## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE	UNITED STATES
	-
STARBUCKS CORPORATION,	)
Petitioner,	)
v.	) No. 23-367
M. KATHLEEN McKINNEY, REGIONAL	)
DIRECTOR OF REGION 15 OF THE	)
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,	)
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL	)
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,	)
Respondent.	)
	_

Pages: 1 through 67

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## HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION

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5	v.	) No. 23-367
6	M. KATHLEEN McKINNEY, REGIONAL	)
7	DIRECTOR OF REGION 15 OF THE	)
8	NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,	)
9	FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL	)
10	LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,	)
11	Respondent.	)
12		-
13		
14	Washington, D.C.	
15	Tuesday, April 23, 202	4
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17	The above-entitled matter of	ame on for oral
18	argument before the Supreme Court	of the United
19	States at 11:39 a.m.	
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25		

1	APPEARANCES:
2	LISA S. BLATT, ESQUIRE, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
3	the Petitioner.
4	AUSTIN RAYNOR, Assistant to the Solicitor General,
5	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf
6	of the Respondent.
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1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	PAGE
3	LISA S. BLATT, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	4
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF:	
6	AUSTIN RAYNOR, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	33
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF:	
9	LISA S. BLATT, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Petitioner	65
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
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21		
22		
23		
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:39 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear
4	argument next in Case 23-367, Starbucks
5	Corporation versus McKinney.
6	Ms. Blatt.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MS. BLATT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
10	it please the Court:
11	Section 10(j) authorizes district
12	courts to grant preliminary injunctions that
13	they deem just and proper. 10(j) thus requires
14	district courts to apply the traditional four
15	factors as set out in Winter versus NRDC.
16	This Court should reverse. The court
17	of appeals held that Winter's four factors do
18	not apply under Section 10(j). All that
19	mattered below was whether any facts supported a
20	non-frivolous legal theory and whether there was
21	harm, not whether that harm was irreparable.
22	The government argues that whether a
23	two- or four-part test governs, the statutory
24	context compels district courts to conduct "a
25	less exacting and more deferential inquiry into

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1 the merits, " "without undertaking an intensive
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- 2 effort to resolve factual issues." But 10(j)
- 3 contains no language, much less clear language,
- 4 diluting the traditional standard.
- 5 Preliminary injunctions are
- 6 extraordinary and drastic remedies. Here, the
- 7 Board seeks a coercive injunction backed by
- 8 contempt sanctions, and the Board seeks the very
- 9 same injunctive relief that it would get if it
- 10 won the case.
- 11 Such relief is highly inappropriate
- 12 absent a clear showing under all four factors.
- 13 The government justifies deference because the
- Board, not trial courts, ultimately decide the
- merits at the back end. But Congress directed
- 16 trial courts, not the Board, to apply the Winter
- 17 factors at the front end.
- The Board hasn't even made any factual
- 19 findings to defer to. Agencies have no
- 20 expertise whatsoever in how courts should
- 21 exercise their equitable discretion. Indeed,
- the Board in its adjudication will not even
- 23 consider the four Winter factors. This Court
- has never deferred to an agency's litigation
- 25 position, and it should not start here.

1	I welcome your questions.
2	JUSTICE THOMAS: Ms. Blatt, the
3	government says that "Petitioner's ahistorical,
4	decontextualized approach is inconsistent with
5	the statutory text, the basic premises of
6	equity, and over a century of caselaw."
7	What's your reaction to that?
8	(Laughter.)
9	MS. BLATT: No.
10	(Laughter.)
11	MS. BLATT: I don't even know where
12	they're getting that. I mean, this Court in
13	Winter and a million other cases has said that
14	these four factors are longstanding, and the
15	clear statement rule goes back to Justice Story
16	But I just think the text on its face, you don'
17	have to get too far, says "just and proper."
18	That's obviously harks to traditional equity.
19	And, here, we have the four factors.
20	JUSTICE THOMAS: Do you think their
21	real their the government argues that
22	you're because they are protecting the
23	Board's jurisdiction, as opposed to the courts'
24	jurisdiction, that that's a difference.
25	MS. BLATT: Not at all. Not at all.

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1 I mean, a preliminary injunction -- I mean, it's
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- 2 assigned to the district court. It has the same
- 3 reasons. You have to show that there's a
- 4 likelihood of success on the merits. And,
- 5 obviously, if the harm is recoverable, you're
- 6 not entitled to the injunction at all in balance
- 7 of the equities.
- 8 There's no -- I don't even understand
- 9 the Board's jurisdiction. There are a multitude
- of contexts where an agency has an adjudication,
- and if it wants a preliminary injunction, it's
- got to make the showing that every other party
- 13 would have to make.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But this is not just
- 15 the standard preliminary injunction that
- district courts do on a daily basis in regular,
- ordinary cases within their jurisdiction that
- 18 they control. I mean, this is an injunction
- 19 that is being provided for in a specific
- 20 paragraph of this statute, which I'm sure you
- 21 agree, does, the statute, require some
- 22 consideration of the Board's prerogatives. The
- 23 Board is the one that is ultimately making this
- 24 unfair labor practice determination in the first
- instance. Congress is setting up a Board to

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1 take care of these issues.
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- 2 So it's -- it's not the ordinary PI
- 3 that the -- that district courts see, correct?
- 4 MS. BLATT: No, not at all. It is an
- 5 ordinary preliminary injunction, and this is an
- 6 ordinary statute with a call to just and proper
- 7 remedies. And we cite six statutes in the U.S.
- 8 Code that use the "just and proper" standard and
- 9 a multitude of statutes saying "necessary and
- 10 proper" or just "proper."
- JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I understand,
- but we are in a particular context, and I think
- 13 the context has to inform how we understand what
- 14 Congress intended with respect to this provision
- of the statute providing for this kind of
- 16 injunction.
- MS. BLATT: Well, maybe we should just
- 18 talk about what we're talking about, and that is
- does anything in that statute or anything in
- 20 common sense say the Board gets to walk in and
- 21 get a coercive injunction on the notion that
- 22 they have a non-frivolous legal theory and the
- 23 -- district court is barred from finding facts,
- it's barred from weighing witness credibility,
- and all that matters is the government has not

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1 presented a joke.
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- 2 JUSTICE JACKSON: Well what -- I guess
- 3 what I'm -- what I'm referring to is that we
- 4 already have a very different context insofar as
- 5 the Board is assigned by Congress with the
- 6 requirement or duty to investigate unfair labor
- 7 practices and make the decision in the first
- 8 instance as to whether or not they occurred.
- 9 That doesn't happen in other PI
- 10 contexts. So I get that in other PI contexts
- 11 the district court is doing the fact finding and
- 12 all of the things you're talking about. This is
- 13 a different context.
- MS. BLATT: So, on pages 42 and 44 of
- our brief, we cite SEC, FTC, CPFC -- I'm going
- 16 to run out of the alphabet -- EEOC, a bunch of
- 17 cases where agencies have adjudicatory
- 18 processes. There's three that we cite on pages
- 19 23 and 42 where it involves you can go to
- 20 district court.
- But, remember, neither the Board nor
- 22 the court of appeals on -- on reviewing of a
- 23 final agency will ever consent or -- consider
- the normal standards for preliminary injunction.
- It -- I mean, we just in terms of

- where all this leads you is why would the Board
- get deference when the Board doesn't deserve any
- 3 deference and has no expertise on how equity
- 4 should be -- should be weighed? And in terms of
- 5 -- we could talk about the four factors. At
- 6 most, statutory context, like every other
- 7 injunction, takes account of -- of the statutory
- 8 context. If we were here because there was
- 9 going to be a nuclear accident, I would think
- 10 that's an important statutory context too.
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: So --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Ms. Blatt, you've
- used in your brief 12 times the description of
- 14 using the stringent version of the four-factor
- 15 test. Is that different than the standard
- 16 four-factor test?
- 17 MS. BLATT: This Court in the Pharma
- versus Walsh and in Winter said "clear showing,"
- 19 so -- but, yes, I think that is a stringent --
- 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So it's different
- 21 than the traditional?
- MS. BLATT: Traditional factor test is
- 23 a clear showing. And what I think --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, all right.
- Now you're doing something else.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I understand very
well why you say we don't give deference to the
Board on the likelihood of success on the

MS. BLATT: Okay.

- 5 merits, which -- there's some language in some
- 6 of the court's decisions below that they think
- 7 they have to, and that's the stuff about not
- 8 weighing credibility, et cetera.
- 9 I -- I do understand why that needs to
- 10 be corrected because, you're right, it's the
- 11 court that has to decide the likelihood of
- 12 merits.

- But, with respect to the other three
- 14 prongs -- irreparable harm, balance of the
- 15 equities, public interest -- in Winter and Nken,
- 16 we talked about that there has to be a
- 17 recognition of the -- the public interest, the
- Navy's interest in doing what it needs to do,
- 19 the -- here, I think it's in the NL -- NLRB's
- 20 interest in making sure that its remedial power
- 21 can be returned after the status quo.
- We have to consider in the balance of
- equities the court below, the harm both to the
- 24 employer but the harm to the union and the harm
- to the NLRB. And, finally, the public interest

- 1 is clear in the -- the Board's requirement. So
- 2 it's -- I -- I don't know that either Winter or
- 3 Nken or anything else -- the word "deference" is
- 4 just misplaced here.
- 5 MS. BLATT: Well, so we've gotten
- 6 likelihood of success off the table, but on both
- 7 the court of appeals and the trial court refused
- 8 to find any facts even on the irreparable harm.
- 9 So all the Board cited the evidence and only one
- 10 cited the evidence was considered on irreparable
- 11 harm.
- 12 And in terms of irreparable harm,
- that's something that district courts do day in
- 14 and day out. And what the Board has here and
- has been arguing in all these cases and what the
- 16 court of appeals found is anytime there's an
- 17 unfair labor practice, if you can show evidence
- of chill because people are afraid of being
- 19 retaliated against if they support the union,
- 20 then -- and I'm quoting from the NLRB -- that
- 21 "faith in workplace democracy can never be
- 22 restored."
- 23 And so, in their manual, their 10(j)
- 24 manual, it's basically a playbook and every case
- 25 they say fill in the blank, they're always

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1 saying, if there's evidence of chill, if anyone
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- 2 says --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I mean, firing all
- 4 eight of the union organizers, I think --
- 5 MS. BLATT: Well, if all eight --
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- it's hard to
- 7 see that, although I do understand that some of
- 8 the organizers did different things than others.
- 9 MS. BLATT: Right.
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And the ALJ who's
- 11 made factual findings here to whom the Court
- 12 will have to eventually give deference found
- 13 that at least two of these union representatives
- should have been fired because they did
- 15 something more than stay after hours.
- 16 MS. BLATT: Right.
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There were
- 18 employees there who were staying after hours
- 19 that weren't fired.
- MS. BLATT: Remember, we -- we're here
- on the injunction. Obviously, the -- the ALJ's
- 22 findings don't deserve any deference. If
- there's a final decision by the Board and that
- 24 goes to a court of appeals, they get substantial
- 25 evidence deference. But --

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1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But I'm going back
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- 2 to the point.
- 3 MS. BLATT: But into the injunction
- 4 standard, if all eight employees commit gross
- 5 misconduct, then there's a -- you know, that's a
- 6 basis for termination.
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But there were two
- 8 others who didn't union organize that weren't
- 9 fired.
- MS. BLATT: And one union organizer
- 11 didn't engage in the misconduct and wasn't
- 12 fired. But here's --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: You -- you don't
- 14 dispute, though, the district court could take
- 15 that fact that --
- MS. BLATT: Sure.
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- Justice Sotomayor
- 18 mentioned into account in -- in the course of
- weighing whether an injunction's warranted?
- MS. BLATT: Absolutely. I mean, this
- is a classic case of burden-shifting, was there
- 22 anti-union animus that justified -- that -- that
- 23 prompted the terminations, and Starbucks'
- 24 managers explained that -- and the employees
- conceded this violated company policy, so the

only issue is whether the policy was enforced in

- 2 other stores.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah, pretextual,
- 4 and a district court could make that
- 5 determination the way the ALJ did perhaps.
- 6 MS. BLATT: Exactly. The problem
- 7 in -- in the circuit split is, and in this case
- 8 in particular, both the district court and the
- 9 court of appeals said district courts are barred
- 10 from considering the evidence. And if you count
- 11 the -- the Board's theory that whenever you have
- 12 a harm to unionization, and their story is union
- 13 support is very fragile, whether it's before the
- 14 union's been voted in or after the union is
- voted in, and any type you -- anytime you have
- an unfair labor practice, that's irreparable
- 17 harm. And we're just saying no.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: But you'd be happy
- 19 with weighing, right?
- MS. BLATT: Yes.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: You'd be happy with
- 22 weighing the harm to the union organizing
- against the harm to Starbucks in retaining the
- 24 employees who had violated store policy by
- 25 staying after hours, with all the pretext

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1 considerations that Justices Gorsuch and
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- 2 Sotomayor have referred to?
- 3 MS. BLATT: Factor --
- 4 JUSTICE BARRETT: You'd be happy with
- 5 that, the balance?
- 6 MS. BLATT: Very happy for Factor 3.
- 7 But Factor 2 is irreparable harm.
- 8 JUSTICE JACKSON: But wait. Before
- 9 you leave Factor 3, why -- why is -- I'm sorry.
- 10 Is that the irreparable harm factor you're
- 11 talking about?
- MS. BLATT: Balance of the equities
- was exactly what Justice Barrett said.
- 14 JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, I -- I see. All
- 15 right. So irreparable harm, what -- what is the
- 16 -- what is being addressed there? I thought it
- was the Board's -- whether the Board's remedial
- authority would be harmed, that that's why
- 19 they're seeking a preliminary injunction.
- 20 MS. BLATT: Yeah, and that just is
- 21 empty words without saying what -- what in the
- 22 harm is irreparable, why can't an order of
- 23 reinstatement matter. And the problem with the
- 24 Board's theory in all these cases is they're
- 25 always entitled to an injunction. There's

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1 always irreparable harm --
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- 2 JUSTICE JACKSON: But -- but --
- 3 MS. BLATT: -- by definition.
- 4 JUSTICE JACKSON: -- but you -- you --
- 5 you've said that many times and you suggest that
- 6 this is happening all the time. There's record
- 7 evidence that in the last year the Board has
- 8 sought 14, 14, 1-4, 10(j) injunctions. So it's
- 9 not as though this is happening a lot.
- 10 MS. BLATT: Well, totally fair, just
- 11 when it happens, but in terms of the --
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: Right. But what I'm
- 13 saying is, if -- if we're -- if we're worried
- about an abusive Board doing things that it's
- not supposed to be, giving undue deference, it
- 16 seems like the Board is pretty careful when it's
- 17 determining whether or not to even seek these
- injunctions since it's only asked for it 14
- 19 times.
- 20 MS. BLATT: Well, I'd like to take
- 21 that on because I do think that they are relying
- 22 on the fact that they've done a fair
- 23 investigation. And no matter how much
- investigation and how much careful
- consideration, it's still a litigating position.

