IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff,
v. No. 138, Original
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Defendant.
HEARING BEFORE
SPECIAL MASTER KRISTIN LINSLEY MYLES
FRIDAY, APRIL 23, 2010
Courtroom 208
United States Bankruptcy Court
300 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina
9:00 a.m.
Volume 1 of 1
Pages 1 through 130

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1
                       PROCEEDINGS
                                                        9:02 a.m.
             The Court:
2
                              Good morning.
3
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Good morning.
4
             Mr. Browning:
                              Good morning.
5
                              Shall we begin with bifurcation?
             The Court:
6
             Mr. Browning:
                              Yes, Your Honor. From North
7
   Carolina's perspective, that makes a lot of sense. I assume
8
   that South Carolina would want to go first since this is
9
   effectively their motion to change the existing case
10
   management.
11
                              Actually, we think North Carolina
             Mr. Frederick:
12
   should go first because there hasn't been a bifurcation order
13
   that's actually been entered to define the proceedings. So
14
   we're happy to let North Carolina go first, unless you want
15
   to hear from us first.
                              We're perfectly happy to keep the
16
             Mr. Browning:
17
   existing case management plan in place until somebody wants
18
   to move to change it.
19
                              I think it does make sense for
             The Court:
20
   South Carolina to go first, but everyone will have a chance
21
   to speak as they wish.
22
             Mr. Browning:
                              Thank you, Your Honor.
23
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Thank you. May it please the
24
   Court, Special Master Myles, we initially took the view that
25
   a bifurcation could make sense in facilitating progress in
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the case because North Carolina disputed whether or not there was any shortage of water in South Carolina at all. And our belief was that an initial threshold showing of that shortage of water in certain periods of low flow could be readily demonstrated promptly within the proceedings.

As we discussed bifurcation with North Carolina, a dispute very quickly arose early on over what the scope of the various phases would be. And as you recall, almost two years ago we briefed this in issue in a preliminary way before any order was entered that specifically defined what the case would look like. Since that time, it's become clear that there is not a way to bridge the disagreement between the parties over what those phases would look like.

So our view is that the initial efficiencies that we thought could be served by limiting the case just to the states and having the intervenors participate just at the equitable apportionment—remedial phase are really not going to be served by any bifurcation at this point and that we're now far enough down the road we have laid out in approximately 35 pages of contention interrogatory responses what our harm case will look like, North Carolina has that as to the intervenors, and that we ought to be more efficient in just going on to discuss and put together the entire case so that we don't have unnecessary arguments over matters of what should be in Phase I, what should be in Phase II, and the

like.

We believe that the normal way the Court has addressed equitable apportionment actions has been to allow the evidence to come in about shortages, about uses, about benefits, and that that will benefit the Court in this case because the same witnesses are likely to be testifying as to both shortages and benefits on the South Carolina side as well as harms that are occurring by increased consumption on the North Carolina side.

So at a number of different levels, we believe that efficiency is served by having a single proceeding that will encompass all of the evidence and that the way that this could play out is that we each put on our case, we explain why South Carolina has been injured by water shortages in particular periods of low flow, that we explain what the economic and other harms are associated with that shortage, that we explain what the benefits to South Carolina are of that, and that we go through the modeling to demonstrate that the interbasin transfers that have been authorized in North Carolina will cause a drop in the amount of water that's available for South Carolina.

And all that can be demonstrated. We can each put in our proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. You can issue a recommended decision. We would only need to inconvenience witnesses once by the depositions that would be

taken and once through the trial testimony that would be adduced and that you would have before you the entire mass of the case without a lot of quibbling over what should be in what phase of the case.

And I think that the briefing here demonstrates pretty clearly that there is such a disagreement over what ought to be in Phase I of the case as North Carolina conceives it that no efficiency will be served at all. In fact, I think that our position is that the way North Carolina is viewing harm is not consistent with the Court's precedents.

So if we were to proceed along the lines that North Carolina is advocating, what they seek to do is to tilt the balance so heavily against South Carolina in Phase I of the proceeding that I think it would be inconsistent with the Court's precedents to proceed along the lines that they are advocating, because what they suggest is that South Carolina has to show shortage of water in South Carolina and that South Carolina did not do more—could not do more to ameliorate those particular harms through conservation, decreased use, availability of other water supplies, et cetera. And there is no precedent that we have seen indicating that that is the way the Court views this.

In fact, in the New Jersey v. New York case, what the Supreme Court did in a case involving two riparian states

was to look at the injuries that had been proffered by New Jersey to not view the case as one where New Jersey had to show there was a complete, full appropriation of all of the available water, but to argue that the interbasin transfer that was being proposed by New York was excessive to a degree. Instead of in excess of 600 million gallons per day, the Court ended up authorizing about 440 million gallons per day, and it said that the excess above that would have caused harm to the recreational uses in New Jersey as well as to the oyster beds that were supported by that amount of water.

And so I think what you've got here is a comparable situation where what South Carolina would be demonstrating throughout the case is in certain periods of low flow not enough water is coming down and it isn't our burden to demonstrate a kind of tort causation theory, but instead to demonstrate that as a shared resource the amount of water that is available to South Carolina is insufficient in those periods of low flow, and that the absence of that water in those periods of low flow is causing a real and substantial harm to people in South Carolina.

The Court: If you were to take out that element, if you were--in other words, some of your position on bifurcation seems to depend upon accepting North Carolina's perception of Phase I, with which you disagree. You're saying taking them at their word and viewing their

definition of Phase I as operative, then the two would be in many ways merged. But if you were to take a more narrow view of Phase I, what would your position be then?

Mr. Frederick: Well, our position is if it can be articulated and defined, that is something that we would evaluate. But we've talked about this now for almost two years, and no one has come up with an articulation consistent with the Court's cases with on point precedent in equitable apportionment cases.

And I think the reason for that is that because this is an action in equity, you're constantly weighing the fairness of factors one way or the other, the harms versus the uses, the benefits versus the detriments. And that kind of weighing occurs in this kind of action and it inherently creates difficulties of definition.

And we've spent hours in meet and confer sessions over the years talking to the other side in a way to try to limit the issues and narrow them. And I don't want to say it is impossible to do that. I can say that with great difficulty skilled lawyers on both sides have been unable to reach an agreement on how to define the phases in a way that actually leads to efficiency.

And our view now, Special Master Myles, is that we have laid out our harm case as North Carolina has requested. They've had it for three weeks. They had it before they

filed their reply brief for the bifurcation. It is true that there may be some supplementation as we gain further evidence. That's part of the discovery process.

But we've laid out what we anticipate the core of our case to be with respect to harm, and we're going to proceed on the guise of how to justify South Carolina be ensured-being assured of a sufficient amount of water so that those harms are ameliorated and avoided in the future, when hydrologists expect that there will be future drought conditions that cause shortages of water.

I would also point, Your Honor, to the Colorado-New Mexico case, where the Court made clear that where there is a situation of a finite amount of water that the upstream user seeking to justify further diversions has to do so through clear and convincing evidence.

And our position is that in these periods of low flow the IBTs that North Carolina state law has authorized for future use will have to be justified by clear and convincing evidence against the existing uses that South Carolina has. Because water is fungible, any withdrawal from the North Carolina side that doesn't make it to South Carolina is going to necessarily cause harm when there is a situation of low flow.

And that will end up being North Carolina's burden to demonstrate that the additional amounts to be withdrawn

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1
   under their authorized IBTs can be justified under a clear
   and convincing evidentiary standard.
2
                               What is it that you said--I
3
             The Court:
   wasn't--the Colorado case says that all--what does it say in
4
   relation to transfers and the burden of proof?
5
6
             Mr. Frederick:
                               What it says is that where there's
7
   a fully appropriated water resource for the upstream state---
8
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Colorado versus---
9
                               New Mexico.
             Mr. Frederick:
10
             The Court:
                               Okay. What page?
11
              (Pause.)
12
             Mr. Frederick:
                               I would look at pages 187 to 88 in
   note 13, where the Court specifically addresses the question
13
14
   of burden. But our point, Your Honor, is that what in effect
15
   I think the case is going to play out in demonstrating is
16
   that the IBTs have authorized under state law a particular
17
   amount of withdrawals in North Carolina. They've not used
18
   all of that capacity that has been authorized by state law,
19
   but there's no provision in state law to protect the down-
20
   stream users.
21
             And the case ultimately will come down to whether
22
   in periods of low flow there needs to be some modification on
23
   the amount that North Carolina can demonstrate by clear and
24
   convincing evidence it's justified in having at the expense
25
   of the existing users in South Carolina.
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And that ultimately comes into the same kind of weighing of factors and harms that North Carolina asserts should be done on the South Carolina side, where under their view of Phase I we have to demonstrate that we couldn't have done more to prevent harm, and all of their uses, including their authorized IBT, which doesn't take into account the effects across the state line, have to be assumed as reasonable use. And that position, Your Honor, is inconsistent with all of the Supreme Court cases that I've seen with respect to equitable apportionment. And it's certainly inconsistent with New Jersey v. New York and Colorado v. New Mexico. A couple of questions. One of the The Court: things that struck me about this idea of North Carolina having the burden of justifying all transfers is you used language to the effect that the transfer would--I forget exactly what you said, but it seemed to be in conflict with your position in the papers that said that the Court couldn't consider the fact that water comes back into another river basin. Is it the harm in that river basin solely or is it the harm to the state as a whole? Mr. Frederick: I think it's the harm within that river basin as demonstrated. I know North Carolina takes a

different position. I've not seen any cases. In fact, one

of the Nebraska and Wyoming cases, I believe, and one of the

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1
   Kansas and Colorado cases dealt with transfers.
2
             But if you look directly at the New Jersey v. New
3
   York case, you've got a case where the water--that was an
   interbasin transfer from the Delaware River to the Hudson
4
   River to supply water needs for New York City. And it was
5
   water being taken out of a river basin, and the Court said,
6
7
   "Yes, New York can take a certain amount; it just can't take
   all that it wants to take." Now---
8
9
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Did anybody raise
   or address the issue of whether water was flowing back into
10
11
   the Hudson and how much?
12
                               Well, there are--I don't know that
             Mr. Frederick:
13
   there was evidence in that case. Of course, the Hudson---
14
             The Court:
                               (interposing) But it doesn't go
15
   back--it wouldn't flow back anyway; right?
16
             Mr. Frederick:
                               The Hudson, if my geography is---
17
             The Court:
                               (interposing)
                                              I don't remember
18
            It flows into the Atlantic Ocean, doesn't it?
   myself.
19
             Mr. Frederick: ---accurate, borders New Jersey
20
   and New York. Whether there are intakes from the New Jersey
21
   side out of the Hudson is not something that I'm familiar
22
   with, although I do know that based on work on other cases
23
   that New Jersey does make riparian uses of the Hudson River.
24
   But I'm not prepared to represent that those water intake
25
   uses---
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1
             The Court:
                              (interposing) Right.
2
             Mr. Frederick: ---were part of the Court's
3
   analysis.
4
                              Here it's different geographically
             The Court:
5
   only that the river into which it would flow would be
6
   entirely--would go--wouldn't be a shared river at the time it
7
   goes into South Carolina; right?
8
                              Right, but I think that if you
             Mr. Frederick:
   were to look at kind of the natural ebb and flow of these
9
10
   equitable apportionment cases, it would be a tremendous
11
   burden to try to take one case over one dedicated river
12
   system and transform that into all basins that end up flowing
13
   down to the downstream state. The Court has never tackled
14
   that.
15
             The Court:
                               I agree it's a difficult issue,
   and it's hard--at one end of the spectrum it's hard to
16
17
   imagine doing that, to take into account every system that
18
   may be interrelated.
19
             But on the other hand, it's hard to imagine not
20
   taking into account water that is diverted and then flows
21
   back into a nearby river system that benefits the state, the
22
   complaining state. So it's hard to understand why you
23
   wouldn't take that into account if the issue is available
24
   water.
25
             Mr. Frederick: And that's why it isn't, because
```

if you look at the equities of the existing users, the people who bought property on Lake Wylie, who try to engage in recreational activities on Lake Wylie, who have sponsored fishing tournaments that have had to be canceled because of insufficient water, if you look at the industries that grew up over decades along the Catawba River and you tell them, "Well, I'm sorry, you're going to lose millions of dollars every year because of water shortages in Catawba, but the people over on the eastern side of the state, they get a benefit"—I don't think the Court has ever looked at equitable apportionment as that kind of analysis. That would be a unique and unprecedented way to analyze harms to existing users. And of course those users don't benefit at all by the water that might come through the state on a different river system.

So in terms of weighing equities, the Court traditionally has looked at the interests of the existing users, who built up their interests over time and who are forced to deal with the shortages of water. And in this case the amount of water that's been authorized by these IBTs is a very large sum.

And coupled with the demonstrable changes to climate that have reduced rainfall, particularly over the last ten years and are projected to occur in the future, I don't think it's an answer to those people that a few drops

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1
   of additional water may be trickling down in some unrelated
2
   river system that they don't have access to.
3
             The Court:
                               Okay.
                               And in any event, Your Honor, that
4
             Mr. Frederick:
   is not something that could readily be done in any kind of
5
6
   definable view of Phase I except in North Carolina's view,
7
   which I would submit is one that's intended to delay the
   prosecution and completion of the lawsuit rather than to
8
   expedite it. Our interest is in expediting the lawsuit so
9
10
   that we can get to a decree that ensures an adequate flow of
11
   water to the people in South Carolina.
12
             The Court:
                               So if we were to have phases, I'd
13
   like to get your sense of what--assuming--what would you--if
14
   you were to be able to define Phase I, if we were to have
15
   phases, what would Phase I be? What issues would be
16
   included?
17
             I think there's a difference over whether--
18
   obviously harm to South Carolina, decreased flow, et cetera,
   some of the things you've put in evidence on already; right?
19
20
   So I think everyone agrees on that; right?
21
                               That's correct.
             Mr. Frederick:
22
             The Court:
                               Okay. Now, the next thing is uses
23
   by North Carolina. It sounds like you agree on that, that
24
   that's relevant, at least at a general level, that what uses
25
   North Carolina is making of the water is relevant, including
```

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1
   the transfers, but also consumptive use on the river, et
2
   cetera.
3
             Mr. Frederick:
                               We--in the Phase I brief that we
   did in the summer of 2008, and I forget the exact date, we
4
5
   laid out that---
                              (interposing) It was April.
6
             The Court:
7
   have it here.
8
             Mr. Frederick: It was even earlier than I
9
   remembered.
10
             The Court:
                               Well, I could be wrong.
11
             Mr. Frederick: We laid out what we thought at
12
   that time. That was not an agreed position, and that was an
13
   attempt, Your Honor, to come to--I do want the record to be
14
   clear on this point, because those submissions followed
15
   several hours spanning several weeks, if I recall correctly,
   discussions with North Carolina and the intervenors to try to
16
17
   define Phase I.
18
             And it was our effort to be a compromise document
19
   reflecting what we thought our position was in light of the
20
   statements that had been made by the other side. But it was
21
   also an attempt to define and restrict the necessary role
22
   that the intervenors would play because all the intervenors
23
   had asserted an interest in doing this, protecting their
24
   right at the back end to assert an equitable apportionment.
25
   And our view all along has been that they are adequately
```

1 represented by North Carolina vis-à-vis whether there's 2 enough water flowing from North Carolina to South Carolina to 3 trigger a weighing of the various apportionment factors. So our view is that Phase I as we conceived it 4 originally was simply to rebut North Carolina's assertion 5 6 that there was an inadequate flow. Our point was yes, there's an inadequate flow, and we can demonstrate that and 7 we can prove that, in certain periods of restricted capacity. 8 And once we get to that, the question is what do you do about 9 10 it, given that it is a shared resource and both states have 11 an equality of right, even if not an equality of the actual 12 distribution. 13 So our view is that at this point, given that they 14 have pressed for many months for us to articulate what our 15 harms are and we've now done that, there's not really a purpose to be served in the way we had originally conceived 16 17 Phase I two years ago and that we should just get on with the 18 case and let's---

The Court: (interposing) But how about Phase I as defined more broadly, then, to include uses by North Carolina? I thought there had been agreement and I get the sense from the papers now that there would be agreement that Phase I, if there were to be one, would look at what's--would not just look at whether South Carolina has enough water to engage in the activities that historically it has done, but

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20

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22

23

24

25

1 also whether that diminution in flow is caused by North2 Carolina usage or not.

Mr. Frederick: Your Honor, there is not--let me answer your question in this way. Because water is fungible, any amount taken out and not returned to the river on the north side of the boundary is going to have an effect on the south---

The Court: (interposing) Not necessarily, because it may depend on timing. You've been saying in periods of low flow. So it's not necessarily the case that water taken out in the period of not low flow causes harm of the sort that you're describing.

Mr. Frederick: And that's why as we have defined the harms in our contention interrogatory response, they are limited to periods of low flow. And the case will—it will be like the New Jersey v. New York case, where when the water capacity gets down to a certain amount under the decree that the Court entered there, New York has to assure New Jersey that a certain amount will be available in the Delaware River to flow down. And they can't withdraw from the basin—the Delaware River basin into the Hudson River basin an amount that would cause the cubic feet per second flow to decrease below a certain level. That's what we would be talking about in any kind of equitable decree.

And in those periods where through sufficient

