1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
2	x
3	CIGNA CORPORATION, ET AL., :
4	Petitioners :
5	v. : No. 09-804
6	JANICE C. AMARA, ET AL., :
7	INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL :
8	OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED :
9	x
10	Washington, D.C.
11	Tuesday, November 30, 2010
12	
13	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
14	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
15	at 10:07 a.m.
16	APPEARANCES:
17	THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
18	Petitioners.
19	STEPHEN R. BRUCE, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of
20	Respondents.
21	EDWIN S. KNEEDLER, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General,
22	Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on
23	behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae,
24	supporting Respondents.
25	

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:07 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 4 first this morning in Case 09-804, Cigna 5 Corporation v. Amara. б Mr. Olson. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE B. OLSON 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 9 MR. OLSON: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 10 please the Court: 11 Congress crafted a carefully balanced ERISA 12 enforcement scheme that enables plan participants to 13 recover plan benefits under section 502(a)(1)(B) and 14 equitable remedies for ERISA violations under section 15 502(a)(3). 16 In this case, Respondents are seeking a 17 remedy for misleading plan summaries that violated 18 ERISA. Their remedy, if they were harmed by defective 19 plan summaries, is under 502(a)(3), equitable remedies, 20 not for plan benefits under 502(a)(1)(B). The section 21 that governs the relief that is sought is a necessary 22 antecedent to any of the other questions in this case, 23 and ERISA carefully structures, and this Court has 24 repeatedly said the Court is not interested and does 25 not -- is not willing to alter the structure that

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Congress carefully crafted and carefully developed over
 the years to provide remedies with respect to ERISA
 programs.

And the scheme is such that, if there is a participant to the plan who is seeking benefits under that plan, section (a)(1)(B) of -- subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 502 provides for relief under the plan. If there are other violations of ERISA, section 502(a)(3) provides for equitable relief. That is the scheme carefully developed by Congress.

11 Now, in this case what happened is that 12 Cigna changed its pension program, its ERISA plan, from 13 a defined benefit plan to a cash benefit plan, a cash 14 value plan. And it put out, as required by ERISA, 15 summaries of the new plan that the district court found, 16 and the court of appeals affirmed, were misleading in --17 in the sense that they did not provide all of the 18 information necessary for plan participants to evaluate 19 what was happening.

20 Now, the changes to the plan were lawful. 21 ERISA permitted and does permit these kind of changes to 22 an ERISA plan. There was nothing unlawful about the 23 plan and the plan change. And the beneficiaries, the 24 participants to the plan, did not have any choice. 25 Cigna had the right to change the plan. It did change

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1 the plan.

It did have an obligation under ERISA to provide accurate summaries, and the district court and the court of appeals found that those summaries were not inaccurate. In other words -- they were not accurate. In other words --

7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Olson, when you say 8 the employees had no choice, but the district court 9 found, didn't it, that the reason for this plan summary 10 being misleading was that the employer, Cigna, feared 11 that there might be a backlash on the part of the 12 employees if they found out, if they were told the truth 13 about this plan; that is, that it was less favorable, 14 that they would not have the same benefits that they had 15 under the prior plan?

MR. OLSON: That is correct, Justice MR. OLSON: That is correct, Justice Ginsburg. They had no choice in the sense that Cigna could adopt a change in the plan, as it did. That was permitted under ERISA, but it was required to give accurate summaries.

The choice that you're suggesting and the district court was concerned about is that an individual could have left the employ of Cigna if he or she was unhappy with the change in the plan, or the district court said there could have been some sort of a protest.

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1	What we're saying is that the remedy
2	what was what was the violation is the summary
3	itself. And we're not we're not challenging that
4	here. That's a finding below. The summary was
5	misleading, but that makes it a violation of ERISA. The
б	summary is not the plan. And
7	JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, Mr. Olson, we have
8	several times referred to the plan as having a range of
9	documents associated with it, not as having just a
10	single written instrument, but we referred to documents
11	and instruments governing the plan. We did that in
12	Curtiss-Wright, which is the case that you pin so much
13	on. We did that in Kennedy.
14	And the statute itself talks about that on
15	numerous occasions, that there are documents and
16	instruments, in the plural. And one would think that
17	the SPD is is one of those documents and instruments
18	that govern the plan.
19	MR. OLSON: It's quite clear from the
20	structure of the statute that is correct, as you
21	suggest, that there may be multiple instruments or
22	documents that are the create the plan itself. But
23	the summary plan document, the SPD, is not a part of the
24	plan. It is a separate document. It is a summary. It
25	is a succinct statement of what might be in the plan,

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and it must be accurate, and it must be written in
 comprehensible English.

3 But I would refer the Court to section 1024 4 (b)(2) and (4), which are on pages 3a, 4a, and 5a of the 5 blue brief. That describes the obligations that are б required with respect to the summary plan document. And 7 it describes the instruments of both the summary plan 8 document and the instruments that constitute the plan 9 itself in the following sentence -- and this is a 10 similar sentence in subsection (4), but I'm reading from 11 subsection (2), which is on 4a of the blue brief.

12 It says: "Summary plan" -- it refers to "a 13 summary plan description and the latest annual report 14 and" -- or other -- "and the bargaining agreement, trust 15 agreement, contract, or other instruments under which 16 the plan was established."

17 The construction of that sentence has to be 18 that the summary plan description is a separate 19 It is not one of those latter category of document. 20 documents under which the plan was established. And the 21 proof of that, if -- if English doesn't teach it to us, 22 which I think it does, is the reference to the annual 23 report. No one would say and no one would contend that 24 the annual report is a part of the instruments creating 25 the plan.

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1 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I was struck by 2 something else, Mr. Olson. I was struck by the fact 3 that the -- that the statute saying what is in the 4 summary plan description is packed with information that 5 needs to be in the summary plan description. By б contrast, the written instrument, which you equate to 7 the plan, the written instrument says barely anything 8 about what has to be in it. It just says the name of 9 the fiduciaries has to be in the written instrument. 10 So it seems clear that this statute is set 11 up so that everything that is important, everything that 12 the employee needs to know and needs to rely upon, is 13 supposed to be in the SPD, not necessarily in the 14 written instrument. 15 MR. OLSON: Well, the written instruments, 16 as these things turn out, are long, complex documents. 17 They may be 90, 100 pages long. The summary, as you 18 suggest, Congress said, yes, there is a separate 19 document that must state in intelligible English that 20 plan participants can understand the following things, 21 and they must be furnished to plan participants, but 22 they are not the plan document. The way that ERISA is 23 structured, it --24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Am -- are we missing

