1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	JONATHAN EDWARD BOYER, :
4	Petitioner : No. 11-9953
5	v. :
6	LOUISIANA :
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Monday, January 14, 2013
10	
11	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
13	at 11:00 a.m.
14	APPEARANCES:
15	RICHARD BOURKE, ESQ., New Orleans, Louisiana; on behalf
16	of Petitioner.
17	CARLA S. SIGLER, ESQ., Assistant District Attorney, Lake
18	Charles, Louisiana; on behalf of Respondent.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:00 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument next this morning in Case 11-9953,
5	Boyer v. Louisiana.
б	Mr. Bourke?
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD BOURKE
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. BOURKE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
10	please the Court:
11	The Louisiana Court of Appeal in this case
12	correctly found that the majority of the delay the
13	seven-year delay was caused by the lack of funding, but,
14	when moving to assess that cause under Barker,
15	incorrectly determined that it was a cause beyond the
16	control of the State and, adopting its earlier ruling
17	under the State statute, found that it was a cause
18	beyond the control of the State, in the sense that it
19	was beyond the control of the local district attorney's
20	office.
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Bourke, was was it
22	within the control of your client?
23	MR. BOURKE: He was unable to fund himself,
24	Your Honor. That is why he asked for the appointment of
25	counsel.

3

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: Was he unable to get his
2	Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial?
3	MR. BOURKE: Yes.
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why?
5	MR. BOURKE: That is he was unable to
6	move forward to trial because he was not provided with
7	counsel adequately funded to advance the
8	JUSTICE SCALIA: He had he had one
9	counsel, right? During the whole time?
10	MR. BOURKE: In fact, in a sense, Your
11	Honor, he had two counsel.
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. For part of it, he
13	had two, and then there was not enough funding for the
14	second, okay? So he was faced with a choice.
15	Louisiana, as I understand it, has adopted a
16	provision, which the Sixth Amendment does not require.
17	The Sixth Amendment just requires counsel, but Louisiana
18	says, in capital cases, we are going to provide two
19	counsel, and you can't go to trial until you have two
20	counsel, okay?
21	MR. BOURKE: No, Your Honor
22	JUSTICE SCALIA: No?
23	MR. BOURKE: that is not correct. That
24	is not the State of Louisiana law.
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the State of

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1 Louisiana law? 2 MR. BOURKE: Louisiana absolutely does not 3 provide a right to two counsel in capital cases. The 4 Louisiana Supreme Court, in Rule 31, provided that the 5 court should appoint two counsel, but, also, it provided expressly that that created no procedural or substantive 6 7 right. 8 Similarly, there is no right --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I don't -- I don't 10 understand that. That's not Louisiana law that you --11 that you can't proceed without two counsel? That's not 12 the law in Louisiana? I thought that's --13 MR. BOURKE: That is not the law in 14 Louisiana. 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I -- you don't consider 16 supreme court rules to be law? 17 MR. BOURKE: It is a supreme court rule 18 which directs the trial judge to appoint two counsel. 19 However, it makes it clear --20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it the fact that, in 21 Louisiana, you cannot proceed to trial in a capital 22 case, unless there are two counsel? 23 MR. BOURKE: No, Your Honor. That is not 24 the --25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Then -- then you don't have

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1	a case. You should have proceeded to trial.
2	MR. BOURKE: No, Your Honor. In in this
3	case, as the court of appeal correctly found, Mr. Boyer
4	did not have adequate funding for the case to go to
5	trial. The court of appeal did not predicate that on
б	the need for two counsel. The motion to determine
7	source of funds was not predicated on Rule 31.
8	JUSTICE GINSBURG: The one the one
9	counsel who was qualified, what was his name?
10	MR. BOURKE: Mr. Lorenzi was lead certified
11	counsel.
12	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Lorenzi, yes. He was
13	only one at the time who was qualified to be lead
14	counsel?
15	MR. BOURKE: Correct.
16	JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the Louisiana Supreme
17	Court said, you don't have to do this. You're his
18	you're his attorney, but you have a right to be paid,
19	and the State has to pay you.
20	So there was no obligation on the counsel's
21	part to do anything; and he kept asking, please have a
22	funding order, let me be paid, and I'll do my job.
23	MR. BOURKE: Yes, Mr. Lorenzi declined to
24	pay for Mr. Boyer's defense out of his own pocket.
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: Wasn't there, at all times,

б

1	one counsel who was being paid by the State?
2	MR. BOURKE: There was
3	JUSTICE SCALIA: At all times?
4	MR. BOURKE: There was, at all times, one
5	counsel appointed as associate counsel, that is for the
6	purpose of assisting Mr. Lorenzi as lead counsel.
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: Was that counsel qualified
8	enough under our constitutional Sixth Amendment
9	jurisprudence?
10	MR. BOURKE: Well, I don't understand the
11	the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to place
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well
13	MR. BOURKE: a qualification minimum, so
14	I'm not sure I'm understanding your question.
15	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, the question is would
16	only lead counsel under under the supreme court's
17	rule qualify as competent counsel, for purposes of
18	complying with the constitutional requirement? Or would
19	this certified second chair qualify?
20	MR. BOURKE: The there is no I'm
21	having trouble answering the question, Justice Scalia,
22	because the two things don't talk to each other. The
23	Sixth Amendment doesn't impose a certification
24	requirement.
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: Exactly. I'm just saying

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1	can you establish that the one counsel that your client
2	had throughout this whole whole proceeding would not
3	satisfy the constitutional requirement?
4	Can you is there any basis for your
5	saying that?
6	MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor.
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: What?
8	MR. BOURKE: The court of appeal twice
9	found knowing that associate counsel had been
10	appointed, the court of appeal twice found that the case
11	could not proceed due to a lack of adequate funding, and
12	the State
13	JUSTICE SCALIA: Not because of a Federal
14	constitutional reason. The court found, you are not
15	complying with the supreme court rule. You can't
16	proceed without complying with the supreme court rule.
17	It seems to me your client was faced with a
18	choice: You could either demand what Louisiana, in its
19	generosity, has given to capital defendants, namely, the
20	right to two counsel whether it's by statute or by
21	supreme court rule, it doesn't matter you could either
22	demand that right; or you could demand your right to a
23	speedy trial. That was your choice.
24	And it seems to me what counsel chose was to
25	insist, all along, I want my right to two to two

8

1	counsel. You didn't have to
2	JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Bourke, did anyone
3	JUSTICE SCALIA: you didn't have to take
4	that right. You could have gone to the to the
5	supreme court and said you know, since it's taking so
6	long, I demand my constitutional right to a speedy
7	trial. But you didn't do that.
8	MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, if Mr. Boyer had
9	been brought into court and had been told, we've got
10	associate counsel here; they are qualified in the sense
11	that they are barred in Louisiana, and they can take
12	your case to trial and move it forward now.
13	But, if you wait, we might have funding for
14	another lawyer here, who will join him, is more senior
15	and experienced and will double your firepower. You can
16	choose, Mr. Boyer, do you want to go ahead now with this
17	guy? Or do you want to wait?
18	In that circumstance, there would not be an
19	invidious choice between the right to counsel and the
20	right to speedy trial. It would be, we are giving you
21	constitutionally adequate counsel, and you can wait for
22	better, if you wish to.
23	But that is not what occurred here. And,
24	Justice Scalia, the
25	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you can you tell me

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1 why that is not what occurred here?