```
1
   rainfall both states have more than their fair share, there
   wouldn't be any of the kinds of restrictions on withdrawals
2
3
   that would be necessary in those periods. This would be--
   this case is about the low flow periods and the harms that
4
   are caused by more withdrawal than North Carolina's fair
5
   share in those periods of low flow.
6
7
                               But what would--will you be making
             The Court:
   any showing if that were Phase I relating to North Carolina's
8
9
   uses? What would your--what would that part of your case be
10
   in Phase I?
11
                               That part of our case would look
             Mr. Frederick:
12
   at--whether it's Phase I or Phase II or it's all mushed
13
   together, would look at North Carolina's consumptive
14
   patterns, its withdrawals, what's actually been taken out,
   how much has been returned. And it would look at that over
15
16
   different periods of time historically to show that in
17
   periods of low flow, North Carolina is taking out more than
18
                    That's in a nutshell what our case would
   its fair share.
19
   demonstrate.
20
             And our expert hydrologist will do this with graphs
21
   and pie charts and all sorts of things to show that when
22
   water reaches a certain level, what North Carolina is taking
   out is in excess of what should be available to preserve the
23
24
   interests of the South Carolina water users.
25
                               But don't you also have to look at
             The Court:
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the needs of the North Carolina water users? That's what I'm
1
2
   kind of confused by.
             Mr. Frederick: And that's what gets into the
3
4
   whole balancing. That's why this all gets mushed together,
   Special Master Myles, because once you ask that question,
5
   which I concede is the correct question in the entirety of
6
   the equitable apportionment analysis, you're balancing in
7
   essence the future needs and capacities of the North Carolina
8
9
   population growth versus the existing uses of the South
10
   Carolina users. And that's how you have to ultimately
11
   determine what is each state's fair share when the water is
12
   scarce.
13
             The Court:
                              Uh-huh.
14
                              And it's that very question--
             Mr. Frederick:
   because North Carolina, I don't fault them for protecting and
15
   representing the interests of their citizens. They would
16
17
   like Phase I only to be about South Carolina and whether
18
   South Carolina could conserve more or get water from other
19
   places to meet the needs of the people that have been harmed
20
   and all that. But in fact---
21
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Assume for a moment
   that that is not part of Phase I, if we were to have a Phase
22
23
   I. I understand that was in your papers, and--but if you
24
   were to have a narrower Phase I that either includes -- it
25
   includes the South Carolina water needs, it includes South
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1
   Carolina's current receipt of water and projected receipt of
   water in the sense of trying to show that there's not enough
2
   or there won't be enough, right, and then whatever showing
3
4
   gets made on North Carolina, assuming one could come up with
   a definition of that.
5
6
             So what if that were Phase I? I guess what I
7
   wanted to ask is how long would you -- I'm just wanting to get
   an estimate of time of trial and time to trial, between now
8
   and when the trial would be. If you could think about it--
9
10
   you don't have to answer on the spot, but what would be your
11
   estimate, assuming we can--I understand there's been
12
   difficulty defining Phase I, but that's because no one has
13
   ever asked me to define it. I can do that. We could just
14
   have a debate about that and come up with a definition that
15
   we think is workable.
16
             Mr. Frederick: Well, consistent with the Court's
17
   precedents, and the Court---
18
             The Court: (interposing) Right; of course,
   of course.
19
20
             Mr. Frederick: And the Court hasn't---
21
             The Court:
                              (interposing) But I just mean it
22
   can be decided.
23
             Mr. Frederick: But the question is to what
24
   benefit and what purpose in serving efficiency, both judicial
25
   efficiency and the efficiency---
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1
             The Court:
                              (interposing) Right.
                              ---of the witnesses---
2
             Mr. Frederick:
3
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Which is why I want
4
   to ask the question about timing. Assuming we--see, I am
5
   confident that we can come up with a definition of Phase I
6
   that would be comprehensible. In other words, it could be
7
   workable. But that doesn't answer your question about
   whether it's efficient and whether it makes sense to do it
8
9
   that way.
10
             Mr. Frederick: Or consistent with the Court's
11
   precedents.
12
             The Court:
                               I'm only saying the definitional
13
   question really to me isn't the be-all and end-all of this
14
   case because we can deal with the definitional question.
15
   What we need to deal with more is the broader question of
16
   what's the most efficient way to proceed.
17
             And so assuming we can do a definition that doesn't
18
   include all of the equitable issues of -- well, and including --
19
   it doesn't include--doesn't include alternative sources of
20
   water, doesn't include a valuation, economic valuation of
21
   uses, doesn't include the -- I guess there must be a non-
22
   economic valuation of uses too, presumably. That would all
23
   be Phase II.
24
             What then would be--how long would it take the
25
   parties to get from now until the beginning of Phase I,
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1
   taking into account that you've already done a lot of the
   work in the discovery you just served, and then how long
2
   would it take to complete Phase I and then likewise for Phase
3
   II, versus how long would it take, do you think, to get to
4
   trial if it were a consolidated--or not consolidated, but
5
   nonbifurcated proceeding, and how long would that trial take?
6
7
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Let me start at the back end.
8
             The Court:
                               Okay.
9
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Okay.
             The Court:
10
                               Yeah.
11
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Because I think that the way we
12
   have been thinking about this is -- because all, you know, the
13
   discovery requests have served--have requested what would be
14
   Phase II documents about the equitable apportionment factors.
15
   There's a lot of documents that have been produced.
16
             We are still awaiting data from the Duke outside
17
   consultant on the CHEOPS model which did the hydrology
18
   modeling.
              I understand that we are very close to being able
19
   to get access to that. Our experts would need to evaluate
20
   that so that they can help determine their view of the hydro-
21
   logical reports.
22
             But assuming that we were to get that relatively
23
   soon, my expectation is that we would be ready to go to trial
24
   on the entire case within the next 18 to 22 months, and that
25
   depending on how you defined the Phase I aspects of it with
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respect to, you know, what needed to be proved, we would be ready to go in, you know, six to nine months.

I don't think--and it's hard to estimate here on the fly, Special Master Myles, what length of trial we're talking about, but our belief is that we're looking at probably 30 witnesses I think probably for both sides combined. Maybe they have more. I don't know. They can speak to that.

But our sense is that some of the witnesses would not need to be put on the stand for very long because they have relatively limited points to make, but that the experts who will be providing the greatest grist for the mill might actually be on the stand for multiple days in both cases, so that the trial itself would probably last several weeks unless you were to help provide an efficiency by allowing people to submit their testimony through a written means and then just do cross-examination before you, which would in my experience be a way to shorten the proceedings.

So there are ways that we can work through those case management mechanisms, but our belief is that we can be ready to go to trial relatively promptly and that, you know, some of the unknowns are really in whether or not having a Phase I, which in effect—and I think that it's fair to assume, given the way everything has been litigated in this case, even matters that probably shouldn't be litigated or

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shouldn't need to be litigated, that there will be litigation over the definition of Phase I, that once Phase I happens, it can be expected that the party that did not prevail will go to the Court seeking exceptions. We'll have another year or year and a half delay before we can even start Phase II. And our view is that the people in South Carolina ought not to have to wait for a determination of what their water rights are. We're prepared to put the whole case together so that there can be one unified record and the Court can make its evaluations of the various legal questions that will be raised and based on findings of fact as to what the capacity of the river system is. Our view in short is that, you know, the more we spend time litigating and fighting over these definitional points, the less time we spend on the substance of the case. And we'd like to focus on the substance of the case. The Court: So when you said--you said several weeks, that the trial could go several weeks. Now, that's only if it's all together; right? Mr. Frederick: I believe that a harm case--I mean depending--and this is--I feel some uncertainty being that we're on the record about this, Special Master Myles, and not knowing how any Phase I would be defined or what purposes really would be served by that in view of the fact that many of the same witnesses we would have to put on would have to

be deposed for both Phase I and a Phase II and they'd have to be put on trial for Phase I and Phase II, but I would think that we could put a harms case on in not really very many trial days.

So I think if you look in terms of what the cases show for injury, the efficiency to the judicial process, the efficiency to the witnesses involved, just allowing the case to proceed, given the fact that the parties have already exchanged discovery that has invited the production and analysis of Phase II matters—and let me just point out one last point in favor of allowing the case to proceed as the normal course of equitable apportionment cases.

We believe that the prospect of a settlement and a compromise to ensure that in these periods of low flow the states could work out an appropriate compromise to ensure that South Carolina's needs are assured through settlement are best facilitated by moving in a direction where we get all the evidence out there. Everybody has got their positions staked out. Everybody knows what the case looks like. And then the powers that be can sit down to try to work out what would be a reasonable compromise.

That gets hindered the more phases and the more decisional points get put in place and the more opportunities for delay through appeal to the justices. And that doesn't serve the interests in having the parties come together to

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1
   try to work out their differences. Unless you have further
2
   questions---
             The Court:
                              No. I'd like to hear from North
3
              Thank you.
4
   Carolina.
5
             Mr. Browning:
                              May it please the Court, I will
   plan on speaking on behalf of North Carolina, and it's my
6
7
   understanding that Virginia Seitz will make a presentation on
   behalf of the intervenors.
8
9
             In our entire nation's history, there have only
10
   been nine equitable apportionment actions with respect to
11
   nine different rivers. And there's good reason for that.
12
   These are the most costly and complicated types of litigation
13
   basically known to mankind. Analyzing a river, determining
14
   the values, determining the usage of the river is extremely
15
   complicated. And this is something that the Court should not
16
   rush.
          It should give the parties an opportunity to present
17
   their evidence and do it in a way that makes sense, because
18
   this court's decision will be binding for decades, if not
19
   hundreds of years.
20
             There is no question that this original action has
21
   been a drain upon resources on behalf of both states. North
22
   Carolina has gathered documents in response to the existing
23
   discovery requests from over 200 document custodians. In the
24
   course of discovery, North Carolina has produced to South
25
   Carolina a total of 947,286 pages of materials.
                                                     The State of
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North Carolina has retained consultants to assist with electronic discovery of documents at the cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars to the State of North Carolina.

This has been a tremendous endeavor on behalf of both states, but more importantly, if Phase II is suddenly merged into Phase I, the effort, the cost, that North Carolina has incurred will be simply the tip of the iceberg, that there will be a tremendous number of costs associated with Phase II, balancing of equities, that we don't need to get to if South Carolina is unable to meet its threshold showing as set out in the Supreme Court's precedents that it has suffered substantial injuries that have been caused by the defendant state.

That is the threshold that the United States

Supreme Court has set. That is a perfectly logical reason to separate this case into phases. That is what the parties proposed. That is what the parties have been working towards.

And suddenly North Carolina feels like the rug has been pulled out from under our feet, that we have been proceeding along those lines, planning, making progress towards discovery, and South Carolina suddenly says, "Well, now that we have a ruling on intervention, what had been worked out with regard to the case management plan no longer makes sense." From North Carolina's perspective, we have a

very tough time seeing why that about face by South Carolina
has taken place.

Our experts, as we've talked to them to try to plan a logical way to sequence this case, we have had many conversations with them about what makes sense here. And those experts when we hear what they have to say in terms of the type of discovery, the type of evidence that must be presented, if you're balancing the equities between two states, North Carolina is fully convinced that the amount of time, energy, work, and effort that will have to be put into Phase II is ten times greater than what the parties have been working towards under the existing case management order with respect to how Phase I is defined. It makes a lot of sense to avoid those costs if they're unnecessary.

South Carolina has talked at length about its contention interrogatories and its 35 pages setting out its harm, but the fact of the matter is it is North Carolina's position that South Carolina will be unable to meet the threshold showing that the United States Supreme Court has set in equitable apportionment actions.

And even though South Carolina has recently served its contention interrogatories, of course one of the central questions is whether North Carolina has caused any harm to South Carolina and what those harms are. In its 35 pages of contention interrogatories, South Carolina describes in

slightly more detail what it has set out in the bill of complaint in terms of how it believes it's been harmed. But when it comes to the issue of causation in response to contention interrogatory number 4, South Carolina basically says with respect to causation, "It's simply premature. We cannot—we will provide our expert reports in due course as directed by the Special Master."

And Mr. Frederick turns to the case of New Jersey v. New York, the case concerning the diversion of water for the city of New York from the Delaware to the Hudson River. But we have to remember in that case we were talking about one specific interbasin transfer that could be readily evaluated by the parties.

That is not the case that South Carolina is attempting to make out here. What they're now saying is "We have been harmed by interbasin transfers and all of these other consumptions by North Carolina." Well, in that regard, North Carolina is still in the dark. We don't know what South Carolina is saying. Their contention interrogatories will tell you—just simply tell us, "We'll tell you what the excess water is that North Carolina has been taking when the Special Master issues an opinion or issues an order directing us to provide expert testimony."

But this case is fundamentally different from New York $v.\ New\ Jersey$ because there you dealt--the Court was

dealing with one specific, definable interbasin transfer that the parties could take, consider, determine a calculation of harm and damages. Unfortunately, the bill of complaint that we're facing here is much more nebulous, referencing all interbasin transfers, and as we've learned in the course of the last couple of years, other consumption uses by North Carolina.

But North Carolina really needs to know at some point before we can proceed what it is that South Carolina is really saying that North Carolina has done wrong that has resulted in a substantial injury. That's why we've been fighting so hard to have South Carolina come forward and present its case so we'll know what to defend. That is why we're fighting so hard to keep this case in phases because we really need to know what South Carolina is complaining about in terms of the consumption by North Carolina, what is the quantity that we are taking that's in excess of what they believe is appropriate, so that we can really do the modeling, do the work to defend this case.

Now, as I've said, our experts have noted--informed us that the balancing of equities will require much, much more work than what the parties have previously presented to the Court as being the issue that can be resolved in Phase I, and if I could just take a few moments to explain why their analysis makes sense.

As we've talked about, one of the issues that clearly is a Phase II issue is the benefit that South Carolina receives from these IBTs that flow into the Yadkin River basin. Of course the analysis and flow of a river requires very complex computerized modeling, very expensive expert analysis. That expert analysis and that computer modeling does not come cheap.

We of course have somewhat of an advantage with regard to the Catawba River because Duke Energy has already done a substantial part of that work through its licensing process and the CHEOPS computerized modeling that already exists that will be a starting point for the analysis of the Catawba River.

With regard to the Yadkin River, however, the work will be substantial in trying to evaluate the flow, the hydrology of that river, but it's important in a balancing of the equities that we ultimately do that work. But that work can be postponed for another day.

All of the IBTs that South Carolina complains about in its bill of complaint, the flow from all of those IBTs go into the Yadkin River. The Yadkin River when it flows into South Carolina is the Pee Dee River in South Carolina.

As can be seen in Exhibit 1 and 2 to South

Carolina's bill of complaint, what really set off South

Carolina to file this lawsuit was the interbasin transfer

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1
   that was approved by the North Carolina Environmental
   Management Commission with respect to Concord and Kannapolis.
2
   That IBT allows Concord and Kannapolis to withdraw water from
3
   the Catawba River and discharge it to the Yadkin River.
4
   That's what caused this bill of complaint to be filed
5
6
   initially, or certainly when you look at the exhibits and the
   bill of complaint, you get that strong sense.
7
             But the part of the story that South Carolina
8
   really tries to distance themselves from is before that
9
10
   interbasin transfer certificate was issued by the North
11
   Carolina Environmental Management Commission, our environ-
12
   mental people went to their counterparts, the environmental
13
   people at agencies in South Carolina, and basically said, "We
14
   have before us this IBT application. Does South Carolina
15
   want to be heard?"
16
             Their environmental people responded that
17
   basically, "Thanks, but no thanks. We don't think it's a
18
   transfer of such significance to merit attention, but
19
   moreover it puts the water in the Yadkin River, " where in
20
   their words--I'm sorry, puts it in the Pee Dee River, where,
21
   quote, "we may need it more anyway." That's set out in North
22
   Carolina's opposition to the bill of complaint, the
23
   declaration of Mr. Fransen.
24
             The Supreme Court has made clear that in balancing
25
   the equities, the Court must consider the benefits to the
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1 downstream state of water usage by the upstream state even if the, quote, "locality of benefit" in the downstream state has 2 changed. That of course is the decision of Kansas v. 3 4 Colorado, 206 U.S. at page 100-101. 5 Under Kansas v. Colorado, the benefit that South Carolina receives in the Yadkin River basin is clearly 6 7 relevant in the balancing of equities. Fortunately, the 8 existing case management order reserves that issue for Phase II because it will be a tremendous amount of work. It is an 9 10 issue that the parties have not yet conducted discovery 11 against. 12 And that really makes sense to hold that very 13 complex issue off until a later day, because if South 14 Carolina can't meet their threshold burden of proof, there is 15 no reason to do modeling of a completely different river 16 basin in order to balance the equities in this particular 17 case. 18 As set out in our briefs, there are many other 19 issues that North Carolina believes will have to be dealt 20 with in Phase II, when Your Honor is faced with the balancing 21 of the equities, that simply doesn't need to be considered at 22 the current time. 23 One example is the fact that a tremendous volume of the Catawba River--or compared to other usages of the Catawba

River, a great percentage of the river is used in connection

24

25

with the generation of electricity. There are nuclear power plants, coal fired power plants, in addition to the hydro facilities that Your Honor is very familiar with. But those plants have to have cooling water. Cooling water of course results in a significant amount of evaporation, water that is lost from the Catawba River.

Well, that electricity just doesn't benefit North
Carolina that's generated by Duke Energy. It has benefits to
South Carolina as well. Duke's service area is in South
Carolina as well as North Carolina.

