1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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3	JEFF PREMO, SUPERINTENDENT, :
4	OREGON STATE PENITENTIARY, :
5	Petitioner : No. 09-658
6	v. :
7	RANDY JOSEPH MOORE :
8	x
9	Washington, D.C.
10	Tuesday, October 12, 2010
11	
12	The above-entitled matter came on for oral
13	argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
14	at 11:06 a.m.
15	APPEARANCES:
16	JOHN R. KROGER, ESQ., Attorney General, Salem, Oregon;
17	on behalf of Petitioner.
18	STEVEN T. WAX, ESQ., Federal Public Defender, Portland,
19	Oregon; on behalf of Respondent.
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (11:06 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear 4 argument next this morning in Case 09-658, Premo v. 5 Moore. б Mr. Kroger. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF GENERAL JOHN R. KROGER 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 9 MR. KROGER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 10 please the Court: 11 The court of appeals held that Arizona v. 12 Fulminante was the clearly established Federal law to 13 control and govern the outcome of this case. This was 14 an error, because this Court has never applied 15 Fulminante's direct appeal harmless error standard, 16 which places the burden of proof on the government, to a collateral ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 17 18 where the burden of proof is on the inmate. 19 In Boyer, unlike Fulminante, there is no 20 trial transcript to review because the defendant pleaded no contest or guilty before trial. The court of 21 appeals' decision conflicts with both 22 Strickland v. Washington and Hill v. Lockhart and will 23 have grave negative consequences for our criminal 24 25 justice system.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: But isn't -- isn't Fulminante relevant as -- just for the proposition that a defendant's own confession carries heavy weight, leaving the rest of it -- the statement that -- in Fulminante that when a defendant confesses to the crime, that carries heavy weight?

MR. KROGER: Yes, Your Honor, I think it's 7 relevant to that extent, that a confession from a 8 9 defendant is significant evidence. However, it 10 certainly does not imply, as the court of appeals 11 proceeded to do here, that it controls the prejudice prong of Strickland, that it sets a new standard of 12 review of harmlessness, that it shifts the burden of 13 14 proof onto the government, or that it limits the 15 prejudice analysis to that question of the potential impact of the confession at trial. 16

And so for all those reasons, I -- I think the -- the court of appeals has gone well beyond any potential relevance of the Fulminante decision.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is it -- if I am understanding your argument, it is that the Court erred in assuming that if the confession had been suppressed -- which you're not arguing for or against. I'm assuming you are not taking your amicus's position

25 that we have to get to the question of what would have

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happened in a motion to suppress -- but that under all
 circumstances, if there's a suppressible confession, a
 defendant should never plead guilty.

You are saying that that conclusion is whatthe Ninth Circuit drew and that was wrong?

6 MR. KROGER: Your Honor, we're -- we are 7 suggesting that the court was wrong both in stating 8 Fulminante provided the standard of review, as well as 9 holding that you can, in effect, assume prejudice simply 10 because defense counsel failed to file a motion which 11 defense counsel believed was not --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So it's another way of saying what I said, which is, no defendant should plead quilty if it's a suppressible confession?

MR. KROGER: That is correct, Your Honor.16 That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. So now, what is the other information that would have made a plain guilty in this case inevitable? However, that's a higher standard than you need to meet, but --MR. KROGER: As -- as Your Honor noted, that is a much higher standard than we have to meet under Hill v. Lockhart. There were very good reasons why

24 defense counsel's advice that this defendant plead

25 guilty was sound and reasonable advice.

