

(ORDER LIST: 608 U.S.)

MONDAY, APRIL 20, 2026

CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY DISPOSITION

24-1099 SMITH, KYLE, ET AL. V. SCOTT, ROCHELLE, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of *Zorn v. Linton*, 607 U. S. ____ (2026) (*per curiam*). Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

25A872 HOLLAND, DJAVON V. UNITED STATES

The application for stay addressed to Justice Sotomayor and referred to the Court is denied.

25M66 HANLEY, ORPHEUS, ET UX. V. PA PUB. UTIL. COMM'N

The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record is denied.

25M67 MARCH, ANTHONY W. V. UNITED STATES

The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with the supplemental appendix under seal is granted.

25M68 IN RE SEALED PETITIONER

The motion for leave to proceed as a veteran is denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.

25M69 SEALED APPELLANT V. SEALED APPELLEE

The motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of certiorari under seal is denied.

24-621 NRSC, ET AL. V. FEC, ET AL.

The motion of intervenors for leave to file a supplemental brief after oral argument is granted.

25-6048 BRENTLEY, MARK V. PITTSBURGH, PA, ET AL.

25-6100 SULLIVAN, LEIHINAHINA V. UNITED STATES

The motions of petitioners for reconsideration of orders denying leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied.

25-6798 PEMBERTON, JAY V. BELL'S BREWERY, INC.

25-6801 PHILLIPS, EMIR J. V. BD. OF CURATORS, ET AL.

25-6802 PHILLIPS, EMIR J. V. BD. OF CURATORS, ET AL.

25-6826 SMITH, KELLI V. UNITED PARCEL SERV., INC.

25-6828 TOURE, ABRON V. AM. EXPRESS NAT. BANK

25-6838 WRIGHT, RUSTIN P. V. WOMACK, ASHLEY B.

25-6849 TERRY, VINCENT V. McCALLA RAYMER LEIBERT, ET AL.

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until May 11, 2026, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

CERTIORARI GRANTED

25-581 ST. MARY CATHOLIC PARISH, ET AL. V. ROY, LISA, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to Questions 1 and 2 presented by the petition.

25-5343 BEAIRD, KENDRICK J. V. UNITED STATES

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma*

pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to the following question: Whether *Stinson v. United States*, 508 U. S. 36 (1993), still correctly states the rule for the deference that courts must give the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines.

CERTIORARI DENIED

24-276 CROWNHOLM, RYAN, ET AL. V. MOORE, RICHARD B., ET AL.
24-279 360 VIRTUAL DRONE SERV., ET AL. V. RITTER, ANDREW L., ET AL.
24-920 PARDUE, VP, TX BD., ET AL. V. HINES, RONALD S.
24-932 KORY, PIERRE, ET AL. V. BONTA, ATT'Y GEN. OF CA, ET AL.
25-77 FOOTE, STEPHEN, ET AL. V. LUDLOW SCH. COMM., ET AL.
25-407 BREIMEISTER, SCOTT V. UNITED STATES
25-435 CURTIN, REBECCA V. UNITED TRADEMARK HOLDINGS, INC.
25-622 OFFICE & PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES V. SPACEX, ET AL.
25-639 BANC OF AMERICA, ET AL. V. PHILADELPHIA, PA, ET AL.
25-664 DOTSON, DIR., VA DOC V. WOLFE, JUSTIN M.
25-680 SWIFT, BERNARD T., ET UX. V. CIR
25-689 JOHNS, GEORGE S. V. GEORGIA
25-693 GARCIA MORIN, JUAN J. V. BLANCHE, ACTING ATT'Y GEN.
25-726 HICKS, ALAN L. V. FRAME, SUPT., MOUNT OLIVE
25-746 THOMAS, CARVIN L., ET AL. V. KUSTOFF, ROBERTA, ET AL.
25-774 JOHNSON, ERIC T. V. UNITED STATES
25-809 PERFECTION BAKERIES, INC. V. RETAIL WHOLESALE AND DEPT. STORE
25-818 HARGROVE, TERRELL A. V. HEALY, WARDEN
25-920 GALYNSKY, LOUIS V. RODRIGUEZ, VINCENT, ET AL.
25-921 WILSON, MALCOLM V. CASTANEDA, ANGELITA
25-922 GUILLAUME, JEAN F. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
25-928 GORO, JOSEPH H. V. KANOUNO, WASSEN

25-932 BIVENS, DOROTHY V. ZEP, INC.

25-933 ARBEENY, DANIEL, ET AL. V. CUOMO, ANDREW, ET AL.

25-940 ZIRVI, MONIB V. AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER, ET AL.

