1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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3	JERRY W. GUNN, ET AL., :
4	Petitioners : No. 11-1118
5	v. :
6	VERNON F. MINTON :
7	x
8	Washington, D.C.
9	Wednesday, January 16, 2013
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11	The above-entitled matter came on for ora
12	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
13	at 11:05 a.m.
14	APPEARANCES:
15	JANE WEBRE, ESQ., Austin, Texas; on behalf of
16	Petitioners.
L7	THOMAS M. MICHEL, ESQ., Fort Worth, Texas; on behalf of
18	Respondent.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(11:05 a.m.)
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear
4	argument next this morning in Case Number 11-1118,
5	Gunn v. Minton.
6	Ms. Webre?
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF JANE WEBRE
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
9	MS. WEBRE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
_0	please the Court:
.1	In Grable, this Court explained that
_2	"arising under" jurisdiction demands, not only a
_3	contested Federal issue, but a substantial one embedded
_4	in a State claim in order to indicate whether there is a
_5	serious Federal interest in exercising Federal
-6	jurisdiction over the State claim.
_7	This Court should reverse the judgment below
8	because Minton Mr. Minton's claims do not present a
_9	substantial Federal issue, and exercising Federal
20	jurisdiction over his claim and legal malpractice claims
21	like his, State legal malpractice claims would
22	JUSTICE GINSBURG: The question is whether
23	the experimental use whether that was a viable
24	theory. Why isn't that a substantial what do you
25	mean by, "substantial"?

- 1 MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, defining
- 2 substantiality is a difficult point. I -- I would
- 3 answer in two layers. First, Mr. Minton's claim did not
- 4 involve a legal question of does the -- how does the
- 5 experimental use doctrine work; how is it applied, what
- 6 are its parameters?
- 7 The question was did his fact-bound and
- 8 situation-specific affidavit present relevant evidence
- 9 of the application here in this particular case. And it
- 10 is not a substantial question because, first, from a --
- 11 a unique case perspective, it involved merely a
- 12 hypothetical determination.
- 13 There were no actual patent rights that
- 14 would be at issue. Those were already fully, finally,
- irrevocably determined in the underlying patent
- 16 litigation in Federal court.
- 17 And, second, from a jurisprudence
- 18 standpoint, the -- the question of uniformity of patent
- 19 law, any decision by a State court, in Mr. Minton's
- 20 legal malpractice claim, would not be binding in any
- 21 way, on either the PTO in a patent application, or on
- 22 any subsequent Federal court deciding a real patent
- 23 case.
- 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you mean substantial
- 25 beyond the -- the -- this particular case?

1	MS. WEBRE: Yes, Your Honor. And I I
2	think that that's where the Federal circuit's
3	jurisdictional the Federal circuit's "arising under"
4	jurisdiction standard, which the Supreme Court of Texas
5	applied here, that's exactly where it goes awry, is that
6	the court improperly conflates the the question of
7	necessity of a Federal issue with the question of
8	whether that issue is substantial.
9	And, in the Grable case, this Court
L O	emphasized that those are two separate issues. There
11	are four prongs to the Grable test. The Federal issue
12	embedded in the State claim must be necessary to the
13	State claim; actually disputed; substantial; and then
L4	there is a federalism inquiry that exercised a Federal
15	jurisdiction over this State claim can't upend the
16	proper balance between State and Federal authority.
17	The Grable court announced that, and then
18	just a year later, in the Empire HealthChoice case, Your
19	Honor Justice Ginsburg, you wrote that opinion for
20	the Court, and that acted sort of as an underscoring of
21	"and here's how limited the Grable rule really is."
22	The Empire HealthChoice opinion
23	distinguishes between Grable, which presented a merely
24	pure question of law, and the claims at issue in Empire
25	HealthChoice which were fact-bound and

- 1 situation-specific. It distinguished the -- the
- 2 question of whether a State court is competent to apply
- 3 Federal law to the extent relevant to the claims and
- 4 found that, yes, it was.
- 5 And the -- the Court emphasized that,
- 6 certainly, the State courts are going to be deciding the
- 7 occasional Federal issue here and there, but let's not
- 8 make a Federal case out of each and every State tort
- 9 claim that might have an embedded Federal issue.
- 10 Now, in the earlier argument, there was some
- 11 discussion of the fact that jurisdiction means a lot of
- 12 different things in a lot of different contexts. But,
- 13 here, this Court has, on more than one occasion,
- 14 determined that jurisdiction -- "arising under"
- 15 jurisdiction means the same thing in 1331, the general
- 16 Federal question jurisdictional grant, and 1338(a),
- 17 the -- the exclusive provision that's applicable
- 18 specifically to patents.
- Now, that has been amended slightly. It --
- 20 it, now, includes compulsory counterclaims where they
- 21 didn't used to be a part, but the jurisdictional grant
- that Congress gave through the first sentence of 1338(a)
- 23 uses the same exact phrase, the "arising under," "any
- 24 civil action arising under Federal law."
- 25 And, Justice Scalia, you wrote the opinion

- 1 for the Court in the Holmes Group case and explained
- 2 that the linguistic consistency between those two means
- 3 that they mean the same thing.
- 4 There is nothing unique about this subject
- 5 matter -- the patent subject matter, that changes the
- 6 scope of the jurisdictional grant. To be sure, the --
- 7 the grant of original jurisdiction to the district
- 8 courts is exclusive, and that is different from the
- 9 general Federal question.
- 10 And to be --
- 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, why isn't that
- 12 significant? Doesn't that manifest Congress's view
- 13 that -- that -- that this is -- that this is a
- 14 complicated specialty area? And so there would be,
- 15 arguably, a special reason for having these cases, cases
- 16 that involve a patent issue, in Federal court, rather
- 17 than State court?
- 18 MS. WEBRE: Yes, Your Honor. But the --
- 19 Congress did that in a couple of different ways. First
- 20 of all, I think it begs the question -- it begs the --
- 21 the core question, to say that exclusive -- the fact
- 22 that jurisdiction is exclusive answers the
- 23 substantiality because, in order to get to exclusivity
- 24 of the jurisdiction, you have to get to jurisdiction
- 25 first.