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1 First of all, the defendant faced a very strong government case, even at that stage of the 2 3 investigation. Second, there was a potential charge of 4 aggravated murder that could be brought if the case were 5 taken to the grand jury. 6 7 Third, the plea offer that was extended to the defendant and which the defendant took was very 8 favorable to the defendant, both in terms of -- of 9 capping the amount of time that the defendant would 10 11 serve, as well as dismissing two additional mandatory minimum charges of assault and kidnapping. So --12 13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Were those higher than 14 the minimum he pled to? Were those mandatory minimums 15 higher? 16 MR. KROGER: No, Your Honor, but they could have been run consecutive rather than concurrent. 17 18 I -- I think more significant is the fact 19 that when the defendant himself testified about the 20 reasons he pled guilty, none of the reasons he provided 21 had anything to do with the strength of the government's case or the failure of counsel to file the motion. 22 23 What the defendant said motivated his guilty plea was a concern about an aggravated murder charge, a 24 25 desire not to have to testify against his brother, which

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he believed would be the outcome of a guilty plea. And
 those factors were in the defendant's mind when he
 decided to take the guilty plea.

4 So in this case, even if one were to shift 5 the burden onto the government -- and I do not believe 6 that -- that that is consistent with Strickland -- the 7 government would prevail here.

8 This case raises, I think, significant 9 consequences for application of Strickland and 10 Hill v. Lockhart. Strickland and Hill clearly place the 11 burden of proof in a collateral proceeding on the 12 inmate.

13 The court of appeals here shifted the burden 14 of proof, pursuant to Fulminante, onto the government. 15 One can see this in the petition appendix at page 48 16 where the court states that there is not enough evidence 17 in the record to prove that the defendant would have 18 pled guilty had the confession been denied.

As I stated to Justice Sotomayor, I believe the government actually could meet that burden, but that is certainly not the burden that either Strickland or -or Hill requires.

23 Second, the Court's application of 24 Fulminante transforms the Hill v. Lockhart analysis. It 25 narrows it to one degree, because it's focused on one

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1 issue, what the government's evidence would be at trial, 2 rather than looking at the broad array of issues which 3 might motivate a defendant to plead quilty which the courts will look at under -- under Hill v. Lockhart. 4 For example, under Hill v. Lockhart the 5 court will not only look at the defendant's testimony 6 7 with respect to the estimate of the strength of the 8 government's case, but also look at the potential for an additional sentence that is higher or additional charges 9 that carry a higher sentence if the defendant proceeds 10 11 with litigation rather than pleading guilty.

12 It will look at the investigation risk that 13 additional evidence would be found in, if the case 14 continued rather than terminating in an early plea. And 15 it will look at personal factors such as the ones that 16 were evident in this case that might motivate a guilty 17 plea.

For those reasons, the Hill v. Lockhart standard encompasses a broader array of factors in determining whether there is prejudice than a simple application of Fulminante's direct appeal post-trial standards.

It is also the case that the application of Fulminante will substantially increase the amount of speculation which courts have to engage in compared with

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1 applying the proper Hill v. Lockhart test.

2 Hill v. Lockhart limits the amount of 3 speculation by focusing on the defendant's motive in pleading quilty and whether the ineffective assistance 4 could have influenced that decision to plead quilty. 5 б JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about Judge Berzon's 7 test, that seems to be simple and a matter of common 8 sense, that if you get rid of the confession, then you have a better chance of getting a good deal in the plea 9 10 bargain? The confession certainly -- it -- this serves 11 the defendant to get rid of that as well as weight on 12 the prosecution's side. 13 MR. KROGER: Your Honor, I would say two 14 things: First, the test which is proposed by Judge 15 Berzon in the concurrence has never been recognized or promulgated by this Court. So in a collateral 16 proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S. Code 2254, it would not 17 18 be clearly established law that the State court was 19 required to follow. 20 And second, application of that standard, as

Judge Bybee noted in his concurrence, would require an immense amount of speculation. In this case, the majority in the Ninth Circuit hypothesized that filing the motion to suppress the confession would strengthen the defendant's position in negotiation vis-à-vis the

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1 Government.

