

MONDAY, MAY 23, 2016

CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS

15-1 JOHNSON, SHERMAINE A. V. MANIS, WARDEN

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016).

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand in this case: The Court has held the petition in this and many other cases pending the decision in *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016). In holding this petition and now vacating and remanding the judgment below, the Court has not assessed whether petitioner's asserted entitlement to retroactive relief "is properly presented in the case." *Id.*, at ____ (slip op., at 13). On remand, courts should understand that the Court's disposition of this petition does not reflect any view regarding petitioner's entitlement to relief. The Court's disposition does not, for example, address whether an adequate and independent state ground bars relief, whether petitioner forfeited or waived any entitlement to relief (by, for example, entering into a plea agreement waiving any entitlement to relief), or whether petitioner's sentence actually qualifies as a mandatory life without parole sentence.

Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. I concur in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. See *Adams v. Alabama*, 578 U. S. ____ (2016) (Alito, J., concurring).

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. I concur in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. See *Adams v. Alabama*, 578 U. S. ____ (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

15-620

JONES, ERIC A., ET AL. V. GILLIE, PAMELA, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Sheriff v. Gillie*, 578 U. S. ____ (2016).

15-785

PUNDT, EDWARD V. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U. S. ____ (2016).

15-1100

CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, ET AL. V. BURWELL, SEC. OF H&HS, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in light of *Zubik v. Burwell*, 578 U. S. ____ (2016). Nothing in the *Zubik* opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by petitioners' health plans "obtain, without cost, the full range

of FDA approved contraceptives.” *Wheaton College v. Burwell*, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 1). Through this litigation, petitioners have made the Government aware of their view that they meet “the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds.” *Id.*, at ___ (slip op., at 2). Nothing in the *Zubik* opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, “precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage” going forward. *Ibid.* Because the Government may rely on this notice, the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on petitioners for failure to provide the relevant notice.

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurs in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand in this case for the reasons expressed in *Zubik v. Burwell*, 578 U. S. ___ (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

15-1131 MI CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, ET AL. V. BURWELL, SEC. OF H&HS, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in light of *Zubik v. Burwell*, 578 U. S. ___ (2016). Nothing in the *Zubik* opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by petitioners’ health plans “obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives.” *Wheaton College v. Burwell*, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 1). Through this litigation, petitioners have made the Government aware of their

view that they meet “the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds.” *Id.*, at ___ (slip op., at 2). Nothing in the *Zubik* opinion, or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, “precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage” going forward. *Ibid.* Because the Government may rely on this notice, the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on petitioners for failure to provide the relevant notice.

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurs in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand in this case for the reasons expressed in *Zubik v. Burwell*, 578 U. S. ___ (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

- 15-6284 KNOTTS, WILLIAM V. ALABAMA
- 15-6290 BONDS, JAMES W. V. ALABAMA
- 15-6300 SLATON, NATHAN V. ALABAMA
- 15-6306 FLOWERS, CLAYTON J. V. ALABAMA
- 15-6904 BARNES, MICHAEL S. V. ALABAMA
- 15-6905 BARNES, MICHAEL S. V. ALABAMA

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama for further consideration in light of *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ___ (2016).

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand in these cases: The Court has held the petitions in these and many other cases

pending the decision in *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016). In holding these petitions and now vacating and remanding the judgments below, the Court has not assessed whether petitioners' asserted entitlement to retroactive relief "is properly presented in the case." *Id.*, at ____ (slip op., at 13). On remand, courts should understand that the Court's disposition of these petitions does not reflect any view regarding petitioners' entitlement to relief. The Court's disposition does not, for example, address whether an adequate and independent state ground bars relief, whether petitioners forfeited or waived any entitlement to relief (by, for example, entering into a plea agreement waiving any entitlement to relief), or whether petitioners' sentences actually qualify as mandatory life without parole sentences.

Justice Alito, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. I concur in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. See *Adams v. Alabama*, 578 U. S. ____ (2016) (Alito, concurring).

