1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	MARVIN GREEN, :
4	Petitioner : No. 14-613
5	v. :
6	MEGAN J. BRENNAN, :
7	POSTMASTER GENERAL. :
8	x
9	Washington, D.C.
10	Monday, November 30, 2015
11	
12	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
13	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
14	at 11:07 a.m.
15	APPEARANCES:
16	BRIAN WOLFMAN, ESQ., Stanford, Cal.; on behalf of
17	Petitioner.
18	CURTIS E. GANNON, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor
19	General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
20	behalf of Respondent.
21	CATHERINE M.A. CARROLL, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; for
22	Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the
23	judgment below.
24	
25	

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	BRIAN WOLFMAN, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	CURTIS E. GANNON, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	19
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	CATHERINE M.A. CARROLL, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Court-appointed	
11	amicus curiae in support of the judgment	
12	below	37
13	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
14	BRIAN WOLFMAN, ESQ.	
15	On behalf of the Petitioner	55
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (11:07 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 4 next in Case 14-613, Green v. Brennan. 5 Mr. Wolfman. 6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN WOLFMAN 7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 8 MR. WOLFMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 9 please the Court: 10 The basic principle of this Court's timeliness cases, Title VII and otherwise, is that the 11 12 clock starts when the cause of action is complete. 13 Because a constructive discharge claim is complete only 14 after the employee resigns, this Court should reverse. 15 The court has indicated that limitations 16 principles should be as simple as possible. The Tenth 17 Circuit's rule, however, injects unnecessary complexity. Identifying the last discriminatory act in an alleged 18 19 hostile work environment can be difficult. 20 And as this Court said in early --21 JUSTICE SCALIA: What does the statute say? 22 Can we look at the statute? What's it -- what does the 23 statute say? 24 MR. WOLFMAN: The statute says matter -aggrieved party has to bring within 45 days the matter 25

1 alleged to be discriminatory. 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: The matter alleged to be 3 discriminatory. And is the resignation of -- of the 4 employee a matter alleged to be discriminatory? 5 MR. WOLFMAN: Absolutely, Your Honor. The 6 matter --7 JUSTICE SCALIA: The employee discriminated against himself? 8 9 MR. WOLFMAN: No. The matter -- the matter alleged is the whole of the claim. As the dictionaries 10 11 say, and as most of the lower courts say, the matter is 12 just a shorthanded way of referring to the cause of 13 action that the -- the person is bringing. 14 Here, the matter -- and this is 15 undisputed -- is a constructive discharge which, as this Court said in Suders, has two elements, both the 16 17 precipitating conduct and the resignation. Without 18 both, there is no constructive discharge claim. 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But for a constructive 20 discharge claim to succeed you have to point to a discriminatory or an unlawful act. 21 22 MR. WOLFMAN: It is true that --23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And so we have to find 24 this anyway. 25 MR. WOLFMAN: It is true that that is one

Alderson Reporting Company

1 component. There is no question that there are going to 2 be -- again, Suders said there would be both 3 precipitating conduct and the resignation; both elements 4 must be present for there to be constructive discharge. 5 But -- but let's assume for a second that 6 the -- that the -- the matter alleged to be 7 discriminatory is ambiguous in some sense. Then the 8 court should just go to its time-honored default rule. 9 Default rule is that the cause of action must be fully formed before the limitations period is triggered. 10 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course. That's -- that 12 rule is adopted for statutes that do not have a 13 conciliation provision. What use is the conciliation 14 provision once the employee has guit? 15 MR. WOLFMAN: I -- I think not, Your Honor. 16 The conciliation process always anticipates that the 17 claim will have occurred; that the acts giving rise to the claim, including all the elements, have occurred 18 before conciliation --19 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's fine, but the employer can make it up, you know. It's -- they try to 21 22 bring the employer and the employee together. 23 MR. WOLFMAN: That is true. 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right? 25 MR. WOLFMAN: But only --

Alderson Reporting Company

JUSTICE SCALIA: But he's quit. He's gone.
He's no longer an employee. What conciliation can there
be?

MR. WOLFMAN: Your Honor, that is true for any of the acts that could be brought prior to the 45-day trigger. For instance, a termination would fit exactly the scenario you're suggesting, a termination which, after all, is the analogue to the constructive discharge. That claim cannot be brought into the conciliation process until it exists.

11 So it's just the first component of the 12 process -- what you're referring to, Your Honor, as 13 conciliation -- moves quickly into a more adversarial 14 stages, and all of those stages presuppose that there is 15 a cause of action that exists, or a claim that exists. 16 And again, that's quite consistent with this 17 Court's default rule that -- that the limitations period

18 is -- is not triggered until the claim is fully formed.
19 And that's perfectly consistent with all of this Court's
20 Title VII timeliness cases.

If you look at, for instance, Evans, if you look at Ricks. At Ricks there was a fully formed cause of action, and that's why the limitations period was triggered, because the limitations period was triggered by the denial of tenure.

Alderson Reporting Company

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I somehow feel 2 you've given up too much. You can charge a 3 discriminatory termination, correct? And that's the 4 employer making a decision that he is going to fire you 5 for reasons that are not legitimate; they're 6 discriminatory. 7 Isn't a constructive discharge that the moment that the environment has gotten so hostile that 8 9 you feel overwhelmed and have to leave, isn't that the 10 discriminatory act as well? MR. WOLFMAN: Yes. I think --11 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So that that discharge 13 itself is discriminatory because it -- the employer has 14 proceeded in a pattern that has led you to that 15 decision? MR. WOLFMAN: That's exactly right. And I 16 17 did not mean to be retreating from that position at all. 18 That's the two elements of the claim. So the resignation is part and parcel of the claim. You have 19 20 the precipitating conduct, and you have the resignation. 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's what I'm saying. 22 I don't think -- I think it's --23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well --24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You keep talking about it as two separate elements. 25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 MR. WOLFMAN: Well, there are separate 2 elements but when the resignation occurs, the -- the 3 claim is imputed to the employer. 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's the 5 precipitating --6 MR. WOLFMAN: It's imputed to the employer. 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: They're -- they're not 8 always the same at the same point. The employer could 9 have been discriminating against this employee for years, and -- and there's no additional discrimination 10 11 for an entire year. But the employee has finally gotten 12 fed up with it, and after a year, during which the 13 employer has done nothing else discriminatory, he 14 decides I'm going to guit. Now he'd still have a claim for, you know, discriminatory provoking of -- of the 15 quitting, but the -- but the time period for the 16 17 discrimination and the time period for the quitting are a year apart. 18 19 MR. WOLFMAN: Well, that's certainly 20 possible, but again, that would -- that would be the 21 case in many situations. 22 So, for instance, let's assume for a second 23 that there had been a discriminatory demotion on day 24 one, and then a year later there has been a discriminatory termination with perhaps the exact same 25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 motive. No one disputes that both of those claims are 2 independently actionable, and no one disputes that their 3 limitations periods have a different trigger date. 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: It is an act of the 5 employer, and quitting is not an act of the employer. 6 The act of the employer -- the unlawful act of the 7 employer is coercing the quitting. So you have to find an act on his part that coerces the quitting. 8 That's 9 quite different from the employer discharging the 10 person --11 MR. WOLFMAN: There are --12 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- for discriminatory --13 MR. WOLFMAN: -- are some differences, but 14 the point is that the resignation, at the point of 15 resignation, when the cause of action accrues -- and no one here disputes that's when the cause of action 16 accrues -- that conduct is imputed to the employer. 17 18 And it's not simply in the that's not --19 that's what this Court said in Suders, but it's not 20 simply --21 JUSTICE SCALIA: For purpose of remedy, yes, it is. It's --22 23 MR. WOLFMAN: Not simply for purposes of 24 remedy. A cause of action for constructive discharge will be dismissed if the person is still on the job and 25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 has not resigned. 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Wolfman --3 MR. WOLFMAN: This is part of the 4 affirmative case. 5 JUSTICE KAGAN: If -- you might be pulled in 6 two different directions here but you don't have to 7 accept what Justice Sotomayor is saying to win this case; isn't that right? 8 9 In other words, one could say, yes, if you 10 had discriminatory acts language, that might point to 11 the last predicate discriminatory act as opposed to the 12 resignation, it might or it might not, but here that 13 language doesn't exist. Here the language is 14 discriminatory matter. That refers to the entire claim. 15 And when you refer to the entire claim, it's clear that 16 the resignation is part and parcel of that. 17 MR. WOLFMAN: That is right. I mean, we --18 JUSTICE KAGAN: And it at least creates 19 ambiguity, such that the default rule would operate. 20 MR. WOLFMAN: That -- that --21 JUSTICE KAGAN: So you don't have not to go 22 to that --23 MR. WOLFMAN: I think that is true, that we have argued this in two alternative ways. One is simply 24 25 that the cause of action is not complete until there's a

Alderson Reporting Company

1 resignation. And we think the regulation is clear, but
2 even if it were not clear, the default rule kicks in and
3 we win.

4 But there's no question also that one of the 5 premises of the constructive discharge, constructive 6 eviction, constructive termination as in the Mac's Shell 7 case, there is no question that there is this idea that when the relationship is ended, that is imputed to the 8 9 employer. Some courts have focused more on that 10 rationale, and others have focused more on our principal 11 rationale, which is simply that the cause of action is 12 not complete until the resignation occurs.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why doesn't that mean that it's within the employee's ability to stretch out the time that he has? Plus there could have been all this discrimination and the employee stays on the job, and then sometime down the road decides to quit.

MR. WOLFMAN: Well, I think -- I think that 18 is a concern in theory but not in practice. In -- in 19 reality, there are no such claims. The claims would be 20 21 so weak that those constructive discharge claims are not 22 brought, and amicus cites no claims of that nature. 23 And let me just say that in this case --24 Court's decision in Bay Area Laundry, which applied the default rule, the same -- the same concern was raised 25

Alderson Reporting Company

that the limitations period, the trigger, would be within the hands of the plaintiff. And the Court said, well, that may be so, but that's the way the statute was written, the limitations period was written, and so be it.

And the Court also added that the plaintiff would have incentives to bring the claim as soon as possible, and that would, of course, be true here. It -- if in fact the person could no longer take it, they would want to leave. They certainly wouldn't want to bring a weak claim that came years after the precipitating conduct. That --

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, not -- not 14 years but maybe several months. I mean, you know, yes, 15 you can't take it anymore, but maybe you also need a 16 paycheck or -- or, you know, you're going to be eligible 17 for the bonus in six weeks, you may as well at least 18 wait until then.

MR. WOLFMAN: That is possible. There are -- most cases, most of the constructive discharge cases are bought -- brought promptly. Again, no one has suggested here -- and there are many constructive discharge cases in the courts that there have been any significant delay.

25 JUSTICE ALITO: May I follow up on

Alderson Reporting Company

1 Justice Kagan's question? You were discussing the 2 possibility of deciding this case based on the 3 particular language of the regulation that applies here, 4 but your question presented is phrased much more 5 broadly. 6 You say under Federal employment 7 discrimination law, so I took that to mean that the rule that you're advocating would be the same for public and 8 9 private sector employment. 10 MR. WOLFMAN: I think it would be, Your Honor, and I think so. I think this -- this Court's 11 12 decision would apply there, or at least give significant 13 guidance. The private sector --14 JUSTICE ALITO: But there is -- this matter alleged to be discriminatory applies only to Federal 15 16 employment. 17 MR. WOLFMAN: That is correct, but if I 18 might -- if I might extend my answer. The -- the private sector statute talks about an unlawful 19 20 employment of practice occurring. And again, in light of the default rule, even if there's ambiguity in -- in 21 22 that phraseology, in light of the default rule, I think 23 it's very likely that you're going to have the same rule 24 apply in both situations. 25 Both of them seem to be describing the

Alderson Reporting Company

claim, the cause of action, what it is that the employee 1 2 is complaining about. 3 JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't it true that outside 4 of the area of constructive discharge -- and maybe 5 constructive discharge is different, and I think that's 6 really the thrust of your argument. But outside of that 7 situation there must be an act of intentional discrimination within the limitations period. 8

9 MR. WOLFMAN: Well, that is likely correct, 10 if by that you are rejecting the notion -- again, in my 11 discussion with Justice Sotomayor -- that the 12 resignation is imputed to the employer. And that is --13 that is the case, Your Honor --

JUSTICE ALITO: Yeah, but you're arguing that there's -- because there's this imputation, it's different for constructive discharge.

17 MR. WOLFMAN: Right.

JUSTICE ALITO: But my -- my question is outside of that context, under Evans and Ricks and Morgan and Ledbetter, there must be an act of intentional discrimination within the limitations period.

23 MR. WOLFMAN: Yes, Your Honor. But let's be 24 clear about what those cases stand for. Those cases do 25 reflect the facts as you just stated them. But in each

Alderson Reporting Company

of those cases, the trigger date was when the claim first became actionable, and that's the exact same rule we're asking for here.

4 And let me again extend my answer to you, 5 Justice Alito, which it is true that constructive 6 discharge could be unique in the sense you're suggesting 7 in the Title VII case, in the Title VII area. But let's remember that constructive eviction, constructive 8 9 business termination are treated the exact same way. 10 Your Honor, I -- I do want to go back to 11 some of the practical implications. As I -- as I began 12 saying, the Tenth Circuit rule would inject unnecessary 13 complexity. By contrast, the date of resignation is 14 easy to identify. Most administrative claimants are 15 laypeople and are unlikely to be cognizant of the 16 last-act rule posited by the Tenth Circuit.