2 It is also very possible, however, that the 3 Government would respond to filing a motion as opposed 4 to taking an early offer of guilty plea by taking the case to the grand jury, seeking an aggravated murder 5 charge, and thus, putting the defendant in a worse б 7 position in the case. And, in fact, as Judge Bybee 8 noted, he questioned whether the courts have the proper 9 tools to be able to speculate years after the quilty plea whether a particular motion may have increased or 10 11 may have decreased the amount of leverage that a 12 defendant has, or what kind of response that that motion 13 might have drawn from the prosecution. 14 JUSTICE BREYER: But you have to, don't you? 15 I mean, what's the alternative? I mean, imagine a case 16 where it's clear there was a malpractice or an inadequate assistance, and it happened a long time ago 17 18 and now you have to decide, well, was it prejudicial or 19 not? It's prejudicial if in the absence of that he 20 would have gone to trial or wouldn't have pleaded 21 guilty, or -- and what's the alternative to trying to 22 figure out whether that's so? 23 MR. KROGER: Your Honor --24 JUSTICE BREYER: It can't be the State

25 always wins and it can't be the defendant always wins.

10

2MR. KROGER: I think the alternative, Your3Honor, is application of Hill v. Lockhart, which looks4not at speculation about how this could or could not5have affected the plea bargaining process, but looks6very concretely at the defendant's pretrial7decision-making process and examines the record to8determine why the defendant pled guilty and whether they9can prove with a reasonable probability that he would10not have pled guilty11JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, but that is isn't12that sorry, maybe we are just quibbling. I I13don't quite see it. That would seem to me to be going14into the plea bargaining process. Would he have pleaded15guilty, what would have happened?16MR. KROGER: I I think the difference,17Your Honor, is that when you are applying18Hill v. Lockhart, you almost always have at least three19very concrete pieces evidence to show the defendant's20state of mind. You have the defendant's own testimony21or deposition, or in this case both. You have the trial22counsel's affidavit for testimony about the23decision-making process his client engaged in, and then24you have the guilty plea colloquy itself.	1	So so what's the alternative?
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	23	decision-making process his client engaged in, and then
25 So you always have a a concrete record	24	you have the guilty plea colloquy itself.
	25	So you always have a a concrete record

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1 that the court years later can review in order to 2 determine what motivated the -- the decision to plead 3 guilty.

4 If one were applying Judge Berzon's proposed alternative prejudice finding, one would have to engage 5 in a great deal of speculation. One would, I presume, б 7 have defense counsel and the government make claims 8 about what they might have done in response to hypotheticals, which does not seem to be a -- a -- a 9 10 reasonably judicable standard. As a --11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Without any 12 confession -- forget about the brother or the 13 girlfriend -- assume that there had been no confession, 14 wouldn't it have been a fair conclusion to draw that 15 without any confession whatsoever that the plea 16 bargaining strength of the defendant in this case would have been appreciably higher and that the prosecutor 17 18 would have had to offer something --19 MR. KROGER: Your Honor, if none of -- none 20 of the three confessions --21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: None of the three --MR. KROGER -- had been made. 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- whatsoever. 23 I mean, if the brother's confession -- or the confession to the 24 25 brother is a very big piece of why a plea would have

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been reasonable in this case. Let's assume no
 confession.

MR. KROGER: Your Honor, I still think 3 4 taking, recommending a guilty plea and taking of a quilty plea would be a rational response to the 5 remaining evidence. Even at this early stage in the б 7 proceeding, the police had uncovered certainly the body 8 with the direct shot to the temple. It had recovered 9 the -- the murder weapon. It had recovered the car 10 which the defendants had borrowed and which had blood in the trunk where the victim had been locked and 11 12 transported.

They had four witnesses who were present when the plan to kidnap and assault the victim was hatched. So they would have testified very directly about the forming of the plot.

There was an eyewitness who identified the defendant, Mr. Moore, at the trailer where the victim was abducted. And then, of course, there was a co-conspirator, Mr. Salyer, who was cooperating with the Government prior to the confession and whose -- whose cooperation was known to the defendant.