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. I concur in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand. See *Adams v. Alabama*, 578 U. S. ____ (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

15M118 PARKER, ANTHONY V. LEHIGH CTY. DOMESTIC CT., ET AL.
15M119 BANKS, FRAENCHOT D. V. UNITED STATES
15M120 MARCHAND, GREGG V. SIMONSON, ERIK

The motions to direct the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time are denied.

15M121 CHISHOLM, JOHN T., ET AL. V. TWO UNNAMED PETITIONERS, ET AL.

The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record is granted.

15-8399 KIRBY, KENDA R. V. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY

The motion of petitioner for reconsideration of order denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied.

15-8623 DAVIS, CATHARINE E. V. NEW YORK CITY DEPT. OF ED.

15-8680 PAUL, RONALD I. V. DE HOLCZER, PAUL D., ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until June 13, 2016, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

CERTIORARI DENIED

15-113 LAWSON, CARRIE D. V. SAUER INC.

15-776 BOLLINGER, LARRY M. V. UNITED STATES

15-798 CHINATOWN NEIGHBORHOOD, ET AL. V. HARRIS, ATT'Y GEN. OF CA, ET AL.

15-1005 CHABAD-LUBAVITCH OF MI, ET AL. V. SCHUCHMAN, DOV, ET AL.

15-1021 SUNRISE CHILDREN'S SERVICES V. GLISSON, VICKIE, ET AL.

15-1143 GREENBLATT, MARTHA, ET VIR V. KLEIN, HOWARD

15-1147 BEE'S AUTO, INC., ET AL. V. CLERMONT, FL

15-1149 DIBBS, STEPHEN J. V. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FL

15-1155 GOSSAGE, HENRY E. V. TERRILL, RICHARD, ET AL.

15-1156 VILLAGE SUPERMARKETS, ET AL. V. HANOVER 3201 REALTY, LLC

15-1160 DOW CHEMICAL CO. V. NOVA CHEMICALS CORP., ET AL.

15-1165 DROMGOOLE, MELISSA V. TEXAS

15-1168 RYE, MICHELLE, ET VIR V. WOMEN'S CARE CENTER, ET AL.

15-1169 BOWEN, DEBORAH V. TEXAS
15-1170 KAKOSCH, HANNO V. SIEMENS CORPORATION, ET AL.
15-1171 TAYLOR, CURTIS V. US NATIONAL BANK ASSOCIATION
15-1181 MILLER, ROBERT M. V. OLESIU, SHAYNA, ET AL.
15-1221 REXINE, CHRISTINA M. V. REXINE, JOEY L.
15-1231 ASHCRAFT, JULIA A. V. KENNEDY, PATRICK D.
15-1239 HERSON, JEFFREY, ET AL. V. RICHMOND, CA
15-1250 GREEN, JOSEPH L. V. TEXAS
15-1259 BURNS, ARTIE V. REYNOLDS, WARDEN
15-1269 CARAMADRE, JOSEPH V. UNITED STATES
15-7332 SAID, MOHAMED A., ET AL. V. UNITED STATES
15-7552 GARZA, LUIS A. V. UNITED STATES
15-7561 HOLLAND, ANDREW M. V. ARKANSAS
15-7639 ASCENCIO, FRANK V. CALIFORNIA
15-7798 ADAMS, CURTIS V. UNITED STATES
15-7946 FLEMING, WILLIAM H. V. SAINI, TEJINDER, ET AL.
15-8225 KING, TERRY L. V. TENNESSEE
15-8336 WIGGINS, DAVID V. ALABAMA
15-8564 HALL, MARC V. RAMSEY COUNTY, MN, ET AL.
15-8566 BOWMAN, ERNEST V. GRIFFIN, SUPT., GREEN HAVEN
15-8568 VALDEZ, ANDREW P. V. MICHIGAN
15-8574 FORD, JON T. V. TEXAS
15-8575 MUHAMMAD, MALCOLM V. FLEMING, LIEUTENANT, ET AL.
15-8591 BERNAL, RODRIGO A. V. PFEIFFER, ACTING WARDEN
15-8592 BLAKE, ANDREW P. V. PIERCE, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-8593 BOYD, FRANCIS V. GARMAN, SUPT., ROCKVIEW, ET AL.
15-8597 BERMUDEZ, ANTONIO V. TEXAS
15-8602 MORRIS, JEROD A. V. DAVEY, ACTING WARDEN