25-947 MOSS, ROBERT W. V. LATOURETTE, SHAWN M.

25-950 HARTMAN, MARK V. YOST, ATT'Y GEN. OF OH

25-961 ROSHAN, PEYMAN V. SEARLE, CHRISTINE M., ET AL.

25-974 WICKSTROM, KEVIN D., ET AL. V. AIR LINE PILOTS ASSN., INT'L

25-975 CALPORTLAND CO. V. THOMAS, ROBERT, ET AL.

25-982 HARMON, TERESA M. V. WATERMAN, LOUIS I., ET AL.

25-991 SEALEY, SAMANTHA L. V. MANCIAS, ARTURO, ET AL.

25-992 JOHNSON, REGINALD V. SATSUMA, AL, ET AL.

25-995 ARNOLD, VENISHA V. 1600 WEST LOOP SOUTH, ET AL.

25-998 SELLMAN, NICHOLAS V. AVIATION TRAINING CONSULTING

25-1004 CITIZENS BANK, N.A. V. CONTI, JOHN

25-1007 JEAN-BAPTISTE, HAROLD V. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ET AL.

25-1021 JACKSON, RICHARD C. V. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC.

25-1031 JANISSE, JULIUS V. MLK HEALTHCARE CORP.

25-1064 PRIME, MICHAEL V. UNITED STATES

25-1074 HOWARD, RISIE V. HORMEL FOODS CORP.

25-1076 PETERSON, GEORGE V. UNITED STATES

25-1087 HILTON, WILLIAM M. V. UNITED STATES

25-1092 PARTRIDGE, PIPER, ET AL. V. BENTON, AR, ET AL.

25-1094 BARRETT, CHARLES V. UNITED STATES

25-1104 CPC PATENT TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD. V. APPLE INC.

25-1109 GIBSON, RICHARD, ET AL. V. CENDYN GROUP, LLC, ET AL.

25-1111 RUSSELL, ROXANA T. V. WALMART INC., ET AL.

25-1116 ZAHLER, JORDAN V. JACKSON LEWIS P.C., ET AL.

25-5688 TWIGG, LINDA K. V. TWIGG, ALLAN L.

25-5961 GARDNER, EVA M. V. MARYLAND
25-5962 ORTIZ-RODRIGUEZ, ISMAEL A. V. UNITED STATES
25-6088 CORTEZ-ZEPEDA, ANDIS N. V. UNITED STATES
25-6244 YASIN, TASLEEMA V. VM MASTER ISSUER, LLC
25-6512 TRAIL, AUBREY C. V. NEBRASKA
25-6553 HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR V. UNITED STATES
25-6697 ABIOYE, ADEDAYO V. BRAIMOH, MOJISOLA, ET AL.
25-6726 REECE, WILLIAM L. V. OKLAHOMA
25-6727 BLACKWELL, ANTONIA V. BOEHM, MICHAEL, ET AL.
25-6728 DAY, SHANNON V. TEXAS
25-6736 PEREZ, TARRA A. V. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF U.S.
25-6737 PONTEFRACT, CLYDE V. BUREAU OF PRISONS, ET AL.
25-6740 CULVERHOUSE, DAVID L. V. TEXAS
25-6743 GEORGE, GAYLE V. U.S. BANK, ET AL.
25-6745 SUN, LINDA V. D.C. EMPLOYEE APP., ET AL.
25-6752 MOORE, JEROME V. TEXAS
25-6762 McLAUGHLIN, EILEEN V. COMMUNITY LIVING ASSN., ET AL.
25-6763 PINA, FREDERICK V. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO INS. CO.
25-6764 FLORES, JERRY L. V. TEXAS
25-6770 GRAY, HEATH W. V. PA, DEPT. OF STATE
25-6777 GUARDIOLA, OLDA R. V. RODRIGUEZ, MARICELA
25-6779 STANTCHEV, SASHO V. BUNKER HILL COM. COLLEGE
25-6781 HALL, STACY G. V. MYOTTE, BUDDY, ET AL.
25-6782 BELL, COSEA V. LOUISIANA
25-6784 ANDERSON, ALBERT M. L. V. NOVANT HEALTH, ET AL.
25-6787 HUNTER, JAMES W. V. S. F.
25-6788 JACKSON, ANTONIO B. V. MARYLAND
25-6792 SMALLS, DANIEL V. SC DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERV., ET AL.

25-6794 EMERT, ROBERT V. SCHUCK, ANDREA, ET AL.

25-6797 SCIPIO, ESHAWN J. V. FINKLEA, HENDRICK, ET AL.