17 Reasonable intuition; that is, common sense, 18 will tell an employee that I cannot and certainly need 19 not bring my claim that I was forced out before I was 20 actually forced out.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but I think 22 the government suggests that this is exactly a case 23 where it's not so easy to figure out when the 24 constructive termination was.

25 MR. WOLFMAN: Well, when the resignation

Alderson Reporting Company

1 occurred? 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: When the resignation 3 occurred. MR. WOLFMAN: Well, let me just say, Your 4 5 Honor, on that score, no one disputed that issue below, 6 and --7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that doesn't 8 mean it was easy or -- or hard. 9 MR. WOLFMAN: No, Your Honor, I think it 10 does mean it was easy. Every -- the -- all the parties below, the administrative decisionmaker below, and the 11 12 Tenth Circuit below all held that -- that -- all 13 indicated that my client resigned on -- on February --14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you know that 15 the case -- you know, someone says this is ridiculous, I can't take it anymore, I will resign in three months. I 16 mean, what is the date of constructive termination then? 17 18 MR. WOLFMAN: Well, our rule is that definitive notice of resignation. I think the 19 20 government agrees with that. And so if you hand in a letter or you state I am going to resign on Friday or 21 22 next Monday, that the trigger date would be the date --23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No. He says -- I -- I 24 interpreted the Chief Justice's question, maybe wrongly, suppose he says in his own mind I can't take it anymore, 25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 three months from now I'm going to resign. 2 MR. WOLFMAN: I think the trigger date would 3 be that date. If he --4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: When he resigns? 5 MR. WOLFMAN: If he give notice --6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: When he resigns? 7 MR. WOLFMAN: His resignation is the -- the 8 date that he says that because that's the date he gave 9 definitive notice --10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, no. The date that he 11 says it to himself or the date that he does resign? 12 MR. WOLFMAN: Oh. Was the Chief Justice 13 positing something going on in the mind of the -- of the 14 plaintiff? 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, no. It's -it's, you know, I think it's fairly common for people to 16 17 set a resignation date at some point in the future. You know, a schoolteacher will say as soon as this school 18 year is over, I'm out of here. 19 20 MR. WOLFMAN: I think the date of resignation is the date the teacher says that. 21 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Then no --23 JUSTICE SCALIA: There's no cause of action 24 yet. JUSTICE GINSBURG: You mean --25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: There's no cause -- you've 2 been -- you've been arguing to us you can't have the 3 statute running until there's a cause of action. 4 MR. WOLFMAN: There is a cause of action 5 because there's been a resignation, definitive notice of 6 resignation. It's true that the person is still on the 7 job --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: He's still getting paid. 9 MR. WOLFMAN: That is correct, but -- but 10 the person has resigned. And the lower courts --11 JUSTICE SCALIA: He hasn't resigned. He's given notice of his intention to resign three months 12 13 from now. 14 MR. WOLFMAN: I don't believe -- if the -if the Court wishes to adopt a -- a last-day-of-work 15 16 rule, that obviously would benefit --17 JUSTICE SCALIA: No --18 MR. WOLFMAN: -- I'm fine. 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- I'm just adopting the 20 rule of what he says. If he says I resign, he's 21 resigned. If he says I will resign in three months, he 22 doesn't resign until three months. 23 MR. WOLFMAN: We believe that when someone, 24 for instance, hands in a letter and said, my last day of work -- I resign, my last day of work will be Friday, 25

1 that that constitutes a resignation, and that our rule 2 is definitive date of resignation. 3 If the Court wishes, again, to adopt the last-date-of -- of-work rule, that would obviously 4 5 benefit my client but it is not necessary. 6 I would like to reserve the balance of my 7 time. 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 9 Mr. Gannon. ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON 10 11 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT 12 MR. GANNON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 13 please the Court: 14 We agree with petitioner that the period for 15 initiating administrative consideration of a constructive-discharge claim should begin when the 16 17 employee gives notice of resignation and not when the 18 employer commits the last act which might or might not 19 lead to that resignation. 20 And if I can turn to the colloquy that the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia were just having with 21 22 my friend, we think that one of the virtues of this rule 23 is that it -- it leads to the same result in both cases 24 of actual termination and cases of constructive termination. 25

Alderson Reporting Company

	2
1	JUSTICE ALITO: Why don't you change why
2	don't you just amend the regulation?
3	MR. GANNON: Well, we think
4	JUSTICE ALITO: We're interpreting the
5	language it's not even a statute. It's a regulation.
6	It's your regulation.
7	MR. GANNON: It is
8	JUSTICE ALITO: Why don't you just amend it
9	to make it clear? You think this is a sensible rule, it
10	is a very clear rule. And it's probably a sensible rule
11	when you've got a 45-day period.
12	Why don't you just change the regulation?
13	Why
14	MR. GANNON: The EEOC
15	JUSTICE ALITO: this elaborate
16	litigation.
17	MR. GANNON: The EEOC may well do that,
18	Justice Alito. The same question is going to present
19	itself with respect to we think materially the same
20	question presents itself in the non-Federal sector where
21	the statute, as has already been discussed, refers to
22	when the allegedly unlawful employment practice
23	occurred. And the EEOC has construed this portion of
24	the regulation as being effectively the same as the rule
25	in the non-Federal sector.

	-
1	And the rule that we're asking for is this
2	Court's rule from Ricks. It's the exact same rule.
3	This rule about being when definitive notice has
4	is is given for a termination, Justice Scalia, you
5	were saying that when somebody says I quit, my last day
6	of work is three months from now, therefore, he hasn't
7	actually quit, that's Ricks.
8	The Court concluded that when the employer
9	there said you have been denied tenure, here is your
10	terminal contract, you will be working here for only one
11	more year, that the relevant date was the date on which
12	the operative decision had been made and it had been
13	communicated to the employee. And so we think that the
14	rule should be the same for cases of actual discharge
15	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But Ricks
16	MR. GANNON: and constructive discharge.
17	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Ricks alleged only
18	discrimination, not discriminatory not constructive
19	discharge.
20	MR. GANNON: That's true. There is a
21	difference here.
22	JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's why I have a
23	problem with Ricks.
24	MR. GANNON: Well
25	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, I don't think

21

Ricks reads directly on what you're saying. You -- you want to have an extension. MR. GANNON: We're trying to say that we think that the same rule should apply to actual and constructive discharges, and -- and it is a rule that is

date of notification rather than date of separation.
And that's the rule that everybody applies on the
termination side; it's the rule that most of the courts
of appeals have applied in the -- in the discharge side.
In the context of terminations, only
Justice Stevens suggested we should be using the actual

12 date of separation --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But again, as Justice Scalia points out, there's a difference between the employee taking the action and the -- and the employer taking the action --

MR. GANNON: We agree that that -JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- and that distinguishes
Ricks.

20 MR. GANNON: That does -- that does make 21 this case different. That's why this isn't on all fours 22 with Ricks. And we do think that you would have to make 23 the decision that you want to apply the same rule across 24 to the constructive discharge context. But we think the 25 reason you would do that is precisely because, as the

Alderson Reporting Company

1	Court acknowledged in Suders, a constructive discharge
2	requires both an employee's decision to resign and the
3	precipitating conduct. And until both of those things
4	have happened, there is no constructive discharge.
5	Nobody can say I have been constructively discharged
6	until both of those things
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: It seems to me you're
8	you're loading the dice when when you say it requires
9	both a decision to resign.
10	MR. GANNON: Well, the
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: It it requires a
12	resignation.
13	MR. GANNON: Well, I would just
14	JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, that's that's
15	the problem.
16	MR. GANNON: I was just quoting the Court's
17	decision in Suders, Justice Scalia.
18	JUSTICE SCALIA: No, we weren't discussing
19	this very issue.
20	MR. GANNON: Well, we were discussing the
21	Court was discussing when a constructive discharge was
22	actionable, and that until and so we do think it's
23	not just the decision in the employee's head. We think
24	that the decision has to actually be communicated.
25	And so we this is one reason why actually

23

this isn't -- this wouldn't interfere as much with the concern for counseling and conciliation that you were discussing with my friend, which is that, as in cases of termination, it could be that everybody knows that the discharge has happened -- it's a constructive discharge or an actual discharge.

7 Everybody knows when the employer says, 8 you're fired, your last day of work is 14 days from 9 today, same thing when the employee says I'm giving my 10 notice, I quit, my last day is 14 days from today. At 11 that point, whichever one has happened, the employee can 12 go and initiate counseling. He may not be out the door 13 yet. There may be a resolution that happens. If he 14 does end up going out the door, counseling can happen afterwards. But he doesn't have to initiate counseling 15 16 before this happens. There's a 45-day --17 JUSTICE SCALIA: He doesn't even have to

18 tell the employer why he's resigning.

19 MR. GANNON: That's -- that's --

JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, all the employer knows is you're -- you're leaving at the end of this term of -- of school.

23 MR. GANNON: And --

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Or you're leaving in three 25 months. That's all the employer knows.

24

1 MR. GANNON: And in our view, when -- when 2 -- once he's given notice, I'm leaving in three months, 3 he then has 45 days to initiate the counseling with --4 with the agency counselor. 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: He doesn't even have to 6 specify in his notice of quitting that he is quitting 7 because of discriminatory action. He doesn't even have 8 to specify that. 9 MR. GANNON: That -- that is generally true in the rest of the doctrine. That has nothing to do 10 with the statute of limitations. The EEOC will ask did 11 you tell your employer this is why you were resigning. 12 13 It will be something that will make it more difficult to 14 prove his case. But we --15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I think whether he has to 16 say that or not has a lot to do with -- with when the 17 effective date ought to be, it seems to me. MR. GANNON: Well, we think that the reason 18 19 that this counts as being an act that should be imputed 20 to the employer is because it is forced by the 21 circumstances. 22 And we think that the doctrine itself is 23 self-limiting. It limits the time period between when 24 the employee is able to suffer the consequence of what the employer does to him, and then actually say I can't 25

1 take this anymore, because as the Court held in Suders, 2 the employee is going to have to prove that the 3 situation was intolerable, but he can --4 JUSTICE SCALIA: But he doesn't have to say 5 that. 6 MR. GANNON: He doesn't have to say that --7 JUSTICE SCALIA: He doesn't have to say I 8 can't take this anymore --9 MR. GANNON: -- on the day --10 JUSTICE SCALIA: He just has to quit or say 11 I'm quitting at the end of this term of school, and then 12 later say, oh, the reason I quit was it was I just 13 couldn't take it anymore. 14 MR. GANNON: And he has to do that within 45 days. 15 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Within 45 days after --17 after when? 18 MR. GANNON: After the date --19 JUSTICE SCALIA: After his giving the 20 notice. MR. GANNON: After the date of notification. 21 22 Just as, like -- as I was saying before, just as if it 23 were when the employer said, you're fired, your last day 24 of work is two weeks from today. The clock is ticking. That's the rule from Ricks. We think it should be the 25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 same rule here, and we think that the reason why this is 2 called a constructive discharge is -- is right there in 3 the phrase is -- is pregnant with the idea that this is 4 an action that is being imputed to the employer. 5 And so although it is true that, unlike the 6 regular -- the other claim of discrimination that 7 Justice Kennedy was mentioning before in Ricks, although 8 the employer has not actually done something necessarily 9 during the limitations period, the new act of discrimination that we think is relevant here is the act 10 of the employee, and it's one that it's called a 11 12 constructive discharge precisely because it is not 13 actually a discharge. It is instead an act of the 14 employee that is a resignation, but it is treated in law 15 as a legal fiction as if it is a discharge. And we 16 think that that's -- that squares the circle here. And 17 we --JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, I would -- I 18

would take the term constructive discharge to refer not to the notice of quitting, but rather to the acts of the employer that forced the quitting. Even though the person hasn't been discharged, you have constructively discharged him because you've made his life miserable. MR. GANNON: I -- I take the point, Justice Scalia, but that's not enough to allege a

Alderson Reporting Company

1 constructive discharge. Until the employee actually 2 says I'm quitting, there has not been a constructive 3 discharge. And so just because an -- and this may be 4 what Justice Sotomayor was asking about before, but 5 we --6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And that -- that works 7 the same way with eviction and other cases where you 8 have constructive, that the person has to act --MR. GANNON: That -- that's correct. And we 9 10 think the constructive eviction case is a very close parallel. And it shows that it's unusual but not 11 12 unprecedented that the plaintiff might be the one that 13 actually controls when the clock starts on the statute 14 of limitations. 15 And take the case of a constructive 16 eviction. If somebody wants to bring a claim for the 17 breach of the covenant of warranty, that's a claim that 18 doesn't start until the tenant has been evicted, either actually or constructively. And so there's some choice 19 20 there of when -- when --21 JUSTICE SCALIA: What do you mean, 22 constructively? I don't understand. Constructive of --23 can't you bring a claim of constructive eviction while you're still occupying the premises? 24 MR. GANNON: The -- it -- that's -- that's 25