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- 2 an act of Congress relating to patents before it can
- 3 then be exclusive. So -- so we still have the first
- 4 step. But, also, Congress did not cast the net broader
- 5 than the general "arising under" standard.
- 6 Even under the -- the statutory framework
- 7 after the America Invents Act amendment -- under the
- 8 statutory structure, there are still a number of patent
- 9 issues -- legal issues that are going to be decided in
- 10 the State courts that do not come within the exclusive
- 11 jurisdiction of the Federal courts. For example,
- 12 compulsory counterclaims, now, come within the exclusive
- jurisdiction, but permissive counterclaims don't.
- 14 Permissive counterclaims can certainly
- 15 present just as substantive a question of patent law,
- 16 and, yet, those are excluded under the statutory scheme
- 17 of 1338(a). Patent issues raised as a defensive matter
- 18 are not sufficient to support "arising under"
- 19 jurisdiction under 1338(a).
- 20 So, certainly, Congress contemplated a
- 21 situation where some patent issues are just not going to
- 22 come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
- 23 courts.
- 24 And I think it's interesting to -- to back
- 25 up a little bit and look at the Federal circuit's

- 1 evolved perception of its own exclusive jurisdiction.
- 2 In the early years of the Federal circuit, in 1984, the
- 3 first Chief Justice -- the first chief judge of the
- 4 court, Chief Judge Markey, in the Atari case that is
- 5 cited at page 21 of the amicus brief filed by the
- 6 American Intellectual Property Lawyers Association, the
- 7 Federal circuit wrote, "Congress was not concerned that
- 8 an occasional patent law decision of a regional circuit
- 9 court or of a State court would defeat its goal of
- 10 increased uniformity in the national law of patents."
- 11 And that was the view of the Federal
- 12 circuit's own jurisdiction in 1984. But, in the time
- 13 evolved, the Federal circuit has changed its perception
- 14 of its own jurisdiction, and that's why we are here
- 15 today, is, in 2007, the Federal circuit went awry and --
- 16 and changed the standard that no longer follows what
- 17 this Court articulated in Grable.
- 18 They -- they have improperly conflated the
- 19 necessity and substantiality components of the -- of an
- 20 appropriate Grable analysis. And they totally disregard
- 21 a proper balance of the State and Federal interests.
- 22 The Federal circuit announced that there's an interest
- 23 in -- Federal interest in uniformity of patent law, and
- 24 then that was that. That was the end of the inquiry.
- 25 There is no balance if you don't look at the State

- 1 interest on the other side.
- 2 And, in legal malpractice cases, in general
- 3 and in Mr. Minton's claim in particular, there are
- 4 substantial State interests. There is the general
- 5 interest, the right of a State to develop its own State
- 6 claims, its own State law, and its own State courts.
- 7 But there is also a State interest in
- 8 governing the relationship between attorney and client
- 9 that happens through the legal malpractice process.
- 10 But, specifically, with regard to Mr. Minton's claim,
- 11 one of his primary theories in -- in this case -- in the
- 12 legal malpractice case, is that the attorney's error,
- 13 with regard to bringing up the Experimental Use
- 14 Doctrine, deprived him of the opportunity to make a
- 15 lucrative settlement with the NASD in the underlying
- 16 patent litigation.
- 17 Well, the question of exactly how you prove
- 18 whether and to what extent the NASD would have paid a
- 19 settlement and for how much in the underlying case is a
- 20 matter of tremendous dispute right now. That is an
- 21 evolving issue in the -- in the legal malpractice
- 22 jurisprudence of the State of Texas.
- In fact, in the month of December 2012, the
- 24 Supreme Court of Texas heard argument in a case called
- 25 Elizondo v. Krist that addresses that precise issue.

- 1 How do you prove that NASDAQ would have paid him
- 2 \$100 million, if only these lawyers had raised this
- 3 issue earlier?
- And, yet, if this -- if Mr. Minton's claims
- 5 are hailed into Federal court because of the fact-bound
- 6 and situation-specific application of the Experimental
- 7 Law Doctrine, the Federal courts would be Erie guessers
- 8 as to that important issue that the State courts really
- 9 need to resolve.
- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Ms. Webre, is there any
- 11 binding effect of a Federal determination here on State
- 12 law? And is there any binding effect of any State
- 13 determination here on Federal law?
- MS. WEBRE: No, Your Honor.
- 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: If it was left to the
- 16 State, would what the States say about -- about patent
- 17 law be binding in any Federal cases? And, vice-versa,
- 18 if it went to the Federal jurisdiction, would anything
- 19 that the Federal court says about -- about State tort
- 20 law be binding on State courts?
- 21 MS. WEBRE: In neither direction would any
- 22 decision be binding. The -- the State -- any decision
- 23 in a State court on a legal malpractice matter regarding
- 24 issues of patent law would not be binding in any way on
- 25 the Federal courts or on the PTO in handling any of the

- 1 patent applications -- prosecution of patents.
- 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that -- that being
- 3 so, your -- your last argument about the Federal
- 4 government messing up -- you know, State tort law in an
- 5 area that -- that is currently very much in the fore in
- 6 the -- in the decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, that
- 7 doesn't really carry a lot of weight, except in this
- 8 single case.
- 9 I mean, they are not going to mess up Texas
- 10 law in that regard. They may get this case wrong,
- 11 but --
- 12 MS. WEBRE: You -- you are right that --
- 13 that it will not, substantially, adversely impact Texas
- 14 State law, but that's an illustration of a substantial
- 15 State interest.
- 16 And, in a way, it's akin to the issue in
- 17 Grable because the -- the embedded issue in Grable that
- 18 justified this Court reaching down and grabbing a State
- 19 law claim and bringing it up into Federal courts wasn't
- 20 just that the issue was disputed, the -- the
- 21 construction of that statute was unresolved. But that
- 22 it needed resolving. It needed resolving by a court
- 23 whose decision could be precedential, so then it's
- 24 resolved from then on.
- 25 And so the -- the question of how do you

- 1 prove a settlement is an issue that needs resolving by a
- 2 court who's going to advance the jurisprudence.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: What about the Federal
- 4 issue? Doesn't that need resolving?
- 5 MS. WEBRE: There are no Federal issues that
- 6 need resolving here because it's solely a question of
- 7 the application of these specific facts in this
- 8 affidavit to the doctrine. There's -- there's no
- 9 overarching question of -- of patent law that needs
- 10 resolving.
- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let me -- me ask this
- 12 question: Suppose you have two cases, hypothetical,
- 13 case A, case B, both involve the Experimental Use
- 14 Doctrine in Federal patent law. In case A, it's a very
- 15 weak argument; it's most unlikely it's not going to
- 16 apply. Case B, very strong argument, Experimental Use
- 17 Doctrine applies.
- 18 Any difference in the removability in those
- 19 two cases?
- MS. WEBRE: I don't believe so, Your Honor,
- 21 because the question isn't the -- the significance to
- 22 the particular claim. The question is the Federal
- 23 issue. Is there a --
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if -- if you say --
- 25 since you're going to say it -- I mean, if it's a

- 1 "substantial" Federal issue, then it's substantial in
- 2 hypothetical B, but not in hypothetical A?
- 3 MS. WEBRE: Well, it's -- it's, perhaps,
- 4 more necessary. But -- and maybe what I need to do is
- 5 back up a little bit and discuss what I think are the
- 6 factors for a court to look at, when deciding whether or
- 7 not an embedded Federal issue is a substantial one.
- 8 And looking at this -- this Court's
- 9 articulation in the Grable case and the Empire
- 10 HealthChoice case, the -- the issues that the Court
- 11 looked at -- one was the nature of the Federal -- of the
- 12 Federal question itself -- the Federal issue, is it a
- 13 constitutional issue?
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So does that mean that,
- 15 if the claim in the malpractice action is that the PTO
- 16 acted unconstitutionally -- assume that set of facts --
- 17 how does that change your analysis?
- 18 MS. WEBRE: That -- that would be a more
- 19 substantial Federal question than the one presented
- 20 here, but I submit that it would not be sufficient to
- 21 warrant "arising under" jurisdiction here because it
- 22 is -- it involves only a hypothetical actual set of
- 23 patent rights. No judgment that can happen in a State
- 24 legal malpractice case actually impacts any patent
- 25 rights.