And doing that analysis of the consumptive usage as a result of the generation of electricity and which state really gets the benefit of that is going to be very, very complex, factual discovery, something that only has to be done when you're balancing the equities. It should be appropriately saved for a later date until South Carolina has first come forward and met its threshold showing of harm caused at the hands North Carolina.

As we've set out in the brief, one of the other issues that rightfully should be deferred until Phase II is the fact that the largest city in both of these two states is right at the border, Charlotte, North Carolina. That city—there are a number of workers from South Carolina that commute into the city each day.

Of course, as they're in the city of Charlotte,

they're consuming water. They are placing a tax--they are taxing the natural resources, the withdrawal of water from the Catawba River. That has to be considered at some point in the balancing of the equities, but it's not going to be an easy task to engage in. There is no reason to do it now. It should be deferred when we are at the stage of balancing the equities.

The same is true with respect to the many facilities that straddle the border between North Carolina and South Carolina. As we set out in the brief, one of the prime examples is Carowinds, a major theme park with a major water park, significant consumption. It is in both North Carolina and South Carolina. South Carolina is getting the benefit of property taxes for a substantial portion of that theme park, but all of the water for that park is drawn from North Carolina through the City of Charlotte.

Those sort of facilities we're going to have to identify, and we're going to have to try to somehow create a fair balancing as to who gets credit for the usage of water at those bistate facilities. And again, my point is that there are many, many areas here that will be very complicated discovery that will have to be done if this court is going to issue an order that will basically be binding for decades to come, but it's not going to be an easy task.

Let's take on the task that we can manage, which is

what the Supreme Court has said is the threshold showing of substantial harm to the complaining state that is caused by the defendant state. That is Phase I. That is a essentially what both sides agreed to in the progress reports dated February 3rd, 2009 from both states. The language in the two progress reports is remarkably similar. Both recognize that South Carolina has to show harm of a serious magnitude that was caused by North Carolina.

That is the case we should be trying to get our handle around, because we can do that in an efficient manner. But when we're talking about the balancing of the equities—and I could drone on and on as we did in our brief about the many tasks that we think are Phase II, but I believe Your Honor gets my point that we should be looking at cost savings and how to do this efficiently. We believe that treating this in phases makes an awful lot of sense.

The Court: Let me ask you this, and I did appreciate the detail that was in your brief. So if there were to be a Phase I, and I'm going to--this is sort of the same question I asked Mr. Frederick a moment ago--and we could agree upon--at least we seem to be in agreement at a general level of what the question presented would be at that phase, is there substantial harm to the complaining state caused by the defendant state. I think we're on board with that; right? I think both parties are---

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1
              Mr. Browning:
                               (interposing) Yes.
              The Court:
                               ---would agree to that.
2
3
                               Phase I being the complaining
              Mr. Browning:
4
   state--both causation and harm would---
5
              The Court:
                               (interposing) Right.
                               ---need to be shown in that.
              Mr. Browning:
6
7
              The Court:
                               So with that in mind, then, just
   getting back to this question about what that second part of
8
9
   it would be if you had to define Phase I, we've gotten into
   more detail in the brief in here than we did before about
10
11
   what those questions would be.
12
              And it seems to--seemingly the easy question is the
13
   transfers and what is this magnitude of water being trans-
14
   ferred out. That's one use by North Carolina that is alleged
15
   to be a harm. Then we have the other uses, consumptive uses
   and other uses, that South Carolina has said are their harm,
16
17
   but we haven't got a lot of detail about what those are.
18
   That's not really the issue, because they'll have that--if
19
   that's part of Phase I, that will be part of the case, so
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   they'll have to put on their evidence at the latest -- at that
21
   time.
22
              So how would you --would you envision that being the
23
   totality, then, of Phase I is to take--if we can look at all
24
   the uses of North Carolina, if one could quantify those, and
25
   then compare them against the needs of South Carolina, would
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1	that be Phase I, or would you also, as South Carolina is
2	contending, be wanting to look at conservation possibilities,
3	ways that South Carolina could alleviate its harm without
4	diminishing the flow that's now gone to North Carolina?
5	Mr. Browning: Yeah. I believe that South
6	Carolina is exaggerating one of the points we made in our
7	early brief. The key here based upon the Supreme Court's
8	precedent is they have to show causation and substantial
9	harm. Now, the question then is how do you show causation.
10	We pointed out early on in our brief that a self-
11	inflicted wound is not causation by North Carolina, if for
12	example they have all of their taps running and are just
13	having such gross waste of water that they can't show
14	causation under that scenario. But in terms of the detailed
15	work in terms of an economic analysis of cost benefit,
16	conservation efforts, clearly all of that is Phase II.
17	Our only pointand it was a point that I thought
18	we made in passing, so I'm kind of surprised that it got such
19	great detail in South Carolina's briefs this go-aroundis if
20	you have a self-inflicted harm, you're not going to be able
21	to show causation, butthat's our point.
22	The way I look at it, Your Honor, is what Phase I
23	is about is South Carolina has to show that there have been
24	harms, and they have to show it has been caused by North
25	Carolina. So really what you're looking at on the North

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1
   Carolina side of the border is basically a volumetric
   analysis of how much water is being taken out of the river.
2
   The various things that Mr. Frederick ran through in terms of
3
   quantity of withdrawals, quantities of return, that's what's
4
   needed to calculate causation.
5
              And where the real cost will come and the time and
6
7
   detail and attention will be when we're not doing that
   volumetric analysis for both states, but we're also trying to
8
9
   evaluate the usage and place economic value on how the usages
10
   take place, which is all the balancing and equities that go
11
   into Phase II.
12
              So a long-winded way of saying your answer, yes,
13
   Your Honor, you're absolutely right. We look at Phase I as
14
   it is set out in our letter--progress report of February 3,
15
   2009 as being fairly straightforward. All of the Phase II
16
   issues that we ran through in our brief are truly Phase II.
17
   They do not come into play at Phase I, nor should they.
18
              What we're asking is for this court to tell South
19
   Carolina they have to come forward, meet their threshold
20
   burden, show specific injuries, bring forth their witnesses,
21
   and explain to the Court how North Carolina has caused that.
22
   And it's that expert piece that we really need to get this
23
   case moving forward.
24
              The Court:
                               Which expert piece?
                               The causation; as I said, their
25
              Mr. Browning:
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1 interrogatory--contention interrogatory number 4, where we are asking them how much--"What is it that you contend is the 2 amount of water usage by North Carolina that should be 3 eliminated in order to prevent substantial harms?" And their 4 response is basically, "You'll find out when you get our 5 expert reports." 6 7 The Court: I see. Just a couple of questions. Is there an historical element to either of the 8 parts that you've described in Phase I in terms of South 9 10 Carolina's harm? Does the showing go back in time? Is it 11 meant to say, "Okay, before we had this much water; now we're 12 getting this much water"? And in the case of North Carolina, 13 does it go back in time to say, "Prior uses were this amount, 14 and now they're this amount"? 15 Mr. Browning: Your Honor, I think prior usages have to probably be considered as background, particularly 16 17 when you're dealing with a river system that fluctuates over 18 time. And I gathered today from what Mr. Frederick said that they are really narrowing their case to simply drought, low 19 20 flow type conditions. So if that's the case, you certainly 21 need to consider the history of the river to have a better 22 picture for that. 23 Of course it's our position that in light of the 24 comprehensive relicensing agreement, the world has changed, 25 that the problems that South Carolina saw previously during

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1
   drought have been mitigated substantially as a result of the
2
   change in the management of these dams by Duke Energy.
                               Uh-huh. And does the--does that
3
             The Court:
   question about the effect of the CRA come into Phase I?
4
5
                              Your Honor, again, I think it's
             Mr. Browning:
   going to be background that has to be considered in terms of
6
7
   whether South Carolina is experiencing a harm caused by North
8
   Carolina. With these new operating parameters and the
   basically guarantees that South Carolina has in terms of flow
9
10
   of water into the state, it's going to be much more difficult
11
   for them to prove their case based upon drought conditions
12
   and what took place prior to the comprehensive relicensing
13
   agreement.
14
                              Uh-huh.
             The Court:
                                        Okay, that's helpful.
   Now, a couple other questions, and these aren't necessarily
15
16
   logically related, but one is Mr. Frederick's point about the
17
   burden of proof from Colorado versus Kansas.
                                                  I hadn't
18
   focused on that passage in the case before, but---
19
             Mr. Browning: (interposing) Your Honor---
20
             The Court:
                             ---do you have a--do you agree
21
   with his analysis of that case?
22
             Mr. Browning: We completely disagree with how he
   has tried to use Colorado v. New Mexico.
23
24
             The Court:
                               Sorry; New Mexico.
25
             Mr. Browning:
                             Footnote 13 sets out basically the
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1
   framework, and it reiterates the Court's precedent in terms
2
   of the threshold burden that I've been referring to, that the
   complaining state--and this is language at footnote 13 on
3
   page 188 of the opinion.
4
5
             The complaining state, New Mexico, "must therefore
   bear the initial burden of showing that a diversion by
6
7
   Colorado will cause substantial injury to the interests of
   New Mexico." That is in a nutshell a summary of that
8
   threshold showing that South Carolina has to come forward
9
10
   with.
11
             The Court:
                               Right.
                                       So then in the text---
12
             Mr. Browning:
                               (interposing) Yes. Where we
13
   differ with Mr. Frederick is the next sentence then goes on
14
   that "In this case, New Mexico has met its burden since any
15
   diversion by Colorado, unless offset by New Mexico at its own
16
   expense, will necessarily reduce the amount of water."
17
             It's that second step in the process where we
18
   disagree with him and his use of Colorado v. New Mexico
19
   because in this case, factually, the river was fully appro-
20
   priated so that basically early on in the opinion--I believe
21
   it's page 180--the Court notes that there is little, if any,
22
   water from the river that makes the confluence with the
23
   Canadian River. Yes, that's at page 180 of the opinion.
24
             So factually, Colorado v. New Mexico is vastly
   different from this case. There has never been a time period
25
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where the Catawba River has run dry, and with the dams that
1
2
   are operated, there has been continuous water flow.
             So to take this case and say "During times of low
3
   flow, we don't have any burden of proof here; we are just
4
   like the complaining state in Colorado v. New Mexico" really
5
   doesn't make any sense because this is not a river that's
6
7
   been fully appropriated. There are--through many periods
   there is sufficient flow of water. And South Carolina can
8
   increase the number of dams along the river and take
9
10
   advantage of that excess flow if it were to so choose.
11
             Instead what it's saying is, "North Carolina, you
12
   have many dams on your side of the border. Let that water
13
   go, or don't make use of that water in other river basins.
14
   Save it and send it down to us when we really need it." So
15
   that's why we think Colorado v. New Mexico is completely
16
   inapplicable the way they're trying to use it.
17
             The Court:
                               Uh-huh.
                                        Okay.
                                               Now, I wanted to
18
   get at a couple of other questions that have been raised in
19
   the briefs about witnesses and experts. And this may be able
   to be folded into the question I asked Mr. Frederick also,
20
21
   which is if you had to do a ballpark estimate of time--you
22
   know, what's of interest really is time to trial and time of
23
   trial if we were to have the phases versus if we were to have
24
   the whole case.
25
                               That's right.
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Mr. Browning:

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The Court: So if you could speak to those issues and maybe try to address also--there's the issue that South Carolina has raised about witnesses having to appear twice, so that's one issue, and then -- in having to either appear at trial or in deposition twice. And also just a question I had from the briefing about experts, to what extent is there overlapping expert testimony, or to what--or, you know, to the contrary, then, to what extent are the experts really distinct for the two sets of issues we're talking about here? Yes, Your Honor. Let me try to Mr. Browning: take that in order, and please set me straight if I get off track here. First of all, with regard to time to trial, let me first of all respond to Mr. Frederick's comment that if I understood what he's saying is he wants you to compress Phase II into Phase I, and we should be in a position to try this case in 18 to 22 months. I might have misunderstood what he's saying, but let me explain from North Carolina's perspective why that's completely unrealistic. First, if you'll notice in their reply brief, all of the issues that North Carolina -- or a substantial number of the issues that we are talking about that are involved in the balancing of the equities Mr. Frederick is basically saying it's not relevant, that for example Yadkin River, we don't get to have any evidence on

that category because it's irrelevant. With regard to commuters coming to Charlotte, he's basically saying it's irrelevant because you get the advantage of having workers from the state of South Carolina.

So he is--I think in his calculation of 18 to 22 months is assuming that all of the issues that our experts have identified as being crucial nobody will have to bother with. So I think it's unrealistic in that regard.

I think it's also unrealistic given the fact that our first document request was served on South Carolina July 1, 2008, and to my knowledge South Carolina is still in the process of providing additional electronic documents. If South Carolina has completed their document production, we will be bringing that before the Court here shortly because we do not think their production is complete. But it's taken them two years to get through the first document request that North Carolina has had out there, and that of course doesn't include all of what we're going to need to ask for if Phase II is suddenly lumped into Phase I.

So I think we need to be realistic about lead times on how much work will be done to gather this evidence. And we can all say things optimistically about when we can get to trial if it causes—if it advances our position, but I think the parties really need to step back and take a serious look at how much time is needed.

Now, if we are on the existing Phase I track, for us I think it is an effort to analyze the critical paths that need to be undertaken to bring Phase I to trial. As we've said consistently to Your Honor, that whenever we have South Carolina's experts' reports identifying what they claim to be the issue of causation, our experts will need nine months to go through this very complicated analysis, the computerized modeling, the effort that would need to be done, so in doing that calculation, as we've said throughout, that we will need nine months from the time we get their expert report.

So where that leaves us is how much time will it take to wrap up discovery to allow the intervenors to have their additional say with regard to discovery and the catch-up discovery they want to do. And like Mr. Frederick, I'm afraid that giving you a number off the top of my head probably is not going to be realistic, but we would certainly agree to sit down with all the parties and whichever way the Court is leaning in terms of case management directive to work out something that would be reasonable so that we can bring this case to trial as quickly as possible. But we think the most effective way to do that is to stick with the existing Phase I and the existing case management.

I think your next category was the overlap of fact witnesses. We do not think that there will be a substantial overlap. There might be some. But there of course are case

management ways to eliminate any potential difficulty. Mr. Frederick had raised the issue of possibly coming forward with creative ways to present the evidence at trial, which is something that we would certainly consider.

I don't think you will have many witnesses that will be both Phase I and Phase II, but to the extent that you are, they are probably witnesses that are at the various intervenors or the City of Charlotte, and they can certainly—they as well as the South Carolina witnesses can be accommodated in various ways, whether it's minimizing the overlap, working with them so we're not disruptive on their schedules.

But the fact of the matter is if you've got two relatively unrelated topics, doing someone's deposition at the outset of this case for two days is really not appreciably different from doing their deposition on Phase I for one day, and assuming you need it later on, their deposition on Phase II another day. So I think--I am optimistic that the attorneys in this case can work together to minimize any inconvenience with regard to witnesses.

Now, with respect to experts, there will be many categories of expert testimony that will not be covered in Phase I at all: things we've talked about in our brief, the analysis of census data and what that means, having someone get up here on the stand and walk through the data in a way

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that the attorneys aren't fumbling through the data to try to
1
   explain it to the Court, things like electrical usage and
2
   generation by Duke Energy and which state benefits from that
3
   usage. Those categories are going to be expert witnesses
4
   that are totally unrelated from Phase II.
5
6
             Now, North Carolina does envision that our hydro-
7
   geologist -- we will probably use the same one to testify on
   Phase I with regard to the Catawba River and later on in
8
   Phase II, when he also has to discuss the Yadkin River, but
9
10
   there is no question a tremendous cost saving to split up
11
   that so that if we never need to get to an analysis of the
12
   Yadkin River, we don't have to expend all of those resources
13
   to get him into a position to opine about the Yadkin River.
14
              The Court:
                               Okay. One other question, just--
15
   this is just a fact finding question.
16
              Mr. Browning:
                               Yes, Your Honor.
17
              The Court:
                               To what extent have the -- at least
18
   as you perceive it has the document production been covering
19
   both phases, or has it been largely limited to Phase--what we
20
   call Phase I issues?
21
              Mr. Browning:
                               With regard to our discovery
22
   request to South Carolina, they've objected, so it's been--to
23
   the extent they view something that is Phase II, so it's been
24
   very limited.
25
             Mr. Frederick:
                               I object to that.
                                                  That's actually
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1
   not true, Your Honor. I know I'll get a chance, but I do
2
   want to just put out there that's just not accurate.
                               Well, let me hear from--let me
3
             The Court:
   hear from both of you on that, because I'd like to--I should
4
   have asked you that one when you were up, but---
5
6
             Mr. Browning:
                              And with regard to subpoenas to
7
   third parties, we went ahead and decided that given the
   provision of the case management order that allows us to go
8
   ahead and obtain Phase II discovery if it's efficient, it was
9
10
   much easier for these water users to go ahead and have them
11
   do one focused search rather than to be burdened with two
12
   separate subpoenas at different times.
13
                               So, for example, just hypotheti-
             The Court:
14
   cally in such a subpoena, what do you call it--what would you
15
   call the Phase I and Phase II issues to such a witness, say a
   witness that was a third party? You're asking them "What
16
17
   uses are you making of the water?"
18
             Mr. Browning:
                              Your Honor, basically our
   subpoenas were getting at the volumetric usage and various
19
20
   other related issues concerning---
21
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Well, then what
22
   would be the Phase II part of that, if there was one?
23
             Ms. Lucasse:
                               I would say drought.
24
             Mr. Browning:
                              Yes, Your Honor. Sorry for the
25
   interruption, but drought is a good example that.
                                                       Where it
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1
   was something that we were viewing as a Phase II issue that
   we recognized, it was easier to go ahead and--since we were
2
   burdening the entity with one subpoena, let's go ahead and
3
   get them to gather it all in the same process.
4
5
                               I see, okay. And then one other
             The Court:
   question, and I'll ask Mr. Frederick this also, is what
6
7
   about -- we haven't really talked about depositions. And when
   do the parties anticipate wanting to commence depositions?
8
9
                               I would defer to the intervenors
             Mr. Browning:
10
   in terms of how much additional catch-up discovery they would
11
   need. We have not had an opportunity to really confer along
12
   those lines, quite frankly. You know, deciding whether we
13
   have two phases together or one phase has certainly made it a
14
   little bit more complicated to have some of those conversa-
15
   tions as to what steps we take next.
16
             The Court:
                               Uh-huh.
                                        Okay.
17
                              Your Honor, if there are no
             Mr. Browning:
18
   further questions, it's the position of the State of North
19
   Carolina that there is no reason that your existing case
20
   management plan should be modified. The State of North
21
   Carolina would ask that South Carolina's request to modify
22
   that to merge Phase II into Phase I should be denied.
                                                           Thank
23
   you.
24
             Ms. Seitz:
                               Good morning. I'll attempt to be
25
   very brief. I first wanted to say that we, Duke Energy, have
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served our catch-up document requests on South Carolina. We have not taken further steps. I think we anticipate serving also some contention interrogatories ourselves focused on our particular interests.