25 something? They -- they cannot be in the SPD unless

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they are in the plan; isn't that right? 1 2 MR. OLSON: Well -- if the -- if the --3 JUSTICE SCALIA: So -- so the one cannot be 4 more detailed than the other, can it? 5 MR. OLSON: The plan can be more detailed б than the SPD. 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right. But what --8 JUSTICE KAGAN: But can't the SPD --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Whatever is in the SPD must 10 be in the plan; isn't that right? 11 MR. OLSON: Well, if the plan is -- if the 12 SPD complies with ERISA, yes. It has to be --13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. That's what I'm 14 talking about, of course. 15 MR. OLSON: Yes. Yes, exactly. But not 16 everything that is in the plan, or the plan -- as the 17 statute says, the documents that constitute the plan 18 need not necessarily be in the summary. The words 19 "summary plan" --20 JUSTICE KAGAN: But, Mr. Olson, what about 21 the opposite? Because the statute seems to be written 22 so that things are in the SPD which don't need to be in 23 the written instrument. And together, they all somehow 24 constitute the plan. 25 MR. OLSON: Well, I -- I submit that that is

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1 not the way the statute is written, and subsections (2) 2 and (4) of the provision that I was referring to make 3 that clear if the word "summary" itself did not make 4 that clear. But the Curtiss-Wright case to which you 5 referred to in your earlier question also proves that. б Curtiss-Wright case talked about a summary 7 plan description and said it can't modify the plan --8 using "plan," "summary plan description," in different 9 terms -- it cannot modify the plan, which is what the 10 district court here held, unless the plan specifically 11 says that it may be modified in a certain way and that 12 the summary is an appropriate amendment to the plan. So 13 the Court -- and this was a unanimous decision of this 14 Court -- was referring to the summary as something that 15 was separate, that might modify the plan if the plan 16 itself allows for it to be modified in that fashion. Now, the Government says that the summary 17 18 plan description is a part of the plan and so do 19 Respondents. And that's what the court below -- the 20 court below didn't actually find that the SPD was a part 21 of the plan. The court found, on the latter pages of 22 its opinion, that it was a modification, it was an 23 amendment to the plan. That's inconsistent with the Curtiss-Wright case because in this case the plan itself 24 25 specifically says that it cannot -- does not say that it

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1 can be amended by the SPD.

2	JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that what the
3	district court said was that they would treat the plan
4	as containing what the summary said, not that that it
5	was part of the plan itself, not an amendment,
6	amendment. I thought that was what the district court
7	said.
8	MR. OLSON: I think in the on page of
9	the this is of this is the summary to the cert
10	petition, page 218, which is the district court's the
11	conclusions of the district court's decision. Under
12	Roman numeral VIII, the district court specifically said
13	that the terms of Part B have been correspondingly
14	modified by the SPDs.
15	The court was saying I think you were
16	referring, Justice Ginsburg, to the relief that the
17	court ordered, but the court was ordering that relief on
18	the theory that the SPDs modified the plan. And the
19	plan itself, under Curtiss-Wright, doesn't provide for
20	
	it to be amended in that way. And the SPDs
21	it to be amended in that way. And the SPDs JUSTICE SCALIA: It can't be part of the
21 22	
	JUSTICE SCALIA: It can't be part of the
22	JUSTICE SCALIA: It can't be part of the plan without modifying the plan, can it?

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1 MR. OLSON: That's correct. And the SPDs, 2 the two SPDs themselves, on page 922a and 938a of the 3 Joint Appendix, specifically say that if there's any 4 discrepancy between the SPD and the plan, the plan 5 governs. The language is at the bottom of, for example, б at the bottom of 922a. So --7 JUSTICE KAGAN: But the SPD can't negate the 8 force of ERISA, and if ERISA says that the summary has 9 to be consistent with the plan documents, nothing in the 10 SPD can negate that requirement. 11 MR. OLSON: That's correct. No one -- but 12 Congress did consider prohibiting a provision like that 13 in SPDs, that they could not disclaim, they could not 14 say that if there's any inconsistency, the plan 15 governed, and Congress did not adopt such a provision. 16 This is a perfectly legal provision, to tell 17 someone that if there's any discrepancy -- and there's 18 bound to be discrepancies, the -- as I said, the plans themselves can be 90, 100 pages, very long and very 19 20 complex. That's why there is an SPD that can't contain 21 everything in the plan. 22 And one of the things that would be the

23 outcome of what the Government and Respondents are 24 urging here is that plan creators, these companies that 25 create these plans, either will be discouraged from

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1 doing it, or they will start preparing summaries that 2 are 90 and 100 pages long so they --3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But they can't do that 4 because the statute requires the summary to be 5 understandable and not prolix. б MR. OLSON: That's Catch 22, because if 7 there's a -- if there's a discrepancy because they have 8 to be short, summary, and intelligible, then we have --9 we're faced with the proposition that someone's going to 10 say, well, I read the SPD and it didn't say what was in 11 the plan. If the SPD is as long and as detailed as the 12 plan, then there's a violation of ERISA. 13 My point I guess in this is that, yes, 14 Justice Kagan, the statute requires the SPD to contain 15 certain information. We accept the fact of the conclusions of the court below in this case that they 16 17 did not do so. There are two SPDs. They failed to live 18 up to the -- to the requirements of ERISA. There is a 19 remedy for that. It is a violation of ERISA, and it 20 specifically says in 502(a)(3) that for violations of 21 ERISA, equitable remedies are available. And that is 22 what Congress decided. It is -- unless it's a part of 23 the plan, you must go under (a)(3). 2.4 JUSTICE KAGAN: But the very question here

is if there is an SPD that is inconsistent in some way

25

1 with the written instrument, what happens? Is the 2 written instrument modified or, instead, is the 3 provision in the SPD given operative effect? And that 4 question is one about your benefits under the plan. 5 MR. OLSON: I would submit that it can't б modify the plan unless the plan permits that. That's 7 Curtiss-Wright. That's a unanimous decision of this 8 Court. 9 JUSTICE KAGAN: I do think you're 10 over-reading Curtiss-Wright. Curtiss-Wright talked 11 about whether a particular provision satisfied the 12 requirement that a plan have an amendment provision. It 13 didn't say anything at all about whether there are 14 provisions that can have operative effect regardless of 15 whether they pass through a formal amendment procedure. 16 MR. OLSON: It seems to me -- I think we 17 might disagree about that, respectfully. I think that 18 the sense of the opinion in Curtiss-Wright was that if 19 you're going to say that this SPD modifies the plan, it can only do so if the plan permits the SPD to modify the 20 21 plan. Then the Court sent it back to a lower court to 22 determine whether in fact the employees that were involved in creating the SPD there had the authority 23 24 under the plan to modify the plan -- was it done --25 JUSTICE BREYER: So far we're just

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1 discussing, I take it, whether under (1) the other side 2 is entitled to their benefits even if they weren't hurt, 3 on a contract theory. 4 MR. OLSON: That --5 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. But I thought б we took the case to decide a different issue. 7 MR. OLSON: Yes. 8 JUSTICE BREYER: And that is -- I'll assume 9 you're right -- it should have come under (3). But I 10 don't know if that's harmful, whether it was (3) or (1). 11 And the question I thought we were to decide was, if 12 you're under (3), say, where equity is at issue, now 13 equity is at issue and the district court says: Here we 14 have 27,000 people, and now here's how I'm going to go 15 about this. I'm going to look at this provision mistake 16 here, and the mistake it seems to me was likely to cause 17 them harm. And once that's shown -- and they showed it, 18 it's likely to cause it harm; we can't be sure, but it's 19 likely -- then it's up to your client to refute case by 20 case that these guys were not -- or women were not 21 really harmed. Okay? 22 Now, that seems very sensible to me. And --

and if that's the issue we're going to decide, I'd like to hear you explain why that isn't sensible. It's an equitable matter. This is simply a way of going about