- 1 It's not the -- the fact finding, the
- 2 adjudication that Congress assigned it.
- 3 And second of all, the Board is asking
- 4 for more deference to a litigation position than
- 5 it would get at the back end. The Board could
- 6 never get this kind of deference even if it had
- 7 gone through the full adjudication.
- 8 And, third, the Board can't have it
- 9 both ways. Either they're spending so much time
- investigating, maybe they should spend that time
- 11 adjudicating so you don't need these year-long
- injunctions, or if they're saying, well, it
- takes so long for us to adjudicate, maybe
- 14 because it's a hard question.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: But I guess what I'm
- saying is they're only saying that in 14 cases.
- 17 I mean, you're right, maybe -- maybe they should
- 18 be going faster. But they have only asked for
- 19 this kind of injunction in a very, very small
- 20 number of cases. Twenty thousand complaints are
- 21 filed with the Board. Seven hundred result in
- Board action, and of those 700 that the Board is
- investigating and doing and determining, they've
- 24 asked for this kind of injunction 14 times.
- So, I mean, I appreciate that maybe

- 1 the standards we need to look at and I
- 2 understand four factors versus two factors, but
- 3 this is not sounding like a huge problem.
- 4 MS. BLATT: Well, restraint is not a
- 5 basis for deference. And whether or not it's a
- 6 huge problem, what Petitioner wants is just a
- 7 level playing field, the normal injunctive
- 8 factors that agencies and private parties should
- 9 get. So, even if the Board only sought one
- 10 injunction, can -- can you please hold that the
- 11 four factors apply? And we --
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, when you said the
- normal process, so it's just the traditional
- four-factor test applied normally? That's what
- 15 you want?
- MS. BLATT: Yes. Yes. I hope I
- 17 didn't -- that's not a trick question.
- 18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yeah. No.
- 19 (Laughter.)
- JUSTICE KAGAN: It's -- it's supposed
- 21 to be a clarifying question.
- MS. BLATT: Yeah, four factors with no
- 23 deference and to please make sure that --
- 24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Maybe I'll take that
- 25 as a compliment, that --

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1
                (Laughter.)
                JUSTICE KAGAN: -- that you think I'm
 2
 3
      that crafty, but, really --
 4
                MS. BLATT: I -- I think we -- we
      definitely need a reversal with the four
 5
 6
      factors.
 7
                JUSTICE KAGAN: And -- and -- and --
 8
      and just on -- on the -- on this -- on the
 9
      irreparable harm part, you say in your reply
10
     brief that under that four-factor test applied
11
     normally, the Court is supposed to decide
12
     whether delay is going to frustrate -- I'm using
     your words -- "frustrate the Board's ability to
13
14
     remedy the alleged unfair labor practices." So
15
     you have no problem with that?
16
                MS. BLATT: Right, as long as it's --
17
      it's actually irreparable, like there's some --
      so let me just see if I can try to be -- you
18
19
     know, help here. Chill can't be -- chill can be
20
      irreparable, but it has to be chilled from
21
      something that's about to happen, an event that
2.2
      can't be unscrambled.
23
                And so, when we talk about the Board's
     remedial factors, it can't be faith in workplace
24
25
     democracy. It has to be -- there's -- there's
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1 an event, there's an election that they've
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- 2 actually, you know, barricaded the store and
- 3 employees can't get into vote. Unless we get
- 4 this injunction, you can't recreate the
- 5 conditions. So that's all we're talking about.
- And, there, the Board's remedial power
- 7 is being frustrated and there's irreparable
- 8 harm, but all the more reason you've -- you
- 9 know, balance of the equities, it may be that
- 10 the employer had to shut down the store because
- it's not making money.
- 12 JUSTICE KAGAN: And on the equities
- and the public interest, I mean, I think also in
- 14 your brief you acknowledge that when the -- the
- 15 -- a statute like this is involved and public
- interests are involved, a court is supposed to
- 17 take that into account in a way that's different
- from what it might in a statute between private
- 19 parties -- excuse me, in a case between private
- 20 parties with only private interests.
- 21 MS. BLATT: I -- I think that's
- 22 correct because, by definition, the public
- interest is broader than a breach of contract.
- 24 And if you have, you know, the environment or --
- or, I don't know, voting rights, there's public

- 1 interests, but the case that this originates and
- 2 in the Oakland Cannabis and the Virginia
- 3 Railway, it's public interest as deliberately
- 4 expressed in legislation. So where the Court
- 5 has been on public interest is saying district
- 6 courts can't reach out the confines of the
- 7 statute either in going too far or too little.
- 8 And that's -- that, I think, does go to public
- 9 interest.
- 10 But I do think our point is this
- 11 public interest wasn't even referenced below,
- 12 except for the district court saying there's a
- 13 public interest in the statute, is that if
- there's not a showing under all three factors,
- the public interest is not served by, you know,
- 16 putting a scarlet letter on an employer and
- 17 having them just live under an injunction that
- they violated the act based on a non-frivolous
- 19 legal theory, with not even their side of the
- 20 evidence being heard. That is very damaging to
- 21 the public interest in my view.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: Are you saying that
- 23 chill is never enough for irreparable harm?
- MS. BLATT: No, chill can be.
- 25 JUSTICE BARRETT: It can be. It can

- 1 be.
- 2 MS. BLATT: Yes.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: It's just that it
- 4 requires more of a showing than the Sixth
- 5 Circuit required here?
- 6 MS. BLATT: Yeah. So the Sixth
- 7 Circuit three times said, you know, there's
- 8 inherent chill, but they also pointed to
- 9 evidence of chill. And all we're saying is
- 10 evidence of chill needs to be tied to something
- 11 that can't be undone, like the -- we -- we can't
- vote, now that we're chilled from voting,
- 13 there's about to be a vote.
- 14 The court said two things here in
- 15 terms of chill. They said no one was wearing
- union pins because they were scared, and, two,
- the terminated employees, although they're on
- the bargaining unit, it's not as convenient to
- 19 talk to your -- the fellow employees if you're
- 20 not on the shift.
- 21 And those are harms, but they're not
- 22 harms that are -- they're not the harms that are
- irreparable unless you're going to say anytime
- that you have a allegation there's fear of
- retaliation or an encumbrance, somehow that's

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1 not -- not reparable. There was not even a
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- 2 bargaining thing scheduled.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now all you're
- 4 doing is --
- 5 MS. BLATT: The union had just won the
- 6 vote.
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now you're doing
- 8 -- asking us in -- in the opinion to weigh the
- 9 factors ourself and say what the correct
- 10 weighing is.
- MS. BLATT: I wouldn't do that --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I thought you --
- MS. BLATT: -- if I were you.
- 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right. All you
- came in here and said apply the traditional
- 16 test, right?
- 17 MS. BLATT: Yeah, I -- I agree. I was
- 18 just trying to explain to Justice Barrett that
- 19 we concede that chill could definitely be
- 20 relevant, but what we're concerned about is the
- 21 Board's definition of chill automatically leads
- 22 to, when -- whenever there's something against
- 23 unionization effort, that's irreparable harm.
- 24 But, yeah, I don't -- if I were you, I
- 25 would leave this a very short opinion, but

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1 please make clear --
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- 2 JUSTICE JACKSON: But can I -- can --
- 3 MS. BLATT: -- that irreparable harm
- 4 means irreparable.
- 5 JUSTICE JACKSON: Can -- can I ask you
- 6 about likelihood of success in this situation?
- 7 I know others may have taken it off the table,
- 8 but I'm a little curious as to why the district
- 9 court would not at least have to put itself in
- 10 the shoes of the Board when making this
- 11 predictive judgment.
- I mean, this is why I said context
- matters in my view and that we're in the context
- of a statute in which Congress has given the
- 15 Board the ability to determine the merits and --
- 16 at least in the first instance, and the ability
- 17 to make the investigation, to find the facts.
- 18 And in this context, that body has made a
- 19 preliminary determination in these 14 cases that
- an injunction is warranted.
- 21 So -- so is that relevant to the
- 22 district court's determination, or it just comes
- in and handles this as though there was no Board
- or the Board is just one of the parties and it
- 25 doesn't pay any attention --

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1 MS. BLATT: So --
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- 2 JUSTICE JACKSON: -- to those
- 3 preliminary determinations?
- 4 MS. BLATT: -- it's totally irrelevant
- 5 because, when the Board is --
- 6 JUSTICE JACKSON: Irrelevant or
- 7 relevant?
- 8 MS. BLATT: Totally irrelevant because
- 9 the Board is a prosecuting party. It is a party
- 10 that -- the NLRB is the general counsel. He's
- an adversary even before the Board.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: But not according to
- 13 the statute. The statute -- it doesn't just
- relegate the Board to prosecuting party status.
- The statute says the Board is the one that's
- 16 making the initial merits determination. And
- so, when you're asking in the context of the
- 18 preliminary injunction what is the likelihood of
- 19 success on the merits, it doesn't seem to me to
- 20 be irrelevant that the Board has determined
- 21 based on its preliminary investigation that an
- 22 injunction is warranted.
- MS. BLATT: Well, it's the general
- 24 counsel, a separate authority under the statute.
- 25 But I would be embarrassed if I were the Board

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1 to say, yeah, we've made up our mind and we hope
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- 2 district courts --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: No, it's not that
- 4 they've made up their mind.
- 5 MS. BLATT: Well, they haven't.
- 6 JUSTICE JACKSON: The question is --
- 7 the question is, given this unique statutory
- 8 context in which we have the Board as a fact
- 9 finder and a decisionmaker and also a
- 10 prosecutor, as you've pointed out, right, that's
- 11 what makes this context different than when we
- would ordinarily apply the four factors as a
- 13 court.
- MS. BLATT: And all --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: We have an authority
- here that has made a preliminary determination
- 17 that these facts are such that there's a
- 18 likelihood of success on the merits. So how can
- 19 the district court ignore that?
- MS. BLATT: Because that, what you
- 21 just said, basically sums to a litigation memo
- 22 that a lawyer wrote to the Board and the Board
- 23 signs off not in its capacity as a fact finder,
- 24 but it's just authorizing litigation.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is your --

- 1 MS. BLATT: There's nothing to defer
- 2 to. They haven't found any facts.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Is your point here
- 4 that the litigating arm of the Board has brought
- 5 this action, but the Board in its adjudicative
- 6 powers as the Board has not yet determined
- 7 anything?
- 8 MS. BLATT: And they better not have
- 9 because then they're going to look biased. But,
- 10 more importantly, the -- the Board -- the -- the
- 11 -- the litigating arm can file this injunction
- 12 and then turn around and change his or her
- 13 theory before the ALJ and the Board. It's not
- 14 certain --
- 15 JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand. But
- we're talking about a prediction, and so I would
- 17 think that the litigating arm of the Board would
- have a pretty good predictive capacity in terms
- of assessing what the Board might do in this
- 20 case.
- MS. BLATT: Well --
- JUSTICE JACKSON: And I just want to
- 23 know why that's irrelevant to a district court
- 24 in this situation also determining likelihood of
- 25 success on the merits.

- 1 MS. BLATT: Okay. So, if you have a
- 2 pure legal issue, this is completely irrelevant
- 3 because who cares what a lawyer in NLRB thinks.
- 4 I mean, they -- if there's a meaning of the
- 5 statute, it just doesn't matter. In terms of
- 6 this case, which is a question of
- 7 burden-shifting in terms of what caused a
- 8 termination, that is a mixed question of law and
- 9 fact. And if it takes the Board two years to
- 10 figure it out at the back end, it can't be that
- 11 you would get deference when they haven't found
- 12 any fact. But I --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I suppose otherwise
- 14 we -- a district court might take -- cognizance
- of the fact that agencies almost always win --
- MS. BLATT: Well, that's what --
- 17 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- before their --
- MS. BLATT: -- I was going to say.
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- their
- 20 adjudicative bodies.
- MS. BLATT: If they have a 90 percent
- 22 success rate, we'll always lose. I mean,
- 23 really, that can predict -- and the Board tells
- 24 courts this, you should know we're going to win
- because we always win. That's in their manual.

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1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I mean, the fact
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- 2 is the government cites at page 39 of its brief
- 3 that applying the two-part test, that they --
- 4 that the success rate of the NLRB is only
- 5 61 percent. So it's not a rubber stamp.
- 6 MS. BLATT: So --
- 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Even the two-part
- 8 test is not.
- 9 MS. BLATT: Right. And we're saying
- 10 that's because, in the two-part test, the
- 11 overwhelming cases settle. And so that takes --
- it's pretty -- the fortitude of those employers
- 13 that fight on is probably because they have a
- 14 good case.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's kind of --
- 16 it's kind of --
- MS. BLATT: But, whether or not they
- 18 win or lose, it should be the right test.
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's kind of
- 20 interesting too that the government fights a
- 21 test that it claims it does better under.
- MS. BLATT: I don't understand the
- 23 government's position except to say that --
- 24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It points out it
- does better with the four-part test than the

- 1 two-part test. But yet it's fighting the
- 2 four-part test.
- 3 MS. BLATT: I think the government's
- 4 view is we'll take the traditional test if you
- 5 apply it untraditionally.
- 6 JUSTICE JACKSON: Consistent with the
- 7 untraditional context in which we are operating?
- 8 MS. BLATT: Yes, and all I'm trying to
- 9 say is it's not that untraditional to have an
- 10 administrative agency. There's a lot of them in
- 11 the federal government. And the -- and the
- 12 Congress authorizes injunctions a lot, and when
- it uses terms like "just and proper," Congress
- 14 knows how to -- and we cite examples in our
- 15 brief -- to give the agencies a leg up. It does
- 16 that -- or at least in the trademark context.
- 17 It does in another context where they'll presume
- 18 irreparable harm. I think, in the antitrust
- 19 context, there's also special concerns. So
- 20 Congress knows how to do that.
- 21 But the fact it went to the district
- 22 court, which is completely outside the normal
- 23 process of Board review, suggests that Congress
- 24 expected district courts to do what they do all
- 25 the time, and that is to apply -- to apply

- 1 Winter.
- 2 JUSTICE JACKSON: Isn't the history of
- 3 this that Congress originally took the district
- 4 courts completely out of it and that they just
- 5 kind of brought them in in this one capacity?
- 6 That's what I had understood.
- 7 MS. BLATT: Yeah, that -- that's
- 8 correct, that Norris-LaGuardia basically put a
- 9 -- almost an absolute categorical ban on
- 10 injunctions because courts were too aggressive
- in stopping unions. And then it shifted in 1947
- 12 pro-employers. So it's a little ironic that the
- 13 government is relying on a statute that was
- 14 supposed to help employers.
- But the district court is, you know,
- 16 supposed to exercise the just and proper
- 17 discretion. Otherwise, it's banned under the
- 18 stat -- Norris-LaGuardia from entering an
- 19 injunction.
- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 21 Thomas?
- Justice Alito?
- Justice Kagan?
- 24 Justice Gorsuch?
- 25 Justice Barrett?

1	JUSTICE BARRETT: No.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And Justice
3	Jackson Barrett? Okay.
4	Thank you, counsel.
5	Mr. Raynor.
6	ORAL ARGUMENT OF AUSTIN RAYNOR
7	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
8	MR. RAYNOR: Mr. Chief Justice, and
9	may it please the Court:
10	I think the question in this case has
11	narrowed considerably, so I'll just walk through
12	the factors.
13	First, on irreparable harm, in its
14	opening brief, Petitioner fought the idea that
15	the irreparable harm inquiry should focus on
16	whether the Board is going to be able to remedy
17	the harm at the end of its proceedings. At page
18	2 of its reply, it now concedes the focus is on
19	the Board's remedial power. And I understood my
20	friend to further concede that point in her
21	argument this morning.
22	Second, on harm, the question is not
23	whether there is a certainty of harm. The
24	question is whether there's a likelihood of
25	harm. The test used by the Sixth Circuit is

- 1 reasonably necessary. That's the Ahearn case.
- We think that's fully consistent with this
- 3 Court's precedents.
- 4 And as to whether all discharges
- 5 count, we agree that not all unlawful discharges
- 6 necessarily show irreparable harm. The question
- 7 that the Board looks at and the question that we
- 8 think the Court should look at is whether that
- 9 extinguishes the momentum of the union drive or
- 10 impairs it in such a serious way that an order
- from the Board a year or two down the road won't
- 12 be able to restart the drive.
- 13 Second, on public interest and the
- equities, our basic point here is that when
- 15 Congress makes a judgment about what is in the
- 16 public interest, the court cannot override that
- 17 judgment in weighing the equities at that stage.
- 18 This is the Oakland Cannabis case. The Court
- 19 says, if Congress has made a judgment that
- 20 something is unlawful, you can't basically make
- 21 that thing lawful at the equities stage by
- refusing to enforce Congress's judgment.
- That doesn't mean that in some cases,
- 24 at the preliminary stage, if there's extremely
- 25 compelling interests on the other side or public

- 1 interests on the other side, that an injunction
- will automatically be necessary. But we think
- 3 that in a case like this one, where Congress has
- 4 made a judgment in -- in a run-of-the-mine case,
- 5 there's only going to be purely private profit
- 6 -- profit motive interests on the other side,
- 7 injunctive relief is typically going to be
- 8 warranted. Again, I think Petitioner concedes
- 9 this basic point at page 13 of its reply. It
- 10 says that courts are not entitled to revise
- 11 Congress's judgment.
- 12 Third, that leaves the merits, which I
- 13 think has been the subject of a lot of
- 14 discussion this morning. We think that the
- 15 Court should take into account all relevant
- 16 context. One piece of context is the statistics
- 17 that Justice Jackson mentioned. The Board
- 18 receives 20,000 unfair labor charges every year.
- 19 It issues 750 complaints. Last year, it
- 20 authorized 14 petitions and filed seven. That's
- 21 seven out of 20,000.
- We think a court can properly take
- 23 account of that in trying to make a predictive
- 24 judgment about how the Board is going to come
- out. This ultimately is a predictive judgment.