28

1 one version of constructive eviction. Under the -under the more classical version of constructive 2 3 eviction that came up in cases involving breach of the 4 covenant of warranty, the eviction would be constructive 5 because no one actually came and forced you out. 6 Instead, you just yielded to a superior claim of 7 paramount title, and that was your choice of when you decided you weren't going to fight this anymore. 8 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: But in fact you don't have 10 to get out. I think --11 MR. GANNON: In fact you had not yet --12 JUSTICE SCALIA: You can bring -- you can 13 bring a claim against your landlord for constructive 14 eviction while you're still occupying the premises. 15 MR. GANNON: Well, the Court recognized in the Mac's Shell decision that's more of an innovation 16 17 that -- that it wasn't the way this was classically 18 handled. And -- and in Mac's Shell said that it thought 19 that there wasn't a constructive termination of a 20 franchise until the franchise had actually -- until somebody had actually walked out and allegized it to 21 22 both the classical cases of constructive eviction, and 23 this case of constructive discharge. 24 We think that it's clear that if the employee says this would be bad enough for me to resign 25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 but I'm not going to resign, I want to bring a claim for 2 constructive discharge, he couldn't do that. He 3 could -- he could say I've been discriminated against, 4 he could say there's been a hostile work environment, 5 but we do think, in disagreement with -- with my friend, 6 the court-appointed amicus, we do think that these are 7 two different claims. And the Court's opinion in Suders indicated 8 9 that there's a distinction between, for instance, the underlying claim for hostile work environment and then 10 the more aggravated claim of a constructive discharge 11 12 for hostile work environment. 13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Do the predicate acts have 14 to be independently actionable or not? 15 MR. GANNON: I don't think that they have to In most cases they will be. We -- we take that 16 be. 17 point as probably going to be an unusual case where you 18 can bring a constructive discharge and nothing else. 19 The paradigmatic case is the one that the 20 Court was hypothesizing in Suders where you have a hostile work environment where there are lots of things 21 22 that would have been actionable as discrimination, but 23 they wouldn't have necessarily have warranted quitting. 24 And then the employee says this is too much, it's crossed the line, I'm quitting. That second claim 25

Alderson Reporting Company

1 we think is a new claim. That's why the Court described 2 it as a second -- as an additional -- as a graver claim. And in the discussion of amending the 3 4 complaints that -- that the amicus invokes in the EEOC's 5 management directive, the reason why the court of 6 appeals and the amicus can say that the employee could 7 always just amend a timely complaint about the underlying discrimination and add a claim for 8 9 constructive discharge is because the EEOC considers this to be a new incident of discrimination. But you 10 can actually amend a pending complaint because it's 11 12 related to what went before. 13 But the reason why you have to amend the complaint is because it's a new claim. 14 It's not just 15 evidence that's relevant to damages for the underlying discrimination. There's -- there's -- the employee is 16 17 going to have to prove that he's made a decision to 18 resign, and also that the reason he did so was because 19 the situation was so intolerable that he -- he was left 20 with no other choice. But that --21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can you explain the 22 difference between your position and the Petitioner's? 23 Why do you date the constructive discharge from, what is 24 it, December 16th? 25 MR. GANNON: Yes. And so I take it you're

Alderson Reporting Company

1	you're talking about the factual question. I don't
2	understand us as have a disagreement about the legal
3	question. But with respect to applying the rule to this
4	case, the difference is that we think that the
5	settlement agreement that Petitioner signed on December
6	16th which is the relevant clauses are reprinted at
7	pages 60 and 61 of the Joint Appendix manifested his
8	unequivocal notice of his intention to resign. We think
9	that satisfies the rule that both of us are talking
10	about here.
11	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But he was given a
12	choice.
13	MR. GANNON: We don't think
14	JUSTICE GINSBURG: He was given a choice of
15	the
16	MR. GANNON: That's that is not the way
17	we think the agreement reads, Justice Ginsburg. The
18	first two sentences of the clause that crosses the page
19	from 60 to 61 say Mr. Green agrees to retire from the
20	Postal Service no later than March 31st, and Mr. Green
21	agrees to take all necessary steps to effect his
22	retirement
23	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But then read on.
24	MR. GANNON: And the next sentence says
25	it doesn't say Mr. Green has an option of not retiring

Alderson Reporting Company

1 if he decides to change his mind and then report to --2 for duty. It says if retirement from the Postal Service 3 does not occur, that he will report for duty in a 4 station to which he already --5 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, suppose he showed up 6 in -- in Wyoming? What would you have done? 7 MR. GANNON: Do you mean --JUSTICE ALITO: Wouldn't you have allowed 8 9 him to take that job at the lower pay? MR. GANNON: You mean if he had -- he had 10 11 not taken all steps necessary to effect his resignation 12 by March 31st? Then we think --13 JUSTICE ALITO: No. No. You said --14 MR. GANNON: We think he would have been in 15 breach of the agreement. I'm not sure what would have 16 happened then, but the reason this sentence is in the agreement is to take account of -- of circumstances that 17 18 are no fault of his. If the Postal Service, or in particular the OPM, takes --19 20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It's not a breach. 21 MR. GANNON: Pardon? 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The agreement says if he 23 hasn't taken all the steps, if it does not occur, 24 Mr. Green will report for duty. 25 MR. GANNON: Yes, it does --

Alderson Reporting Company

	5
1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: In Wyoming.
2	MR. GANNON: And it doesn't say that he has
3	a choice of doing that. He will have already breached
4	the second sentence if he decides not to retire.
5	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why not have the second
6	sentence there?
7	MR. GANNON: Pardon?
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why have the second
9	sentence there at all? Why are you giving him an option
10	if he's if he hasn't retired?
11	MR. GANNON: We do not read this as giving
12	him an option. We read this as responding
13	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There was not reached by
14	the court below, correct?
15	MR. GANNON: This was reached by the
16	district court. It was an alternative holding by the
17	district court. The Petitioner did not appeal that
18	alternative holding. And so in the court of appeals,
19	the court was just considering the antecedent question
20	of whether we should only look to the act of the
21	employer or also the act of the employee.
22	And so this factual question didn't actually
23	come up before the court of appeals. We noted in the
24	statement of facts in our court of appeals brief that
25	the agreement included his the settlement agreement

included his agreement to retire, but otherwise we did
 take the case on his premise, and the court of appeals
 did not address this.

4 So we do think that it would be appropriate 5 for the Court here, if it agrees with us, if this 6 agreement is sufficiently clear, to say that Petitioner 7 will lose on the facts of this case.

8 If you want to remand and have the court of 9 appeals consider whether the district court was correct in reaching that, that would also be appropriate. But 10 11 we think that this wouldn't be that different from what 12 the Court did in Irwin where in Irwin the Court said, 13 well, the court of appeals was wrong about finding that 14 there was no possibility of equitable tolling; 15 nevertheless, there is no way he will ever satisfy equitable tolling on the facts of this case, so he 16 17 loses.

18 And I do think that one final thing I would 19 like to say is that the Court should be able to take 20 some comfort from the real-world evidence that we have. It's not much. We don't have evidence of cases from the 21 22 five circuits that have adopted a version of the notice 23 of resignation rule between 1987 and 2000 that indicates 24 that employers are being besieged with stale 25 discrimination claims that are being revived by

Alderson Reporting Company

employees' attempts to quit some months or years after 1 2 the fact. And so we think that it's doesn't present 3 those concerns. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Frankly, I'm a little 4 5 less moved by that because, from my personal experience, 6 those stale claims generally don't make it past a motion 7 to dismiss. 8 MR. GANNON: Well, that -- that --9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Very few of them are 10 appealed because if they're really that stale, those 11 constructive discharge claims are usually thrown out. 12 MR. GANNON: Well, I --13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The case is litigated on 14 other grounds. MR. GANNON: Well, I think that's right, but 15 -- and I think that -- but it's also the case that in 16 17 many cases, in fact in most cases, there isn't going to be very much time between these two dates, and therefore 18 it usually isn't going to be that dispositive. 19 20 In this case, we think that the things happened on the same day. Even under Petitioner's 21 22 approach, he had some weeks to make his decision. But 23 the reason why he wasn't prejudiced by being able to 24 take some weeks to make his decision is precisely 25 because he was using annual leave, he wasn't suffering

Alderson Reporting Company

1	the consequences of a hostile work environment, he
2	hadn't taken the pay cut, he hadn't had to move 400
3	miles away, and so this was an unusual case where he
4	would have been able to take that much time.
5	And so it looks like, as in in
6	practicality's sake, that that it hasn't made a big
7	difference. And that's why we think it would be useful
8	for the Court to say this is effectively the Ricks rule.
9	It should apply to both cases of actual and cases of
10	constructive termination.
11	If there are no further questions, we would
12	urge the Court to affirm.
13	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
14	Ms. Carroll.
15	ORAL ARGUMENT OF CATHERINE M.A. CARROLL
16	AS COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE
17	IN SUPPORT OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW
18	MS. CARROLL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
19	please the Court:
20	We agree that the Ricks rule should apply
21	here as it does to any other kind of claim under Title
22	VII, and like any other kind of claim under Title VII, a
23	constructive discharge claim has to challenge actionable
24	conduct by the employer.
25	In applying the EEOC's regulation here, we

Alderson Reporting Company

1 have to ask, what was that actionable conduct, that 2 matter alleged to be discriminatory, and when did it 3 occur.

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, you just sort of made those two synonymous. But they don't have to be synonymous. A matter might mean the claim, not the particular discriminatory conduct that's the predicate for the claim.

9 MS. CARROLL: Justice Kagan, I think that 10 the EEOC has, by equating the Federal sector provision 11 with the private sector provision, has suggested that 12 both of these provisions do focus on the alleged 13 unlawful employment practice. In addition when the EEOC 14 promulgated this rule in its current form, it explained 15 that this rule, quote, continued the rule that had applied under the prior version which used the language 16 17 alleged discriminatory event.

18 So I don't think the inclusion of the word 19 "matter" by itself makes a difference. After all, it 20 doesn't just say matter. It says matter alleged to be 21 discriminatory, and we think that has to be read as a 22 whole to clearly focus on what is it that is the target 23 of the claim.

And that language is -- it does not become ambiguous just because it might be challenging to apply

Alderson Reporting Company

1 it in a particular fact pattern. I think this Court's 2 decision in Morgan is an excellent example of that where 3 the Court said we have a clear rule that requires us to 4 identify what was the alleged unlawful employment 5 practice and when did it occur, and that's the analysis 6 here.

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: I mean, this is an unusual kind of claim, and it's an unusual kind of claim because 8 9 there are predicate acts and then there is also a resignation which clearly has to occur before the suit 10 11 can be brought. And when there is this, you know, this 12 composite set of things that has to go on before a suit, 13 it seems to me that it's at least approaching the kind 14 of possible ambiguous -- ambiguous stage to say, yeah, that's a matter, that's a practice that both of those 15 16 things have to be part of it.

17 MS. CARROLL: I think that that's difficult to reconcile with how Morgan treated the word 18 "practice." Always bearing in mind, as the Court has 19 20 explained in a case like Graham County, for instance, the kind of ambiguity that triggers resort to a default 21 22 accrual rule is ambiguity in the literal text of the 23 provision. There it was unclear whether a particular 24 limitations period even applied and the Court said, 25 literal text is ambiguous, there are clues that point in

Alderson Reporting Company

1 one direction, we think this default rule points in the 2 same direction.

3 But the Court hasn't applied that background 4 rule to override language that's -- that otherwise 5 clearly calls for an analysis of, in this case, what is 6 it that the plaintiff alleged to be discriminatory. 7 Here, Mr. Green alleged a discrete act of retaliation that he says occurred in December of 2009. 8 9 He alleges no repeated or cumulative acts of discrimination subsequent to that date and so --10 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about that he hasn't got a claim? He can't even -- you can't come to court 12 13 with a claim for constructive discharge until you've 14 said I'm discharged. So he -- you're suggesting that 15 the time runs from a time when he does not yet have a ripe claim. 16 17 MS. CARROLL: Well, we does not have a ripe 18 claim for constructive discharge. He would have a ripe claim for discrimination or retaliation to challenge the 19 20 underlying predicate acts, and in this position --21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But then are you saying 22 that constructive discharge will -- will lead to a cause 23 of action only when it is so close to the precipitating 24 event that they are almost contemporaneous?

25 MS. CARROLL: I'm not 100 percent sure I

Alderson Reporting Company

1 followed the question, but let me --

2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: When, under your view, 3 when is there a constructive discharge that itself leads 4 to triggering the statute of limitations? 5 MS. CARROLL: I think in a constructive 6 discharge case -- and to be clear, that label can be 7 applied to a range of different fact patterns -- it will often be the case that the predicate conduct that 8 9 precipitates the resignation is itself alleged to be discriminatory. Take the facts of Suders, for instance, 10 where there was an ongoing pattern of harassing 11 12 behavior. Individual acts contributing to that hostile 13 work environment had occurred leading up to and indeed 14 on I believe the very day of the resignation. There, I 15 think it is, as Your Honor suggests, not going to matter at all which rule the Court were to adopt in this case. 16 17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: They're almost 18 contemporaneous. 19 MS. CARROLL: They would be contemporaneous. 20 But in a case like this, it's much clearer to see the conceptual distinction between Mr. Green's own 21 22 individual independent decision to resign and his 23 employer's predicate discriminatory conduct. And in 24 Suders, the Court made very clear that those were two 25 distinct components of a constructive-discharge claim.