And I think the only additional point I want to make, since everyone seems to be in agreement that bifurcation should be maintained if it would serve efficiency purposes, is that if in fact Your Honor can define the phases, there's both the potential for early resolution of the case and for the narrowing of issues in Phase II critically in a phasing of the litigation.

For example, we're thrashing around, as you can tell a little bit, on causation. And once those expert reports are delivered and we actually have a sense of what the uses are in North Carolina that are causing the harm in South Carolina, I think that will focus and narrow substantially Phase II in ways that could significantly benefit.

If we don't do that and we simply litigate the entirety of the case without narrowing—the narrowing of Phase I and I might point out dispositive motions in Phase I could bring to the case, then we, you know, look at potentially having a vast amount of discovery connected to Phase II that might be unnecessary if you've already resolved either on dispositive motions or in a mini-trial some of the

issues of causation and harm--the amount of harm in Phase I.

So, you know, it's hard to predict at this point exactly how much benefit you might get from resolving the Phase I issues, but I think it has the potential—we all acknowledge it has the potential if they don't meet the threshold of ending the case, but it also even if it doesn't do that has substantial potential to narrow the case in Phase II and thus limit the amount of discovery that's done.

The last thing I'll say is that in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has put a significant burden on the state--the complaining state to cross that threshold to prove is a reason I think to maintain bifurcation because it demonstrates the importance to the Court of allowing an equitable apportionment case to be fully litigated.

It is, you know, essentially a sovereign to sovereign complaint of the highest importance. And so in order to take those next steps, there's a threshold showing that must be made. And I think it's appropriate to recognize that procedurally with the bifurcation that you've ordered.

On the specific issue of phases--because a lot of the conversation this morning has been about debating the contours of phasing and you've expressed confidence that I think we share that a definition, a workable definition, of Phase I could be done, particularly now that the case is confined to situations of drought and low flow. Since both

states operate under riparian regimes, I think the question is at times of drought or low flow is the water sufficient to meet existing reasonable uses. And North Carolina says in addition that the complaining state must show that the cause of that insufficiency is North Carolina uses and not the drought or low flow.

Now, how might this be shown? I think for example if North Carolina is not experiencing the drought harms that South Carolina is experiencing, if its recreational facilities are in full swing, if it is continuing to consume at the same rate that it consumes in times when there is no drought or low flow, that might be one way in which South Carolina could show that it's not the drought that's harming South Carolina; it's North Carolina's uses.

We think that's going to be a very difficult showing to make in light of the low inflow protocol, which imposes at times of low flow and drought very significant behavior changes, very significant regimes of conservation on both states.

So we think that there is some reason to believe that it's going to be hard for South Carolina to show that the harms of the sort it's experiencing, which are drought related harms, are not caused simply by the droughts, are not harms that North Carolina is also experiencing at the same time. But we think that is what Phase I should be about.

Now, there's some possibility that other types of evidence could be relevant in that Phase I proceeding. For example, if there's--since the standard is reasonable use, there may be some evidence that's relevant to show that certain uses in South Carolina aren't reasonable.

But I think both parties agree and the intervenors also agree that the issues that relate to balancing of the equities are simply not issues that are up for consideration in Phase I, in particular uses in North Carolina and their value and their value relative to the use of that same water in South Carolina, South Carolina—the availability in South Carolina of additional sources of water.

Those issues that are articulated in North
Carolina's brief in some detail, everyone agrees that one way
or another, however you define Phase I, those issues should
not be in Phase I. And I think that necessarily means that
we can create a Phase I that's limited, has the promise of
reaching dispositive motions in an efficient way, and it
would then allow the narrowing of the case substantially for
Phase II.

On the expert witness front, I think it's significant to point out that experts addressing the first issues of harm to South Carolina and its causes would not be addressing the same kind of issues or modeling that would be required to address the value of uses in North Carolina of that increment

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   of water, and then compare the value of those uses in North
2
   Carolina to South Carolina. So at the very least, the type
   of expert work that's required and the nature of expert
3
4
   testimony that's required in phases is very different.
5
             And I think that experts are the best example of
   the nonduplication of witnesses that you have in phases.
6
   these are, I think as all the parties agree, going to be the
7
   witnesses that take the most time and the most effort on
8
   behalf--and the most testimony days for you when you hold a
9
10
   trial.
11
             The last thing I think I'll say is that Duke
12
   witnesses would be different for the different phases of the
13
   trial. And I know that we are not the only or by any means
14
   the most relevant player here, but I can tell you that the
15
   people who would be testifying from Duke about the question
16
   of uses in North Carolina and the benefits to North Carolina
17
   of Duke Power's uses of water in North Carolina would not be
18
   the same folks that will be testifying about the modeling of
19
   the river that I think is principally at stake in Phase I.
20
             The Court:
                               Well, I imagine that's true. That
21
   had occurred to me earlier, that even with other smaller
   entities, it may not be the same individuals who are
22
23
   testifying if it's a corporate entity.
24
             Ms. Seitz:
                               And I think, as North Carolina
25
   indicated, a lot of the witnesses that you can anticipate
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1
   would require multiple deposition days and multiple trial
2
   testimony days would be from these corporate type entities
3
   and would often be the designated expert within those
   entities on the particular topic at hand.
4
5
             The Court:
                               Uh-huh.
                               Settlement we think will be sub-
6
             Ms. Seitz:
7
   stantially aided in addition by bifurcation. I think if--as
   I expect would be true after the dispositive motions on the
8
   Phase I issues that Phase II is significantly narrowed, I
9
10
   think that is the most conducive atmosphere to settlement
11
   conversations and that if the parties are just flinging over
12
   the transom at each other information on uses, cost of uses,
13
   benefits of uses in their relative states, that that's not
14
   going to narrow and focus the issues in a way that's most
15
   conducive to settlement conversations among the parties.
16
             We agree with North Carolina also that in order for
17
   experts to respond to South Carolina's expert showing of the
18
   causation of its harms, it's going to require, you know,
   substantial expert work on the order of six to nine months
19
20
   also.
21
             The Court:
                               Just--I don't mean to interrupt
22
   you, but---
23
             Ms. Seitz:
                               (interposing) No, I'm finished.
24
   Are there are further ways that---
25
             The Court:
                               (interposing)
                                              If it were--I mean
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some of the points that are made on both sides seem valid in the briefing if you just--conceptually valid, that South Carolina makes the point that having everything all at once in the record is useful in certain ways, including for settlement they say, but also if it goes up to the Court for some interrogatory review to have the whole record available and therefore not have to redo issues--well, actually that would be the limited--that would be I guess a threshold issue that gets decided, then it gets remanded, and then you don't have to redo the trial.

So I guess it wouldn't be an interrogatory, but it would be a final report review but that gets sent back on some issue, versus going up on a Phase I interim report and then getting sent back and having to go back to trial. I think that was one of their points. I'm not articulating it very well, but having the full record would be more efficient from the standpoint of going up to the Court. And then having a full record would avoid obviously overlap, and the issues are all intertwined. So those are kind of the basic points.

If Phase I were--if Phase II were a manageable size--in other words, if the issues on Phase II were all manageable size, then it may be less efficient to split it up than to keep it together. It would just be a set of additional issues that would be part of the mix that you'd be

1 discovering, you'd be trying, you'd be--and maybe then you'd have a decisional tree that would allow you to make the 2 3 decision in phases, but you'd have the whole record there. So I guess that a lot of it does boil down to the 4 factual question of what size would these phases be if we had 5 6 So that's why I'm sort of trying to get at the relative size of the trial in the two phases versus one whole 7 trial and the relative time to prepare them. Do you have a 8 sense of the magnitude of what we call the Phase II issues? 9 10 Ms. Seitz: I have the strong sense that in 11 light of the multiplicity of factors that the Court has said 12 are relevant to the ultimate equitable balancing, the 13 balancing of the equities issue in the second phase, that 14 it's far, substantially bigger than Phase I and that the only hope really to narrow Phase II is to force the parties to 15 16 focus in Phase I their articulation of harms and the 17 causation of harms. 18 Otherwise, the Phase II I think is--and I think 19 history shows it if you look at the Court's other equitable 20 apportionment cases. The length of time they routinely take, 21 the number of phases they routinely endure as reports go up 22 to the Court and come back down, it's pretty--these are sub-23 stantial, decade long litigations. And that's not--doesn't 24 seem to be unusual because so many factual issues are 25 relevant in determining the equitable apportionment of a

1 river between and among states. 2 And so the potential for ending the case after 3 Phase I and the potential that a Phase I dispositive motion practice could limit Phase II I think is really the only hope 4 for limiting what will otherwise be the massive discovery 5 inevitably of Phase II. 6 7 And so you--you know, this is certainly within the wheelhouse of your discretion I think in terms of your power 8 both to order it, and the pattern of Supreme Court cases will 9 10 allow you to phase if you would like to and you ultimately 11 believe it's more efficient. 12 And if as you say you believe you can define Phase 13 I, it truly seems to us that it will both limit and manage 14 Phase II and shorten the whole proceeding substantially. It's a fact question, I agree, for you whether ultimately you 15 16 can make the case shorter by proceeding in phases or by 17 proceeding all at one time. Are there further questions for 18 intervenors? 19 The Court: Not at this moment; thank you, Ms. 20 Seitz. Mr. Frederick, you wanted to say something about the 21 discovery and whether you objected to things on the ground 22 that they're Phase II issues. 23 Mr. Frederick: We--Your Honor, let me just 24 address the document production momentarily. The document

production has been comprehensive from South Carolina's

25

perspective. What we have continued to do is to update our production in light of documents that were created by South Carolina governmental officials since the previous production was made.

And that is why we view this as a continuing production. We're not freezing in time, you know, as of 2007 all the documents created, but that as people from the various agencies have created documents that are relevant, we regard our obligation as a continuing one. So for instance documents created last month are going to be produced in due course. And I think that Mr. Browning may not fully understand that that is how we are treating our discovery obligation with respect---

The Court: (interposing) I thought he was--Mr. Frederick: (interposing) Secondly, we have
continued to produce documents and will continue to produce
documents as we view them as relevant to the entire case. To
the extent that what they are asking for are documents that
become part of our case that we get from third parties with
respect to how they define Phase II, I can't represent here
that we have produced all of those kinds of documents.

But the thing that is a bit tricky about the way
the document production is operating in this case is that a
lot the relevant documents are in the hands of third parties
who have been subpoenaed. North Carolina subpoenaed in

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1
   excess of 115 people. We've subpoenaed quite a number.
                                                              The
2
   people that are actually harmed are not the government
3
   agencies or the ---
4
              The Court:
                               (interposing) Uh-huh, sure.
5
              Mr. Frederick:
                               ---respective governments.
6
   They're the people of the state, and so---
7
              The Court:
                               You wouldn't expect that.
8
              Mr. Frederick:
                               That's right.
9
              The Court:
                               So are most of the subpoenas to
10
   water users on both sides?
11
              Mr. Frederick:
                               That's right. And the way the
12
   questions have been framed--North Carolina issued more or
13
   less the same subpoena to everybody and it asked for, you
14
   know, essentially all documents under the sun.
15
              I'm not faulting them for a broad and all-
16
   encompassing document request, but I think that you could
   look at their request and if you are a third party user
17
18
   assume that what's being asked is everything that goes to
19
   benefit as well as use and justifying those uses.
20
              The Court:
                               So you're not objecting to those
21
   third party subpoenas on any ground relating to Phase I and
22
   Phase II? You're not involving yourself in those subpoenas?
23
              Mr. Frederick:
                               That's correct. Well--that's
24
   correct.
25
              The Court:
                               But in terms of your own
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production, in terms of what the State of South Carolina has produced in its own document production, then you've limited that production to Phase I?

Mr. Frederick: I'm not aware that we haven't produced anything as it would pertain to Phase II. I will double check and make sure. We don't have any interest restricting any of the document production. Our volume happens to be less. We're a smaller state than North Carolina. And we are continuing our production as those documents are created.

But the way we have asked for documents and the way I understand they've been produced on both sides has been just whatever documents you have, in part because we've never been able to get any kind of agreement on what issues are going to be decided in Phase II versus Phase I. And that's caused I think both sides prudently just to be more expansive in the way they produce documents than they otherwise would be.

If I could address the causation issue, because I think something very important happened in the hearing that I want to make note of. And that is that for the first time North Carolina has conceded that causation shall be done on, quote, a volumetric basis.

And that is crucial because for two years they've been arguing that it's got to be like a tort standard, that

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1
   it's the Concord-Kannapolis transfer that's causing the harms
2
   or it's the Charlotte transfer that's causing the harms.
3
   think they now concede what we've been saying all along, that
   you look at this on a volumetric basis.
4
5
             And if I could just highlight a fact as we under-
   stand it, Special Master Myles, that's important for you in
6
7
   evaluating the sense and sensibility of an actual Phase I and
   Phase II differentiation, if you just look at the authorized
8
   amounts of interbasin transfers, the authorized amounts under
9
10
   North Carolina state law, you're somewhere in the area of 73
11
   to 85 million gallons per day. Okay, so---
12
             The Court:
                               (interposing) You mean the ones
13
   that are permanent---
14
             Mr. Frederick:
                              (interposing)
                                              That's correct.
15
                               ---not the below the certain level
             The Court:
16
   that don't need a permit.
17
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Right. And as to those we're
18
   doing discovery with ---
19
             The Court:
                               (interposing)
                                              Because that would
20
   be infinite, right, if you---
21
             Mr. Frederick: (interposing) Well, there are a
   finite number of people who live in North Carolina---
22
23
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Right.
24
             Mr. Frederick: ---but it could potentially be
25
   large. We don't have reason to believe that it is in the
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order of, you know, scores of millions of gallons per day, but we don't yet know because we haven't gotten all the documents as to those folks.

The Court: Uh-huh.

Mr. Frederick: But if I--let me just try to get this more concrete for you because I think that some of these questions of causation may not seem so concrete yet. But if you look at just what's authorized and you look at it in terms of the 73 to 85 million gallons per day, what's actually being consumed from those IBTs now we understand is in the nature of 15 to 20 million gallons per day.

So what the hydrologists are going to end up showing is that if you compare what's actually being consumed with what they're authorized under the North Carolina state permits to take, it's a big gap. And the point of the lawsuit is if you get into periods of low flow and they take under state law--under North Carolina state law what they're authorized by that law to take, then you're going to create--it's a complete zero-sum game in those periods of low flow, where you're looking at less than 1,000 cubic feet per second of flow.

And so when North Carolina now acknowledges that it is a volumetric inquiry, Duke I understand does not agree with that and Ms. Seitz' position on causation is different. So there's going to be--if I understand their positions, and

they seem to be contradicting each other, there will be disagreement on what constitutes proper causation to be determined. And that is an issue that goes directly to the Court's core precedents and is an issue that ultimately will be decided by the justices.

Efficiency is going to best be served by allowing the various parties to put in their evidence and then argue to the Court about how the legal standards for things like injury and causation and benefit and extent of conservation should be done.

If North Carolina, for instance, is serious that South Carolina actually has to build more dams on the Catawba River in order to protect its interests in water, that would require the Supreme Court to overrule Colorado v. New Mexico, where the Court said the downstream state does not have to take measures, quote, "at its own expense" in order to preserve its rights to the water and protection of the water.

I trust North Carolina was speaking in a hyperbolic way rather than serious because I don't think the Supreme Court's cases support the notion that South Carolina has to take those kinds of extreme measures in order to protect its interests.