2 MR. BOURKE: Because the funding problem did 3 not exist solely around Mr. Lorenzi's overhead and 4 expenditure. There was no money for investigation. 5 There was no money for experts. And the associate counsel who had been appointed had been appointed solely 6 7 and for the limited purpose as an assistant to 8 Mr. Lorenzi, not to conduct the case in his own right. 9 If this issue had been raised in the trial 10 court, this would have been clearly explained into this 11 record. It wasn't. But the trial court and the 12 appellate court of -- the court of appeal -- Third 13 Circuit in Louisiana knew and understood that there was 14 no investigative funding. There was no expert funding. 15 There had been an assistant. 16 This isn't the case where there was a lawyer 17 appointed and they were waiting for the second lawyer. 18 It's a case where they'd found an assistant and were 19 waiting for the first lawyer. 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How much money would 21 be needed for investigation and experts before you would 22 acknowledge that that would be competent representation? 23 MR. BOURKE: That's a very case-specific determination, Your Honor and, in Louisiana, at that 24 25 time, rested with a judicial determination that the

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1 investigative or expert expenses were reasonably 2 necessary to ensure a fair trial within the meaning of 3 the Due Process Clause. 4 So it -- it was a funding level tagged to 5 the constitutional minimum of due process. 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, a finding by the 7 district court -- or whichever court found it, that 8 there was not enough money to pay counsel, to investigate, and to -- to do whatever else -- buy 9 10 stamps -- is not a finding by the district court that 11 there was not enough money to investigate and to buy 12 stamps. 13 Counsel was a part of that mix. You never 14 had a finding that there was not enough money to pay 15 counsel, right? Or -- I'm sorry -- that there was not 16 enough money to allow the counsel that has been 17 appointed to investigate and buy stamps. 18 Was there ever any such finding? 19 MR. BOURKE: There was never --20 JUSTICE SCALIA: The -- the big tag item 21 was -- was paying counsel; wasn't it? 22 MR. BOURKE: No, Your Honor. That was one 23 of the big tag items. But, in a capital case, the investigation of both the guilt phase and the full 24 mitigation and life investigation, along with the use of 25

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1 potential expert witnesses, particularly in the case 2 where there were all the indications of mental health 3 problems and the like, are often equal to or, in some 4 cases, greater than the cost of counsel.

5 And so, no, the big -- the big tag item wasn't just Mr. Lorenzi's overhead and expenses. 6 The 7 big tag item was providing adequate funding. And to 8 return to your earlier point, Justice Scalia, just to --9 to make it clear, the Louisiana Supreme Court cases, 10 which mandate that a case cannot go forward without 11 counsel, do not reference Rule 31 at all, or two 12 counsel.

13 They are cases which stand for the 14 proposition that the case cannot go forward without 15 constitutionally adequate counsel, counsel who can 16 provide reasonably effective assistance.

17 This case began in 2002. At that point, the 18 controlling Louisiana decision on not moving forward without effective assistance was Peart -- P-e-a-r-t --19 which we cite in our brief, which said that the court 20 21 will not allow a case to proceed without reasonably effective counsel. 2.2

23 During the life of this case -- sorry. JUSTICE BREYER: Your -- your point of view 24 25 in this case --

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1	MR. BOURKE: Yes, sir.
2	JUSTICE BREYER: In your point of view,
3	would it satisfy you if we say, the Louisiana court of
4	appeal found the largest part of the delay involved the
5	funding crisis experienced by the State of Louisiana
б	that meant giving you adequate money for counsel.
7	Then they said, the progression of the
8	prosecution was out of the State's control, as
9	determined by this court, which I think referred to that
10	funding crisis. And we could and your view would be
11	that's what they said. We don't know the underlying
12	facts, but that's what they said.
13	And, insofar as they said that the State
14	wasn't responsible for that part of the delay that they
15	are talking about, they're wrong because the State is
16	responsible for not providing enough money, even if it's
17	a problem and to say they weren't responsible is wrong,
18	okay? That's what you want us to say?
19	MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor.
20	JUSTICE BREYER: Period. And send it back.
21	MR. BOURKE: Well, Your Honor
22	JUSTICE GINSBURG: You would like us to say
23	what Judge Cook said in in her opinion, that
24	responsibility for funding rests with the State, not
25	with the defendant.

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1	Once an attorney is appointed, it is the
2	State's obligation to ensure that adequate funds are
3	available for the defense. And I take "for the defense"
4	to mean not simply counsel, but the witnesses, the
5	the investigation.
б	It is certainly true that none of the delay
7	due to the lack of funds was, in any way, attributable
8	to the defense. That's, essentially, what you would
9	like us to say?
10	MR. BOURKE: That is what Judge Cook said
11	and
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think it's enough
13	that none of the delay was attributable to the defense.
14	The defense has to complain, has to demand its right to
15	a prompt trial.
16	What did your client do? Frankly, I I am
17	skeptical that a capital defendant who has already
18	confessed to the crime wants to be tried as soon as
19	possible. I'm skeptical about that.
20	Now, what what did your client do to
21	demand his right to a prompt trial?
22	MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, what Mr. Boyer did
23	was act, at all times, in full compliance with the
24	procedural mechanisms set up in Louisiana for doing
25	that.

14

1	At arraignment he he had already
2	identified he was indigent and asked for counsel. At
3	arraignment, he requested a jury trial.
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
5	MR. BOURKE: His lawyer was appointed, and
6	his lawyer immediately identified the funding problem
7	and said, we need money, or we can't go forward.
8	Louisiana statute bars counsel from filing a motion for
9	speedy trial without an affidavit saying, you're ready
10	to go forward. Louisiana has said, in Article 7
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that's surely,
12	that's unconstitutional. Did counsel say, I demand a
13	speedy trial? You can't condition my right to a speedy
14	trial upon my getting some affidavit or something.
15	MR. BOURKE: It's a procedural rule, Your
16	Honor.
17	JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm still waiting for
18	for anybody telling the court, I demand a speedy trial,
19	and, if I don't get a speedy trial, you are violating
20	the Constitution, and I ought to go scot-free.
21	MR. BOURKE: Well, Your Honor, the rule I am
22	referring to is a procedural rule. It does not, in any
23	way, limit the relief from a speedy trial, but you can't
24	move for a speedy trial. You can move to quash because
25	you have been denied one, but you can't move for one.

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1	It's exactly what this Court referred to
2	in
3	JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't it true that you
4	waited three years before doing that?
5	MR. BOURKE: That was the first point at
6	which, under Louisiana procedure, he had a remedy
7	available, exactly as Judge Cook stated in her
8	abstaining opinion. That was when he could move to
9	quash. He could not move for a speedy trial in a valid
10	motion for speedy trial, without having an affidavit
11	saying, we are ready to go.
12	Louisiana has passed that rule to stop pro
13	forma requests for speedy trial.
14	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Can we clarify one point?
15	Justice Scalia said something about a defendant facing
16	the death penalty going "scot-free." There was an armed
17	robbery charge that was added in 2007.
18	Do you dispute that a new clock started in
19	2007, the first time that the robbery charge was was
20	made?
21	MR. BOURKE: We do, Your Honor. That armed
22	robbery charge is a lesser included offense of the
23	first-degree murder count. Mr. Boyer was originally
24	indicted on first-degree murder, which, in Louisiana, is
25	intentional killing during the course of an armed

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robbery -- there are other varieties, of course -- but
 intentional killing during an armed robbery. And those
 are the elements of first-degree murder.