Alderson Reporting Company

1	And I think, you know, the Petitioner and
2	the government's position asks the Court to extend the
3	legal fiction that equates constructive discharge.
4	JUSTICE BREYER: Well, the matter complained
5	of here is a constructive discharge. In a tort suit or
6	many the matter complained of is negligent behavior
7	leading to an injury. I take it in the tort suit the
8	statute of limitations doesn't begin to run until there
9	is harm.
10	MS. CARROLL: I think that's generally true
11	of tort suits
12	JUSTICE BREYER: All right. If that's
13	generally true in a tort suit, and my guess is in a
14	contract suit for breach of contract, if the contracting
15	party sent the ships out and you knew that it wouldn't
16	be delivered, it's not actionable until it isn't
17	delivered and I guess there are ways around that, but my
18	point is generally in the law where the matter
19	complained of is a certain kind of incident in the
20	world, negligence leading to harm, action of a
21	discriminatory, et cetera, nature that leads to a
22	discharge, normally the statute of limitations begins to
23	run when the harm occurs.
24	Now why should it be any different here?
25	MS. CARROLL: In this case, the

42

Alderson Reporting Company

discrimination, the retaliation I should say, that was challenged was the forcing -- forcing of Mr. Green into the settlement agreement in December. He alleges that that was retaliatory and he was harmed by that at that time, and he could have promptly initiated counseling on that complaint.

Now, it is true that, as a consequence of
that discriminatory retaliatory conduct, the stakes got
higher for him at a later point when he decided --

JUSTICE BREYER: Of course, he could have, but we're talking about only the constructive discharge part. I mean, sometimes defendants do seven bad things at once, or at least allegedly bad.

MS. CARROLL: That's correct, but --JUSTICE BREYER: And we're only talking about one of them, the one that we're talking about is the constructive-discharge claim.

18 So I go back to my question about 19 negligence, because that was the first course I took in 20 law school so I remember that, but the -- the fact is 21 why should we treat this any differently?

MS. CARROLL: So, in general, we don't this should be analyzed any differently than any other kind of claim, which is that we have to identify what is the alleged unlawful practice and when did it occur. Why is

Alderson Reporting Company

1 that? Because --2 JUSTICE BREYER: Because you have to, as you 3 said, in the a tort case it's not just that the person 4 behaved negligently, but that negligence had to result 5 in a harm. 6 MS. CARROLL: And --7 JUSTICE BREYER: So I'm just -- that's the only simpleminded analogy I'm drawing and I wonder why 8 9 it doesn't work. MS. CARROLL: I think it does work because 10 11 in this case there was retaliation alleged in December 12 that harmed Mr. Green at that time. He later suffered a 13 more painful consequence, which under Ricks does not 14 trigger a new construct -- a new statute of limitations. 15 But I want to go back --16 JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose there was evidence 17 that the employer had a continuing intent to force Mr. Green's resignation. So you've got emails that say, 18 Mr. Green is causing trouble for us by charging us with 19 20 discrimination, we're going to do A, B, C, D and E to 21 force him to retire. And then on the day when he quits 22 there is another email that says, Hallelujah, we've 23 achieved our objective, he's retired. 24 Now when would it run in that situation? MS. CARROLL: I think if --25

Alderson Reporting Company

JUSTICE BREYER: Wouldn't it run from the date of discharge because there would be an intent at -as of that date?

MS. CARROLL: But if I'm understanding the hypothetical correctly, that sounds to me like a case that would be analyzed under the Court's decision in Morgan, where you have an environment of hostility that is composed of many individual acts, some of which might not be independently actionable in and of themselves, joined with a discriminatory --

JUSTICE ALITO: Let me clarify it. So nothing more is done. There are all these acts up to a certain point, and then 45 days, 50 days pass and the employee resigns, but the employer has all along had the intention of forcing the resignation. So on the date of the resignation the employer intends to cause a discharge for discriminatory reason.

18 MS. CARROLL: I still think Morgan answers 19 that question because Morgan says there has to be an act 20 contributing to the hostile work environment that occurs within the 40 -- within the charging period. And that's 21 22 the exact same analysis whether on the 46th day the 23 employee decides that's it, I quit, or if he simply 24 decides that's it, I'm finally going to speak up about 25 this hostile work environment that's being been going

45

Alderson Reporting Company

1 It has nothing to do with constructive discharge. on. 2 JUSTICE BREYER: That's the -- now, I'm 3 getting this more clearly because your response to my 4 question, which is now relevant to this too, is, look, 5 the plaintiff was hurt on the very day that last act was 6 performed, indeed he suffered because he saw the act 7 being performed, and that was one of the things that led him later to guit. 8 9 So let's count that as the injury. And 10 let's count the whole thing complete as of that time. 11 That's basically the argument for your side, I think. 12 And now the argument against you is that's 13 going to be a nightmare. Because there will be in fact 14 a whole range of acts, a whole series in many cases and 15 will then, in order to run the statute of limitations, 16 have to get into the question of which of those acts --17 maybe there were some he didn't know about -- which of 18 those acts actually did produce harm and which did not. And he just really won't know when to bring his lawsuit 19 20 as compared with the comparatively simple thing: He 21 quits. 22 MS. CARROLL: Right, I understand that 23 contention, but I think that the so-called difficulty is

25 arise in a hostile work environment case where there was

no different than the difficulty, so-called, that would

24

Alderson Reporting Company

1	no resignation. You would still have to
2	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, that's true.
3	MS. CARROLL: figure out what were
4	there acts within the 45-day period that contributed to
5	the environment. Maybe that's going to be difficult on
6	some facts, but that's a result of this Court's decision
7	in Morgan, again, nothing to do with constructive
8	discharge.
9	Now, with respect to
10	JUSTICE KAGAN: There's something more than
11	just simplicity, which is, you know, suppose you had a
12	case where somebody is first demoted and then somebody
13	is fired. You would never say, oh, he was demoted. He
14	suffered the injury then, it just raised the stakes.
15	You would say, no, there's two independent things and
16	now he can bring a termination claim.
17	MS. CARROLL: That's right.
18	JUSTICE KAGAN: And the power of the
19	constructive-discharge claim is to say the exact same
20	thing really has happened here, that once you lose the
21	job, it's more than the stakes have been raised. It's
22	that there is a separate injury that then becomes
23	legally actionable.
24	MS. CARROLL: Well, the analysis when there
25	is a demotion followed by a termination is not simply

1 that there's been a second separate injury, but that 2 there's been a second separate violation of Title VII by 3 the employer. That's why it is a discrete unlawful 4 employment action triggering a fresh limitations period. 5 In constructive discharge, you know, the 6 analysis that the second separate event, the employee's decision to resign is itself the actionable thing, that 7 8 is the analysis that the court of appeals had applied in In Suders the guestion was: Do we treat 9 Suders. 10 constructive discharge as a tangible employment action for purposes of determining vicarious liability. 11 The 12 Third Circuit said, well, yes, we treat these as 13 equivalents for all intents and purposes, so naturally, 14 when there's a constructive discharge, that means 15 there's been a tangible employment action. 16 This Court rejected that analysis and said, no, the legal fiction does not extend that far. 17 To be 18 sure, the Court says, we treat those two the same for remedial purposes in the sense that an employee who has 19 20 been constructively discharged can recover for that to the same degree and for the same extent as if he or she 21 22 had been actually discharged. 23 That makes sense because you have this 24 background duty to mitigate and, in the circumstance of

25 a constructive discharge, we don't think the employee

48

Alderson Reporting Company

1 should be tagged with the consequences of having, you 2 know, so-called failed to mitigate damages. But 3 that's -- that's the purpose of the legal fiction --4 JUSTICE KAGAN: But if we're going to say, 5 yes, these are different and for some purposes we're 6 going to look to the fiction and for other purposes 7 we're not going to look to the fiction, it seems to me 8 as though here it makes sense to take account of the 9 fiction in the sense that the person cannot bring a 10 claim until the resignation has happened. 11 So that's the kind of paradigmatic case in 12 which, boy, there is something really powerful pushing 13 that, yes, you can -- you should recognize the 14 constructive discharge as a discharge in this case. 15 MS. CARROLL: But the limitations period here does not run from the accrual of the claim, it runs 16 from the time of the matter alleged to be 17 18 discriminatory, the unlawful employment action. And as this Court explained in Suders, the constructive 19 20 discharge entails both predicate discrimination -- and we do think it has to be independently actionable. 21 We 22 think the Court recognized that when it said in Suders 23 that for Ms. Suders to prove her hostile work 24 environment claim was quoting necessary predicate to her constructive discharge claim, and that's also the 25

Alderson Reporting Company

uniform holding in the courts of appeals. There has to
 be predicate, unlawful conduct by the employer and a
 subsequent decision by the employee to resign.

4 When you have a provision that singles out 5 as the start of the limitations period one of those two 6 components, then the fact that the claim hasn't accrued 7 yet is not something that the Court can rely on to 8 override that clear language. I think this Court's 9 decision in Pillsbury is a really excellent example of 10 that, where under the Longshoremen's Act, there was a 11 provision that ran from the time of injury. And the 12 plaintiffs pointed out, well, that we can't actually 13 recover compensation for our injury until a disability 14 has manifested, so we should say that we should 15 interpret injury to mean disability. And the Court said, well, no. I mean, it's true that that will run 16 17 the limitation period before the claim can accrue, but 18 the language says what it says.

For what it's worth here, I don't think that this reading is actually going to cut off claims except in cases of, you know, real lack of diligence, because here, it's not the case that there's no claim available after the initial act of discrimination by the employer, there is a claim available, the employee can initiate counseling on that, and as a matter of the conciliation

Alderson Reporting Company

Official

policy, he or she ought to do that promptly in order to bring about the best chance of a prompt and informal reconciliation.

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: The language we're focusing 5 on here is the language of a regulation. What statutory 6 language does that regulation implement?

MS. CARROLL: The cause of action for Federal employees in 2000e-16(c), if I have that right, requires that, it extends a cause of action to Federal employees who have been aggrieved by the final decision of an agency that has been produced through this administrative process that is all a design of -- of EEOC regulations.

14 So there, the -- unlike in the private 15 sector provision, the charging period here is purely a 16 creature of the regulation. The time limit that exists 17 in the statute on the Federal sector side is only the 18 time limit for bringing the lawsuit once you have been 19 aggrieved by the final agency decision.

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You say this isn't 21 going to be a problem much. I think it's going to be a 22 problem a lot of times. People are in jobs and they're, 23 you know, suffering this particular type of adverse work 24 environment or discrimination, but quitting your job is 25 a very big deal. I think you have to plan out when

Alderson Reporting Company

1 that's going to be, and just because you can't take it 2 anymore doesn't mean that you could quit work right 3 away.

MS. CARROLL: But this rule doesn't require you to quit in order to be able to raise and seek resolution.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, sure, it doesn't 8 require you to quit, it just requires you to tell your 9 boss, you know, I can't take this anymore. And now I've 10 got to conciliate with you, but, you know, it creates 11 complications in the workforce if you raise that type of 12 issue.

MS. CARROLL: It can. I mean, to be clear, the EEOC regulations require that this must be all done anonymously until the complaining employee says actually, please go ahead and tell my employer so that we can try to pursue alternative --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suspect most
19 employers could figure out who is complaining in these
20 types of situations.

21 MS. CARROLL: Well, be that as it may, I 22 think the policy underlying this provision is the 23 recognition that the purpose of all of this is to try to 24 prevent discrimination and to correct it as soon as it 25 has occurred. It is unquestionably a very short

Alderson Reporting Company

1	provision, and the Court recognized in Morgan that this
2	very short provision exists because of the recognition
3	that we want these sorts of alleged discriminatory,
4	retaliatory circumstances to be addressed right away.
5	There are safeguards built in. This provision, I think
6	probably unique among statutes of limitations that I
7	know of, actually mandates that it be extended if, for
8	example, the employee didn't know about the time limit
9	or didn't know didn't have a reasonable basis to
10	suspect discrimination.
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What what is your
12	position on the government's stance?
13	MS. CARROLL: On the legal question or the
14	factual
15	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Factual question.
16	MS. CARROLL: We haven't taken a position on
17	that because the court of appeals didn't didn't find
18	it necessary to do so. You know, we
19	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think it's an
20	example of the difficulty of trying to figure out when
21	the discrimination occurred if you have this last-act
22	kind of thing.
23	MS. CARROLL: Well, to the contrary, I think
24	their dispute has a risen because they're trying to
25	apply the date-of-resignation rule and are finding it

Alderson Reporting Company

1 difficult to agree on when that resignation occurred. 2 As I -- as I said earlier, I think in our --3 under the rule that the court of appeals adopted in this 4 case, we think it asks the Court or the agency to engage 5 in precisely the same inquiry that it would have to do 6 whether -- even if there had not been a constructive 7 discharge. It's still, in every case, about identifying what is the alleged violation of the statute. 8 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What do you do with 10 Suders that seemed to distinguish two things; one was the hostile environment, and the second was the 11 12 constructive discharge. And the Court said that that --13 that the hostile environment is a lesser included 14 component of the more serious constructive-discharge 15 claim. 16 MS. CARROLL: May I respond? 17 I think Suders recognized that Ms. Suders 18 had to prove up both pieces. She had to prove unlawful conduct by the employer, namely, a severe and pervasive 19 20 change in the terms and conditions of her employment amounting to a hostile work environment, and she had to 21 22 meet the constructive discharge standard. And if the 23 Court's intent in saying so had been to equate 24 constructive discharge with actual discharge for all intents and purposes, then I don't see how the Court 25

Alderson Reporting Company

could have come to the conclusion that the affirmative
 defense is -- is ever available.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. Mr. Wolfman, four minutes. 4 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BRIAN WOLFMAN 5 6 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 7 MR. WOLFMAN: Your Honor, if I might, I would like to begin where we ended. Suders considered 8 9 and then recognized a claim for constructive discharge, 10 what we would call in the old days a cause of action. At pages 142 and 143, the Court said it was considering 11 12 whether a claim for constructive discharge lies under 13 Title VII.