- 1 How is the Board going to come out? What is the
- 2 likelihood of success before the Board? And
- 3 it's relevant that there is substantial
- 4 winnowing that goes on before the complaint is
- 5 filed in district court.
- I think it's also relevant to note
- 7 that the Board has approved the Section 10(j)
- 8 petition. And just to clarify the separation of
- 9 functions within the agency here, the general
- 10 counsel is the prosecutorial arm to the Board.
- 11 The Board members themselves are the
- 12 adjudicative authority.
- But the statute, Section 10(j) itself,
- 14 vests in the Board the power to approve a
- 15 Section 10(j) petition. So, before a 10(j)
- 16 petition is filed in court, the Board itself has
- approved it. And that's relevant in making the
- 18 predictive judgment about how this claim is
- 19 likely to come out before the Board. The
- 20 adjudicator has already preliminarily signaled
- 21 its view of the merits.
- That doesn't mean the Board has made
- 23 up its mind. It hasn't seen all the evidence.
- 24 But that's a relevant consideration for the
- 25 district court to think about in determining

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1 whether there is a likelihood of success on the
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- 2 merits.
- 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, you
- 4 mentioned that it's a small number of -- I
- 5 forget exactly your framing -- that -- that,
- 6 what, reach the question in court about the
- 7 application of the factors?
- 8 MR. RAYNOR: Out of the 20,000 --
- 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes.
- 10 MR. RAYNOR: -- there's only seven
- 11 that get to court, right, last year. That was
- 12 the -- those were the numbers.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And you said
- 14 therefore we should assume what?
- 15 MR. RAYNOR: I think -- I think what
- the Court should do is just to think about the
- 17 fact that the Board has looked -- basically
- 18 brought the cream-of-the-crop cases before the
- 19 Board -- this is -- before the court. This is
- 20 an expert agency that has said we think these
- 21 are the most deserving of relief. And --
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well --
- 23 MR. RAYNOR: -- as Justice Jackson was
- 24 mentioning earlier, this isn't a case where the
- 25 Board has engaged in abuse or bringing all sorts

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of claims before courts. It's been --
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- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I don't
- 3 know why the inference --
- 4 MR. RAYNOR: -- highly selective.
- 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't know
- 6 why the inference isn't the exact opposite, that
- 7 these are the ones you really feel that you've
- 8 got to put, you know, the -- the best
- 9 behind them because these are the ones that are
- 10 going to end up in -- in court, the ones that
- 11 are most vulnerable.
- 12 MR. RAYNOR: But the function of the
- 13 Section 10(j) petition, Mr. Chief Justice, is to
- 14 preserve the Board's remedial authority. So
- 15 these are the cases where the Board is worried
- 16 about irreparable harm accruing before the Board
- 17 can issue its decision.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I thought that --
- 19 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Raynor, I'm a
- 20 little curious about your statistical argument.
- 21 So let's say that the -- that your office files
- 22 a motion for emergency relief, and you want to
- 23 try to convince us that there's a probability
- that we're going to grant certiorari.
- 25 If -- if you, in making that argument,

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1 you say: Look, we're very selective in the
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- 2 solicitor general's office about when we're
- 3 going to petition for certiorari, we get lots of
- 4 requests from the litigating divisions to file
- 5 cert petitions, and we go along with that in a
- 6 tiny minority of the cases, and we have quite a
- 7 good record of success when we do petition for
- 8 cert, is that something we should consider in
- 9 that context?
- 10 MR. RAYNOR: Justice Alito, I don't
- 11 think there's any bar to the Court considering
- 12 it.
- 13 (Laughter.)
- MR. RAYNOR: And just if I may?
- 15 JUSTICE ALITO: Seriously?
- 16 MR. RAYNOR: I -- I certainly don't
- 17 think there's a bar. This is an equitable
- 18 analysis. But I think the context here is
- 19 different in that Congress has --
- JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, I think it's --
- 21 you're going to have to tell me why it's
- 22 different.
- MR. RAYNOR: The reason is that
- 24 Congress has set up a scheme where the agency
- 25 can seek 10(j) relief to protect its own

- 1 adjudicative authority.
- 2 And as Justice Jackson mentioned, the
- 3 history here is that initially there was pretty
- 4 widespread judicial intrusion into labor
- 5 disputes, and in 1932, Congress cut that off and
- 6 said we're not going to allow district courts to
- 7 intervene. And in 1935, it centralized
- 8 adjudication of disputes in the Board.
- 9 In 1947, it decided it had to walk
- 10 back its restriction a little bit, and so it
- 11 allowed Section 10(j) relief, but it didn't
- 12 allow Section 10(j) relief for district courts
- 13 to engage in a wide-ranging and intrusive
- 14 involvement in labor disputes. It allowed
- 15 courts to come in basically as ancillary to the
- agency proceedings and protect the integrity of
- 17 those proceedings.
- 18 And in that context, I do think it is
- 19 relevant that the Board is selective about the
- 20 petitions that it files.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I -- I appreciate
- that point, but would you agree that the
- 23 likelihood of success on the merits inquiry
- 24 means likelihood of success on the merits in
- 25 this case?

1 MR. RAYNOR: As opposed to some other

- 2 case, Justice Gorsuch?
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: As opposed to other
- 4 cases.
- 5 MR. RAYNOR: Correct. It's a focus on
- 6 this particular case.
- 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It has to -- it has
- 8 to be focused, and so we have to look at the
- 9 merits of this case, right?
- 10 MR. RAYNOR: Correct.
- 11 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And so the Sixth
- 12 Circuit's rule that you can't engage in fact
- 13 finding has to be wrong.
- MR. RAYNOR: Justice Gorsuch, we agree
- that some fact-finding is permissible. And I
- think there's been a tendency to caricature what
- 17 the Sixth Circuit is doing. There was a two-day
- 18 evidentiary hearing in this case and there was
- 19 discovery.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, the Sixth
- 21 Circuit said fact-finding is inappropriate.
- MR. RAYNOR: Correct. It did -- it
- 23 did say that. And I agree that language, if
- 24 taken out of context --
- 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: And so -- and you've

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1 walked us --
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- 2 MR. RAYNOR: -- could be read in that
- 3 way.
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. So that's
- 5 wrong.
- 6 MR. RAYNOR: I -- I agree --
- 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: That statement is
- 8 wrong.
- 9 MR. RAYNOR: -- that that statement on
- 10 its own is.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. Yeah. And --
- 12 and -- and you've walked through the four
- factors, which seems to suggest you agree there
- 14 are, indeed, four factors.
- MR. RAYNOR: We agree that all four
- 16 considerations from Winter are relevant to this
- 17 analysis.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Do we apply the
- 19 test the same way we usually apply it as a
- 20 general matter?
- MR. RAYNOR: I think it -- no, I --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Or does -- does a
- 23 district court apply it the same way as --
- MR. RAYNOR: I think there has to be
- 25 some translation to this context. And on --

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1 just focusing on likelihood of the merits for a
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- 2 moment, we think that there has to be a
- 3 substantial legal theory and that there has to
- 4 be sufficient facts that a reasonable
- 5 fact-finder could find for the Board. And we do
- 6 think that --
- 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: That doesn't sound
- 8 like the -- yeah.
- 9 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It doesn't sound
- 10 like likelihood of success on the merits at all.
- MR. RAYNOR: It -- it -- it's -- it's
- 12 likelihood of success of the merits in the sense
- that you're assessing how likely is the Board to
- 14 succeed. And we think they have to show a
- reasonable probability of success. That's the
- 16 standard that we think governs here. And we
- 17 think that's consistent with --
- 18 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Not likelihood of
- 19 success, reasonable? What's reasonable? What
- 20 -- is that -- it's obviously -- is that above
- 21 50 percent? Is that 30 percent?
- MR. RAYNOR: I'm hesitant to put a
- 23 percentage on it, Justice Gorsuch.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: I'm not surprised.
- 25 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: It's lower than

- 1 50.
- 2 MR. RAYNOR: I think it's consistent.
- 3 For example, you know, Justice Kavanaugh, your
- 4 opinion in Labrador says fair prospect. I think
- 5 that's generally along the lines of what we have
- 6 in mind. We don't think reasonable probability
- 7 necessarily needs a percentage to spell it out.
- 8 JUSTICE KAGAN: So, I'm sorry, are you
- 9 saying it's the same or it's a lower bar than
- 10 the usual likelihood of success standard as
- 11 applied in courts every day under Winter?
- 12 MR. RAYNOR: We think that it is a
- 13 lower standard, principally for the -- the
- 14 factual part which I mentioned, which is we
- think, if a reasonable fact-finder can find for
- 16 the Board, that is sufficient.
- We do think that that's effectively
- 18 the test that the Sixth Circuit has been
- 19 applying. I could point you to Ozburn-Hessey,
- 20 which is a decision where the Sixth Circuit
- 21 says, look, the Board has put in evidence that
- 22 this --
- JUSTICE KAGAN: And is the reason for
- this lower standard only that the Board is, you
- know, generally restrained in asking for these

- 1 along the lines that you said, or is there some
- 2 other reason why we should apply -- why courts
- 3 should apply a lower standard?
- 4 MR. RAYNOR: I think it's a structural
- 5 point, which is that Congress intended the Board
- 6 to be the primary adjudicator here.
- 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, it did intend
- 8 the Board to be the primary adjudicator, but it
- 9 also gave this power over injunctions to the
- 10 court.
- 11 MR. RAYNOR: Right. And -- but we
- 12 think that power has to be exercised cognizant
- of the fact that the Board is going to be
- 14 adjudicating this dispute. The court is not
- going to get out in front of the Board. It's
- 16 going to protect the Board's authority. If you
- 17 -- if you --
- 18 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I don't see -- I
- don't see why that follows, because it's a
- 20 preliminary analysis. It's just a quick look.
- 21 And what happens in the merits happens at the
- 22 merits. And in all sorts of alphabet soup
- agencies, we don't do this. District courts
- 24 apply the likelihood of success test as we
- 25 normally conceive it.

- So why is this particular statutory
- 2 regime different than so many others that your
- 3 friend points out?
- 4 MR. RAYNOR: Well, Justice Gorsuch,
- 5 with respect to the statutes that they identify,
- 6 the case law in the lower courts does not
- 7 uniformly support them. It's actually quite
- 8 mixed. There's a lot of it that supports our
- 9 position. In --
- 10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: There's a lot on the
- 11 other side too.
- MR. RAYNOR: I acknowledge that it is.
- 13 JUSTICE GORSUCH: An awful lot. And
- 14 -- and I -- I just struggle to understand what
- 15 you're asking lower courts to do and how it
- would be unique to the NLRB context as opposed
- 17 to others, cognizant as well that these
- injunctions often run against employers and for
- 19 the benefit of unions too, so whatever standard
- 20 we come up with here, you know, goose and
- 21 gander, or -- we have to be cognizant of that.
- MR. RAYNOR: I think, to the extent
- 23 you adopt a standard in this case, its
- 24 generalizability will actually be fairly
- limited. There's only a handful of statutes

- 1 they identify that allow injunctive relief
- pending administrative proceedings. There's
- 3 three in particular: The FTC, the EEOC, the
- 4 Department of Labor.
- 5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right.
- 6 MR. RAYNOR: But other statutes, for
- 7 example, simply involving the federal
- 8 government, the authority to sue to enforce
- 9 federal law, we don't think it would generalize
- 10 because there's not the structural concerns I
- 11 raised with Justice Kagan.
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: Mr. Raynor, is that
- 13 because what we're talking about here is a
- 14 predictive judgment related to what the Board is
- 15 likely to find, that -- that there are
- 16 predictive judgments or there's the preliminary
- 17 relief determination that courts are used to
- making, which is who's going to win, you know,
- 19 from my perspective as between the parties that
- are before me, right?
- 21 Someone's brought a complaint.
- 22 Someone is defending. I'm looking at this
- 23 preliminarily and making a judgment as to who's
- 24 likely to win on the merits of the legal issue
- 25 that they have brought.

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1 That's the ordinary course of things.
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- 2 I think -- and maybe I'm wrong and you can --
- 3 that -- that the predictive judgment here is not
- 4 that.
- 5 The predictive judgment here is the
- 6 Board is seeking injunctive relief to protect
- 7 its remedial authority and what -- to the extent
- 8 we're applying the four factors, it's the
- 9 likelihood that the Board is going to decide
- 10 that there is an unfair labor practice in this
- 11 situation and reverse the stakes on the ground
- or whatever. Is -- is -- is that right?
- MR. RAYNOR: Yes, I do think that's
- 14 correct. The Board is the principal adjudicator
- here. We're trying to predict how they're going
- 16 to come out.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: I -- I don't --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: They're not the
- 19 final --
- 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- see how that could
- 21 possibly be, Mr. Raynor, that, you know, a court
- is supposed to say, well, I have one view of the
- law, but I'm just going to assume that the Board
- has a different view of the law just because
- 25 this case was brought?

