

(ORDER LIST: 607 U.S.)

MONDAY, MARCH 9, 2026

ORDERS IN PENDING CASES

25-112 CHATRIE, OKELLO T. V. UNITED STATES

The motion of petitioner for leave to file Volume III of the joint appendix under seal is granted.

25-6484 MORTVEDT, DONALD N. S. V. CLAWSON, CHARLES E., ET AL.

25-6486 BOWMAN, MARVIN V. CITY OF CHICAGO BD. OF ED.

The motions of petitioners for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* are denied. Petitioners are allowed until March 30, 2026, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.

CERTIORARI GRANTED

25-579 DEPT. OF AIR FORCE, ET AL. V. GUAHAN, PRUTEHI

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.

CERTIORARI DENIED

25-290 ODEKU, CHRISTOPHER V. TEXAS

25-308 LYNK LABS, INC. V. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., ET AL.

25-461 MANGANO, EDWARD V. UNITED STATES

25-634 FAMILY FEDERATION, ET AL. V. MOON, HYUN J., ET AL.

25-641 ABDULLA, ABDULMALIK M. V. BONDI, ATT'Y GEN.

25-658 JONES, MATTHEW, ET AL. V. KING, AMBER M., ET AL.

25-753 ZIONESS MOVEMENT, INC. V. THE LAWFARE PROJECT, INC.

25-783 CARUSO, SONIA H. V. TX MEDICAL BD., ET AL.

25-786 MINKOWSKI, JULIA V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA

25-787 CARBIN, JOHN F. V. MA BD. PLUMBERS AND GAS, ET AL.
25-789 PLESE, ANGELA K. V. AUSTIN, RONALD, ET AL.
25-791 ARNOLD, EDWARD R. V. ALLSTATE INSURANCE CO.
25-804 HUTCHINSON, GEORGE B. V. UNITED STATES, ET AL.
25-843 DISABILITY RIGHTS NY V. NY STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, ET AL.
25-868 HUGHES, BRANDON V. NFL
25-871 BROOKS, GLENN A. V. UNITED STATES
25-872 LaFAVE, KIMBERLY, ET AL. V. FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA, ET AL.
25-877 CLAY, JEFFREY S. V. UNITED STATES
25-883 FORD, JAMES T. V. FLORIDA
25-895 PEDERSON, LEE M. V. SEC
25-897 SMITH, RONALD V. SAENZ, HUNTER, ET AL.
25-913 LOVELL, KEEGAN L. V. UNITED STATES
25-5629 McFARLIN, DARVELL V. McFARLANE, WARDEN
25-6051 COLEMAN, CLAUDE V. UNITED STATES
25-6079 MORELOCK, JAMES A. B. V. UNITED STATES
25-6285 ALTAMIRANO, RUDY V. UNITED STATES
25-6481 WEBSTER, BRENT E. V. REDWOOD HOLDINGS, LLC
25-6482 MYLES, ARIANNE A. V. FLORIDA
25-6483 MUSGROVE, THEODORE E. V. IDAHO
25-6488 JONES, MATTHEW V. YOST, ATT'Y GEN. OF OH
25-6495 ELYSSE, JASON V. FLORIDA
25-6496 CARR, PAUL D. V. MACOMBER, SEC., CA DOC
25-6498 JONES, CYNTHIA S. V. PROVIDENCE TEACHERS UNION
25-6500 BRYANT, ANITA V. ESTATE OF LAURA J. BRYANT
25-6507 NICHOLSON, DERRICK V. GEORGIA
25-6510 CARTER, TILON L. V. TEXAS
25-6619 RUBINI, JACOB V. GREENE, WARDEN

25-6644 ARBAUGH, JAMES D. V. UNITED STATES
25-6704 BACA-RODRIGUEZ, HORACIO V. UNITED STATES
25-6721 JEFFERSON, PALMA V. UNITED STATES
25-6730 CARLOS-RAMOS, DANIEL V. UNITED STATES
25-6732 DELGADO, DANIEL V. UNITED STATES
25-6741 CANNON, KIMBERLY V. FLORIDA
25-6749 WILLIAMS, COLIN V. UNITED STATES
25-6750 JOHNSON, SHAWN T. V. UNITED STATES
25-6751 YOUNG, JEFFREY W. V. UNITED STATES
25-6753 SHARPE, MICHAEL V. CONNECTICUT
25-6760 TEALEH, FLOMO V. STEINER, POSTMASTER GEN., ET AL.
25-6767 MANBORDE, MARIO A. V. DIXON, SEC., FL DOC
25-6773 CLEMONS, DEVERN V. FLORIDA
25-6805 PROPHET, ANTONIO V. FRAME, SUPT., MOUNT OLIVE

The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.

25-529 BROWN, WARDEN V. CHANDLER, LOUIS

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

25-781 WENGER, DONALD V. WARREN, JAMES T., ET AL.

The petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment is denied.