15-8611 ELINE, PAUL H. V. WETZEL, SEC., PA DOC, ET AL.
15-8616 URREA, FABIAN C. V. MONTGOMERY, WARDEN
15-8619 VASQUEZ, LUIS V. SPEARMAN, ACTING WARDEN
15-8625 SIPPLEN, WILLIAM V. BRYSON, COMM'R, GA DOC
15-8627 AGUIRRE, LUIS A. V. AGUIRRE, TRINA S.
15-8638 SASAKI, TERENCE V. NYU HOSPITALS CENTER, ET AL.
15-8641 ALLEN, KERRY D. V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
15-8643 LOPEZ, EFRAIN V. TEXAS
15-8647 JONES, TOMMY E. V. WILLIE, DON, ET AL.
15-8649 LITTLEPAGE, DANIEL V. OHIO
15-8650 LOZANO, JESUS D. V. DUCART, WARDEN
15-8654 WILLIAMS, TERIK V. PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL.
15-8676 WILSON, DE'MARION V. CLARKE, DIR., VA DOC
15-8682 RODRIGUEZ, JOSE S. V. CALIFORNIA
15-8731 TOWNSEND, ALBERT J. V. BRADSHAW, WARDEN
15-8745 COX, KENNETH J. V. COLORADO
15-8755 DOE, PYLORD P. V. DEPT. OF H&HS
15-8769 BOUVIER, CARLA V. COLVIN, ACTING COMM'R, SOCIAL
15-8776 SUTHERLAND, JAMES L. V. DOVEY, JOHN
15-8778 SEDINE, JEFFREY L. V. MICHIGAN
15-8785 GAY, BYRON K. V. COLORADO
15-8802 WHITE, GARY V. FLORIDA
15-8807 RIOS, KEITH R. V. MONTEREY CTY. DEPT. OF SOCIAL
15-8827 WRIGHT, JULIET V. JAMES CITY COUNTY, VA
15-8833 McKANT, BRIAN V. CAMERON, SUPT., HOUTZDALE
15-8839 PLEASANT, JEFFREY A. V. CLARKE, DIR., VA DOC
15-8891 BLANKENSHIP, D. E. V. BACA, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-8906 UHRICH, JOSHUA V. CLARK, SUPT., ALBION, ET AL.

15-8923 PEASE, JEFFREY M. V. RAEMISCH, EXEC. DIR., CO DOC
15-8937 JOHNSON, GLORIA R. V. MASONITE INT'L CORP.
15-8951 SEDA, ANTHONY W. V. MSPB
15-8953 SATIZABAL, CARLOS V. GILMORE, SUPT., GREENE, ET AL.
15-8968 HEURUNG, JOHNNY V. UNITED STATES
15-8969 HAYNES, WILLIS M. V. UNITED STATES
15-8970 GARY, WILLIE O. V. UNITED STATES
15-8979 DEEM, STEVEN V. UNITED STATES
15-8981 TAYLOR, CARLTON R. V. UNITED STATES
15-8984 TORRES, EDWIN V. V. UNITED STATES
15-8987 JIAU, WINIFRED V. UNITED STATES
15-8995 WEIKAL-BEAUCHAT, WENDY K. V. UNITED STATES
15-9001 BANUELOS-ESTRADA, RAUL V. UNITED STATES
15-9009 KILLINGBECK, JOHN C. V. UNITED STATES
15-9011 POACHES, STEPHEN V. CAMERON, SUPT., HOUTZDALE
15-9013 DESAI, SHREYANS V. UNITED STATES
15-9018 JONES, ARTHUR N. V. UNITED STATES
15-9019 JACKSON, DELDRICK D. V. UNITED STATES
15-9026 GUERRERO, JUAN V. UNITED STATES

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

15-873 ANGELOTTI CHIROPRACTIC, ET AL. V. BAKER, CHRISTINE, ET AL.

