1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 3 JASON M. RANSOM, : 4 Petitioner : 5 : No. 09-907 v. 6 FIA CARD SERVICES, N.A., FKA MBNA : 7 AMERICA BANK, N.A. : 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Monday, October 4, 2010 11 12 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 14 at 10:06 a.m. 15 APPEARANCES: CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE, ESQ., Las Vegas, Nevada; on behalf 16 17 of Petitioner. 18 DEANNE E. MAYNARD, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf 19 of Respondent. 20 NICOLE A. SAHARSKY, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor 21 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on 22 behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, 23 supporting Respondent. 24 25

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:06 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 4 first this term in Case 09-907, Ransom v. FIA Card Services. 5 Mr. Burke. 6 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 9 MR. BURKE: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, 10 and may it please the Court: 11 In 2005, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Act. 12 It made a policy decision to limit judicial discretion 13 on a case-by-case basis in the area of reasonable and 14 necessary expenses. It did so by creating a formula 15 that entailed an aggregate set amount of expenses for an 16 individual. Now, Congress could have created this from 17 scratch. It could have used an arbitrary figure. But 18 19 instead, there were figures that the IRS already had, 20 based on Census Bureau statistics, that said nationwide, 21 in a certain area, an individual would spend this much a 22 month on average. 23 In the case of Mr. Ransom, that's approximately 2500 a month. Forgetting about how it's 24 25 divided up, if I had 100 people come in and answer the

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1 following five questions the same way Mr. Ransom did, 2 and that's age, location, household size, gross income, 3 and if you have a vehicle, how many, they would all get 4 a \$2500 standard aggregate deduction, which works out to 5 \$150,000 over a 5-year period. Now, the crux of this is whether or not б 7 courts are allowed to dig in and cut out pieces of the 8 standard aggregate amount. 9 JUSTICE ALITO: Why is that the crux of it? Congress made reference to the local standards, right? 10 MR. BURKE: Yes. 11 12 JUSTICE ALITO: And were the -- was the commentary in the Collection Financial Standards in 13 14 existence at the time when Congress enacted this 15 provision? 16 MR. BURKE: There was a Collection Financial 17 Analysis that was in place, and it was noted in 1998 as 18 a prior version of the bill that ultimately wasn't 19 passed. 20 JUSTICE ALITO: And that explains what the IRS understands the local standards to mean; isn't that 21 22 right? 23 MR. BURKE: I would disagree with that. I would say -- well, it would -- it would explain what the 24 25 IRS means, but that's where I would end it, because the

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1 IRS standards are used to collect taxes. They are 2 discretionary. They --JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I understand that, but 3 4 Congress decided to make reference to the local standards in this bankruptcy provision, didn't it? 5 6 MR. BURKE: Standards. 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Yes. 8 MR. BURKE: It didn't go beyond that. 9 JUSTICE ALITO: And this -- and at the time when it did that, there was official IRS commentary 10 11 regarding the meaning of those standards, correct? 12 MR. BURKE: For the IRS to use in collecting 13 taxes. 14 JUSTICE ALITO: And your argument is that 15 Congress intended to adopt the standards promulgated by 16 the IRS, but not the IRS's interpretation of the 17 standards. 18 MR. BURKE: Correct, not their methodology 19 or interpretation. 20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Doesn't the chart say 21 "ownership costs"? 22 MR. BURKE: Yes. 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And you would read that to mean non-costs as well? I mean, if the -- if the 24 25 table is called ownership costs, then why not use the

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1 IRS's definition of what costs are, and that definition says, what, loan payments and lease payments? 2 3 MR. BURKE: Because you -- we have to look 4 at it as a standard aggregate. And what I mean by that is -- okay, the Bankruptcy Code doesn't define ownership 5 costs. And ownership costs could be the replacement б 7 value. It could be buying a new vehicle. It could be 8 the costs associated with making payments on a vehicle. 9 What that -- that average number is, in this 10 case, \$471, is a nationwide figure that somebody would 11 spend on average in a month. It doesn't mean that any 12 one individual spends that amount. 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Burke, isn't it --14 isn't it the case that, even on the other side's 15 interpretation of it, it doesn't come down to actual 16 costs anyway? Isn't it the case, or do I misunderstand 17 it, that so long as there is one payment, you get the 18 entire deduction?

20 \$1.
21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Even one payment of \$1, you
22 get the entire deduction. So to argue this case as
23 though it's a question of whether you actually expend
24 the money that you're getting the credit for is

MR. BURKE: That's their position, or even

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25 simply -- is simply false. You don't do that under

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either side's interpretation, right? 1 2 MR. BURKE: Again, I would perhaps --3 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm trying to help you, 4 Mr. Burke. 5 (Laughter.) JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Burke, before you 6 7 respond to that question, isn't it so that in the event 8 that Justice Scalia just proposed, the trustee could 9 propose an amendment to the plan to reflect that that cost is no longer being incurred? 10 11 MR. BURKE: The cost has never been 12 incurred. That's the point. And --13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: My question is: In the 14 situation that Justice Scalia proposed, it's not 15 automatic that the \$471 gets deducted because there 16 could be proposed an amendment of the plan to reflect that that -- there's no longer any expense for 17 18 ownership. 19 MR. BURKE: In the situation where there is 20 a dollar, of course, an amendment can be made. But see 21 the -- the dollar doesn't show up in the means test. 22 The means test is the aggregate --23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it isn't -- it isn't 24 automatic that because there's one payment, then 25 forever, the rest of the 5 years, he gets to deduct the

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1 \$471. 2 MR. BURKE: That's what the lower court 3 said. 4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. What -- what happens under the tax law? Do they make an adjustment 5 under the tax law as well? б 7 MR. BURKE: Of course -- under the tax law, 8 you get a standard deduction. 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: A standard --MR. BURKE: No different than here. Nobody 10 11 goes behind the scenes and says, hey, what is that 12 standard deduction? 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. So that they --14 what is suggested is that you look at it and apply the 15 IRS's approach as to whether you get into the chart, but 16 then you don't use the IRS's approach when the trustee 17 takes you out of the chart. Is that what you think is 18 the law? 19 MR. BURKE: No, that's not what I think is 20 the law. What I'm saying is Congress has given, in this 21 case, an individual like Jason Ransom \$150,000 over 5 22 years to spend. They are not saying whether he actually 23 spends it in any one category. 24 For instance, the car ownership might be -equate to \$28,000 over 5 years. Rent might be 1,000. 25

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1 That's 60,000 over 5 years. Congress did not say go 2 back and make sure Mr. Ransom is spending every dollar. 3 These are averages across the nation. And when it comes 4 to a car ownership expense, we're not saying spend \$471. Oh, you have no payment? You didn't spend anything for 5 5 years? б What it's saying is, over 5 years, I 7 No. 8 have a cost associated with owning that vehicle, whether it's a loan or lease payment, whether it's replacing the 9 10 vehicle, whether it's major repairs, on average, across 11 the country. 12 JUSTICE BREYER: You do. You do, but the difficulty that I -- I don't get the answer to 13 14 Justice Ginsburg's first question. 15 Of course you have all kinds of costs 16 dealing with ownership, but what the IRS says, what it 17 says in the statute, is you are supposed to take the applicable costs from IRS. And what it has on page 5a 18 19 is it has something called "ownership costs." 20 MR. BURKE: Correct. 21 JUSTICE BREYER: And it defines those as 22 \$471. 23 MR. BURKE: Correct. 24 JUSTICE BREYER: And then on 3a, where it says what ownership costs are, it says the 25