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1 it. What's wrong with that? 2 MR. OLSON: Well, in the first place, it is 3 important which section that --4 JUSTICE BREYER: I agree, but I don't 5 understand -- I'm with you on this one so far. б MR. OLSON: Okay. Okay. Because it's a 7 different defendant. The plan is the defendant versus 8 the plan administrator is the defendant. So that's 9 important. 10 Secondly, (a)(3) provides only for remedies that are available in equity. Then the point that you 11 12 -- that you're making with respect to what provision of 13 equity, what is the -- what is the action that's brought 14 and what is the remedy sought, as this Court talked 15 about in the Varity case, and so therefore those are 16 those questions. 17 Now, the Second Circuit said "likely 18 harmed." The fact is, as I pointed out at the very 19 beginning, this was a lawful change in a plan and it's a 20 plan where 27,000 people that were employees were 21 participants in this plan and they would have had to do, 22 as Justice Ginsburg suggested, either leave the company 23 and suffer some harm or engage in some --2.4 JUSTICE BREYER: You're sounding to me as if you're saying there wasn't likely harm. Okay.

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1 MR. OLSON: Except --2 JUSTICE BREYER: Are you conceding that the 3 standard that they used, that the standard was -- the 4 question that you raised at the beginning, whether --5 whether the showing of likely harm is sufficient in the б absence of a rebuttal? 7 MR. OLSON: Absolutely we are not, and so --8 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. That's what I 9 want to hear: What's the argument against that 10 standard? 11 MR. OLSON: Six circuit courts of appeals 12 have held that -- that detrimental reliance is required. 13 If -- if this is an action under (a)(3) under equity, 14 neither the Government nor the Respondents dispute the 15 fact that detrimental reliance would be required if 16 you're proceeding in equity under (a)(3). 17 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. And does 18 "likely harm" capture that idea? 19 MR. OLSON: "Likely harm" is not a 20 demonstration of prejudicial reliance. 21 JUSTICE BREYER: Why not? Why not? 22 MR. OLSON: That's the --23 JUSTICE BREYER: That's the kind of harm 24 they mean. What they mean --25 MR. OLSON: Because --

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1 JUSTICE BREYER: -- by harm is they were 2 hurt, brought about by reliance. 3 MR. OLSON: Well, in the first place, it 4 comes out of the blue, "likely harm," as I suggested, 5 since this was a legal, lawful change. People were going to retain their employment. They didn't have a б 7 right to opt for one or the other. If they could prove 8 that they were -- this is --9 JUSTICE BREYER: You object to this decision 10 saying the following: Of course, the lower court said 11 likely harm is necessary. As we understand it, given 12 the context of equity, what that means here is that 13 there was reason to believe -- reason to believe -- it 14 was probable that, or some words like that, that there 15 would have been harm caused by reliance on the -- the 16 misstatement. 17 MR. OLSON: I -- that would not be justified 18 at all. I mean, under equity, as this Court said in the 19 Lyng v. Payne case, which is cited in the briefs, this 20 is like an estoppel action. An essential element of an 21 estoppel action is detrimental reliance on the adverse 22 party's misrepresentation. 23 What the district court below did was, by

23 what the district court below did was, by 24 coming up with this "likely harm" harm thing, is throw 25 the burden over to the plan or the plan administrator

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1 and saying: Demonstrate that any one of your -- all of 2 your 27,000 members of this purported class somehow were 3 hurt by a change in a plan over which they had no 4 control, over which they had no discretion, unless they 5 were going to leave the -б JUSTICE GINSBURG: But wasn't the -- wasn't 7 the meaning of "likely harm" simply that they were 8 promised one thing in the plan document, and so what

9 likely harm is, is we have to do away with what they 10 call, what is it, "the wear-away effect"? So that's the 11 harm, the wear-away effect, and we have to remedy that. 12 And the way to remedy it is to treat this as, what is 13 it, instead of (a) or (b), (a) plus (b)?

MR. OLSON: And that would be an action to seek benefits under the plan, which would be an (a)(1)(B) action against the plan itself.

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes.

18 MR. OLSON: Against the plan. The record 19 suggests in various parts -- I can't remember exactly 20 which page to refer to -- that \$70 million would be the 21 consequence of this against the plan, on which some 22 people, depending upon how long they were with the 23 company, when they left the company, whether they were 24 about to retire, whether they stayed longer and the 25 interest rates fluctuated, there can be all --

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1 innumerable permutations of the effect upon persons --2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Then you can't --3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Excuse me, Chief Justice. 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Then you can't 5 require, it seems to me, each individual to make a б calculation about whether they have actually been 7 harmed, whether there's detrimental reliance. The whole 8 point of these plans is to give people some comfort and 9 assurance when they are age whatever, that: Don't 10 worry; retirement is taken care, or at least I can rely 11 on that. 12 And your formulation would sort of put that 13 up in the air and say: We don't know if you're going to 14 be harmed or not; wait until you're 65 and we will see. 15 MR. OLSON: Well, Chief Justice --16 Mr. Chief Justice, that is the statute. The statute gives you relief with respect to a misleading plan 17 18 summary under the laws of equity. The laws of equity 19 would require that the person say -- demonstrate in some 20 way that they were harmed. The petition -- the 21 Respondents in this case, the named members of the 22 class, claim that they were out 30-some thousand dollars 23 each. They would have an incentive to bring an action 24 by themselves.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it couldn't be --

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1 MR. OLSON: Under the rules --2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it couldn't be 3 brought as a class action, and isn't that a large piece 4 of this picture, that proceeding as they did they can 5 proceed as a class? Proceeding under detrimental б reliance, it would be hard to get a class because it 7 would be an individual case of detrimental reliance. 8 MR. OLSON: The Rules Enabling Act provides 9 that a class mechanism cannot change the substantive 10 provisions of law. And so, it cannot be that, because 11 this is brought as a class action, the rules of equity 12 somehow change. 13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Then the question is, 14 under the -- under the section that the district court 15 proceeded under, not the one that you say is proper, a 16 class action would be appropriate. 17 MR. OLSON: A class action might be 18 appropriate, but it would not change the detrimental 19 reliance requirement. Again, this --20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, turning to (a)(3), I 21 have two questions. One is, as you -- and this is 22 probably for your friends on the other side more than 23 you. But as you understand the "likely harm" standard that prevails in the Second Circuit, is it likely harm 24 25 to a majority of the members of the class, all of the

1 members of the class? Do you know? Has the Second 2 Circuit told us what that means? 3 MR. OLSON: Yes, well, the Second Circuit 4 suggested, and the Government and Respondents, 5 particularly the Respondents, say if there's a material б difference, likely harm is presumed. And the Government 7 itself says --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Likely harm to whom? I 9 think that's the question --10 MR. OLSON: That is the question. 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- that Justice Kennedy is asking, and I have the same question. Does it mean 12 13 likely -- is it likely that the class as a whole has 14 been harmed, or that each -- is it likely that each 15 individual member of the class has been harmed? 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or -- or a significant 17 number? 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Or a majority? Or 19 whatever? 20 MR. OLSON: Yes, I --21 JUSTICE SCALIA: What does "likely harm" 22 mean? Do we know that? 23 MR. OLSON: And I -- I totally agree with 24 the import of those questions. You can't describe that, 25 in this Court --