25-6806 MORRIS, TERESA F. V. CRAWFORD & CO., ET AL.

25-6807 RAMIREZ, EDWARD L. V. CALIFORNIA

25-6811 JOHNSON, GIFFORD V. GUERRERO, DIR., TX DCJ

25-6815 ELLIS, STEVEN T. V. FLORIDA

25-6818 CARTER, VERNON V. DIXON, SEC., FL DOC

25-6820 DECKER, TROY L. V. OKLAHOMA

25-6822 REHBEIN, CIARA L. V. PADDOCK, JESSICA M.

25-6825 LAWLESS, RICHARD R. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.

25-6832 DONALD, STANLEY V. MICI, CAROL, ET AL.

25-6834 KOMOREBI, AMADASOPHIA V. KATKIN, ANDREW

25-6841 HUYNH, PHILONG V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL.

25-6844 SIMPSON, SHANNON V. LOUISIANA

25-6852 BRINSON, CLINTON V. WALMART, INC.

25-6855 ZHANG, QINGFEI V. UNIV. OF KY, ET AL.

25-6859 WOOD, DANIEL R. V. STRAUSS, DIR., MT DOC

25-6864 PERSON, GREGORY S. V. PENNSYLVANIA

25-6865 MULLINS, ROBERT A. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.

25-6866 OHIO, EX REL. ALLAH-U-AKBAR V. SCHROEDER, JUDGE

25-6912 SIMPSON, THOMAS B. V. WALTERS, DIR., VA DOC

25-6915 STARZENSKI, PATRYK N. V. BLANCHE, ACTING ATT'Y GEN.

25-6918 BUTLER, IKIA V. MSPB

25-6925) PEREZ, KAREN A. V. UNITED STATES

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25-6964) RIVERA RODRIGUEZ, JOVAN V. UNITED STATES

25-6930 LIVINGSTON, GREGORY V. TENNESSEE

25-6939 PELAYO, GUADALUPE V. ARIZONA

25-6952 DOSTER, MICKEY V. UNITED STATES

25-6953 PAYCER, DAVID B. V. UNITED STATES
25-6954 NEWBERRY, NATASHA N. V. UNITED STATES
25-6955 DEAKINS, MARK A. V. UNITED STATES
25-6956 MARTIN, NICHOLAS J. V. UNITED STATES
25-6957 CASTILLO-PEÑA, CESAR V. UNITED STATES
25-6958 CARSON, ADAM V. UNITED STATES
25-6960 HALLS, SHAMEEK J. V. UNITED STATES
25-6962 MORRISSETTE, RAHEEM V. UNITED STATES
25-6963 COLE, ERNESTO F. V. UNITED STATES
25-6965 GREEN, DEMETRIUS V. UNITED STATES
25-6966 GARNER, ERIC A. V. UNITED STATES
25-6971 PHILLIPS, TONY V. UNITED STATES
25-6973 HERNANDEZ, FABIAN H. V. UNITED STATES
25-6977 DIAZ, BASILIO J. V. UNITED STATES
25-6979 EWELL, ANTHONY S. V. UNITED STATES
25-6983 SCOTT, MARQUEZ D. V. UNITED STATES
25-6985 WOODS, MARK V. WARDEN, CANAAN USP
25-6987 EDWARDS, DEMARTINAS L. V. UNITED STATES
25-6988 HUDSON, EDDIE V. UNITED STATES
25-6994 JACKSON, BRANDON G. V. UNITED STATES
25-6999 NEAL-WILLIAMS, RODJAUN V. MARYLAND
25-7004 CHI, ANSON V. UNITED STATES
25-7005 COLVIN, KENNETH V. RURKA, WARDEN
25-7007 FELLMY, STEVEN T. V. UNITED STATES
25-7008 WOLF, DANIEL J. V. COLORADO
25-7010 CONNER, MICHAEL V. UNITED STATES
25-7011 DELEON-JUAREZ, LAZARO V. UNITED STATES
25-7015 MCCARTHY, STEPHEN V. DEA