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1 transportation standards consist of nationwide figures 2 for monthly loan or lease payments, referred to as 3 ownership costs. So when I read that, I said ownership 4 costs means monthly loan or lease payments, nothing 5 else. Now, you have all kinds of other things. 6 7 It's just these words "ownership costs" don't refer to 8 those other things, because of that definition given right there. That's what I thought Justice Ginsburg was 9 10 initially asking. 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes, I was. 12 JUSTICE BREYER: And I -- and how -- how do you get out of that what I think of as very, very clear 13 14 language which says what these standards refer to? 15 MR. BURKE: Because the standards refer to 16 the numbers. It's a chart. 17 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, but it doesn't -- for 18 example, suppose you buy a dozen apples every month, and 19 they cost you \$48 extra. You're not going to say the 20 ownership costs refer to the apples, even if you decorate the car with them. 21 22 (Laughter.) 23 MR. BURKE: What -- what --24 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, ownership costs refers to lease and loan payments. Nothing else. 25

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1	JUSTICE SCALIA: What's the language we're
2	dealing with, Mr. Burke? Do you want to quote the
3	language to us?
4	Nobody's quoted the language. What does it
5	say is applicable?
6	MR. BURKE: What the statute says is the
7	applicable you shall get, mandatory, the applicable
8	amounts specified based on where a debtor resides
9	JUSTICE SCALIA: Wait. The the
10	applicable amounts specified where?
11	MR. BURKE: In the national local standards.
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: Read the text of the
13	statute, would you, please, for me? I couldn't even get
14	it from your brief. You had to refer me back to the
15	petition. Why isn't in an appendix to your brief or
16	printed in the beginning of your brief, instead of
17	kicking me back to dig out your petition?
18	MR. BURKE: "The debtor's monthly expenses
19	shall be the debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts
20	specified under the national local standards."
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: "Amount specified under"
22	the standard.
23	MR. BURKE: Specific amount, "applicable"
24	modifies "amounts specified."
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: "Applicable amounts

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1	specified," not the amounts specified if applicable.
2	MR. BURKE: Correct, based on where a debtor
3	resides.
4	Now, the only way a court can say that an
5	individual has to have a debt on a car to get this
б	deduction there's two ways: One
7	JUSTICE ALITO: Look at the local standard,
8	which is on page 8 of the appendix to your brief, right?
9	And all it says is "Ownership Costs," "First Car,"
10	"\$471." That's the relevant text, isn't it?
11	MR. BURKE: Yes.
12	JUSTICE ALITO: What if a person leases a
13	car? Do you think they get ownership costs?
14	MR. BURKE: Yes, because they get the cost
15	whether they owe on it or not.
16	JUSTICE ALITO: But they don't own the car,
17	so how can they get ownership costs?
18	MR. BURKE: There's a different definition.
19	"Ownership" doesn't mean it can mean possession.
20	But
21	JUSTICE ALITO: Where do you get that, from
22	the
23	MR. BURKE: Black's Law Dictionary.
24	JUSTICE ALITO: from the Collection
25	Financial Standards?

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1	MR. BURKE: No. The Collection Financial
2	Standards say you get the lease you get the deduction
3	if you have a loan or a lease payment.
4	JUSTICE ALITO: Where do you get the
5	definition that somebody who leases something owns it?
б	MR. BURKE: I don't. I'm not sure they do
7	own it.
8	JUSTICE ALITO: Then how do they get
9	ownership costs?
10	MR. BURKE: Because you have possession of
11	it. It's based on having the item. It's costs
12	associated with having the item, whether it's paid off
13	or not.
14	JUSTICE ALITO: If somebody rents an
15	apartment, do they own the apartment?
16	MR. BURKE: Probably under ownership, their
17	possession is some type of an ownership. It may be just
18	possessory.
19	JUSTICE BREYER: Is there something wrong
20	with the IRS saying what they mean? It says ownership
21	costs means monthly loan or lease payments. Now, is
22	there something
23	MR. BURKE: The problem
24	JUSTICE BREYER: That's what it says it
25	means. Now, is there something illegal about it

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1 defining ownership costs in that way?

2 MR. BURKE: No, for the collection of taxes, 3 there is not. But if you're going to use -- start 4 digging into the manual, you might as well bring it all 5 into 707(b), and, as we discussed earlier, there was 6 language that said the collection financial analysis 7 should be brought in, but that was deleted in the final 8 version.

9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why not just -- it says you are supposed to look at the form; it says ownership 10 11 costs. So the only thing you'd look at the IRS for 12 is -- the manual -- is to define ownership costs. And 13 they say ownership costs means those two things. MR. BURKE: Well, I don't -- there's no 14 15 reason to limit it. If you're going to -- the text 16 doesn't say -- it says national local standards. It 17 doesn't discriminate or give disparate treatment to that 18 If you're going to give it to one item, then one item. 19 it can be pulled in, and it should be -- the same 20 treatment should be given to all items, and we should 21 have to prove some type of a --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: I don't follow that. If the simple thing is to just -- what does the word "costs" mean? And then you look to the IRS manual, and it tells you that "costs" means loan or lease payments.

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1 To collect taxes, that's how MR. BURKE: 2 they defined it. But in the statute it says you get "local standard amounts specified." It does not stretch 3 4 it and say "under the IRS's interpretation." That 5 language was taken out. And if we were to use the IRS's interpretation, here's the whole problem: It's б 7 discretionary. It goes up and down. It's based on an 8 IRS revenue agent. It -- let me give you a separate 9 example. Nobody --

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Burke, if we could stay 11 with this. The \$471 is derived by looking at the 12 average loan or lease payments nationwide. Then, in 13 addition to that, we know that the IRS has a separate 14 category for operating costs that is meant to reflect 15 costs of having a car that are not your loan and lease 16 payments. So, between those two things, why wouldn't we 17 say that ownership costs means your loan and lease 18 payments, but operating costs means your other costs of 19 having a car, and that you get the operating costs if 20 you have a car but don't make loan and lease payments, 21 and you get the ownership costs if you do make loan and 22 lease payments?

23 MR. BURKE: Because to reach that, you have 24 to go into the Internal Revenue Manual. It's not in the 25 statute that says you have to owe on it to get it. And

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1 if you go into the Internal Revenue Manual -- let's look at operating expenses. What it says, in collecting 2 3 taxes -- and it's in the Joint Appendix at pages 83 4 through 88. But what it says, when it comes to local national other expenses, an internal revenue agent has 5 discretion. You only get these expenses -- this is the б 7 overall idea -- if they produce income or if it's for 8 health and welfare.