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1	JUSTICE KENNEDY: My question had no import.
2	I really wanted to know the answer to that.
3	(Laughter.)
4	MR. OLSON: Well, the answer the answer
5	is what the district court ordered and the Government
6	seeks and the Respondents seek, is they're all harmed by
7	this, that there's any material disparity, then
8	everybody
9	JUSTICE BREYER: Maybe it wouldn't be too
10	hard. They're they're joined as members of the class
11	in light of a certain set of characteristics, and the
12	judge would find that, other things being equal,
13	individuals who have that set of characteristics which
14	in this circumstance make them members of the class
15	would be harmed in all likelihood, okay? Done.
16	Now, it's up to it's up to the the
17	defendant then to show that in a particular case this
18	individual wasn't harmed.
19	MR. OLSON: It defies reality
20	JUSTICE BREYER: Why?
21	MR. OLSON: Justice Breyer, to suggest
22	that the 27,000 people each one occupy a different
23	position in terms of the length of their employment,
24	when they might be retiring, what their benefits might
25	be, whether they might take a lump sum or an annuity.

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All of those thing are different. And the only way they 1 2 can --3 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, it depends on the 4 facts. Maybe they have a union or --5 MR. OLSON: The only way they could have б been harmed, Justice Breyer, is if they had otherwise 7 decided to leave the employ of the company and go 8 someplace else. They could demonstrate that. 9 If I could save my time --10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Your white light is --11 just one more thing. If you proceed under (a)(3), 12 doesn't Mertens bar the award of -- of monetary damages? 13 MR. OLSON: I think it would. I mean, this 14 Court --15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, then -- then you're 16 not offering us much. You say: Oh, please go under 17 (a)(3), but then you go back and say: Oh, well, you 18 can't get monetary damages. 19 MR. OLSON: In the first place, that's 20 Congress's choice. It's an equitable remedy that would 21 be required. Congress made that decision. This Court 22 has said it's not going to reconstruct what Congress 23 carefully did. 2.4 The thing is that it would have to balance people wanting to create these plans and go into these 25

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1	plans and the solvency and stability of the plan; what
2	Justice Breyer is suggesting, and the Second Circuit
3	suggested, is that you would expose plans to enormous
4	liability because someone might think that someone might
5	have left the employ of the of the company and taken
б	a different job. That's not realistic. And and
7	that's why it just came out of out of thin air.
8	If I may
9	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
10	Mr. Olson.
11	Mr. Bruce.
12	ORAL ARGUMENT OF STEPHEN R. BRUCE
13	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
14	MR. BRUCE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
15	please the Court:
16	Our position is that detrimental reliance is
17	not found in section 102 of ERISA, which establishes the
18	summary plan description requirement. It's not found in
19	section 404(a)(1)(D) of ERISA, which establishes the
20	fiduciary duty that's in accordance with the plan
21	documents and instruments, plural, insofar as consistent
22	with the provisions of this title.
23	It's also not consistent with any language
24	in section 502(a), either in 502(a)(1)(B) or 502(a)(3).
25	The reference to equitable relief is to appropriate

1 equitable relief to redress a violation of Title I or a 2 violation of the terms of the plan. JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, that seems to me 3 4 like just a roundabout, complex way of saying that you 5 must recover under the plan, because if reliance is not б required then there must be some basis on which you must 7 recover, and that recovery must be under the plan. So 8 it's -- it's --9 MR. BRUCE: Well, the -- the --10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, if you say -- if 11 you say injury is not required, then -- then I don't see 12 how the SPD can give you recovery, unless the SPD is the 13 plan, which brings us right back to the argument, which 14 is your argument, under the first -- under the first 15 section, under (a) --16 MR. BRUCE: Under either (a) --17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- (a)(1), (a)(1). 18 MR. BRUCE: Under -- our understanding is 19 that under either (a)(1)(B) or (a)(3), that the court is 20 effectively providing an injunction in a case like this, 21 where -- where an action violates the statute. And here 22 a plan provision which had a very detrimental effect on 23 people was not disclosed to them, and so the effect of the statute is to make that unfavorable provision 24 25 ineffective. And so --

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1 JUSTICE ALITO: If the -- if the SPD is part 2 of the plan, then where does the "likely harm" standard 3 come from? MR. BRUCE: I think, as we've said in our 4 5 brief, we think that the likely harm, possible б prejudice, and the material conflict that -- that is 7 used in the Third Circuit in Burstein, we think that all 8 of those standards are very similar, that they are 9 really looking at whether it --10 JUSTICE ALITO: No, but why is there any 11 requirement whatsoever, other than the fact that it's in 12 the plan? If the SPD is the plan and the SPD says you 13 get certain benefits that you wouldn't get under the 14 written document, then -- the previously executed 15 written document, then you get the benefits under the 16 SPD, period. It doesn't matter whether there's likely 17 harm or reliance or anything else, right? 18 MR. BRUCE: Well, I think, Justice Alito, we 19 see this more as a nondisclosure issue, that the 20 unfavorable provisions in the plan were not disclosed, 21 and that the effect of the statute is to make those 22 unfavorable plan provisions ineffective. But because 23 the statute refers to, for example, material 24 modifications and being sufficiently comprehensive and 25 reasonably apprising, that there are enough

1 qualifications in there where the court can look and 2 see, is this really -- was this conflict, was it really 3 about something that was significant to people that 4 might have an impact on their decision making and 5 whether the terms of their employment are satisfactory, б whether they might want to seek another job, they might 7 just go into the office and say: We need more benefits. 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It seems to me that 9 it's a very tough argument to say -- to make a 10 nondisclosure claim on the theory that the summary is 11 part of the plan, because the whole point of a summary 12 is not to disclose everything. If it disclosed 13 everything, it wouldn't be a summary. And if you can 14 claim something because it didn't disclose it, it seems 15 to me that's in tension with the idea that it's not 16 supposed to be just a repetition of the plan. 17 MR. BRUCE: Our position is that the SPD is 18 one of the documents or instruments governing the plan. 19 And by statute it's required to have certain -- to meet 20 certain requirements, and therefore it becomes a 21 document governing the plan. It is -- in response to 22 Mr. Olson, it is referred to as a document in section 1024(a)(6) of the statute, and of course this Court has 23 24 repeatedly referred to it as a plan document and to 25 "plan documents" plural. So, what --

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1	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But there's I think
2	the brief the Petitioners' brief pointed out, it
3	governs the plan only when it's more favorable to the
4	participants, because you wouldn't say, if the plan were
5	more favorable and the summary would show fewer
б	benefits, that the summary would then govern.
7	MR. BRUCE: I think the the
8	favorable/unfavorable is that the way the way I see
9	it is that an unfavorable plan term, when you look at
10	Curtiss-Wright, an unfavorable plan term must be validly
11	adopted and it must be disclosed in accordance with
12	ERISA in order to be effective.
13	And so, in the Frommert v. Conkright case,
14	that was specifically what the Second Circuit held, was
15	that the summary plan description did not disclose the
16	phantom offset, and therefore the phantom offset was
17	ineffective. Here the summary plan description did not
18	disclose the wear-away provisions. People's normal
19	expectation is that if they are under a pension plan and
20	they are continuing to work, that they are continuing to
21	earn pension benefits. So that the SPD was not
22	apprising them that there were unfavorable provisions in
23	the plan, which were validly adopted, but which were
24	secret as far as they were concerned.