23 So, with all of those pieces, even if one 24 stripped the three confessions out of the case, you 25 would still have a situation where the Government 's

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1 case was strong, where there was a very severe risk the 2 Government would go to the grand jury and obtain an 3 aggravated murder charge, and where there was 4 significant advantages to pleading early and locking in a lower sentence to a felony murder charge. 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Kroger, from -б 7 General Kroger -- from everything you said, and I take 8 it -- from your brief, too, that you are not urging the -- that -- that counsel's assistance was adequate? 9 You are not contesting that the confession was 10 11 involuntary? You seem to be putting everything on the 12 prejudice issue; is that right? 13 MR. KROGER: No, Your Honor. We -- we 14 concede and forfeited the issue that the -- the motion 15 to suppress would have been meritorious, but believed 16 the district court got it right when it held that on both prongs of Strickland, both on deficient performance 17 18 and on prejudice, the defendant has failed to make 19 his -- his -- meet his burden of proof. 20 I think the -- the prejudice argument here 21 is extraordinarily strong, but I think the deficient 22 performance, even if one concedes that the motion would have been meritorious, the deficient performance prong 23 is strong as well, because the defendant can't meet his 24 25 burden of proof that defense counsel's representation

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was unreasonable, given the strength of the government's
 case, given the quality of the plea offer that was made,
 and given the defendant's own reasoning for why he pled
 quilty.

5 The case has significant practical consequences for the criminal justice system. One is б 7 that if the Ninth Circuit's opinion stands, it will be much easier to challenge quilty pleas years after the 8 fact on collateral challenge, and this will undercut the 9 principle of finality. One would certainly expect to 10 11 see fewer Government plea offers in cases like this, if 12 the Government believed years later it would have to present all of its trial evidence in a collateral 13 14 proceeding in order to rebut the presumption under 15 Fulminante that there was prejudice.

16 Second, it has severe implications for the freedom of defense counsel to exercise its discretion 17 18 and represent its client using the wide latitude that 19 Strickland recognized was necessary. Strickland itself 20 stated that it's a mistake to hem in defense counsel with strict rules about what should or should not be 21 22 done, because defense counsel needs that wide latitude. 23 If there is a -- a virtual presumption that motions to suppress must be filed, even where defense counsel 24 reasonably believes it will not resound to the advantage 25

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of his client and may cost the client a chance to plea 1 early, the defense counsel must take that option, it's a 2 3 severe restriction on the --4 JUSTICE BREYER: If -- if he had gone to 5 trial, what's the sentence -- what's the range of sentence he could have gotten? б 7 MR. KROGER: Your Honor, if he had gone to trial on the charges that were pending, and these --8 9 these were not charges from the grand jury, he would 10 have faced at least the mandatory minimum of 25 years 11 that he pled guilty to, plus the potential of 12 additional -- an additional sentence both on that charge perhaps as high as life, given the two other potential 13 14 mandatory minimum sentences of -- of kidnapping and 15 assault that could be brought. 16 JUSTICE BREYER: And if they had gone back to the grand jury, as the prosecutor I guess could have 17 18 done, it could have gone to the grand jury? 19 MR. KROGER: This case pled guilty before, 20 Your Honor, yes. So --21 JUSTICE BREYER: It could have gone to the 22 grand jury. Then what is the maximum he could have 23 gotten? 24 MR. KROGER: It could have been a capital case, Your Honor. This could have been an aggravated 25

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murder case because the facts involved a very severe 1 2 beating to the extent perhaps of torture where a 3 Defendant who was very vulnerable who had a protruding 4 hernia that was in a truss was savagely beaten, his nose was broken, he was locked in the trunk of the car, taken 5 to a remote location and shot in the temple with one 6 7 shot of a revolver. 8 It is distinctly possible that the state 9 would have come from the Grand Jury as a capital case 10 and at the very least have been an aggravated murder 11 carrying a life sentence, not a 25-year sentence. 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about his argument that his failure -- the Defendant in the case arising 13 14 out of this episode, if Salyer did go to trial and he 15 ended up getting that exact same sentence that this Defendant did? 16 17 MR. KROGER: Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Salyer did receive the same sentence after he went to trial. 18 19 His case, though, was very different from that of the 20 Petitioner, because the Petitioner was the individual 21 who cocked the pistol and fired the round into the head of the victim killing him. And so it is very unlikely 22 23 that the other two co-conspirators would have found themselves charged with an intentional murder based on 24

25 the facts of this case. But because this pistol could

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only be fired if it were cocked and because the round
 went into the temple, it would have been a reasonably
 strong aggravated murder case against this Defendant who
 was the triggerman.