And if you look--for instance, there has been talk about this notion of conservation in the low inflow protocol, one of the issues that will be addressed by this court in

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1
   whatever phase we presume will come out in the case. But the
   notion of the low inflow protocol it is true is designed to
2
   have each of the states operate at a certain point of
3
   consumption. And it is a regulatory mechanism that is done
4
   through the CRA for each state.
5
6
             But if you look at the projections that Duke made
7
   about when Stage 3 of the low inflow protocol would be
   invoked, they've already--they're already off. Their 50 year
8
   projection was that it would only need to be invoked in four
9
10
   months in a 50 year time span. And yet in the first two to
11
   three years of that projection, the low inflow protocol at
12
   Stage 3 has already been invoked for 15 months.
13
             The Court:
                               But what does that mean, though?
14
   I mean I'm not following what follows from that.
15
             Mr. Frederick:
                               The model as projected for the low
   inflow protocol is understating the degree to which South
16
17
   Carolina is experiencing shortages of water.
18
                               But if the low inflow protocol is
             The Court:
19
   invoked and therefore in place, then what would be different
20
   if the model had been accurate in predicting how frequently
21
   it would need to be invoked?
22
             Mr. Frederick:
                               It's---
23
             The Court:
                               (interposing) I'm not following
24
   that.
25
             Mr. Frederick:
                               The model assumes that North
```

1 Carolina consumption can be at a certain level, okay, and 2 that the conditions will require restrictions and reductions 3 for only a limited number of months over a 50 year period. 4 And if the assumption is wrong, which it appears to be, then South Carolina suffers disproportionately because 5 6 the low inflow protocol reduces the amount of water available to South Carolina, and what North Carolina is able to 7 continue to consume and use without more drastic conservation 8 9 measures is higher than the water available in South 10 Carolina. 11 And so the point about having conservation in play 12 is something that really ties into the equitable factors, but 13 it also--when you analyze how the low inflow protocol was 14 modeled, I think that the evidence is going to show that 15 South Carolina is suffering harm almost on a nature of a per se basis in the same way that in Colorado v. New Mexico, 16 17 where the river was overappropriated, because you'll see that 18 as the case--as the hydrology is modeled, the more times you invoke the low inflow protocol, the less water is available 19 20 in South Carolina. 21 But isn't there also less water The Court: 22 available in North Carolina? 23 Mr. Frederick: It is, to be sure. But the point 24 of it is whether or not it's accurate because that affects 25 what other storage capacity measures you take in other time

```
1
   periods. I mean if the---
2
                              (interposing) But if it were
             The Court:
3
   accurately predicting the fact of the longevity of the
   drought conditions, if you will, then what would the result
4
   be in the low inflow protocol? Would it then require less
5
   water to be used by both states?
6
7
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Yes, that's correct.
             The Court:
                              So South Carolina would get---
8
9
                              (interposing) And less water to
             Mr. Frederick:
10
   be transferred under these IBTs that have been authorized.
11
                               So less water would be used by
             The Court:
12
   North Carolina than is provided for now under the low inflow
13
   protocol, but also less water would be available to South
14
   Carolina as well?
15
             Mr. Frederick:
                              The point about the measurement,
   Your Honor, is what is absolutely critical about this whole
16
17
   modeling, because yes, when Stage 3 gets invoked, there's
18
   less water available on both sides. The question is how much
19
   less on the South Carolina side or were there ways to model a
20
   river differently, to understand it better, so that those
21
   protocol stages would be invoked differently.
             And I would submit to you that the question of
22
23
   triggering the low inflow protocol as a question of hydro-
24
   logical modeling is going to be very much at issue in the
25
   case and will be very much at issue at the beginning of the
```

```
1
   case, so that one of the points that you will be charged to
   render fact findings on, you know, will be the questions of
2
   what are the capacity of the river, how much water flows
3
   down, what is available to be used--those are standard
4
   questions that special masters have to make fact findings
5
   on--and what are the projected levels in the future for water
6
   capacity. And those kinds of questions, which are routinely
7
   done as fact findings by special masters, will invariably
8
   call into question the way of engaging in analysis of how
9
10
   much water can be available.
11
              I think the point--let me just address the point
12
   about the Pee Dee-Yadkin. We have opposed the production of
13
   documents concerning that river system. I can represent to
14
   you that we will continue to object if a motion to compel is
15
   brought. That will be decided by you.
16
             That will be a subject that I'm sure if North
17
   Carolina hews to its position would be decided ultimately by
18
   the justices because I'm not aware of any case that has done
19
   a full-blown double equitable apportionment analysis with two
20
   major river systems. So that is going to be an issue that's
21
   going to ultimately go up, and there will have to be a
22
   decision about its relevance to deciding this, but ---
23
             The Court:
                               (interposing) But not on an
24
   interim basis, presumably.
25
             Mr. Frederick:
                               It depends on how and where it's
```

```
defined as being relevant. If the point of injury that they
1
2
   assert in their briefs is correct, that we're not really
   suffering injury because we get a benefit from the Yadkin,
3
4
   then it becomes an issue to be decided sooner rather than
   later. If it's a question of the ultimate weighing of the
5
6
   facts and benefits, then it's presumably one that can be
7
   decided later.
                              Well, it's funny because you've
8
             The Court:
   said in the past that the use of water within one state is an
9
10
   intrastate issue, and now--not that--I'm not going to--
11
   obviously that is on a different set of issues that you've
12
   said that---
13
             Mr. Frederick:
                              (interposing)
                                             Yes.
14
             The Court:
                              ---but---
15
             Mr. Frederick: (interposing) I still hew to that
16
   too.
17
             The Court:
                              ---but that now it's not possible
18
   to consider water that's removed from one river basin.
19
   still flows down into the state. It would be surprising to
20
   me if that were utterly irrelevant, but I guess that's really
21
   not an issue for today. But it does seem that it would be
22
   surprising that it would be utterly irrelevant that ---
23
             Mr. Frederick: (interposing) I think it is
24
   legally irrelevant, Your Honor. And we will brief it that
   way and we will argue it that way, and we will go to the
25
```

1 justices on that point if necessary at the appropriate time, because I'm not familiar with any case, not a single 2 equitable apportionment case, that concerns multiple river 3 systems where the point in issue is one and where you have 4 before you a rather defined problem. You have an amount of 5 water authorized under state law permits that is four times 6 the amount of actual use now, and the amount of actual use 7 now is creating shortages in South Carolina during periods of 8 9 low flow. 10 So at one level, this case can be very easily 11 decided and done by a decree that says you can't do the IBT

beyond a certain level. That would very simply solve this case without a lot of complexities that North Carolina wants to introduce that I think are more confusing than enlightening. And, you know, if you view causation in that

If I could turn briefly to the Colorado and Wyoming case and Nebraska and Wyoming, the Court there apportioned

based on harms during the irrigation system. It was not a

requirement to show harm throughout the entire course of the river flow. And the analogy here I think is pertinent to

21 liver from. That the analogy here I think is pertin

fashion, I think that you'll be guided.

22 those periods of low flow.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

23

24

The Court's decisions in those two cases, as well as the two I adverted to in my earlier argument, the *Colorado*

25 v. New Mexico and New Jersey v. New York, indicate that

there's flexibility in deciding--in certain river conditions and certain time periods a decree can be entered to limit the amount that the upstream state can withdraw from the river basin.

And finally, with respect to--well, two last points. One is that with respect to the document production, Duke has served a document request that is the catch-up discovery that you ordered I believe three months ago. That has been--Catawba River Water Supply Project had issued a document request several years ago, and to my knowledge they have not yet served any catch-up discovery.

It appears from our analysis that the Duke request is largely, if not entirely, duplicative of what has already been requested by the parties. And it's not clear that there is any additional cache of documents that's not already been produced. But I think that it's fair to say that with respect to document productions, we are—you know, we're at a state where everybody knows what everybody else is going to be producing.

My final point is that on the burden to bifurcate, the question and I think the challenge and what has taken us now some time to work our way through is the question of what efficiency is really served. Duke here argues that a benefit of bifurcation is somehow to narrow the issues for Phase II, but they don't explain exactly what gets narrowed or how

that's consistent with the standards for deciding whether to bifurcate proceedings.

Ordinarily bifurcation occurs where you have liability to be determined and then you have damages done in a separate phase. I think the reason why the parties have had difficulty in their meet and confers agreeing on what should be in Phase I versus Phase II is because equitable apportionment cases don't readily lend themselves to the kind of bifurcation that the courts traditionally have handled.

And because I think you can reasonably expect that however you define Phase I there will be disagreements about the relevancy of evidence going into the Phase I pot versus the Phase II pot, at the end of the day ultimately it's going to be more efficient just to let the parties put on their cases and argue about the legal standards and for you to make the rulings.

Finally, I don't know where this notion about the ten times burden comes into play. They have asserted that several times in their papers. That's simply not consistent with what our experts have told us. It's not--I don't think it's consistent with, you know, a logic of how you would view the relative costs and benefits of use.

Ultimately I think your decision is going to come down to can North Carolina continue to sustain authorizing into the future an amount of withdrawals in--you know, to 50

1 or 60 million gallons per day and justify that on the basis 2 of their future use versus the harms that will be demonstrable to the existing users in South Carolina. 3 That's what the case is ultimately going to come down to. And it won't 4 take, you know, five years of analysis of various people to 5 kind of get to the nub of the question presented, which is 6 7 just that. Before you sit down, I did have a 8 The Court: couple of other questions. On the volumetric point that you 9 made before, you were saying there's a difference of opinion 10 11 between North Carolina and Duke the way they're stating what 12 would be encompassed by Phase I. And you used the word 13 "volumetric" to be a concession by North Carolina, that you 14 would look at the amount of water that North Carolina is 15 using. 16 Now, as I was reading the papers and listening to 17 you all today, there is a difference between specific uses. 18 There's a discussion about what specific uses North Carolina 19 is -- that you claim North Carolina is engaging in, and do 20 those specific uses cause specific harms. And you've made 21 the point correctly that water is fungible, so you can't say, 22 well, this particular use causes this particular harm, which I don't think really is what they were saying. 23

I think what they were saying is you have to--in

order to understand the volumetric nature of the North

24

25

```
1
   Carolina uses, you have to look at particular uses, if
   nothing else to be able to say this -- to add them up, to
2
   figure out how much there is and figure up what uses they
3
   are, just so you know what uses you're talking about, not
4
   just how much water there is in total. So I don't know if
5
   that -- that to me is part of the volumetric analysis, even if
6
7
   you're identifying specific uses in North Carolina.
             And I think one of the questions apparently that's
8
9
   been posed in the interrogatories is what specific uses is
10
   South Carolina complaining about, if you will, which I think
11
   goes to that same issue of what uses are we looking at here
12
   on the North Carolina side of the equation.
13
             And I think everyone agrees that's part of Phase I,
14
   that it isn't pure volumetric, not just a number that you
15
   would add to that side of the ledger. You'd look at what
16
   goes into that number.
17
                               I confess you've lost me, Special
             Mr. Frederick:
18
   Master Myles. I mean I don't understand the distinction ---
19
                               (interposing) Well, let me ask
             The Court:
20
   you this.
21
             Mr. Frederick: ---between the .5 million gallons
22
   per day that their water park at Carowinds takes and the .5
23
   that might be part of a Concord-Kannapolis interbasin
24
   transfer from---
25
                               (interposing) Well, how do you
             The Court:
```

1 figure out how much they're using to begin with? 2 Mr. Frederick: Oh, those--those records are 3 available, and both sides are analyzing the withdrawal 4 amounts. 5 So in your mind, then, Phase I The Court: would simply be, you know, a fill in the blank, one number 6 7 volume, this is it, and that's North Carolina's use. you'd turn to the South Carolina side of the ledger and you'd 8 look at all the harm, what particular uses South Carolina is 9 10 trying to make of the water but not able to because of this 11 number that's coming from North Carolina. 12 Mr. Frederick: It's a moving number, but in 13 essence -- I mean in a nutshell that's the gist of it. 14 reason it's a moving number is because there's a varying 15 amount of water that's coming into the watershed, and so that necessarily affects how much gets withdrawn. It affects the 16 17 degree to which it's used for power projects and---18 The Court: (interposing) And would that 19 number be authorized water or would it be actual use, because 20 you keep talking about how much is authorized. And I'm not 21 sure what the magic--what that number is if it's not actually 22 being used, because, you know, we were just saying that 23 authorized could mean anything. If there was no law 24 prohibiting the taking of water without a license, all the 25 water would be authorized in that sense, so the real question

```
1
   is what's being used.
2
             Mr. Frederick: I think you've put your finger
3
   right on the nub of the concern that South Carolina has that
4
   instigated this lawsuit, and if I could just take a moment to
   try to unpack that in a way that I hope will be helpful to
5
6
   you.
7
             The whole point about so much more water being
   authorized is that North Carolina state law says it's not
8
   relevant to determine whether or not South Carolina suffers
9
10
   any harm if that amount is taken out. And that's why
11
   South---
12
                               (interposing) But do any states
             The Court:
13
   do that? I mean---
14
                               (interposing) Yes, South
             Mr. Frederick:
   Carolina--yes, the model riparian rights code calls for that.
15
16
   South Carolina's law calls for downstream users' adverse
17
   effects being taken into account whenever you do an IBT.
18
                              So South Carolina's law requires
             The Court:
19
   South Carolina to consider, to the extent there are down-
20
   stream states, the interests of the downstream states?
21
             Mr. Frederick:
                               It's defined as downstream users.
22
   I'm not sure that it's been litigated in South Carolina
23
   courts. But the point of it is if North Carolina with
24
   impunity can allow its authorized users under state law to
25
   take more than what they're doing now up to an authorized
```

```
1
   amount, that causes direct and real injury to South Carolina.
2
                               But what if there were no law at
             The Court:
3
   all in the state prohibiting the taking of water?
             Mr. Frederick: We would still be here, Your
4
   Honor, because in those periods of low flow there's not
5
6
   enough water coming down.
7
             The Court:
                               But if they're not using it, it
   wouldn't be relevant. There wouldn't be a case.
8
                                                      If there
9
   was no use, how can you have a case?
10
             Mr. Frederick: You have a case by existing users
11
   being affected adversely and you have projected future harms
12
   to existing users based on the amount that's being
13
   authorized.
14
             If Charlotte doesn't have to go to South Carolina,
   Concord and Kannapolis don't have to go to South Carolina
15
16
   under North Carolina's theory of their state law in order to
17
   get permission by saying, "South Carolina, if we take out a
18
   full amount of our authorized use, are you going to be
19
   affected by that, " that causes direct injury to South
   Carolina if in fact they do it. The whole point of having an
20
21
   injunction, Your Honor, is whether we suffer irreparable
22
   injury by the operation of the state law, which doesn't take
23
   into account ---
24
             The Court:
                               (interposing) But even--every
25
   injunction requires the consideration of harm.
```

```
1
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Right.
2
             The Court:
                              And if there's no--if there's no
3
   showing of a projected use and an actual use, then there
   would be no harm.
4
5
                              But then why would they get the
             Mr. Frederick:
   authorization under their permit to get that amount of water
6
7
   in the future? They're expecting greater water needs, and
   that's why they got their state law to permit them to get
8
   additional water. And it's that authorization coupled with
9
10
   the existing threshold of harm that creates the injury to
11
   South Carolina.
12
                               And is that the premise behind the
             The Court:
13
   statement that the river now is fully appropriated?
14
             Mr. Frederick:
                              At periods of low flow, correct.
15
             The Court:
                               Does the premise that it's fully
   appropriated include on the North Carolina side authorized or
16
17
   actual use?
18
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Actual use, actual use at periods
19
   of low flow, meaning that any additional amounts such as the
20
   60 extra million gallons per day that are authorized if they
21
   were to be taken in the future, that would cause direct,
22
   irreparable per se harm to South Carolina.
23
             The Court:
                               So when you say overappropriated--
24
   I mean fully appropriated I think is what you're saying.
25
   What does that exactly mean, then, taking into account you're
```

```
1
   talking about uses -- not authorized uses, but actual uses.
2
                               Actually we're talking about the
             Mr. Frederick:
3
   capacity of the river to provide the sustained existing uses.
4
   So just to give you an example, when Lake Wateree goes down
   to the point where the industrial intake valves are exposed
5
   and they can't draw water out because they're just pipes that
6
7
   are sticking out into the air, that would be fully appro-
8
   priated.
9
             So if you drew down another 60 million gallons per
10
   day and the pipes are now 10 feet in the air above the water
11
   level and it would take a certain amount of time to
12
   regenerate and replenish, that causes harm every single day
13
   to South Carolina.
14
                               So fully appropriated doesn't mean
             The Court:
15
   that every drop of water under existing uses and under the
   conditions specified, say drought conditions, is used up;
16
17
   right?
18
             Mr. Frederick:
                               That's correct.
                                                That's how I
19
   understand the Court's cases because---
20
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Okay. I just was
21
   wondering.
22
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Yeah. No, that's how--because---
23
             The Court:
                               (interposing) I've seen a fully
24
   appropriated river, the Rio Grande, when I was in El Paso,
   and that river is fully appropriated by the time it gets to
25
```