The motion of California Society of Industrial Medicine and Surgery, et al. for leave to file a brief as *amici curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

15-1036 PENNSYLVANIA V. ROSE, STEVENSON L.

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

- 15-1118 MICHAEL'S FLOOR COVERING V. RESILIENT FLOOR COVERING, ET AL.
The motion of Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. for leave to file a brief as *amicus curiae* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
- 15-8530 MISSUD, PATRICK A. V. USCA 9
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*). The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and this petition.
- 15-8580 JOHNSON, R. WAYNE V. STEPHENS, DIR., TX DCJ
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*).
- 15-8600 McFADDEN, CRAWLEY V. DETROIT UNITED INSURANCE, ET AL.
- 15-8651 SCHEIB, CAROLE L. V. BANK OF NY MELLON
- 15-8912 AHMED, NAWAZ V. SHELDON, WARDEN

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied, and the petitions for writs of certiorari are dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

HABEAS CORPUS DENIED

15-9088 IN RE MICHAEL A. ZONE
15-9114 IN RE KEVIN C. FAULKNER
15-9121 IN RE HARRY E. MILES

The petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied.

MANDAMUS DENIED

15-8658 IN RE SHAW RAHMAN
15-8735 IN RE JAMES A. McDONALD

The petitions for writs of mandamus are denied.

REHEARINGS DENIED

15-664 BLAGOJEVICH, ROD V. UNITED STATES
15-923 KIRSCHMANN, RHONDA V. KIRSCHMANN, DOLLY M.
15-1007 LOVE, UNTERS L. V. WASHINGTON
15-6958 MURRAY, BRAY J. V. WOLF, GOV. OF PA, ET AL.
15-7204 PIANKA, VICTOR V. DE LA ROSA, WARDEN, ET AL.
15-7538 WISMER, JUDITH V. SARASOTA HOUSING AUTHORITY
15-7589 LAMBERT, ANDREW J. V. MICHIGAN
15-7704 REEDMAN, DAVID V. BRYSON, COMM'R, GA DOC
15-7714 TURNER, JOHN A. V. MARYLAND
15-7897 TORRES, MARCO M. V. SCOTT, GOV. OF FL
15-8154 DHALIWAL, BALWANT S. V. IMPERIAL COUNTY, CA, ET AL.

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RENALDO CHANTE ADAMS *v.* ALABAMA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA

No. 15–6289. Decided May 23, 2016

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama for further consideration in light of *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016).

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand.

The Court has held the petition in this and many other cases pending the decision in *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016). In holding this petition and now vacating and remanding the judgment below, the Court has not assessed whether petitioner’s asserted entitlement to retroactive relief “is properly presented in the case.” *Id.*, at ____ (slip op., at 13). On remand, courts should understand that the Court’s disposition of this petition does not reflect any view regarding petitioner’s entitlement to relief. The Court’s disposition does not, for example, address whether an adequate and independent state ground bars relief, whether petitioner forfeited or waived any entitlement to relief (by, for example, entering into a plea agreement waiving any entitlement to relief), or whether petitioner’s sentence actually qualifies as a mandatory life without parole sentence.

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RENALDO CHANTE ADAMS *v.* ALABAMA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA

No. 15–6289. Decided May 23, 2016

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate, and remand.*

The Court grants the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, vacates the decision below, and remands for reconsideration in light of *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016), which holds that *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U. S. ____ (2012), applies retroactively to cases on state collateral review. As a result of *Montgomery* and *Miller*, States must now ensure that prisoners serving sentences of life without parole for offenses committed before the age of 18 have the benefit of an individualized sentencing procedure that considers their youth and immaturity at the time of the offense.