- 1 Let's say Mr. Minton won a judgment from a
- 2 State legal malpractice court saying, it was the
- 3 negligence, that you would have won the experimental use
- 4 exception, your patent would have been declared valid.
- 5 And so he has a judgment from a State court saying,
- 6 the -- the loss of your patent was the result of the
- 7 negligence and not because it was actually invalid.
- 8 That doesn't give him a valid patent. He
- 9 cannot take that judgment and then sue somebody and say,
- 10 look, look, I've got a patent. And it's --
- 11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So go back to -- you
- 12 were going through a list of questions, and I posited
- 13 let's assume that the malpractice claim does involve a
- 14 constitutional question.
- MS. WEBRE: Yes. So --
- 16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Then what other
- 17 factors --
- 18 MS. WEBRE: Well, the -- the -- in the
- 19 continuum constitutional issues would be more
- 20 substantial; statutory issues would be a little less
- 21 substantial. In fact, this Court grappled with that in
- the Grable case and said, we're not going to draw a hard
- 23 and fast line on statutory issues.
- 24 But then, in the Empire HealthChoice
- 25 opinion, the Court noted that this is a -- the issue --

- 1 the Federal issue there was nonstatutory, and so,
- 2 therefore, let's not make a Federal case out of it. So,
- 3 in that continuum, that would be one factor to look at.
- 4 Another factor to look at would be, is the
- 5 Federal issue -- the legal issue undisputed or
- 6 uncertain? Not necessarily the application of these
- 7 particular facts to the legal issue because there really
- 8 isn't a Federal interest in how this affidavit is
- 9 construed or not.
- 10 But, in -- in the resolution of the legal
- 11 issues, as in Grable, is the question of law disputed or
- 12 uncertain? And the corollary to that is does it need
- 13 resolving? Because that was the situation in the Grable
- 14 case. But just because an issue is novel doesn't ipso
- 15 facto make it a -- a substantial issue.
- 16 This Court, in the Merrell Dow case,
- 17 discussed that, that --
- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why -- why do all -- why do
- 19 all of these issues cut in your favor, in all cases
- 20 involving malpractice? I mean, you're urging, not just
- 21 that your client win here, but you want us to adopt a
- 22 general rule that malpractice suits involving patent
- 23 rights can never, ever come under "Federal arising"
- 24 under jurisdiction.
- 25 Isn't that -- isn't that what you want us to

- 1 say?
- MS. WEBRE: Yes, Your Honor.
- 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: So the burden would be on
- 4 you to show that every one of these factors, in all of
- 5 those cases, is always going to cut in your favor.
- 6 That -- what, that they will never involve a
- 7 constitutional issue? That they will never, ever
- 8 determine future patent decisions?
- 9 MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, I -- I urge
- 10 that because I think that's the only appropriate
- 11 application of the Grable test to legal malpractice
- 12 cases. And it's not that --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I like -- I like
- 14 bright-line rules. In fact -- you know, I thought
- 15 Holmes had it right. It doesn't arise under, unless the
- 16 cause of action is a Federal cause of action. But once
- 17 we've gone down -- down the road of Grable, I don't --
- 18 you're -- you're proving a negative.
- The burden is on you to prove a negative,
- 20 that there is no situation that can arise in -- in
- 21 malpractice cases involving patents where the Federal
- 22 issue would justify arising under jurisdiction. That's
- 23 a hard road to hoe.
- 24 MS. WEBRE: I think there are two reasons --
- 25 there are two reasons why that's the only appropriate

- 1 way to apply the Grable test to legal malpractice cases,
- 2 and both of them involve the lack of precedent from the
- 3 case.
- 4 One is it can never involve actual patent
- 5 rights. The consequence of a judge's --
- 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How about fraud on -- a
- 7 claim of fraud on -- that the malpractice was fraud on
- 8 the PTO? Lawyer loses that. It's been litigated.
- 9 Isn't it res judicata, and won't it affect the patent --
- 10 or might it not affect the patent in a patent action?
- 11 MS. WEBRE: No, Your Honor, it would not.
- 12 It would not affect the patent office, either, as a
- 13 matter of res judicata or as a matter of issue
- 14 preclusion -- non-mutual issue preclusion or as a matter
- 15 of jurisprudential precedent, for a couple of reasons.
- 16 One is that, as a starting point, the -- the
- 17 question of attorney misconduct can affect the issuance
- 18 of a patent before the patent office, but that would
- 19 happen not in the context of a legal malpractice claim,
- 20 but in the context of the actual prosecution of the
- 21 patent before the PTO itself.
- 22 So the PTO would have made a -- its own
- 23 determination and granted or not granted limited
- 24 sanction, whatever action it is the PTO takes in --
- 25 before -- in a proceeding before itself, the PTO would

- 1 be deciding that.
- 2 So a legal malpractice case would only be
- 3 subsequent to that. So, in -- in the first instance,
- 4 the PTO gets to decide that.
- From a res judicata standpoint, the PTO's
- 6 patent review manual -- the Manual of Examination of
- 7 Patents provides that res judicata effect is only given
- 8 to decisions by either the Board of Patent Review or
- 9 Interferences, the United States District Court for the
- 10 District of Columbia, and the Federal circuit. No State
- 11 courts make that list.
- 12 So, from a res judicata standpoint, only
- 13 going right up the chain is going to bind the PTO. And,
- 14 from an issue preclusion standpoint, the PTO would never
- 15 be a party -- could never be a party to a -- a legal
- 16 malpractice claim and, therefore, would not be bound by
- 17 any State court decision.
- 18 And what's kind of a funny --
- 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I find that somewhat
- 20 hard to follow.
- 21 Let's assume, in adjudicating a medical -- a
- 22 malpractice claim, the State court finds that the
- 23 attorney suppressed information. It's a finding of
- 24 fact. He had this information in his or her file, and
- 25 they didn't disclose it. I'm not quite sure how the PTO

- 1 ignores that litigation.
- MS. WEBRE: The PTO may not ignore it. The
- 3 PTO --
- 4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Or the district court
- 5 doesn't, if it gets to review that in a later action.
- 6 MS. WEBRE: Well, but --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm only raising this
- 8 question to address Justice Scalia's point. You're
- 9 asking for an absolute rule, and I posited a situation
- 10 where I think it's not so clear that a State court
- 11 finding might not have an effect.
- 12 So do we have to go to your absolute rule?
- MS. WEBRE: No, Your Honor. You do not have
- 14 to go to my absolute rule. I think that the absolute
- 15 rule is the -- the most sensible and appropriate
- 16 application of the Grable test to State law legal
- 17 malpractice claims, and it has the added benefit of
- 18 certainty. It -- it doesn't roll us back to the Justice
- 19 Holmes' rule.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I guess you might argue
- 21 that, even if it fails the Grable test in a couple of
- 22 isolated cases, we should still adopt that rule because
- 23 the benefits of having a -- a clear rule that doesn't
- 24 have to be litigated in every -- every case outweigh the
- 25 fact that one or two might -- might not come out that