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So there's a -- there's a

presumption that everything in the plan is favorable? 1 Ι 2 still don't see how you get it both ways. If it -- if 3 it understates the benefits, that doesn't count? 4 MR. BRUCE: The -- the Congress in ERISA is 5 concerned with unfavorable effects on participants. б It's about protecting employee rights. So the focus is 7 on losses of benefits, and there is a specific provision 8 in the regulations and in the statute about disclosing 9 all the circumstances that can result in a loss of 10 benefits. So there was a plan provision here which 11 caused the loss of benefits that was never disclosed to 12 people. And it was -- there was no baseline where 13 people knew, well, the plan document may have a 14 wear-away provision, and the SPD doesn't mention it and 15 therefore there is no wear-away. 16 They didn't know what wear-away was. They

16 They didn't know what wear-away was. They 17 don't know what wear-away is today, because it has never 18 been disclosed to them that there's a way to -- to rig 19 up a pension plan where you can have a period of years, 20 unbeknownst to you, where you're not earning any an 21 additional benefits.

JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. Are you finishedwith that?

24 MR. BRUCE: Yes. Sorry.

25 JUSTICE BREYER: If you're finished. As I

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understand what you have been saying and written, you don't mean that the SPD, the summary, is a contract? I mean, one thing would be to say it's a part of the plan and moreover it's a contract, so therefore we enforce it according to terms. That's one view.

6 But if you took that view, you get into 7 problems such as were mentioned. The employer would 8 write 10,000 pages because he knows it's an enforceable 9 contract. Nobody would understand it. You'd have to 10 worry about the time when it was less favorable than the 11 written document. So call it a plan if you want, as 12 long as you don't mean it's an enforceable contract.

13 Now, there's a provision that deals with it, 14 saying just what you said in response to Justice Alito. 15 And what I don't understand is why wouldn't that 16 provision govern? I take it there's a provision, 17 1054(g)(1), that says a plan cannot reduce the rate of 18 accrual of future benefits unless there's written notice 19 in a manner calculated to be understood by the average 20 plan participant.

21 So I would have thought, I read that, I get 22 what you've said in your brief. The summary was 23 inadequate. It wouldn't have been understood, and, 24 therefore, according to this particular provision, those 25 provisions in the plan that reduce benefits are void.

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So now we enforce the plan with the -- in the absence of 1 2 those particular void provisions, and you get what you 3 want. Now, I thought that makes a lot of sense to me, 4 except I don't see that anywhere in this case. 5 MR. BRUCE: Now --6 JUSTICE BREYER: So there's some reason it 7 doesn't seem to appear in the opinions. It doesn't 8 appear in the briefs. It doesn't appear anywhere until 9 you just mentioned it in response to Justice Alito, or 10 seemed to. 11 MR. BRUCE: No, it is in the opinion. 12 JUSTICE BREYER: It is? 13 MR. BRUCE: The district court found a 14 violation. It's 1024(h) -- it's 204(h) of ERISA, that that provision -- the district court found a violation 15 16 of that provision, which if the court had provided 17 relief would have resulted in the class receiving much 18 more relief than the court ultimately ordered; that it 19 would have resulted in the class receiving four or five 20 times as much relief, because they would have just been 21 put back under the old pension formula. 2.2 JUSTICE SCALIA: What is that provision? 23 JUSTICE BREYER: (h). He's right, it's (h). 24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Does it appear anywhere in

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-- in the briefs? 1024(h), does it appear anywhere in

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the briefs?

2 MR. BRUCE: It appears in our petition for 3 certiorari, because after the district court found a 4 violation of it, the district court declined to provide 5 relief because there had been an intermediate interim б amendment that might have --7 JUSTICE BREYER: I understand that. So 8 suppose we can't reach that, which would seem to be the 9 logical thing to govern this, but we can't, okay? Then 10 we only have two choices. The first choice is (1)(b), 11 which seems to -- you want to use that by treating the 12 summary as a contract, or we go to (3), in which case 13 we're under equity. 14 Now, between those two, the first one gets 15 all the problems that we just were talking about. The 16 second one would seem to be you're free and clear as 17 long as you show some kind of reliance and harm, and 18 then we're back to what I thought we granted this for, 19 which is why not say if harm is likely, then the burden 20 shifts? 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why not? 22 MR. BRUCE: That's -- that's -- that's one 23 way that it would be -- that was the way it's approached 24 under the Securities Act, where there is an express 25 reliance requirement.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: What happens in a trust law 2 where, let's say, there are 10 or 50,000 beneficiaries 3 in a trust, and -- and the trustee has indeed made an 4 error. And now they can recover money only if, only if 5 there really has been harm. Now, how do the -- how does б trust law work that out? This can't be the first time 7 this ever arose in history. We have a big class, and --8 MR. BRUCE: Well, I -- we didn't go based on 9 a trust law case involving a big class, but we based it 10 on Bogert and on section 173 in the Restatement of 11 Trusts, that when there is a breach of the duty to 12 disclose all of the material information that the 13 beneficiary needs to know in interacting with a third 14 party, which in this case would be Cigna with respect to 15 their employment, that then there is no requirement of 16 proving reliance; that the trustee can prove -- as the 17 Second Circuit set up, that the trustee can try and 18 prove that the beneficiaries have all the information 19 that they needed.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: So you say under standard trust law once you show there's a breach, the burden shifts to the trustee to show that there's no harm? MR. BRUCE: For a breach of the duties to the --

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JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, I understand that

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to be the Second Circuit rule, but I didn't understand 1 2 that to be the rule generally in the law of trusts, and 3 I quarrel with the Government's brief on that. I think 4 the Government's brief is quite wrong to suggest that 5 this is part of the law of trusts. б MR. BRUCE: Now, I --7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Now, it could be the law 8 of ERISA under the Second Circuit, but that's something 9 quite different. 10 MR. BRUCE: My understanding is -- I mean, 11 that's the law that's been -- that this Court has 12 adopted in securities cases where we have nondisclosures 13 to broad classes, is that there's a presumption of 14 reliance, which -- because it's unrealistic for 15 thousands of people to prove reliance in -- in --16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that's not under 17 trust -- trust law, or correct me if I'm wrong. 18 MR. BRUCE: Well, that's -- that's what I'm 19 saying, that there's a commonality between the 20 securities cases, trust law as stated in the -- in the 21 comment to section 173 and in Bogert, and what the 22 Second Circuit is doing. 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could I just stop --24 the securities cases, does that involve stock traded in 25 a market, in which case the inference of harm would be

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1 much more obvious and follow more logically than in the 2 trust context?