9 And so, when we look at the Joint Appendix 10 page 88, section B, under the local standard 11 transportation expenses, when it talks about operating 12 costs, which is something you just mentioned, it says 13 you only get transportation expenses that are used to 14 produce income or the health and welfare of an 15 individual and their family.

Plus, the fact that you own a car, the IRS under its discretion can take away the operating costs if it's on four cinder blocks in your backyard. You're not incurring fuel costs, mileage costs; you are not probably paying registration or any of those other operating costs. The IRS agent, under their manual, can take away that expense.

23 So, why stop and say, well, we're just going 24 to look at the ownership costs? And all they're saying 25 here is if you owe on it, you get it; if you don't owe,

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1 you don't get it. Let's not look at anything else in 2 the Internal Revenue Manual, which is a 39-part, 3 500-page document that in some ways is almost 4 incomprehensible, and direct the --5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Burke, the -- it's unusual to allow a deduction for the purpose of б 7 calculating disposable income although you don't have any expense. I understand how you get to that 8 9 conclusion with respect to car ownership. Is there any 10 other provision that in -- in calculating disposable 11 income, you are allowed a deduction for an expense that 12 you don't incur? 13 MR. BURKE: If the Court understands my view 14 that Congress gave --15 JUSTICE GINSBURG: No. The question -- is there anything else that works like this? You don't

16 17 have the expense, nonetheless you have the deduction? 18 Any -- I mean, there are a whole list of deductions, 19 expenses. Is there any other one that works this way? 20 It doesn't matter whether you have the expense, in fact. 21 JUSTICE KAGAN: For example, Mr. Burke, what 22 would happen if you didn't actually have any out-of-pocket medical costs? Could you still claim a 23 deduction for out-of-pocket medical costs? 24 25 MR. BURKE: I'm saying you get all the

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1 deductions, whether you owe on it or not. Is there a specific one besides the car ownership that says you 2 3 have to owe on it? No. But my point is --4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is that the general view 5 of the courts? Is the answer that you just gave б supported uniformly by the courts that have looked at 7 this? 8 MR. BURKE: There's about 60 published cases. They are split almost 50-50, actually more --9 10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Even -- in other words, 11 even on this point, they are split? 12 MR. BURKE: This is one line that they have looked at in the cases. Basically --13 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand what 15 you're saying. He asked, are they split 50-50 on the 16 point that is before us here? Yes or no? 17 MR. BURKE: Yes, they're about 50-50. 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do they apply -- do the 19 courts apply the housing and utilities listed amount 20 whether or not you pay for a house or not, whether or 21 not you rent? 22 MR. BURKE: There's two published cases I'm 23 aware of, and both allowed it. One, somebody had military housing; one, the house was paid off. Both 24 25 courts said you get it under the local standards. But

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the IRS manual would not give that to you, because under the local standards the IRS manual says you get the specific amount or your actual payment, whatever is less.

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, once again, Mr. Burke, this is -- I don't know why you don't point this б 7 out. This is not the difference between your position 8 and the position of the other side. You get the 9 deduction for the other side as well, whether or not you are making the payment. Now, maybe it can be adjusted 10 11 by the trustee, but as far as the statute is concerned, 12 so long as you make one payment of \$1, under their theory you're entitled to claim the deduction; isn't 13 14 that right?

15 MR. BURKE: That's correct.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: So.

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: My question, incidentally, about courts was not with reference to the car expense. 18 19 It was with reference to the hypothetical or to the 20 issue proposed by one of my colleagues, that said, what 21 if you don't -- Justice Kagan -- suppose you don't have 22 the medical expense. And the answer -- and your -- and I wanted to know if your answer is supported uniformly 23 by the courts that have looked at this, or if there is 24 25 also a split on that point?

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1	MR. BURKE: I apologize for not
2	understanding it. No, every other expense deduction
3	that I have seen besides the car ownership, somebody
4	gets it.
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And they get it
6	whether or not they incur that expense or not?
7	MR. BURKE: Correct.
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In other words,
9	food you don't have to say, well, he did spend this
10	much money on food, so he gets the standard deduction.
11	MR. BURKE: Correct.
12	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If he doesn't eat as
13	much as somebody else, he gets the same deduction,
14	right?
15	MR. BURKE: Correct. Or if he lives at home
16	and mom cooks for him.
17	JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Burke, even you
18	would say is this correct that if you don't own a
19	car at all, you can't claim the car costs?
20	MR. BURKE: Yes.
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Is that is that by
22	reason of the Internal Revenue Service
23	MR. BURKE: No.
24	JUSTICE SCALIA: manual, or is it by
25	reason of the Bankruptcy Code itself?

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1	MR. BURKE: It's by reason of the Bankruptcy
2	Code that refers to the standards, and the standards
3	specifically say you have one car, no cars, and you get
4	a public transportation, or two cars; pick the one.
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: So it's in the chart
6	MR. BURKE: It's in the chart.
7	JUSTICE SCALIA: that you claim okay.
8	JUSTICE ALITO: What if you own a car, but
9	it's completely inoperable and it has no value? You buy
10	it for a dollar. It's a junk car, and you're planning
11	possibly to restore it at some point. Do you get the
12	deduction then?
13	MR. BURKE: Based on a strict reading of the
14	code, you get it.
15	Now, would the IRS allow it? Again, that's
16	a discretionary standard, but any time you have an
17	objective test, there's going to be line-drawing and
18	perceived unfairness on the outskirts.
19	JUSTICE KENNEDY: And would your answer be
20	the same if the allowance was set, the decree was made,
21	and and the debtor then went out and bought the
22	junker to put in his driveway just in order to get the
23	400-plus dollars a month, or would that be deemed an
24	evasion of the law that could be addressed by the
25	Bankruptcy Court?

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1 It can addressed by the MR. BURKE: 2 Bankruptcy Court, and that's the beauty of the statute. 3 We don't need to go into the Internal Revenue Manual. We just need their tables, because there's a provision, 4 5 1325(a)(3), that deals with good faith. So if it appears somebody is not acting in good faith, then --6 7 JUSTICE BREYER: What is -- we've got about 8 half the courts in the country agreeing with you. And so you've read all those arguments, and what in your 9 10 opinion is the best one on the point, again, where I am 11 stuck, which is Justice Ginsburg's original point? I 12 mean, I can think of millions of examples. You have a 13 form that says -- the employer says entertainment 14 expenses. Then it defines entertainment expenses as 15 food and transport, and they leave out movies, you know. 16 Or you could have vacation expenses, and vacation expenses are defined as transport and hotel, and they 17 18 leave out meals. And here we have a definition of 19 ownership expenses, and they say leasing and loaning, 20 and they leave out other forms of ownership. 21 MR. BURKE: Because --22 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, the argument is, well, 23 that's what they mean by it, so that's what applicable. Now, what's the best argument against that in those 24 25 50 cases? Why is it trying -- why to try to get an