- 1 way if we applied Grable.
- MS. WEBRE: Well --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Because we're making it up
- 4 anyway, right?
- 5 (Laughter.)
- 6 MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, I -- I would
- 7 take it a step further than that because I think that
- 8 any actual impact of -- of what you're positing, Justice
- 9 Sotomayor, is so ephemeral. The idea that -- that the
- 10 PTO will look at a fact-finding in a legal malpractice
- 11 case, and, oh, goodness, I didn't realize there was this
- 12 suppression of evidence, I'm now going to dig further.
- Well, that's such a speculative and
- 14 ephemeral possibility, it doesn't disrupt the fabric of
- 15 patent jurisprudence -- patent law, in any way, and it
- 16 doesn't tie the hands of the PTO in any way. It doesn't
- 17 bind the PTO in any future consideration of a
- 18 continuation patent or any other related
- 19 continuation-in-part patent.
- JUSTICE KENNEDY: Let -- let me ask you
- 21 this: The Brighton Miller treatise is rather
- 22 complimentary of Grable, it says it brought
- 23 considerable certainty to the area. I was pleased to
- 24 hear that because I'm not sure that it's true.
- 25 (Laughter.)

1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But can you just tell me, as an as an
2	empirical matter, does "arising under"
3	for removal jurisdiction cases consume a tremendous
4	amount of time in litigation in the Federal courts?
5	It's just
6	MS. WEBRE: Well, it it does a couple of
7	things. First is it consumes a lot of time of the
8	courts and the litigants in removing and then getting
9	remanded again. And it as is discussed in the
10	JUSTICE KENNEDY: What I yes. What I
11	mean is the argument over "arising under" over
12	jurisdiction.
13	MS. WEBRE: There are, on this issue of the
14	legal malpractice cases, in the wake of the Federal
15	circuit's opinions, the Air Measurement case and
16	Immunocept case in 2007, scores and scores and scores of
17	courts State and Federal courts have been grappling
18	with this precise jurisdictional issue.
19	I think this case is about the fifth or
20	sixth cert petition that came up to this Court on this
21	jurisdictional question. I think there are three or
22	four behind us in queue, and there there continues to
23	be uncertainty in the lower courts on this precise
24	issue.
25	And and it really presents for this Court

1	a question of is "arising under" jurisdiction truly a
2	lenient standard, as the Federal court has articulated?
3	Now, it's true that the the entire body
4	of State law legal malpractice cases arising out of
5	patent representation is not going to overwhelm the
6	Federal court. It's not going to to
7	JUSTICE KENNEDY: So my question was even
8	broader. Let's say we resolve legal malpractice.
9	Then then we will have products liability with a
10	particular product, and then we will have some food and
11	agriculture cases. It goes on and on.
12	MS. WEBRE: Well, I think that is a that
13	is a that's a substantial issue. But, like
14	Justice Scalia said, that you know, the this Court
15	departed from Justice Holmes' construct some years ago.
16	But I think that there is the opportunity in this case
17	to provide a great deal of certainty, to provide
18	absolute certainty vis-à-vis legal malpractice cases
19	because of their unique hypothetical aspect. The
20	consequence of the judgment affects no rights.
21	But, second, in reaffirming
22	rearticulating the Grable test, emphasizing the
23	importance and the separateness of the substantiality
24	inquiry, emphasizing the importance of the federalism
25	aspect, this Court has a great opportunity to resolve a

1	lot of uncertainty.
2	And, if there are no further questions, I
3	would like to reserve the the remainder of my time.
4	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
5	Mr. Michel?
6	Is that correct, "Michel"?
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF THOMAS M. MICHEL
8	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
9	MR. MICHEL: It is, Your Honor. Thank you.
10	Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the
11	Court:
12	This case is about whether a State court has
13	subject matter jurisdiction over a State law patent
14	malpractice claim that rests entirely on an issue of
15	patent law that is only heard in Federal court, and when
16	that issue is dispositive, central to the case, has
17	issues of first impression in them, has no State
18	analogue in any other area of the law, and whether in
19	the deciding issues of questions of law and will not
20	disturb the balance between State and Federal judicial
21	responsibility.
22	JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about other areas of
23	exclusive Federal jurisdiction, where the claim, if you
24	are stating it initially, would have to go into Federal
25	court and not State court, say, an antitrust claim, a

- 1 copyright claim?
- Is -- is what you're saying about patents,
- does that go for every area, where initial jurisdiction
- 4 is exclusively in the Federal court?
- 5 MR. MICHEL: No, Your Honor. It does not.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Then what's the
- difference between, say, antitrust and patent?
- 8 MR. MICHEL: There -- there are many
- 9 differences, Your Honor. First, antitrust has -- has a
- 10 State analogue. The Texas Supreme Court in
- 11 Coca-Cola v. Harmer, 218 Southwest --
- 12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Then take immigration
- 13 law.
- MR. MICHEL: Yes.
- 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Don't get in the weeds.
- 16 Take immigration law.
- MR. MICHEL: Yes. Now, once again, the
- 18 issues -- immigration law may be a -- a differing area
- 19 where there is exclusive Federal court jurisdiction in
- 20 that area, possibly. But, once again, the analysis and
- 21 the application in immigration law, from a malpractice
- 22 case, may give rise in that area.
- 23 However --
- 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. I guess I just
- don't understand this. Is it the case that there is

1	"arising under" jurisdiction only when the Federal cause
2	of action presented is one over which Federal courts
3	have exclusive jurisdiction?
4	MR. MICHEL: That
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that is that the
6	rule?
7	MR. MICHEL: I believe, in part.
8	JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, any any Federal
9	statute that can be sued upon, both in Federal courts
10	and in State courts, but as to which Federal courts are
11	the dispositive adjudicators, you say that that does not
12	come within this "arising under" rule?
13	MR. MICHEL: Does does not come within
14	this Court's doctrinal holdings in Grable and Empire
15	because we have a Federal balancing and State balancing
16	issue. And, as we've articulated, when Congress has
L7	articulated
18	JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have a case for
19	that, that says, if a suit could be brought in State
20	court, even though it involves a dispositive Federal
21	question as to which this Court would be the you
22	know, the last interpreter, it cannot possibly come
23	within "arising under" jurisdiction?
24	Have you got a case for that.

MR. MICHEL: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I don't

25

- 1 know if I followed your question. 2. JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have a case which 3 says that, when a Federal question is presented in a 4 case over which Federal courts have jurisdiction, but 5 also State courts have jurisdiction, although, needless to say, the Federal courts would be dispositive on the 6 7 issue, such a case cannot come within the "arising under" jurisdiction? 8 9 MR. MICHEL: No, I don't think anything that 10 expressly. But the A&T and the --JUSTICE SCALIA: I would find it 11 12 extraordinary for -- for that to be the rule. 13 MR. MICHEL: Well, you can't isolate it. 14 That rule is more complicated because it is the application of the Grable standard that's the analysis. 15 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But getting back --17 Justice Ginsburg simply made the point, I had thought, 18 that you place a good deal of reliance on the fact that
- that you place a good deal of reliance on the fact that
 there is exclusive jurisdiction. And her question to me
 pointed out how far-reaching this case might be because
 it -- it could involve patents, copyright, all other
 areas of exclusive jurisdiction. If that is going to be
 your special rule, it's not so confined as you suggest.
- 25 Certainly -- certainly, you -- you could have cases

24

That's all that question meant to me.

