SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES JAMAR ALONZO QUARLES,) Petitioner,) v.) No. 17-778

UNITED STATES,) Respondent.)

Pages: 1 through 66 Place: Washington, D.C.

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1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -3 JAMAR ALONZO QUARLES,) Petitioner,) 4 5) No. 17-778 v. 6 UNITED STATES,) 7 Respondent.) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8 9 Washington, D.C. Wednesday, April 24, 2019 10 11 12 The above-entitled matter came on for 13 oral argument before the Supreme Court of the 14 United States at 10:08 a.m. 15 16 **APPEARANCES:** 17 18 JEREMY C. MARWELL, Washington, D.C.; 19 on behalf of the Petitioner. ZACHARY D. TRIPP, Assistant to the Solicitor General, 20 21 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; 22 on behalf of the Respondent. 23 24 25

Official - Subject to Final Review

CONTENTS ORAL ARGUMENT OF: PAGE: JEREMY C. MARWELL, ESQ. On behalf of the Petitioner ORAL ARGUMENT OF: ZACHARY D. TRIPP, ESQ. On behalf of the Respondent REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF: JEREMY C. MARWELL, ESQ. On behalf of the Petitioner

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:08 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 17-778, 4 5 Ouarles versus United States. Mr. Marwell. 6 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEREMY C. MARWELL 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER MR. MARWELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and 9 10 may it please the Court: 11 For centuries, the essence of burglary 12 has been punishing those who trespass for the purpose of committing a crime. That was the 13 14 rule at common law. It remained the majority 15 view at the time of ACCA and Taylor. For two main reasons, the Court should confirm that 16 17 generic burglary retains that traditional 18 requirement of contemporaneous intent, intent at the time of the initial trespass. 19 20 First, the sources that matter under Taylor show that "remaining in" was understood 21 2.2 as a modest expansion of the traditional 23 offense to cover those who entered lawfully, 24 but then overstay their welcome to commit a 25 crime.

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But the government reads Taylor's use 1 2 of that one word, "remaining in", as a sharp 3 break from that tradition. Under that view, "remaining" would cover anyone who enters 4 unlawfully, regardless of whether they had that 5 burglarious intent at the time of entry as long 6 7 as the intent was formed later. And nothing in 8 Taylor or the sources that existed at the time 9 of ACCA suggest an intention or acknowledgment 10 of making such a dramatic change.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, something -something in Taylor tugs the other way; that is, Taylor said that there would be few statutes that were broader than the generic, and even in, what, 1986, there were more than a few statutes that are like the statute before us.

MR. MARWELL: Yes, Justice Ginsburg. 18 The government claims there were six statutes 19 20 as of -- or six states as of 1986 that had defined remaining-in burglary more broadly than 21 2.2 -- than our definition. I think that's well 23 below the threshold. And, in fact, Taylor 24 contemplated that there would be a few. Tt. 25 gave the example of California, in which

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1 shoplifting qualified as burglary.

2	JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought
3	MR. MARWELL: So
4	JUSTICE GINSBURG: it was higher?
5	I thought it was somewhere between nine and 14?
б	MR. MARWELL: Well, the the
7	government claims six statutes. There were 29
8	statutes as of 29 jurisdictions as of 1986
9	that had remaining-in variants, but I think
10	when you when you look at how the states had
11	interpreted those and and in some cases, at
12	the plain language of the statutes, I think the
13	best reading of where those states were it
14	shows that a majority, even of the remaining-in
15	stat states, retained the traditional
16	requirement of contemporaneous
17	JUSTICE ALITO: Well
18	MR. MARWELL: intent.
19	JUSTICE ALITO: if we look at the
20	statutes in existence in 1986, and we count
21	only those in which there is a judicial opinion
22	interpreting the statute on the remaining-in
23	question, and not those which contain dicta in
24	cases involving where the where there was
25	an intent at the time of entry, what is the

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breakdown?

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2 MR. MARWELL: Well, as you know, we -we think you should not only look --3 JUSTICE ALITO: I know. 4 5 MR. MARWELL: -- at the remaining --JUSTICE ALITO: You think we should 6 7 look more broadly. You want us to count all 8 the statutes in which there is no remaining-in 9 burglary to start out with. 10 MR. MARWELL: Correct --11 JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. 12 MR. MARWELL: -- be -- because Taylor refers -- Taylor instructs to look at how a 13 14 majority of states define burglary, and --JUSTICE ALITO: Well, we know that 15 16 Taylor -- that Taylor's definition of burglary 17 includes "remaining in," does it not? 18 MR. MARWELL: Correct. And --JUSTICE ALITO: All right. So then 19 20 why would we look at the -- the statutes that 21 don't have any remaining-in element at all? 2.2 MR. MARWELL: Because the 22

jurisdictions that had just entry burglary show a widespread adherence to that traditional rule, that you needed intent at the time of

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1 entry. And the government's rule, the 2 government's interpretation of the Taylor test takes that away because they say, if you enter 3 unlawfully without any intent at the time and 4 you form intent later, that's burglary. And 5 that's not consistent. That's much broader 6 7 than the 22 entry states. 8 But I think -- if -- if I can respond 9 to the question about just looking at the 29. 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Right. 11 MR. MARWELL: There are states like 12 Alaska, which has the Arabie decision from 13 1985; New York, which has the Licata decision 14 from 1971; Connecticut, which has the Belton decision from 1983, where the court said that 15 16 "remaining in" applies to a lawful entry followed by a subsequent formation of intent. 17 18 And I take the point that may not be 19 100 percent on point with the question, but we 20 think it forecloses the government's reading, 21 again, because they -- that preserves the 22 requirement of intent at initial unlawful 23 entry. 24 There are also some statutes, Justice

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Alito, where the plain language of the statute,

25

we think, supports our view. Maine had a 1 2 statutory sentencing provision that said you can be punished not only for burglary but also 3 for the offense that you commit after entering 4 5 or remaining. Maine had that entry or 6 remaining statute. 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: And I guess what 8 strikes me, Mr. Marwell, is that the distinction just wasn't -- you know, it wasn't 9 10 really present at that time, that -- that --11 that now we can look and see how there really 12 is a split on this question, but in 1986, there were so few cases or -- or statutes that 13 clearly made the distinction and put a state on 14 one side or the other of it. 15 And if that's the case, if the 16 distinction wasn't salient, why would we assume 17 that Congress meant to incorporate it into the 18 19 burglary element? Well, I -- I think the 20 MR. MARWELL: 21 Court typically interprets statutes to assume 2.2 some degree of continuity with what had come 23 before, and here Taylor acknowledged the common law rule. And we have a number of authorities 24 25 that suggest that this contemporaneous intent

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requirement was -- was the essential thing that
 differentiated burglary from trespass.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What do you do with the "surreptitiously" definition that was in existence before 1986? How does that inform our analysis?

7 MR. MARWELL: So the Court said in 8 Taylor that it -- it was adopting a definition 9 that was very close to the 1984 statute, which 10 had the surreptitious. I think surreptitious 11 helps us. It certainly indicates that 12 remaining was not a continuous state in the 13 sense that the government says it was.

And I think "surreptitiously," as our amicus explains, has a connotation of doing something for a -- for -- for a fraudulent reason or staying -- staying past your welcome for the purpose of committing a crime.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Justice Alito asked you what the lineup was of states that read it your way and the states that read it the government's way. You mentioned at least three or four that predated 1986 that read it your way.