And then it -- it holds, we agree with the lower courts and the EEOC that Title VII encompasses employer liability for constructive discharge. Not simply damage enhancing, but liability for constructive discharge.

I do want to turn to, Mr. Chief Justice, your question about the government's position on the date of resignation. It is not entirely correct that the Tenth Circuit did not address this. At Petition Appendix 2A, here's what the Tenth Circuit said: That shortly after being put on leave he signed a settlement agreement under which he would choose either to retire

Alderson Reporting Company

1 or to work in a position that paid much less and was 2 about 300 miles away. That was the premise on which 3 the --4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. That's true, 5 and that's why I thought --6 MR. WOLFMAN: Yes. 7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that was an open 8 question. But the government, Mr. Gannon says that in 9 fact the district court said that you chose to retire on -- in December, and you didn't appeal that finding by 10 the district court. 11 12 MR. WOLFMAN: That is not correct. The 13 district court was of two minds on the question. At one 14 point it -- it indicated that his -- his agreement was a 15 resignation. At another point -- and this is in other reply brief -- the district court said the exact 16 17 opposite. It said what the Tenth Circuit said. And the district court opinion, its legal ruling is not premised 18 on that -- what the government is saying is a finding. 19 Now, let me also say that the EEO decision 20 in this case, that is the Postal Service itself said --21 22 this is at the Joint Appendix 23 -- a fair reading of 23 the agreement reveals that he was given the choice to retire or to report to a new job, and was allowed to 24 25 continue his career.

Alderson Reporting Company

1 Unless the Court has anything further. 2 JUSTICE BREYER: What is your response to 3 her -- I think she's saying in most of these cases there is a hostile work environment. Where there is a hostile 4 5 work environment you have 45 days from the last act, and 6 so what we should do is look at this injury as simply 7 one more injury caused by a hostile work environment. 8 And just as you don't look at the date of injury there, 9 you look to the environment, et cetera, we so do the 10 same thing here. It's simpler, et cetera. 11 MR. WOLFMAN: Right. There are two answers 12 to that, Justice Breyer. First of all, I do want to 13 challenge the premise of the seven illustrative cases 14 cited in Suders, illustrative for constructive 15 discharge. Three of them were standalone constructive 16 discharges, untethered to any other claim; that's number 1. 17 18 Number 2, even if you have what this Court in Suders called a subset of constructive discharge 19 cases, that is one arising out of a hostile work 20 environment, they are still distinct claims. That's 21 22 really the point of Suders. They're distinct claims, 23 they're separately actionable, and we know they're 24 separately actionable because the constructive-discharge 25 claim is not actionable until resignation.

Alderson Reporting Company

1	Unless the Court has anything further.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
3	Ms. Carroll, this Court appointed you to
4	brief and argue this case as an amicus curiae in support
5	of the judgment below. You have ably discharged that
6	responsibility, for which the Court is grateful.
7	The case is submitted.
8	(Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the case in the
9	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

				Lage JJ
A	54:24	41:9 43:25 44:11	APPEARANCES	based 13:2
	add 31:8	49:17 53:3 54:8	1:15	basic 3:10
a.m 1:14 3:2	added 12:6	allegedly 20:22	Appendix 32:7	basically 46:11
ability 11:14	addition 38:13	43:13	55:23 56:22	basis 53:9
able 25:24 35:19	additional 8:10	alleges 40:9 43:3	applied 11:24 22:9	Bay 11:24
36:23 37:4 52:5	31:2	allegized 29:21	38:16 39:24 40:3	bearing 39:19
ably 58:5	address 35:3 55:22	allowed 33:8 56:24	41:7 48:8	began 15:11
above-entitled 1:12		alternative 10:24		0
58:9	addressed 53:4		applies 13:3,15	begins 42:22
Absolutely 4:5	administrative	34:16,18 52:17	22:7	behalf 1:16,20 2:4
accept 10:7	15:14 16:11 19:15	ambiguity 10:19	apply 13:12,24	2:7,10,15 3:7
account 33:17 49:8	51:12	13:21 39:21,22	22:4,23 37:9,20	19:11 55:6
accrual 39:22	adopt 18:15 19:3	ambiguous 5:7	38:25 53:25	behaved 44:4
49:16	41:16	38:25 39:14,14,25	applying 32:3	behavior 41:12
accrue 50:17	adopted 5:12 35:22	amend 20:2,8 31:7	37:25	42:6
accrued 50:6	54:3	31:11,13	appointed 58:3	believe 18:14,23
accrues 9:15,17	adopting 18:19	amending 31:3	approach 36:22	41:14
achieved 44:23	adversarial 6:13	amicus 1:22 2:11	approaching 39:13	benefit 18:16 19:5
acknowledged 23:1	adverse 51:23	11:22 30:6 31:4,6	appropriate 35:4	besieged 35:24
act 3:18 4:21 7:10	advocating 13:8	37:16 58:4	35:10	best 51:2
9:4,5,6,6,8 10:11	affirm 37:12	amounting 54:21	area 11:24 14:4	big 37:6 51:25
14:7,20 19:18	affirmative 10:4	analogue 6:8	15:7	bonus 12:17
25:19 27:9,10,13	55:1	analogy 44:8	argue 58:4	boss 52:9
28:8 34:20,21	agency 25:4 51:11	analysis 39:5 40:5	argued 10:24	bought 12:21
40:7 45:19 46:5,6	51:19 54:4	45:22 47:24 48:6	arguing 14:14 18:2	boy 49:12
50:10,23 57:5	aggravated 30:11	48:8,16	argument 1:13 2:2	breach 28:17 29:3
action 3:12 4:13	aggrieved 3:25	analyzed 43:23	2:5,8,13 3:3,6	33:15,20 42:14
5:9 6:15,23 9:15	51:10,19	45:6	14:6 19:10 37:15	breached 34:3
9:16,24 10:25	agree 19:14 22:17	annual 36:25	46:11,12 55:5	Brennan 1:6 3:4
11:11 14:1 17:23	37:20 54:1 55:14	anonymously	arising 57:20	Breyer 42:4,12
18:3,4 22:15,16	agreement 32:5,17	52:15	asking 15:3 21:1	43:10,15 44:2,7
25:7 27:4 40:23	33:15,17,22 34:25	answer 13:18 15:4	28:4	45:1 46:2 47:2
42:20 48:4,10,15	34:25 35:1,6 43:3	answers 45:18	asks 42:2 54:4	57:2,12
49:18 51:7,9	55:25 56:14,23	57:11	Assistant 1:18	BRIAN 1:16 2:3,14
55:10	agrees 16:20 32:19	antecedent 34:19	assume 5:5 8:22	3:6 55:5
actionable 9:2 15:2	32:21 35:5	anticipates 5:16	attempts 36:1	brief 34:24 56:16
	ahead 52:16	anymore 12:15	available 50:22,24	58:4
23:22 30:14,22	Alito 12:25 13:14	16:16,25 26:1,8	55:2	bring 3:25 5:22
37:23 38:1 42:16	14:3,14,18 15:5	26:13 29:8 52:2,9		12:7,11 15:19
45:9 47:23 48:7	20:1,4,8,15,18	anyway 4:24	В	28:16,23 29:12,13
49:21 57:23,24,25	33:5,8,13 44:16	apart 8:18	B 44:20	30:1,18 46:19
acts 5:17 6:5 10:10	45:11	appeal 34:17 56:10	back 15:10 43:18	47:16 49:9 51:2
27:20 30:13 39:9	allege 27:25	appealed 36:10	44:15	bringing 4:13
40:9,20 41:12	alleged 3:18 4:1,2,4	appeals 22:9 31:6	background 40:3	51:18
45:8,12 46:14,16	4:10 5:6 13:15	34:18,23,24 35:2	48:24	broadly 13:5
46:18 47:4	21:17 38:2,12,17	35:9,13 48:8 50:1	bad 29:25 43:12,13	brought 6:5,9
actual 19:24 21:14	38:20 39:4 40:6,7	53:17 54:3	balance 19:6	11:22 12:21 39:11
22:4,11 24:6 37:9	30.20 37.4 40.0,/	33.17 34.3		11.22 12.21 39.11
	I		1	I

Page	60
rage	00

				Page 60
built 53:5	2:9 37:15	cites 11:22	55:1	54:19
business 15:9	cause 3:12 4:12 5:9	claim 3:13 4:10,18	comfort 35:20	consequence 25:24
	6:15,22 9:15,16	4:20 5:17,18 6:9	commits 19:18	43:7 44:13
<u> </u>	9:24 10:25 11:11	6:15,18 7:18,19	common 15:17	consequences 37:1
C 2:1 3:1 44:20	14:1 17:23 18:1,3	8:3,14 10:14,15	17:16	49:1
Cal 1:16	18:4 40:22 45:16	12:7,11 14:1 15:1	communicated	consider 35:9
call 55:10	51:7,9 55:10	15:19 19:16 27:6	21:13 23:24	consideration
called 27:2,11	caused 57:7	28:16,17,23 29:6	comparatively	19:15
57:19	causing 44:19	29:13 30:1,10,11	46:20	considered 55:8
calls 40:5	certain 42:19 45:13	30:25 31:1,2,8,14	compared 46:20	considering 34:19
career 56:25	certainly 8:19	37:21,22,23 38:6	compensation	55:11
Carroll 1:21 2:9	12:10 15:18	38:8,23 39:8,8	50:13	considers 31:9
37:14,15,18 38:9	cetera 42:21 57:9	40:12,13,16,18,19	complained 42:4,6	consistent 6:16,19
39:17 40:17,25	57:10	41:25 43:17,24	42:19	constitutes 19:1
41:5,19 42:10,25	challenge 37:23	47:16,19 49:10,16	complaining 14:2	construct 44:14
43:14,22 44:6,10	40:19 57:13	49:24,25 50:6,17	52:15,19	constructive 3:13
44:25 45:4,18	challenged 43:2	50:22,24 54:15	complaint 31:7,11	4:15,18,19 5:4 6:8
46:22 47:3,17,24	challenging 38:25	55:9,12 57:16,25	31:14 43:6	7:7 9:24 11:5,5,6
49:15 51:7 52:4	chance 51:2	claimants 15:14	complaints 31:4	11:21 12:20,22
52:13,21 53:13,16	change 20:1,12	claims 9:1 11:20,20	complete 3:12,13	14:4,5,16 15:5,8,8
53:23 54:16 58:3	33:1 54:20	11:21,22 30:7	10:25 11:12 46:10	15:24 16:17 19:24
case 3:4 8:21 10:4,8	charge 7:2	35:25 36:6,11	complexity 3:17	21:16,18 22:5,24
11:7,23 13:2	charging 44:19	50:20 57:21,22	15:13	23:1,4,21 24:5
14:13 15:7,22	45:21 51:15	clarify 45:11	complications	27:2,12,19 28:1,2
16:15 22:21 25:14	Chief 3:3,8 12:13	classical 29:2,22	52:11	28:8,10,15,22,23
28:10,15 29:23	15:21 16:2,7,14	classically 29:17	component 5:1	29:1,2,4,13,19,22
30:17,19 32:4	16:24 17:12,15	clause 32:18	6:11 54:14	29:23 30:2,11,18
35:2,7,16 36:13	19:8,12,21 37:13	clauses 32:6	components 41:25	31:9,23 36:11
36:16,20 37:3	37:18 51:20 52:7	clear 10:15 11:1,2	50:6	37:10,23 40:13,18
39:20 40:5 41:6,8	52:18 53:11,15,19	14:24 20:9,10	composed 45:8	40:22 41:3,5 42:3
41:16,20 42:25	55:3,19 58:2	29:24 35:6 39:3	composite 39:12	42:5 43:11 46:1
44:3,11 45:5	choice 28:19 29:7	41:6,24 50:8	conceptual 41:21	47:7 48:5,10,14
46:25 47:12 49:11	31:20 32:12,14	52:13	concern 11:19,25	48:25 49:14,19,25
49:14 50:22 54:4	34:3 56:23	clearer 41:20	24:2	54:6,12,22,24
54:7 56:21 58:4,7	choose 55:25	clearly 38:22 39:10	concerns 36:3	55:9,12,16,17
58:8	chose 56:9	40:5 46:3	conciliate 52:10	57:14,15,19
cases 3:11 6:20	circle 27:16	client 16:13 19:5	conciliation 5:13	constructive-disc
12:20,21,23 14:24	Circuit 15:12,16	clock 3:12 26:24	5:13,16,19 6:2,10	19:16 41:25 43:17
14:24 15:1 19:23	16:12 48:12 55:22	28:13	6:13 24:2 50:25	47:19 54:14 57:24
19:24 21:14 24:3	55:23 56:17	close 28:10 40:23	concluded 21:8	constructively 23:5
28:7 29:3,22 30:16 35:21 36:17	Circuit's 3:17	clues 39:25	conclusion 55:1	27:22 28:19,22
36:17 37:9,9	circuits 35:22	coerces 9:8	conditions 54:20	48:20
46:14 50:21 57:3	circumstance 48:24	coercing 9:7	conduct 4:17 5:3	construed 20:23
40.14 50.21 57.5 57:13,20	circumstances	cognizant 15:15	7:20 9:17 12:12	contemporaneous
CATHERINE 1:21	25:21 33:17 53:4	colloquy 19:20	23:3 37:24 38:1,7	40:24 41:18,19
	cited 57:14	come 34:23 40:12	41:8,23 43:8 50:2	contention 46:23
				1