```
1
   El Paso. There's no water left. It literally trickle flows.
2
   So I just was wondering.
3
                               I'm from Texas, Your Honor.
             Mr. Frederick:
                                                            I'm
   well familiar with what you're describing. And it is true
4
5
   that, you know, by the time--and you could go even further
   south and by the time you get to Laredo, there's even less.
6
7
             But the point here is that the South Carolina users
   who've built up their lives and their livelihoods on the
8
   expectations of a certain amount of water and they develop
9
10
   their industries and they develop their businesses for
11
   greenscaping and recreation and water use, and now they don't
12
   have the water anymore--they built their waterfront home and
13
   now their dock is completely exposed because it doesn't get
14
   down to the water because the water has receded to a certain
15
   amount -- those people suffer real and substantial injury.
16
             And it doesn't matter whether Concord took the
17
   water or the water park at Carowinds took the water or it got
18
   somewhere else. It's a function of the fact that that water
19
   isn't there anymore. And that is particularly true in
20
   periods of low flow where it can now be modeled that every-
21
   body is going to have to cut back a little bit. And the
22
   question is how much does each state have to cut back in
23
   order to protect the existing users' interests.
24
             The Court:
                               Uh-huh.
                                        Okay. That makes sense.
25
   Now, just regarding--is it number 4, question number 4, on
```

```
1
   the interrogatories? I'm trying to find the--somewhere in
2
   here I have the---
3
             Mr. Frederick: I don't have that in front of me.
4
   If the question is about--well, I'll let you ask the
5
   question. I'm sorry.
6
             The Court: I think I have it here, number 6.
7
   Number 6? Is that right?
8
             (Pause.)
9
             Mr. Browning: Your Honor, interrogatory number 4
10
   is:
11
              "What amount of the Catawba River water use in
12
             North Carolina, whether in the form of interbasin
13
             transfers, consumptive uses, or other activities,
14
             does South Carolina contend must be eliminated in
15
             order to prevent substantial harms to South
16
             Carolina?"
17
                              Okay. That--I see, so--and number
             The Court:
18
   6 is asking--because I don't have number 4. I don't think
19
   you gave me number 4 in the attachment to the reply brief;
20
   right?
21
             Mr. Browning: Yes, Your Honor, you're right.
22
   It's interrogatory number 6 that's attached.
23
             The Court:
                               Yeah. So number 4 is the one that
24
   identifies particular harms that should be eliminated, in
25
   South Carolina's opinion. And then 6 just asks for the
```

```
1
   identification of consumptive uses in North Carolina just
2
   simply---
3
              Ms. Seitz:
                               (interposing) And South Carolina.
4
              The Court:
                               And South Carolina, yes, but I'm
   just focusing on North Carolina for the moment, but yeah.
5
6
   And so South Carolina declines to answer 6 in large part, I
7
   think, right, because of -- do you have a copy of this?
              Mr. Frederick:
8
                               Not---
9
              The Court:
                               (interposing) It's attached to
10
   North Carolina's reply brief.
11
                               Exhibit 4.
             Mr. Browning:
12
              The Court:
                               Number 6 is. Number 4 is not.
13
                              Exhibit 4; which tab is it?
             Mr. Frederick:
14
                               Right here (indicating).
             Mr. Browning:
15
              (Pause.)
16
              Mr. Frederick:
                               Yes.
                                     I'm sorry; what was the
   question, Your Honor?
17
18
                               Just that South Carolina has not
              The Court:
19
   given an answer regarding consumptive uses in North Carolina.
20
              Mr. Frederick:
                               That's correct.
21
              The Court:
                               And then on the other one, which I
22
   don't have here and I don't think you do either, South
23
   Carolina has declined to answer number 4 I think for similar
24
   reasons, except that it's saying "We'll produce an expert
25
   report at some point identifying"--what, identifying harms
```

1 from North Carolina? 2 Mr. Frederick: Well, let me address the expert 3 report. Can I just address the part on number 6 first? Sure. Yeah. 4 The Court: 5 What has played out over at least Mr. Frederick: 6 the last year, maybe the last year and a half or so, is an 7 attempt to replicate Duke's CHEOPS model, which is the model that Duke used to provide hydrological projections of the 8 Catawba River as part of the relicensing procedure with the 9 10 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 11 And for the last nine months, we have been meeting 12 and conferring with the outside consultants that Duke 13 retained in order to get the source code for those model 14 projections. And we either will have to file a motion to 15 compel or we will get it worked out within the next week or so, but the consultants have the source code that would allow 16 17 our consultants to be able to understand what the various 18 variables are for making the projections that we believe 19 understate the amount of water available. And that under-20 statement is reflected by the fact that Duke's guess that 21 four months only over the next 50 years would trigger the low inflow protocol at Stage 3 proved to be wrong by a factor of 22 23 4. 24 And so once we get that data and our experts are

able to provide their completed analysis of the hydrology,

25

we'll be able to answer number 6 and that will be encompassed within their report, because I think what they will show is here's how Duke modeled it, here is where we think there are some flaws that need to be better understood, and once those are understood, you'll have a better picture of what the true state of the river is. So that is what we're waiting on. We still don't have that data after many months of trying to get it.

Now, with respect to number 4, if I understand the interrogatory, the question is do we care more about interbasin transfers or particular forms of consumption. You know, as a matter of law, I'm not sure South Carolina has ever taken the position that any particular consumptive use that's not returned to the river is something that South Carolina has standing to complain about. Our position has always been that intrastate uses of water are for the sovereign state to decide.

So I'm not sure that we'll ever have a position that satisfies North Carolina in wanting--if what they want us to do is to, you know, target a--it's the Carowinds water park, that's the problem, I don't think we'll be in a position ever to offer a view that one form of consumptive use that doesn't return water to the basin is any more harmful than any other particular consumptive use.

The Court: But if you were to have an

```
1
   unbifurcated trial--I'm just trying to get at what you think
2
   you would be proving. If you were to have a trial that was
3
   not bifurcated, then you would have to do that, right---
             Mr. Frederick:
4
                               (interposing) No, no, because---
5
             The Court:
                               ---because you would have to go
6
   through and say, "Look, okay, now there's this use, there's
7
   that use, and there's the other use, and now we have to value
   those uses." So Charlotte, you know, has a certain amount of
8
9
   water that's being transferred for drinking water. How do we
10
   value that? There's a theme park that uses X amount of
11
   water. How do we value that? Do you not have to go through
12
   the analysis?
13
                               I don't think so.
             Mr. Frederick:
                                                  I think the
14
   Chief Justice got it right in his opinion in the case when he
15
   said it's for each state to decide how to provide the value
   for the particular intrastate uses of water.
16
17
                              Yeah, but that was--I don't think
             The Court:
18
   that he was making the law of the case in that opinion. He
19
   was talking about -- well, I don't think he was saying that
20
   ultimately all one does is not--that one doesn't look at uses
21
   of the water and the value of those uses, because if he was
22
   saying that, I think he'd be overruling a fair amount of
23
   precedent.
24
             Mr. Frederick:
                              No, I think his opinion was quite
25
   consistent with precedent, that the purpose of the equitable
```

apportionment is to decide how much each state gets of a 1 river, and then it's for that state to decide--I mean it's 2 3 for North Carolina ultimately to---4 The Court: (interposing) But how do you do that without analyzing existing uses? 5 6 Mr. Frederick: If you take all of the actual 7 uses, Your Honor, and you put some value on them, that creates a valuation that I think gets compared to the down-8 stream state. 9 10 But what the case will ultimately turn on are 11 future uses by North Carolina against existing uses by South 12 Carolina. And if you look at the equitable apportionment 13 through that lens, keeping in mind that all existing uses may 14 be okay in North Carolina, there may be some requirement of 15 conservation -- that will -- you know, yet to be determined. 16 But if the ultimate decree is like it was in 17 Colorado and in New Jersey v. New York, that when the river 18 gets to a certain stage these cutbacks have to happen so that the existing users in South Carolina can be protected, that's 19 20 a perfectly valid and routine form of equitable apportionment 21 decree. 22 And that doesn't mean that you have to value, you 23 know, the water experience of the kids at the Carowinds park 24 versus the water drinkers in Charlotte. You just say here's 25 the amount of existing use, and if that amount increases by,

```
1
   you know, double or if it increases by triple, then the water
2
   intake valves on the South Carolina side are going to get
3
   farther and farther away from the water.
                                              And---
4
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Well, what about
   this quote that we always have in the briefs--it's like in
5
   every brief--from Colorado v. New Mexico, "physical and
6
7
   climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the
   several sections of the river, the character and rate of
8
   return flows, the extent of established uses "---
9
10
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Yeah.
11
                               --- "availability of storage water,
             The Court:
12
   the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas,
13
   the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to
14
   downstream areas"? Do we not have to go through any of that
15
   analysis?
16
             Mr. Frederick:
                               No.
                                    Those are the equitable
17
   apportionment factors that ultimately go to can a decree be
18
   fashioned to protect the downstream state and the upstream
19
   state's uses.
20
              I mean, you know, I'm not discounting the fact that
21
   all those factors go into the case and they go into an
22
   evaluation of what decree gets fashioned. I'm suggesting
23
   that in a period of low flow, our position will be that
24
   certain protections need to be made for South Carolina, and
25
   in the periods of high flow those---
```

```
1
             The Court:
                               (interposing) But what if--even
2
   in a period of low flow, what if hypothetically South
3
   Carolina's uses were all say--you know, this is purely hypo-
4
   thetical---
5
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Okay.
6
             The Court:
                              ---but just watering golf courses,
7
   and North Carolina's uses were all drinking water? Would you
   not undertake an analysis even in a period of low flow of the
8
   relative value of those two consumptive uses?
9
10
                              There would be an evaluation.
             Mr. Frederick:
                                                              Ι
11
   believe there would. And the Court has said on several
12
   occasions drinking water is the highest use of the water
13
   available to the state and its citizens.
14
             The Court:
                             So you would have to know what
15
   North Carolina is---
16
             Mr. Frederick:
                             (interposing) Yes.
17
             The Court:
                               ---doing with the water no matter
18
   whether you're in low flow or not low flow. That would be a
19
   relevant inquiry.
20
             Mr. Frederick:
                               It would. But the question of
21
   whether or not an equitable apportionment decree would impose
22
   on North Carolina a restriction on those particular uses is
23
   not so clear to me from the Court's cases, because what the
24
   Court's cases have held as I read them is if the amount of
25
   water coming down to the downstream state is sufficient, it's
```

commensurate with drinking water.

up to the upstream state to decide how to allocate internally
its intrastate allocation.

But to be sure, the drinking water of the people in
any community will outweigh under any normal way of thinking
about it a water park or some other use that is not

7 The Court: Uh-huh. So with that in mind, and 8 assuming for the moment that there would be in Phase I at

9 least an inquiry into North Carolina uses, what particular

10 uses are being complained of in adding up to the consumption

11 by North Carolina that you're complaining about? Okay, so

12 assuming that's part of Phase I for the moment, when will you

13 be in a position to answer question number 4 and question

14 number 6?

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

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6

Mr. Frederick: We would still take the position, as I understand the question, that number 4 is legally irrelevant because you add them all up. It's a total number. And that total number may fluctuate a little bit depending on high flow, low flow, but the harm is caused when the amount available in South Carolina drops below the amount that's necessary to protect the interests of South Carolina.

Now, the injury is caused when there is insufficient water coming down across the border. Whether or not you then--if you're evaluating future uses and you're saying, "Okay, we're going to model this river" and there's a certain

```
1
   amount and maybe there's a projected decision in Concord,
   North Carolina to do another water park and there is a
2
   planned industrial use in South Carolina, you know, hypo-
3
4
   thetically I suppose in the future you would weigh analysis
   of those things in determining whether or not as you model
5
6
   this in the future there would be a need to protect South
7
   Carolina uses.
             But I think that for purposes of keeping the case
8
9
   simple and manageable, we're here primarily to protect
10
   existing users against future authorized use that becomes
11
   actual use in North Carolina.
12
                               I understand that, but--I under-
             The Court:
13
   stand that's your position. But I was wondering if you had
14
   to respond to number 4, in other words if there was an order
15
   compelling a response, how long would that take?
16
             Mr. Frederick:
                               I'd have to work with our experts,
17
   Your Honor.
18
             The Court:
                               Okay.
                                      And then in terms of the
19
   CHEOPS, I was a little--partly just because I don't fully
20
   understand what's in the CHEOPS model, but you were saying
21
   you need the CHEOPS data to respond to number 6. What is it
22
   in the CHEOPS data that -- is it data about existing or
23
   projected consumptive uses? Is that the data that you're
24
   needing---
25
             Mr. Frederick:
                               (interposing)
                                              Yes.
```

```
1
             The Court:
                             ---to respond to number 6?
2
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Yes.
3
                              Okay. That's helpful. And then
             The Court:
4
   the final question, I think--I may have a couple of questions
   for the other side, but in terms of the CRA, you talked about
5
   how the assumptions going into it were flawed and that
6
7
   affected--it has affected the analysis. Is there any--well,
   I guess I should ask this. What phase is that at now? It
8
9
   was extended by a year. What's the status of the proceeding
10
   now?
11
             Mr. Frederick:
                              It's still pending.
12
             The Court:
                              Still pending, okay. And is it
13
   awaiting anything? Is it still awaiting further regulatory
14
   action at the state level?
15
             Mr. Frederick:
                              Yes.
16
             The Court:
                              Okay. And is that regulatory
17
   action likely to be forthcoming anytime soon, or is it--do
18
   you have any--you may not be the best person to say, but do
19
   you know what the status of that is?
20
             Mr. Frederick: I don't know when the state
21
   decision will fully resolve itself. I know there is activity
22
   in that, but I don't know that there is a time line set by
23
   state law for a decision to be made.
24
             The Court:
                             And is the issue that you raised
25
   here today about the laws and the model--has that issue been
```

```
1
   raised with anyone in that proceeding, in the CRA proceeding?
2
             Mr. Frederick: Well, it is certainly before the
3
   FERC and I think that those FERC references have been
4
   adverted to in the state proceedings, but I have not been
   part of the state's--the state regulatory action in that
5
   process, Your Honor.
6
7
             The Court:
                               Okay. So maybe--would you
   anticipate if we went forward with Phase I that the CRA would
8
   be part of that proceeding? Would it be an issue? Would it
9
10
   be considered in Phase I if we had a Phase I?
11
             Mr. Frederick:
                               I think that it is fair to say
12
   that modeling projections and what effect on the future
13
   availability of water as projected under the CRA, as
14
   projected under the CHEOPS model, will be an issue that South
15
   Carolina will present at both phases, however they get
16
   defined, because that's a fundamental question here.
17
             The Court:
                               Just because the United States
18
   came in at the Supreme Court level on the intervention
19
   issue--or they had not come in at this level; they had not
   come in previously--would they--and you've told me before in
20
21
   an earlier proceeding that they monitor this case in some
22
   fashion or another, that they keep an eye on this case. Are
23
   they likely to want to come in in Phase I if the CRA and the
24
   licensing proceeding is at issue, either--I should really ask
25
   in Phase I or more generally at the trial?
```

1	Mr. Frederick: I would not hazard to speak for
2	how the federal government would assess its interests at the
3	various phases. It's safe to say the CRA itself explicitly
4	says that water consumption is not an issue that it
5	addressed, soand FERC has taken the position that this case
6	can proceed along its course and that will not, you know,
7	affect how FERC views the licensing because the licensing is
8	addressed to power needs. It's not addressed to water
9	consumption.
10	The Court: Uh-huh. Okay. I did want to ask
11	eitherprobably North Carolina about the issue about the
12	differenceMr. Frederick was saying there's a difference of
13	opinion between you and Duke.
14	Mr. Browning: Difference of opinion between Duke
15	and North Carolina?
16	The Court: On the subject of whether it's a
17	volumetric analysis or whether there's some other
18	Mr. Browning: (interposing) Yes, I appreciate
19	you raising that, Your Honor. I always get a little bit
20	nervous when Mr. Frederick says I've conceded something, and
21	I will say that I think the record speaks for itself.
22	But my point is that in all of these other cases
23	like New Jersey v. New York, you're looking at a specific
24	interbasin transfer, a diversion of water, with a volumetric
25	analysis. That of course needs to be the starting point for

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River."

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Phase I. That is what we're trying to find out through these
contention interrogatories, what it is that South Carolina is
really trying to say North Carolina has done to cause them
harm. And of course the starting point is volumetric.
          I can't say that I was able to follow Mr.
Frederick's argument to realize what he was saying in terms
of the diversion between North Carolina and Duke, but I don't
think I have--I think our position is fairly well set out in
the briefs and what I said earlier today.
          If, Your Honor, I could make another very brief
point, Mr. Frederick was speaking in terms of Colorado v. New
Mexico and was coming up with his definition of full appro-
priation, which I don't think is consistent with the Court's
case law. But it really doesn't matter how Mr. Frederick
defines full appropriation or Chris Browning defines full
appropriation. It matters what the Court said.
          And I would turn the Court's attention to Colorado
v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at page 180. And it's just one
sentence that I wanted to quote from, Your Honor. At page
180, if yours is printed the same way that mine is, in the
column on the left, the very bottom paragraph, the sentence
here, "The Special Master found that most of the water of the
Vermejo River is consumed by New Mexico users and that very
little if any reaches the confluence with the Canadian
        That is a description of a river that has been
```