25

At 1986, how many states had opined in

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1 the government -- in the government's way? 2 MR. MARWELL: The government has five where there were judicial decisions in Texas, 3 which adopted a slightly different statutory 4 language that made clear that it was covering 5 anyone who was present in and then committed. 6 7 I think -- in our blue brief we -- we 8 cited 15 jurisdictions, 15 of the 29, but I think, again, if -- if we look at the entry 9 10 states, that gets us 22 as of 1986. And then 11 we get over the -- the hurdle of Taylor --12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well that's --13 MR. MARWELL: -- which is --14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- 15 is a -- is a 15 third of -- not guite a third, a little less than a third, of the states. Isn't that enough 16 17 to say that that's what Congress had in mind? If Taylor says only a few would be excluded by 18 its definition, that's a lot more than a few. 19 MR. MARWELL: Well, we -- Taylor says 20 21 you're trying to craft a generic burglary 2.2 definition that aligns with how most states 23 viewed it, viewed burglary, at the time. And 24 we think most states viewed burglary in -- in 25 our way.

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And so the government has a different 1 2 reading. If you adopt our rule, that it -- it 3 will exclude six jurisdictions as of 1986. And I think that's below the threshold that the 4 Court has -- has declined to read a statute in 5 a way that might exclude ten jurisdictions. 6 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So I'm sorry, what 8 was the 15 you were talking about? 9 MR. MARWELL: Fifteen are 10 jurisdictions that read "remaining" in our way. 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Oh, I'm sorry, I 12 -- that's not the question I asked. 13 MR. MARWELL: Oh, I'm sorry. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As of 1986, how 14 many jurisdictions read it the government's 15 16 way? 17 MR. MARWELL: Six. 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Six. MR. MARWELL: Five -- five using 19 20 intermediate, mostly intermediate state court decisions, and one was Texas. 21 2.2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What has -- how --23 how large has that number grown since 1986? 24 MR. MARWELL: So the government cites 25 18 jurisdictions today. But we think this

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Court's decision in Castleman and Stokeling 1 2 looks -- when it asks the question of how many 3 jurisdictions would be excluded, is looking to the time that Congress adopted the statute. 4 And I think that makes sense. 5 Otherwise you are interpreting the word 6 7 "burglary" in ACCA in 1986 to expand 8 potentially in the future without any further 9 congressional action. 10 And that's why I think in Stokeling 11 and Castleman the Court said we're looking to 12 how many jurisdictions would be excluded as of 13 1986. 14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: The -- the LaFave treatise at -- at the time said, "far more 15 16 common today is the burglary statute which covers one who either enters or remains in the 17 premises. This means, of course, that the 18 requisite intent to commit a crime within need 19 20 only exist at the time the defendant unlawfully 21 remained within." 2.2 So how do you respond to that --23 MR. MARWELL: So the --24 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- contemporaneous 25 evaluation of the law?

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1 MR. MARWELL: So I think that language 2 could -- could support our rule or the government's rule, potentially, but if you look 3 at the rest of what LaFave said, LaFave --4 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Well, let's just 5 stick with that --6 7 MR. MARWELL: Okay. 8 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- sentence. How could it -- it said the intent "need only exist 9 10 at the time the defendant unlawfully remained 11 within." 12 MR. MARWELL: And -- and we think that "remaining within" refers to that point where 13 14 somebody overstays their welcome. And I think you can see that by how LaFave discussed the 15 16 other remaining-in statutes. 17 They said -- the LaFave treatise said, 18 for instance, it gave one example of what the remaining statutes were intended to do and it's 19 the classic bank customer who comes into the 20 21 bank while the bank is open and then stays on 2.2 to steal the bank's money. 23 That, I think, is the -- is the 24 classic example of what states were trying to 25 get at when they added the words "remaining."

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But LaFave then talked about the Texas 1 2 statute and said Texas has a different --3 different words in its statute and it says, if you are present in and you commit a crime, then 4 that's -- that -- that counts as burglary in 5 6 Texas. 7 And LaFave said that's -- that was 8 intended to fix potential concerns about proof 9 that would exist in the remaining 10 jurisdictions. 11 JUSTICE BREYER: Is there any reason 12 to think that the person who stays in the bank, and then, ah, what a nice idea, I'll help 13 14 myself to some money, is any the less violent or at risk of violence or risk of -- is there 15 any less risk there than when he gets the idea 16 17 of going into the bank two weeks earlier? 18 MR. MARWELL: Yes. I think the -- the -- the existence of pre-formed intent, so 19 20 somebody who comes to the bank with the advance 21 plan to commit another crime shows that they 2.2 will be more resolute in their desire to 23 accomplish that crime. 24 It may result in them bringing a 25 weapon because they know they're going to do

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that. And I think it aligns with this -- with 1 2 the fact that ACCA is governing career criminals, trying to select people who have 3 that profit motive to do multiple crimes. 4 And you look at the fact patterns of 5 the cases that are really the point of 6 7 disagreement between us and the government, you 8 know, Gaines from the New York Court of 9 Appeals, a homeless person who breaks into a 10 warehouse to get out of the cold, while he's in 11 there decides to grab a jacket and is caught 12 coming out, or the case of young people who break into a house not -- not intending to 13 14 steal something -- this is the JNS case from Oregon -- take something while they're in there 15 16 and caught on the way out. 17 JUSTICE BREYER: There are --18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Part of --19 JUSTICE BREYER: -- no -- no people 20 who think, well, I want to rob this bank, I'm a little worried about the noise if I break in, 21 22 or I guess, I want to rob this bank, he thinks 23 it when he's inside. A night watchman, a teller who forgot 24 25 to go out -- I don't know if that exists, but I

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1 can't quite figure out -- I'm sure there is 2 some cases both ways, I would think. 3 MR. MARWELL: So --JUSTICE BREYER: Anybody ever look at 4 5 that and --MR. MARWELL: Well, so Taylor, just --6 7 just to -- Taylor referred to the risk of 8 violence when somebody does an intrusion to commit a crime. And I think that's -- that 9 10 captures this idea of --11 JUSTICE BREYER: Right. 12 MR. MARWELL: -- of why we care about 13 pre-formed intent. 14 JUSTICE KAGAN: But -- but part of our understanding of why burglary is a -- is a 15 risky crime is when the burglar meets somebody 16 17 else, the victim, the police officer, whoever. 18 And that person is not going to know when the criminal formed his intent. 19 20 MR. MARWELL: That -- that's correct. But two -- two points, Justice Kagan: One, 21 22 it's -- the government's position comes very 23 close to saying that any time you are present 24 somewhere where you're not supposed to be, there's that risk of a violent confrontation. 25

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1 And Congress did not use the word 2 "trespass" in ACCA. It could have enumerated 3 trespass. I think the government's position 4 comes close to that.

And then, second, I -- I do think 5 there is, you know, a distinction from the --6 7 from the victim or the property owner's 8 perspective of somebody who comes having 9 pre-formed the intent to do something else as 10 opposed to the innocent rationales of somebody 11 who's trespassing for -- by assumption for --12 for doing something other than committing a 13 crime.

JUSTICE ALITO: Is the offense we're concerned with here, his third degree home invasion conviction in Michigan, anything like these cases that you've just described?