25-6474 DOVE, ANTHONY V. BROADWELL, DR., ET AL.

The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal matters from petitioner

unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See *Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (*per curiam*). Justice Jackson, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the order barring this incarcerated petitioner from filing future *in forma pauperis* petitions in noncriminal matters. See *Howell v. Circuit Court of Indiana*, 607 U. S. ____ (2026) (Jackson, J., dissenting).

25-6742 EDWARDS, GEZO G. V. UNITED STATES

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

MANDAMUS DENIED

25-803 IN RE ANDY DESTY

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

25-785 IN RE VAN IRION, ET AL.

The petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition is denied.

PROHIBITION DENIED

25-6508 IN RE ANGELIINA L. LAWSON

25-6538 IN RE JEFFERY GREENE

The petitions for writs of prohibition are denied.

REHEARINGS DENIED

25-249 POON-ATKINS, CHRISTY, ET VIR V. RIVERSPRINGS HOA, INC., ET AL.

25-355 DONDERO, JAMES, ET AL. V. JERNIGAN, STACEY G., ET AL.

25-544 CHEN, MAY Y. V. AMERIWAY CORPORATION

25-5856 STEELE, CHERYL V. SALB, MICAH

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JARON BURNETT *v.* UNITED STATES

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25–5442. Decided March 9, 2026

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting from the denial of certiorari.

Almost two decades ago, Jaron Burnett pleaded guilty to a federal crime that carried a maximum sentence of 120 months in prison. Initially, the district court sentenced Mr. Burnett to less than that—105 months in prison, followed by 15 years of supervised release.

Over six years after his release from prison, the government charged Mr. Burnett with violating the terms of his supervised release. In response, the district court sentenced him to 13 additional months in prison. See 18 U. S. C. §3583(e)(3) (providing that a district court may impose a term of imprisonment if a defendant violates the terms of his supervised release). That new term brought Mr. Burnett’s total time in prison to 118 months, just 2 fewer than the maximum Congress authorized for his underlying conviction. Mr. Burnett finished serving his time in July 2022 and returned to supervised release.

Two years later, the government again charged Mr. Burnett with violating the terms of his supervised release and again sought to send him to prison. This time, Mr. Burnett argued, the court needed to proceed differently. His underlying conviction subjected him to a maximum lawful term of 120 months in prison, no more. Should the government seek prison time beyond that because of his latest alleged supervised release violations, Mr. Burnett submitted, the

GORSUCH, J., dissenting

Sixth Amendment required the government to prove its case to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The district court disagreed. Proceeding without a jury and applying a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court found that Mr. Burnett had committed some of the alleged supervised release violations. And, based on its factual findings, the court sentenced him to 14 more months in prison, bringing his total term of incarceration to 132 months—12 more than the statutory maximum associated with his crime of conviction. The court of appeals affirmed that result.

In his petition to us, Mr. Burnett does not ask for much. He does not object to receiving new prison time for supervised release violations. He does not even object to a court issuing that prison time based on its own factual findings under a preponderance of the evidence standard, so long as the punishment issued does not exceed the statutory maximum for his underlying crime of conviction. All Mr. Burnett claims is the right to have a jury decide any contested facts under the reasonable doubt standard where, as here, a court seeks to impose a sentence that will cause a defendant's total time in prison to exceed the statutory maximum Congress has authorized for his underlying conviction.

I would have taken this case to consider that argument. Most federal criminal defendants serve time on supervised release. Some commit violations. Few face a realistic prospect of spending more time in prison than the maximum term authorized for their underlying convictions. See *United States v. Henderson*, 998 F. 3d 1071, 1086 (CA9 2021) (Rakoff, J., dissenting). But even if the class of cases like Mr. Burnett's is small, the stakes are high. Many federal criminal defendants today serve long terms on supervised release (terms that can be further extended after any new violation). See §§3583(b), (h). Others serve on supervised release for life. See §3583(k). And, under the logic of the decision below, defendants like these can effectively

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wind up losing for decades (and sometimes forever) the right to receive a federal jury trial to resolve charges against them under the reasonable doubt standard. All the government need do is accuse the defendant of a supervised release violation and convince a judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence that more punishment is warranted. With no more than that, further prison time may follow—even for periods that exceed the maximum Congress has authorized for the defendant’s only crime of conviction.

Bypassing juries, trials, and the reasonable doubt standard in this way may hold some obvious advantages for prosecutors. But whether this arrangement can be squared with the Constitution is another thing. Under the Sixth Amendment, this Court has held, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, *any* fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U. S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added); see also *Erlinger v. United States*, 602 U. S. 821, 833 (2024); *United States v. Haymond*, 588 U. S. 634, 644 (2019) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases). The Court’s failure to grant review to address whether what happened to Mr. Burnett complies with that Sixth Amendment rule is unfortunate. I can only hope we will take up another case like his soon—and that, in the meantime, lower courts will more carefully consider the Sixth Amendment’s application in this context. Respectfully, I dissent.