				iuge oi
context 14:19 22:10	56:11,13,16,18	21:5 24:8,10 26:9	design 51:12	discharged 23:5
22:24	57:1,18 58:1,3,6	26:23 36:21 41:14	determining 48:11	27:22,23 40:14
continue 56:25	Court's 3:10 6:17	44:21 45:22 46:5	dice 23:8	48:20,22 58:5
continued 38:15	6:19 11:24 13:11	days 3:25 24:8,10	dictionaries 4:10	discharges 22:5
continuing 44:17	21:2 23:16 30:8	25:3 26:15,16	difference 21:21	57:16
contract 21:10	39:1 45:6 47:6	45:13,13 55:10	22:14 31:22 32:4	discharging 9:9
42:14,14	50:8 54:23	57:5	37:7 38:19	discrete 40:7 48:3
contracting 42:14	court-appointed	deal 51:25	differences 9:13	discriminated 4:7
contrary 53:23	1:22 2:10 30:6	December 31:24	different 9:3,9 10:6	30:3
contrast 15:13	37:16	32:5 40:8 43:3	14:5,16 22:21	discriminating 8:9
contributed 47:4	courts 4:11 11:9	44:11 56:10	30:7 35:11 41:7	discrimination
contributing 41:12	12:23 18:10 22:8	decided 29:8 43:9	42:24 46:24 49:5	8:10,17 11:16
45:20	50:1 55:15	decides 8:14 11:17	differently 43:21	13:7 14:8,21
controls 28:13	covenant 28:17	33:1 34:4 45:23	43:23	21:18 27:6,10
correct 7:3 13:17	29:4	45:24	difficult 3:19 25:13	30:22 31:8,10,16
14:9 18:9 28:9	creates 10:18 52:10	deciding 13:2	39:17 47:5 54:1	35:25 40:10,19
34:14 35:9 43:14	creature 51:16	decision 7:4,15	difficulty 46:23,24	43:1 44:20 49:20
52:24 55:21 56:12	crossed 30:25	11:24 13:12 21:12	53:20	50:23 51:24 52:24
correctly 45:5	crosses 32:18	22:23 23:2,9,17	diligence 50:21	53:10,21
counsel 19:8 37:13	cumulative 40:9	23:23,24 29:16	direction 40:1,2	discriminatory
55:3 58:2	curiae 1:22 2:11	31:17 36:22,24	directions 10:6	3:18 4:1,3,4,21
counseling 24:2,12	37:16 58:4	39:2 41:22 45:6	directive 31:5	5:7 7:3,6,10,13
24:14,15 25:3	current 38:14	47:6 48:7 50:3,9	directly 22:1	8:13,15,23,25
43:5 50:25	CURTIS 1:18 2:6	51:10,19 56:20	disability 50:13,15	9:12 10:10,11,14
counselor 25:4	19:10	decisionmaker	disagreement 30:5	13:15 21:18 25:7
count 46:9,10	cut 37:2 50:20	16:11	32:2	38:2,7,17,21 40:6
counts 25:19		default 5:8,9 6:17	discharge 3:13 4:15	41:10,23 42:21
County 39:20	D	10:19 11:2,25	4:18,20 5:4 6:9	43:8 45:10,17
course 5:11 12:8	D 3:1 44:20	13:21,22 39:21	7:7,12 9:24 11:5	49:18 53:3
27:18 43:10,19	D.C 1:9,19,21	40:1	11:21 12:20,23	discussed 20:21
court 1:1,13 3:9,14	damage 55:17	defendants 43:12	14:4,5,16 15:6	discussing 13:1
3:15,20 4:16 5:8	damages 31:15	defense 55:2	21:14,16,19 22:9	23:18,20,21 24:3
9:19 12:2,6 18:15	49:2	definitive 16:19	22:24 23:1,4,21	discussion 14:11
19:3,13 21:8 23:1	date 9:3 15:1,13	17:9 18:5 19:2	24:5,5,6 27:2,12	31:3
23:21 26:1 29:15	16:17,22,22 17:2	21:3	27:13,15,19 28:1	dismiss 36:7
30:20 31:1,5	17:3,8,8,10,11,17	degree 48:21	28:3 29:23 30:2	dismissed 9:25
34:14,16,17,18,19	17:20,21 19:2	delay 12:24	30:11,18 31:9,23	dispositive 36:19
34:23,24 35:2,5,8	21:11,11 22:6,6	delivered 42:16,17	36:11 37:23 40:13	dispute 53:24
35:9,12,12,13,19	22:12 25:17 26:18	demoted 47:12,13	40:18,22 41:3,6	disputed 16:5
37:8,12,19 39:3	26:21 31:23 40:10	demotion 8:23	42:3,5,22 43:11	disputes 9:1,2,16
39:19,24 40:3,12	45:2,3,15 55:21	47:25	45:2,17 46:1 47:8	distinct 41:25
41:16,24 42:2	57:8	denial 6:25	48:5,10,14,25	57:21,22
48:8,16,18 49:19	date-of-resignation	denied 21:9	49:14,14,20,25	distinction 30:9
49:22 50:7,15	53:25	Department 1:19	54:7,12,22,24,24	41:21
53:1,17 54:3,4,12	dates 36:18	described 31:1	55:9,12,16,18	distinguish 54:10
54:25 55:11 56:9	day 8:23 18:24,25	describing 13:25	57:15,19	distinguishes 22:18
	l	l	l	l

Page	62
r uge	02

				raye 02
district 34:16,17	23:2,23 48:6	Evans 6:21 14:19	far 48:17	Friday 16:21 18:25
35:9 56:9,11,13	employees 51:8,10	event 38:17 40:24	fault 33:18	friend 19:22 24:3
56:16,18	employees' 36:1	48:6	February 16:13	30:5
doctrine 25:10,22	employees 50.1 employer 5:21,22	everybody 22:7	fed 8:12	fully 5:9 6:18,22
doing 34:3	7:4,13 8:3,6,8,13	24:4,7	Federal 13:6,15	further 37:11 57:1
door 24:12,14	9:5,5,6,7,9,17	evicted 28:18	38:10 51:8,9,17	58:1
drawing 44:8	11:9 14:12 19:18	eviction 11:6 15:8	feel 7:1,9	future 17:17
duty 33:2,3,24	21:8 22:15 24:7	28:7,10,16,23	fiction 27:15 42:3	
48:24	24:18,20,25 25:12	29:1,3,4,14,22	48:17 49:3,6,7,9	G
40.24	25:20,25 26:23	evidence 31:15	fight 29:8	G 3:1
E	27:4,8,21 34:21	35:20,21 44:16	figure 15:23 47:3	Gannon 1:18 2:6
E 1:18 2:1,6 3:1,1	37:24 44:17 45:14	exact 8:25 15:2,9	52:19 53:20	19:9,10,12 20:3,7
19:10 44:20	45:16 48:3 50:2	21:2 45:22 47:19	final 35:18 51:10	20:14,17 21:16,20
earlier 54:2	50:23 52:16 54:19	56:16	51:19	21:24 22:3,17,20
early 3:20	55:16	exactly 6:7 7:16	finally 8:11 45:24	23:10,13,16,20
easy 15:14,23 16:8	employer's 41:23	15:22	find 4:23 9:7 53:17	24:19,23 25:1,9
16:10	employers 35:24	example 39:2 50:9	finding 35:13 53:25	25:18 26:6,9,14
EEO 56:20	52:19	53:8,20	56:10,19	26:18,21 27:24
EEOC 20:14,17,23	employment 13:6,9	excellent 39:2 50:9	fine 5:20 18:18	28:9,25 29:11,15
25:11 31:9 38:10	13:16,20 20:22	exist 10:13	fire 7:4	30:15 31:25 32:13
38:13 51:13 52:14	38:13 39:4 48:4	exists 6:10,15,15	fired 24:8 26:23	32:16,24 33:7,10
55:15	48:10,15 49:18	51:16 53:2	47:13	33:14,21,25 34:2
EEOC's 31:4 37:25	54:20	experience 36:5	first 6:11 15:2	34:7,11,15 36:8
effect 32:21 33:11	encompasses 55:15	explain 31:21	32:18 43:19 47:12	36:12,15 56:8
effective 25:17	ended 11:8 55:8	explained 38:14	57:12	general 1:7,19
effectively 20:24	engage 54:4	39:20 49:19	fit 6:6	43:22
37:8	enhancing 55:17	extend 13:18 15:4	five 35:22	generally 25:9 36:6
either 28:18 55:25	entails 49:20	42:2 48:17	focus 38:12,22	42:10,13,18
elaborate 20:15	entire 8:11 10:14	extended 53:7	focused 11:9,10	getting 18:8 46:3
elements 4:16 5:3	10:15	extended 55.7 extends 51:9	focusing 51:4	Ginsburg 11:13
5:18 7:18,25 8:2	entirely 55:21	extension 22:2	follow 12:25	17:22,25 28:6
eligible 12:16	environment 3:19	extension 22.2 extent 48:21	followed 41:1	31:21 32:11,14,17
email 44:22	7:8 30:4,10,12,21	extent 40.21	47:25	32:23 40:11 54:9
emails 44:18	37:1 41:13 45:7	F	force 44:17,21	give 13:12 17:5
employee 3:14 4:4	45:20,25 46:25	fact 12:9 29:9,11	forced 15:19,20	given 7:2 18:12
4:7 5:14,22 6:2	47:5 49:24 51:24	36:2,17 39:1 41:7	25:20 27:21 29:5	21:4 25:2 32:11
8:9,11 11:16 14:1	54:11,13,21 57:4	43:20 46:13 50:6	forcing 43:2,2	32:14 56:23
15:18 19:17 21:13	57:5,7,9,21	56:9	45:15	gives 19:17
22:15 24:9,11	equate 54:23	facts 14:25 34:24	form 38:14	giving 5:17 24:9
25:24 26:2 27:11	equates 42:3	35:7,16 41:10	formed 5:10 6:18	26:19 34:9,11
27:14 28:1 29:25	equating 38:10	47:6	6:22	go 5:8 10:21 15:10
30:24 31:6,16	equitable 35:14,16	factual 32:1 34:22	four 55:4	24:12 39:12 43:18
34:21 45:14,23	equivalents 48:13	53:14,15	fours 22:21	44:15 52:16
48:19,25 50:3,24	ESQ 1:16,18,21 2:3	failed 49:2	franchise 29:20,20	going 5:1 7:4 8:14
52:15 53:8	2:6,9,14	fair 56:22	Frankly 36:4	12:16 13:23 16:21
employee's 11:14	et 42:21 57:9,10	fairly 17:16	fresh 48:4	17:1,13 20:18
r - J	UT4.21 J1.7,10	J J	11 USH TO.T	,
L	1	1	1	1