18 In that case, as I understand it, he assaulted his girlfriend and then -- and this 19 20 is what the judge said as the factual basis for 21 his no contest plea -- "The victim reported 2.2 that Mr. Quarles broke in through a screen 23 window and assaulted her while in the house." And the judge said, "We certainly can 24 25 infer that he had an intent to commit an

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assault while he was entering." And this 1 2 establishes that he did commit an assault while 3 he was in the house. MR. MARWELL: So the -- the facts that 4 you've recited, Justice Alito, I think would 5 not be available to a sentencing court. That 6 7 was a colloquy in the state court where Mr. 8 Ouarles pleaded no contest. So he was not asked to confirm those facts. 9 10 And I think that --JUSTICE ALITO: Well, doesn't --11 12 doesn't the judge, in order to accept a no contest plea, have to establish, be satisfied 13 14 that there is a factual basis for the plea? MR. MARWELL: I think -- well, in 15 Michigan law, no contest is -- is -- is 16 17 acquiescing in the imposition of punishment but not confirming or denying the facts. 18 And I think under --19 20 JUSTICE ALITO: So the judge doesn't have to be satisfied -- we'll check it out. 21 2.2 Under Michigan law -- this is 23 surprising to me -- a judge can accept a non --24 a no contest plea without ascertaining that 25 there is a factual basis for the plea?

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1 MR. MARWELL: Even if so, I think 2 under this Court -- the way this Court said in 3 Shepard and Mathis, the kinds of facts that are 4 available to the sentencing judge, those are 5 limited to ones where the defendant confirmed 6 the accuracy.

7 But I think under, under the Court's 8 categorical approach, what matters is the text 9 of the Michigan statute, which is very broad. 10 It's as broad as that Texas statute because it 11 says any time you're present in and you -- and 12 you commit.

And if there's a concern about whether the question presented is presented, the government didn't raise that in its brief in opposition. And the Sixth Circuit very clearly engaged with the question of what "remaining in" means.

19 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Taylor didn't say 20 that the statute had to exactly correspond to 21 generic burglary. It said "substantially 22 corresponds"?

23 MR. MARWELL: That -- that's right.
24 But we think that the -- the -- the -- the
25 element here of contemporaneous intent is

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what's been called the most fundamental essence 1 2 of burglary. So I think substantial -- it's hard to 3 say that it substantially corresponds if it's 4 5 missing, you know, the core element. JUSTICE GINSBURG: 6 When you gave the number six, did that exclude all the states 7 8 with remaining-in statutes that had not 9 interpreted those statutes? 10 MR. MARWELL: That's correct. Well, the -- the number six, I think, was how many 11 12 states at the time of ACCA had -- had clearly adopted the government's reading. And the 13 14 government says -- identifies only six. 15 We think the other jurisdictions are 16 most fairly read to have adopted our rule, 17 especially when viewed in light of the background interpretive principles, that you're 18 19 going to assume a degree of continuity and 20 you're going to not assume that the states had 21 completely reconfigured the offense of burglary 2.2 just by adding a word "remaining." 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did that turn out 24 to be the case, states that had remaining-in

25 statutes in 1986 and then interpreted them

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1 later?

2	MR. MARWELL: Well, some jurisdictions
3	have gone towards the government's view. The
4	government identifies 18 as of today. There
5	are some jurisdictions that have adopted our
6	view, and 19 jurisdictions that have not
7	adopted any remaining-in variant and have
8	stayed only defining burglary as intent at
9	entry. So
10	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Give me the count
11	again?
12	MR. MARWELL: So if the question is
13	what's the headcount today?
14	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes.
15	MR. MARWELL: Nineteen states retain
16	the intent at entry, so entry only. Three
17	states have remaining statutes and they have
18	adopted our rule. Eighteen states, the
19	government has identified today as adopting
20	their rule.
21	And I think that leaves 11, that gets
22	us to 51 jurisdictions, where the government
23	implicitly says they haven't resolved the
24	question.
25	JUSTICE KAGAN: The the 18 states

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that the government says have their rule, do 1 2 they have other burglary statutes or would we 3 be essentially removing the only burglary statutes of those states? 4 MR. MARWELL: So it -- it -- focused 5 on today's laws, that's going to depend on how 6 7 the states have treated the statutes. 8 We cited in our brief the Priddy case from the Sixth Circuit. Tennessee is one of 9 10 the statutes. The Priddy case decided that 11 Tennessee was divisible. 12 Michigan has two other burglary statutes in separate sections with separate 13 14 punishments that apply to breaking and entry, including of a dwelling. They don't have the 15 remaining-in issue. So that would remain 16 17 regardless of what you decided here. 18 And then I think it would depend on 19 how -- the divisibility --20 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What --21 MR. MARWELL: -- analysis. 2.2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What percentage of 23 burglaries do you think are remaining-in versus 24 entry burglaries? 25 MR. MARWELL: So what we -- one thing

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we know at the time of ACCA was that the New 1 2 York burglary statute was very influential. 3 And the commentaries to that burglary statute, which we cited in our reply brief, say 4 5 explicitly that entry was the common, more common variant. 6 7 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Far more common, 8 right? 9 MR. MARWELL: Yeah. Yeah. And T 10 think that -- that shows why the states would 11 not have completely reframed their burglary 12 statutes through the unacknowledged and unexplained addition of two words, "remaining 13 in." 14 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But it shows --15 and this is an effect of Taylor, but the 16 17 effects of adopting your position would be to knock out all burglaries from potentially 18 or 18 more states as predicates? 19 20 MR. MARWELL: So I don't -- so, again, 21 I think the -- the relevant question is how 22 many would have been knocked out at the time Congress enacted ACCA, since that, I think, is 23 24 the fairest reading of Castleman and Stokeling. 25 As of today, I think it depends on the

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divisibility analysis. And there are a number of jurisdictions of that 18 where I think it would be a -- a litigated issue, and a number of jurisdictions that have other burglary statutes that aren't affected. So --

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is -- is there any way 7 to tell, maybe there's not, among remaining-in 8 burglaries, what proportion of them are people 9 who formed their intent later versus formed 10 their intent at the moment of decision to 11 remain?

12 MR. MARWELL: I'm not aware of a 13 statistic on that front. I -- I would say that 14 it -- the benefit of doing the 50-state survey 15 gives you a sense of where that issue has been 16 material.

And you see it in the cases cited in our brief, where you either have somebody who, you know, was lawfully present, went into the bank or into the store, or you have a situation where the authorization to enter was disputed. And so the prosecution will charge both.