25-7019 KIRUI, KENNETH K. V. ARIZONA
25-7020 WHALEN, ARCHIE M. V. UNITED STATES
25-7022 RANGEL-SALAZAR, JONATHAN V. UNITED STATES
25-7023 MAITLAND, WAYNE R. V. UNITED STATES
25-7024 VASQUEZ, ABRAHAM R. V. UNITED STATES
25-7027 PAGE, JUSTIN R. V. MASSACHUSETTS
25-7028 ADKINS, ORLANDO R. V. UNITED STATES
25-7034 WINFREY, EULA V. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PTO
25-7035 RAMIREZ, JESUS A. V. UNITED STATES
25-7039 NEAL, TYREE M. V. UNITED STATES
25-7041 MACKINS, DANZEL V. UNITED STATES
25-7044 TORRES-ESPINOZA, HECTOR V. UNITED STATES
25-7045 SIMPSON, KENNETH R. V. UNITED STATES
25-7046 TANASESCU, SIMONA V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
25-7047 CARTER, MICHAEL K. V. UNITED STATES
25-7049 IWAS, HASNA B. V. UNITED STATES
25-7052 PETTER, JORGE V. UNITED STATES
25-7058 ORDONEZ-VEGA, LUIS V. UNITED STATES
25-7061 JONES, JABIAS D. V. MARTINEZ, AMBER, ET AL.
25-7063 CASTILLO-ZAMUDIO, CLEMENTE V. UNITED STATES
25-7067 COE, DAVONTE J. V. UNITED STATES
25-7068 LUCIANO, EDUARDO V. UNITED STATES
25-7070 LAWRENCE, ADE V. UNITED STATES
25-7072 ABERCROMBIE, TEVIN V. UNITED STATES
25-7073 CHAMBERS, PHILMON D. V. UNITED STATES
25-7075 BUSH, ZACHARY T. V. UNITED STATES
25-7080 MARQUEZ, OSCAR A. V. UNITED STATES
25-7082 TUCKER, DeVON J. V. UNITED STATES

25-7085 GRAHAM, CHRISTOPHER A. V. UNITED STATES

25-7088 SEATON, EDDIE V. UNITED STATES

25-7089 FLETCHER, JARIOUS D. V. UNITED STATES

25-7090 MATEO-REYES, HECTOR D. V. UNITED STATES

25-7104 CARPENTER, CHARLES V. DeJOY, LOUIS

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

25-690 THORNELL, DIR., AZ DOC, ET AL. V. BIEGANSKI, BRADLEY

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

25-874 JOHNSON & JOHNSON CONSUMER INC. V. NOOHI, NARGUESS

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

25-977 JOHNSON & JOHNSON, ET AL. V. SAN DIEGO CTY. EMPLOYEES, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Alito and Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

25-6709 WEBB, GREGORY R. V. GARRETT, SANDRA, ET AL.

25-6766 MAPES, ERIC J. V. USDC WD TX

The petitions for writs of certiorari before judgment are denied.

25-6837 SMITH, SAMUEL L. V. SMITH, NATASHA K.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

25-6877 WINNINGHAM, GLENN V. YARBROUGH, CHAD, ET AL.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma*

pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*).

25-6937 BUNKLEY, MAURICE N. V. CORRIGAN, WARDEN

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Sotomayor would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.

25-6938 CAMPBELL, ANTHONY T. V. DICKEY, P.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8.

25-6950 O'BRIEN, JESSICA A. V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

HABEAS CORPUS DENIED

25-7095 IN RE LEONARD NAJACQUE

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

MANDAMUS DENIED

25-942 IN RE RONNY JACKSON, ET AL.

25-946 IN RE HADEN C. YONCE

25-6800 IN RE FELIX VERDEJO-SANCHEZ

25-6836 IN RE RODOLFO VELA, ET AL.

The petitions for writs of mandamus are denied.

PROHIBITION DENIED

25-6739 IN RE BRANDY CORNETT

The petition for a writ of prohibition is denied.

REHEARINGS DENIED

25-537 PIERSON, RAYMOND H. V. RUSHING, PHYLISS M.

25-663 HEADMAN, ALAN V. FBI, ET AL.

25-687 BRYANT, RICHARD E. V. BRAUNLICH, MARK, ET AL.

25-694 HILL, JEFFREY L. V. JOHNSON, LEANDRA G., ET AL.

25-720 CROMITY, LOUEMMA V. ORLANDO, FL

25-796 DURU, PRINCEWILL A. V. UNITED STATES

25-803 IN RE ANDY DESTY

25-5269 MILLER, MICHAEL D. V. FLORIDA

25-5704 REESE, JEANIE V. SELECT PORTFOLIO, ET AL.

25-6035 GIVEY, RYAN P. V. GIVEY, ALICIA A.

25-6072 MARCUM, WILLIAM D. V. MSPB

25-6149 JONES, BYRON V. MICHIGAN

25-6181 SCHIFF, GRAHAM V. WARDEN

25-6227 CLARK, MELVIN V. ACEVEDO, ACTING WARDEN

25-6272 TAYLOR, JAMES V. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORP., ET AL.

25-6461 COCHREN, MICHAEL A. C. V. WHITE CASTLE SYS., INC., ET AL.