5 The final point I would like to make to the Court is that this case involves or should involve б 7 significant deference to the State court decision. This 8 was not a summary denial by the State court. The State 9 court held a hearing at which it received all testimony 10 that was available. It made very explicit findings of 11 fact about the facts in the case. It made a credibility 12 finding about the evidence that had been submitted by 13 the Petitioner, and it ruled after citing the proper 14 Strickland standard that the Defendant had failed to 15 carry his burden of proof.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: It's a little hard when we take away the finding that the confession was admissible. We have to extract that.

MR. KROGER: Your Honor, even if you --JUSTICE KENNEDY: I'm not quite sure what to do with the State court's case, assuming we have to presume, because of the posture of the case, that the confession was inadmissible.

24 MR. KROGER: Your Honor, I would say two 25 things with respect to that. First of all, the State

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1 court's decision, even if it were incorrect in its 2 ruling that the confession would not have been 3 admissible, the State court's conclusion that the motion 4 would not have assisted the Defendant in any way, the finding that it would have been fruitless because of the 5 other confessions, the other two confessions in the б 7 case, is a reasonable decision that the Court made and 8 is dispositive and thus under AEDPA should receive 9 deference.

I would also suggest the case is somewhat similar to Yarborough v. Alvarado. There was a custody issue at stake and this Court explicitly held that one might come out one way or the other on the custody issue, that reasonable jurists might split, but that that fact alone rendered the State court's opinion on voluntariness or on custody in that issue as reasonable.

And again, as here, though we are not asserting that this confession was admissible, should the Court consider it, it's clearly a close question on voluntariness and somewhat factually similar to Yarborough where even if the State court were was wrong, it was still a reasonable adjudication of the claims. If there were no further questions from the

24 Court, Your Honor, I would like to reserve the remainder 25 of my time for rebuttal.

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1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
2	Mr. Wax?
3	ORAL ARGUMENT OF STEVEN T. WAX
4	ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
5	MR. WAX: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
6	please the Court:
7	Mr. Moore established prejudice under Hill
8	from his attorney's failure to recognize the
9	involuntariness and inadmissibility of the lengthy tape
10	recorded statement obtained from him by the police. The
11	most critical type of evidence that the State can have
12	in any case.
13	The Ninth Circuit's conclusion to that
14	effect was correct, and was correctly based on this
15	Court's precedence of Strickland, Hill, and Kimmelman.
16	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I am having a little bit
17	of trouble here with your argument for the following
18	reasons. Assume we suppress the confession. Why is it
19	unreasonable for the defense attorney to have concluded
20	that the evidence showing your client's presence at the
21	shooting, and identification as the shooter, that it was
22	solely that he should have gone to trial on a defense
23	that he wasn't involved in the shooting at all.
24	Once you put him in this shooting, then the
25	only issue he seems to be confused about is that he

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1 thinks that because it was accidental that that presents 2 a defense to felony murder. And that's clearly an 3 erroneous position on his part.

4 So what made the case so weak that the 5 Government was never going without the confession to 6 prove felony murder?

7 MR. WAX: Well, Your Honor, we believe that 8 the case is not as the State would have it, a strong 9 case in the absence of this confession.

We also believe that the proper focus is not solely on the strength of the State's case, and that under Hill it is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances, and look for the objective factors in this record that inform the decision of what Mr. Moore would have done or would have been likely to have done in the absence of his counsel's mistakes.