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1 MR. RAYNOR: No. I -- I took the --
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- 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: It's got to be the
- 3 court's view of the law, right?
- 4 MR. RAYNOR: Well, I took the premise
- of Justice Jackson's question to be, for
- 6 example, if there's NLRB precedent that the
- 7 Court hasn't weighed in on yet. We -- but we
- 8 know that precedent is going to apply before the
- 9 Board. It would have to think about the fact
- 10 that that precedent --
- 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes, sure, if there's
- 12 NLRB precedent, that -- you know, that's the
- reigning -- that's the governing law, the court
- is supposed to think about that.
- MR. RAYNOR: Correct.
- 16 JUSTICE KAGAN: Because that's the
- 17 governing law.
- 18 MR. RAYNOR: Correct.
- 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: But it's just supposed
- 20 to think about that as a court doing what courts
- 21 normally do, which is applying the law as the
- 22 court finds it to a case.
- MR. RAYNOR: Yes, Justice Kagan. And
- 24 -- and if you all were inclined just to think
- 25 that the likelihood of success test applies

- 1 exactly the same way in this case that it does
- 2 in others, I still would submit that it would be
- 3 easier for the Board to satisfy that test,
- 4 principally because, as I mentioned earlier, the
- 5 Board has already approved the petition. It has
- 6 signaled its preliminary view of the merits.
- JUSTICE BARRETT: But that means we're
- 8 giving the Board a boost because of the
- 9 screening function that it's engaged in and
- 10 we're saying, well, you know, the Board clearly
- 11 thought it was meritorious when it had its
- 12 prosecutorial hat on, so we should assume that
- when the Board has its adjudicatory hat on, that
- it's going to rule in favor of itself.
- MR. RAYNOR: Justice Barrett, I
- 16 acknowledge that the Board could change its mind
- 17 once it has all the evidence before it. It
- doesn't have the evidence before it, the ALJ
- 19 hearing evidence, for example, at the time it
- approves the petition.
- 21 But I would dispute the notion that
- 22 it's acting in a prosecutorial role at this
- 23 stage. It's approving the petition -- the 10(j)
- 24 petition to protect its adjudicative authority.
- 25 And Congress hasn't given it -- for example, the

- 1 way that district courts have the authority to
- 2 issue a PI to protect their own authority,
- 3 Congress hasn't given that to the Board and said
- 4 you have to ask the district court.
- 5 JUSTICE BARRETT: Because the district
- 6 court is an independent check, right? Because
- 7 this is a big deal --
- 8 MR. RAYNOR: Correct.
- 9 JUSTICE BARRETT: -- to have the
- injunction in place no matter who it enjoins.
- 11 So the district court is an independent check,
- 12 so it seems like it should be just doing what
- 13 district courts do since it was given the
- 14 authority to do it.
- 15 MR. RAYNOR: Yes. We -- we
- 16 acknowledge this isn't a rubber stamp, and I
- 17 think the success statistics in the various
- 18 circuits bear that out. And we do think that
- 19 there has to be an inquiry into the merits.
- Ozburn-Hessey, again, is an example where the
- 21 Court said the evidence is over -- overwhelming
- 22 against the Board. We're not going to blind
- ourselves to that. We're not going to grant
- 24 relief here.
- There is some factual weighing that

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1 goes on. We're not disputing that it is a
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- 2 check. The only question is what -- to what
- 3 extent it should be a check.
- 4 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Let me -- let me see
- 5 if I can put it this way. So the district
- 6 court's supposed to ask likelihood of success on
- 7 the merits. Is it supposed to ask what I think
- 8 are the likelihood of success on the merits
- 9 objectively as best I can come up with, as
- 10 neutral a judgment as I can muster? Or is it
- 11 supposed to ask, well, I don't think you're
- 12 likely to succeed, but I think the Board will?
- Is that what -- is that -- is that --
- that seems to me the delta between the positions
- 15 here. And, you know, I -- I -- gosh, I -- it's
- 16 clear to me that your -- you know, your -- your
- friend's going to win, but the Board's going to
- 18 rule otherwise. Is -- is that -- you know, is
- 19 that really supposed to be what a district judge
- is supposed to do?
- MR. RAYNOR: Well, Justice Gorsuch,
- 22 I'm not sure, I guess, in the hypothetical what
- 23 would be the basis for the discrepancy.
- 24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Nor would I, except
- for maybe the statistics you keep referencing,

- 1 the fact that boards tend to win in front of
- 2 boards. They sometimes lose in later review,
- 3 but they win at least in front of the board.
- 4 And I guess, if we're going to take
- 5 account of statistics, why not also ask how
- 6 often the NLRB gets reversed? You know, I mean,
- 7 where -- where does it end? And -- and why,
- 8 again, shouldn't a district judge just ask, as
- 9 best they can muster, with relevant NLRB
- 10 precedent in mind, all of the law, all of the
- 11 facts? And it may have different facts before
- 12 it too than -- than the Board did when it
- 13 authorized the 10(j). It's going to hold a
- 14 hearing.
- MR. RAYNOR: Right.
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: So it's going to be
- 17 a different factual record. It's going to look
- 18 at all the law. What's wrong with the best
- 19 judgment a neutral magistrate can issue?
- 20 MR. RAYNOR: Justice Gorsuch, setting
- 21 aside our front-line position about how we think
- 22 it's a lower standard here, if you thought it
- 23 was the same standard, then our position is
- 24 simply that all contexts should be considered.
- We're -- we're not contending that any one

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1 particular characteristic should be dispositive.
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- 2 Ours is the pro-context position.
- 3 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Okay. Thank you.
- 4 JUSTICE JACKSON: But why -- so why do
- 5 you think it's a lower standard?
- 6 MR. RAYNOR: Justice Jackson, again, I
- 7 think it's a couple things, but it's principally
- 8 structural. We think the Board is -- is the
- 9 adjudicator here. The role of the district
- 10 court is -- to protect and facilitate the
- 11 Board's adjudication --
- 12 JUSTICE JACKSON: And that's in the
- 13 statute from your view -- it's not your view of
- just sort of how it should be?
- MR. RAYNOR: Correct.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: You -- you see --
- 17 you read the statute as set -- as setting up
- 18 this structure?
- MR. RAYNOR: Yes, exactly. This --
- 20 this is the function of a Section 10(j)
- 21 petition. The board -- the 10(j) petition
- 22 expires when the Board issues its order. At
- that point, there's a different statutory
- 24 authority that allows the Board to enforce its
- order in court. And so all we're talking about

- is a petition that's specifically designed to
- 2 protect the Board's adjudication.
- And, again, the historical record
- 4 supports this in the sense that Congress didn't
- 5 want wide-ranging district court involvement in
- 6 labor disputes. It wanted to give a limited
- 7 district court authority to protect the Board's
- 8 adjudicative authority.
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Why do you think
- 10 Congress did that?
- 11 MR. RAYNOR: I think the reason is
- 12 that in 1932, when it passed the
- Norris-LaGuardia Act, it imposed very stringent
- 14 restrictions on district court ability to issue
- injunctions. And in the post-war period, there
- 16 was essentially a lot of labor unrest that
- 17 courts weren't able to step in expeditiously and
- 18 stop. And the court thought that was necessary.
- 19 And so, if you look at the legislative history,
- 20 Congress says, look, it sometimes takes the
- 21 Board a while to rule and there might be a lot
- of harm inflicted in the meantime, so we need to
- 23 give district courts the authority to prevent
- that harm while Board proceedings are ongoing.
- 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: It's certainly true,

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1 though, that Congress was not eager to
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- 2 resuscitate the labor injunction and Debs,
- 3 right?
- 4 MR. RAYNOR: Correct. And --
- 5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yeah. And -- and
- 6 that was not a particularly glorious era for --
- 7 for -- for courts, and you would think,
- 8 therefore, maybe a more restrictive injunctive
- 9 test rather than a looser one might apply?
- 10 MR. RAYNOR: Well, Justice Gorsuch, I
- 11 think I would actually frame the --
- 12 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Traditional rules of
- 13 equity might -- you -- you might want
- 14 them.
- MR. RAYNOR: I would frame it actually
- 16 a little differently. I think what Congress was
- 17 concerned about doing was restricting the power
- 18 of district courts and protecting --
- 19 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yes.
- 20 MR. RAYNOR: -- the centralized
- 21 adjudicative authority --
- JUSTICE GORSUCH: And in --
- MR. RAYNOR: -- of the Board.
- 24 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- restricting the
- power of district courts, you'd maybe want the

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1 full considerations of equity brought to bear
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- 2 rather than a looser standard that's -- results
- 3 in more judicial interference in labor affairs.
- 4 MR. RAYNOR: I -- I recognize that
- 5 that's one way to think about it, but our view
- 6 is that ours is actually a more modest
- 7 conception of the judicial role, which is that
- 8 it's protecting the Board's adjudicative
- 9 authority rather than engaging in its own
- 10 free-ranging exploration of the merits.
- 11 JUSTICE JACKSON: In this context,
- 12 consistent with the kind of injunction that
- we're talking about here, it's not sort of
- 14 protecting the parties in general; it's
- 15 protecting this particular interest, which is
- the Board's authority?
- 17 MR. RAYNOR: Exactly. And there's
- 18 public -- we are not suing on behalf of any
- 19 private parties. The Board is suing to protect
- 20 public rights only. And we do think, to the
- 21 extent this is generalizable, it's actually a
- 22 relatively limited set of statutes to which our
- 23 rule here would apply.
- 24 If the Court has no further questions?
- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,

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1
      counsel.
 2
                Do you agree with your friend on the
      other side that we can dispose of this in a
 3
 4
      short opinion?
 5
                (Laughter.)
                MR. RAYNOR:
 6
                            Yeah.
                (Laughter.)
 7
                CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you.
 8
                Justice Thomas?
 9
10
                JUSTICE THOMAS: Mr. Raynor, if the
11
      injunction -- the -- if the approach here is to
12
      protect the interests of the Board, do you -- do
13
      other agencies benefit from the same -- from
14
      this approach?
15
                MR. RAYNOR: Justice --
16
                JUSTICE THOMAS: And if they don't,
17
      why?
18
                MR. RAYNOR: Justice Thomas, as I
19
      acknowledged earlier, I think other agencies
20
      that have a specific statutory authority to seek
21
      injunctive relief pending agency proceedings
      likely could benefit from a similar kind of
22
23
      rule.
24
                We don't think that the rule that
25
      we're requesting here would reply -- would apply
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- 1 to all the statutes that they cite where, for
- 2 example, the government simply has the ability
- 3 to sue to enforce federal law. That doesn't
- 4 have the same type of ancillary quality that we
- 5 think the injunctive relief in this case does.
- 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito?
- 7 Justice Sotomayor?
- 8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The ALJ ruled last
- 9 May. Exceptions have been filed. How -- how
- 10 long is this going to take?
- 11 MR. RAYNOR: The -- the statistics are
- that, typically, from complaint to final Board
- order is about two -- two years. It varies
- somewhat every fiscal year, but about two years.
- So we're coming up on when you might expect the
- 16 Board to rule on that basis.
- 17 The -- the complaint --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And the injunction
- 19 lasts until then or lasts until what?
- 20 MR. RAYNOR: It lasts until the Board
- 21 issues its order. At that point, there's a
- 22 different statutory authority in 10(e) where the
- 23 Board can go get preliminary relief --
- 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Are we sure that
- before we rule, the Board isn't going to have

- 1 issued its preliminary injunction so that this
- 2 case is mooted?
- 3 MR. RAYNOR: I'm not sure about that.
- 4 I'm not privy to what the Board's timing will
- 5 be, so I can't make any representations. If --
- 6 if the Board were to rule before this Court were
- 7 to rule, I think that there would be a question
- 8 of mootness because the petition would expire --
- 9 the injunction would expire by its own terms.
- 10 So we --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's why I was
- 12 asking. Thank you.
- MR. RAYNOR: And we would obviously
- make a submission on that point if that were to
- 15 occur.
- 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan?
- 17 JUSTICE KAGAN: I just want to make
- 18 sure I completely understand how you think that
- 19 this case is narrowed. You started, you said --
- you quoted Ms. Blatt's reply brief as to
- 21 irreparable harm as to the equities and the
- 22 public interest.
- 23 That -- I -- I take it that you -- and
- I don't think that Ms. Blatt at all retreated
- 25 from her reply brief today. So I take it that

- 1 that's pretty much not at issue now and that the
- 2 real question in dispute is whether the
- 3 likelihood of success inquiry is ratcheted down
- 4 somewhat.
- Is that what you understand the only
- 6 issue in dispute to be?
- 7 MR. RAYNOR: I think so, Justice
- 8 Kagan, assuming that the way we understand
- 9 irreparable harm is that it focuses on the
- 10 Board's remedial authority and there only has to
- 11 be a reasonably likely showing of irreparable
- 12 harm. And then, on the public interest, our
- view is simply that Congress has said what the
- 14 public interest here is. If you think there's
- been a likelihood of success on the violation,
- 16 however you want to define that, by the time we
- 17 get to public interest and weighing of the
- 18 equities, it's going to have to be a pretty
- 19 compelling private interest on the other side to
- 20 overcome Congress's judgment that this kind of
- 21 conduct should be illegal.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: And then, with respect
- to the likelihood of success, you're not arguing
- 24 as I understand it that somehow the Court is
- supposed to say, well, let's pretend I'm not a

- 1 court, let's pretend that I'm the Board. A
- 2 court is supposed to do what a court does.
- 4 MR. RAYNOR: Yes, Justice Kagan.
- 5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Look at the law and
- 6 make the best decision on the law.
- Now you have a different standard that
- 8 you think that the court ought to apply when the
- 9 court looks at the law and makes the best
- 10 decision on the law, and I understand that
- 11 difference, but this isn't something where
- 12 you're saying, like, the court is supposed to
- 13 pretend to be the Board?
- MR. RAYNOR: Justice Kagan, I think
- that's generally correct with a caveat we do
- 16 think it's relevant that the Board has approved
- 17 the petition. And we do think, in circumstances
- where there may be a law or a rule that applies
- 19 to the Board but not to the district court, the
- 20 district court would have to take that into
- 21 account, for example, NLRB precedent.
- JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. Thank you.
- 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice --
- JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Just one thing on
- 25 irreparable harm. You just said reasonably

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1 likely, and I think they say likelihood. Are
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- 2 those the same things?
- 3 MR. RAYNOR: Yes. I -- I know --
- 4 I -- I think, basically, what we think, it has
- 5 to be reasonably necessary. And --
- 6 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Okay.
- 7 MR. RAYNOR: -- that that's the way
- 8 the Sixth Circuit framed it and that's the test
- 9 we would stand by. I don't think there's a
- 10 whole lot of daylight between those different
- 11 formulations.
- 12 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Thank you.
- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice
- 14 Barrett?
- 15 Justice Jackson?
- 16 JUSTICE JACKSON: Just one final
- 17 thing. Why -- why is it relevant in this
- 18 context that the Board has approved the petition
- 19 when it wouldn't be in a normal -- in an
- 20 ordinary scenario of the -- the court just
- 21 making the kind of determination that Justice
- 22 Kagan put forward?
- MR. RAYNOR: Justice Jackson, in a
- 24 normal scenario, the Board its -- excuse me, the
- 25 court itself is determining whether to issue a

1	preliminary	injunction	So it	it doesn't
_	pretruitiary	TII JUIICCTOII.	20 IL	IL GOESII L

- 2 have reference to another actor that may or may
- 3 not have approved preliminary relief.
- In this case, we know the Board is the
- 5 ultimate adjudicator, and we know that it has
- 6 signaled its preliminary view of the merits by
- 7 approving the petition. That type of structural
- 8 relationship isn't present when the district
- 9 court is issuing the preliminary injunction
- 10 without regard to an agency request.
- I don't want to overstate this point.
- 12 As I've mentioned, the Board can change its mind
- once it hears the evidence. It hasn't
- 14 prejudged, but we do think this is relevant to
- 15 the predictive inquiry about how this case is
- 16 going to come out, what the likelihood of
- 17 success is.
- JUSTICE JACKSON: Thank you.
- 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
- 20 counsel.
- MR. RAYNOR: Thank you.
- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Rebuttal, Ms.
- 23 Blatt?
- 24
- 25

1	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT		
2	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER		
3	MS. BLATT: Thank you. May it please		
4	the Court:		
5	Just a couple things. On page 91 of		
6	the district court, the district court said, in		
7	terms of likelihood of success, my next inquiry		
8	focuses on whether there are any facts		
9	supporting each allegation without resolving		
10	conflicting evidence. So there's no question		
11	there was none of that.		
12	And in terms of the standard that as		
13	long reasonable facts support the Board's theory		
14	that should be enough, if that sounds familiar,		
15	it's because it's the standard for summary		
16	judgment, and that obviously is not the standard		
17	for an injunction.		
18	And it's a little bit ironic that		
19	that's the standard from summary judgment		
20	because, if you can survive summary judgment, at		
21	least we get a trial. So this is even worse		
22	than a party would have at summary judgment. So		
23	they should have to prove their case like any		
24	other party.		
25	In terms of so the likelihood of		

- 1 success, just another thing to keep in mind, the
- 2 only evidence that the district court is going
- 3 to have is the evidence before the district
- 4 court.
- In terms of the legal theory, the --
- 6 the Board has been very, very aggressive on some
- 7 of its legal theories, including in a case where
- 8 Starbucks sought discovery, the Board turned
- 9 around and called that an unfair labor practice
- 10 and then told the district court they had to
- 11 defer to it.
- The Board also says that you have to
- bargain with unions that have been decertified.
- 14 So these are very serious legal questions that
- 15 do come up.
- And the other thing, if they want
- 17 deference on to their -- their investigative
- decision, then why aren't they producing their
- 19 litigation memo? I mean, really. If they --
- that's what you're supposed to do when you get
- 21 deference is show your work.
- 22 And this is obviously a privileged
- 23 document and their manual is a cookie-cutter
- thing saying here's how you get your litigation
- 25 memo, here's how you get Board approval. So at

1 least disclose it.