25-6526 WALLS-BEY, JOHNNY R. V. ARIZONA

25-6587 ADAMS, JETT G. V. SHANNON, DIR., WY DOC, ET AL.

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE

D-3159 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF GARY L. GUYMON

Gary L. Guymon, of Las Vegas, Nevada, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be

disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3160 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF HENRY NEIL PORTNER

Henry Neil Portner, of Fallbrook, California, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3161 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF BRIAN T. GOLDSTEIN

Brian T. Goldstein, of Overland Park, Kansas, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3162 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF MICHAEL ROY NACK

Michael Roy Nack, of Clayton, Missouri, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

D-3163 IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF PHILLIP B. LEISER

Phillip B. Leiser, of Tysons Corner, Virginia, is suspended from the practice of law in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law in this Court.

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA *v.* R.W.ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 25–248. Decided April 20, 2026

PER CURIAM.

In the wee hours of a winter morning in Washington, D. C., District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officer Clifford Vanterpool received a radio dispatch call directing him to check out a suspicious vehicle at a specific address. Officer Vanterpool reached the apartment building at that address around 2:00 a.m. As he turned his marked police vehicle into the parking lot, he saw two people immediately flee from a car, “unprovoked,” after “[p]olice had not done anything other than simply pull up.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. The runners left open at least one of the car doors. The driver then began to back out of the parking space, rear door still open. Officer Vanterpool decided to investigate. He parked directly behind the car, left his own vehicle, ordered the driver, R. W., to put his hands up, and drew his service weapon.

R. W. raised a “single argument” on appeal—that Officer Vanterpool lacked reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the seizure. *In re R.W.*, 334 A. 3d 593, 599 (D. C. 2025). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that Officer Vanterpool, by stopping R. W. without reasonable suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.

When an officer makes a “brief investigatory stop[] of persons or vehicles that fall[s] short of [a] traditional arrest,” the Fourth Amendment “is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ““may be afoot.”” *United States v. Arvizu*, 534 U. S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting *United States v. Sokolow*, 490 U. S.

Per Curiam

1, 7 (1989)). In assessing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, a reviewing court must “look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case”—an analysis that precludes the “evaluation and rejection” of “factors in isolation from each other.” *Arvizu*, 534 U. S., at 273–274. Because the D. C. Court of Appeals departed from these principles—and because Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W.—we reverse.

I

Largely based on evidence found after Officer Vanterpool told R. W. to put his hands up, the District of Columbia charged R. W. (a minor at the time) with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, felony receipt of stolen property, unlawful entry of a motor vehicle, and operating a vehicle in the District of Columbia without a permit. Before trial, R. W. moved to suppress the evidence obtained after he was stopped. Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied R. W.’s motion, relying on four facts to conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W.: (1) the officer had received a radio dispatch call regarding a suspicious vehicle at a specified address, (2) the officer saw “two persons fleeing from a vehicle” upon his arrival, (3) “[i]t was almost 2 a.m.,” and (4) as the officer approached the car, it began “backing out of the parking space . . . while the rear driver’s side door [was] still open.” 334 A. 3d, at 599. After a bench trial, the trial court adjudicated R. W. delinquent on all counts and assigned R. W. to one year of probation with conditions.

On appeal, the D. C. Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and vacated the delinquency adjudication.* The court “first assess[ed] the legitimacy and

*The District of Columbia conceded that “Officer Vanterpool seized R. W. when he first asked R. W. to put his hands up,” so the D. C. Court of Appeals decided only “whether the facts then known by Officer

Per Curiam

weight of each of the factors bearing on reasonable suspicion” before “weigh[ing] that information all together.” *Id.*, at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the first step of this analysis, it held that the trial court had erred by considering two factors: the radio dispatch call and the flight of R. W.’s companions. It “excis[ed]” those factors from the analysis. *Id.*, at 597. It then concluded that, without more, the remaining facts—the late hour and the car’s movement—did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. After the D. C. Court of Appeals ruled, the District of Columbia sought certiorari.

II

The question is whether the facts available to Officer Vanterpool—before he ordered R. W. to put his hands up—warranted the stop. In other words, we ask whether Officer Vanterpool had a reasonable suspicion that R. W. was engaged in criminal wrongdoing. *Sokolow*, 490 U. S., at 7–8. Such reasonable suspicion arises when, based on the “totality of the circumstances,” the detaining officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal wrongdoing. *Arvizu*, 534 U. S., at 273 (quoting *United States v. Cortez*, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981)). Reasonable suspicion “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which *reasonable and prudent men*, not legal technicians, act.” *Kansas v. Glover*, 589 U. S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting *Prado Navarette v. California*, 572 U. S. 393, 402 (2014)). It permits officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” *Glover*, 589 U. S., at 380–381 (quoting *Illinois v. Wardlow*, 528 U. S. 119, 125 (2000)).