And often the easier course, if you take the government's reading, is, well, don't worry about whether intent existed at the time

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of entry because, you know, there was a 1 2 commission of a misdemeanor or a crime while you're -- while you're --3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It has to be 4 5 -- it has to be very unusual that someone enters a bank and only then does it occur to 6 7 them that that's where money is that they might 8 want to rob. 9 (Laughter.) 10 MR. MARWELL: Well, I -- I think the 11 reason that the states adopted these 12 remaining-in variants is because you're right in the sense what they were trying to get at 13 14 was the person who came to the bank with that plan and they were going to avoid having to 15 16 break in because they could enter lawfully. And there was a sense that that person is a 17 burglar, just like the one who actually breaks 18 19 and enters. 20 But I think that supports our view 21 because those are captured under both -- both 2.2 sides' tests because that -- that person has 23 the intent at the time he -- his presence in 24 the -- in the bank becomes unlawful. 25 JUSTICE ALITO: What do you make of

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Taylor's definition of -- of burglary, where 1 2 the Court said that the contemporary meaning of 3 burglary means at least the following, and --I'm sorry, contains at least the following 4 5 elements: An unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in a building or other 6 7 structure with intent to commit a crime? How 8 do you read -- how can you read that consistent 9 with your interpretation? 10 MR. MARWELL: I think the way the 11 Eighth and Fifth Circuits and Seventh Circuits 12 have which is that, you are, A, defining burglary, coming at it at against the 13 14 background of a common law rule that everyone agrees, the government and us, had this 15 16 contemporaneous intent requirement. And you're 17 pairing "remaining" with "entry." And everyone agrees entry is a point in time. So you have 18 the contextual -- your -- you inform the 19 20 meaning of "remaining" by context. 21 And then you have "remaining" modified 2.2 by the words "with intent." And as the 23 examples --JUSTICE ALITO: Yes, it's remaining --24 25 MR. MARWELL: -- of some --

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1 JUSTICE ALITO: -- remaining with 2 intent to commit a crime. 3 MR. MARWELL: Right. JUSTICE ALITO: So where do we get the 4 5 -- the -- the point of entry there? MR. MARWELL: I -- I think you get 6 7 it --8 JUSTICE ALITO: I'm sorry, the time of 9 Where -- where do you -- how do you entry. 10 read into that the requirement that the -- the 11 intent has to be present at the time of entry? 12 MR. MARWELL: Because you're reading 13 "remaining" in the context of entry. And --14 and you are trying to define an offense of burglary at a time where 22 states 15 16 unquestionably said you have to have intent at 17 entry. 18 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What do you mean 19 by --20 MR. MARWELL: So --21 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: I'm sorry to 22 interrupt. 23 MR. MARWELL: I'm sorry. 24 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: What do you mean 25 by context there? It says "or" -- entry into

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1 "or" remaining in.

2	MR. MARWELL: Well, I the this
3	Court in the Neal case that we cited in our
4	reply brief has said when you have a pair of
5	words, you know, disjunctive pair of words, you
6	look at one in the context of the other.
7	And
8	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: But there are two
9	distinct concepts, and at least I read Taylor
10	as saying these two distinct concepts are ways
11	you can fall within generic burglary.
12	MR. MARWELL: But they're two distinct
13	concepts engaged in the effort of defining what
14	burglary was in most states at that time. And
15	I think if you read "remaining" in the
16	continuous way that the government says, it all
17	but eliminates the intent-at-entry requirement.
18	I don't think that is what Taylor would have
19	done explicitly. And, again, that's because
20	JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Although there
21	were some states, you acknowledge, that
22	supported the government's position at that
23	time and that are cited in LaFave, which is
24	cited right after this sentence in Taylor, is
25	the LaFave treatise. I

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1 MR. MARWELL: Correct. And -- and 2 Taylor acknowledged that its definition was not going to be perfect or was not going to be 3 maximalist in the sense of capturing every 4 single state. It gave some examples: 5 The vending machine; California, shoplifting is 6 7 burglary. It said there may be some states 8 that are broader.

But just to get back, the government's 9 10 definition puts entry completely out of focus, 11 as the Fifth Circuit says, and it makes entry 12 the small minority view because every unlawful entry followed by formation of intent is 13 14 burglary under their view. And I just think Taylor did not give an indication of -- of 15 16 changing, diverting that far.

If -- if you read Taylor as creating 17 simply an empty -- empty vessel to be filled in 18 as states decided, you know, whether they would 19 20 expand their burglary statute, I don't --21 that's an odd way to read a criminal statute. 2.2 JUSTICE ALITO: I mean, what you say 23 is a -- is an argument that one might make to a 24 state legislature in defining burglary, because 25 the other definition can potentially catch some

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of these people who have less -- less dangerous characteristics -- that where their -- that individual crime has less dangerous characteristics, but under ACCA, the person has to have three prior convictions.

And here your client has two prior 7 convictions for assault with a deadly weapon, 8 so this is just the third. So this is not a case where this definition is -- is imposing a 9 10 severe punishment on somebody who, you might 11 argue, is less blameworthy; isn't that right? 12 MR. MARWELL: Well, I think under -under the Court's categorical approach, the --13 14 the -- the question is the statutes, not the -not the conduct. And I don't think that the --15 16 just needing three necessarily speaks to what the three needs. 17

We cited in our reply brief, you know, there are certain populations that are subject to multiple, you know, low-level offenses and so might well get three. If I could reserve?

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,24 counsel.

25 Mr. Tripp.

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1 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ZACHARY D. TRIPP 2 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT MR. TRIPP: Mr. Chief Justice, and may 3 it please the Court: 4 Petitioner's conviction here is a 5 burglary conviction for purposes of ACCA. 6 And 7 if I could just make three or four points why that's right and try to simplify things a bit 8 9 in response to the questioning. 10 So, first, I think you can really just 11 begin and end with the text here. The statute 12 says burglary. This Court has already held that that means any statute with these basic 13 14 elements which include remaining with intent and -- and that's true regardless of the exact 15 definition or label. 16 17 And -- and this is just what it means to remain in a place. You remain there as long 18 as you stay. That's what this Court already 19 held in Cores, the case about the alien crewman 20 who remained in the United States unlawfully 21 2.2 because he was still here.

And that's also how this works in the law of trespass, which I think is really important here because it has the same pairing,

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to enter land or remain on land without 1 2 permission. And the "remaining" prong for 3 trespass is a continuing trespass. It's telling you that if you're on somebody's else's 4 5 land without their permission, it doesn't matter how -- how you got there, how long 6 7 you've been there; you're under a continuing 8 obligation to leave.

9 And I think the -- the right way to 10 understand the -- the -- the Taylor formulation 11 and -- and really what's happening in these 12 state laws is -- is aligning their burglary law with trespass. So that there's a trespasser in 13 14 your house or some other building or other structure like that, and they have the intent 15 to commit the crime, that's what burglary is. 16 17 And then I think another important point about the text here, right, is --18 19 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Tripp, the -- the 20 formulation that Taylor used, and I agree it 21 tends to support your position, but, I mean, 22 nobody could think that the person who was

23 writing the Taylor opinion had this issue in

24 mind at that point.

25

So it's one of these things of how do

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we read our own opinions and do we read them 1 2 like statutes or do we read them a little bit differently, understanding what was and what 3 wasn't in the mind of the Court at that time? 4 MR. TRIPP: Right. And -- and I think 5 6 an -- an important part is the next piece that 7 I was about to get to where it says that --8 that -- the statutes just need to have these basic elements and that it doesn't matter how 9 10 exactly they are defined and labeled. 11 And so I think what it tells you is 12 that when there's variation among the states, 13 right -- Congress was trying to cast a broad 14 net. It was trying to pick up burglary statutes, the typical range of variation. 15 And so when there's variation among the states 16 about how do you define the "remaining" prong 17 in their burglary statute and how long does it 18 19 last, how does it interact with the "intent" 20 prong in their burglary statute, it's still a burglary statute. It -- it doesn't matter for 21 22 purposes of Taylor. It's just too far down in 23 the weeds.