The present case differs from most of those in which the Court grants, vacates, and remands for reconsideration in light of *Montgomery*. The petitioner in this case—as with a few others now before the Court—was sentenced to death prior to our decision in *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U. S. 551 (2005), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a death sentence for a minor. During that pre-*Roper* period, juries in capital cases were required at the penalty phase to consider “all relevant mitigating evidence,” including “the chronological age of a minor” and a

*This opinion also applies to the other petitions held for *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016), in which the defendant was originally sentenced to death, No. 15–1, *Johnson v. Manis*; No. 15–6284, *Knotts v. Alabama*; No. 15–6290, *Bonds v. Alabama*; No. 15–6300, *Slaton v. Alabama*; No. 15–6306, *Flowers v. Alabama*; No. 15–6904, *Barnes v. Alabama*; and No. 15–6905, *Barnes v. Alabama*.

ALITO, J., concurring

youthful defendant’s “mental and emotional development.” *Eddings v. Oklahoma*, 455 U. S. 104, 116–117 (1982); see also *Roper v. Simmons*, *supra*, at 603 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“A defendant’s youth or immaturity is, of course, a paradigmatic example” of the type of mitigating evidence to which a “sentencer in a capital case must be permitted to give full effect”). After *Roper*, death sentences imposed on prisoners convicted of murders committed as minors were reduced to lesser sentences.

In the present case, petitioner committed a heinous murder in 1997 when he was 17 years old. See 955 So. 2d 1037, 1047–1049 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). Wielding a knife and wearing a stocking mask to conceal his face, petitioner climbed through a window into the home of Melissa and Andrew Mills. Petitioner demanded money, but the Mills family had only \$9 on hand. While petitioner remained in the Mills home with Melissa Mills and her three young children, Andrew Mills raced to an ATM and withdrew \$375, the maximum amount available. Petitioner then demanded more money, so Andrew went to a nearby grocery store to cash a check. While holding her at knife point, petitioner raped Melissa Mills, who was four months pregnant, before stabbing her repeatedly in the neck, upper and lower chest, and back. The stab wounds pierced her liver and lungs, and she eventually succumbed.

When police arrived at the Mills’ home, summoned by the grocery store clerk, Melissa Mills was gasping for breath and bleeding profusely. Petitioner fled but was captured nearby 20 minutes later. His clothes were covered in Melissa Mills’ blood, and he had in his possession the knife used to kill her, which was also covered in her blood. Nine blood-smearred dollar bills were located nearby. Petitioner’s DNA matched the semen recovered from the rape kit performed as part of Melissa Mills’ autopsy.

A jury found petitioner guilty of murder and then pro-

ALITO, J., concurring

ceeded to decide whether he should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole. *Id.*, at 1048; see Ala. Code §13A-5-45 (1982). Under the Alabama law then in force, “[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime” was one of the statutory “[m]itigating circumstances” that the jury was required to consider. §13A-5-51(7). The jury nevertheless concluded that petitioner’s age did not warrant a sentence of less than death. After *Roper*, however, petitioner’s sentence was commuted to life without parole. See *Ex parte Adams*, 955 So. 2d 1106 (Ala. 2005).

In cases like this, it can be argued that the original sentencing jury fulfilled the individualized sentencing requirement that *Miller* subsequently imposed. In these cases, the sentencer necessarily rejected the argument that the defendant’s youth and immaturity called for the lesser sentence of life imprisonment without parole. It can therefore be argued that such a sentencer would surely have felt that the defendant’s youth and immaturity did not warrant an even lighter sentence that would have allowed the petitioner to be loosed on society at some time in the future. In short, it can be argued that the jury that sentenced petitioner to death already engaged in the very process mandated by *Miller* and concluded that petitioner was not a mere “‘child’” whose crimes reflected “‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity,’” *post*, at 2 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in decision to grant, vacate, and remand), but was instead one of the rare minors who deserves life without parole.†

†A similar argument can be made in other cases in which the jury originally sentenced a minor to death. Here are some examples of other cases in which it might be inferred that the original sentencing juries concluded that the evidence established “irreparable corruption,” despite the fact that the defendant had not yet reached the age of 18 at the time of the crime. *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 18).