17 JUSTICE ALITO: What does your office do in this situation, all right, a client is indicted in 18 19 Federal court and you anticipate that there are all 20 sorts of motions that you might make if this case is 21 going to trial, but at an early point the prosecution 22 offers you what looks like a really good plea bargain. 23 Now do you litigate all those motions? If you have, you 24 know, you have a chance of winning, of suppressing some statements that your client made, suppressing physical 25

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1 evidence, getting certain evidence excluded with a 2 motion in limine, maybe you could win on a severance 3 motion, do you think you litigate all those rather than 4 grabbing a good plea deal when it's offered to you? 5 MR. WAX: Your Honor, the answer is certainly no, we do not litigate all of the motions. 6 7 JUSTICE ALITO: So if you take the deal, 8 then you want it later to be open to the Defendant if 9 he's not, you know, after the Defendant has spent some 10 time in jail, he's not too happy with the deal any more, 11 he can now come back and say, well, the Federal public defender's office was ineffective because they could 12 13 have moved to suppress my confession and the illegal 14 search, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, that is all 15 open for relitigation years later? 16 MR. WAX: No, Your Honor. 17 JUSTICE ALITO: No? 18 MR. WAX: And the issue here is not as we 19 have attempted to articulate in our brief solely and in 20 the abstract the failure to file the motion. The 21 problem is that Mr. Moore's attorney did not understand 22 that the statement was suppressible. In the situation that you are putting to me, if I or an assistant in my 23 office says to a client, look, there is a strong motion 24 25 to suppress the confession, the drugs, what have you,

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1 but here are other factors that we should look at. And 2 at the conclusion and with that proper advice the client decides I will take the deal, then I have performed 3 4 effectively, and the case is not one that could be subject to a collateral attack as this case is. 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What would have been the б 7 defense? 8 MR. WAX: Excuse me, Your Honor. 9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What would have been the defense absent the confession? You have one at trial on 10 the confession, suppressing it, how would he have defend 11 12 the this case? 13 MR. WAX: Your Honor, he would have been 14 able to defend this case first by articulating the 15 Government's obligation to prove his guilt beyond a 16 reasonable doubt. You take out the confession and you posit it in your questioning of Attorney General Kroger 17 18 that the strength of his brother's confession is a 19 given. We respectfully disagree. The brother Raymond 20 is a police --21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What motive would his 22 brother have had to put him at the scene of this shooting as the accidental killer? That's all his 23 brother would have had to say. He was at the scene, he 24 25 accidentally -- this gun went accidentally off.

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1	MR. WAX: The brother is a police informant.
2	The brother describes himself in the deposition.
3	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: His brother had no
4	pending charges against him at the time.
5	MR. WAX: That is true, Your Honor, but the
6	police had used them as their agent.
7	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So what does that have
8	to do with what interest does his brother have when he
9	has no pending charges against him at the time, he's
10	going to use this as a future chip in case he does
11	something wrong?
12	MR. WAX: Your Honor, the point is that
13	he
14	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: To put his brother into
15	jail for 25 years? This is illogical, counsel.
16	MR. WAX: If he were to appear and testify,
17	which is one of the points that I believe the Ninth
18	Circuit properly pointed out, that Mr. Moore knowing his
19	brother might have had every confidence
20	JUSTICE BREYER: Might. See, that's the
21	trouble. We have a lot of evidence, I think, here, at
22	least by first glance, that a lot of evidence he shot
23	the guy. A lot of evidence he carried kidnapped him.
24	All right? And now the now, maybe it was accidental,
25	but if it was accidental, it's still felony murder; and

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1 he received through the plea bargaining the minimum 2 sentence he could get for that. 3 You started out by saying that the -- the 4 State court's conclusion that this was not prejudicial was clearly wrong. All right. If it's clearly wrong, 5 what is it so clear, that he could get off if he went to б 7 trial? 8 MR. WAX: Your Honor, I will respond to the second part but I believe there is a premise in which 9 you said, that we reject. There is no State court 10 11 finding under Hill. And there is no deference --

JUSTICE BREYER: There is no -- there is no State court finding that this was not prejudicial? MR. WAX: The court never reached the Hill guestion.

JUSTICE BREYER: I'm not talking about Hill. I don't know the names of the cases associated. I thought that the court in the State court said -- but I might be wrong; I'd like to know -- made a finding that one, this was not ineffective assistance of counsel and two, it was not prejudicial.