Page 63

	_			
24:14 26:2 29:8	holds 55:14	45:8	judgment 1:23 2:11	keep 7:24
30:1,17 31:17	Honor 4:5 5:15 6:4	informal 51:2	37:17 58:5	Kennedy 4:19,23
36:17,19 41:15	6:12 13:11 14:13	initial 50:23	Justice 1:19 3:3,8	16:23 17:4,6,10
44:20 45:24,25	14:23 15:10 16:5	initiate 24:12,15	3:21 4:2,7,19,23	21:15,17,22,25
46:13 47:5 49:4,6	16:9 41:15 55:7	25:3 50:24	5:11,20,24 6:1 7:1	22:13,18 27:7
49:7 50:20 51:21	hostile 3:19 7:8	initiated 43:5	7:12,21,23,24 8:4	40:21 41:2,17
51:21 52:1	30:4,10,12,21	initiating 19:15	8:7 9:4,12,21 10:2	kicks 11:2
gotten 7:8 8:11	37:1 41:12 45:20	inject 15:12	10:5,7,18,21	kind 37:21,22 39:8
government 15:22	45:25 46:25 49:23	injects 3:17	11:13 12:13,25	39:8,13,21 42:19
16:20 56:8,19	54:11,13,21 57:4	injury 42:7 46:9	13:1,14 14:3,11	43:23 49:11 53:22
government's 42:2	57:4,7,20	47:14,22 48:1	14:14,18 15:5,21	knew 42:15
53:12 55:20	hostility 45:7	50:11,13,15 57:6	16:2,7,14,23 17:4	know 5:21 8:15
Graham 39:20	hurt 46:5	57:7,8	17:6,10,12,15,22	12:14,16 16:14,15
grateful 58:6	hypothesizing	innovation 29:16	17:23,25 18:1,8	17:16,18 39:11
graver 31:2	30:20	inquiry 54:5	18:11,17,19 19:8	42:1 46:17,19
Green 1:3 3:4	hypothetical 45:5	instance 6:6,21	19:12,21,21 20:1	47:11 48:5 49:2
32:19,20,25 33:24		8:22 18:24 30:9	20:4,8,15,18 21:4	50:21 51:23 52:9
40:7 43:2 44:12	I	39:20 41:10	21:15,17,22,25	52:10 53:7,8,9,18
44:19	idea 11:7 27:3	intends 45:16	22:11,13,13,18	57:23
Green's 41:21	identify 15:14 39:4	intent 44:17 45:2	23:7,11,14,17,18	knows 24:4,7,21,25
44:18	43:24	54:23	24:17,20,24 25:5	KIIO WS 2 1. 1, 7, 21, 25
grounds 36:14	identifying 3:18	intention 18:12	25:15 26:4,7,10	L
guess 42:13,17	54:7	32:8 45:15	26:16,19 27:7,18	label 41:6
guidance 13:13	illustrative 57:13	intentional 14:7,21	27:25 28:4,6,21	lack 50:21
guiuance 15.15	57:14	intents 48:13 54:25	29:9,12 30:13	landlord 29:13
Н	implement 51:6	interfere 24:1	31:21 32:11,14,17	language 10:10,13
Hallelujah 44:22	implications 15:11	interpret 50:15	32:23 33:5,8,13	10:13 13:3 20:5
hand 16:20	imputation 14:15	interpreted 16:24	33:20,22 34:1,5,8	38:16,24 40:4
handled 29:18	imputed 8:3,6 9:17	interpreting 20:4	34:13 36:4,9,13	50:8,18 51:4,5,6
hands 12:2 18:24	11:8 14:12 25:19	intolerable 26:3	37:13,18 38:4,9	last-act 15:16 53:21
happen 24:14	27:4	31:19	39:7 40:11,21	last-date-of 19:4
happened 23:4	incentives 12:7	intuition 15:17	41:2,17 42:4,12	last-day-of-work
24:5,11 33:16	incident 31:10	invokes 31:4	43:10,15 44:2,7	18:15
36:21 47:20 49:10	42:19	involving 29:3	44:16 45:1,11	Laundry 11:24
happens 24:13,16	included 34:25	Irwin 35:12,12	46:2 47:2,10,18	law 13:7 27:14
harassing 41:11	35:1 54:13	issue 16:5 23:19	49:4 51:4,20 52:7	42:18 43:20
hard 16:8	including 5:18	52:12	52:18 53:11,15,19	lawsuit 46:19 51:18
harm 42:9,20,23	inclusion 38:18	52.12	54:9 55:3,19 56:4	laypeople 15:15
44:5 46:18	independent 41:22	J	56:7 57:2,12 58:2	lead 19:19 40:22
harmed 43:4 44:12	47:15	J 1:6	Justice's 16:24	leading 41:13 42:7
head 23:23	independently 9:2	job 9:25 11:16 18:7	JUSTICE 5 10.24	42:20
hear 3:3	30:14 45:9 49:21	33:9 47:21 51:24	K	leads 19:23 41:3
held 16:12 26:1	indicated 3:15	56:24	Kagan 10:2,5,18,21	42:21
higher 43:9	16:13 30:8 56:14	jobs 51:22	30:13 38:4,9 39:7	leave 7:9 12:10
holding 34:16,18	indicates 35:23	joined 45:10	47:10,18 49:4	36:25 55:24
50:1	individual 41:12,22	Joint 32:7 56:22	Kagan's 13:1	leaving 24:21,24
L				I

				rage or
25:2	lower 4:11 18:10	Morgan 14:20 39:2	objective 44:23	paradigmatic
led 7:14 46:7	33:9 55:15	39:18 45:7,18,19	obviously 18:16	30:19 49:11
Ledbetter 14:20		47:7 53:1	19:4	parallel 28:11
left 31:19	M	motion 36:6	occupying 28:24	paramount 29:7
legal 27:15 32:2	M.A 1:21 2:9 37:15	motive 9:1	29:14	parcel 7:19 10:16
42:3 48:17 49:3	Mac's 11:6 29:16	move 37:2	occur 33:3,23 38:3	Pardon 33:21 34:7
53:13 56:18	29:18	moved 36:5	39:5,10 43:25	part 7:19 9:8 10:3
legally 47:23	making 7:4	moves 6:13	occurred 5:17,18	10:16 39:16 43:12
legitimate 7:5	management 31:5		16:1,3 20:23 40:8	particular 13:3
lesser 54:13	mandates 53:7	N	41:13 52:25 53:21	33:19 38:7 39:1
let's 5:5 8:22 14:23	manifested 32:7	N 2:1,1 3:1	54:1	39:23 51:23
15:7 46:9,10	50:14	naturally 48:13	occurring 13:20	parties 16:10
letter 16:21 18:24	March 32:20 33:12	nature 11:22 42:21	occurs 8:2 11:12	party 3:25 42:15
liability 48:11	MARVIN 1:3	necessarily 27:8	42:23 45:20	pass 45:13
55:16,17	materially 20:19	30:23	of-work 19:4	pattern 7:14 39:1
lies 55:12	matter 1:12 3:24,25	necessary 19:5	oh 17:12 26:12	41:11
life 27:23	4:2,4,6,9,9,11,14	32:21 33:11 49:24	47:13 52:7	patterns 41:7
light 13:20,22	5:6 10:14 13:14	53:18	old 55:10	pay 33:9 37:2
limit 51:16,18 53:8	38:2,6,19,20,20	need 12:15 15:18	once 5:14 25:2	paycheck 12:16
limitation 50:17	39:15 41:15 42:4	negligence 42:20	43:13 47:20 51:18	pending 31:11
limitations 3:15	42:6,18 49:17	43:19 44:4	ongoing 41:11	people 17:16 51:22
5:10 6:17,23,24	50:25 58:9	negligent 42:6	open 56:7	percent 40:25
9:3 12:1,4 14:8,21	mean 7:17 10:17	negligently 44:4	operate 10:19	perfectly 6:19
25:11 27:9 28:14	11:13 12:14 13:7	never 47:13	operative 21:12	performed 46:6,7
39:24 41:4 42:8	16:8,10,17 17:25	nevertheless 35:15	opinion 30:8 56:18	period 5:10 6:17,23
42:22 44:14 46:15	21:25 23:14 24:20	new 27:9 31:1,10	OPM 33:19	6:24 8:16,17 12:1
48:4 49:15 50:5	28:21 33:7,10	31:14 44:14,14	opposed 10:11	12:4 14:8,22
53:6	38:6 39:7 43:12	56:24	opposite 56:17	19:14 20:11 25:23
limits 25:23	50:15,16 52:2,13	nightmare 46:13	option 32:25 34:9	27:9 39:24 45:21
line 30:25	means 48:14	non-Federal 20:20	34:12	47:4 48:4 49:15
literal 39:22,25	meet 54:22	20:25	oral 1:12 2:2,5,8	50:5,17 51:15
litigated 36:13	MEGAN 1:6	normally 42:22	3:6 19:10 37:15	periods 9:3
litigation 20:16	mentioning 27:7	noted 34:23	order 46:15 51:1	person 4:13 9:10
little 36:4	miles 37:3 56:2	notice 16:19 17:5,9	52:5	9:25 12:9 18:6,10
loading 23:8	mind 16:25 17:13	18:5,12 19:17	ought 25:17 51:1	27:22 28:8 44:3
longer 6:2 12:9	33:1 39:19	21:3 24:10 25:2,6	outside 14:3,6,19	49:9
Longshoremen's	minds 56:13	26:20 27:20 32:8	override 40:4 50:8	personal 36:5
50:10	minutes 55:4	35:22	overwhelmed 7:9	pervasive 54:19
look 3:22 6:21,22	miserable 27:23	notification 22:6		Petition 55:22
34:20 46:4 49:6,7	mitigate 48:24 49:2	26:21	<u> </u>	petitioner 1:4,17
57:6,8,9	moment 7:8	notion 14:10	P 3:1	2:4,15 3:7 19:14
looks 37:5	Monday 1:10 16:22	November 1:10	p.m 58:8	32:5 34:17 35:6
lose 35:7 47:20	months 12:14	number 57:17,18	page 2:2 32:18	42:1 55:6
loses 35:17	16:16 17:1 18:12		pages 32:7 55:11	Petitioner's 31:22
lot 25:16 51:22	18:21,22 21:6	$\frac{0}{0}$	paid 18:8 56:1	36:21
lots 30:21	24:25 25:2 36:1	O 2:1 3:1	painful 44:13	phrase 27:3
L				

F				raye 05
phrased 13:4	precisely 22:25	provoking 8:15	range 41:7 46:14	rejecting 14:10
phraseology 13:22	27:12 36:24 54:5	public 13:8	rationale 11:10,11	related 31:12
pieces 54:18	predicate 10:11	pulled 10:5	reached 34:13,15	relationship 11:8
Pillsbury 50:9	30:13 38:7 39:9	purely 51:15	reaching 35:10	relevant 21:11
plaintiff 12:2,6		purpose 9:21 49:3	read 32:23 34:11	27:10 31:15 32:6
17:14 28:12 40:6	40:20 41:8,23	52:23	34:12 38:21	46:4
	49:20,24 50:2			
46:5	pregnant 27:3	purposes 9:23	reading 50:20	rely 50:7
plaintiffs 50:12	prejudiced 36:23	48:11,13,19 49:5	56:22	remand 35:8
plan 51:25	premise 35:2 56:2	49:6 54:25	reads 22:1 32:17	remedial 48:19
please 3:9 19:13	57:13	pursue 52:17	real 50:21	remedy 9:21,24
37:19 52:16	premised 56:18	pushing 49:12	real-world 35:20	remember 15:8
Plus 11:15	premises 11:5	put 55:24	reality 11:20	43:20
point 4:20 8:8 9:14	28:24 29:14	0	really 14:6 36:10	repeated 40:9
9:14 10:10 17:17	present 5:4 20:18	question 5:1 11:4,7	46:19 47:20 49:12	reply 56:16
24:11 27:24 30:17	36:2	-	50:9 57:22	report 33:1,3,24
39:25 42:18 43:9	presented 13:4	13:1,4 14:18	reason 22:25 23:25	56:24
45:13 56:14,15	presents 20:20	16:24 20:18,20	25:18 26:12 27:1	reprinted 32:6
57:22	presuppose 6:14	32:1,3 34:19,22	31:5,13,18 33:16	require 52:4,8,14
pointed 50:12	prevent 52:24	41:1 43:18 45:19	36:23 45:17	requires 23:2,8,11
points 22:14 40:1	principal 11:10	46:4,16 48:9	reasonable 15:17	39:3 51:9 52:8
policy 51:1 52:22	principle 3:10	53:13,15 55:20	53:9	reserve 19:6
portion 20:23	principles 3:16	56:8,13	reasons 7:5	resign 16:16,21
posited 15:16	prior 6:5 38:16	questions 37:11	REBUTTAL 2:13	17:1,11 18:12,20
positing 17:13	private 13:9,13,19	quickly 6:13	55:5	18:21,22,25 23:2
position 7:17 31:22	38:11 51:14	quit 5:14 6:1 8:14	recognition 52:23	23:9 29:25 30:1
40:20 42:2 53:12	probably 20:10	11:17 21:5,7	53:2	31:18 32:8 41:22
53:16 55:20 56:1	30:17 53:6	24:10 26:10,12	recognize 49:13	48:7 50:3
possibility 13:2	problem 21:23	36:1 45:23 46:8	recognized 29:15	resignation 4:3,17
35:14	23:15 51:21,22	52:2,5,8	49:22 53:1 54:17	5:3 7:19,20 8:2
possible 3:16 8:20	proceeded 7:14	quite 6:16 9:9	55:9	9:14,15 10:12,16
12:8,19 39:14	process 5:16 6:10	quits 44:21 46:21	reconcile 39:18	11:1,12 14:12
Postal 32:20 33:2	6:12 51:12	quitting 8:16,17	reconciliation 51:3	15:13,25 16:2,19
33:18 56:21	produce 46:18	9:5,7,8 25:6,6	recover 48:20	17:7,17,21 18:5,6
POSTMASTER	produced 51:11	26:11 27:20,21	50:13	19:1,2,17,19
1:7	prompt 51:2	28:2 30:23,25	refer 10:15 27:19	23:12 27:14 33:11
power 47:18	promptly 12:21	51:24	referring 4:12 6:12	35:23 39:10 41:9
powerful 49:12	43:5 51:1	quote 38:15	refers 10:14 20:21	41:14 44:18 45:15
practical 15:11	promulgated 38:14	quoting 23:16	reflect 14:25	45:16 47:1 49:10
practicality's 37:6	prove 25:14 26:2	49:24	regular 27:6	54:1 55:21 56:15
practice 11:19	31:17 49:23 54:18		regulation 11:1	57:25
13:20 20:22 38:13	54:18	R	13:3 20:2,5,6,12	resigned 10:1 16:13
39:5,15,19 43:25	provision 5:13,14	R 3:1	20:24 37:25 51:5	18:10,11,21
precipitates 41:9	38:10,11 39:23	raise 52:5,11	51:6,16	resigning 24:18
precipitating 4:17	50:4,11 51:15	raised 11:25 47:14	regulations 51:13	25:12
5:3 7:20 8:5	52:22 53:1,2,5	47:21	52:14	resigns 3:14 17:4,6
12:12 23:3 40:23	provisions 38:12	ran 50:11	rejected 48:16	45:14
	F			
L	1	1	1	