3 MR. BRUCE: Well, one -- one of this Court's 4 very first ERISA cases was Teamsters v. Daniel, in which 5 the Securities and Exchange Commission had considered б pension plans to be a security. And -- and the case 7 actually involved break-in-service rules, and this Court 8 concluded that whatever protections the securities laws 9 offered, potentially offered, to participants were now 10 offered in more concrete form under ERISA. 11 But the -- the point that I want to get back 12 to on reliance is that my reading of this Court's 13 decision in Bridge and in Lyng v. Payne is that this 14 Court does not look for the closest analogy to a 15 statutory provision. The question is: What did 16 Congress do in enacting this statutory provision? 17 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I ask you this: Ιf 18 this were an individual action and it -- and it were 19 under (a)(3), what would either the plaintiff or the 20 defendant have to show, depending on what the burden --21 who has the burden, on the issue of likely harm? 22 What would "likely harm" mean in that 23 The person was likely to have left the context? 24 employment of the company, or what? What else? 25 MR. BRUCE: "Likely harm" can include

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1 that the -- that if the person knew about the provision, 2 they might have asked for the provision to be changed. 3 They might have asked for a different compensation 4 package. They might have asked -- they might have taken 5 personal kind of self-help steps to protect themselves б so that they might have -- have, you know, decided to 7 have their wife work longer. They might have decided to 8 work longer themselves. They could have saved and saved 9 differently.

10 There's both the -- the steps that you can 11 take in relation to your employment and the steps that 12 you can take on a personal basis.

13 JUSTICE BREYER: Could they here have 14 gone -- could they also have said to the company: Look, 15 why are you doing this? If interest rates fall, we're 16 going to lose money. But interest rates might rise, and 17 if interest rates rise, you'll lose money. So we're 18 risk-averse, so what we would like to do is just make 19 sure we get the same pension that we would under Plan A, 20 and then if there's more on Plan B, add it in, and we'll 21 risk the fact that interest rates might have gone up. 22 MR. BRUCE: The district court --23 JUSTICE BREYER: So they could -- they might 24 have talked the company into it.

MR. BRUCE: Well, the district court found

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that there was a real prospect of employee backlash if the employees knew about these benefit reductions. It's well-established in behavioral economics that people are very averse to losses. So if a -- if the statute and the regulations are requiring the loss to be disclosed, it isn't going out on a limb to say that there's going to be a reaction to that.

8 And here, Cigna knew that there was a 9 reaction to that, and they had examples from the press 10 of with Deloitte & Touche had had a similar situation 11 where they had to roll back the cash balance changes 12 because employees were so upset.

13 I think, in response to Justice Alito's 14 question, the -- I don't think that the individual has 15 to -- that if the individual has to prove possible 16 prejudice, then I think that, as -- as our district 17 court ruled here, then I think the standard inevitably 18 becomes very close to actual prejudice. And so I think 19 that the possible prejudice is really to the employee 20 group. It's to the -- the statute is in terms of the 21 average plan participant. It's all based on objective 22 standards.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Under your proposal, I assume, if you prevail, under your position, the -- the summaries will now become part of the plan. So that

1 even if there's no intent to mislead, there can be a 2 class action if the -- if the SPD is in anyhow at 3 variance with the plan --4 MR. BRUCE: Well, as we --5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- and to the -- to the б detriment of the employee. 7 MR. BRUCE: Well, as we said in the brief, 8 there are already cases that -- that recognize 9 exceptions to liability here, and one of them is for prompt correction of any problem. So if you have the 10 11 unintentional error in that unintentionally the 12 wear-away provisions weren't disclosed, well, then the 13 issue is: Why wasn't that corrected at any point in 14 time? We're now 12 years out, and Cigna has never 15 disclosed those wear-aways to anyone. 16 JUSTICE ALITO: If an administrator -- if an 17 administrator issues a summary plan description that is 18 100 pages long and is basically the same thing as the 19 written instrument, and that's a violation of the 20 requirement in ERISA that it be a summary and that it be 21 intelligible to ordinary readers, what remedy is 22 available to a beneficiary? 23 MR. BRUCE: I think -- I think that that's 24 -- obviously, injunctive relief in terms of an order to 25 correct that would be available. I think in terms of --

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of affecting the benefit offers, of saying, well, is 1 2 a -- if the SPD is identical to the plan document, is 3 there any -- there are no undisclosed plan provisions, 4 then. So it becomes -- it becomes more difficult in 5 terms of relief, but obviously there would be relief for б the understandability requirement. 7 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, doesn't that put 8 the -- think of the incentives for the administrator in 9 that situation or for the plan sponsor. If you issue a 10 succinct SPD, you risk misleading the recipients as to the contents of the plan, and you may have financial 11 12 liability. 13 If, on the other hand, you issue -- you err 14 on the side of issuing an SPD that is comprehensive, 15 well, the worst that can happen, according to what you 16 just said, is you can be faced with an injunction to 17 provide a more concise and comprehensible statement. 18 MR. BRUCE: Well, intentional errors should 19 not be countenanced, and here Cigna was deliberately 20 misleading employees. If it's an unintentional error, 21 then it should be promptly corrected. 2.2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 23 MR. BRUCE: Thank you. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Kneedler. 25 ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

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1	ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
2	SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS
3	MR. KNEEDLER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
4	please the Court:
5	The pension benefits an employee accrues
б	while she works are a major component of her
7	compensation for working, just as her wages are. The
8	employee is entitled to receive those benefits and to
9	recover them if they are withheld without any
10	particularized showing of detrimental reliance, just as
11	she is entitled to recover the wages that were promised
12	to her.
13	JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, Mr. Kneedler, do you
14	view this as essentially a contract case, as that just
15	suggested, or instead a trust case?
16	MR. KNEEDLER: We view it as basically a
17	contract case. In Firestone, the Court referred to
18	contractually contractually guaranteed benefits,
19	those under the plan. And the reason we think that
20	here, in this case the district court found that the SPD
21	basically promised, represented to employees, that after
22	the conversion they would receive pension benefits in
23	the form of A plus B, the old benefits plus the new
24	benefits, accruing right away.
25	ERISA the scheme of ERISA is that the SPD

is often -- typically the only document that the 1 2 employee receives to inform him or her about the 3 contents of the plan. 4 JUSTICE ALITO: If this is a contract case, 5 then where does the "likely harm" standard come from? б If I'm owed something under a contract, I'm entitled to 7 get that under the contract. I don't need to show that 8 I was likely harmed by, that I relied in any -- in any 9 way on anything. 10 MR. KNEEDLER: Right. We do not think 11 detrimental reliance -- and I think it works out --

12 JUSTICE ALITO: Do you think likely harm is
13 required?

14 MR. KNEEDLER: In this sense: If the -- if 15 the SPD contains these sorts of representations such 16 that the employee could reasonably be expected to rely 17 upon them in defining her benefits, then that controls. 18 The likely harm is not being told, or being told 19 something different from what the underlying plan says. 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: But the likely harm --21 MR. KNEEDLER: That could be rebutted --22 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's not the likely harm. 23 That's the breach. That's the offense. 2.4 MR. KNEEDLER: But the --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're saying once you make

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the offense, you have to cough up what you stated in the -- in the summary. MR. KNEEDLER: Unless the participant actually knew or couldn't reasonably depend upon it. Actually knew -- for example, this was the case in the Govoni case in the First Circuit, that -- whose formulation is the one that other courts typically

8 follow. That was the situation where the employee found 9 out before she retired what the true facts were, and, 10 therefore, there could have been no claim of harm or --11 or that the --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, then it's not 13 contract.