Petitioner William Knotts, No. 15-6284, was 17 years old when he

ALITO, J., concurring

In cases in which a juvenile offender was originally sentenced to death after the sentencer considered but rejected youth as a mitigating factor, courts are free on remand to evaluate whether any further individualized consideration is required.

escaped from a juvenile facility, broke into two houses, and stole multiple weapons, hundreds of rounds of ammunition, food, and other supplies. He then hid in the woods to plan an attack on a woman who had called him a “cracker” and a “honky.” Knotts broke into the woman’s home, laid in wait for her, and shot her to death in front of her 2-year-old son. The victim’s husband discovered her body—and their son, sitting next to her, crying, covered in blood—four hours later. *Knotts v. State*, 686 So. 2d 431, 442, 442–443 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).

Petitioner Nathan Slaton, No. 15–6300, was 17 years old when he decided to spend a morning shooting birds with his BB gun. He then got into a fight with his next-door neighbor over the gun, so he entered her house, unplugged her phone, raped her, beat her over the head, strangled her, and shot her. Slaton confessed to the rape-murder. *Slaton v. State*, 680 So. 2d 879, 884–885 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).

Petitioner Michael Barnes, Nos. 15–6904, 15–6905, was 17 years old when he committed capital murder in the course of a burglary and rape. Neighbors of the victim saw smoke in her house. When firefighters responded, they discovered Barnes’ victim. Her severely burned body was tied to her bed, an electrical appliance cord wrapped around her neck, and charred paper scattered about her. An autopsy revealed that the victim had been sexually assaulted and was alive when the fire was set. She died from strangulation, smoke inhalation, and her burns. *Barnes v. State*, 704 So. 2d 487, 489–490 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).

Petitioner Shermaine Johnson, No. 15–1, was a serial rapist (he had committed four rapes, including the rape of a 13-year-old girl) before, at the age of 16, he committed the rape and brutal murder for which he was sentenced to death. *Johnson v. Commonwealth*, 259 Va. 654, 662–667, 529 S. E. 2d 769, 773–776 (2000).

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RENALDO CHANTE ADAMS *v.* ALABAMA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA

No. 15–6289. Decided May 23, 2016

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins, concurring in the decision to grant, vacate and remand.*

The petitioners in these cases were sentenced to death for crimes they committed before they turned 18. In most of these cases, petitioners’ sentences were automatically converted to life without the possibility of parole following our decisions outlawing the death penalty for juveniles.¹ See *Roper v. Simmons*, 543 U. S. 551 (2005); *Thompson v. Oklahoma*, 487 U. S. 815 (1988). Today, we grant, vacate, and remand these cases in light of *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 577 U. S. ____ (2016), for the lower courts to consider whether petitioners’ sentences comport with the exacting limits the Eighth Amendment imposes on sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole.

JUSTICE ALITO suggests otherwise, noting that the juries that originally sentenced petitioners to death were statutorily obligated to consider the mitigating effects of petitioners’ youth. “In cases like this,” he writes, it can “be

*This opinion also applies to No. 15–1, *Johnson v. Manis*; No. 15–6284, *Knotts v. Alabama*; No. 15–6290, *Bonds v. Alabama*; No. 15–6300, *Slaton v. Alabama*; No. 15–6306, *Flowers v. Alabama*; No. 15–6904, *Barnes v. Alabama*; and No. 15–6905, *Barnes v. Alabama*.

¹The only exception is that of Michael Shawn Barnes, who was sentenced to life without parole after all three of the juries to consider the question recommended life without parole over the death penalty. See Reporter’s Tr. 1, *Alabama v. Barnes*, Nos. CC 94–1401 and CC 94–2913 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., June 12, 1998), 5 Record 202 (sentencing judge states only, “I’ve overruled two juries in this case, but I’m not going to overrule this one”).

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argued that the original sentencing jury fulfilled the individualized sentencing requirement that *Miller* subsequently imposed.” *Ante*, at 3 (concurring opinion).

But *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U. S. ___ (2012), did not merely impose an “individualized sentencing requirement”; it imposed a substantive rule that life without parole is only an appropriate punishment for “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” *Montgomery*, 577 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” *Id.*, at ___–___ (slip op., at 16–17) (same). There is no indication that, when the factfinders in these cases considered petitioners’ youth, they even asked the question *Miller* required them not only to answer, but to answer correctly: whether petitioners’ crimes reflected “transient immaturity” or “irreparable corruption.” 577 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 16–17).