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1	expense which isn't loan or lease? Have you any more
2	right to it than if you tried to get an expense to my
3	totally irrelevant apples? I mean, it doesn't fit
4	within the applicable definition. What's the answer?
5	MR. BURKE: The means test is a form, and if
6	you look at the form the means test is a form.
7	JUSTICE BREYER: I've looked at the form.
8	MR. BURKE: If you look at the form
9	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.
10	MR. BURKE: It just says
11	JUSTICE BREYER: Ownership.
12	MR. BURKE: That's it. There's no
13	definition in the form.
14	JUSTICE BREYER: But they two pages
15	earlier they say what they mean by the word "ownership."
16	MR. BURKE: Not the the IRM does.
17	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.
18	MR. BURKE: Not the statute and not the B22
19	form that's filled out by debtors.
20	JUSTICE BREYER: You say half the courts
21	say, oh, you just sort of imagine what ownership
22	expenses are, and anything that they can fall within
23	that general English language word is what they can
24	deduct; is that their approach? Because we you say
25	cut off the definition, cut off the definition from the

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word "ownership"; don't use it. So what do we use to 1 2 define what ownership is? 3 MR. BURKE: We don't have to. Congress gave 4 standard amounts for --JUSTICE BREYER: No, I know, but it's for 5 ownership; it's not for, for example, whistling. It's б 7 for ownership. So -- so how do we define what that \$471 8 attaches to? Do we use a State common law definition or 9 something? How have they done it? 10 MR. BURKE: Because you can take it as a 11 bunch of variables. It's not in the Bankruptcy Code. 12 If -- so it could be replacement costs; it could be major repairs; it could be --13 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is this a problem 15 distinctive to your case? Doesn't the other side have 16 the same problem with ownership? Don't they acknowledge 17 that even if you are leasing the car you get the 18 deduction? 19 MR. BURKE: Yes. 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't see why this is 21 distinctive to your case. It's a problem both sides 22 face. And we don't avoid it by coming out against you, 23 do we? 24 MR. BURKE: No, we don't. 25 JUSTICE BREYER: Why?

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1 JUSTICE ALITO: What if -- what if the 2 definition of --3 JUSTICE BREYER: Why don't we? 4 JUSTICE ALITO: -- ownership costs was moved into the local standards themselves? Would the outcome 5 be different then? 6 7 MR. BURKE: Are you saying in 707(b)? 8 JUSTICE ALITO: No. It's moved from the CFS to the local standards, which are referred to in the --9 in the code provision. 10 11 MR. BURKE: My answer would still be the 12 same because that's not a congressional formula. That's a form that comes off the Department of Justice Website 13 14 which administers the U.S. Trustee's program and that's 15 their litigation position. 16 JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Burke, if the table said loan and lease costs, you wouldn't have a case? If 17 18 it said -- instead of ownership costs, if it said loan 19 and lease costs, then you would sit down and you would 20 say I'm not entitled to that deduction? 21 MR. BURKE: No. I would say an individual 22 who owns a car, whether they owe or not, gets the 23 deduction because it's part of this aggregate standard. 24 JUSTICE KAGAN: Even if it's called loan and lease costs? 25

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1	MR. BURKE: Correct. It's not a breakdown
2	on what any one individual has. It's an aggregate.
3	JUSTICE GINSBURG: You may want to save the
4	rest of your time for rebuttal.
5	MR. BURKE: Thank you. I will.
6	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
7	Ms. Maynard.
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF DEANNE E. MAYNARD
9	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
10	MS. MAYNARD: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
11	please the Court:
12	The Bankruptcy Code precludes an above-
13	median-income debtor like Petitioner from shielding from
14	his creditors \$471 a month for a car payment that he
15	does not have. A debtor with
16	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: food costs, housing
17	costs, utility costs, by getting his parents to pay for
18	those things and still take this deduction?
19	MS. MAYNARD: The statute allows a debtor to
20	take an applicable monthly expense amount. So if the
21	debtor truly has no food costs, then the food standard
22	would be not applicable to the debtor, so
23	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Your adversary said that
24	only two courts have addressed this issue and have
25	permitted those deductions. So under what reasoning

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would we apply a different standard to the car costs as opposed to those other costs?

MS. MAYNARD: Well, I think, with respect -I think the cases he was talking about were housing.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Housing.

MS. MAYNARD: Right. So housing and car 6 7 costs are part of the local standards. Food, clothing, 8 house cleaning supplies, those are part of the national standards. The -- in our view, the text that goes along 9 with -- accompanies the tables, which is not the 10 11 Internal Revenue Manual -- it's just the pages reprinted at 1a to 3a of our brief. The Collection Financial 12 Standards, the prefatory explanation for what the tables 13 14 mean. In our view, that is -- goes along with --15 incorporated into the national local standards. 16 The national standards, Justice Sotomayor, are allowed, as long as you have under the calculations 17 18 -- as explained in the standards, under the national 19 standards, a debtor would receive the allowance in the 20 table as long as they have any such expense, so 21 regardless of amount. However, if they have no such 22 expense, then they are taken out by the statutory 23 language in the means test, which says that the standard

24 must be applicable to the debtor. And --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So if they have

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pre-purchased their food expenses, so long as they have 1 \$1 of food expense they get the entire expense even 2 3 though they're not incurring it? 4 MS. MAYNARD: If they are --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And there are things 5 б like, you can pay up, you know, have the grocery deliver 7 your food every month and you can pay in advance, and if 8 you're paid up, you still get the full food expense that is allowed? 9 10 MS. MAYNARD: No, Your Honor. I think if, 11 over the 60-month period looking forward, you know, that 12 you're going to -- you've already paid up for your food 13 for the next 60 months and you're not going to incur any 14 additional food expenses, no, then in that situation the 15 standard would be inapplicable to you. You would be 16 having no -- in that hypothetical --17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But if you paid \$1 for food, you'd get the full amount for 60 months? 18 19 MS. MAYNARD: Under the standard. That's 20 the way the standards operate, Your Honor. 21 I haven't seen any cases litigated over food 22 expense --23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So your argument 24 leads to a result that's just as absurd as your

25 colleague's result on the other side.

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1 MS. MAYNARD: I don't believe so, Your 2 Honor --3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I mean, that was a 4 big part of your argument. You said his position leads to an absurd result, and yours is just as absurd. 5 MS. MAYNARD: I don't think so, Your Honor, б 7 for this reason, which is that the national standards 8 are food, clothing, house cleaning supplies, things that 9 you expect every debtor to have. You don't see much 10 litigation about those expenses. The local standards, however, operate differently. In our view -- and our 11 12 view's different from the government's, Justice Scalia. 13 In our view, under the local standards and the way that 14 they apply as explained in the Collection Financial 15 Standards, is that the debtor is allowed their actual expense for the local standard or the amount in the 16 table, whichever is less. So in the hypothetical --17 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Where does it say that? 19 MS. MAYNARD: In our --20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The debtor's monthly 21 expenses shall be the debtor's applicable monthly 22 expense amounts specified under the national and local standards. So the national and local standards have 23 24 amounts listed. Where does it say you take only the 25 actual, not the national or local standard?