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1
   totally sucked dry.
2
                               Where--mine didn't---
              The Court:
3
              Mr. Browning:
                               (interposing) I'm sorry.
              The Court:
                               ---print out, so what---
4
5
             Mr. Browning:
                               (interposing) Yes, Your Honor.
6
   If you're on page 180 of the Supreme Court--459 U.S.---
7
              The Court:
                               (interposing) There it is. Here
8
   it is. I found it.
9
             Mr. Browning:
                               Yes.
             The Court:
10
                               Yeah.
11
                               That is the crucial factual
             Mr. Browning:
12
   scenario that explains what the Court was referring to when
13
   it was referencing a river that was fully appropriated. That
14
   is not the Catawba River.
15
              Now, Mr. Frederick had also indicated that North
   Carolina doesn't give consideration to South Carolina users
16
17
   with respect to interbasin transfer certificates. Let me be
18
   clear that the current North Carolina statute expressly
19
   provides that initially in that permit South Carolina users
20
   will be considered. So that is set out in the statute as it
21
   currently exists, that South Carolina users will be
22
   considered in determining whether to issue an interbasin
23
   transfer certificate.
24
              The only other point that I'll make in passing is
25
   that in light of Mr. Frederick's objection during my
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1
   presentation, I must admit that I have to tell him that I
   appreciate him conceding that with respect to the discovery
2
3
   request of the Yadkin-Pee Dee River that South Carolina has
   not produced those documents.
4
5
             Again, that is a very complicated issue that we do
   not think needs to be addressed until Phase II, and we don't
6
7
   think we'll be getting to Phase II because we don't think
   South Carolina can use Colorado v. New Mexico to win its day
8
   in court because the factual scenario in that case is vastly
9
   different from the Catawba River. If there are no further
10
11
   questions, again we would ask--yes, Your Honor.
12
             The Court:
                               Just one. Thank you.
                                                      On the
13
   issue of again the CRA being in Phase I, which I think I
14
   asked you about before, but is there a view as to whether the
15
   federal government, the FERC or the United States, is going
16
   to want to get involved in Phase I?
17
                              Like Mr. Frederick, I would not
             Mr. Browning:
18
   want to hazard a guess as to their involvement. I would
19
   think--just speculating, I would think they would probably be
20
   more likely to wait until there's any report that you issue
21
   to the Supreme Court and then evaluate the situation at that
22
   point in time.
23
             The Court:
                               Uh-huh.
                                        I think what---
24
             Mr. Browning:
                              (interposing) But that's a guess
25
   on my part.
```

```
1
             The Court:
                               What I contemplate doing anyway,
2
   and I might run this by the parties at some point in time, is
3
   asking them, like I probably should have done before on
   intervention. I didn't think they'd be interested, but in
4
   hindsight I would have asked them. You could just issue an
5
   order calling for the views of the solicitor general on the
6
7
   question of intervention.
             Then you'd know earlier rather than later what
8
   their views are. And they don't have to say, but there's
9
10
   nothing that prevents I think them from submitting views in
11
   the phase--in the special master phase of the case, which I'm
12
   assuming they've done--you may know this--in other cases.
13
                               Yes, Your Honor. That's certainly
             Mr. Browning:
14
   a possibility, and at the appropriate time I think it would
15
   be something for us to all be thinking about on our periodic
16
   conference calls, which I assume will be resumed here before
17
   too long. But I also agree with Mr. Frederick that the
18
   United States government does monitor original actions and
19
   they will jump in when they want to, but we can certainly
20
   evaluate that on a case by case situation.
21
                               Right. It's an important
             The Court:
22
   question, I think, for whether -- it doesn't really decide
   bifurcation, but I think it will be important to know in
23
24
   deciding what any trial will look like.
25
             Mr. Browning:
                               Sure.
```

```
I did want to ask Ms. Seitz one
1
             The Court:
2
   question.
3
             Mr. Browning:
                              Yes, Your Honor.
             The Court:
4
                               Thank you, Mr. Browning.
                                                         It's the
   same question really, whether there was a difference of
5
6
   opinion on---
7
             Ms. Seitz:
                               (interposing)
                                              I don't think there
   is a difference of opinion. I think I was attempting to be
8
9
   completely consistent with what North Carolina had said
10
   about, you know, the content of Phase I and what everyone
11
   agreed with in Phase II. And I would add that my experience
12
   in Alabama v. North Carolina is that the solicitor general
13
   does step in at the special master stage when it has an
14
   interest and files a brief.
15
                                        Okay, that's helpful.
             The Court:
                              Uh-huh.
   And then I did want to ask you since you're probably the
16
17
   person most likely to know whether there's been any other
18
   developments in the FERC case that I should know about.
19
                               There's a pending motion by Duke
             Ms. Seitz:
20
   for judgment on the question whether the South Carolina water
21
   quality certification is essential to proceeding with the
22
   license. It's been pending a long time. There's been no
23
   action for a long time.
24
             There's also litigation continuing on the 401 water
25
   quality proceeding in South Carolina. Like Mr. Frederick,
```

```
1
   I'm not involved in that litigation on behalf of Duke, so
2
   what I know is that there are motions pending but that again
3
   there's been no resolution.
4
             The Court:
                               Okay. Thank you.
5
             Ms. Seitz:
                               Thank you.
6
             The Court:
                               Is there anything else on
7
   bifurcation? Maybe we'll take a very short break and then
   come back and deal with the issue of the amicus application.
8
   So I'll be back at 20 minutes--where is the clock in here?
9
10
   Maybe at a quarter of? Why don't we come back at 11:45?
11
              (A recess was taken from 11:32 a.m. to 11:46 a.m.)
12
             The Court:
                               We can resume. The City of
13
   Charlotte, do you want to go first?
14
             Mr. Banks:
                               Yes. Good morning, Special
15
   Master, James Banks for the City of Charlotte.
16
             The Court:
                               Good morning, Mr. Banks.
17
             Mr. Banks:
                               I don't think South Carolina and
18
   Charlotte are very far apart on the issues surrounding our
   request to participate as an amicus curiae. To begin with,
19
20
   no party objects to our participation in some form, and so if
21
   the Special Master agrees that we would add value, the
22
   question really is in what form the participation should be
23
   granted.
24
             We've asked for some fairly specific things and
25
   South Carolina has urged you to place restrictions on some of
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those, but not all. And the first of those is participation in conferences that are periodically scheduled by and large on the telephone.

And while first saying that we should be satisfied with reading transcripts after the fact, I think South Carolina has moved to the point where it's sufficient if we are on the phone to listen, but not to speak unless we are responding to a specific inquiry.

Charlotte thinks that it's much more efficient and important for Charlotte to be in a position to interject a point from time to time on matters pertaining to Charlotte or facts that Charlotte would know about that no other party likely would understand because it's more efficient to do that at the time rather than to read a transcript, note an error or an assumption about something that's just not correct, and then need to seek permission to provide a clarification, perhaps even get an objection and have to brief that, and then finally make a submission that pertains to something that could have been corrected on the spot if Charlotte had had at least the opportunity during the conferences to ask your permission to speak to a particular point and not simply had to stay silent waiting for someone else to recognize that Charlotte might have something to say on that point and raise the issue of what is Charlotte's view.

So we want--we would like to have the opportunity to pipe up when it's relevant, recognizing that we're not a party, and that the matters that we would be legitimately addressing should we speak up would pertain to Charlotte or some fact bearing on Charlotte's practice of water withdrawal and distribution. So that would be the first request.

The second request we've made at least for initial participation is that we be served with everything that's filed, everything--other documents that are exchanged among the parties except of course for confidential information.

We don't expect to get confidential information and would be prepared to assist the parties in maintaining separate lists, service lists, if that's necessary, so that it's not a complicated or logistically difficult thing for parties to exclude Charlotte from distributions that include confidential information Charlotte should not have.

Finally, we would ask that we be allowed to attend hearings and depositions. South Carolina has objected basically on logistical grounds that there would be considerations of the size of the room to be used to accommodate extra lawyers or that more time would be consumed by Charlotte needing to exit the room and return when matters were to be discussed that Charlotte should not hear, so forth.

All I can say is that Charlotte is prepared to do

its best to not be disruptive, but again, it's important for Charlotte to be in attendance in case things come up that need to be clarified at a deposition or a hearing. The interest--Charlotte's interest would be in getting all the facts accurately on the record.

And there will be occasions when Charlotte understands that something has been said isn't quite right because of something Charlotte understands and others might not. And we would like to be in a position in the conferences to speak up and in the depositions to apprise counsel for North Carolina that something needs to be clarified so that the record is accurate. And it's too late to do that reading a transcript of a deposition sometime after the fact. It needs to be done on the spot.

And then I guess finally Charlotte would like the opportunity to ask the Special Master in the future for other means of participation should those needs arise in the course of the proceedings.

South Carolina has mentioned, for example, that in a traditional amicus role, the filing of amicus briefs on decisions of the Special Master or on dispositive motions might be appropriate. They've even mentioned that the proposed intervenors, Duke and CRWSP, if they were participating as amici, should be able to present evidence, because they were arguing that they, Duke and CRWSP, were in

```
1
   possession of information that would be valuable to your
   hearing of this case, and South Carolina said, well, they
2
   might as amicus parties be able to present evidence. And we
3
   think Charlotte should be in the same position to the extent
4
   there are issues on which evidence from Charlotte would be
5
   helpful to your consideration of the case.
6
             So we would expect to come forward with those kinds
7
   of requests at a later date should the need arise. And we
8
9
   simply ask that in your order, if you should allow us to
10
   participate, that you make note that you would entertain such
11
   specific requests later on.
12
              (Pause.)
13
             The Court:
                               Okay.
                                      Thanks.
14
              (Pause.)
15
             The Court:
                               Just one moment.
16
              (Pause.)
17
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Thank you.
                                           I think that Mr. Banks
18
   is correct, that the points of disagreement are fairly
19
   narrow, but there is one overarching principle that is
   important. All nine justices agreed that Charlotte is
20
21
   adequately represented by North Carolina in the case. So to
22
   the extent that what Charlotte is seeking to do is to
23
   supplement what North Carolina can do in adequately repre-
24
   senting the City, I think their participation should be
25
   viewed through that lens.
```

Traditionally amici in the Court have been able to monitor the Court's web site to be able to get documents that are publicly available documents. I think that the question of participation and serving--Charlotte's role in monitoring, the example Mr. Banks gave, I think is one that is quite attenuated for participating in conferences. It's something that the North Carolina attorney general certainly is capable of doing.

The one point about service I think is important in light of the way things have proceeded with Duke's consultant concerning the CHEOPS model, and I do want to raise this because this is a matter of significant practical concern to South Carolina. We don't have any objection to Charlotte having access to the documents that are available on the web site for the case. That's perfectly adequate, and those documents are publicly available.

What causes us concern is the entity that Duke has retained as its outside consultant for the CHEOPS modeling has insisted on extremely stringent protective measures with respect to its internal data for its proprietary purposes, and to the point where we were negotiating over setting up an outside vendor so that there are specific stations that can be used to view this data. I fully expect that that—and they've asked for all of its data to be treated as confidential, and it's a humongous amount of data bits.

What I expect is that there will be a large number of documents created in the course of this litigation that use in some form or another those documents created by HDR or within HDR's files. And my concern is that by including Charlotte as an automatic receiving party of all filings that there will be the inadvertent disclosure of materials subject to protective order where one of the entities filing a brief here could have avoided by keeping a closed listserv of those recipients. And so I would like to protect our team from the inadvertent disclosure in a way that would cause objection by HDR simply by including Charlotte as though they are a shadow party able to receive all of the documents that get filed back and forth.

Now, I understood Mr. Banks today to say that he accepts the notion that there will be confidential protections and that they would not have access to that confidential information. My point is that by including an order that they automatically receive everything creates the kinds of administrative difficulties of protection that are hard to deal with when there may be a submission that includes in one footnote something that is included and it automatically gets sent over to Charlotte and that creates a problem that adds to the administrative burden to the states in a way that's unnecessary, particularly when as its parens patriae North Carolina can get all the documents, and if

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1
   Charlotte wants to develop a reporting relationship with
   North Carolina, it's certainly within North Carolina's
2
   capability to decide what documents go to Charlotte and which
3
4
   do not.
             And with respect to the last point, attendance at
5
   hearings, we don't have any problem with Charlotte or any
6
7
   member of the public I suppose attending hearings, you know,
   subject to your approval if it is a public hearing.
8
   problem that we had with their initial suggestion on
9
10
   depositions was that they were requesting the right as an
11
   amici to be asking questions at depositions and to be
12
   involved in the scheduling of depositions, which is difficult
13
   enough with the multiple players we have involved here.
14
   didn't want to add to the administrative burden of having to
15
   deal with amici questions at depositions where North Carolina
   has insisted on very strict time limits for depositions to be
16
17
   taking place.
18
             And then finally with respect to future requests,
   we assume that they'll be taken up on a case by case basis.
19
20
             The Court:
                               In terms of -- so you wouldn't have
21
   an objection anymore to their appearing at depositions as
22
   long as they're not involved in controlling the scheduling or
23
   involved in asking questions.
24
                               It is a problem obviously for--
             Mr. Frederick:
25
         I mean we have an objection, but it is not something
   yes.
```

```
1
   that I think can be--can't be overcome. It is a violation of
2
   the core notion that North Carolina adequately represents
3
   Charlotte. And we object to that extent because the justices
4
   we think spoke very clearly on that subject.
5
                              But that has to do with inter-
             The Court:
   vention as a party. And the justices also said and you said
6
7
   that it was okay to be an amicus. So we just have to figure
   out where we draw the line.
8
9
             Mr. Frederick: No, that's correct. And I'm not
10
   aware of any amicus participating in a deposition.
11
   haven't cited anything.
12
             The Court:
                              You mean asking questions.
13
             Mr. Frederick:
                             Well, even appearing at one.
14
             The Court:
                              But do you know I mean one way or
15
   the other?
16
                              No, I don't, but I am speaking
             Mr. Frederick:
17
   from a certain level of experience in doing litigation over a
18
   long period of time where it would be unusual to have people
19
   that are not parties sitting in on depositions without a
20
   demonstrable reason---
21
             The Court:
                              (interposing) Right.
22
             Mr. Frederick: ---why they are there.
                                                       I can
23
   understand why a Charlotte witness--I fully expect that Mr.
24
   Banks will be there for that deposition.
25
             The Court:
                              Right.
```

```
1
             Mr. Frederick: I understand that.
2
             The Court:
                               I quess amici can range over a
3
   whole broad spectrum of why they're interested. And many are
4
   interested in a more academic level, and they file briefs
   because they're interested in the legal issue that's being
5
   presented. So you wouldn't expect them to show up at
6
   depositions. But Charlotte's interest is more a--it's more
7
   at a factual level. It's more at a level that has to do with
8
9
   their interest in the particular factual subject matter.
10
             Mr. Frederick: They have to be able to demon-
11
   strate to meet any test for amicus participation that their
12
   value in that particular function demonstrably assists the
13
   Court. That's always the test for amicus participation.
14
   having a Charlotte lawyer sit in a deposition, what value
15
   added to the Court I think is very difficult for them to
16
   articulate.
17
             The Court:
                              So what is your ultimate position,
18
   then, on depositions? Where do you come out on that?
19
                              We object to them having a role in
             Mr. Frederick:
20
   depositions. But I can say that if they are not able to ask
21
   questions and they're not able to affect scheduling, if you
22
   were to order that over our objection, I'm not sure that's a
23
   point that we would except to.
24
                               Okay. And conferences, in terms
             The Court:
25
   of just being on the conference calls that we have---
```

1	Mr. Frederick: (interposing) The same position.
2	I don't know how their listening to the call live demon-
3	strably adds to the Court's understanding of the issues in
4	the case. May there be some particular point where we have a
5	conference call and Charlotte, you know, will be, you know,
6	at issue and there may be a case by case exception to that,
7	but the teleconferences are transcribed and they have an
8	attorney general who represents them.
9	The Court: But do you have also any objection
10	to the proposal that if they are on conference calls, say
11	they're on conference calls, that rather than waiting to be
12	asked if they have anything to add, because presumably that
13	would be fine if someone were to say what"Does Charlotte
14	have anything to say on this," that if they have something to
15	add they can ask for permission on the call to add something?
16	Mr. Frederick: I think again the test is are they
17	adequately represented by their state's attorney general.
18	And again, is that something that we would except to
19	The Court: (interposing) But why isI'm
20	having trouble with why that bears on the amicus analysis,
21	because if a bunch of law professors can be an amicus in a
22	case, you don't ask that question for them, are they
23	adequately represented by their state or someone else. You
24	ask are they adding anything to the proceeding that's helpful
25	as a friend of the Court.

