggested, the reasons that Ms Brown suggested, that seems to us to be not the case, that the burden here is on the Applicant, the burden has not been met.

My second basic point Mr. President, is that the Applicant here seems to me have responded to large parts of the United States submission by ignoring them or trivializing them. They ignored Ms Brown's long, and I think very informative description, of the realities of consular practice. Paraguay had nothing to say about that this afternoon. In large measure they ignored the indications that we brought to you regarding the realities of how States interpret and imply their obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. They ignored altogether the circumstances of Mr.

Breard's trial, defences for which he was charged, the adequacy of his counsel, the extensive nature of the appellate remedies that he pursued. They ignored large parts of the United States submission.

My third major point, Mr. President, is that it seems to me that the presentation here by distinguished counsel for Paraguay showed an undue preoccupation with the domestic litigation in the United States in which matters similar to these are being addressed. Counsel for Paraguay indicated that in his view, those cases were not relevant. We would agree, and we therefore will not seek here to re-argue them. I do wish here though to respond particularly to the cases that were raised at the last minute, and that were the occasion of the question from President Schwebel. The Applicant will presumably make those available to the Court, and the Court can inspect them and come to its own judgment regarding their implications. Our recollection is that the cases that the Court has requested were immigration cases involving deportation orders, and not criminal cases. That is our recollection, and we suffer from not having the text with us, but it is our belief that they turned not on the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations obligations as such, but on the fact that the immigration service had failed to follow its own regulations, calling for consular notification. Under federal law, federal agencies are required to follow their regulations, and that was the basis for the courts' decision on those cases. That is our recollection, if we have mischaracterized them, the Court will soon have the opinions and will be able to see, but that is our understanding of what was involved in those cases.

My fourth point is that it seems to me that the Applicants in this case have ignored — have dealt with significant parts of the United States presentation this morning by ignoring it — or in any case by trivializing the implications. We spent a good deal of time here going through the implications of the course of action that is advocated by Paraguay, for example, for other governments, the other parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

Counsel for Paraguay responded to that essentially by trivializing the point, saying we have one case and one case only here, and that's all the Court need concern itself about. With respect, Mr. President, that seems to me not to be good enough. With respect to the concerns of the United States, again, counsel for Paraguay minimized or trivialized the consequences of the remedy that they seek here, but again I think in all fairness, that is not good enough. The United States has significant interest in the orderly and authoritative administration of its criminal law, certainly in a case where the murder took place in 1992, the trial took place in 1993, and there appears to be no guilt, no dispute between the parties as to the guilt of the accused.

I think the same observation holds true as well concerning our points regarding the implications of the remedy sought by Paraguay for the Court. The concern is a real one, the implications for other countries and other situations are real, they cannot be ignored. That brings me closer to my final points, Mr. President.

The fifth point is the rather basic question. Is there a remedy? And the associated question, is there jurisdiction here? For the reasons that I indicated, it seems to me that the Court must consider the likelihood of Paraguay being able to show that the remedy that underlies their whole case exists and is available to them within the four corners of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. It is not appropriate for me here to re-argue the points I made this morning but I simply invite the Court to consider them. The point that there is no support in the text, the point that there is no support in the history, the point that there is no support in practice. I think it is a fair gloss on that, that Paraguay is quite unlikely to be able to show that the remedy it seeks either is available, or in any case, is to be found within the sphere of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations which of course is the requirement for there to be jurisdiction. We are at something of a disadvantage because Paraguay, as the Applicant, has never really made the case. We have sought to respond, Paraguay has then tried to make its case by dealing with our response and we are left in this very unsatisfactory situation, Mr. President, that the basic burden of the Applicant has not been met. I think I would agree here with distinguished counsel for Paraguay who, in his presentation this afternoon, used words to the effect — and I freely admit that this is a paraphrase and not a quote; I hope this is a fair paraphrase — that

to find the remedy, you must go beyond the text of the treaty, that is the problem, Mr. President, there is no jurisdiction. The Applicants seem unlikely to prevail on the merits.

Let me turn to my sixth and final point, Mr. President, and that is the reference to the *Hostages* case. Now, there was I think perhaps a misunderstanding of our position and I want to deal with it, because I think it is important. It is not our contention here that the Court is divested of jurisdiction by reason of the fact that we have confessed error and admitted that Mr. Breard was not given consular notification, that is not our point at all. Our point is the much broader one, that I have just discussed, that the remedy that is sought here is a remedy that goes far beyond the scope of the Vienna Convention and far beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court.

Let me respond to other points regarding the *Hostages* case. It does seem to me that it is — unseemly is perhaps too strong a word — but it is not quite right to draw upon the *Hostages* case as the precedent for action by this Court here. The *Hostages* case involved a much more aggravated situation, the continued detention of a large number of hostages in conditions of apparent danger, in violation of fundamental rules for the protection of diplomats and consuls. It was a profound, potentially very dangerous, disruption of international relations and it seems to me that it perhaps trivializes that case to analogize it to a situation where the Applicant is seeking not to deal with matters of great consequence at stake in the *Hostages* case, but rather to disrupt the operations of the criminal courts of a party to the Statute of this Court. It seems to me the analogy is not appropriate and it is not one that should illuminate the deliberations of this Court. Mr. President, I apologize that these remarks have been somewhat disjointed, the circumstances are a bit difficult, but I hope they have been of some use in clarifying our position. As always my delegation appreciates the courtesy of the Court in listening to our presentation. You have heard already the submission of the United States Agent and it is only for me to thank the Court.

The VICE-PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Crook. This brings us to the end of these oral hearings. I would like to express on behalf of the Court its warm thanks to the Agents, counsel and advocates of the Parties for the quality of their arguments and the courtesy and co-operation they have shown. In accordance with the usual practice, may I ask the Agents to remain at the disposal of the Court for any further information which it might need and, subject to that, I now declare closed the oral hearings on the request for the indication of provisional measures in the case concerning the *Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. the United States)*. The Court will now withdraw to deliberate. The Order containing the decision of the Court will be read at a public sitting to be held on Thursday 9 April. There being no other matters before it today, the Court will now rise.

The Court rose at 4.35 p.m.