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1 MS. MAYNARD: I read that text, Your 2 Honor -- again, the Court doesn't need to decide this 3 maximum cap issue to decide this case, because the 4 Petitioner has no expense whatsoever, and so it's not applicable to him. 5 б But in our view, Justice Sotomayor -- in our 7 view, you get it from the language of the statute that 8 says the debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the national standards and local 9 10 standards. And the way that we understand the national and local standards to work is, if you look at page --11 12 it's explained on page 1a of the petition to our brief, 13 the red brief. Maximum allowance -- it's the third 14 paragraph down: "Maximum allowances for housing and 15 utilities and transportation, known as the Local 16 Standards, vary by location. Unlike the National Standards, the taxpayer is allowed the amount actually 17 18 spent or the standard, whichever is less." 19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that's -- but that's 20 not what the provision at issue here says. It says you 21 use the amount specified under the national standards, 22 and you use actual for everything else. That's what the statute said. So now you're trying to move the actual 23 24 into the first half of the text? 25 MS. MAYNARD: No, Your Honor, that's not how

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1 I understand the text. The text provides --2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why would you even 3 bother? Why don't you -- if -- if what you're arguing 4 is that only actual expenses are -- are what you can claim, you wouldn't need the first half. 5 б MS. MAYNARD: Yes, you would, Your Honor, 7 because what the -- what the statute's purpose here is 8 -- I mean, I think it's helpful to step back. 9 Chapter 13 sends one to chapter 7's means test for the purpose of calculating the amounts 10 11 reasonably necessary for the maintenance and support of 12 the debtor. And Congress chose to import the -- the 13 methodology of the national standards and local 14 standards as a way both to set the categories of 15 expenses that debtors could receive payments for, and, with the case of the national and local standards, to 16 set the amounts. They were worried about capping upper 17 18 discretion because Congress -- it's guite clear from the 19 text and the legislative history -- was concerned about 20 above-median-income debtors taking luxurious expense 21 amounts. 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what you would have the statute read is: The debtor's monthly expenses 23 shall be the debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts 24 specified, as a -- as a maximum. You would have to add 25

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1 "maximum" somewhere there.

2 MS. MAYNARD: No, Your Honor, because the 3 amount under the national standards, as the national 4 standards operate, is the -- is an allowance, not an 5 actual, and the amount under the local standards, as б they operate, is the amount actually spent or the amount 7 in the table, whichever is less. And, again --8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your -- your 9 position penalizes debtors who pay their expenses in 10 advance, who don't incur additional debt to pay for 11 things like their car. I would have thought the 12 Bankruptcy Code would think that's a good thing, that they're not incurring debt that they can't afford to pay 13 14 off, but instead, to the extent they can, they're paying 15 expenses in advance. Why should somebody who does that 16 be in a worse position than somebody -- than somebody who takes out a loan they can't afford to pay back? 17 18 MS. MAYNARD: Money is fungible, Your Honor, 19 so to the extent the debtor has incurred expenses before 20 going into bankruptcy instead of, as here, paying off 21 this more than \$85,000 in credit card debt, shouldn't be able to --22 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, he hasn't incurred -- he hasn't incurred expenses. It's the whole 24 25 point, I guess, that he's paid for something.

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1	MS. MAYNARD: He used his money, perhaps, to
2	purchase his car outright, instead of to pay down his
3	credit card debt, and so he has a salary of \$50,000, and
4	he has a credit card debt of \$85,000, and he owns a
5	2-year car 2-year-old car outright. He should not be
б	able to deduct, as a measure of his reasonably necessary
7	expenses for his maintenance and support over the next
8	50 months, \$28,000 that he doesn't need for a car
9	payment that he doesn't make.
10	JUSTICE BREYER: You're
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Even though he can
12	do it even though he can do it for everything else
13	he can do it for food, he can do it for housekeeping
14	expenses, he can do it for personal care expenses, he
15	can even do it the other, the final category is
16	miscellaneous, so he can do it for anything.
17	MS. MAYNARD: Well, the miscellaneous, all
18	those numbers are capped, and the legislative history
19	makes clear Congress thought all those numbers would
20	actually effectively act as caps. In other words, to
21	the extent there was debate in the Congress, Congress
22	was concerned that these numbers were actually too low,
23	not that they were going to give anybody a windfall.
24	But to the extent
25	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what you're proposing

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1 is that every debtor has to go to the Bankruptcy Court 2 and show what their monthly food bills have been over 3 what period of time, how much their personal supplies 4 have been over what period of time? How can you calculate forward what they are going to spend on a 5 monthly basis for each of those items? Isn't that the б 7 reason the tables are used, so that you don't have to do 8 that?

9 MS. MAYNARD: Yes, Your Honor, and in the national standards, which all the items you just list 10 11 are national standards, under the national standards you 12 don't do the actuals. On page 1a, it explains: "Allowances for food, clothing and other items, known as 13 14 the National Standards, apply nationwide except for 15 Alaska and Hawaii.... Taxpayers are allowed the total 16 National Standards amount for their family size and income level, without questioning amounts actually 17 18 spent."

For -- yes, for those hard-to-calculate items, you do -- our position is you do get the amounts in the chart. For local standards -- the local standards, however, which include home, mortgage, lease expenses, utilities, and transportation, which include both ownership costs and operating costs, you get the actual or whichever is less.

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1	JUSTICE SCALIA: I must say your position is
2	more logical than the position that you read in some of
3	the instructions applicable to the to the chart
4	that's referred to in the Bankruptcy Code, but not
5	others. I mean, it seems to me, if you're going to read
б	in the requirement that have to have made a lease
7	payment, you should also read in the requirement that
8	you're referring to now, which would mean your deduction
9	is limited by the by the amount of your lease
10	payment.
11	I don't see why is there any reason why
12	one would read in the other one and not read in yours?
13	MS. MAYNARD: Not in our view, Your Honor,
14	because in our view the chart is is ambiguous about
15	what the number stands for. And so in the national
16	standards, the text, the prefatory text, explains that
17	the amount is an allowance if you have the expense. In
18	the local standards, the prefatory text explains that
19	the amount operates as a cap.
20	But the important point for this case, Your
21	Honor, is that you don't have to decide anything about
22	the national standards because Petitioner is left at the
23	statutory door. He has no applicable monthly expense
24	amount for operating
25	JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Maynard, what would

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happen if the debtor had a car that was 200,000 miles old -- 200,000 miles, and it was going to break down, you know, within the next 5 years? Would the debtor then be able to take the deduction?

5 MS. MAYNARD: If the debtor owns the car 6 outright at the time they file for bankruptcy, they 7 would not get the deduction.