The State unpacked those two elements -- or two lesser included offenses, to second-degree murder, which is intentional killing, and armed robbery. And the State, in fact, conceded that, had the charge remained a first-degree murder charge, then the armed probbery charge would have created a double jeopardy problem.

11 And that's at page 3703 to '4 of the record, 12 where counsel for the State indicated that the armed 13 robbery charge could be added because the primary 14 charge, the -- the first-degree murder, had been dropped to second-degree murder, and specifically said, 15 16 Mr Bourke is correct, that, had we filed for 17 first-degree murder, there may be double jeopardy 18 problems.

But, because they had unpacked that charge from murder and armed robbery down to murder and, also, armed robbery, there was no double jeopardy problem. That is what --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: What about -- what about the basic problem in this case, as I understand the question presented, is should the State be responsible

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1	when the funding problem is at a local level?
2	So suppose you have a State that says you
3	know, we have had problems in funding; if we give this
4	to the counties, it's going to be much better, and the
5	counties are very, very good at raising money and
б	knowing who the counsel are. And so it's all handled by
7	the county.
8	Then one county has a disaster, a hurricane
9	in that county, particularly. Is that not a reason for
10	delaying? Or does the State have to immediately step in
11	and and supplement the funding? Can't the county
12	say, oh, we need another two years?
13	MR. BOURKE: Well, Justice Kennedy
14	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I take it that's the issue
15	that we're trying to decide here.
16	MR. BOURKE: Well, I think it starts with
17	the proposition that it is the State, not the
18	prosecutor, who has the responsibility to ensure a
19	speedy trial, in accordance with due process.
20	And then the State can make all sorts of
21	different arrangements, and the States around this
22	country make different arrangements, but it's their
23	responsibility to make sure that they work. And, if
24	they don't work, then the State is going to have to make
25	reasonable accommodation for that, to meet its

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1 responsibility.

2 And so, by assisting the cause of delay 3 against the State, but within the Barker weighing 4 framework, the courts dealing with speedy trial claims 5 would be able to deal with short-term unexpected 6 exigencies. They would be able to weigh the 7 reasonableness of the response. 8 A valid reason for delay will justify that delay, as this Court said in Barker, but here --9 10 JUSTICE BREYER: The answer to the 11 question -- that's what I was trying to do -- this case -- the briefing is filled with whether he asked in 12 13 time, whether he was delaying, whether he should have 14 done some other thing, whether he should have -- but the question that's asked is, simply, whether the failure to 15 16 fund counsel is a factor that should be weighed against 17 the State. 18 MR. BOURKE: Yes. 19 JUSTICE BREYER: And maybe it only gets very 20 little weight because maybe there was a hurricane, and 21 maybe it doesn't even matter because he didn't make the right motions. But the lower court said it shouldn't be 22 23 weighed against the State, period. And do we have to do anything other than say, if you're right, yes, it 24

25 should.

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1	Now, how much weight it gets, well, that
2	depends. There was a hurricane and but but it's
3	something that they can't just ignore in in the
4	hearing. They have to figure out what happened and
5	to to the extent the State should have done more, it
б	weighs against the State.
7	Do you want any more than that?
8	MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor.
9	JUSTICE BREYER: And what else?
10	MR. BOURKE: The first thing that we want is
11	exactly that, Your Honor, that the court below
12	incorrectly incorrectly failed to attribute this to
13	the State. And this Court I accept this Court could
14	stop there and remand to the Third Circuit to deal with
15	that in accordance with
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: Not not quite. I mean,
17	the question presented is not as general as that. It's
18	much more fact-bound.
19	It says whether a State's failure to fund
20	counsel for an indigent for five years, particularly
21	where failure was the direct result of the prosecution's
22	choice to seek the death penalty, should be weighed
23	against the State for speedy trial purposes.
24	I think this is inviting us to look into the
25	facts of this case and decide whether this five-year

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1 delay, particularly since the prosecution chose the 2 death penalty -- you know, I don't like having to do 3 that and -- but it seems, to me, that's what the 4 question presented at least requires. 5 MR. BOURKE: Well, Your Honor, it -- I think it would be open to this Court to answer the question by 6 7 saying the court got it wrong at the first step by 8 failing to attribute it to the State and then remand for full consideration of weighing, in light of that. 9

10 What we have asked in our briefing for the 11 Court to do is to also provide some guidance on the 12 weight that should be given to delay resulting from the 13 lack of funding because in this case --

JUSTICE ALITO: If we provide -- if we provide that guidance, what do we do about the continuances that Mr. Lorenzi requested that relate to the funding? "January 10, 2003, Lorenzi requests a continuance of funding hearing, citing scheduling problems."

20 "August 5, 2003, Lorenzi moves to continue
21 hearing on motion to designate source of funds so that
22 the Indigent Defender Board can consider funding Boyer's
23 case at an August 26 meeting." So this is -- okay.
24 "Lorenzi moves to continue September 12,
25 2003. Lorenzi moves to continue hearing on motion to

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1 designate funds in trial, so that the IDB may, again, 2 consider the funding defense at its next meeting. 3 December 15, Lorenzi moves to continue hearing on motion 4 to designate funds," et cetera. 5 There are many of these motions. What do we do with those? 6 7 MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, I'd suggest that 8 this Court does exactly the same thing that the Louisiana Court of Appeal did with them, which was to 9 10 find that it was the lack of funding, not any action by 11 Mr. Lorenzi, which caused the delay. 12 The -- the Louisiana Court of Appeal declined to adopt the State's argument that it was Mr. 13 14 Lorenzi's fault. And the reason it did that was because 15 the lack of a funding hearing caused no delay at all in 16 the conduct of this trial. 17 The funding hearing, when conducted, 18 produced no funding, no ruling or order, and had no influence on the date of the trial. And, of course, the 19 20 right at issue was the right to go to trial, not to --21 the timing of pretrial hearings. 22 Furthermore, all of those continuances, which were joined in by the State, were related to 23 24 trying to identify and find funding for this case and 25 for this man. None of them were for a dilatory purpose.

22

1	They were because a new procedure was
2	announced to submit bills in a different way to the IDB
3	because the Louisiana Supreme Court had accepted the
4	Citizen case. And ultimately
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I mean,
б	Justice Alito's problem seemed, to me, to get back to
7	Justice Scalia's point, is that he seemed more
8	interested in the funding than a speedy trial, the
9	funding that would be provided by the State under its
10	procedures.
11	MR. BOURKE: In the absence of funding,
12	there was no trial to be had. At the funding hearing
13	or I'm sorry at the motion to quash hearing in
14	November 2006, there was a colloquy between the trial
15	court and the prosecutor in which the trial court said,
16	what are we going to do with this case? They can't have
17	a defense without money.
18	This was not absolutely not
19	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And, as
20	Justice Alito pointed out on several occasions, what the
21	defense lawyer said was, let's put it off and see if we
22	can get funding, let's put it off until there's the
23	funding hearing, let's put it off and put it off, as
24	opposed to saying, I want a speedy trial, I'm entitled
25	to it now, if you don't have the money, I don't get a

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1 speedy trial, I get off scot-free.