24 And I think --

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But then what do

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we do with the common law that has informed us? 1 2 And I do understand that in -- in Taylor we were very clear that the -- burglary had 3 evolved from the common law in -- in dramatic 4 ways, including the fact that most of the time 5 burglary was limited to dwellings, and in more 6 7 recent generations, it has expanded to a 8 break-in to any structure that people own. 9 But, still, your definition, your 10 reading would be Congress intended to sweep in 11 every statute that called itself burglary? 12 MR. TRIPP: It -- it --13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Basically that's 14 you're -- you're -- what you're saying. They weren't looking at the common law. They 15 weren't looking at the majority of states, 16 17 which were -- who defined it as just "entering 18 in." 19 When they previously used the word 20 "surreptitiously," they were talking about -they were thinking about everybody who remains 21 22 without permission, even if they're not there 23 surreptitiously. 24 MR. TRIPP: So I -- I -- I think there 25 is a lot packed in there. A -- a couple

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1 responses.

2	I mean, I think what Congress was
3	trying to pick up was the typical range of
4	burglary statutes in the states. And
5	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why isn't the
6	typical the majority, the ones where "entering
7	in"?
8	MR. TRIPP: So the typical, even in
9	1986, most states had remaining-in burglary.
10	The 29 states had it. That's undisputed.
11	JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well
12	MR. TRIPP: Most of them, 27 of them,
13	it was almost verbatim
14	JUSTICE GORSUCH: If if I might on
15	that, just to interrupt, I'm sorry, but just
16	just to get the playing field right, we have
17	the 29, but then we have, I believe, about six
18	where we have subsequent judicial decisions
19	indicating that it required intent upon entry,
20	some of which were later overturned by
21	legislatures or whatever.
22	And you're asking us to not pay
23	attention to those six and use 29 rather than,
24	I think it's 23, something like that. I might
25	have my numbers not quite right, but it's

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1 slightly under half.

2	And you asked us to ignore those
3	subsequent decisions because they came after
4	1986. But we usually look at statutes and
5	and and say judicial, later judicial
6	decisions we're interpreting as they were
7	written at the time, retroactively, and that
8	they're not pieces of legislation that have
9	prospective effects.
10	So I'm not sure why we would ignore
11	those six or whatever number of cases it would
12	be and take us down to 23 rather than 29.
13	So I'm sorry for interrupting, but if
14	the premise of the entire discussion is it's
15	29, I guess I need some help on
16	MR. TRIPP: So
17	JUSTICE GORSUCH: whether that's
18	the case.
19	MR. TRIPP: I think the answers
20	sort of all get to the same place, and and
21	and that I think really our position is no
22	matter how you look at this and how far you
23	dig, you're going to get to the same answer.
24	Right?
25	So Taylor's formulation is

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JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, I'm confident 1 2 the government wants to win this case no matter 3 what. (Laughter.) 4 MR. TRIPP: No, if I -- If I could --5 if I could just walk you through --6 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: But if you could 8 walk through 29 --9 MR. TRIPP: Yeah. 10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- versus 23, and 11 why I should pay attention to one number rather 12 than the other. 13 MR. TRIPP: So -- so just -- the Taylor formulation is enter or remain. 14 15 Twenty-nine states had remaining-in burglary, and the overwhelming majority of them were 16 17 almost verbatim that formulation, just enter or 18 remain, right, that's what they were saying. 19 This is just what it means to remain in a 20 place. Right? And so then if you were trying to 21 22 figure out what is it the states were doing, 23 again, I think the first place you would look 24 is their statutes. Their statutes just say 25 "remain."

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If you look at their judicial 1 2 decisions in 1986, or imagine your Congress 3 drafting this statute, literally every single judicial opinion that has ever -- every single 4 state that has ever resolved this timing 5 question has read "remain" to mean remain, to 6 7 -- to -- read it literally to cover the entire 8 time that you are trespassing. 9 I mean, I -- I just think that the --10 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Maybe you could get 11 to my question at some point. 12 MR. TRIPP: Right, and --13 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Which is why should 14 I ignore those later judicial decisions? I quess I'm just looking for a reason why. 15 MR. TRIPP: I -- I quess, we're -- I'm 16 17 not trying to count -- so we're trying to put 18 -- put two -- two different figures. I'm trying to -- to understand sort of two 19 different points in time. 20 One is: What was Congress thinking in 21 22 1986? And I think if you're just trying to 23 approach this from the perspective of a 24 legislator who is trying to understand what 25 this is in 1986, the answer is the state of the

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1 law in 1986.

2	The other thing that we're looking to,
3	just in this conversation, is: What would the
4	effect of adopting Petitioner's ruling be? And
5	there we have to look to the change in the law.
6	Right? And and I think they they
7	recognize this.
8	But today the number is that there is
9	18 states that have that read "remain" to
10	to mean remain, either in their case law or
11	with statutes that have adopted that rule, and
12	those states have a population of 130 million
13	people.
14	We're talking about tossing out an
15	enormous number of burglary prosecutions. And
16	I really want to emphasize how much this would
16 17	I really want to emphasize how much this would be the tail wagging the dog.
17	be the tail wagging the dog.
17 18	be the tail wagging the dog. And in in response to Justice
17 18 19	be the tail wagging the dog. And in in response to Justice Kavanaugh's question, I mean, this is very
17 18 19 20	be the tail wagging the dog. And in in response to Justice Kavanaugh's question, I mean, this is very clearly, I think if you look at these cases
17 18 19 20 21	be the tail wagging the dog. And in in response to Justice Kavanaugh's question, I mean, this is very clearly, I think if you look at these cases JUSTICE GORSUCH: You you just
17 18 19 20 21 22	<pre>be the tail wagging the dog.</pre>

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1 decisions normally operate retroactively? 2 MR. TRIPP: I agree with you that, yeah, that -- that ordinarily we understand the 3 judicial opinions here to -- to reflect the 4 state of the law as it existed at the time. 5 I'm just trying to --6 7 JUSTICE GORSUCH: How -- and I guess 8 I'm just on a totally different tangent. We had some conversation last term in Stitt and 9 10 Sims about how we approach these cases 11 generally. 12 And I guess I'm wondering whether the government's given any further thought to that? 13 14 This approach of counting up states and -- and 15 then asking whether this statute matches the platonic ideal of burglary in 1986, according 16 17 to, however, 50-state survey, it's not very popular with lower courts, to say the least, 18 19 and it's not easy to do. 20 And it's -- and it -- one might also 21 ask whether it's fair to -- whether it puts 22 anybody on fair notice what -- what their 23 conduct is, if it is later dependent upon this 24 mathematical exercise. 25 MR. TRIPP: So --

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1 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Has the government 2 considered about whether we should consider 3 whether the states, if they call some things burglary, whether that should be dispositive, 4 5 for example? MR. TRIPP: To -- to my knowledge, we 6 7 haven't changed our position on -- on -- or 8 adopted any sort of new thing on that. 9 But I -- I would say I think this case 10 is honestly an opportunity to try to simplify 11 things, that what you can just say here is that 12 the Taylor formulation, it means what it says, right, that -- that enter or remain, that's 13 14 good enough, that it doesn't matter how exactly the states define these things. 15 And there's disagreement among the 16 17 states on all kinds of other subsidiary issues. What constitutes -- what makes your 18 Right? presence unprivileged, whether it extends to 19 20 the whole building or only part of it? What 21 exactly constitutes an entry? 2.2 And Petitioner has given you no 23 logical stopping point. 24 And the reason is because they're 25 already way past it. Right? Taylor says that