r				Laye UU
resolution 24:13	16:7,14 17:15	5:11,20,24 6:1	severe 54:19	stage 39:14
52:6	19:8 37:13 51:20	7:23 8:7 9:4,12,21	Shell 11:6 29:16,18	stages 6:14,14
resort 39:21	52:7,18 53:11,15	17:23 18:1,8,11	ships 42:15	stakes 43:8 47:14
respect 20:19 32:3	53:19 55:3 58:2	18:17,19 19:21	short 52:25 53:2	47:21
47:9	rule 3:17 5:8,9,12	21:4 22:14 23:7	shorthanded 4:12	stale 35:24 36:6,10
respond 54:16	6:17 10:19 11:2	23:11,14,17,18	shortly 55:24	stance 53:12
Respondent 1:20	11:25 13:7,21,22	24:17,20,24 25:5	showed 33:5	stand 14:24
2:7 19:11	13:23 15:2,12,16	25:15 26:4,7,10	shows 28:11	standalone 57:15
responding 34:12	16:18 18:16,20	26:16,19 27:18,25	side 22:8,9 46:11	standard 54:22
response 46:3 57:2	19:1,4,22 20:9,10	28:21 29:9,12	51:17	Stanford 1:16
responsibility 58:6	20:10,24 21:1,2,2	51:4	signed 32:5 55:24	start 28:18 50:5
rest 25:10	21:3,14 22:4,5,7,8	scenario 6:7	significant 12:24	starts 3:12 28:13
result 19:23 44:4	22:23 26:25 27:1	school 17:18 24:22	13:12	state 16:21
47:6	32:3,9 35:23 37:8	26:11 43:20	simple 3:16 46:20	stated 14:25
retaliation 40:8,19	37:20 38:14,15,15	schoolteacher	simpleminded 44:8	statement 34:24
43:1 44:11	39:3,22 40:1,4	17:18	simpler 57:10	States 1:1,13
retaliatory 43:4,8	41:16 52:4 53:25	score 16:5	simplicity 47:11	station 33:4
53:4	54:3	second 5:5 8:22	simply 9:18,20,23	statute 3:21,22,23
retire 32:19 34:4	ruling 56:18	30:25 31:2 34:4,5	10:24 11:11 45:23	3:24 12:3 13:19
35:1 44:21 55:25	run 42:8,23 44:24	34:8 48:1,2,6	47:25 55:17 57:6	18:3 20:5,21
56:9,24	45:1 46:15 49:16	54:11	singles 50:4	25:11 28:13 41:4
retired 34:10 44:23	50:16	sector 13:9,13,19	situation 14:7 26:3	42:8,22 44:14
retirement 32:22	running 18:3	20:20,25 38:10,11	31:19 44:24	46:15 51:17 54:8
33:2	runs 40:15 49:16	51:15,17	situations 8:21	statutes 5:12 53:6
retiring 32:25		see 41:20 54:25	13:24 52:20	statutory 51:5
retreating 7:17	S	seek 52:5	six 12:17	stays 11:16
reveals 56:23	S 2:1 3:1	self-limiting 25:23	so-called 46:23,24	steps 32:21 33:11
reverse 3:14	safeguards 53:5	sense 5:7 15:6,17	49:2	33:23
revived 35:25	sake 37:6	48:19,23 49:8,9	Solicitor 1:18	Stevens 22:11
Ricks 6:22,22	satisfies 32:9	sensible 20:9,10	somebody 21:5	stretch 11:14
14:19 21:2,7,15	satisfy 35:15	sent 42:15	28:16 29:21 47:12	submitted 58:7,9
21:17,23 22:1,19	saw 46:6	sentence 32:24	47:12	subsequent 40:10
22:22 26:25 27:7	saying 7:21 10:7	33:16 34:4,6,9	soon 12:7 17:18	50:3
37:8,20 44:13	15:12 21:5 22:1	sentences 32:18	52:24	subset 57:19
ridiculous 16:15	26:22 40:21 54:23	separate 7:25 8:1	sorry 56:4	succeed 4:20
right 5:24 7:16	56:19 57:3	47:22 48:1,2,6	sort 38:4	Suders 4:16 5:2
10:8,17 14:17	says 3:24 16:15,23	separately 57:23,24	sorts 53:3	9:19 23:1,17 26:1
27:2 36:15 42:12	16:25 17:8,11,21	separation 22:6,12	Sotomayor 7:1,12	30:8,20 41:10,24
46:22 47:17 51:8	18:20,20,21 21:5	series 46:14	7:21,24 8:4 10:7	48:9,9 49:19,22
52:2 53:4 57:11	24:7,9 28:2 29:25	serious 54:14	14:11 28:4 33:20	49:23 54:10,17,17
ripe 40:16,17,18	30:24 32:24 33:2 33:22 38:20 40:8	Service 32:20 33:2	33:22 34:1,5,8,13	55:8 57:14,19,22
rise 5:17	44:22 45:19 48:18	33:18 56:21	36:4,9,13 56:4,7	suffer 25:24
risen 53:24	50:18,18 52:15	set 17:17 39:12	sounds 45:5	suffered 44:12 46:6
road 11:17	56:8	settlement 32:5	speak 45:24	47:14
ROBERTS 3:3	Scalia 3:21 4:2,7	34:25 43:3 55:24	specify 25:6,8	suffering 36:25
12:13 15:21 16:2	5 cana 5.21 T.2,1	seven 43:12 57:13	squares 27:16	51:23
			1	1

Page 67

				rage 07
sufficiently 35:6	tenure 6:25 21:9	53:5,19,23 54:2,4	21:20 25:9 27:5	usually 36:11,19
suggested 12:22	term 24:22 26:11	54:17 57:3	42:10,13 43:7	
22:11 38:11	27:19	Third 48:12	47:2 50:16 56:4	V
suggesting 6:7 15:6	terminal 21:10	thought 29:18 56:5	try 5:21 52:17,23	v 1:5 3:4
40:14	termination 6:6,7	three 16:16 17:1	trying 22:3 53:20	version 29:1,2
suggests 15:22	7:3 8:25 11:6	18:12,21,22 21:6	53:24	35:22 38:16
41:15	15:9,24 16:17	24:24 25:2 57:15	turn 19:20 55:19	vicarious 48:11
suit 39:10,12 42:5,7	19:24,25 21:4	thrown 36:11	two 4:16 7:18,25	view 25:1 41:2
42:13,14	22:8 24:4 29:19	thrust 14:6	10:6,24 26:24	VII 3:11 6:20 15:7
suits 42:11	37:10 47:16,25	ticking 26:24	30:7 32:18 36:18	15:7 37:22,22
superior 29:6	terminations 22:10	time 8:16,17 11:15	38:5 41:24 47:15	48:2 55:13,15
support 1:22 2:11	terms 54:20	19:7 25:23 36:18	48:18 50:5 54:10	violation 48:2 54:8
37:17 58:4	text 39:22,25	37:4 40:15,15	56:13 57:11	virtues 19:22
suppose 16:25 33:5	Thank 19:8 37:13	43:5 44:12 46:10	type 51:23 52:11	
44:16 47:11	55:3 58:2	49:17 50:11 51:16	types 52:20	W
Supreme 1:1,13	theory 11:19	51:18 53:8	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	wait 12:18
sure 33:15 40:25	thing 24:9 35:18	time-honored 5:8	U	walked 29:21
48:18 52:7	46:10,20 47:20	timeliness 3:11	unclear 39:23	want 12:10,10
suspect 52:18 53:10	48:7 53:22 57:10	6:20	underlying 30:10	15:10 22:2,23
suspect 52.16 55.16 synonymous 38:5,6	things 23:3,6 30:21	timely 31:7	31:8,15 40:20	30:1 35:8 44:15
synonymous 50.5,0	36:20 39:12,16	times 51:22	52:22	53:3 55:19 57:12
Т	43:12 46:7 47:15	title 3:11 6:20 15:7	understand 28:22	wants 28:16
T 2:1,1	54:10	15:7 29:7 37:21	32:2 46:22	warranted 30:23
tagged 49:1	think 5:15 7:11,22	37:22 48:2 55:13	understanding	warranty 28:17
take 12:9,15 16:16	7:22 10:23 11:1	57:22 48:2 55:15	45:4	29:4
16:25 26:1,8,13	11:18,18 13:10,11	today 24:9,10	undisputed 4:15	Washington 1:9,19
27:19,24 28:15	13:11,22 14:5	26:24	unequivocal 32:8	1:21
30:16 31:25 32:21	15:21 16:9,19	tolling 35:14,16	uniform 50:1	wasn't 29:17,19
33:9,17 35:2,19	17:2,16,20 19:22	tort 42:5,7,11,13	unique 15:6 53:6	36:23,25
36:24 37:4 41:10	20:3,9,19 21:13	44:3	United 1:1,13	way 4:12 12:3 15:9
42:7 49:8 52:1,9	20:3,9,19 21:15 21:25 22:4,22,24	treat 43:21 48:9,12	unlawful 4:21 9:6	28:7 29:17 32:16
taken 33:11,23	23:22,23 25:15,18	48:18	13:19 20:22 38:13	35:15
37:2 53:16	25:22 26:25 27:1	treated 15:9 27:14	39:4 43:25 48:3	ways 10:24 42:17
takes 33:19	27:10,16 28:10	39:18	49:18 50:2 54:18	We'll 3:3
talking 7:24 32:1,9	29:10,24 30:5,6	trigger 6:6 9:3 12:1	unnecessary 3:17	we're 15:3 20:4
43:11,15,16	30:15 31:1 32:4,8	15:1 16:22 17:2	15:12	21:1 22:3 43:11
talks 13:19	32:13,17 33:12,14	44:14	unprecedented	43:15,16 44:20
tangible 48:10,15	35:4,11,18 36:2	triggered 5:10 6:18	28:12	49:4,5,7 51:4
target 38:22	36:15,16,20 37:7	6:24,24	unquestionably	we've 44:22
teacher 17:21	38:9,18,21 39:1	triggering 41:4	52:25	weak 11:21 12:11
tell 15:18 24:18	39:17 40:1 41:5	48:4	untethered 57:16	weeks 12:17 26:24
25:12 52:8,16	41:15 42:1,10	triggers 39:21	unusual 28:11	36:22,24
tenant 28:18	44:10,25 45:18	trouble 44:19	30:17 37:3 39:7,8	went 31:12
Tenth 3:16 15:12	46:11,23 48:25	true 4:22,25 5:23	urge 37:12	weren't 23:18 29:8
15:16 16:12 55:22	49:21,22 50:8,19	6:4 10:23 12:8	use 5:13	whichever 24:11
55:23 56:17	51:21,25 52:22	14:3 15:5 18:6	useful 37:7	win 10:7 11:3
	51.21,25 52.22	17.3 13.3 10.0		
	1	1	1	1

Page 68

i				
wish as 19.15 10.2	17.10 21.11			
wishes 18:15 19:3	17:19 21:11	5		
Wolfman 1:16 2:3	years 8:10 12:11,14	00 10.10		
2:14 3:5,6,8,24	36:1	55 2:15		
4:5,9,22,25 5:15	yielded 29:6			
5:23,25 6:4 7:11	Z	<u>6</u>		
7:16 8:1,6,19 9:11		60 32:7,19		
9:13,23 10:2,3,17	0	61 32:7,19		
10:20,23 11:18		7		
12:19 13:10,17	1	<i>I</i>		
14:9,17,23 15:25	1 57:17	8		
16:4,9,18 17:2,5,7	100 40:25	0		
17:12,20 18:4,9	11:07 1:14 3:2	9		
18:14,18,23 55:4	12:04 58:8			
55:5,7 56:6,12	14 24:8,10			
57:11	14-613 1:4 3:4			
wonder 44:8	142 55:11			
word 38:18 39:18	143 55:11			
words 10:9	16th 31:24 32:6			
work 3:19 18:25,25	19 2:7			
21:6 24:8 26:24	1987 35:23			
30:4,10,12,21				
37:1 41:13 44:9	2			
44:10 45:20,25	2 57:18			
46:25 49:23 51:23	2000 35:23			
52:2 54:21 56:1	2000e-16(c) 51:8			
57:4,5,7,20	2009 40:8			
workforce 52:11	2015 1:10			
working 21:10	23 56:22			
works 28:6	2A 55:23			
world 42:20				
worth 50:19	3			
wouldn't 12:10	3 2:4			
24:1 30:23 33:8	30 1:10			
35:11 42:15 45:1	300 56:2			
written 12:4,4	31st 32:20 33:12			
wrong 35:13	37 2:12			
wrongly 16:24				
Wyoming 33:6	4			
34:1	40 45:21			
	400 37:2			
$\frac{\mathbf{X}}{-122}$	45 3:25 25:3 26:15			
x 1:2,8	26:16 45:13 57:5			
Y	45-day 6:6 20:11			
yeah 14:14 39:14	24:16 47:4			
year 8:11,12,18,24	46th 45:22			
ycai 0.11,12,10,24				
	l	l	l	1