2 MR. BOURKE: Well, under Louisiana's Article 3 701, there was no filing a motion for speedy trial, 4 saying, please give me a speedy trial, set a date now. 5 And at the same time --

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: The Constitution requires 7 such a motion. I mean, I don't care whether they have 8 a -- you know, a speedy trial motion. If -- if denying 9 him the right to speedy trial violates the Constitution, 10 surely, he is entitled to bring that to the attention of 11 the Louisiana court, whether there's a specific 12 statutory or rule provision or not.

MR. BOURKE: Your Honor, this Court, in Barker, when dealing with this very topic under the issue of assertion, specifically said it would allow judges to take account of assertion in accordance with local procedural requirements.

The local procedural requirement in a State that already has its own statutory prescriptive period, if you don't bring second-degree murder to trial within two years, you're out.

The -- Louisiana does not need a defendant to tell them that they have to bring a speedy trial, and they don't want a defendant doing it, unless they're ready to go to trial themselves. They don't want the

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1	sort of pro forma assertion that was rejected.
2	JUSTICE SCALIA: Now, they they don't
3	even want counsel to say you know, Your Honor, we've
4	been trying to get funding, and we're we're just sick
5	and tired of waiting for this. We demand a speedy
б	trial, and, if we don't get funding and, therefore,
7	don't get a speedy trial, we think there's a
8	constitutional violation, and we're going to ask that
9	the indictment be dismissed.
10	MR. BOURKE: Well, in July
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: Nobody ever made a
12	statement like that to the Court, did they?
13	MR. BOURKE: In July of 2005
14	JUSTICE SCALIA: What did you say?
15	MR. BOURKE: In July of 2005, Mr. Lorenzi
16	moved to quash the indictment and said exactly that,
17	said, it's too late, no funding, no trial, speedy trial
18	is up. And it was still another two years before the
19	funding crisis was solved.
20	So there was a very lengthy period, if such
21	notice were required and that is not, in our
22	submission, the message from Barker and the message from
23	Article 701, they got that notice in July 2005, when
24	there was the motion to quash.
25	And returning to your question

25

1	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But wasn't there
2	something about that motion was withdrawn the 2005
3	motion was withdrawn in 2006?
4	MR. BOURKE: If if I can clarify that,
5	Justice Ginsburg, Mr. Lorenzi was at pains to say he was
6	not withdrawing the motion, but dismissing the motion to
7	quash because he couldn't advance it in a successful way
8	in Louisiana without demonstrating prejudice.
9	JUSTICE SCALIA: Dismissing it, instead of
10	withdrawing it, that's the fine line he's drawing?
11	MR. BOURKE: He specifically
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that a line in Louisiana
13	law? I don't know. Does this this come from French
14	law or something? It seems, to me, withdrawing and
15	dismissing sound, to me, the same thing.
16	MR. BOURKE: Well, the point, Your Honor,
17	was that he was not withdrawing his claim to a speedy
18	trial, but, rather, dismissing his motion to quash on
19	the violation of that at
20	JUSTICE SCALIA: Withdrawing his motion to
21	quash. So it was withdrawn, right?
22	MR. BOURKE: No, it was dismissed. He chose
23	dismiss, rather than withdraw is the word, and what he
24	intended by that was that he wasn't saying, I don't want
25	one; he was saying, I can't bring the type of hearing

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1 Louisiana courts require to get my Sixth Amendment 2 motion to quash granted. 3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I -- I think what you --4 let's go back to that. It was his view that, under 5 Louisiana law to assert his Sixth Amendment right, he had to follow the procedure laid out in the Louisiana 6 7 rule? 8 MR. BOURKE: To move for a speedy trial, he 9 had to do exactly that. 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Under the 11 Sixth Amendment, he had to comply with the 12 requirements -- the procedural requirements of 13 Louisiana. 14 MR. BOURKE: The local procedural requirements for how one goes about doing that. 15 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So then how 17 do you -- if he couldn't do it in 2002, '03, '04, or 18 '05, how did he end up doing it in '05? 19 MR. BOURKE: The -- it's the difference 20 between moving for a speedy trial, please give me a 21 trial date, I want to go to trial next week, and moving 22 to quash because the speedy trial right has been 23 violated. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why didn't he move to 24

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25 quash earlier?

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1	MR. BOURKE: He moved to quash at the first
2	moment that it became available under the State statute,
3	which was at the three-year mark. He moved one month
4	after that three-year mark, as soon as it became
5	available.
6	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. What is
7	there a law or a regulation in in Louisiana that
8	gives it a three-year mark?
9	MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor. Article 579
10	and following provides that the State must bring a
11	first-degree murder charge to trial within three years,
12	or the case is prescribed, the indictment must be
13	dismissed with prejudice. And so the State always knew
14	it had that deadline.
15	It didn't even set a trial date for a period
16	of over three years in the middle of this, didn't even
17	try to set a trial date for three-and-a-half years,
18	didn't bring Mr. Boyer into court for
19	three-and-a-half years to address his case at all.
20	And so, as soon as the remedy available
21	became open, as Judge Cook said in her opinion, defense
22	counsel filed using exactly the remedy provided for.
23	If there are no further questions, Your
24	Honor, I will reserve the remainder of my time.
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

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1	Ms. Sigler?
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF CARLA S. SIGLER
3	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
4	MS. SIGLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
5	please the Court:
6	This Court should affirm the holding of the
7	Third Circuit Court of Appeals for three separate
8	reasons.
9	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How about the
10	reasoning is delay because of the lack of funding
11	attributable to the State or not? Or to the district
12	attorney as agent of the State?
13	MS. SIGLER: Justice Sotomayor, I don't
14	believe that the funding that we can credibly argue
15	that funding is completely outside the role of the
16	State.
17	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what's wrong with
18	what's been suggested by some, to remand to tell the
19	court below to whatever extent this was the basis of
20	your decision, it was wrong. Now, redo the Barker
21	the factors.
22	MS. SIGLER: Well, Your Honor, if you review
23	the Third Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, which is at
24	Appendix D, the other Barker factors are analyzed,
25	incredibly thoroughly, with a mind to this Court's

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jurisprudence, and the rationale may be flawed with regard to that one point in this Court's opinion, but the result is not.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So is one factor determinative always in this calculation? I thought it was a weighing factor. And so, if it's a weighing factor, why isn't that, in and of itself, a factor that a court needs to weigh against the others?

9 MS. SIGLER: I think that this Court has 10 always acknowledged, in its Barker v. Wingo 11 jurisprudence, that there is no one talismanic factor; 12 all of the factors are interrelated, and all are 13 reviewed. And that is why, even if the Court disagrees 14 with that one assessment of the Third Circuit's opinion, 15 the result is sound.

16 With --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but how do we know that? How do we know that they would have reached the same determination if they had gotten it right on that single factor?