2	In terms of getting out in front,
3	obviously, the district court's findings aren't
4	binding on the ALJ or the Board.
5	And in terms of lower courts, the only
6	thing I'll add is that almost all the cases that
7	kind of water down the standard are pre-Winter.
8	There was one post-Winter case that didn't cite
9	Winter, and then the Ninth Circuit, the
10	government relied on and cited the court said
11	this is in tension with Winter.
12	We'd ask that the judgment be
13	reversed.
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
15	counsel. The case is submitted.
16	(Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the case
17	was submitted.)
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bargain [1] 66:13

1
<b>1-4</b> [1] <b>17:</b> 8
<b>10(e</b> [1] <b>59:</b> 22
<b>10(j</b> [18] <b>4</b> :11,13,18 <b>5</b> :2 <b>12</b> :
23 <b>17</b> :8 <b>36</b> :7,13,15,15 <b>38</b> :
13 <b>39</b> :25 <b>40</b> :11,12 <b>50</b> :23 <b>53</b> :13 <b>54</b> :20,21
<b>11:39</b> [2] <b>1:</b> 19 <b>4:</b> 2
<b>12</b> [1] <b>10:</b> 13
<b>12:31</b> [1] <b>67:</b> 16
<b>13</b> [1] <b>35:</b> 9 <b>14</b> [7] <b>17:</b> 8,8,18 <b>18:</b> 16,24
<b>25</b> :19 <b>35</b> :20
<b>15</b> [1] <b>1</b> :7
<b>1932</b> [2] <b>40</b> :5 <b>55</b> :12
1935 [1] 40:7
1947 [2] 32:11 40:9
2
<b>2</b> [2] <b>16</b> :7 <b>33</b> :18
<b>20,000</b> [3] <b>35</b> :18,21 <b>37</b> :8 <b>2024</b> [1] <b>1</b> :15
<b>23</b> [2] <b>1</b> :15 <b>9</b> :19
23-367 [1] 4:4
3
<b>3</b> [2] <b>16</b> :6,9
<b>30</b> [1] <b>43:</b> 21
<b>33</b> [1] <b>3</b> :7
39 [1] 30:2
4
4 [1] 3:4
<b>42</b> [2] <b>9</b> :14,19 <b>44</b> [1] <b>9</b> :14
5
50 [2] 43:21 44:1
6
<b>61</b> [1] <b>30</b> :5
65 [1] 3:10
700 [1] 18:22
750 [1] 35:19
9
90 [1] 29:21 91 [1] 65:5
A
a.m [2] <b>1:</b> 19 <b>4:</b> 2 ability [5] <b>20:</b> 13 <b>25:</b> 15,16
<b>55:</b> 14 <b>59:</b> 2
able [3] 33:16 34:12 55:17
above [1] 43:20
above-entitled [1] 1:17
absent [1] 5:12 absolute [1] 32:9
Absolutely [1] 14:20
abuse [1] 37:25

17 35:15,23 53:5 62:21 accruing [1] 38:16 acknowledge [4] 21:14 46: 12 **50**:16 **51**:16 acknowledged [1] 58:19 act [2] 22:18 55:13 acting [1] 50:22 action [2] 18:22 28:5 actor [1] 64:2 actually [8] 20:17 21:2 46: 7.24 56:11.15 57:6.21 add [1] 67:6 addressed [1] 16:16 adjudicate [1] 18:13 adjudicating [2] 18:11 45: adjudication [7] 5:22 7:10 **18**:2,7 **40**:8 **54**:11 **55**:2 adjudicative [8] 28:5 29: 20 36:12 40:1 50:24 55:8 56:21 57:8 adjudicator [6] 36:20 45:6. 8 **48**:14 **54**:9 **64**:5 adjudicatory [2] 9:17 50: 13 administrative [2] 31:10 **47**:2 adopt [1] 46:23 adversary [1] 26:11 affairs [1] 57:3 afraid [1] 12:18 Agencies [8] 5:19 9:17 19: 8 **29**:15 **31**:15 **45**:23 **58**:13, agency [9] 7:10 9:23 31:10 36:9 37:20 39:24 40:16 58: 21 64:10 agency's [1] 5:24 aggressive [2] 32:10 66:6 agree [10] 7:21 24:17 34:5 40:22 41:14,23 42:6,13,15 **58:**2 Ahearn [1] 34:1 ahistorical [1] 6:3 Alito [6] 32:22 38:19 39:10, 15 20 **59**·6 ALJ [6] 13:10 15:5 28:13 50:18 59:8 67:4 ALJ's [1] 13:21 allegation [2] 23:24 65:9 alleged [1] 20:14 allow [3] 40:6,12 47:1 allowed [2] 40:11,14 allows [1] 54:24 almost [3] 29:15 32:9 67:6 alphabet [2] 9:16 45:22 already [3] 9:4 36:20 50:5 although [2] 13:7 23:17 analysis [3] 39:18 42:17 45:20 ancillary [2] 40:15 59:4 animus [1] 14:22 another [3] 31:17 64:2 66:

anti-union [1] 14:22 antitrust [1] 31:18 anytime [3] 12:16 15:15 23: appeals [6] 4:17 9:22 12:7, 16 **13**:24 **15**:9 APPEARANCES [1] 2:1 application [1] 37:7 applied [3] 19:14 20:10 44: applies [2] 49:25 62:18 apply [20] 4:14,18 5:16 19: 11 **24**:15 **27**:12 **31**:5,25,25 **42**:18.19.23 **45**:2.3.24 **49**:8 **56**:9 **57**:23 **58**:25 **62**:8 applying [4] 30:3 44:19 48: 8 **49**:21 appreciate [2] 18:25 40:21 approach [3] 6:4 58:11,14 approval [1] 66:25 approve [1] 36:14 approved [6] 36:7,17 50:5 **62**:16 **63**:18 **64**:3 approves [1] 50:20 approving [2] 50:23 64:7 April [1] 1:15 aren't [2] 66:18 67:3 argues [2] 4:22 6:21 arguing [2] 12:15 61:23 argument [11] 1:18 3:2,5,8 **4**:4,7 **33**:6,21 **38**:20,25 **65**: arm [4] 28:4,11,17 36:10 around [2] 28:12 66:9 aside [1] 53:21 assessing [2] 28:19 43:13 assigned [3] 7:2 9:5 18:2 Assistant [1] 2:4 assume [3] 37:14 48:23 50: assuming [1] 61:8 attention [1] 25:25 AUSTIN [3] 2:4 3:6 33:6 authority [23] 16:18 26:24 **27**:15 **36**:12 **38**:14 **40**:1 **45**: 16 **47**:8 **48**:7 **50**:24 **51**:1.2. 14 **54**:24 **55**:7,8,23 **56**:21 57:9.16 58:20 59:22 61:10 authorized [2] 35:20 53:13 authorizes [2] 4:11 31:12 authorizing [1] 27:24 automatically [2] 24:21 **35**:2 awful [1] 46:13 В back [6] 5:15 6:15 14:1 18:

18 **32:**25 **33:**1,3 **50:**7,15 **51:**5.9 **63:**14 barricaded [1] 21:2 based [2] 22:18 26:21 basic [3] 6:5 34:14 35:9 basically [7] 12:24 27:21 32:8 34:20 37:17 40:15 63: basis [5] 7:16 14:6 19:5 52: 23 59:16 bear [2] 51:18 57:1 BEHALF [10] 1:9 2:2,5 3:4, 7.10 **4**:8 **33**:7 **57**:18 **65**:2 behind [1] 38:9 below [4] 4:19 11:6,23 22: benefit [3] 46:19 58:13 22 best [6] 38:8 52:9 53:9.18 **62:**6.9 better [3] 28:8 30:21,25 between [5] 21:18,19 47: 19 **52**:14 **63**:10 biased [1] 28:9 big [1] 51:7 binding [1] 67:4 bit [2] 40:10 65:18 blank [1] 12:25 BLATT [74] 2:2 3:3,9 4:6,7, 9 **6**:2,9,11,25 **8**:4,17 **9**:14 **10**:12,17,22 **11**:1 **12**:5 **13**: 5.9.16.20 **14:**3.10.16.20 **15:** 6.20 **16**:3.6.12.20 **17**:3.10. 20 **19**:4,16,22 **20**:4,16 **21**: 21 22:24 23:2,6 24:5,11,13, 17 **25**:3 **26**:1,4,8,23 **27**:5, 14,20 28:1,8,21 29:1,16,18, 21 **30**:6,9,17,22 **31**:3,8 **32**: 7 60:24 64:23 65:1,3 Blatt's [1] 60:20 blind [1] 51:22 **BOARD** [128] 1:8.10 5:7.8. 14,16,18,22 7:23,25 8:20 9: 5.21 **10:**1.2 **11:**4 **12:**9.14 13:23 17:7.14.16 18:3.5.8. 21,22,22 19:9 25:10,15,23, 24 **26:**5,9,11,14,15,20,25 **27**:8,22,22 **28**:4,5,6,10,13, 17,19 **29**:9,23 **31**:23 **33**:16 **34:**7,11 **35:**17,24 **36:**1,2,7, 10,11,14,16,19,22 **37:**17, 19,25 **38:**15,16 **40:**8,19 **43:** 5,13 **44:**16,21,24 **45:**5,8,13, 15 **47**:14 **48**:6,9,14,23 **49**:9 **50**:3,5,8,10,13,16 **51**:3,22 **52**:12 **53**:3,12 **54**:8,21,22, 24 **55**:21.24 **56**:23 **57**:19 **58:**12 **59:**12.16.20.23.25 **60**:6 **62**:1,13,16,19 **63**:18, 24 64:4,12 66:6,8,12,25 67:

Board's [24] 6:23 7:9,22 12: bargaining [2] 23:18 24:2 barred [3] 8:23,24 15:9 1 **15**:11 **16**:17,17,24 **20**:13, BARRETT [16] 15:18,21 23 21:6 24:21 33:19 38:14 **16**:4,13 **22**:22,25 **23**:3 **24**: **45**:16 **52**:17 **54**:11 **55**:2,7 **57:**8,16 **60:**4 **61:**10 **65:**13 boards [2] 53:1,2 bodies [1] 29:20 body [1] 25:18 boost [1] 50:8 both [4] 11:23 12:6 15:8 18: breach [1] 21:23 brief [9] 9:15 10:13 20:10 21:14 30:2 31:15 33:14 60: 20.25 bringing [1] 37:25 broader [1] 21:23 brought [7] 28:4 32:5 37: 18 **47**:21,25 **48**:25 **57**:1 bunch [1] 9:16 burden-shifting [2] 14:21 29:7 C call [1] 8:6 called [1] 66:9 came [2] 1:17 24:15 Cannabis [2] 22:2 34:18 cannot [1] 34:16 capacity [3] 27:23 28:18 **32:**5 care [1] 8:1 careful [2] 17:16,24 cares [1] 29:3 caricature [1] 41:16 Case [36] 4:4 5:10 12:24 14: 21 15:7 21:19 22:1 28:20 **29**:6 **30**:14 **33**:10 **34**:1.18 35:3.4 37:24 40:25 41:2.6. 9.18 46:6.23 48:25 49:22

**50:1 59:**5 **60:**2.19 **64:**4.15

65:23 66:7 67:8,15,16

cases [15] 6:13 7:17 9:17

12:15 16:24 18:16,20 25:

19 **30**:11 **34**:23 **37**:18 **38**:

centralized [2] 40:7 56:20

certainly [2] 39:16 55:25

certiorari [2] 38:24 39:3

characteristic [1] 54:1

check [4] 51:6,11 52:2,3

charges [1] 35:18

change [3] 28:12 50:16 64:

caselaw [1] 6:6

15 39:6 41:4 67:6

caused [1] 29:7

caveat [1] 62:15

century [1] 6:6

certain [1] 28:14

certainty [1] 33:23

cetera [1] 11:8

cert [2] 39:5.8

categorical [1] 32:9

balance [6] 7:6 11:14,22

5 29:10 40:10

backed [1] 5:7

16:5,12 21:9

banned [1] 32:17

bar [3] 39:11.17 44:9

ban [1] 32:9

abusive [1] 17:14

accident [1] 10:9

according [1] 26:12

account [7] 10:7 14:18 21:

CHIEF [21] 4:3,9 32:20 33: 2,8 37:3,9,13,22 38:2,5,13 **57**:25 **58**:8 **59**:6 **60**:16 **62**: 23 63:13 64:19,22 67:14 chill [12] 12:18 13:1 20:19, 19 22:23,24 23:8,9,10,15 24.19 21 chilled [2] 20:20 23:12 circuit [10] 15:7 23:5.7 33: 25 41:17.21 44:18.20 63:8 67:9 Circuit's [1] 41:12 circuits [1] 51:18 circumstances [1] 62:17 cite [6] 8:7 9:15,18 31:14 59:1 67:8 cited [3] 12:9,10 67:10 cites [1] 30:2 claim [1] 36:18 claims [2] 30:21 38:1 clarify [1] 36:8 clarifying [1] 19:21 classic [1] 14:21 clear [8] 5:3.12 6:15 10:18. 23 12:1 25:1 52:16 clearly [1] 50:10 Code [1] 8:8 coercive [2] 5:7 8:21 cognizance [1] 29:14 cognizant [3] 45:12 46:17, come [9] 35:24 36:1.19 40: 15 46:20 48:16 52:9 64:16 66:15 comes [1] 25:22 coming [1] 59:15 commit [1] 14:4 common [1] 8:20 company [1] 14:25 compelling [2] 34:25 61: compels [1] 4:24 complaint [4] 36:4 47:21 59:12.17 complaints [2] 18:20 35: completely [4] 29:2 31:22 32:4 60:18 compliment [1] 19:25 concede [2] 24:19 33:20 conceded [1] 14:25 concedes [2] 33:18 35:8 conceive [1] 45:25 conception [1] 57:7 concerned [2] 24:20 56:17 concerns [2] 31:19 47:10 conditions [1] 21:5 conduct [2] 4:24 61:21 confines [1] 22:6 conflicting [1] 65:10 Congress [26] 5:15 7:25 8: 14 9:5 18:2 25:14 31:12. 13,20,23 **32**:3 **34**:15,19 **35**: 3 39:19,24 40:5 45:5 50:

25 **51**:3 **55**:4,10,20 **56**:1,16 courts [36] **4**:12,14,24 **5**:14, 61:13 Congress's [3] 34:22 35: 11 61:20 consent [1] 9:23 consider [4] 5:23 9:23 11: 22 39:8 considerably [1] 33:11 consideration [3] 7:22 17: 25 36:24 considerations [3] 16:1 **42**:16 **57**:1 considered [2] 12:10 53: 24 considering [2] 15:10 39: Consistent [5] 31:6 34:2 **43**:17 **44**:2 **57**:12 contains [1] 5:3 contempt [1] 5:8 contending [1] 53:25 context [28] 4:24 8:12.13 9: 4.13 **10:**6.8.10 **25:**12.13.18 **26:**17 **27:**8.11 **31:**7.16.17. 19 35:16.16 39:9.18 40:18 41:24 42:25 46:16 57:11 **63**:18 contexts [4] 7:10 9:10,10 **53**:24 contract [1] 21:23 control [1] 7:18 convenient [1] 23:18 convince [1] 38:23 cookie-cutter [1] 66:23 **CORPORATION** [2] 1:3 4: correct [15] 8:3 21:22 24:9 **32**:8 **41**:5.10.22 **48**:14 **49**: 15.18 **51**:8 **54**:15 **56**:4 **62**: 3.15 corrected [1] 11:10 counsel [8] 26:10,24 33:4 36:10 37:3 58:1 64:20 67: 15 count [2] 15:10 34:5 couple [2] 54:7 65:5 course [2] 14:18 48:1 COURT [90] 1:1.18 4:10.16. 16 5:23 6:12 7:2 8:23 9:11. 20,22 10:17 11:11,23 12:7, 7,16 13:11,24 14:14 15:4,8, 9 20:11 21:16 22:4,12 23: 14 25:9 27:13,19 28:23 29: 14 **31**:22 **32**:15 **33**:9 **34**:8, 16,18 **35**:15,22 **36**:5,16,25 37:6,11,16,19 38:10 39:11 42:23 45:10,14 48:21 49:7, 13,20,22 **51:**4,6,11,21 **54:** 10,25 **55**:5,7,14,18 **57**:24 **60**:6 **61**:24 **62**:1,2,2,8,9,12, 19.20 63:20.25 64:9 65:4.6. 6 66:2.4.10 67:10

court's [6] 11:6 25:22 34:3

49:3 52:6 67:3

D.C [3] 1:14 2:2,5 daily [1] 7:16 determinations [1] 26:3

16,20 **7**:16 **8**:3 **12**:13 **15**:9 22:6 27:2 29:24 31:24 32: 4,10 **35**:10 **38**:1 **40**:6,12,15 **44**:11 **45**:2,23 **46**:6,15 **47**: 17 **49**:20 **51**:1,13 **55**:17,23 **56**:7,18,25 **67**:5 courts' [1] 6:23 CPFC [1] 9:15 crafty [1] 20:3 cream-of-the-crop [1] 37: credibility [2] 8:24 11:8 curious [2] 25:8 38:20 cut [1] 40:5