- where there is concurrent jurisdiction, 1983, in which
- we'd have the same problem.
- 3 MR. MICHEL: I think -- I think the factors
- 4 that go into determining the -- one of the grounds that
- 5 has been articulated by Grable and the balancing for
- 6 Merrell Dow is the number of cases that would come into
- 7 Federal court, and it is a doctrinal decision. It is a
- 8 doctrinal rule.
- 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So patent law cases of
- 10 malpractice are smaller in number than copyright
- 11 cases --
- 12 MR. MICHEL: Patent law cases --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR -- immigration, other
- 14 exclusive jurisdictions, so that's okay to -- to remove,
- 15 but those others aren't?
- MR. MICHEL: Those --
- 17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Does that make a whole
- 18 lot of sense?
- MR. MICHEL: That is the articulation in
- 20 Grable, Your Honor.
- 21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, how about a
- 22 different one, the one that's being proposed by your
- 23 adversary --
- MR. MICHEL: That --
- 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- which is define

- 1 "substantial" as to how it affects Federal law, which I
- 2 think was the bottom line -- or the development of
- 3 Federal law, the bottom line of Grable.
- 4 And she says -- you dispute this in your
- 5 brief -- that it doesn't affect the invalidated patent,
- 6 that there's no way that a judgment on the malpractice
- 7 is going to be used in a continuation patent dispute
- 8 because it's not one of the listed preclusive courts.
- 9 So how does a ruling affect patent law?
- 10 MR. MICHEL: Sure. Many -- many ways, Your
- Honor.
- 12 First, the test is uniformity, under Grable,
- 13 the uniformity of patent law -- Federal law, not whether
- 14 the --
- 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why is -- who's going to
- 16 follow it?
- 17 MR. MICHEL: In many situations. For
- 18 example, she -- she conflates -- Petitioners conflate,
- 19 res judicata with issue preclusion. That goes back to
- 20 your earlier question, Justice Sotomayor, and that issue
- 21 preclusion will have an effect. And as, in fact --
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: Issue preclusion applies
- only to someone who was a party.
- 24 MR. MICHEL: Correct. That would only apply
- 25 to the inventor; it would not apply to the PTO. It can

- only be used against, in this, case Mr. Minton. And, in
- fact, patent counsel in this case, under the rules of
- 3 the Federal circuit, under patent law and the Patent
- 4 Manual, disclosed the State court's rulings in this case
- 5 to the Patent Office during its continuing patent. The
- 6 State district court judge made a scope and claim
- 7 decision.
- 8 So, Justice Sotomayor, back to your
- 9 question --
- 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But that, certainly, is
- 11 not binding. The -- whatever the State -- whatever the
- 12 State court says, as a matter of patent law, has no
- binding effect on that question coming into Federal
- 14 court.
- MR. MICHEL: It does.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: How?
- 17 MR. MICHEL: Under this Court's decision
- 18 Marrese v. The Academy of Orthopedic Assertions --
- 19 Surgeons, a State court's decision is entitled to issue
- 20 preclusion, even in Federal forum. And so that is
- 21 why -- also the patent -- the continuation patent
- 22 would -- could be declared invalid for failing to
- 23 disclose that information.
- We are not saying it's binding on the PTO,
- 25 but it is an issue of issue preclusion as against Minton

- 1 that would be in front of the PTO and is in front of the
- 2 PTO, as we speak.
- JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, is that -- my
- 4 goodness, but you are going to have a purely
- 5 hypothetical State decision here. The State will have
- 6 held that -- you know, if -- if he had said this, the
- 7 result would have been something else. And you think
- 8 that that precludes the -- the issue when it arises in
- 9 real life?
- 10 And you say, since the State court made that
- 11 hypothetical determination, it precludes me from arguing
- 12 it in -- in real life.
- MR. MICHEL: Yes. It is a factor --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have any cases like
- 15 that? It seems, to me, a rather weird -- weird
- 16 situation. I mean, maybe it could, but it -- it's
- 17 strange.
- 18 MR. MICHEL: Well, it is a matter of issue
- 19 preclusion. This Court -- that is the danger of
- 20 allowing these patent law issues to proceed in State
- 21 court.
- 22 This Court -- the State district court in
- 23 this case entered in a brand-new issue of Federal -
- 24 Petitioners and Respondents totally disagree as to
- 25 whether this is a fact-specific case or whether this case

1	involves issues of law. And, in fact, we contend it
2	involves issues of first impression.
3	In this case, the State district court made
4	holdings about issues of whether the question of the
5	experimental use exception is a question of law or a
6	question of fact.
7	It made the requirement that experimental
8	use had to go to a required claim element, as opposed to
9	a claimed element. It made the determination and the
10	Court of Appeals made the legal determination that
11	knowledge of the buyer is conclusive, rather than as a
12	factor.
13	Those are all issues of not only disputed
14	substantial issues of Federal patent law that both
15	parties submitted briefings in the trial court and the
16	court of appeals, 70 pages long, disputing the legal
17	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Besides the parties
18	MR. MICHEL: Yes.
19	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: how else does it
20	affect the development of patent law?
21	MR. MICHEL: The
22	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Who else is going to
23	follow
24	MR. MICHEL: They're
25	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: this malpractice

1	determination?
2	MR. MICHEL: It's going to have a really
3	profound effect on the patent law practitioners who are
4	uniquely situated and work in parcel and interlocking
5	with the Patent Law Office.
6	It is the patent lawyers who draft the
7	patents, it is the patent lawyers who present them to
8	the Patent Office, they are the ones who engage when
9	they need to be amended or refined or narrowed or
10	broadened.
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: They knew they knew
12	these were controverted issues. You say that they
13	they are controverted issues. So they would have been
14	alerted to a problem anyway. And they certainly would
15	not accept a State court determination as authoritative
16	resolution of that problem.
17	MR. MICHEL: The patent
18	JUSTICE SCALIA: The patent attorneys. I
19	mean, you
20	MR. MICHEL: No, the Patent Office will have
21	to take that as guidance because their new taskmaster
22	will not be be following Federal patent law because,
23	in this case, the Court injected a brand-new requirement