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1 the -- the disagreement among the states about 2 how to interpret these -- these different 3 elements, it just doesn't matter. There is still burglary statutes. 4 5 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Taylor says --MR. TRIPP: And I think that's really 6 7 the heart, the heart of our submission here, 8 that this is just too far down in the weeds. 9 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Taylor said 10 "substantially" corresponds, not "exactly" 11 corresponds. 12 MR. TRIPP: Right. Right. And --13 and, again, if Congress had an extremely 14 specific, you know, and especially this -- this interpretation, an -- an idiosyncratic and 15 arcane and honestly pretty novel understanding 16 17 of remaining that reflects no dictionary definition of the term, that -- that Congress 18 19 would have provided that --20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, there's 21 _ _ 2.2 MR. TRIPP: -- definition. Tt. 23 wouldn't have just said burglary. 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It can't be 25 idiosyncratic because a number of states have

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1 accepted it. As of 1986, you had a number of 2 states who read it that way. 3 MR. TRIPP: I -- I --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You have the 4 5 common law understanding that it was entry only and not remaining in. 6 7 You have the use of "surreptitious" as 8 a definition prior to this statute, which also has a -- a sense of, that you're surreptitious, 9 10 that you're remaining in with the intent to do something because you're hiding from being 11 12 found to do something. 13 So I -- I -- I'm not sure how you call 14 it idiosyncratic. MR. TRIPP: So I -- I -- I -- I 15 16 think it is idiosyncratic. Today it's still very much the minority position in this timing 17 rule. As of 1986 we think the number was zero, 18 19 that exactly zero states had adopted the timing 20 rule Petitioner is -- is advocating. 21 And I -- I also just wanted to -- to 22 sort of take a step back and emphasize that, 23 you know, the reason Congress, as Taylor says, 24 Congress was focused on modern law enforcement 25 concerns, not "arcane distinctions" that have

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little relevance to modern law enforcement 1 2 concerns. And it's harder to think of a better 3 description of this rule. I mean, you imagine being at home 4 woken at -- at night from the sound of 5 footsteps downstairs. You come downstairs and 6 7 there's an intruder in your house who's is 8 stealing your television or, worse, is like 9 intent on assaulting you. I just don't think anybody would care 10 in that situation or -- or know whether the 11 12 intruder developed that intent three seconds 13 before or three seconds after breaking in. 14 The timing just doesn't matter. What matters is there is an intruder in your house 15 who's bent on stealing your television or -- or 16 17 assaulting you. 18 I think the same -- another very 19 powerful illustration of this --20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you think that it's a different reaction if you hear someone 21 2.2 downstairs and they are in your pantry and you 23 come down and they are stuffing their face with 24 food, do you think you're going to have the 25 same reaction to that person than you had to

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1 the person walking away with your TV? 2 MR. TRIPP: I -- I -- I think --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Or somebody 3 walking out of your house, you see they're 4 5 empty-handed, except they have a coat on now. They're clearly homeless. They're disheveled. 6 7 They're unclean. 8 Do you think your reaction's going to 9 be the same to the person stealing your TV? 10 MR. TRIPP: I -- I -- I think that 11 your reaction to those different situations --12 those different situations would be very different, but it would -- it doesn't depend on 13 14 the timing rule. It depends on the underlying 15 facts. 16 JUSTICE GORSUCH: I -- I quess --17 MR. TRIPP: And I think the best 18 illustration of this --JUSTICE GORSUCH: I guess, I'm -- I'm 19 20 sorry to interrupt, but -- again, but I -- I'm 21 stuck on a little something differently. I 22 would probably react badly to all of them 23 myself. 24 (Laughter.) 25 JUSTICE GORSUCH: But I quess I'm

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wondering, though, those other crimes are bad, 1 2 too. Nobody is here to defend entering without 3 intent and then committing a crime with intent No -- nobody thinks that's a good 4 later. 5 thing. But the question is whether it was 6 7 burglary. And burglary is a very specific 8 crime. And at common law it did require intent 9 _ _ 10 MR. TRIPP: Right. 11 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- upon entry. So 12 calling it some arcane thing that is nuanced to a point where nobody cares is like asking us to 13 14 ignore a thousand years worth of law. 15 MR. TRIPP: So --JUSTICE GORSUCH: And -- and -- and --16 17 and also possibly a majority of the 18 jurisdictions in 1986. And so I -- I quess 19 that just -- perhaps there's a better argument 20 _ _ 21 MR. TRIPP: So it's --2.2 JUSTICE GORSUCH: -- than that it's 23 too arcane. 24 MR. TRIPP: Just -- just -- I want to 25 be clear. We agree with the rule that the

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1 timing needs to be contemporaneous. You need 2 to have the intent while you are remaining, 3 right?

We also know that the whole point of the "remaining" prong was to eliminate the common law requirement that there be an entry, right? That's the only thing it's doing in any of these statutes is eliminating that prequirement.

10 It was part and parcel of the states 11 getting rid of the requirement that there be a 12 break-in, that it be a dwelling, that it be at night, that it be with the intent to commit a 13 14 felony. We also know that the states were not only focusing on the sort of surreptitious 15 16 remaining type fact pattern because only a tiny number of the states actually required that. 17 18 Most of them just said "remaining." And I 19 think --

20 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: The law -- the 21 law -- to pick up on Justice Kagan's question 22 from earlier, the law had sufficiently changed 23 by 1986 that the author of the opinion in 24 Taylor knew enough to put "remaining in." 25 MR. TRIPP: Yeah. And -- and it's

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1 undisputed that "remaining in" is -- is -- is
2 part of what Congress was trying to reach. And
3 I guess what I'm --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Right. But the question, Mr. Tripp, is how the intent requirement figures in that. There was no question that they -- that Taylor says and -and that the "remaining in" was by then a known feature.

10 But just as you said, the "remaining 11 in" was really an attempt to close a loophole, 12 if you will, in the entry and say, look, we have these cases that are coming up where the 13 14 person is not entering unlawfully, the -- the person -- the person is only remaining 15 16 unlawfully. And so it was an attempt to close 17 that loophole.

But then the question that I think Mr. Marwell is raising is whether the intent to close that loophole suggests that there was also a desire to really shift the historic common law understanding of when the intent needed to develop.

And he's suggesting, no, it was really just an attempt to close the small loophole but

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you shouldn't read into that some much larger
 desire to -- to -- to shift the understanding
 of intent and when it arises.

MR. TRIPP: So a couple different 4 responses to that. So, first of all, I think 5 this is actually not a very big shift because 6 7 this timing question doesn't come up very much. 8 There's still 11 states that have had remaining-in burglary on the -- on the books 9 10 for decades. The timing question is never --11 they don't have any case law on this.

12 And then as for what the states were doing, as I was saying, we know that they were 13 14 adding the "remaining" prong to eliminate the requirement that there be an entry, and we know 15 16 that they were doing more than just picking up the guy who was staying behind and hiding in a 17 store after hours who could steal things inside 18 because they -- they weren't requiring that it 19 20 be surreptitious.