D

damaging [1] 22:20 day [3] 12:13,14 44:11 daylight [1] 63:10 deal [1] 51:7 Debs [1] 56:2 decertified [1] 66:13 decide [4] 5:14 11:11 20: 11 48:9 decided [1] 40:9 decision [7] 9:7 13:23 38: 17 44:20 62:6.10 66:18 decisionmaker [1] 27:9 decisions [1] 11:6 decontextualized [1] 6:4 deem [1] 4:13 defending [1] 47:22 defer [3] 5:19 28:1 66:11 deference [16] 5:13 10:2.3 **11:**3 **12:**3 **13:**12.22.25 **17:** 15 18:4.6 19:5.23 29:11 66:17.21 deferential [1] 4:25 deferred [1] 5:24 define [1] 61:16 definitely [2] 20:5 24:19 definition [3] 17:3 21:22 24:21 delay [1] 20:12 deliberately [1] 22:3 delta [1] 52:14 democracy [2] 12:21 20: Department [2] 2:5 47:4 description [1] 10:13 deserve [2] 10:2 13:22 deserving [1] 37:21 designed [1] 55:1 determination [8] 7:24 15: 5 25:19,22 26:16 27:16 47: 17 63:21

difference [2] 6:24 62:11 different [17] 9:4,13 10:15, 20 13:8 21:17 27:11 39:19, 22 46:2 48:24 53:11,17 54: 23 59:22 62:7 63:10 differently [1] 56:16 diluting [1] 5:4 directed [1] 5:15 **DIRECTOR** [1] 1:7 discharges [2] 34:4,5 disclose [1] 67:1 discovery [2] 41:19 66:8 discrepancy [1] 52:23 discretion [2] 5:21 32:17 discussion [1] 35:14 dispose [1] 58:3 dispositive [1] 54:1 dispute [5] 14:14 45:14 50: 21 61:2.6 disputes [4] 40:5,8,14 55: disputing [1] 52:1 district [56] 4:11.14.24 7:2. 16 **8:**3.23 **9:**11.20 **12:**13 **14**:14 **15**:4,8,9 **22**:5,12 **25**: 8,22 **27:**2,19 **28:**23 **29:**14 **31:**21,24 **32:**3,15 **36:**5,25 **40**:6,12 **42**:23 **45**:23 **51**:1, 4,5,11,13 **52**:5,19 **53**:8 **54**: 9 **55:**5,7,14,23 **56:**18,25 **62:** 19,20 64:8 65:6,6 66:2,3, 10 67:3 divisions [1] 39:4 document [1] 66:23 doing [11] 9:11 10:25 11: 18 **17**:14 **18**:23 **24**:4.7 **41**: 17 **49:**20 **51:**12 **56:**17 done [1] 17:22 down [4] 21:10 34:11 61:3

drive [2] 34:9.12 duty [1] 9:6 E each [1] 65:9 eager [1] 56:1 earlier [3] 37:24 50:4 58:19 easier [1] 50:3 EEOC [2] 9:16 47:3 effectively [1] 44:17 effort [2] 5:2 24:23 eiaht [3] 13:4.5 14:4 either [3] 12:2 18:9 22:7 election [1] 21:1 embarrassed [1] 26:25 emergency [1] 38:22 employees [7] 13:18 14:4, 24 15:24 21:3 23:17,19 employer [3] 11:24 21:10 22:16

employers [3] 30:12 32:14

**46:**18

empty [1] 16:21

67:7

drastic [1] 5:6

encumbrance [1] 23:25 end [7] 5:15,17 18:5 29:10 33:17 38:10 53:7 enforce [4] 34:22 47:8 54: 24 59:3 enforced [1] 15:1 engage [3] 14:11 40:13 41: 12 engaged [2] 37:25 50:9 engaging [1] 57:9 enioins [1] 51:10 enough [2] 22:23 65:14 entering [1] 32:18 entitled [3] 7:6 16:25 35:10 environment [1] 21:24 equitable [2] 5:21 39:17 equities [11] 7:7 11:15,23 **16**:12 **21**:9,12 **34**:14,17,21 60:21 61:18 equity [5] 6:6,18 10:3 56: 13 57:1 era [1] 56:6 ESQ [3] 3:3 6 9 **ESQUIRE** [1] 2:2 **essentially** [1] **55**:16 et [1] 11:8 even [14] 5:18,22 6:11 7:8 **12**:8 **17**:17 **18**:6 **19**:9 **22**: 11,19 24:1 26:11 30:7 65: 21 event [2] 20:21 21:1 eventually [1] 13:12 evidence [20] 12:9,10,17 13:1.25 15:10 17:7 22:20 23:9.10 36:23 44:21 50:17. 18.19 **51:**21 **64:**13 **65:**10 66:2.3 evidentiary [1] 41:18 exact [1] 38:6

50:19,25 51:20 59:2 62:21 examples [1] 31:14 except [3] 22:12 30:23 52: Exceptions [1] 59:9 excuse [2] 21:19 63:24 exercise [2] 5:21 32:16 exercised [1] 45:12 expect [1] 59:15 expected [1] 31:24 expeditiously [1] 55:17 expert [1] 37:20 expertise [2] 5:20 10:3 expire [2] 60:8,9 expires [1] 54:22 explain [1] 24:18 explained [1] 14:24 exploration [1] 57:10 expressed [1] 22:4 extent [4] 46:22 48:7 52:3 **57**:21

exacting [1] 4:25

**50**:1 **54**:19 **57**:17

Exactly [6] 15:6 16:13 37:5

example [8] 44:3 47:7 49:6

determined [2] 26:20 28:6

determining [5] 17:17 18:

23 28:24 36:25 63:25

determine [1] 25:15

extinguishes [1] 34:9 extraordinary [1] 5:6 extremely [1] 34:24

F

face [1] 6:16 facilitate [1] 54:10 fact [16] 9:11 14:15 17:22 **18:**1 **27:**8,23 **29:**9,12,15 30:1 31:21 37:17 41:12 45: 13 49:9 53:1 fact-finder [2] 43:5 44:15

fact-finding [2] 41:15,21 factor [6] 10:22 16:3,6,7,9,

factors [23] 4:15.17 5:12. 17.23 **6**:14.19 **10**:5 **19**:2.2. 8,11,22 20:6,24 22:14 24:9 27:12 33:12 37:7 42:13,14

facts [11] 4:19 8:23 12:8 25: 17 **27**:17 **28**:2 **43**:4 **53**:11, 11 65:8,13

factual [6] 5:2,18 13:11 44: 14 51:25 53:17

fair [3] 17:10,22 44:4 fairly [1] 46:24

faith [2] 12:21 20:24 familiar [1] 65:14

far [2] 6:17 22:7 faster [1] 18:18

favor [1] 50:14 fear [1] 23:24

federal [4] 31:11 47:7,9 59:

feel [1] 38:7 fellow [1] 23:19 field [1] 19:7 fiaht [1] 30:13 fighting [1] 31:1 fights [1] 30:20

figure [1] 29:10 file [2] 28:11 39:4

filed [5] 18:21 35:20 36:5, 16 **59**:9

files [2] 38:21 40:20 fill [1] **12**:25

final [5] 9:23 13:23 48:19 **59:**12 **63:**16

finally [1] 11:25

find 5 12:8 25:17 43:5 44:

15 47:15 finder [2] 27:9.23

finding [4] 8:23 9:11 18:1 **41:**13

findings [4] 5:19 13:11,22 **67:**3

finds [1] 49:22 fired [4] 13:14,19 14:9,12

firing [1] 13:3 first [4] 7:24 9:7 25:16 33:

fiscal [1] 59:14 focus [3] 33:15.18 41:5 focused [1] 41:8 focuses [2] 61:9 65:8 focusing [1] 43:1 follows [1] 45:19 forget [1] 37:5 formulations [1] 63:11 fortitude [1] 30:12 forward [1] 63:22 fought [1] 33:14 found [4] 12:16 13:12 28:2 four [16] 4:14.17 5:12.23 6: 14.19 10:5 19:2.11.22 20:5 27:12 42:12,14,15 48:8 four-factor [4] 10:14,16 19: 14 20:10 four-part [3] 4:23 30:25 31:

fragile [1] 15:13 frame [2] 56:11,15 framed [1] 63:8 framing [1] 37:5 free-ranging [1] 57:10 friend [3] 33:20 46:3 58:2 friend's [1] 52:17 front [5] 5:17 45:15 53:1.3 **67**:2

front-line [1] 53:21 frustrate [2] 20:12,13 frustrated [1] 21:7 FTC [2] 9:15 47:3 full [2] 18:7 57:1 fully [1] 34:2 function [3] 38:12 50:9 54:

functions [1] 36:9 further [2] 33:20 57:24

G

gander [1] 46:21 gave [1] 45:9 General [6] 2:4 26:10.23 **36**:9 **42**:20 **57**:14 general's [1] 39:2 generalizability [1] 46:24 generalizable [1] 57:21 generalize [1] 47:9 generally [3] 44:5,25 62:15 gets [2] 8:20 53:6 getting [2] 6:12 67:2 give [5] 11:3 13:12 31:15 55:6.23 given [5] 25:14 27:7 50:25 **51:**3.13 giving [2] 17:15 50:8 glorious [1] 56:6 goose [1] 46:20 GORSUCH [47] 14:13,17 15:3 16:1 27:25 28:3 29: 13,17,19 30:15,19,24 32: 24 38:18 40:21 41:2,3,7,11 14,20,25 42:4,7,11 43:9,18 23.24 45:18 46:4.10.13 47: 5 **52**:4,21,24 **53**:16,20 **54**:3

55:25 56:5,10,12,19,22,24 gosh [1] 52:15 got [3] 7:12 38:8 49:2 gotten [1] 12:5 governing [2] 49:13,17 government [12] 4:22 5:13 **6**:3,21 **8**:25 **30**:2,20 **31**:11 32:13 47:8 59:2 67:10 government's [2] 30:23 **31:**3 governs [2] 4:23 43:16

grant [3] 4:12 38:24 51:23 gross [1] 14:4 ground [1] 48:11 guess [4] 9:2 18:15 52:22

Н

53:4

handful [1] 46:25 handles [1] 25:23 happen [2] 9:9 20:21 happening [2] 17:6,9 happens [3] 17:11 45:21, happy [4] 15:18,21 16:4,6

hard [2] 13:6 18:14 harks [1] 6:18 harm [39] 4:21.21 7:5 11:14 23.24.24 12:8.11.12 15:12. 17.22.23 16:7.10.15.22 17: 1 20:9 21:8 22:23 24:23

25:3 31:18 33:13,15,17,22, 23,25 34:6 38:16 55:22,24 60:21 61:9,12 62:25 harmed [1] 16:18

harms [3] 23:21,22,22 hat [2] 50:12.13 hear [1] 4:3

heard [1] 22:20 hearing [3] 41:18 50:19 53:

hears [1] 64:13 held [1] 4:17 help [2] 20:19 32:14 hesitant [1] 43:22

highly [2] 5:11 38:4 historical [1] 55:3

history [3] 32:2 40:3 55:19 hold [2] 19:10 53:13

hope [2] 19:16 27:1 hours [3] 13:15,18 15:25 however [1] 61:16

huae [2] 19:3.6 hundred [1] 18:21 hypothetical [1] 52:22

idea [1] 33:14 identify [2] 46:5 47:1 ignore [1] 27:19 illegal [1] 61:21

impairs [1] **34**:10 important [1] 10:10 importantly [1] 28:10 imposed [1] 55:13 inappropriate [2] 5:11 41: inclined [1] 49:24

including [1] 66:7 inconsistent [1] 6:4 Indeed [2] 5:21 42:14 independent [2] 51:6,11 inference [2] 38:3.6 inflicted [1] 55:22 inform [1] 8:13

inherent [1] 23:8 initial [1] 26:16 initially [1] 40:3

injunction [36] 5:7 7:1,6, 11,15,18 8:5,16,21 9:24 10: 7 **13**:21 **14**:3 **16**:19,25 **18**: 19,24 **19**:10 **21**:4 **22**:17 **25**: 20 **26**:18,22 **28**:11 **32**:19 **35**:1 **51**:10 **56**:2 **57**:12 **58**:

11 **59**:18 **60**:1,9 **64**:1,9 **65**:

iniunction's [1] 14:19 injunctions [10] 4:12 5:5 17:8,18 18:12 31:12 32:10 **45:**9 **46:**18 **55:**15

injunctive [8] 5:9 19:7 35: 7 **47**:1 **48**:6 **56**:8 **58**:21 **59**:

inquiry [7] 4:25 33:15 40: 23 51:19 61:3 64:15 65:7 insofar [1] 9:4

instance [3] 7:25 9:8 25: 16

intend [1] 45:7 intended [2] 8:14 45:5 intensive [1] 5:1 interest [22] 11:15,17,18,

integrity [1] 40:16

20,25 21:13,23 22:3,5,9,11, 13,15,21 **34**:13,16 **57**:15 60:22 61:12,14,17,19

interesting [1] 30:20 interests [7] 21:16,20 22:1 **34:**25 **35:**1,6 **58:**12

interference [1] 57:3 intervene [1] 40:7 intrusion [1] 40:4 intrusive [1] 40:13

investigate [1] 9:6 investigating [2] 18:10,23 investigation [4] 17:23,24

25:17 26:21 investigative [1] 66:17 involved [2] 21:15,16 involvement [2] 40:14 55:

involves [1] 9:19 involving [1] 47:7 ironic [2] 32:12 65:18 irrelevant [6] 26:4.6.8.20 28:23 29:2

irreparable [29] 4:21 11:14 12:8,10,12 15:16 16:7,10,

15,22 17:1 20:9,17,20 21:7 **22**:23 **23**:23 **24**:23 **25**:3,4 **31:**18 **33:**13,15 **34:**6 **38:**16 60:21 61:9,11 62:25 Isn't [7] 32:2 37:24 38:6 51: 16 **59**:25 **62**:11 **64**:8 issue [10] 15:1 29:2 38:17 47:24 51:2 53:19 55:14 61: 1 6 63 25 issued [1] 60:1 issues [5] 5:2 8:1 35:19 54: 22 59:21 issuing [1] 64:9 itself [5] 25:9 36:13,16 50:

14 **63**:25

JACKSON [35] 7:14 8:11 9: 2 16:8,14 17:2,4,12 18:15 **25**:2,5 **26**:2,6,12 **27**:3,6,15 **28**:15,22 **31**:6 **32**:2 **33**:3 35:17 37:23 40:2 47:12 54: 4,6,12,16 **57:**11 **63:**15,16, 23 64:18

Jackson's [1] 49:5 ioke [1] 9:1 judge [2] 52:19 53:8 judgment [22] 25:11 34:15, 17.19.22 35:4.11.24.25 36: 18 **47**:14,23 **48**:3,5 **52**:10 **53:**19 **61:**20 **65:**16,19,20,

22 67:12 judgments [1] 47:16 judicial [3] 40:4 57:3,7

jurisdiction [4] 6:23,24 7: 9,17 Justice [196] 2:5 4:3.9 6:2.

15.20 7:14 8:11 9:2 10:11.