8 JUSTICE KAGAN: Even though if you look ahead, if you project forward, it's pretty clear that 9 10 the debtor is going to have to incur those expenses? 11 MS. MAYNARD: They would not get the 12 deduction under this calculation. However, under this Court's decision in Lanning, when one goes to project 13 14 the disposable income, it's conceivable that the debtor 15 could prove that it's known or virtually certain that 16 they will need a new car and that that could be accounted for. 17

But -- but also the Bankruptcy Code in 1329 allows for modification of a plan, and so when the time arises that their car conks out and they need a new car, they can move to modify their plan. I think it's --JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, the modification works for chapter 13, but it doesn't work for chapter 7; is that right?

MS. MAYNARD: Well, they make that statement

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1	in their reply brief, Your Honor, but I'm not sure
2	exactly what they mean by that, because in chapter 7
3	this test is being used for a very different purpose.
4	It's the gateway; it's a presumptive test for abuse.
5	And so, again, our reading makes perfect sense in that
6	context because what you want to know is, does this
7	debtor actually have moneys it can prepay its creditors,
8	should it be
9	JUSTICE BREYER: The sorry. Are you
10	finished?
11	MS. MAYNARD: I was I actually haven't
12	answered her question.
13	JUSTICE BREYER: Go ahead.
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why don't you finish
15	answering the question?
16	JUSTICE BREYER: Finish, yes.
17	MS. MAYNARD: So, in chapter 7, once you
18	if you decide it's presumptively not presumptively
19	abusive, and you stay in chapter 7, then chapter 7 is a
20	liquidation. There's no ongoing plan. So I all of
21	your nonexempt assets are liquidated, your creditors are
22	paid off, and then you are discharged. If 3 years from
23	now your car conks out, you're just like you and me; you
24	are not in bankruptcy, you just you try to make do.
25	JUSTICE BREYER: I think it is well, I'm

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1 trying to work out what was his point. And I don't 2 blame him for this. But trying to figure it out, he 3 says look: This whole thing was written for a different 4 purpose than the IRS, and if we start reading all those things from the beginning into the tables, we're really 5 б going to get into a mess. For example, we are going to 7 give people deductions when they have lease payments, 8 even though they're not owners when they have lease 9 payments. The company owns -- not even an ownership 10 expense, but it does say use the lease payment. And 11 then it has all these other things.

12 So forget it; do a simple thing. It says ownership expense. You go to the registry of motor 13 14 vehicles and you say, is Smith the owner? And they'll 15 tell you, yes or no. And if the answer is yes, he deducts \$471. Sometimes that's too little; sometimes 16 17 that's too much. But once we depart from that, we're 18 really in a nightmare of trying to figure out what all 19 these things mean that were written for other purposes. 20 So, what do you say to that?

MS. MAYNARD: I say, Justice Breyer, that there's nothing in the statute or the legislative history that suggests this was meant to be an overall budget for above-median-income debtors. This was about capping upper discretion and limiting the expenses

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available as reasonably necessary expenses for
 above-median-income debtors.

And I think that point is made perfectly 3 4 clear by the fact that if you can compare it to what happens now to a below-median-income debtor, a 5 below-median-income debtor in the same situation as б 7 Petitioner, who owns his car outright, would be allowed 8 no amount as an expense for his vehicle, because he 9 doesn't have an actual expense that's reasonably 10 necessary.

And I think that the 2005 Congress would think it was a senseless result, as they argue here, that Petitioner gets \$471, above-median-income debtor, the very class of debtors with whom Congress was concerned in the 2005 amendments, to shield from his creditors over the life of the plan when he has no comparable expense.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do you think that --19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What we are talking about 20 is a paradigm of someone -- we're comparing someone who 21 has a \$470-a-month car payment and he gets -- and he gets the deduction. Why is that, in light of the second 22 sentence -- let's see, the third sentence of the 23 statute, which says, "Notwithstanding any other 24 25 provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the

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debtor shall not include any payments for debts." I 1 2 mean, that would be the car company. 3 And has -- has that point been litigated? 4 MS. MAYNARD: That -- that sentence is somewhat of a conundrum, Your Honor, and I think that 5 the Court doesn't need to decide the meaning here, 6 because whatever it does, it doesn't get Petitioner 7 within the Romanette ii calculation --8 9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No -- no, but it would --10 MS. MAYNARD: -- because he has no payment. 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It would eliminate the 12 anomaly that -- one of the principal anomalies. There 13 are many anomalies in each position. It would eliminate 14 one of the principal asymmetries that seems to concern 15 the counsel and the Court. 16 MS. MAYNARD: Well, my understanding of that provision is that it serves two purposes. 17 18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That it? 19 MS. MAYNARD: Serves two purposes. The 20 first is that it makes clear -- in the back of our 21 brief, we have the other necessary expenses from the 22 IRM. And on -- near the back, page 25a, two of the 23 categories of other necessary expenses are secured or legally perfected debts and unsecured debts. 24 So I think the -- the otherwise -- the 25

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I "notwithstanding" sentence makes clear that Romanette ii should not capture those other unsecured debts and secured debts, that it's the very purpose of this whole calculation to figure out how much money you have to pay those things.

The second purpose the sentence serves is to б 7 make sure that there is no double-counting, because 8 Romanette iii, the very next provision in the means 9 test, allows the debtor to claim monthly payments for secured debts. Now, many car loans are probably secured 10 11 debts, and in our view if you actually have a car loan 12 -- now, remember again, he neither has a car loan, nor a car lease payment, nor any kind of ownership payment. 13

But if -- if one actually did have a car loan that was secured by the car, which I think is the vast majority of car loans, in our view the debtor expenses nothing for that under Romanette ii, and only the actual amount of that debt under Romanette iii.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought the -- the general position was you get either the actual payment or the 471, of whichever is higher.

22 MS. MAYNARD: Whichever is less.

I think that -- that's my understanding of how the local standards work, Your Honor. I think, then, as a practical matter, that really will end up

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only applying to car leases with respect to 1 2 transportation ownership costs, because I think that the 3 "notwithstanding" sentence removes secured car loans from Romanette ii and has them calculated under 4 Romanette iii, where there is no comparable cap. 5 And the -- but -- but the point at issue in 6 7 this case doesn't involve the interaction between 8 Romanette ii and Romanette iii, because no matter how those two things interact, when the debtor has no 9 10 payment whatsoever, he ought not to be able to claim any 11 car ownership costs, because what we're trying to figure 12 out is what amounts does he reasonably need for his 13 maintenance and support? And this question is a very 14 important question. This scenario happens a lot. 15 In the 2007 study that U.S. Trustees did is 16 -- at Congress's request to which Petitioner cites in his reply brief, the average overpayment of a debtor in 17 18 claiming this transportation ownership expense was \$335, 19 which is a lot when you're talking about the standard in 20 the chart being 471. There are many debtors who are 21 getting this expense either above their amount or when 22 they have no such expense at all, and so even if the Court doesn't resolve these other issues that are 23 implicated by this case, the decision here is a simple 24 25 one, which is: This debtor has no applicable monthly

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1 expense amount for transportation ownership costs, and 2 he shouldn't be allowed to expense any amount for that. 3 If there are no further questions, the 4 Respondent requests the Court would affirm the judgment 5 below. 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 7 Ms. Saharsky. 8 ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICOLE A. SAHARSKY, ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE, 9 10 SUPPORTING RESPONDENT 11 MS. SAHARSKY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 12 please the Court: 13 The only question this Court needs to 14 resolve in this case is whether the vehicle ownership 15 expense is applicable to Petitioner. The answer is no. 16 The ownership cost is for loan and lease 17 payments, the cost to acquiring the vehicle, and he just 18 doesn't have any payments of that type. To allow him to 19 pretend that he does would create absurd results. He'd 20 be able to shield approximately \$28,000 from his unsecured creditors, and he'd be better off than lower 21 income chapter 13 debtors. And we just don't think that 22 23 that's a result that Congress intended. We don't think 24 it --25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And if he paid --

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JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I -- excuse me, Chief Justice. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If he paid a dollar, he would be able to shield \$27,999, and you're comfortable with that result? MS. SAHARSKY: Well, that goes to the question of whether the amount in the table is the amount to be used or a cap on actual expenses.