21 So then to figure out what is it that 22 they were trying to do, I think really in a 23 natural way to understand that is to just read 24 the text of their statutes. They say "remain." 25 This is just what it means to remain in a

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1 place, that you remain as long as you stay. 2 If you want to dig deeper and look at the case law in the time in 1986, the case law 3 was unanimous on this timing question in favor 4 5 of reading that to just mean what it says. And -- and so I think really -- and 6 7 then again to come back, Taylor focus --8 focuses on -- it says, look, what the states 9 were trying to do here is focusing on modern 10 law enforcement concerns, right? And the concern, of course, is that there's a 11 12 trespasser in your house or some other building or other structure like that and that he's 13 14 intent on committing a crime. 15 And -- and again, I think it's really important that in many of these cases, just 16 nobody would care when the intent was formed. 17 18 The problem is that there's the -- the criminally-minded trespasser. A very powerful 19 illustration of this is the domestic violence 20 situation which we talk about in our brief, 21 2.2 which would be -- which would be burglary under 23 -- under Petitioner's rule, right? 24 If an ex-boyfriend goes to visit the 25 ex-girlfriend, she lets him in, and then they

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start to argue. She says, look, you need to 1 2 get out of here. If at that moment he intends to assault her, that's burglary under -- under 3 Petitioner's rule because he remains with 4 intent. But if he decides to assault her three 5 or four seconds later, it's not? 6 7 And just -- you know, from the 8 perspective of the victim who's being assaulted in her own home by an unwelcome visitor, just 9 10 -- what does it matter? JUSTICE BREYER: True, but we're --11 12 we're trying to figure out something about the crime in general. In general, is it more 13 14 likely to involve violence or not? So we have situation 1, where he 15 intends to commit the crime inside the house 16 either when he breaks in or when he first 17 remains. Situation 2, he doesn't form the 18 intent to commit a crime until after he first 19 breaks in or first unlawfully remains. Okay? 20 Those are the two situations. 21 2.2 I would have always thought -- I guess 23 this is only the 50th time I've asked this 24 question, but I would have always thought, you 25 know, you could look up the cases on it and get

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1 an idea, empirically. And -- and then we'd 2 have at least something to go on, even if they 3 were only appellate cases. MR. TRIPP: Yeah. 4 5 JUSTICE BREYER: Has anyone ever done 6 that? 7 MR. TRIPP: I think honestly the --8 the cases that are cited in these briefs do 9 that. And -- and they tell you, they -- they 10 paint a pretty powerful picture. I urge you to 11 read a lot of them. It's true some of them are 12 minor. 13 JUSTICE BREYER: I can only read so 14 many. 15 (Laughter.) 16 MR. TRIPP: Some of these are very 17 significant --18 JUSTICE BREYER: Can I get help from 19 my law clerks? 20 (Laughter.) 21 MR. TRIPP: Many of these are -- yeah. 22 Many of these are very significant crimes. I 23 -- I want to be clear that the -- the situation I was talking about, of somebody coming in and 24 25 then later seeing a woman inside he decides to

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1	assault, the domestic violence situation I was
2	talking about, these are not hypotheticals.
3	These are the facts of Gratton out of Alabama,
4	of DeNoyer out of South Dakota, of Fontes out
5	of Ohio. That's that's the seeing a woman
6	after you break in. The domestic violence one,
7	Braddy versus out of Florida. You know
8	and a lot of these are very, very serious
9	crimes.
10	And I think they illustrate that what
11	these people are engaged in is very erratic and
12	impulsive decision-making, right, that they've
13	they they already decided to break into
14	somebody's house, and then they make an
15	impulsive or or to be in a place where
1.6	

17 then they make a decision to -- to engage in 18 some other further conduct, I think in many 19 cases is really very, very serious.

they're not supposed to be and not leave, and

16

It's true there is some that are much more minor like -- like Gaines, the facts of that. But, again, what makes that sympathetic is not the timing; it's the -- it's a homeless guy who's cold, right? And you could have that same homeless guy, you know, in -- in Buffalo,

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it's -- it's snowing, it's very, very cold, 1 2 he's walking down the street, he looks in a window and he sees a coat, and so he -- he 3 breaks in, he grabs the coat, and he goes. 4 5 That's burglary under their rule, even though it's just equally sympathetic. What --6 7 what makes it sympathetic or not are the facts 8 of the underlying case, not the timing rule 9 that he's urging. 10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Tripp, I'm not 11 sure whether this is here nor there, but, you 12 know, some of the serious crimes that you just mentioned, and they are extremely serious, if 13 14 you went out on the street and asked a hundred people whether those assault cases are 15 16 burglary, you would get a hundred "no" answers. Does that matter? 17 18 MR. TRIPP: I -- I think the -- the 19 place where that instinct is most powerful is 20 for the domestic violence situation, where I 21 agree that that is like -- feels intuitively 2.2 different. And I think this was really what 23 drove the drafters of the Model Penal Code and 24 -- and says -- there's some language in LaFave 25 to say you shouldn't have remaining-in

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burglary, and if you do at all, it should be 1 2 surreptitious. And --- and I think really the 3 short answer is that the states didn't buy it. The states just didn't do that. They didn't 4 limit it to remain -- to surreptitious 5 remaining. The majority of them adopted 6 7 remaining statutes. Even more of them have it 8 today. 9 And so I -- I think, basically, the 10 states have recognized that there's something 11 really much more fundamental here. It -- it's 12 not about the nature of the intrusion. Tt's 13 about the fact that there is an unwelcome visitor, somebody in your home. It's about the 14 safety and security of a person in their own 15 home or in some other space like that, from an 16 unwelcome visitor who's bent on committing some 17 18 kind of crime. And I -- and I think the fact that a 19 20 lot of these are actually -- I mean, a lot of these are really very, very serious crimes, 21 2.2 when the --23 JUSTICE BREYER: In --24 MR. TRIPP: -- the timing question does 25 come up.

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1 JUSTICE BREYER: Some of them are and 2 a certain amount of them aren't. Has the Department ever thought -- you don't have to 3 answer this -- but has the Department ever 4 thought of recommending to Congress a change so 5 that instead of looking at the generic crime 6 7 where the answer is going to be sometimes yes, 8 sometimes no, there's violence, but saying look and see whether the person on the individual 9 10 occasion submitted -- committed a violent act? 11 Have you ever thought of that? And if they say 12 no, we're not going to do that? 13 MR. TRIPP: I mean, I'm sure people 14 have thought of it, but to my knowledge, the --

the Department hasn't proposed any affirmative legislation on this. I know there's legislation that's pending on the Hill about this, that -- that the Department is providing technical assistance on. But -- but, beyond that, I'm not sure I know. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: Can I --

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: -- ask the same question that I asked the other side, which is in the universe of burglaries, do you have a

MR. TRIPP: If I can --

2.2

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1 sense of how many are remaining in? 2 MR. TRIPP: I -- my sense is that it's 3 pretty rare, that -- that it's pretty few, that in the, like, overwhelming number of burglary 4 cases, you're going to have evidence of an 5 unlawful entry and then that's just how you 6 7 prove it up and that becomes the whole case. 8 And I guess actually this gets out to this idea that our reading of "remaining" makes 9 10 that prong more important than the "entry" And -- and I think really our response 11 pronq. 12 is that it doesn't matter, right, that if you 13 look at the law of trespass, it has the same 14 pairing of "to enter" or "remain." And I don't think anybody cares which 15 -- whether one of those is more important than 16 17 the other or whether many entry trespasses bleed into remaining trespasses. 18 Thev --19 they're covering the waterfront of a trespass, 20 and I think it's the same here. 21 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: And if you were to 22 lose this case, potentially all burglaries from 23 how many states would no longer be able to be 24 counted as --25 MR. TRIPP: Yeah, it -- it would be 18