The last factfinders to consider petitioners’ youth did so more than 10—and in most cases more than 20—years ago. (Petitioners’ post-*Roper* resentencings were generally automatic.) Those factfinders did not have the benefit of this Court’s guidance regarding the “diminished culpability of juveniles” and the ways that “penological justifications” apply to juveniles with “lesser force than to adults.” *Roper*, 543 U. S., at 571. As importantly, they did not have the benefit of this Court’s repeated exhortation that the gruesomeness of a crime is not sufficient to demonstrate that a juvenile offender is beyond redemption: “The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.” *Id.*, at 570; see also *id.*, at 573; *Miller*, 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).

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When petitioners were sentenced, their youth was just one consideration among many; after *Miller*, we know that youth is the dispositive consideration for “all but the rarest of children.” *Montgomery*, 577 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 14). The sentencing proceedings in these cases are a product of that pre-*Miller* era. In one typical case, a judge’s sentencing order—overruling a unanimous jury verdict recommending life without parole instead of death—refers to youth only once, noting “the court finds that the age of the defendant at the time of the crime is a mitigating circumstance” and then that “[t]he [c]ourt rejects the advisory verdict of the jury, and finds that the aggravating circumstances in this case outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the punishment should be death.” Sentencing Order, *Alabama v. Barnes*, No. CC 94–1401 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Dec. 12, 1995), 2 Record 225. Other sentencing orders are similarly terse.² In at least two cases, there is no indication that youth was considered as a standalone mitigating factor.³ In two others, factfind-

²See, e.g., Sentencing Order, *Alabama v. Adams*, No. CC 97–2403 (C. C. Montgomery Cty., Ala., Dec. 10, 1998), 1 Record 309–311 (“This Court finds that the age of Adams at the time of the crime as a mitigating circumstance, does exist and is considered by this Court. This Court notes that Adams’s age alone is not determinative of whether the death penalty should be imposed in this case, nor is imposition of such a sentence unconstitutional. . . . These choices made by Adams diminish the impact of his age as a mitigating circumstance”); Sentencing Order, *Alabama v. Knotts*, No. CC 91–2537 (C. C. Montgomery Cty., Ala., Oct. 2, 1992), 2 Record 595, 606 (“The defendant was seventeen (17) years and eleven (11) months old at the time of the crime. The Court finds this to be a mitigating circumstance, but also finds that the aforesated aggravating circumstances outweigh this mitigating evidence”) (overruling 9-to-3 jury recommendation for life without parole); Appendix, *Alabama v. Slaton*, No. CC 87–200210 (C. C. Marshall Cty., Ala., May 22, 1990), 13 Record 242 (considering only “[t]hat the defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the crime”).

³See Sentencing Order, *Alabama v. Bonds*, No. CC 00–1289 (C. C. Houston Cty., Ala., Nov. 14, 2002), 1 Record 257; Jury Instructions,

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ers did not put “great weight”⁴ on considerations that we have described as particularly important in evaluating the culpability of juveniles, such as intellectual disability, an abusive upbringing, and evidence of impulsivity and immaturity. *Miller*, 567 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

Standards of decency have evolved since the time petitioners were sentenced to death. See *Roper*, 543 U. S., at 561. That petitioners were once given a death sentence we now know to be constitutionally unacceptable tells us nothing about whether their current life-without-parole sentences are constitutionally acceptable. I see no shortcut: On remand, the lower courts must instead ask the difficult but essential question whether petitioners are among the very “rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” *Montgomery*, 577 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).

Johnson v. Virginia, No. 992525 (Va., Jan. 11, 2000), I App. 225–250.

⁴See Sentencing Order, *Alabama v. Knotts*, No. CC 91–2537 (C. C. Montgomery Cty., Ala., Oct. 2, 1992), 2 Record 607–610; Sentencing Order, *Alabama v. Barnes*, No. CC 94–1401 (C. C. Mobile Cty., Ala., Dec. 12, 1995), 2 Record 223 (“borderline mental retardation” makes defendant “no less accountable for his actions”).