12.20.24 11:2 13:3.6.10.17 14:1.7.13.17.17 15:3.18.21 **16:**4.8.13.14 **17:**2.4.12 **18:** 15 **19**:12.18.20.24 **20**:2.7 21:12 22:22,25 23:3 24:3, 7,12,14,18 25:2,5 26:2,6, 12 **27:**3,6,15,25 **28:**3,15,22 **29**:13,17,19 **30**:1,7,15,19, 24 31:6 32:2,20,20,22,23, 24,25 33:1,2,2,8 35:17 37: 3,9,13,22,23 38:2,5,13,18, 19 **39**:10.15.20 **40**:2.21 **41**: 2,3,7,11,14,20,25 **42:**4,7, 11,18,22 43:7,9,18,23,24, 25 **44**:3.8.23 **45**:7.18 **46**:4. 10.13 47:5.11.12 48:17.18. 20 49:2,5,11,16,19,23 50:7, 15 **51**:5,9 **52**:4,21,24 **53**:16, 20 **54**:3,4,6,12,16 **55**:9,25 **56**:5,10,12,19,22,24 **57**:11, 25 58:8,9,10,15,16,18 59:6,

6,7,8,18,24 60:11,16,16,17

61:7,22 62:4,5,14,22,23,23,

24 63:6,12,13,13,15,16,21,

23 64:18.19.22 67:14

Justices [1] 16:1

justified [1] 14:22 justifies [1] 5:13

#### Κ

KAGAN [29] 10:11 19:12, 18,20,24 20:2,7 21:12 32: 23 44:8,23 45:7 47:11 48: 17,20 49:2,11,16,19,23 60: 16,17 61:8,22 62:4,5,14,22 63:22

**KATHLEEN** [1] 1:6 KAVANAUGH [10] 42:18. 22 43:7.25 44:3 48:18 55: 9 62:24 63:6.12 keep [2] 52:25 66:1 kind [13] 8:15 18:6.19.24 30:15.16.19 32:5 57:12 58: 22 **61**:20 **63**:21 **67**:7 knows [2] 31:14,20

LABOR [17] 1:8.10 7:24 9: 6 12:17 15:16 20:14 35:18 40:4,14 47:4 48:10 55:6, 16 56:2 57:3 66:9 Labrador [1] 44:4 language [4] 5:3,3 11:5 41: last [4] 17:7 35:19 37:11 59: lasts [3] 59:19,19,20 later [1] 53:2 Laughter [7] 6:8,10 19:19 20:1 39:13 58:5.7 law [17] 29:8 46:6 47:9 48: 23,24 49:3,13,17,21 53:10, 18 59:3 62:5,6,9,10,18 lawful [1] 34:21 lawyer [2] 27:22 29:3 leads [2] 10:1 24:21 least [7] 13:13 25:9,16 31: 16 **53:**3 **65:**21 **67:**1 leave [2] 16:9 24:25 leaves [1] 35:12 lea [1] 31:15 legal [9] 4:20 8:22 22:19 **29**:2 **43**:3 **47**:24 **66**:5,7,14 legislation [1] 22:4 legislative [1] 55:19 less [2] 4:25 5:3 letter [1] 22:16 level [1] 19:7 likelihood [30] 7:4 11:4,11 12:6 25:6 26:18 27:18 28: 24 33:24 36:2 37:1 40:23. 24 43:1,10,12,18 44:10 45: 24 48:9 49:25 52:6,8 61:3, 15,23 **63**:1 **64**:16 **65**:7,25 likely [8] 36:19 43:13 47:15, 24 52:12 58:22 61:11 63:1

limited [3] 46:25 55:6 57:

LISA [5] 2:2 3:3,9 4:7 65:1

lines [2] 44:5 45:1

litigating [5] 17:25 28:4,11, minority [1] 39:6 17 39 4 litigation [6] 5:24 18:4 27: 21,24 66:19.24 little [7] 22:7 25:8 32:12 38: 20 40:10 56:16 65:18 live [1] 22:17 long [4] 18:13 20:16 59:10 **65**:13 longstanding [1] 6:14 look [11] 19:1 28:9 34:8 39: 1 41:8 44:21 45:20 53:17 **55**:19.20 **62**:5 looked [1] 37:17 looking [1] 47:22 looks [2] 34:7 62:9 looser [2] 56:9 57:2 lose [3] 29:22 30:18 53:2 lot [10] 17:9 31:10,12 35:13 46:8,10,13 55:16,21 63:10 Ints [1] 39:3 lower [10] 43:25 44:9 13 24 45:3 46:6.15 53:22 54:5

# M

**67:**5

made [9] 5:18 13:11 25:18 27:1.4.16 34:19 35:4 36: magistrate [1] 53:19 managers [1] 14:24 manual [4] 12:23,24 29:25 66:23 many [2] 17:5 46:2 matter [6] 1:17 16:23 17:23 29:5 42:20 51:10 mattered [1] 4:19 matters [2] 8:25 25:13 McKINNEY [2] 1:6 4:5 mean [18] 6:12 7:1.1.18 9: 25 13:3 14:20 18:17.25 21: 13 **25**:12 **29**:4.22 **30**:1 **34**: 23 36:22 53:6 66:19 meaning [1] 29:4 means [3] 25:4 40:24 50:7 meantime [1] 55:22 members [1] 36:11 memo [3] 27:21 66:19,25 mentioned [7] 14:18 35:17 37:4 40:2 44:14 50:4 64: mentioning [1] 37:24 meritorious [1] 50:11 merits [28] 5:1.15 7:4 11:5.

12 25:15 26:16,19 27:18

28:25 35:12 36:21 37:2 40:

23,24 41:9 43:1,10,12 45:

21,22 47:24 50:6 51:19 52:

might [8] 21:18 28:19 29:

14 55:21 56:9,13,13 59:15

mind [8] 27:1.4 36:23 44:6

50:16 53:10 64:12 66:1

7,8 57:10 64:6

million [1] 6:13

misconduct [2] 14:5,11 misplaced [1] 12:4 mixed [2] 29:8 46:8 modest [1] 57:6 moment [1] 43:2 momentum [1] 34:9 money [1] 21:11 mooted [1] 60:2 mootness [1] 60:8 morning [2] 33:21 35:14 most [3] 10:6 37:21 38:11 motion [1] 38:22 motive [1] 35:6 Ms [70] 4:6,9 6:2,9,11,25 8: 4,17 9:14 10:12,17,22 11:1 **12**:5 **13**:5,9,16,20 **14**:3,10, 16,20 **15**:6,20 **16**:3,6,12,20 17:3,10,20 19:4,16,22 20:4, 16 **21**:21 **22**:24 **23**:2,6 **24**: 5.11.13.17 **25:**3 **26:**1.4.8. 23 **27**:5.14.20 **28**:1.8.21 **29**: 1.16.18.21 **30:**6.9.17.22 **31:** 3.8 32:7 60:20.24 64:22 **65**:3 much [5] 5:3 17:23,24 18:9

# muster [2] 52:10 53:9

multitude [2] 7:9 8:9

61:1

narrowed [2] 33:11 60:19 **NATIONAL** [2] 1:8,9 Navy's [1] 11:18 necessarily [2] 34:6 44:7 necessary [5] 8:9 34:1 35: 2 55:18 63:5 need [4] 18:11 19:1 20:5 needs [4] 11:9.18 23:10 44: neither [1] 9:21 neutral [2] 52:10 53:19 never [4] 5:24 12:21 18:6 22.23 next [2] 4:4 65:7 Ninth [1] 67:9 Nken [2] 11:15 12:3 NL [1] 11:19 NLRB [11] 11:25 12:20 26: 10 29:3 30:4 46:16 49:6. 12 53:6.9 62:21 NLRB's [1] 11:19 non-frivolous [3] 4:20 8: 22 22:18 none [1] 65:11 nor [2] 9:21 52:24 normal [6] 9:24 19:7,13 31: 22 63:19,24 normally [4] 19:14 20:11 **45**:25 **49**:21

nothing [1] 28:1 notion [2] 8:21 50:21 NRDC [1] 4:15 nuclear [1] 10:9 number [2] 18:20 37:4 numbers [1] 37:12

# О Oakland [2] 22:2 34:18

objectively [1] 52:9 obviously [8] 6:18 7:5 13: 21 43:20 60:13 65:16 66: occur [1] 60:15 occurred [1] 9:8 office [2] 38:21 39:2 often [2] 46:18 53:6 Okay [8] 11:1 29:1 33:3 42: 4,11 54:3 62:22 63:6 once [2] 50:17 64:13 one [17] 7:23 12:9 14:10 19: 9 23:15 25:24 26:15 32:5 35:3,16 48:22 53:25 56:9 57:5 62:24 63:16 67:8 ones [3] 38:7.9.10 ongoing [1] 55:24 only [18] 12:9 15:1 17:18 18:16.18 19:9 21:20 30:4 35:5 37:10 44:24 46:25 52: 2 **57**:20 **61**:5,10 **66**:2 **67**:5 opening [1] 33:14 operating [1] 31:7 opinion [4] 24:8,25 44:4 opposed [4] 6:23 41:1,3 **46:**16 opposite [1] 38:6 oral [5] 1:17 3:2.5 4:7 33:6 order [6] 16:22 34:10 54:22. 25 59:13.21 ordinarily [1] **27**:12 ordinary [6] 7:17 8:2,5,6 48:1 63:20 organize [1] 14:8 organizer [1] 14:10 organizers [2] 13:4,8 organizing [1] 15:22 originally [1] 32:3 originates [1] 22:1 other [21] 6:13 7:12 9:9.10 **10**:6 **11**:13 **15**:2 **34**:25 **35**: 1.6 **41**:1.3 **45**:2 **46**:11 **47**:6 58:3.13.19 61:19 65:24 66: others [6] 13:8 14:8 25:7 46:2,17 50:2 otherwise [3] 29:13 32:17 **52:**18 ought [1] 62:8 ourself [1] 24:9 ourselves [1] 51:23 out [21] 4:15 9:16 12:14 22:

6 **27**:10 **29**:10 **30**:24 **32**:4

35:21,25 36:1,19 37:8 41:

24 44:7 45:15 46:3 48:16 **51**:18 **64**:16 **67**:2 outside [1] 31:22 over [3] 6:6 45:9 51:21 overcome [1] 61:20 override [1] 34:16 overstate [1] 64:11 overwhelming [2] 30:11 51.21 own [5] 39:25 42:10 51:2 **57:9 60:9** Ozburn-Hessey [2] 44:19 51:20

### P

p.m [1] 67:16 PAGE [5] 3:2 30:2 33:17 **35:9 65:**5 pages [2] 9:14,18 paragraph [1] 7:20 part [2] 20:9 44:14 particular [7] 8:12 15:8 41: 6 **46**:1 **47**:3 **54**:1 **57**:15 particularly [1] 56:6 parties [7] 19:8 21:19,20 **25**:24 **47**:19 **57**:14.19 party [6] 7:12 26:9.9.14 65: 22.24 passed [1] 55:12 pay [1] 25:25 pending [2] 47:2 58:21 people [1] 12:18 percent [4] 29:21 30:5 43: 21,21 percentage [2] 43:23 44:7 perhaps [1] 15:5 period [1] 55:15 permissible [1] 41:15 perspective [1] 47:19 petition [17] 36:8.15.16 38: 13 39:3.7 50:5.20.23.24 54: 21.21 55:1 60:8 62:17 63: 18 64:7 Petitioner [9] 1:4 2:3 3:4, 10 4:8 19:6 33:14 35:8 65: Petitioner's [1] 6:3 petitions [3] 35:20 39:5 40:

pointed [2] 23:8 27:10 points [2] 30:24 46:3

Pharma [1] 10:17

piece [1] 35:16

place [1] 51:10

playing [1] 19:7

**25**:1 **33**:9 **65**:3

playbook [1] 12:24

please [6] 4:10 19:10,23

point [13] 14:2 22:10 28:3

33:20 34:14 35:9 40:22 44:

19 45:5 54:23 59:21 60:14

pins [1] 23:16

PI [4] 8:2 9:9.10 51:2

Norris-LaGuardia [3] 32:

8.18 55:13

note [1] 36:6

policy [3] 14:25 15:1,24 position [8] 5:25 17:25 18: 4 30:23 46:9 53:21,23 54: positions [1] 52:14 possibly [1] 48:21 post-war [1] 55:15 post-Winter [1] 67:8 power [8] 11:20 21:6 33:19 **36:**14 **45:**9,12 **56:**17,25 powers [1] 28:6 practice [5] 7:24 12:17 15: 16 **48**:10 **66**:9 practices [2] 9:7 20:14 pre-Winter [1] 67:7 precedent [6] 49:6,8,10,12 **53**:10 **62**:21 precedents [1] 34:3 predict [2] 29:23 48:15 prediction [1] 28:16 predictive [10] 25:11 28:18 35:23.25 36:18 47:14.16 **48:**3.5 **64:**15 prejudged [1] 64:14 preliminarily [2] 36:20 47: preliminary [23] 4:12 5:5 7: 1,11,15 8:5 9:24 16:19 25: 19 **26**:3,18,21 **27**:16 **34**:24 45:20 47:16 50:6 59:23 60: 1 64:1,3,6,9 premise [1] **49**:4 premises [1] 6:5 prerogatives [1] 7:22 present [1] 64:8 presented [1] 9:1 preserve [1] 38:14 presume [1] 31:17 pretend [3] 61:25 62:1,13 pretext [1] 15:25 pretextual [1] 15:3 pretty [6] 17:16 28:18 30: 12 **40**:3 **61**:1,18 prevent [1] 55:23 primary [2] 45:6,8 principal [1] 48:14 principally [3] 44:13 50:4 54:7 private [7] 19:8 21:18.19. 20 35:5 57:19 61:19 privileged [1] 66:22 privy [1] 60:4 pro-context [1] 54:2 pro-employers [1] 32:12 probability [3] 38:23 43:15 44.6 probably [1] 30:13 problem [5] 15:6 16:23 19: 3.6 20:15 proceedings [6] 33:17 40: 16.17 **47**:2 **55**:24 **58**:21 process [2] 19:13 31:23 processes [1] 9:18 producing [1] 66:18

profit [2] 35:5,6 prompted [1] 14:23 prongs [1] 11:14 proper [8] 4:13 6:17 8:6,8, 10,10 **31:**13 **32:**16 properly [1] 35:22 prosecuting [2] 26:9,14 prosecutor [1] 27:10 prosecutorial [3] 36:10 50: 12 22 prospect [1] 44:4 protect [11] 39:25 40:16 45: 16 **48**:6 **50**:24 **51**:2 **54**:10 **55**:2.7 **57**:19 **58**:12 protecting [5] 6:22 56:18 **57:**8,14,15 prove [1] 65:23 provided [1] 7:19 providing [1] 8:15 provision [1] 8:14 public [23] 11:15,17,25 21: 13.15.22.25 22:3.5.8.11.13. 15,21 **34**:13,16,25 **57**:18. 20 60:22 61:12.14.17 pure [1] 29:2 purely [1] 35:5 put [7] 25:9 32:8 38:8 43: 22 44:21 52:5 63:22 putting [1] 22:16

#### Q

quality [1] 59:4 question [18] 18:14 19:17, 21 27:6,7 29:6,8 33:10,22, 24 34:6,7 37:6 49:5 52:2 60:7 61:2 65:10 questions [3] 6:1 57:24 66 14 quick [1] 45:20 quite [2] 39:6 46:7 quo [1] 11:21 quoted [1] 60:20 quoting [1] 12:20