21 MS. SIGLER: I think, when you look at the 22 Third Circuit of Appeals opinion, they specifically --23 and with direct quotations to Barker v. Wingo, go 24 through every other factor in the analysis. And they 25 discuss the fact of the repeated continuances of defense

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1 counsel of his own funding motion as part of the 2 assertion of the right. 3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But wait a minute. This 4 is a --5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Whether something is --JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: 6 I'm sorry. 7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Whether something is the State's fault is a significant factor in the analysis, 8 9 and we have made that very clear in our cases. And so, 10 if they got that wrong -- and -- and you, I think, quite 11 rightly, are saying we can't defend that part of it --12 if they got that wrong, don't we at least have to say, 13 okay, well, get it right now, and do it again? 14 MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Kagan, I don't 15 think that what I would say is they got it completely 16 wrong because, as this Court has acknowledged throughout 17 its Barker jurisprudence, there are different weights 18 you attribute to government action, whether it is 19 negligence or whether it is a deliberate attempt on 20 behalf of the State to evade giving a defendant his 21 Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I would like to get 23 the structure of your argument. You began to say 24 there's three reasons. I would just like to hear those 25 three reasons, so that I can understand the framework

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for all these questions. 2 MS. SIGLER: Yes, sir, Justice Kennedy. 3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The three reasons that we 4 should affirm. 5 MS. SIGLER: The first reason is that, as in Vermont v. Brillon, the delay occasioned in this case 6 7 was due to Petitioner's counsel's repeated requests to 8 continue his own funding motion, which delayed a source 9 of funding when he -- the Petitioner wished to proceed 10 with capital-certified counsel. 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Okay. And the second? 12 MS. SIGLER: The second reason, Your Honor, 13 would be, pursuant to Loud Hawk, even if this Court 14 determines that there was a negligence factor with 15 regard to the State of Louisiana in not properly funding 16 capital-certified counsel, there are valid public policy 17 interests at play here and the fact that Louisiana is 18 generous enough to provide specially-certified counsel 19 to capital indigent defendants, when there is no 20 constitutional requirement for it to do so. 21 And then our third argument, Your Honor, 22 would be that, based under the Barker v. Wingo 23 jurisprudence, the delay should not be attributed to the State in this case because of Petitioner's failure to 24 25 meaningfully assert his right to a speedy trial. And --

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1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Okay. Thank you.
2	MS. SIGLER: Yes, sir.
3	JUSTICE GINSBURG: How on that, how could
4	it possibly be Lorenzi's fault, which is what you said
5	is your first point, when he said, pay me, Supreme Court
6	of Louisiana, you have said that my operation as counsel
7	for this indigent defendant doesn't become operative
8	till I get paid, I have a right to get paid.
9	All that counsel did was to say, again and
10	again, pay me, get the funds to pay me. I don't
11	understand how in the world it could be the fault of an
12	attorney who has not gotten one cent from the State, has
13	a right to be paid before he engages in
14	representation how can it be his fault?
15	MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, there
16	are several reasons why it's Mr. Lorenzi's fault. The
17	first of which is he filed a motion under
18	State v. Wigley, and that is Appendix X of your Joint
19	Appendix.
20	In that motion, he identified
21	State v. Wigley, and, although he referenced wanting
22	expert resources as well, he primarily based that motion
23	on his entitlement to attorney's fees.
24	JUSTICE SCALIA: I I was going to ask you
25	that question. Opposing counsel said that it it

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1	wasn't primarily attorney's fees that's at issue here,
2	but investigation costs. That makes a difference to me
3	because, if it's just attorney's fees, he could have
4	gone ahead with one attorney, as far as I'm concerned.
5	MS. SIGLER: I agree with you,
6	Justice Scalia. And, if you look at Appendix LL, which
7	is the hearing on the motion to quash, Mr. Lorenzi says,
8	point blank in that appendix, he says, "I was not
9	going to proceed to file substantive motions until I was
10	funded."
11	And
12	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Doesn't he say, at the
13	same time, I couldn't do the investigation to make the
14	motion required by the State? So didn't that implicate
15	the funding for investigation?
16	MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Sotomayor, if you
17	look at Appendix LL, where Mr. Lorenzi is speaking, he
18	says, "I have done substantial investigation on my own."
19	Mr. Lorenzi had the assistance, at that time, of the
20	LCAC, with Ms. Christine Lehmann assisting him as
21	associate counsel.
22	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Were there funds for
23	investigation?
24	MS. SIGLER: There were funds available in
25	2003 that Mr. Lorenzi did not avail himself of because

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1	he continued his funding motion eight times.
2	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Which funds? Which
3	funds?
4	MS. SIGLER: There were there was a
5	capital defense account that was held by the Calcasieu
6	Parish Public Defender's Office. Mr. Lorenzi identified
7	that account as a source of funding in record volume 1,
8	pages 193 to 194.
9	He says, in a letter to Judge David Painter,
10	then the presiding trial judge, that he has identified a
11	source of funds for his representation. In that same
12	letter, he moves to continue a funding hearing that was,
13	at that time, scheduled for the next month.
14	And
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Wait a minute. I was
16	told maybe I am sort of misreading this record
17	that he was ultimately told that fund wouldn't be made
18	available.
19	MS. SIGLER: That is not correct, Your
20	Honor. If you read Appendix LL, Chief Public Defender
21	Ron Ware testifies that that fund had been used to pay
22	other capital counsel in Calcasieu Parish. It had been
23	used extensively.
24	Now, by the time we get to the funding
25	hearing, which was delayed because of Mr. Lorenzi, we

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1 are in 2006. At that time, there is a backlog in 2 expenses that they are paying other capital counsel 3 because they pay their bills on a first come, first 4 served basis. 5 Had Mr. Lorenzi proceeded to hearing in 2003, there was an identified account that would have б 7 paid him. He did not submit any bills to the public defender's office to be paid. 8 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about --10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Sigler, on appeal, you 11 said this, the -- the State said, because the defendant 12 was without properly funded counsel for so long, the 13 State simply could not ethically or legally bring him to 14 trial. So what did you mean when you said that, that 15 the State could not ethically or legally bring him to 16 trial? 17 MS. SIGLER: Justice Kagan, what that 18 statement meant was that we were aware of the fact that 19 the Petitioner was, at all times, urging his privilege 20 under Rule 31 to capital-certified counsel. 21 We did not want to be involved in the 22 business of questioning a Petitioner's right to counsel. 23 We did not feel that, ethically, we could do so under the Rules of Professional Conduct. For us to interfere 24 25 with that right would have been inappropriate, in our

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1 view. 2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, did you ever say to 3 Mr. Boyer -- you know, you can go ahead, right now, with 4 this single counsel that you have? Was -- was that ever 5 a choice put to him? 6 Or because -- the way I read all of your 7 assertions below and, indeed, the entire record below, 8 is that everybody simply assumed that the case could not 9 go forward in its present circumstances. 10 MS. SIGLER: Justice Kagan, I think that 11 that assumption was made, in part, out of a desire to 12 recognize Mr. Boyer's decision to try to pursue Rule 31 13 privileges. It's certainly -- I understand that we 14 could have --JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, a decision implies a 15 16 choice. Was a choice ever put to him? 17 MS. SIGLER: He had a choice that was 18 implicit, Your Honor, under Louisiana law; and he knew 19 that, and his counsel certainly knew that. 20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, you didn't even know 21 that. You said the State could not ethically or legally 22 bring him to trial. How was he supposed to know that? 23 MS. SIGLER: Justice Kagan, our response 24 in -- in that particular phrase that you are speaking of 25 has to do with our response to how the Petitioner has