```
1
             Mr. Frederick: And that's why original actions
2
   are fundamentally different from most lawsuits, Your Honor.
3
             The Court:
                               But the participation of an amicus
4
   isn't particularly fundamentally different, is it?
5
             Mr. Frederick:
                               Special masters have routinely
6
   denied any amicus participation by individual actors within
7
   the state. Special Master Lancaster did that in Virginia v.
   Maryland. That's not unusual because of the view that the
8
9
   states as parens patriae for all of their citizens represent
10
   them.
11
                               But you had advocated the amicus
             The Court:
12
   mechanism as a way of solving the problems that you have
13
   identified with intervention.
14
             Mr. Frederick:
                               I think there's a difference
   between having an amicus brief on a particular point of law
15
16
   which they would submit or some evidentiary point that ---
17
             The Court:
                               (interposing) But isn't
18
   Charlotte's main contribution to this proceeding factual and
19
   not legal? Why would Charlotte add anything on legal issues
20
   that would be helpful to the Court? It seems to me that
21
   their principal -- not that they wouldn't have anything to say
22
   on legal issues. I'm sure they have excellent legal analysis
23
   of issues, but---
24
             Mr. Frederick:
                               (interposing) But I agree with
25
   you. I agree with you there's a---
```

```
Isn't their main--isn't their main
1
             The Court:
2
   contribution factual?
3
             Mr. Frederick: I think the question, though, is
4
   do they offer a perspective not adequately represented by the
   state's attorney general, who represents all the cities and
5
   all the citizens of North Carolina. Now---
6
7
             The Court:
                              (interposing) But if that were
   the criteria, then--I mean obviously that doesn't apply at
8
9
   trial. We need to get evidence from all those people anyway;
10
   right? You can't--the State can't speak on behalf of all
11
   those citizens if there's a trial; right?
12
             Mr. Frederick: That's what the attorney general
13
   is charged with doing, Your Honor.
14
             The Court:
                              But he can't testify if he doesn't
15
   have personal knowledge.
16
             Mr. Frederick: No, but he's charged with repre-
17
   senting them. We're not saying -- the Charlotte witnesses will
18
   be called at trial. We expect them. We expect Charlotte to
19
   be represented and---
20
             The Court:
                              (interposing) Right, obviously;
21
           I'm just saying that's obvious, that the attorney
   right.
22
   general can't go so far as to testify on behalf of fact
23
   witnesses. You have to have the actual fact witnesses there.
24
                              That's correct.
             Mr. Frederick:
25
                              So I think somewhere in between
             The Court:
```

1 these two points is where Charlotte falls. 2 I accept that it is a continuum. Mr. Frederick: 3 And I think the point is whether to treat them as a shadow 4 party or whether to treat them as a true amicus, where if they have any contribution to make, they request, you know, 5 the specific opportunity to make that contribution. 6 expect at that point we'll have no objection when they 7 articulate exactly why they want to participate at a 8 particular phase as an amicus. 9 10 I think that our principal concern, though, is with 11 the confidential documents in treating Charlotte as a 12 continuing player for all purposes when we have a web site 13 that's a very good web site designed to allow people to 14 facilitate their access to the documents. 15 Given how long it has taken to negotiate with Duke's consultant, I want to be scrupulous on our side about 16 17 protecting the confidentiality measures that we're agreeing 18 to. And I'm very concerned because I think that data will 19 end up figuring in a lot of submissions, and I don't want our 20 team to be in a position of an inadvertent disclosure. 21 What protocol do we have now that The Court: 22 protects confidential -- confidential materials or materials 23 referring to confidential materials from going onto the web 24 site? I know that they shouldn't, but what mechanism do we

have in place to prevent that?

25

```
1
             Mr. Frederick: I believe we have agreed, at least
2
   in discussions, that we're not going to put confidential
3
   information up on the web site.
4
             The Court:
                               Right.
5
             Mr. Frederick: But we haven't so far encountered
6
   this question.
7
             The Court:
                              Yeah, it seems to me there's two
   possible solutions. One is--you know, in the case of
8
9
   Charlotte--your solution that, well, North Carolina can just
10
   send Charlotte anything that is needed. And I think North
11
   Carolina objects to that, but we'll hear from North Carolina.
12
             And then the other--but then the other option would
13
   be to have a mechanism that is a screening mechanism that
14
   would be used both for the web site and for Charlotte to make
   sure that materials that contain confidential information
15
   don't go in either of those places, which we probably need
16
17
            I mean we need to have some mechanism that
   anyway.
18
   identifies those documents. And if it's not adequately
19
   provided for already in the order, we probably need to come
20
   up with a mechanism.
21
                              We have discussed that with North
             Mr. Frederick:
22
   Carolina and the intervenors in way months past. And I think
23
   that the parties are capable of coming up with appropriate
24
   prophylactic measures with respect to that question.
25
             But on the question of having automatic service,
```

```
1
   that creates a different cluster of administrative issues and
2
   challenges that I want to raise with the Court because they
3
   can be--there's no outstanding reason why Charlotte can't
   accomplish its monitoring purposes in a different way without
4
   imposing an administrative burden on the parties with respect
5
   to confidential information.
6
7
                               Uh-huh, but it--I agree, but it
             The Court:
   may be the same administrative burden because something has
8
9
   to be done in that service list to prevent disclosure on the
10
   web site.
              In other words, if it goes to Lori Nichols, who is
11
   my administrator, it will go on the web site unless someone
12
   tells her not to put it on the web site. So it's sort of the
13
   same--somewhat the same problem because it inheres in the
14
   very nature of an omnibus service list, the e-mail service
15
   list.
16
             Mr. Frederick: But it's different in this
17
             The discovery so far has not been sent to your
   respect.
18
   office.
19
             The Court:
                               That's true.
20
             Mr. Frederick:
                               And there's a lot of information
21
   that gets transmitted in those discovery papers will happen
22
   in the course of depositions being taken and the like.
23
             The Court:
                               Okay. Fair enough.
                                                    That's a good
24
   point. Does North Carolina want to add anything before I
25
   hear from Mr. Banks again?
```

1	Mr. Browning: Your Honor, no, unless you have
2	any questions. I think our position is set out in the brief
3	before you.
4	The Court: Well, I did have a question.
5	Forgive me if it's in here, but I just couldn'tit seemed
6	that you were supporting all three modes of participation by
7	Charlotte: the conferences, filings, and hearings and
8	depositions.
9	Then you elaborated on the filings issues, not
10	wanting to have to take on the burden of providing things to
11	Charlotte through North Carolina. But I don't think you
12	elaborated on the other two points. So are youdo you have
13	anythingany comments in response to Mr. Frederick's
14	objections to say depositions, hearings, and conferences?
15	Mr. Browning: Your Honor, our position is fairly
16	simple, that we think that Charlotteits presence in the
17	monthly conferences and its participation so far has been
18	helpful in guiding where this case goes. We are fully
19	supportive of their continued participation as an amicus or a
20	super amicus in whatever way the Court finds to be helpful.
21	And North Carolina will do whatever the Special
22	Master would like for us to do to accommodate their continued
23	presence and participation as the municipality that really
24	has a bull's-eye painted on their back as a result of the
25	bill of complaint. You tell us what we need to do and we'll

```
1
   do it---
2
                               (interposing)
                                              Okay.
              The Court:
3
                               ---because we think Charlotte
              Mr. Browning:
   should be here.
4
5
                               Yeah. And then in terms of the
              The Court:
   service issue, this issue of -- I think that we need to resolve
6
7
   the issue of court filings in a more general way. So that to
   me seems to be something that, as I said a moment ago, has to
8
   be resolved across the board for court filings if there's
9
10
   going to be confidential material.
11
              But what about discovery material? How should we
12
   manage that in terms of who is going to be the filter to make
13
   sure that Charlotte isn't--if we are going to have them
14
   receive copies of discovery, how do we ensure that they don't
15
   receive confidential discovery?
16
                               Your Honor, I think that's just an
              Mr. Browning:
17
   issue in terms of internal firm management that you have in
18
   any litigation that you'll always have the risk of
19
   inadvertently sending something to the wrong address or the
20
   wrong location, but if you're diligent in your service list,
21
   those opportunities can be minimized.
22
              And as long as you make good faith efforts,
23
   somebody is not going to hopefully drag you through the coals
24
   just because somebody in the office makes a mistake and sends
25
   it out to the wrong location. So I think we're really
```

```
1
   spending a lot of time talking about a what if hypothetical
2
   here that I would not be too concerned about.
             The Court:
3
                               Okay. Good.
4
             Mr. Browning:
                               Thank you, Your Honor.
                               Well, Mr. Banks, do you have
5
             The Court:
6
   anything more to add?
7
                                                     I'd like to
             Mr. Banks:
                              Yes, Special Master.
   touch briefly on one point that Mr. Frederick returned to
8
9
   several times. And that is his assertion that Charlotte's
10
   participation ought to be viewed through the lens of the
11
   conclusion that North Carolina represents Charlotte's
12
   interest.
13
              In the Supreme Court briefing on intervention,
14
   South Carolina pointed to two cases in which the role of
15
   amicus curiae was laid out by a special master in original
16
   actions. One of those, Nebraska v. Wyoming, was their chief
17
   example. The Chief Justice in dissent pointed to that same
18
   case and said, "This is a case very much like the one
19
   involving South Carolina and North Carolina.
                                                  It's a very
20
   good example of how amicus curiae can participate in such a
21
   case."
22
             In Nebraska v. Wyoming, amici were denied inter-
23
   vention for the same reason Charlotte was, adequate repre-
24
   sentation by their states. The special master in that case
25
   offered all five the opportunity to participate as amicus
```

curiae, and several did. And he articulated the reason for allowing that as twofold: one, to help so that they could preserve their interest in the matters to be decided, and two, to serve as traditional friends of the court.

And here are the kinds of things that that special master allowed: submission of affidavits, filing of briefs, examination of witnesses, appearance at hearings, and introduction of evidence. Now, this is the very case that both the Chief Justice and South Carolina point to as providing the best example.

The second example is Alaska v. United States in 2005. Again, a party was denied intervention and then allowed—on the basis that it was adequately represented by the State of Alaska and then allowed to participate. And in that case, the special master did precisely what Charlotte is requesting here as an initial matter.

It said that the amicus should be served with relevant filings, that they should be able to attend trial and hearings and to submit briefs on any subject to be decided by the special master. And then there would be a requirement for separate permission at future times to participate in other ways.

In neither of these cases was there a sort of good cause showing or a burden on the amicus curiae to demonstrate that their parent, the state party, didn't adequately

```
1
   represent their interest or that they added something the
2
   State was incapable of adding. They were there to protect
3
   their interest, to provide factual information relevant to
   their issues, and to serve as a friend of the court.
4
   are the cases that South Carolina points to.
5
                               Who was the special master in
6
             The Court:
7
   Nebraska v. Wyoming?
                         Do you know?
8
                               Oh, I don't recall. We might have
             Mr. Banks:
9
   noted it in our -- in our motion we provide citations to the
10
   web sites.
11
             The Court:
                               Yeah.
                                      I saw that.
12
             Mr. Banks:
                              And so that would be the place to
13
   check, but I've forgotten. That was a 1993 matter. And the
14
   special master was active in the late '80s, so I'm not sure
15
   whether it's possible to get any direct feel from that
16
   special master, how that worked out.
17
             But in each of his succeeding reports to the Court,
18
   he had a special section on how the participation by amici
19
   had gone, and he said very positive things about the
20
   constructive contributions they had made to the case.
21
             The Court:
                               Thanks. Mr. Frederick, do you
22
   have anything further?
23
             Mr. Frederick: Just two quick points as we point
24
   out on pages 9 to 10 of our brief. There was a good cause
25
   standard imposed in the Nebraska v. Wyoming case. And if
```

```
1
   memory serves correctly, it was Owen Olpin who was the
   special master there. That good cause standard was required
2
3
   for the submission of the types of matters that Charlotte has
   now just adverted to.
4
5
             And in Alaska it is true that the amici were
   allowed to participate with respect to certain matters, but
6
7
   the special master also denied participation in a site visit
8
   even at the amici's own expense on the grounds that it wasn't
9
   going to materially add to the Court's understanding of the
10
   issues.
11
             The Court:
                               Who were the amici in Alaska?
12
             Mr. Frederick:
                               They were Native American groups.
13
             The Court:
                               Native groups; that's what I
14
   thought.
15
             Mr. Frederick:
                               That's correct. So with that, as
   I say, our point is not that Charlotte is not allowed to
16
17
   participate as an amicus. We do believe that North Carolina
18
   cannot credibly complain about the burden administratively
19
   while imposing it on South Carolina. That doesn't seem to
20
          In their brief when they complain about the adminis-
21
   trative burden of us asking North Carolina to superintend
22
   which documents can fairly be transferred to Charlotte and
23
   they want to pose the burden on us, that seems---
24
             The Court:
                               (interposing) Well, wait.
                                                           I'm
25
   not following why that would have been posed on you.
```

1	Mr. Frederick: Because of the confidentiality
2	issue. Mr. Browning says here that that's simply an issue of
3	good office management. And our point is that we shouldn't
4	have the burden of determining on any individual submission
5	or any individual discovery matter whether there happens to
6	be information that Charlotte shouldn't be given access to.
7	The Court: You're going to have to make that
8	determination anyway to determine whether it's confidential.
9	Wouldn't it have to be stamped confidential or designated?
10	I mean I don't see it as a particularly uniquely South
11	Carolina burden.
12	If we have an order in place that determines that
13	certain discovery materials may be deemed confidential and
14	therefore not made available to the public, then everyone has
15	a burden in producing materials to so designate them. And
16	then other parties have the burden, if they disagree with the
17	designation or believe that other parties' materials need to
18	be designated that weren't, to undertake to have those
19	designated.
20	But I think what North Carolina was saying, you
21	were asking them to be the gatekeeper for all materials that
22	would or would not go to Charlotte, which I don't think
23	anyone is asking South Carolina to do either. It would just
24	be a function of all parties who are designating documents to
25	be careful not to forward any such documents to Charlotte.

1 Mr. Frederick: It wouldn't be forwarded, Your Under Charlotte's proposal, they're included on the 2 3 listserv of addressees for all documents. They asked to be served with all documents. That's what we object to. 4 5 Right, but in terms of if you were The Court: to make documents available to Charlotte, there's three ways 6 7 you could do it. One, you have an omnibus service list that 8 goes to everybody. That doesn't work obviously because everyone except Charlotte is subject to the protective order, 9 10 right, a protective order. 11 So the second option is to have them not be on any 12 service list and have North Carolina have to decide on a 13 piece by piece basis what they get and what they don't get, 14 which doesn't make a whole lot of sense because North 15 Carolina is not the guardian of Charlotte. If they're going to be an amicus, they have their own status. So they would 16 17 be granted leave to participate as an amicus, not subject to 18 the supervision or quidance of North Carolina. They would be 19 participating in their own right. 20 Mr. Frederick: But they are---21 The Court: (interposing) So the third option 22 would be simply to create two service lists, one of which 23 will be for nonconfidential materials, which could go on the 24 web site and also--again, it wouldn't be to the web site for 25 discovery materials but for other materials, and then--so you

1 could have a nonconfidential discovery related service list and then another confidential service list. That would be 2 3 another way to do it. Mr. Frederick: 4 The third approach that you apply I don't think would be consistent with the limited amicus 5 participations in either the Alaska case or the Nebraska case 6 7 because a good cause standard was imposed in Nebraska and a does it facilitate the understanding of the Court standard 8 was used in Alaska. Now---9 10 (interposing) So for each brief The Court: 11 when it was said that -- in other words, are you saying in 12 neither case was there a provision that said that the party 13 would get copies of materials? 14 Mr. Frederick: We're not aware that they had the 15 kind of participation of the sweeping nature that Charlotte has had. Charlotte is asking to be treated as a quasi-party 16 17 after all nine justices rejected that participation. And to 18 be served with all documents in the case is the quintessence 19 of being treated as a party, to be able to participate in 20 hearings, to participate in monthly telephone calls, and the 21 like. 22 We have no objection to a limited participation of 23 a true amicus nature that fits the normal standards for 24 amicus participation. But they were denied intervention 25 status by all nine justices because North Carolina can

```
1
   adequately represent them.
2
             And for North Carolina to now say that they can't
3
   superintend one of their own cities with respect to the
   dissemination of documents is not a position that should be
4
   taken I think to the point of inconveniencing as an
5
   administrative matter South Carolina and imposing on us the
6
   risks of disclosures of information by somebody who may
7
   happen to use the wrong listserv inadvertently in the
8
   dissemination of documents that have taken us six to nine
9
10
   months of hard negotiations in order to get access to them
11
   because they are critical to the case.
12
             I just would like to protect our team from that
13
   kind of risk of inadvertence even if it's a separate listserv
14
   because I understand the sensitivity that Duke's consultant
15
   is applying to this matter.
16
                               Okay. I'm not sure I see the
             The Court:
17
   difference. I'm just having a hard time seeing---
18
             Mr. Frederick: (interposing) North Carolina
19
   bears the risk of an inadvertent disclosure if North Carolina
20
   has the duty to give Charlotte documents. That's not a duty
21
   or a burden or an imposition or a risk that South Carolina
22
   and its counsel have to assume.
23
             The Court: Well, couldn't we just have two
24
   listservs, though, one for---
25
             Mr. Frederick:
                              (interposing)
                                             Yes.
```

```
1
             The Court:
                             You're just afraid someone will
2
   press the wrong button.
3
             Mr. Frederick: It has happened in many litiga-
4
   tions of which I've been a part where somebody puts the wrong
5
   listserv in the "To" column of an e-mail.
                              Uh-huh.
                                       Okay. Well, I should be
6
             The Court:
7
   able to--unless there's other comments or--I should be able
8
   to get something out on this issue very soon on the amicus,
9
   and then obviously we'll take the bifurcation under
10
   submission as well. So both matters are under submission.
11
   And we'll reconvene--we should probably maybe go off record
12
   and set up a time for or talk about resuming conference
13
   calls.
14
             (The hearing was closed at 12:23 p.m.)
```

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF WAKE

CERTIFICATE

I, Kay K. McGovern, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 4 through 129 represent a true and accurate transcript of the proceedings held at the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on Friday, April 13, 2010.

I do further certify that I am not counsel for or employed by any party to this action, nor am I interested in the results of this action.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this 5th day of May, 2010.

Kay K. McGovern, CVR-CM