In our

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And I understood your brief to say it was the amount -- you get the whole 11 12 amount, not simply as a cap.

13 MS. SAHARSKY: That's right. Now, of 14 course, we haven't seen -- the executive office for 15 U.S. Trustees has not seen any \$1 payments. It doesn't 16 know of any such commercially available payments. It 17 suspects the payments would be --

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If the point of the 19 \$1, counsel, is to lead to the extreme hypothetical that 20 would flesh out your position, what if it were \$10,000 21 and the amount would give him \$30,000? The trustees 22 have probably seen loans like that.

23 MS. SAHARSKY: What I'm saying, Your Honor, is that there are many circumstances in which an expense 24 25 amount is a standard amount, but you still need to make

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view, it is --

a threshold showing that it's applicable to you. 1 2 And if I could give the Court one example: 3 When an individual does his Federal income tax forms, 4 you can take a deduction for your dependents, but you can't just take a deduction for any child you have. You 5 have to take a deduction -- you can take a deduction if б 7 the person lives at home with you for more than 1 year 8 and have you a certain amount of expenses to support 9 them, and that is a standard deduction that you get on 10 your tax forms. The IRS doesn't ask everyone to figure 11 out their actual costs. 12 It is the case in real life that there are 13 allowance amounts that are average amounts that are 14 given to people once they meet the criteria. And that's 15 what we are saying happens here. 16 Now, that is, again, only a disagreement as 17 to what you do with people who actually have vehicle 18 ownership expenses. 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why aren't -- why isn't one 20 of the criteria the -- the provision that says maximum 21 allowances for housing and utilities and transportation, known as the local standards, vary by location, and 22 unlike the national standards, the taxpayer is allowed 23 the amount actually spent or the standard, whichever is 24 25 less? Why doesn't that apply?

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1	MS. SAHARSKY: Well, because, Your Honor, in
2	that case it's the IRS commentary we are referring to
3	that's on page la of the red brief appendix.
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
5	MS. SAHARSKY: And that what that's
6	referring to is it says the amount actually spent or
7	the standard. And that's distinguishing between the
8	amount that's actually spent or the standard, which is
9	the standard
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.
11	MS. SAHARSKY: amount in the table.
12	Right.
13	And of course, we look to what the text
14	that Congress enacted in the Bankruptcy Code, and that
15	says that the debtor's monthly expenses shall be the
16	debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts specified
17	under the national standards and local standards.
18	JUSTICE SCALIA: It's not applicable. It's
19	not applicable if, in fact, you haven't spent that much.
20	Just as you claim it's not applicable if you have no
21	payment at all.
22	MS. SAHARSKY: I think that it is it
23	would further Congress's purposes to say that you
24	have to that you look to the actual costs that the
25	debtor has. But we just don't think the text goes that

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1 far, because it says that if the expense amounts -- the 2 category is applicable to the debtor, that then you use 3 the expense amounts specified under the table. But --4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: No, but the -- but the gravamen of Justice Scalia's question is: Why are you 5 running away from 1a, which is what Respondent's counsel б 7 relied on? And if that were clearly relevant to this 8 statute, it would seem to me to answer the question. 9 Are you saying we -- we don't look at this 10 because it's just simply an interpretation; it's not a 11 regulation? What is -- what is -- in your view, what 12 effect do we give to this language that Justice Scalia 13 quoted? Nothing at all? 14 MS. SAHARSKY: It would not be relevant in

the bankruptcy context, in our view, and the reason is because the -- the statutory text refers to the standards. And in our view, you can look to the IRS commentary to see what the standards mean, what their scope is, as Justice Breyer was discussing with his apples hypothetical.

But this additional language is guidance to IRS agents in tax delinquency cases about how to collect taxes. As Petitioners --

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose we -- suppose we
25 think the word "applicable" is ambiguous and difficult

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1 to construe. Do we then look at this language at 1a, or 2 do you say it's irrelevant in all instance -- in all 3 respects?

MS. SAHARSKY: You -- Your Honor, you could look at this language, but we think that it reflects not the standards, but what -- how the IRS uses the standards in individual cases of tax delinquency.

8 To the extent that the IRS is defining what 9 the standards are, what the scope of the standards are 10 -- for example, that ownership costs are loan and lease 11 payments -- of course, we would think that you would 12 look to that, but this additional guidance to IRS agents 13 we don't think is what Congress meant when it said 14 "expense amounts specified under the standards."

But we do think that the text could be read the way you suggest.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So then you would be comfortable with a person who owns a house outright, who only pays \$100 in utilities, taking the full amount of the housing and utilities allowable living expenses because that's the amount specified? MS. SAHARSKY: Well, the housing and

23 utilities expenses have been broken out into a mortgage 24 and rent component and a utilities component. So in 25 that circumstance, we would say the individual only is

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1 allowed the utilities component, but it would be the 2 allowance amount that is specified. It would not be his 3 actual amount.

But, again, this is a question that was not considered by the courts below. In fact, the bankruptcy appellate panel said it is -- in footnote 20 of its brief, said this question is not in this case; it's not before us whether you use the amounts in the table or whether you use the actual amounts. And we don't think --

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Ms. Saharsky, I 12 should -- I should probably know this, but if you do 13 have amounts that are excluded from the disposable 14 income because of car ownership, in other words, you 15 actually have, from -- in your point of view, expenses, 16 do they have to go to the -- pay off the car loan or are 17 they available for everybody? All the creditors? 18 MS. SAHARSKY: They're not available for the 19 creditors. The idea behind this calculation is that 20 there, of course, are secured debts that have priority, 21 and then this calculation is used to figure out how much 22 money is left to pay unsecured creditors. And the idea 23 is that the debtor has certain expenses, that he needs to keep money for himself so he can continue with the 24 25 everyday business of life. For example, the car

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ownership payment is designed to ensure that a vehicle can still use and have access to a car, and if someone has a loan or lease payment, they need to be able to continue making that payment in bankruptcy, but if they don't have any such payment, then they don't have this need for this additional fund because --

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But can he decide --8 let's say he has more food expense than is allowed. Can 9 he decide of the amount that would otherwise go for the 10 car payment that he's going to pay some of that for the 11 food expenses?