On the facts of this case, Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. Already on alert from

Vanterpool created an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.” 334 A. 3d, at 599 (citing *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)).

Per Curiam

the late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle, the officer observed every person in R. W.'s car respond strangely to an approaching police car. Two people took off running. We have observed that “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police . . . is certainly suggestive” of wrongdoing. *Id.*, at 124. The driver, R. W., did not run from the car, but his companions’ flight cast his presence in a suspicious light. After all, we have observed that “a car passenger . . . will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.” *Maryland v. Pringle*, 540 U. S. 366, 373 (2003) (quoting *Wyoming v. Houghton*, 526 U. S. 295, 304–305 (1999)).

We need not determine whether that connection alone supported reasonable suspicion because R. W. was in the driver’s seat and—after the passengers fled from the car—began backing out of the parking space, ignoring the car’s open back door. For most drivers, it would be a surprising event for their back-seat passengers to exit the car and run headlong away from them. But we doubt that most would respond by putting their car into reverse and attempting to drive away without at least checking whether the doors were closed. R. W.’s own actions—combined with the panicked flight of his companions—strongly suggested that he was (like them) engaged in unlawful conduct he wished to hide from police. See *Sibron v. New York*, 392 U. S. 40, 66 (1968) (recognizing that “deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia of *mens rea*”).

III

The D. C. Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion by “excis[ing]” the radio dispatch and the conduct of R. W.’s companions from the analysis, and considering only “the lateness of the hour and the slight movement of the car.” 334 A. 3d, at 597. The totality-of-the-circumstances test,

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however, “precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.” *Arvizu*, 534 U. S., at 274. As our precedents have recognized, “the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in isolation.” *District of Columbia v. Wesby*, 583 U. S. 48, 60–61 (2018).

Indeed, this case reveals the perils of reviewing facts piecemeal and without context. Take the passengers’ flight from the car. We have little doubt that, in some circumstances, an officer could not reasonably attribute his suspicion of a fleeing individual to bystanders milling nearby. Cf. *Ybarra v. Illinois*, 444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979) (recognizing that “a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”). But the “whole picture” here tells a different story. *Cortez*, 449 U. S., at 417.

After watching two people flee from a suspicious car, a reasonable officer surely would question the driver’s next move. Why would the driver hurriedly back up the car without even closing a car door left open by his fleeing companions? Perhaps one could imagine an innocent explanation for such unusual behavior—the court below, for example, surmised that R. W. “may not even have noticed that his companions left the door open.” 334 A. 3d, at 605. “But we have consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’” *Navarette*, 572 U. S., at 403 (quoting *Arvizu*, 534 U. S., at 277). Based on everything the officer observed on the night in question, he drew the “commonsense inference” that all three people in the car—including the driver—were trying to hide wrongdoing from the police. *Glover*, 589 U. S., at 381.

“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires . . . that a court ‘slosh [its] way through’ a ‘factbound morass.’” *Barnes v. Felix*, 605 U. S. 73, 80 (2025) (quoting *Scott v. Harris*, 550 U. S. 372, 383 (2007)). There may be no “easy-to-apply legal

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test” or “on/off switch” in this context, *Barnes*, 605 U. S., at 80 (quoting *Scott*, 550 U. S., at 382–383), but one thing is clear: “The ‘totality of the circumstances’ requires courts to consider ‘the whole picture,’” *Wesby*, 583 U. S., at 60 (quoting *Cortez*, 449 U. S., at 417). The D. C. Court of Appeals expressly declined to do that. 334 A. 3d, at 599. It instead considered *only* the observations that “(1) it was 2:00 a.m. and (2) R. W. reversed a few feet in a parking spot while the vehicle’s rear door was open.” *Id.*, at 605. Expressly “excis[ed]” from its analysis was, for example, the compelling fact that two individuals fled the vehicle as soon as they spotted the police car. Pretending that the most revealing aspect of the encounter did not happen is incompatible with the totality-of-the-circumstances approach required by our precedents.

* * *

The petition for certiorari and R. W.’s motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* are granted, the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.

JACKSON, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA *v.* R.W.ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 25–248. Decided April 20, 2026

JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.