14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The minute you get away 15 from contract --

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it contract or not 17 contract?

18 MR. KNEEDLER: No, it is contract,

19 because -- because in that -- it -- it -- the question 20 is: What is the contract? To the employee, typically 21 the SPD is the only thing that is the contract that --22 JUSTICE BREYER: But the SPD is written by 23 the fiduciary.

24 MR. KNEEDLER: Yes.

25 JUSTICE BREYER: And the other is written by

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1	the by the person who is giving the money, the
2	employer. So now you're saying that it's a contract,
3	even though it wasn't written by the employer and even
4	though it could differ in dozens of ways from the actual
5	from the actual plan document. Sometimes they'd be
6	favorable to the employee, sometimes they'd be
7	unfavorable, sometimes they'd be different but neutral.
8	So what's the judge supposed to do? Forget about the
9	basic document and just enforce this thing written by
10	the fiduciary?
11	MR. KNEEDLER: Well, but the underlying
12	formal document is is what controls, unless the SP
13	unless there's a conflict. This case
14	JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I said that there can
15	be conflicts, sometimes favorable to the employee,
16	sometimes unfavorable, sometimes neutral. So what we
17	have is a document that's, by the way, supposed to be
18	short, but I guess if we took your view it wouldn't be
19	short anymore. And and it it could differ in any
20	one of three ways; and I could think of seven other
21	ways.
22	So and we'll find seven others. So, what
23	how is a judge supposed to react? Is he supposed to
24	say that this two-page document is the contract, is the

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contract, and there are all kinds of conflicts -- what's

supposed to happen? 1 2 MR. KNEEDLER: It forms -- it forms part of 3 the contract. And cases of conflicts between the SPD 4 and the -- and the formal plan document are not common, 5 and they shouldn't be, because the SPD -- the administrator or the employer has an obligation to б 7 make sure --8 JUSTICE BREYER: That isn't my question. My 9 question is: One, why should a document written by a 10 different person, the fiduciary, govern over the actual 11 plan? Second, what happens when you have a favorable 12 conflict? What happens when you have an unfavorable 13 conflict? What happens when you have a neutral 14 conflict? 15 MR. KNEEDLER: As to --16 JUSTICE BREYER: How should it be worked 17 out? 18 MR. KNEEDLER: As to the first point, it is -- it is common, and it was critically true here, that 19 20 the -- that the employer, the plan sponsor, is involved 21 in -- in drafting the SPD. This was an SPD that was 22 issued in conjunction with the plan amendment, and the 23 SPD and the plan amendment --2.4 JUSTICE BREYER: I think the fact that this 25 individual in this case happened to be the same group or

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1 person is beside the point of my question. 2 MR. KNEEDLER: Okay. And -- and so the --3 the second point is, I -- I think it would be useful for 4 the Court to look to the experience of certificates of 5 insurance under group insurance plans. That is the most б directly analogous circumstance in our view. It is the 7 prevailing position in the courts, and it has been for 8 some time, that where an employee -- or employee under a 9 group health plan or pension plan receives a certificate 10 of insurance that sets forth certain elements, essential 11 elements of the plan, and the -- an underlying insurance 12 policy is in conflict with that, that the certificate of 13 insurance governs, for the same reason that the SPD 14 governs --15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is this governed by ERISA 16 or are these things governed by ERISA? 17 MR. KNEEDLER: Some of them may be and some 18 of them may not be. I mean, it --19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So where does the rule 20 come from, then? 21 MR. KNEEDLER: The -- the rule is a common 22 insurance rule that in -- in the group insurance 23 situation, where you have an underlying policy that the 24 individual insured is not going to see. 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: But we have a statute here

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1	which says that it is the plan that governs. I mean,
2	that that's don't you think that's a crucial
3	difference?
4	MR. KNEEDLER: Well, but there's it's
5	also a statute that, as this Court said in
6	Curtiss-Wright, that the SPD is designed to to
7	furnish the employee the essential information under the
8	plan.
9	JUSTICE BREYER: Is that true of the
10	certificate of insurance? Is a certificate of insurance
11	a simple document that any consumer is able to
12	understand or or is supposed to be?
13	MR. KNEEDLER: That's what that is what
14	it's supposed to be. And importantly in that
15	JUSTICE BREYER: Is there an example I could
16	look at? Find one, on line
17	MR. KNEEDLER: I'm not sure. There's not in
18	the record in this case, but but we cite some
19	insurance treatises. And a further point I want to
20	make, that
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Do they use a likely harm
22	standard? Is that where the likely harm standard comes
23	from?
24	MR. KNEEDLER: No, the likely harm standard
25	was a formulation of the of the Second Circuit. I

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: That's nice. Where did						
2	they get it from?						
3	(Laughter.)						
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: They just made it up?						
5	MR. KNEEDLER: Well, I I think it was						
б	it was an effort to judge whether the whether the						
7	particular statements in the SPD were of the sort						
8	that I think it really gets at materiality, whether						
9	the statement's material.						
10	JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Kneedler, I I think						
11	it's a hard question here as to whether to think of this						
12	as more like a contract dispute or more like a a						
13	trust issue.						
14	If we were to look at it as a trust issue,						
15	what would be the result of that? What kind of test						
16	would we use?						
17	MR. KNEEDLER: I think it would be I						
18	think it would be the same thing where you where you						
19	have a either in this case an affirmative						
20	representation of what the of what benefits will be						
21	due, or you could have a situation where there was a						
22	a failure to disclose.						
23	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if it's a contract						
24	case as you're submitting, then the burden-shifting						
25	rules, it seems to me, that apply in trusts don't apply.						