have an expert witness testify to establish your

that was never held by a patent lawyer, that you had to

24

25

1	experimental use testing exception.
2	That's never been held anywhere in Federal
3	patent law. So, now, who's the patent lawyer going to
4	be looking to for guidance? The exclusive Federal
5	courts? The Patent Office? Guidance from the Federal
6	circuits?
7	No, they are going to have their backs
8	watched by the State courts, saying, uh-huh, you know
9	what? I'm going to impose a new legal obligation on
10	you, and you are going to be held for malpractice. And
11	that's not that's not
12	JUSTICE GINSBURG: What would happen what
13	would happen if that came up in an ordinary litigation
L 4	in Federal court, and the Federal circuit, ultimately,
15	decided the question, that the State court was entirely
16	wrong about this; you don't need a witness.
17	Well, that's the end of it, right? Once the
18	Federal court decides the question, then whatever the
19	the State judge thought was the Federal law is is
20	gone.
21	MR. MICHEL: No, that's exactly the problem.
22	The State courts aren't bound by the Federal circuit's

holding. There will be no Federal review of substantial

issues of Federal law -- zero -- unless this Court is

23

24

25

going to --

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. The State
2	courts are not bound by the Federal court's holding?
3	You mean State courts can resolve patent questions,
4	contrary to what the Supreme Court of the United States
5	says the law is?
6	MR. MICHEL: No, not contrary that was
7	the point I was going to make not contrary to the
8	holdings of the United States Supreme Court, contrary to
9	the Federal circuit's holding. And, in fact, the Fort
10	Worth Court of Appeals did not follow the Federal
11	circuit's holding in this area.
12	JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, are you saying,
13	Mr. Michel, that what what the State courts are going
14	to do is to say that, notwithstanding that the Federal
15	circuit has ruled on a matter and notwithstanding that
16	the lawyer has complied with the rule as articulated by
17	the Federal circuit, that, nonetheless, they will be
18	held to have committed malpractice because they didn't
19	comply with the State's rule?
20	Is is that what you think the State
21	judges are really going to do?
22	MR. MICHEL: I think the State judges are
23	going to try to, possibly, apply Federal circuit
24	holding. In this case, they did not. They injected a
25	new holding, which established a new liability for the

Τ	patent lawyers, which is not reviewable, unless this cou
2	were to grant certiorari review.
3	And so that then leaves the only review on
4	these materials these are going to be substantial
5	issues of
6	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what you're arguing,
7	they're going to make a mistake, and, because we might
8	not accept certiorari, that's binding on everybody
9	else
-0	MR. MICHEL: It's
1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: in the State
_2	MR. MICHEL: No. It's binding on the State
13	court practitioners, in that State, who get sued for
_4	legal malpractice. And it's that interrelationship
_5	between the lawyers who are drafting patents they
_6	are going to be getting
L 7	JUSTICE KAGAN: What if a lawyer says to
8	the you know, I complied with all the Federal law
9	all the rules from the Federal circuit, I complied with.
20	MR. MICHEL: Yes.
21	JUSTICE KAGAN: You are suggesting that the
22	State court is going to say, too bad, you committed
23	malpractice anyway because you didn't comply with our
2.4	hypothetical law about patents?

25

 $\mbox{MR. MICHEL:} \mbox{ They did that in this case. At }$

Т	214
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It's not it's
3	not I guess it's not their hypothetical law. They
4	would be saying, this is what we think the Federal law
5	requires, and while we're happy or not happy but
6	it's interesting that the Federal circuit thinks
7	something else, but that doesn't bind us.
8	MR. MICHEL: Correct. Correct. And it's
9	not just hypothetical. The hypothetical doesn't mean
10	insubstantial. The hypothetical doesn't mean
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why is that worse than the
12	fact that, if it goes to Federal court, all of the
13	lawyers in the State, in all malpractice cases, are
14	going to be, supposedly, bound by the Federal court's
15	holding as to State issues of malpractice?
16	I mean, it seems to me it's Twiddle Dum or
17	Twiddle Dee, whichever court system you go to, you are
18	going to terrorize the lawyers of that State on the
19	basis of an opinion of a court that is not dispositive
20	on those issues.
21	So I don't I don't know why
22	MR. MICHEL: I think we disagree. Here,
23	when you try for example, in the patent infringement
24	case, the sole trial is going to be the patent

infringement.

1	You are going to try the Federal lawsuit,
2	Your Honor Justice Scalia, you are trying that patent
3	infringement lawsuit in State court, in the in the
4	case within the case analysis. The Federal rules,
5	that's what is so troubling about
6	JUSTICE SCALIA: And you you are trying
7	the malpractice lawsuit the State malpractice lawsuit
8	in Federal court.
9	MR. MICHEL: Correct. But the application
10	and the rules governing it are going to be by Federal
11	law. The rules in this case in particular, the
12	substantial issue of the experimental use exception, the
13	only issue we've saved was the the experimental use
14	exception. We disagree that just because the State
15	court makes an opinion and a holding, it doesn't have
16	real-world effects. It really does. It's not an
17	advisory opinion.
18	And there needs to be a distinguishment
19	between the side issue the Petitioners are saying
20	they are trying to get you focus on this one micro-issue
21	of whether it will affect an actual patent as to
22	whether it will affect patent law. And it will affect
23	patent law, and it will affect the application of patent
24	law. And so what you're going to have is you're going
25	to have two diverging systems.

1	You're going to have actually, you will
2	have one on the Federal side, and then you will have 50
3	jurisdictions espousing what they think the law is of
4	patent law and not being bound by the Federal circuit,
5	which is going to
6	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Anytime anytime I
7	mean, a lot of patent questions as you already
8	pointed out, a lot of patent questions come up in State
9	court litigations, contract litigations, every time you
10	have a patent question, then must the case go to the
11	Federal court, in your view?
12	MR. MICHEL: No, that is not our position.
13	JUSTICE GINSBURG: So what is the dividing
14	line between patent questions that belong in State court
15	and patent questions that belong only in Federal court?
16	MR. MICHEL: For example, not every
17	malpractice case it will be the case within the case
18	doctrine in a patent case that will go to Federal court.
19	For example, failure to communicate a
20	settlement offer does not have a case within the case.
21	In a business transaction, it doesn't have the case
22	within the case analysis.
23	So those malpractices arising from them will
24	not go to Federal court. Breaches of fiduciary duty for
25	divestiture of fees don't have the causation element.

1 So we are --2. JUSTICE SCALIA: So you are talking about a case that has a patent issue, whether it's a contract 3 4 case, a tort case, a malpractice case -- if it has a 5 patent issue, you think it has to go to Federal court? MR. MICHEL: We do not. 6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, then I repeat Justice 7 8 Ginsburg's question, how do you decide which of those do and which of those don't? 9 10 MR. MICHEL: I think this is a case in 11 This case is on all fours with Grable. 12 no exception. The only distinguishing factor is this 13 hypothetical argument of the case within the case 14 analysis. 15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, why don't you stay 16 within the lines that you give us? You have said not 17 every patent question that comes up in a State court gets 18 dismissed, just so you can start over in Federal court, 19 what patent questions -- now, let's not talk about breach 20 of fiduciary duty general questions -- what patent 21 questions are properly adjudicated in the State court 2.2 as part of a lawsuit that --23 MR. MICHEL: Well, the -- the distinction

where you -- those cases are brought in Federal - I

is, for example, in a licensing case, in a patent case,

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1	mean I'm sorry brought in State court our	
2	our request here is following Grable, that what will go	
3	to Federal court are legal malpractice cases arising	
4	from substantial issues of Federal patent law that have	
5	that case within the case analysis.	
6	And it's that narrow extremely narrow	
7	window of cases. This is not, "Katie, bar the door."	
8	We - we've set forth the empirical numbers. They are	
9	going to be microscopic. But what they do have is	
10	Grable's test. Every element that Grable articulated,	
11	this case meets.	
12	It does involve substantial issues of first	
13	impression.	
14	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But what was the	
15	substantial Federal matter in Grable?	
16	MR. MICHEL: The issue of the IRS, whether	
17	personal service had to be given under an IRS	
18	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes. And that was going	
19	to control, the actions of the Federal agency, of IRS.	
20	MR. MICHEL: Correct.	
21	JUSTICE GINSBURG: And you have no	
22	counterpart for that here?	
23	MR. MICHEL: We do have rules that will	
24	govern the law on experimental use exception.	JUSTICE