The Fourth Amendment may require courts to “slosh . . . through a factbound morass.” *Ante*, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not require readers of judicial opinions to do the same. Any readable analysis will, of necessity, tick through factors, finding some weighty, others less so, and still others not at all, before piling them on a scale and assessing the result. That is what the court below did here, and it was right to do so. Announcing a conclusion without providing reasoning along the way is not helpful to the parties, the public, or the development of the law.

To its credit, the Court applies a similar, factor-by-factor approach here. That the Court’s analysis is comprehensible shows as much. Like the court below, the *per curiam* takes account of the facts in turn: a “late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle”; R. W.’s companions’ “unprovoked flight”; R. W.’s shift into reverse with a car door still ajar. *Ante*, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). And like the court below, the *per curiam* explains how much weight it assigns to each. Unprovoked flight, the Court says, is “certainly suggestive” of wrongdoing. *Ibid.* (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ombined” with the flight, the Court continues, R. W.’s abrupt reversal “strongly suggested” wrongdoing. *Ibid.* This is how courts write opinions.

So I am not sure why our Court sees fit to intervene in this case, let alone to do so summarily. If the intervention reflects a worry that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (DCCA) misunderstands the Fourth Amendment’s totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, that worry seems

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unfounded. The DCCA has grasped the correct inquiry. Its precedents rightly observe that “[t]he issue is not whether any one factor individually justifies a stop, but rather whether ‘collectively’ the totality of the circumstances supports a determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop.” *Parker v. United States*, 333 A. 3d 1162, 1175 (2025) (citing *Mayo v. United States*, 315 A. 3d 606, 637 (2024) (en banc)); see also, e.g., *Maye v. United States*, 260 A. 3d 638, 647 (2021); *Golden v. United States*, 248 A. 3d 925, 941 (2021).

If today’s decision instead reflects dissatisfaction with the DCCA’s comment that it “excis[ed]” certain factors from its analysis, *ante*, at 4–5, I do not contest that this was poor word choice, see *United States v. Arvizu*, 534 U. S. 266, 274 (2002) (rejecting a “divide-and-conquer analysis”). But I do not think that word choice reflects a methodological error. Courts excise facts from their analyses every day. Opinion-writing is an exercise in culling the irrelevant; in application, no “totality-of-the-circumstances” test really lives up to its name. Indeed, today’s *per curiam* necessarily omits a number of facts the Court finds insignificant—e.g., the make and model of the car, the precise location of the stop, the color of R. W.’s friends’ clothing. Though it does not say so, the Court “excises” those facts, too. It does not thereby misapply the Fourth Amendment.

If, finally, the Court’s decision to intervene reflects disapproval of the DCCA’s assessment of which particular facts to weigh and to what extent, I cannot fathom why that kind of factbound determination warranted correction by this Court. The DCCA assigned no weight to two facts—the dispatch call and the unprovoked flight. The Court does not seem to take issue with the first. For good reason: The DCCA reasonably applied our decisions explaining that an officer may not obtain reasonable suspicion by relying on the unsupported hunch of a fellow officer. See *Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary*, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971);

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United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 232 (1985). The Court may be right that the second—the unprovoked flight—should have borne some rather than no weight. But if this context-specific adjustment is all the *per curiam* seeks to achieve, it does not merit the use of our summary discretion.

Even if I would have assigned more heft to a particular fact in my own first-instance assessment, I would not word-smith a lower court in this fashion. In my view, this is not a worthy accomplishment for the unusual step of summary reversal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SAMANTHA ESTEFENIA FRANCISCO CASTRO *v.*
JOSE LEONARDO BRITO GUEVARA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 25–666. Decided April 20, 2026

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Statement of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial
of certiorari.

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was adopted “in response to the problem of international child abductions during domestic disputes.” *Abbott v. Abbott*, 560 U. S. 1, 8 (2010). When one parent “abducts a child and flees to another country,” the Convention “generally requires that country to return the child immediately if the other parent requests return within one year.” *Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez*, 572 U. S. 1, 4 (2014). If, however, the request is filed more than one year after the abduction, then under the “well-settled defense,” the child may be permitted to remain in the new country if “it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in [his or her] new environment,” *id.*, at 5.

This case concerns A. F., a child born in Venezuela to petitioner and respondent. In 2021, when A. F. was three years old, petitioner took A.F. without respondent’s consent and left Venezuela for the United States. Respondent immediately sought her return through Venezuelan and U. S. authorities, but did not file this lawsuit until 2023. The District Court found that A. F. was well settled in the United States and should not be returned to Venezuela. The Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered A. F. to be returned. Petitioner then sought an emergency stay from this Court pending disposition of this petition for certiorari, arguing

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that a stay was necessary to preserve the status quo to allow this Court to review an important issue that has divided the courts of appeals. The Court denied the application in November 2025 over two noted dissents, including mine. See 607 U. S. ____.