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1	phrased this issue all along. The Petitioner has
2	continuously phrased this issue as if he had a right to
3	capital-certified counsel, and, in fact, in his reply
4	brief, that is what he states.
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought I thought the
6	statement meant could not ethically or legally bring him
7	to trial while he is insisting on his right to two
8	counsel.
9	MS. SIGLER: That's correct, Justice Scalia.
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: It would have been
11	different if he had said, the devil with the second
12	counsel, I want a I want a prompt trial.
13	MS. SIGLER: That's correct.
14	JUSTICE SCALIA: Then you would have felt
15	that, legally and ethically, you could proceed.
16	MS. SIGLER: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
17	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about your
18	friend's argument that he couldn't ask for a speedy
19	trial without an affidavit saying he was ready to go to
20	trial?
21	MS. SIGLER: It's interesting that
22	Petitioner argued that here today because, under Article
23	71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while an affidavit
24	is listed in the statute as one requirement, as a matter
25	of course, motions for speedy trial are granted pro se

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3 In addition, Rule 31 does not say that a 4 defendant who is trying to avail himself of Rule 31 5 can't file a motion for a speedy trial. It says nothing to that effect. 6 7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Boyer was -- had a limited education and a low IQ. Did anyone ever counsel 8 9 him about this, no, you don't have to have two lawyers, 10 you can have one? Did any judge ever tell him what his 11 rights were? MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, I would 12 13 first like to address that I do not believe the 14 petitioner has a low IQ. In fact, that was refuted by 15 our Dr. Charles Robertson at a competency proceeding. 16 In fact, the results that was given from an 17 IQ test when he was 15, the person administering it 18 specifically stated that he was malingering, which would 19 cause a 10-point drop in the IO --20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What was the level of his 21 education? MS. SIGLER: I believe his level of 22 education was eighth grade. But I would --23 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And he was expected to 25 know all this about two counsel -- you have a right to

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all the time that meet none of the requirements in that

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statute.

1 two counsel, but, if the State isn't going to pay them, 2 you can go forward with one counsel? 3 Did anyone ever tell this man, with an 4 eighth grade education, what his rights were? 5 MS. SIGLER: Justice Ginsburg, I don't believe that that specific discussion was ever had --6 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: His -- his one counsel 8 might have known. 9 MS. SIGLER: His one --10 JUSTICE SCALIA: He did have one counsel. 11 He had one counsel because he only graduated from the 12 eighth grade. That's why we provide counsel. And that 13 counsel could have known, no? 14 MS. SIGLER: Absolutely. In fact, Mr. Lorenzi was well aware of the fact that he could 15 16 have chosen -- the Petitioner could have chosen to 17 proceed with just one counsel. 18 But I'd also like to note, Justice Scalia, 19 that, from 2002 to 2004, he had three counsel. He had 20 Mr. Lorenzi, he had Mr. Steven Singer, and he had 21 Ms. Christine Lehman. 22 He didn't just have one; he had three. 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And she was not -- you 24 know, you said that, at all times, he had at least two. 25 It seemed to me -- two paid counsel. Lorenzi wasn't

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1 paid, so it was -- was it Singer? 2 MS. SIGLER: Yes, ma'am. 3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And then the woman --4 Lehman, is it? But, when she started representing him, 5 she didn't have the qualifications to be counsel. MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, as has 6 7 been alluded to before, I believe, by Justice Scalia, 8 she absolutely had the qualifications to serve as 9 counsel, as required by the Sixth Amendment. And --10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But she wouldn't -- she 11 couldn't be appointed counsel in a death case under 12 Louisiana's rules. 13 MS. SIGLER: She met the qualifications for 14 associate counsel. In fact, she was later certified in a motion filed by Mr. Lorenzi to be associate counsel --15 16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, but, in the very 17 beginning, she wasn't even gualified to do that. 18 MS. SIGLER: Well, there was a provision --19 there is a provision in Louisiana law -- law that allows someone to move for the admission and the certification 20 21 of somebody as capital counsel, which was the procedure 22 employed in this case. That is perfectly permissible. 23 But Miss Lehman, at that time, was a very experienced attorney, and we lay out her qualifications 24 25 in the brief. So, while she may not have been perfectly

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1 qualified under Rule 31 to serve as lead counsel, she 2 certainly was more than qualified --3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is -- is --4 JUSTICE SCALIA: She was a graduate of Yale 5 law school; wasn't she? 6 MS. SIGLER: She's a very impressive 7 attorney. 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: And another of his counsel, 9 Mr. Singer -- of the three that he had -- he was a 10 graduate of Harvard law school; wasn't he? 11 MS. SIGLER: Yes, Your Honor. 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Son of a gun. 13 MS. SIGLER: Very exceptional. 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is that the minimum constitutional --15 JUSTICE THOMAS: Well, there -- see, he did 16 17 not provide good counsel. 18 (Laughter.) 19 MS. SIGLER: I would refute that, 20 Justice Thomas. 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, is -- do you 22 want to define constitutionally adequate counsel? Is it 23 anybody who's graduated from Harvard and Yale? 24 (Laughter.) 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Or even just passed the

1 bar? 2 MS. SIGLER: Or LSU law. I went to Harvard. 3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I would think -- no, no, 4 This is a very serious question which is, I don't no. 5 know that we have ever defined what the minimum qualification is for gualified counsel. 6 7 But it is -- some of it has to be that 8 counsel themselves feel adequate to represent a capital defendant. 9 10 MS. SIGLER: Well --11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I know plenty of lawyers who would never either volunteer or would resist being 12 13 appointed to take on that kind of case because it has 14 many differences to a normal case. 15 MS. SIGLER: I would agree with that, 16 Justice Sotomayor, but I would invite you to look at the 17 motion that moved for the certification of Ms. Lehman, 18 which is in the record. That motion --19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: She's a very experienced 20 trial counsel. There's no -- no doubt of that. But was 21 she a capital counsel? 2.2 MS. SIGLER: She was, Your Honor. That 23 motion specifically refers to the seven capital cases she had worked on and states that, while at the LCAC ---24 25 the Louisiana Capital Assistance Center -- she had

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1 worked on other capital cases in advisory positions. So 2 she --3 JUSTICE ALITO: Let me -- let me give you a 4 holding -- this is an incredibly factually complicated 5 case. We don't usually take cases that are so fact-bound, but we've taken it. 6 7 (Laughter.) 8 JUSTICE ALITO: Let me give you a rule that 9 we might adopt. If the failure to provide funding makes 10 it impossible for some period of time for a case to be 11 tried, then the delay is attributable to the State. 12 Would you agree with that? 13 MS. SIGLER: If the failure to provide 14 funding is a deliberate attempt on the State to interfere with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 15 16 then I would agree with that. 17 JUSTICE BREYER: You also agree, right on 18 this subject, that the only sentence that I can find --19 I haven't read it totally carefully -- but, in the lower 20 court opinion, that has to do with this is the sentence 21 I read before. 2.2 And it says, "The first three years he was 23 incarcerated, he was charged with first-degree murder, and the progression of the prosecution was out of the 24 State's control, as determined by this Court and the 25

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1 Supreme Court." 2 Now, when I look at those words, I am not 3 100 percent certain what they mean. So it would be 4 helpful -- but I don't want --- you're not going to do 5 it -- I'd like to -- are you -- would you concede that that statement means they're saying that the State, for 6 7 speedy trial purposes, is not to be held accountable, 8 really, at all, for not providing the money, insofar as 9 that's a cause of the delay? Is that a conceded point? Or is that 10 11 something I have to spend quite a lot of time going 12 through? 13 And, if you don't concede that, what is it 14 that you concede, which would spare a little time going 15 through this record. 16 MS. SIGLER: Justice Breyer, I regret to 17 inform you that I do not concede that point. 18 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. 19 MS. SIGLER: I believe that if you look at 20 the --21 (Laughter.) 2.2 JUSTICE BREYER: I thought maybe you would 23 not, but --24 (Laughter.) MS. SIGLER: I believe that, if you look at 25