MS. SAHARSKY: Well, certainly the Bankruptcy Court doesn't scrutinize, you know, what happens to that regard. What it's just trying to do is figure out the disposable income that is available to pay unsecured creditors, that the debtor doesn't need.

17 And I should just note with respect to this question of whether there is an overall budget that the 18 19 debtor is allowed, you know, that's certainly not the 20 case in any of the other provisions that follow this 21 applicable monthly standards and local standards. You 22 have the actual other necessary expenses, actual continuation of taking care of chronically ill family 23 members. And Petitioner himself acknowledges that he 24 25 has to show that he has a car. So it's not the case

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that every debtor is just getting some set amount of money to do what they will with. Congress has referenced the standards. The standards break this out into certain expenses. It says just take the applicable ones. And we just don't think it makes sense to interpret "applicable" in that circumstance to --

JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Saharsky, could you explain to me the government's position on when a debtor with loan and lease payments gets to deduct them under Romanette ii? In other words, this goes back to Justice Kennedy's question, the notwithstanding clause and whether the notwithstanding clause effectively excludes all loan and lease payments from Romanette ii?

14 MS. SAHARSKY: It does not have that effect, 15 Your Honor. What it does is to take out the actual debt 16 payments that are part of the other necessary 17 expenses -- these are on page 25a of the red brief --18 that counsel on our side mentioned. These are other 19 necessary expenses that are actual debt payments, and 20 the local and national standards are expense amounts. 21 We don't think that Congress defined those to be debt 22 payments.

23 So the function of the payments for debts 24 language, we agree with Respondent's counsel, would be 25 twofold. First, it would excise the other necessary

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1 expenses that actually are debt payments, which makes 2 complete sense. You know, one of them is an unsecured 3 debt payment, and you wouldn't want to consider that one 4 of your expenses because the whole point of the calculation is to figure out how much money you have 5 left to pay unsecured debts. And then the other б 7 function that it serves is in Romanette iii because you 8 were getting secured debt payments there to not 9 double-count them in Romanette ii.

JUSTICE KAGAN: But, in other words, the loan and lease payments don't count as debt for purposes of the notwithstanding clause; they count as expense amounts?

14 MS. SAHARSKY: We say that those are expense 15 amounts that are specified. They're not payments for 16 debts. I should note, because Justice Kennedy asked this question, that this was not something that was 17 18 relied upon by the courts below. I don't believe that 19 there's any definitive court of appeals opinion that 20 goes through in detail what that provision is designed 21 to do. So I would urge this Court that it need not 22 resolve it in this case and instead do what the court of 23 appeals did, which is to say that, just looking at the 24 plain text, the word "applicable" means not everybody 25 can get these amounts in the national and local

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standards, and it needs to be someone who actually has those payment amounts. The whole point of this part of this statute is to figure out what money is available to pay unsecured creditors, and it's payments that need to be made for expenses that matter. It's not whether the individual debtor has a car.

7 I also note, just because it came up earlier 8 and is a very important point, that to the extent that 9 the Court only wants to look at the tables to figure out what are ownership costs, are they loan and lease 10 11 payments, just looking at the title of the table, 12 Ownership Costs, you need to have costs. Looking at the 13 fact that there are two different ones -- there's 14 ownership costs as opposed to operating costs -- makes 15 clear that some of the things that Petitioner suggests 16 might be ownership costs are, in fact, operating costs. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 18 Mr. Burke, have you 4 minutes remaining. 19 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER P. BURKE 20 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 21 MR. BURKE: Thank you. 22 The means test knows when to say "actual" when it wants to say "actual." It didn't say "actual" 23 in this case; it said "applicable." 24 25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Burke, would you

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1	explain one facet of this case to me? Given the
2	deduction, the \$471 deduction, disposable projected
3	disposable income comes down to \$210?
4	MR. BURKE: Correct.
5	JUSTICE GINSBURG: As opposed to it would
6	be 600 some dollars if you didn't count the \$471?
7	MR. BURKE: Correct.
8	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Even though the
9	disposable income figure was \$210, the debtor was
10	willing the debtor proposed paying \$500. Why did the
11	debtor come up with a \$500 figure when projected
12	disposable income without the car ownership would be
13	if he gets the car ownership, would only be \$210?
14	MR. BURKE: This is exactly why our view of
15	the law works. The means test is a minimum amount.
16	It's a bottom-line quick figure based on standard
17	deductions. It was \$200 based on our calculation if
18	he's given his deductions based on age, location, et
19	cetera.
20	We then go back to I and J, and J, which is
21	on page 44 of the Joint Appendix, is his current
22	expenses. And if we look at line 13A, there is no
23	vehicle payment. He's not taking \$471. He took his
24	income and expense. The bottom line was 500. He knew
25	he had to pay at least 200. He's willing to pay the

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500. He's not getting a \$471 deduction because there is
 no car payment on his Schedule J.

3 And if we look at the formula that way, the 4 means test is a general form to give standard 5 deductions, to give us a guick bottom line, and the debtor is either going to pay that amount or more based б 7 on his income and expense, and he would pay more if he 8 really didn't have that expense. So if he didn't have a 9 rent expense of \$1,000 a month, it would show up on 10 Schedule J that he didn't have 1,000, so his payment 11 would go to \$1,500 a month. That's the good faith 12 that's involved in this case. 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: It would have to go to 14 1,500 a month, or he, out of the goodness of his heart, 15 would decide to pay that amount? 16 MR. BURKE: He's going to have to pay an amount of at least \$200. 17 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. 19 MR. BURKE: It would be hard to confirm a 20 case if he doesn't pay somewhere in that range. 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Fine. So why -- why would 22 we assume that he -- I don't know -- your client is an 23 extraordinarily generous fellow. I don't think most 24 people, when they go through bankruptcy, are going to 25 cough up any more than they have to.

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MR. BURKE: It's the only way for the form
and the law to work. The means test is a bottom-line
number. If you don't have one of those expenses, it
shows up on Schedule J, and it gives you a number. If
it's higher, we think you should probably pay it or in
that range. If it's lower, Congress isn't saying you
get away with it; it says you get out of chapter 13 if
you're not going to pay this amount. So the formula is
just to come up with a bottom line. Nobody is shielding
anything. It's all black and white on his current
expenses. If he doesn't have it
JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think that the do
you
MR. BURKE: he's not getting it.
JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think that the
Bankruptcy Code provision freezes the the national
and local standards to some degree or completely as they
existed at the time when the statute was enacted?
MR. BURKE: At the time the debtor files,
those numbers are frozen.
JUSTICE ALITO: But the IRS can change
otherwise, they can going forward, they can
completely change the national and local standards?
MR. BURKE: The numbers, but not the
structure. They can do anything they want when they're

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1	collecting taxes, but the numbers and I think the
2	numbers change on an annual basis.
3	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
4	The case is submitted.
5	(Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the case in the
6	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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