GINSBURG: You have -- you have --

1	MR. MICHEL: And that would govern the
2	application in Federal court. That's why it should be
3	in Federal court, to govern how the agency and
4	whether a patent and this suit goes directly it
5	affects patents. This is going to patent validity.
6	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the but the
7	Federal court you said before that whatever the
8	Federal circuit says, the State doesn't have to follow
9	it the next time there's a case in State court, but the
10	Federal court is certainly not going to follow what the
11	State judge says on experimental use.
12	MR. MICHEL: It does. I will tell you
13	the reason why it does, it's in the doctrine of
14	collateral estoppel. It affects the inventor. It's
15	affecting the inventor in this case. This holding of
16	the State district court and the State court of appeals
17	are now before the Patent Office
18	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. How does
19	it the patent's invalid.
20	MR. MICHEL: I'm sorry?
21	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The patent's invalid.
22	Nothing the Court does here is going to change that
23	invalidity. That that's what I don't understand.
24	MR. MICHEL: Correct.
25	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: He's not going to get

- 1 his patent back from this action.
- MR. MICHEL: That's correct.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: He's going to get money
- 4 for losing it, maybe.
- 5 MR. MICHEL: Correct.
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So how does it affect
- 7 the patent?
- 8 MR. MICHEL: There is a pending continuation
- 9 patent. And --
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We're back to that
- 11 issue. Okay.
- 12 MR. MICHEL: Yes, but that is a collateral
- 13 estoppel issue. Here, let me -- let me give up another
- scenario because, in a different role, when the patent
- is not declared invalid and, instead, there is a finding
- of non-infringement, and that's what gives rise to the
- 17 legal malpractice case.
- Then you go to State court, and, in that
- 19 situation, the determination of -- of infringement will
- 20 be raised as a basis for legal malpractice against the
- 21 lawyer in the malpractice action. Then the lawyers
- raise, as within the case within the case exception, is
- that, oh, the patent was invalid.
- So, then, in that situation, a State
- 25 district court will be rendering an opinion on a live

1 patent, and then that will be binding on the inv	entor
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- 2 and will affect real live actual patents, and it does
- 3 affect patents before the Patent Office.
- 4 Petitioner said we -- it's not an issue of
- 5 res judicata. They cite a rule. That's not our
- 6 argument. It's an issue of issue preclusion. It's also
- 7 the duty and the obligation of the lawyer to disclose
- 8 that judicial discussion -- discussion to the Patent
- 9 Office.
- 10 Otherwise his, continuation patent could be
- 11 declared invalid for inequitable conduct -- for not
- 12 disclosing material information.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: And your -- your
- 14 distinction between other areas of Federal jurisdiction
- 15 where the Federal law controls and patent is what?
- 16 What -- Justice Sotomayor brought up immigration law --
- 17 MR. MICHEL: Yes.
- JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- copyright law. Why
- don't they -- why doesn't what you said work the same
- way in those fields?
- 21 MR. MICHEL: I think there are -- there are
- 22 distinctions in the area of patent law versus any other
- area of the law namely because, as we get to the
- 24 State -- and this -- this goes to the analysis of the
- 25 State/Federal balance. That's why the exclusive Federal

1	court jurisdiction.
2	That's why exclusive nationwide jurisdiction
3	in patent law in the Federal circuit is different than
4	any other area of the law. It is that balancing test
5	that we are required to engage in.
6	That's why it's unique from antitrust,
7	trademark, civil rights, securities, employment. Those
8	have concurrent jurisdiction. They may not have an
9	agency involved.
10	For example, bankruptcy initially sounds
11	like it's exclusively Federal court issues, but, when
12	you look underneath the bankruptcy, there is core
13	proceedings, and there's non-core. Non-core are
14	concurrent. Those can be heard in State court.
15	Secondly, those underlying issues in
16	bankruptcy, typically, involve State property right
17	issues anyway. So they are really applying whether
18	somebody has a perfected security interest lien, whether
19	somebody has a justified debt, whether things of that
20	nature.
21	So rather than in any other area of law,
22	these other areas, even if they are exclusive in Federal
23	court jurisdiction, some of those underlying issues are

25 And they are still applying underlying

basically based on who the party is.

1	State issues.
2	JUSTICE GINSBURG: So your case turns on
3	the the Federal circuit having exclusive appellate
4	jurisdiction?
5	MR. MICHEL: That is one of the most
6	defining factors on the State/Federal balance of
7	judicial responsibility. Our understanding of that
8	analysis of the federalism and, also, the articulation
9	of just as we have showed up Petitioners said a
10	whole ton of cases were going to come in.
11	We supported statistics that the numbers
12	will be very small. But the distinguishing factor
13	because of the balancing test that we are required to
14	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But, if there's a large
15	Federal interest, I mean, that's what you're saying that
16	there is in the Federal/State balance the Federal
17	balance it's preponderant on the Federal side.
18	If there is that large Federal interest, is
19	it surprising that the government hasn't come into this
20	case, if there's such a Federal interest to be
21	protected?
22	MR. MICHEL: No, I think the Federal
23	government I can't I can't speculate to for
24	that, Justice Ginsburg. There could be just many
25	reasons why they didn't come in on this case, just like

1	they don't come in on many other cases.
2	But the Federal interest here, in the
3	national uniformity, I think, has been well stated, both
4	by this Court and the Federal circuit.
5	JUSTICE GINSBURG: There's a difference
6	between you and your colleague on what "substantial"
7	means.
8	MR. MICHEL: Yes.
9	JUSTICE GINSBURG: And she says it doesn't
10	just mean necessary essential in this particular
11	litigation, but, as in the Grable case and the Kansas
12	City Title & Trust, has larger ramifications for many
13	other cases, not just this case and whether there's
14	going to be issue preclusion as to this particular
15	inventor.
16	Those I don't see an issue in this case
17	comparable to those.
1.0	AND ANTIGOTOR THE LEGISLATION OF

MR. MICHEL: I think there are -- there are
a number of issues of -- of greater importance than just
this case. The question is the ongoing conflict in
Federal patent law on whether the experimental use
exception is a question of law or a question of fact.