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1 Appendix D, as I stated earlier, the other Barker 2 factors are discussed. And the continuance motions that 3 were filed by defense counsel are mentioned with regard 4 to the assertion of the right; they are not necessarily 5 mentioned with regard to the State. JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, you are right. Most 6 7 of this opinion -- and almost all of it is about the other factors. Now, I agree with you, that's what it 8 looked like. But we do have this sentence. 9 10 So how am I supposed to figure out whether 11 that sentence really means what they say? Or just is something they threw in to make the opinion more 12 difficult for us to understand? 13 14 MS. SIGLER: I don't think that was the stated -- the -- the intention of the Third Circuit, 15 16 Justice Brever. 17 JUSTICE BREYER: No, I don't either. I 18 don't either. But what's the argument -- sounds as if 19 it has something to do with funding. So what's the 20 argument it doesn't? 21 MS. SIGLER: Well, I believe --2.2 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, it says, you see, 23 "as determined by this Court and the Supreme Court." 24 What were they talking about?

MS. SIGLER: Well, I believe what the Third

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1	Circuit was referring to was this Court's
2	Barker v. Wingo jurisprudence. This Court has stated,
3	repeatedly, that even if something
4	JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, okay. Well, then,
5	that's it. They're referring to Barker. Okay.
6	So when they say it's out of this State's
7	control, as referred to in Barker, which is our case,
8	then what they mean is that it's not something that the
9	State had anything to do with, so they shouldn't be
10	blamed for it.
11	MS. SIGLER: I think that they are
12	attempting, in some fashion, to reconcile some of this
13	Court's later statements in the Barker jurisprudence,
14	which this Court made it clear, in Vermont v. Brillon,
15	that certain actions are not going to be attributed to
16	the State for speedy trial purposes
17	JUSTICE BREYER: When you agreed with
18	JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Sigler, could you go
19	back to Justice Alito's question?
20	MS. SIGLER: I'm sorry?
21	JUSTICE KAGAN: That was a good that was
22	a good segue.
23	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You added the word
24	"deliberate"
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Alito, I

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1	think, has a question pending.
2	MS. SIGLER: Okay.
3	JUSTICE ALITO: Well, you agreed with the
4	the principle that I mentioned, except that you want to
5	draw a distinction between the failure to provide
6	funding and the deliberate failure to provide funding?
7	Is that a real difference?
8	MS. SIGLER: Absolutely.
9	JUSTICE ALITO: Can the State inadvertently
10	failed to provide funding?
11	MS. SIGLER: I think that this Court has
12	always recognized, in the Barker jurisprudence, that
13	negligence is a very different factor in how it weighs
14	against a State than a deliberate attempt to violate a
15	constitutional right to a speedy trial.
16	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How can
17	JUSTICE KAGAN: When we said in Krillon
18	delays resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public
19	defender system could be charged to the State, so that
20	suggests systemic breakdown doesn't necessarily mean
21	deliberate. It just means there has been a breakdown,
22	and the result is that the person can't get to trial.
23	And if I think if Justice Alito could
24	even read that again and if you think about it, in light
25	of this statement in Krillon, that systemic breakdowns

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are systemic breakdowns, whether or not they are
 deliberate.

MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Kagan, I think that the best evidence or the fact that there was no systemic breakdown is the funding hearing itself, Appendix JJ.

At that funding hearing, there are extensive discussions about other capital cases within the State that are being tried the entire time this case is pending, including one case that we referred to, State v. Reeves, in Calcasieu Parish, a capital case that went to trial in less than four years, that included a retrial.

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, let's say you have a case where the -- the defendant wants counsel, can't afford counsel, and the State says, we'd love to provide counsel for you, but we're broke, we just don't have any money to provide counsel, but, maybe in a year, we'll have money to provide counsel.

20 Now, what do we do with the delay between 21 that point and -- and the -- the point, a year later, 22 when the money becomes available?

23 MS. SIGLER: Well, I think, from that 24 scenario, we would have to look at the State's 25 intention. I certainly think that, if the State flat

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1 out said, I'm sorry, you're not getting counsel for a 2 year, then we would have to attribute that factor to the 3 State more heavily, even though it does appear that, in 4 your scenario, it's more of a negligence problem than a 5 deliberate we're not going to fund you problem. 6 JUSTICE BREYER: Suppose it is negligent. 7 For -- for a year, this person isn't represented because 8 the State keeps sending the checks to his cousin of the 9 same name. I mean -- you know, they didn't do it 10 purposely. He just happens to have a cousin, this 11 lawyer, of the same name, who doesn't tell him he's 12 getting these checks out of nowhere. 13 So he can't hire the expert. Absolute 14 negligence. I mean, that's not to be attributed to the 15 State? MS. SIGLER: No, Justice Breyer. Clearly --16 17 Is there any authority for JUSTICE BREYER: 18 that? I mean -- you know, maybe you'd discount it 19 because it wasn't deliberate, but no attribution 20 whatsoever? 21 MS. SIGLER: Well, you discount it, 22 Justice Breyer, and you attribute it to more of a 23 negligence standard than you would a -- an absolute failure or refusal to provide counsel. And this Court 24 25 has done that repeatedly.

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1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. What's the
2	difference between saying, I'm broke, and I want to pay
3	the prosecutor because they kept paying the prosecutor,
4	I want to pay for the prosecutor's investigation, but I
5	won't pay you? What what is the difference in
6	applying the negligence versus deliberate standard?
7	I mean, look, in the end, States are always
8	strapped, but I don't know a State who doesn't make some
9	income. They make a choice about where they want that
10	income to go. And it may be, in your judgment, a more
11	legitimate decision, but why is the situation less
12	negligent why is it negligent and not deliberate?
13	Why is the choice one, not the other?
14	MS. SIGLER: Because, Justice Sotomayor, I
15	believe in this Court's decisions, under
16	Barker v. Wingo, the choice aspect the deliberate
17	intent aspect has been looked at by the courts in
18	deciding how much of the blame is to be assessed against
19	the State.
20	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, then answer the
21	question. Why isn't the choice to say, I I'm broke,
22	so I don't want to pay you, I'm going to pay the
23	prosecutor which happened, the prosecutors were being
24	paid throughout. They had enough money to investigate,
25	but we're choosing not to pay the defendants.