1	MR. KNEEDLER: Well, the burden-shifting
2	rule would apply to the extent of enabling the
3	administrator of the plan or the employer to demonstrate
4	that the employee actually knew or that there were other
5	documents that would have informed the employee so that
б	he would not have been misled by the statements in the
7	in the SPD.
8	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, and in all of
9	that
10	MR. KNEEDLER: You have brochures
11	JUSTICE KENNEDY: I think, under trust
12	law, there has to be a showing of breach and harm before
13	there is the burden shifts on causation. And your
14	brief left out the you indicate the burden shifts
15	just so long as you show that there is a misstatement.
16	MR. KNEEDLER: Well, there is harm, because
17	the employee was not told of what the of what the
18	terms of his of his deal were.
19	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Kneedler
20	MR. KNEEDLER: He goes to work every day
21	expecting to earn his wages and expecting to earn the
22	the benefits set forth in the SPD. And in
23	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you put do you put
24	any weight on Congress insisting that the summary, that
25	each each participant get a copy of that summary, but

there's no such requirement with respect to the plan? 1 2 MR. KNEEDLER: That's -- that is critical to 3 our position. And, again, the insurance/certificate of 4 insurance analogy, it's all the same reasons that we say 5 under ERISA, that that's the only document that is б given, it's given for the obvious purpose of -- of 7 telling the employee the essential aspects of the deal 8 that he's going to get, and ERISA identifies, itemizes 9 what they are and requires that the plan administrator 10 not -- not minimize what they are. 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: So it can't -- it can't 12 amend the plan, contrary to what we've said. 13 MR. KNEEDLER: It's not -- it's not an 14 amendment to the plan. 15 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's not an amendment? 16 MR. KNEEDLER: The SPD -- the SPD is part of 17 the plan, and as far as the --18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, wait -- wait. It's 19 part of the plan, but the other part of the plan 20 contradicts this part of it. And -- and you say it is 21 this part, the SPD, that governs, which means it amends 22 the prior part, right? MR. KNEEDLER: It -- it controls. I -- it 23 24 doesn't formally -- it doesn't formally --25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, all right, okay. We'll

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1	say it controls. Does that make you feel better about
2	it?
3	MR. KNEEDLER: Well, that that's the
4	explanation
5	JUSTICE BREYER: Does it control when it's
6	less favorable?
7	MR. KNEEDLER: It does not. The
8	JUSTICE BREYER: Oh. It only controls when
9	it's more favorable, but not when it's less favorable.
10	MR. KNEEDLER: Because
11	JUSTICE BREYER: What theory of contract law
12	gets you to that conclusion?
13	MR. KNEEDLER: Because you have two
14	different documents that may be part of the contract.
15	It's an effort to find out what the deal is. Under the
16	insurance cases that I mentioned, what the courts
17	says what the courts say is the certificate becomes
18	part of the contract, but those cases also say when
19	the when the plan is more favorable, that the plan
20	governs because that under ERISA, that is the
21	operative plan document that the administrator is
22	supposed to operate under day to day.
23	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
24	Mr. Kneedler.
25	Mr. Olson, you have 4 minutes remaining.

1	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE B. OLSON
2	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
3	MR. OLSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
4	I'd like refer first of all to what
5	Respondents said in in response to a question from
6	you, Justice Breyer, about section 204(g). And you
7	JUSTICE BREYER: (j).
8	MR. OLSON: Well, (g), I'm talking about.
9	That's what they I refer you to page 212 of the cert
10	petition appendix under Roman numeral VI, where the
11	district court specifically said: Plaintiffs also seek
12	to assert their claim under ERISA's anti-cutback
13	provision, 204(g). That claim has been rejected in the
14	liability decision. That claim was raised; it was
15	rejected in the liability decision. It's not here
16	anymore.
17	Section the real section that the Court
18	should refer to in 204, is 204(h) (h)(6)(A) of ERISA,
19	and I can't point to the portion of the appendix, but
20	that was an addition by Congress in 2001 to deal with
21	egregiously inaccurate notices of change. That and
22	Congress amended ERISA in 2001, added that provision,
23	and said, if there's an egregious violation of that
24	provision, then you get all the benefits that you should
25	have gotten.

1 That's what Congress can do if it wishes to 2 do. That's what's being sought in this case. Congress 3 can take care of this if it wishes, but Congress enacted 4 a carefully reticulated scheme; you're either suing for 5 benefits under the plan or you're suing for violations б of ERISA. 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why didn't that (h) apply 8 here? Was it not eqregious enough? Is that -- is that 9 why it didn't apply? Or they just forgot about it or 10 what? 11 MR. OLSON: I -- I don't think that the --12 the notice that was involved was referring to the SPD. 13 The SPD, to the extent that it violates ERISA, there is 14 a remedy that still exists; Congress hasn't changed. 15 It's in (a)(3). It must be an equitable remedy. You 16 can seek an injunction. 17 And to the extent the Court is concerned 18 that that's an empty remedy, that that's not a 19 sufficient remedy, that's what Congress decided; and we 20 referred in footnote 3 of our reply brief of a number of 21 cases that -- that circuit courts have handled 22 demonstrating detrimental reliance and providing for 23 remedies. 2.4 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, but I still have the

same question Justice Scalia had, which is -- which is

25

why didn't this (h) thing apply here, because they 1 2 didn't have -- their claim, the notice wasn't good, and 3 if the notice wasn't good, then -- the plan didn't 4 change, and if the plan didn't change, they should have 5 gotten the money. Why didn't it -- why? б MR. OLSON: That provision doesn't apply to 7 the SPD, and they did not bring that case. I don't 8 know --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why doesn't it apply to the 10 SPD? Isn't that a notice? 11 MR. OLSON: I think it's a different type of 12 notice that -- under that provision. 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought it says --14 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, there was a -- there 15 was notice, wasn't there? 16 MR. OLSON: There was a notice. 17 JUSTICE ALITO: And is the claim based on 18 that, or is it based on the SPD? 19 MR. OLSON: The claim is based upon the SPD, 20 and the district court decided that the SPD had amended 21 the plan. And that's inconsistent with what the statute 22 provides. 23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Olson, on your view of 24 showing detrimental reliance, I take it you would 25 require each employee to come forward and say yes, I

1 read this SPD; is that correct?

2	MR. OLSON: Yes. And trust law					
3	JUSTICE KAGAN: And doesn't that really					
4	misunderstand the realities of the workplace? Very few					
5	people read their SPDs, but you only need one person to					
6	read the SPD to come in and say, by the way, folks,					
7	21,000 of us are not getting our retirement benefits for					
8	the next few years. And within a day, every employee in					
9	the workplace is going to know about that. So doesn't					
10	this give an incredible windfall to your client, Cigna,					
11	or to other companies that commit this kind of					
12	intentional misconduct if you hold them to this					
13	detrimental reliance standard?					
14	MR. OLSON: The I refer to what					
15	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that					
15 16						
	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that					
16	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that we're talking about trust law, we're talking about the					
16 17	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that we're talking about trust law, we're talking about the requirement of a loss. I would say that a person would					
16 17 18	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that we're talking about trust law, we're talking about the requirement of a loss. I would say that a person would not necessarily have to have read the SPD but have been					
16 17 18 19	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that we're talking about trust law, we're talking about the requirement of a loss. I would say that a person would not necessarily have to have read the SPD but have been aware of it and taken some steps in connection with it.					
16 17 18 19 20	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that we're talking about trust law, we're talking about the requirement of a loss. I would say that a person would not necessarily have to have read the SPD but have been aware of it and taken some steps in connection with it. And that's the evidence that would have to be					
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16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Justice Kennedy was referring to. To the extent that we're talking about trust law, we're talking about the requirement of a loss. I would say that a person would not necessarily have to have read the SPD but have been aware of it and taken some steps in connection with it. And that's the evidence that would have to be established, and there's no and every court has said that under (a)(3) equity requires detrimental reliance.					

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