The Federal circuit has gone both ways on

that, whether the issue of buyer knowledge is a

conclusive factor or whether it is just one of 13

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- 1 factors.
- 2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Whether they -- those
- questions will come to the Federal circuit, and they'll
- 4 decide it, and then they'll be settled.
- 5 MR. MICHEL: Well, we would hope they would
- 6 be settled, but, then, we're going to have this whole
- 7 other body of law out there in State courts that aren't
- 8 bound by the Federal court to answer those questions.
- 9 And those will govern the practice of patent -- patent
- 10 lawyers.
- 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How likely is that, in
- 12 practice, that once the Federal circuit weighs in, that
- the State judges will go their own way?
- MR. MICHEL: I think it's a very real
- 15 possibility. We've had --
- JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, my -- my experience
- is that Federal judges, including this Federal judge,
- 18 are not interested in -- in getting into the weeds of
- 19 patent law, and, if -- if they could rely on a decision
- of the Federal circuit, they would do that just as fast
- 21 as they can.
- MR. MICHEL: You -- you would -- you would
- think so. It doesn't appear to be the case because, in
- this case, we had holdings that -- that experimental
- 25 testing had to be on a required claim element. There is

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1	also an issue in this case of whether you had to have an	
2	expert witness testify to prove up the experimental use	
3	exception, nowhere held in Federal law.	
4	The problem is these judges often will have	
5	never handled a patent law in their career. This will	
6	go to some judges who have been in family law, got	
7	elected at the district court, and will never have	
8	decided or looked at a patent law case.	
9	We're requesting	
10	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would that be the same	
11	thing for antitrust, be the same for copyright?	
12	MR. MICHEL: But the articulation isn't the	
13	same. There are other in antitrust, there are State	
14	analogs. The the judges are familiar with applying	
15	it. In fact, the State of Texas, in Coca-Cola v.	
16	Harmar, stated that there's a high interest in its own	
17	State interest I mean, antitrust laws. The same with	
18	trademark, trademark is concurrent jurisdiction.	
19	The limited area that applies these factors,	
20	going back to the balancing test, is extremely narrow.	
21	Patent law is unique in that area of almost any other	
22	area of law. We think the Texas Supreme Court got this	
23	decision right, and we request that the Court follow	
24	Grable and apply Grable to the case at hand.	Thank you
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.	

1	Ms. Webre, you have four minutes remaining.
2	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JANE WEBRE
3	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Ms. Webre, can I ask you
5	about the question presented?
6	The way you presented it to us, it it was
7	as though we're we're reviewing whether the Federal
8	circuit was right to reject Grable in in whatever the
9	names of those opinions are. But. In fact, that's not
10	the situation at all.
11	The Texas Supreme Court here applied Grable,
12	and I think just the way you would want it applied. So
13	your your contention is simply they didn't apply it
14	correctly; isn't that right?
15	MS. WEBRE: I disagree, Your Honor. The
16	Texas Supreme Court didn't properly apply Grable. What
17	they applied was the Federal circuit's improper
18	departure from Grable, in two ways.
19	One is they conflated necessity with
20	substantiality, and that comes in the Federal
21	circuit's jurisprudence, that comes from a sound bite
22	from the earlier Christiansen case, where the the
23	line goes something like, "There is a substantial
24	Federal issue because it is necessary to the parties'
25	claim."

1	And so it conflates necessity with
2	substantiality, and the the Texas Supreme Court
3	followed the Federal circuit's construct. They said,
4	we're applying Grable, we're looking at substantiality,
5	but then they did exactly what the Federal circuit did.
6	And ditto with with the Federalism
7	balance. They pointed to the needs of the Federal
8	interest in the uniformity of patent law, and that was
9	the end of the inquiry.
10	And I think that that is a measure of the
11	deference that the Supreme Court of Texas as other
12	State courts would do, the deference they grant to the
13	Federal circuit in deciding the question of appropriate
14	scope of patent jurisprudence and the relative
15	importance of the the uniformity of patent law.
16	And so we arrive to you from the Supreme
17	Court of Texas, but truly presenting the the
18	appropriateness of the Federal circuit's redone
19	application of the Grable test.
20	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you answer the one
21	point your adversary raised that that gives me
22	pause a lot of pause.
23	He says a ruling on patent law of how you
24	should or should not behave in a State malpractice claim
25	will affect all of the lawyers who practice in - in

- 1 your State because each of them will have to do or not
- do whatever that malpractice ruling was because that's
- 3 what the State is going to -- State courts will follow
- 4 in the future.
- 5 So it will change those lawyers' behaviors
- 6 in Federal court.
- 7 MS. WEBRE: Your Honor, I think that is
- 8 such a speculative road to go down. What is it the
- 9 lawyers are going to do different? A lawyer --
- 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They are going to
- 11 present an expert all of the time when they don't need
- 12 to.
- MS. WEBRE: They are -- they are going to do
- some extra work and make an extra belt along with the
- suspenders that they are required to do.
- 16 And where is the harm in that? And where is
- 17 the undermining of -- of the uniformity of patent law if
- 18 a lawyer in a-- in a real patent case in Federal
- 19 court --
- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you can think of an
- 21 example where -- not perhaps on the facts of this case,
- 22 but where a State court's ruling could, in fact,
- establish a -- a code of behavior that's not just belts
- and suspenders, that's something else.
- MS. WEBRE: Your Honor, I think that that

1	spinning out a hypothetical on that would be truly
2	speculative. It's hard to imagine a situation where it
3	would be contrary or intentioned with what what the
4	Federal courts would hold, particularly since it's I
5	agree with Justice Scalia's construct, that the State
6	courts are going to try to apply appropriate Federal
7	law
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What about just
9	the just the flip side of this case? Let's suppose
10	they said, the one no, you don't need an expert. So
11	it's not belt and suspenders; it's neither belt nor
12	suspenders.
13	That's going to affect the conduct of the
14	lawyers in the State in the way that would be disruptive
15	of of the uniformity of Federal patent law.
16	MS. WEBRE: If an expert is required under
L7	Federal jurisprudence, then an expert is required in a
18	real patent case. And if the State court makes the
19	mistake in in an occasional case here or there, then
20	a lawyer practicing in a real patent case in a real
21	case in Federal court, needs to make sure that they are
22	complying with the requirements.
23	And and if you're going to -
24	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, right, the

requirements of the Federal law. The question is

Official

1	there's going to be a different interpretation of what
2	that means in the State court and in the Federal
3	circuit.
4	MS. WEBRE: Well, Your Honor, if there is a
5	conflict, then what you're supposed to follow is the
6	jurisprudence of the courts who before whom you are
7	practicing. If if the Federal circuit or Federal
8	district court has something about patent law, then
9	that's what the lawyers should follow in prosecuting a
L O	patent case.
1	And a lawyer who decides, I'm going to
_2	disregard the Federal circuit standards on fact
_3	question, expert required, whatever it is, and, instead,
14	follow the Fort Worth court of appeals on this issue, I
. 5	submit that that the lawyer does so at his peril, and
L 6	that doesn't undermine the appropriate uniformity of
L 7	patent law.
_8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
_9	The case is submitted.
20	(Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the case in the
21	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
22	
23	
24	
) 5	

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