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1	Why isn't that a deliberate choice?
2	MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Sotomayor, that
3	choice was not made in this case. There was available
4	funds. What we're here we're here today
5	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Available funds to pay
6	the lawyer?
7	MS. SIGLER: There were available funds in
8	2003. I was referring to that letter in the record
9	that
10	JUSTICE GINSBURG: The the court itself
11	said, repeatedly, that the cause of the delay was the
12	funding crisis, the court I think we have to accept
13	that as being the case, that the funding crisis the
14	effort to get this lawyer paid failed, time and again.
15	And it was the court determination that it is the
16	funding crisis that caused the delay.
17	MS. SIGLER: Well, Justice Ginsburg, the
18	funding crisis that the court ruled on was present in
19	2006. It was not present in 2003, when this case
20	started. Mr. Lorenzi, himself, identified a source of
21	funds funds to pay him.
22	And when we hear Chief Public Defender Ron
23	Ware testify at that motion for funding hearing, at
24	Appendix JJ, he says, yes, I have a special capital
25	defense account, and, yes, I have been paying capital

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1 attorneys from this account throughout this time period. 2 The fact that there weren't funds readily 3 available in 2006 is directly attributable to Petitioner's 4 counsels failing to move his funding herein forward in 5 2003, when he first identified that source of funds. This is not a case in which there was never any funding. 6 7 This was a case in which defense counsel, 8 for whatever reason, delayed a resolution of the funding issue, an issue that he, himself, identified as one --9 10 without any resolution, he was not going to go forward 11 with substantive motions. 12 The onus -- the -- the blame -- or more of 13 the blame in this case, on the funding problem, belongs 14 with the Petitioner, not the State of Louisiana, whether we mean the prosecution --15 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm not going to argue 17 the funding issue because I've got to go look at the 18 record again. 19 But let's assume that the record doesn't 20 support your claim because, as I read the decisions 21 below and the record that I saw, there wasn't funding available until -- I think it was 2006 or '7? And so, 22 23 somehow, there's a disconnect between what you're saying and the record. 24 25 But let's assume that -- my hypothetical,

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1 that there wasn't money, despite whatever you're saying. 2 What's your position then? Then it's not 3 deliberate? It's still negligence. 4 MS. SIGLER: Justice Sotomayor, I maintain 5 that position, and I believe it to be consistent with 6 this Court's repeated analysis under Barker v. Wingo 7 jurisprudence. You do look at the intent of the State as 8 either a negligence factor, akin to more of a neutral 9 10 factor, a deliberate factor, or a valid reason for the 11 delay. And I would also suggest to Your Honor --12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So there could never be a systematic breakdown, in your judgment, because any 13 14 time the State gives resources to something else, it's not deliberate -- it's not a systemic breakdown. 15 16 MS. SIGLER: Justice Sotomayor, I would 17 invite you to look at the motion for funding hearing 18 again. There was money allocated to indigent defense by 19 Louisiana. It has increased -- and this is public 20 record, and it's partially supported by the funding 21 hearing. 2.2 That money has increased from 9.4 million in 23 2006 to 20 million in 2 -- I'm sorry -- in 2005, to 20 million in 2006, to \$33 million today. 24 House Bill 1 of 25 the State legislative website. That is the precise

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1	amount prosecutors are awarded by the State.
2	I would, again, suggest that this is not a
3	case of systemic breakdown. And I think that, as a
4	policy matter, this Court should be reluctant to rule
5	against the State of Louisiana, which, as Justice Scalia
6	noted, has been so generous in trying to provide capital
7	indigent defendants with specially qualified counsel,
8	which is more counsel than they're even entitled to
9	under the Sixth Amendment.
10	And I would also urge this Court to be
11	cognizant of its own repeated statements in the past,
12	that this is a very severe remedy with regard to letting
13	a convicted murderer free.
14	I'd also like to address, before I sit down
15	and turn this back over to Mr. Bourke, Justice Ginsburg,
16	earlier, you had addressed the question of whether or
17	not the armed robbery was, in fact, still a valid
18	charge.
19	Contrary to Mr. Bourke's assertion before
20	Your Honor today, if you look at Appendix 254A, there is
21	a writ of opposition that was filed by the Petitioner
22	before the Louisiana Supreme Court. And, at 254A, he
23	says and I quote "Even if the murder indictment
24	were quashed, Mr. Boyer faces the armed robbery
25	prosecution."

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1	The Third Circuit also rejected Mr. Bourke's
2	current double jeopardy argument and stated specifically
3	that there was no speedy trial problem with regard to
4	the armed robbery.
5	Thank you.
б	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
7	Mr. Bourke, you have about 3 minutes
8	remaining.
9	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD BOURKE
10	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
11	MR. BOURKE: Thank you. And I have a few
12	points of clarification that I want to make, just in a
13	very quick fashion.
14	Justice Sotomayor, there was no funding in
15	2001, 2002, 2003. It was never there. If Your Honor
16	looks at the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion in Citizen,
17	it will describe the Turner case funding hearing in
18	2001. Mr. Lorenzi was stuck with that one as well.
19	There was no money.
20	Mr. Lorenzi did, indeed, submit bills in
21	2003 because a new procedure had been announced, and
22	that's at page Joint Appendix page 401 to '3. You'll
23	see the correspondence showing he did submit bills, and
24	there was no money.
25	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There was money

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1 allocated, but, if I understood the record correctly --2 by the State -- the funding was grossly inadequate to 3 cover all the needs? 4 MR. BOURKE: Right. It was -- it was 5 underwater. It was oversubscribed. Tt. --JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Bourke, would you 6 7 respond to the last point made by -- by opposing 8 counsel? 9 MR. BOURKE: Yes, certainly. JUSTICE SCALIA: You did state -- it's in 10 11 Appendix J -- "Even if the murder indictment were 12 quashed, Mr. Boyer faces the armed robbery prosecution." 13 MR. BOURKE: Yes, Your Honor. 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: You told us, today, that that's not the case, that the armed robbery prosecution 15 16 goes down the drain. Which -- which is true? 17 MR. BOURKE: The passage you're referring to 18 is from a writ application purely limited to the 19 application of the State speedy trial statute, which 20 does accord a new clock to every new filing. 21 So, under Louisiana State statutory law, the 22 armed robbery started the State statutory clock again, but that is not the case for the Sixth Amendment --23 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As to the murder or as 25 to the independent robbery count? It's not a lesser

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1 included offense, the robbery count. 2 MR. BOURKE: The armed robbery was a lesser 3 included of first-degree murder, but it is not a lesser 4 included of second-degree murder. Our double jeopardy 5 argument was the same force was applied in both, the force for the murder and the force for the armed 6 7 robbery, so that's completely irrelevant. 8 But that was a State statutory argument 9 about the armed robbery charge, which has no application in the case in front of us. 10 11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Boyer -- why would --12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Go ahead. 13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Why would we get to that 14 question? I mean, no courts below have dealt with it. 15 It has been briefed to us in a grand total of two 16 paragraphs, I think. There would be no reason for us to 17 get to that question. 18 MR. BOURKE: It -- it is well beyond the 19 question presented, Your Honor, I agree. 20 Your Honor, the --21 JUSTICE KAGAN: And so -- so, from that 22 point of view, we can assume that there is a robbery conviction that is still out there. 23 24 MR. BOURKE: He has a murder and armed 25 robbery conviction from the same incident. It's the

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1 same charge as the first-degree murder. It's just 2 unpacked. 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Or assume that there isn't, 4 right? 5 MR. BOURKE: That -- that is why this Court would remand to allow the -- the local court to deal 6 7 with it and ensure that that's accurate. Justice Breyer, the reference to our 8 earlier -- the decision of this Court and the supreme 9 10 court is a reference to the earlier decision on the 11 interlocutory writ application, the earlier decision 12 that a lack of adequate funds prevented the prosecution. 13 And if Your Honor looks at Joint Appendix, 14 at page 126, which is part of the opinion of the Third 15 Circuit, you will see, earlier, in their opinion, they 16 discuss their own earlier ruling in the supreme court --17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 18 The case is submitted. 19 (Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the case in the above-entitled matter was submitted.) 20 21 22 23 24 25

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