Petitioner now asks this Court to address a narrow question: What standard of review should a court of appeals apply when reviewing a district court’s finding of whether a child is well settled in a new environment? The Fifth Circuit held in this case that such findings are primarily legal in nature, and thus should be reviewed *de novo*. 155 F. 4th, at 361–363. As the Fifth Circuit acknowledged, its decision deepened an entrenched split among the Federal Courts of Appeals. *Id.*, at 363, n. 40. At least three Circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit’s position and have applied *de novo* review. See *Alcala v. Hernandez*, 826 F. 3d 161, 171, n. 7 (CA4 2016); *In re B. Del C. S. B.*, 559 F. 3d 999, 1008 (CA9 2009); see also *Lomanto v. Agbelusi*, 2024 WL 3342415, *2 (CA2, July 9, 2024) (applying *de novo* review). Two other Circuits, however, treat these findings as primarily factual, and thus review them for clear error. See *Da Costa v. De Lima*, 94 F. 4th 174, 181 (CA1 2024); *Cuenca v. Rojas*, 99 F. 4th 1344, 1350 (CA11 2024).

This Circuit split warrants this Court’s attention. When Congress codified the Hague Convention, it expressly “recognize[d] . . . the need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention.” 22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(3)(B). Consistent with this congressional mandate, this Court regularly grants review in Hague Convention cases to resolve Circuit splits. See, e.g., *Golan v. Saada*, 596 U. S. 666, 676, and n. 6 (2022); *Monasky v. Taglieri*, 589 U. S. 68, 76 (2020); *Lozano*, 572 U. S., at 10; *Abbott*, 560 U. S., at 7.

The Court’s review is also necessary because the decision below may be erroneous. In *Monasky*, this Court held that a District Court’s finding that a child habitually resides in a country (that is, whether the child is “at home” in that

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country) is a primarily factual finding that turns on the totality of the circumstances and must be reviewed for clear error. 589 U. S., at 84. “Clear-error review,” the Court explained, also “has a particular virtue in Hague Convention cases” because it “speeds up appeals and thus serves the Convention’s premium on expedition.” *Ibid.* Although this Court has not previously addressed the test for when a child is settled in a new environment, the lower courts have coalesced around weighing as many as seven nondispositive factors like the child’s age, the stability and duration of the child’s residence, the child’s attendance in school, the child’s friends and family in the area, the child’s immigration status, and more. 155 F. 4th, at 360–361 (listing seven factors); accord, *Alcala*, 826 F. 3d, at 171; *Lozano v. Alvarez*, 697 F. 3d 41, 57 (CA2 2012), *aff’d* on other grounds, 572 U. S. 1; *In re B. Del C. S. B.*, 559 F. 3d, at 1009. This multifactor test is similar to the totality-of-the-circumstances test for habitual residence that this Court adopted in *Monasky*. See 155 F. 4th, at 369–373 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Moreover, whether a child is “at home” in one country is the converse of whether the child has become “well settled” in another country. See *In re B. Del C. S. B.*, 559 F. 3d, at 1008 (explaining that the two tests are “analogous”). As a result, *Monasky* suggests that clear-error review also should apply to a finding that a child is well settled.

Nevertheless, I concur in the denial of certiorari in this case because it is not an appropriate vehicle for this Court’s review. After this Court denied the emergency stay application, A. F. returned to Venezuela in January 2026. Even if this Court were to grant the petition for certiorari now and rule for petitioner next Term, A. F. likely would not return to the United States for over a year, if not longer, given the Court’s typical schedule for deciding cases and the possible need for further proceedings on remand. By that point, the well-settled analysis would look very different. Then, it would not be clear that returning to this country a

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year from now would be in A. F.’s best interests. See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Mar. 26, 1986, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11, p. 7 (placing “paramount importance” on “the interests of children”). Today, A. F. is eight years old, and it could greatly disturb her formative years to uproot her life yet again.

Had the Court granted a stay last fall, it would have prevented all this potential disruption and maintained the presuit status quo because A. F. could have stayed in the United States pending the disposition of this case. The Court should have done so: Preserving the presuit status quo to enable later review by this Court of an issue worthy of certiorari, after all, is a hallmark reason for this Court to grant emergency interim relief. See, *e.g.*, *Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson*, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief) (slip op., at 2) (“I would grant preliminary relief to preserve the status quo ante”). The Court chose otherwise, and the predictable consequences have followed. I therefore concur in the denial of certiorari in light of these changed circumstances and the Hague Convention’s central emphasis on the child’s well-being.