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1	states and counting. So there's 18 states with
2	a population of 130 million today. There's
3	another 11 that have still haven't addressed
4	this issue. And assuming that the current
5	trends continue, probably more of them will
6	read "remain" to mean "remains."
7	JUSTICE KAGAN: May I ask you the
8	MR. TRIPP: And then
9	JUSTICE KAGAN: same question I
10	asked Mr. Marwell, which how many of those
11	states have other burglary statutes that you
12	could capture, can I say real burglary in?
13	MR. TRIPP: I prefer not the real
14	burglary, but, yeah. I think there is there
15	is there is a mix. I think ten of these
16	states have adopted this rule by statute, but I
17	don't know how much the different ones are
18	are used relative to each other.
19	But you would still be tossing out an
20	enormous number of burglary prosecutions, you
21	know, including from from Michigan, Texas,
22	some very big states.
23	And then I think another critical
24	point, again, is that is that Petitioner's
25	given you no logical stopping point, right,

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that this is -- it -- it cannot end here. 1 2 If you think that it gets at this level of specificity, then why not all the 3 other disputes about, you know, what it 4 constitutes to be unprivileged, what exactly an 5 entry is, and on and on and on. 6 7 And I think what it really gets to is 8 that --9 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right. If the 10 intent to -- if the intent to enter isn't 11 critical, how about the act of what's done once 12 inside? 13 If -- if the mens rea isn't -- if 14 that's too minor to care about, and we're going to just turn every former common law larceny 15 into a burglary, which is what you're asking us 16 17 to do in some ways, because a lot of the other conduct would be larceny, it's not like it 18 would be unpunished at common law, why should 19 20 we care about the actus reas and so why does it 21 have to be taking things to be burglary? 2.2 Couldn't it maybe also conducting a 23 fraud while they're inside? California defines 24 burglary to be almost as expansive as that. So 25 perhaps that's -- that's equally consistent

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1 with your argument logically.

2	MR. TRIPP: So it's it's equally
3	consistent with Petitioner's as well because it
4	covers any crime that's not covered. We we
5	agree that there has to be mens rea. Right?
6	You you have to to intend you have to
7	know that you're unlawfully inside the place
8	that you're on that you're trespassing.
9	And we know and we agree that you
10	need to have intent while you're doing that.
11	The the only dispute here is do you need to
12	have intent only at the initial second
13	JUSTICE GORSUCH: I understand.
14	MR. TRIPP: Of the right? That's
15	just the timing.
16	JUSTICE GORSUCH: But if that's too
17	minor to care about, then why should we care
18	about these other things, too, that were also
19	part of common law burglary?
20	MR. TRIPP: I think part of the answer
21	is that's that remains, first of all, the
22	Taylor formulation and what the the
23	overwhelming majority of states are doing.
24	They are saying that you need to unlawfully
25	enter or remain in a building or structure with

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intent to commit a crime. That's what these 1 2 statutes say. 3 I think if you flip through them you'll see that many of them are --4 5 JUSTICE GORSUCH: So it isn't that it's too minor. It comes back to counting 6 7 again. And then we're just back down to 29 8 versus 23 and we have to decide. 9 MR. TRIPP: I -- I think it's not just 10 about it being minor and it's not just about 11 counting. It's that -- I think what the states 12 have recognized is that the core of this offense are not these kind of questions from 13 14 the common law about did you break and did you enter, it's is there a trespasser in your home 15 who is intent on committing a crime? That --16 if there is, he's a burglar. Right? 17 I think that's -- that's really what the states are --18 19 are boiling it down to. That's the --20 JUSTICE GORSUCH: Any crime? 21 MR. TRIPP: -- modern offense. Anv 22 That's what Taylor says. He agrees crime. 23 with that. Petitioner would agree that if the 24 person is breaking into a house, you know, at 25 night with the intent to commit stock fraud on

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his phone, I mean, I don't know if that would 1 2 ever happen, but, yeah, that's burglary under -- under either of the rules here. 3 And I -- I quess also just to -- to 4 5 try and take one step back in response to some of the -- the -- the questions, right, if 6 7 you're going to have a categorical approach to 8 this statute that doesn't look to the facts of the individual case, you -- you need to have a 9 10 broad definition of the category. Right? 11 Otherwise, if you have a very specific 12 laundry list, a long list of things that every statute needs to match perfectly, all that 13 14 you're going to do is be knocking them out one after another, after another, until there's 15 really nothing left and -- and I think would 16 17 really defeat the purpose of Congress in including burglary among an ACCA predicate. 18 19 I guess maybe just one last point 20 I mean, the -- the statute here, this is here. 21 a home invasion statute. I think most people 2.2 would think that this is the heart of modern 23 burglary. And -- and I -- I -- I think if you 24 25 told the drafters in Congress, you know,

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imagine a person who you think should fit 1 2 within the ACCA, it would be somebody with a 3 track record that looks an awful lot like Petitioner's. 4 So if there's no further questions, 5 we're asking the Court to affirm. 6 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 8 counsel. 9 Mr. Marwell, four minutes remaining. 10 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JEREMY C. MARWELL 11 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 12 MR. MARWELL: Thank you. 13 On the bad cases that the government, 14 the facts that the government alleges, there's no dispute that those are crimes. The question 15 16 is: Are they burglary? They may be trespass. 17 They may be assault. They may be punished separately. But 18 Congress used the word "burglary." 19 And I think the reason that we're here 20 21 is that there is some incongruity between the 22 government's account of generic burglary and these cases that just don't feel like burglary. 23 24 And that's why the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh 25 Circuit, have held that Taylor is not clear on

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1 its face, doesn't resolve the issue.

2	I think it's worth reminding that less
3	than a year before Taylor, the New York Court
4	of Appeals interpreted that state's
5	remaining-in statute the way we say. That
6	statute we know from Colorado and other and
7	other states was a model for other states' laws
8	and I think it helps explain what the Court may
9	have been getting at in Taylor.
10	The government focuses heavily on
11	trespass and the fact that "remaining" has a
12	continuous sense in that law. I think that's
13	the fundamental problem with their position is
14	that they're equating trespass and burglary.
15	And we need some line, we suggest it
16	should be drawn from the common law and state
17	practice, that that distinguishes those two
18	crimes.
19	On the concern about simplicity or a
20	slippery slope, I would suggest I would
21	submit that Taylor provides you an
22	administrable and workable rule. Looking to
23	what states did in 1986 is an objective
24	foundation. It's a point in time.
25	And there isn't actually that much

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dispute between the parties about what state 1 2 law was. It's just a dispute about what 3 inferences or what conclusions to draw. If you walk away from that approach, I 4 think you're left with the difficult questions 5 of what is and what isn't risky in -- in a 6 7 particular consequence. 8 And the -- the government, I think, 9 has -- has not asked you to revisit Taylor in 10 this case. 11 As to whether this issue is a big deal, I think it is a big deal because the 12 government can just charge entry or remaining 13 14 and it essentially makes the long-standing traditional rule of intent at entry disappear 15 in all but the very small number of cases that 16 17 the government identifies, such as a fleeting 18 entry or an interrupted entry. 19 And I -- we don't see any evidence in 20 Taylor that there was intent to make that big a 21 change. 2.2 If this does become a problem, 23 obviously the Department is well positioned to 24 ask Congress to fix it. 25 And if there are no further questions,

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we would suggest that a call to simplicity doesn't justify overlooking hundreds of years under which the essence of burglary has been somebody who trespasses for the purpose of committing a crime. б CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. The case is submitted. (Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the case was submitted.)

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