## R

Railway [1] 22:3 raised [1] 47:11 ratcheted [1] 61:3 rate [2] 29:22 30:4 rather [3] 56:9 57:2,9 RAYNOR [77] 2:4 3:6 33:5, 6,8 37:8,10,15,23 38:4,12, 19 **39**:10,14,16,23 **41**:1,5, 10,14,22 42:2,6,9,15,21,24 **43**:11,22 **44**:2,12 **45**:4,11 **46**:4,12,22 **47**:6,12 **48**:13, 21 **49**:1,4,15,18,23 **50**:15 51:8.15 52:21 53:15.20 54: 6.15.19 **55:**11 **56:**4.10.15. 20,23 57:4,17 58:6,10,15, 18 **59**:11,20 **60**:3,13 **61**:7 62:4,14 63:3,7,23 64:21 reach [2] 22:6 37:6 reaction [1] 6:7

read [2] 42:2 54:17 real [2] 6:21 61:2 really [5] 20:3 29:23 38:7 52:19 66:19 reason [5] 21:8 39:23 44: 23 45:2 55:11 reasonable [7] 43:4.15.19. 19 **44**:6 15 **65**:13 reasonably [4] 34:1 61:11 62:25 63:5 reasons [1] 7:3 REBUTTAL [3] 3:8 64:22 receives [1] 35:18 recognition [1] 11:17 recognize [1] 57:4 record [4] 17:6 39:7 53:17 **55:**3 recoverable [1] 7:5 recreate [1] 21:4 reference [1] 64:2 referenced [1] 22:11 referencing [1] 52:25 referred [1] 16:2 referring [1] 9:3 refused [1] 12:7 refusing [1] 34:22 regard [1] 64:10 regime [1] 46:2 **REGION** [1] 1:7 **REGIONAL** [1] 1:6 regular [1] 7:16 reigning [1] 49:13 reinstatement [1] 16:23 related [1] 47:14 **RELATIONS** [2] 1:8 10 relationship [1] 64:8 relatively [1] 57:22 relegate [1] 26:14 relevant [14] 24:20 25:21 **26**:7 **35**:15 **36**:3.6.17.24 **40**:19 **42**:16 **53**:9 **62**:16 **63**: 17 64:14 relied [1] 67:10 relief [16] 5:9.11 35:7 37:21 38:22 39:25 40:11.12 47:1 17 48:6 51:24 58:21 59:5. 23 64:3 relvina [2] 17:21 32:13 remedial [8] 11:20 16:17 **20**:24 **21**:6 **33**:19 **38**:14 **48**: 7 **61**:10 remedies [2] 5:6 8:7 remedy [2] 20:14 33:16 remember [2] 9:21 13:20 reparable [1] 24:1

required [1] 23:5 requirement [2] 9:6 12:1 requires [2] 4:13 23:4 resolve [1] 5:2 resolving [1] 65:9 respect [4] 8:14 11:13 46:5 61:22 Respondent [4] 1:11 2:6 3: 7 33:7 restart [1] 34:12 restored [1] 12:22 restrained [1] 44:25 restraint [1] 19:4 restricting [2] 56:17,24 restriction [1] 40:10 restrictions [1] 55:14 restrictive [1] 56:8 result [1] 18:21 results [1] 57:2 resuscitate [1] 56:2 retaining [1] 15:23 retaliated [1] 12:19 retaliation [1] 23:25 retreated [1] 60:24 returned [1] 11:21 reversal [1] 20:5 reverse [2] 4:16 48:11 reversed [2] 53:6 67:13 review [2] 31:23 53:2 reviewing [1] 9:22 revise [1] 35:10 rights [2] 21:25 57:20 road [1] 34:11 ROBERTS [18] 4:3 32:20 33:2 37:3.9.13.22 38:2.5 **57:**25 **58:**8 **59:**6 **60:**16 **62:** 23 63:13 64:19.22 67:14 role [3] 50:22 54:9 57:7 rubber [2] 30:5 51:16 rule [13] 6:15 41:12 50:14 **52:**18 **55:**21 **57:**23 **58:**23, 24 59:16,25 60:6,7 62:18 ruled [1] 59:8 rules [1] 56:12 run [2] 9:16 46:18 run-of-the-mine [1] 35:4 same [10] 5:9 7:2 42:19,23 44:9 50:1 53:23 58:13 59:

4 63:2 sanctions [1] 5:8 satisfy [1] 50:3 saying [17] 8:9 13:1 15:17 16:21 17:13 18:12,16,16 22:5,12,22 23:9 30:9 44:9 50:10 62:12 66:24 says [10] 6:3,17 13:2 26:15 34:19 35:10 44:4,21 55:20 66:12 scared [1] 23:16 scarlet [1] 22:16

scenario [2] 63:20.24

scheduled [1] 24:2

scheme [1] 39:24 screening [1] 50:9 SEC [1] 9:15 second [3] 18:3 33:22 34: Section [9] 4:11,18 36:7,13, 15 **38**:13 **40**:11.12 **54**:20 see [9] 8:3 13:7 16:14 20: 18 **45**:18.19 **48**:20 **52**:4 **54**: 16 seek [3] 17:17 39:25 58:20 seekina [2] 16:19 48:6 seeks [2] 5:7.8 seem [1] 26:19 seems [4] 17:16 42:13 51: 12 **52**:14 seen [1] 36:23 selective [3] 38:4 39:1 40: sense [3] 8:20 43:12 55:4 separate [1] 26:24 separation [1] 36:8 serious [2] 34:10 66:14 Seriously [1] 39:15 served [1] 22:15 set [4] 4:15 39:24 54:17 57: setting [3] 7:25 53:20 54: settle [1] 30:11 Seven [4] 18:21 35:20,21 **37:**10 shift [1] 23:20 shifted [1] 32:11 shoes [1] 25:10 short [2] 24:25 58:4 shouldn't [1] 53:8 show [5] 7:3 12:17 34:6 43: 14 66:21 showing [7] 5:12 7:12 10: 18,23 **22**:14 **23**:4 **61**:11 shut [1] 21:10 side [7] 22:19 34:25 35:1,6 **46**:11 **58**:3 **61**:19 signaled [3] 36:20 50:6 64: sians [1] 27:23 similar [1] 58:22 simply [4] 47:7 53:24 59:2 **61**:13 since [2] 17:18 51:13 situation [3] 25:6 28:24 48: six [1] 8:7 Sixth [9] 23:4,6 33:25 41: 11,17,20 44:18,20 63:8 small [2] 18:19 37:4 Solicitor [2] 2:4 39:2 somehow [2] 23:25 61:24 Someone [1] 47:22 Someone's [1] 47:21 sometimes [2] 53:2 55:20

reply [6] 20:9 33:18 35:9

representations [1] 60:5

representatives [1] 13:13

**58:**25 **60:**20 25

request [1] 64:10

requests [1] 39:4

require [1] 7:21

requesting [1] 58:25

somewhat [2] 59:14 61:4

sorry [2] 16:9 44:8

sort [2] 54:14 57:13 sorts [2] 37:25 45:22 **SOTOMAYOR** [23] **10**:12, 20,24 11:2 13:3,6,10,17 14: 1,7,17 **16:**2 **24:**3,7,12,14 **30**:1,7 **59**:7,8,18,24 **60**:11 sought [3] 17:8 19:9 66:8 sound [2] 43:7,9 sounding [1] 19:3 sounds [1] 65:14 soup [1] 45:22 special [1] 31:19 specific [2] 7:19 58:20 specifically [1] 55:1 spell [1] 44:7 spend [1] 18:10 spending [1] 18:9 split [1] 15:7 stage [4] 34:17,21,24 50:23 stakes [1] 48:11 stamp [2] 30:5 51:16 stand [1] 63:9 standard [22] 5:4 7:15 8:8 **10:**15 **14:**4 **43:**16 **44:**10.13. 24 45:3 46:19,23 53:22,23 **54:**5 **57:**2 **62:**7 **65:**12,15, 16.19 **67**:7 standards [2] 9:24 19:1 **STARBUCKS** [4] 1:3 4:4 **15**:23 **66**:8 Starbucks' [1] 14:23 start [1] 5:25 started [1] 60:19 stat [1] 32:18 statement [3] 6:15 42:7 9 **STATES** [2] **1:**1.19 statistical [1] 38:20 statistics [5] 35:16 51:17 **52**:25 **53**:5 **59**:11 status [2] 11:21 26:14 statute [19] 7:20,21 8:6,15, 19 **21:**15,18 **22:**7,13 **25:**14 26:13,13,15,24 29:5 32:13 36:13 54:13,17 statutes [7] 8:7,9 46:5,25 **47**:6 **57**:22 **59**:1 statutory [10] 4:23 6:5 10: 6.7.10 **27**:7 **46**:1 **54**:23 **58**: 20 59:22 stay [1] 13:15 staying [2] 13:18 15:25 step [1] 55:17 still [2] 17:25 50:2 stop [1] 55:18 stopping [1] 32:11 store [3] 15:24 21:2,10 stores [1] 15:2 Story [2] 6:15 15:12 stringent [3] 10:14,19 55: structural [4] 45:4 47:10 54:8 64:7 structure [1] 54:18 struggle [1] 46:14

stuff [1] 11:7 subject [1] 35:13 submission [1] 60:14 submit [1] 50:2 submitted [2] 67:15.17 substantial [3] 13:24 36:3 **43**:3 succeed [2] 43:14 52:12 success [30] 7:4 11:4 12:6 25:6 26:19 27:18 28:25 29: 22 30:4 36:2 37:1 39:7 40: 23.24 43:10.12.15.19 44: 10 45:24 49:25 51:17 52:6. 8 **61**:3,15,23 **64**:17 **65**:7 66:1 sue [2] 47:8 59:3 sufficient [2] 43:4 44:16 suggest [2] 17:5 42:13 suggests [1] 31:23 suing [2] 57:18,19 **summary** [4] **65**:15,19,20, 22 sums [1] 27:21 support [4] 12:19 15:13 46: 7 **65**:13 **supported** [1] **4**:19 supporting [1] 65:9 supports [2] 46:8 55:4 suppose [1] 29:13 supposed [18] 17:15 19:20 **20**:11 **21**:16 **32**:14,16 **48**: 22 49:14,19 52:6,7,11,19, 20 61:25 62:2.12 66:20 **SUPREME** [2] 1:1.18 surprised [1] 43:24 survive [1] 65:20

table [2] 12:6 25:7 talked [1] 11:16 tells [1] 29:23 tend [1] 53:1 tendency [1] 41:16 tension [1] 67:11 terminated [1] 23:17 termination [2] 14:6 29:8 terminations [1] 14:23 terms [16] 9:25 10:4 12:12 17:11 23:15 28:18 29:5,7 31:13 60:9 65:7.12.25 66: 5 67:2.5 test [24] 4:23 10:15.16.22 19:14 20:10 24:16 30:3.8. 10.18.21.25 31:1.2.4 33:25 **42**:19 **44**:18 **45**:24 **49**:25 **50**:3 **56**:9 **63**:8 text [2] 6:5,16 themselves [1] 36:11 theories [1] 66:7 theory [9] 4:20 8:22 15:11 16:24 22:19 28:13 43:3 65: there's [49] 7:3.8 9:18 11:5

12:16 13:1.23 14:5 16:25

17:6 20:17.25.25 21:1.7.25 22:12,14 23:7,13,24 24:22 **27**:17 **28**:1 **29**:4 **31**:10,19 **33**:24 **34**:24 **35**:5 **37**:10 **38**: 23 39:11,17 41:16 46:8,10, 25 **47**:2,10,16 **49**:6,11 **54**: 23 57:17 59:21 61:14 63:9 65:10 therefore [2] 37:14 56:8 thev'll [1] 31:17 thev've [4] 17:22 18:23 21:

1 27:4 thinks [1] 29:3 third [2] 18:8 35:12

THOMAS [7] 6:2,20 32:21 **58:**9,10,16,18 though [4] 14:14 17:9 25: 23 56:1

thousand [1] 18:20 three [5] 9:18 11:13 22:14 23:7 47:3 tied [1] 23:10

timina [1] 60:4 tinv [1] 39:6 today [1] 60:25

took [3] 32:3 49:1,4 totally [3] 17:10 26:4,8 trademark [1] 31:16 traditional [9] 4:14 5:4 6: 18 **10:**21,22 **19:**13 **24:**15

31:4 56:12 translation [1] 42:25 trial [4] 5:14 16 12:7 65:21

trick [1] 19:17 true [1] 55:25 try [2] 20:18 38:23

trying [4] 24:18 31:8 35:23 **48:**15

Tuesday [1] 1:15 turn [1] 28:12 turned [1] 66:8 Twenty [1] 18:20 two [11] 4:23 13:13 14:7 19:

2 23:14,16 29:9 34:11 59: 13 13 14

two-day [1] 41:17 two-part [4] 30:3,7,10 31:1 type [3] 15:15 59:4 64:7 typically [2] 35:7 59:12

U.S [1] 8:7 ultimate [1] 64:5 ultimately [3] 5:14 7:23 35: under [9] 4:18 5:12 20:10 22:14,17 26:24 30:21 32: 17 44:11 understand [15] 7:8 8:11, 13 **11:**2,9 **13:**7 **19:**2 **28:**15 30:22 46:14 60:18 61:5,8, 24 62:10 understood [2] 32:6 33:19 undertaking [1] 5:1

undone [1] 23:11 undue [1] 17:15 unfair [8] 7:24 9:6 12:17 15:16 20:14 35:18 48:10 uniformly [1] 46:7 union [12] 11:24 12:19 13: 4.13 **14**:8.10 **15**:12.14.22 23:16 24:5 34:9 union's [1] 15:14 unionization [2] 15:12 24: unions [3] 32:11 46:19 66: unique [2] 27:7 46:16 unit [1] 23:18 UNITED [2] 1:1.18 unlawful [2] 34:5.20 Unless [2] 21:3 23:23 unrest [1] 55:16 unscrambled [1] 20:22 until [3] 59:19 19 20 untraditional [2] 31:7.9 untraditionally [1] 31:5 up [12] 7:25 27:1,4 31:15 36:23 38:10 39:24 46:20 52:9 54:17 59:15 66:15 uses [1] 31:13 using [2] 10:14 20:12 usual [1] 44:10

varies [1] 59:13 various [1] 51:17 version [1] 10:14 versus [4] 4:5,15 10:18 19: vests [1] 36:14 view [13] 22:21 25:13 31:4 36:21 48:22.24 49:3 50:6 **54**:13.13 **57**:5 **61**:13 **64**:6 violated [3] 14:25 15:24 22: violation [1] 61:15 Virginia [1] 22:2 vote [4] 21:3 23:12,13 24:6 voted [2] 15:14,15

W

voting [2] 21:25 23:12

vulnerable [1] 38:11

wait [1] 16:8 walk [3] 8:20 33:11 40:9 walked [2] 42:1.12 Walsh [1] 10:18 wanted [1] 55:6 wants [2] 7:11 19:6 warranted [4] 14:19 25:20 **26**:22 **35**:8 Washington [3] 1:14 2:2,5 water [1] 67:7 way [12] 15:5 21:17 34:10 **42:**3,19,23 **50:**1 **51:**1 **52:**5 57:5 61:8 63:7

ways [1] 18:9 wearing [1] 23:15 weigh [1] 24:8 weighed [2] 10:4 49:7 weighing [9] 8:24 11:8 14: 19 **15**:19,22 **24**:10 **34**:17 51:25 61:17 welcome [1] 6:1 whatever [2] 46:19 48:12 whatsoever [1] 5:20 whenever [2] 15:11 24:22 Whereupon [1] 67:16 whether [22] 4:19,20,21,22 9:8 14:19 15:1.13 16:17 17:17 19:5 20:12 30:17 33: 16,23,24 **34**:4,8 **37**:1 **61**:2 63:25 65:8 who's [3] 13:10 47:18,23 whole [1] 63:10 whom [1] 13:11 wide-ranging [2] 40:13 55: widespread [1] 40:4 will [7] 5:22 9:23 13:12 35: 2 46:24 52:12 60:4 win [9] 29:15,24,25 30:18 **47**:18,24 **52**:17 **53**:1,3 winnowing [1] 36:4 Winter [12] 4:15 5:16,23 6: 13 10:18 11:15 12:2 32:1 42:16 44:11 67:9.11 Winter's [1] 4:17 within [2] 7:17 36:9 without [4] 5:1 16:21 64: 10 65:9 witness [1] 8:24 won [2] 5:10 24:5 word [1] 12:3 words [2] 16:21 20:13 work [1] 66:21 workplace [2] 12:21 20:24 worried [2] 17:13 38:15 worse [1] 65:21

wrote [1] 27:22

year [6] 17:7 34:11 35:18, 19 37:11 59:14 year-long [1] 18:11 years [3] 29:9 59:13,14