22 MR. WAX: The State --

JUSTICE BREYER: Now I haven't read this very thoroughly, so -- so you -- yet -- so you tell me if I'm wrong about that.

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1	MR. WAX: At pages 205 and 206 in the
2	appendix in the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
3	there are 11 findings of fact. In one of those findings
4	of fact, in findings of fact 8 and 9, the State court
5	used the word fruitless in describing the motion to
б	suppress. In the conclusions of law the State court
7	solely addressed Strickland. And nowhere in the
8	analysis is there any reference to the question of what
9	Mr. Moore would have done.
10	JUSTICE BREYER: Doesn't Strickland require
11	that it be prejudicial?
12	MR. WAX: Yes, of course. However, the
13	analysis that was undertaken here never reached the
14	question of what Mr. Moore would have done.
15	JUSTICE BREYER: If I assume that the word
16	"fruitless" and the reference to Strickland were a
17	finding, that this is not prejudicial if I assume
18	that for the sake of argument for the moment, what is it
19	that you can show that shows it was prejudicial?
20	MR. WAX: Your Honor, I think
21	JUSTICE BREYER: That was the same question
22	I think Justice Justice Sotomayor started with.
23	MR. WAX: Your Honor, there is no question
24	that the evidence with respect to the strength of the
25	State's case includes the facts that the attorney

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general has identified. There is also as we perceive it no question but that the objective record showed that the brother's testimony would have been highly impeachable based on his prior work as an informant, his description of himself --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Impeachable how? What motive did he have to implicate his brother? You still haven't answered that question. All you keep saying is, he was a past cooperator, he had no pending charges, and now he has a motive to do this against his brother because of that?

MR. WAX: Your Honor, I cannot point in the 12 record to a motive. What I can point to is the fact 13 14 that there is in the record his self-description of 15 himself as the golden boy for the police, his working 16 with the same detective who interrogated his brother years before when he completely avoided a murder charge. 17 18 And as a defense attorney, in a case 19 involving a group of men who are not necessarily as 20 socialized and well educated as some other group, that 21 his testimony would have been subject to impeachment. 22 JUSTICE ALITO: Even without his testimony, 23 isn't there a very strong case of kidnapping? Let's just take it step-by-step. What would have been the 24 25 defense to the kidnapping charge?

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1	MR. WAX: The defense to the kidnapping
2	charge in the absence of the confessions could well have
3	been a mere presence defense, that Mr. Moore did not
4	participate in the kidnapping. He had every right to
5	put the State to his to its burden of proof.
6	JUSTICE ALITO: He didn't that he didn't
7	go to the to the victim's RV with the other men?
8	That would have been the defense?
9	MR. WAX: He could certainly have argued
10	that he did not participate in the kidnapping. He's
11	there, he's in the car, and he had no participation in
12	it. But what I believe is being missed in this
13	discussion, if I may, is the focus on the question
14	required to be analyzed in Hill. Would Mr. Moore have
15	gone to trial? Would he have accepted the plea?
16	JUSTICE GINSBURG: On this
17	MR. WAX: And on that there are highly
18	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Wax, just to clear
19	out some of the underbrush, the Ninth Circuit did say
20	that Fulminante was really established law controlling
21	this case. I take it that you are not defending that?
22	MR. WAX: That is correct. The clearly
23	established law that governs here is Strickland, Hill
24	and Kimmelman.
25	JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. I've got on the

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1 other -- I've got -- the other reason I asked the question, to be clear about it, is that -- is that he 2 3 wouldn't have gone to trial in my mind unless he had a 4 pretty good chance of getting a better deal. And what he -- like getting off. And what he got was the 5 minimum. Okay? б 7 One thing I've written down is that the 8 State would not have the confession. That's correct. Number two is he could say his brother is not a very 9 good brother. Moreover he's a rather dubious character 10 11 there, and bring all that -- stuff. Was there anything 12 else? 13 MR. WAX: Yes, Your Honor. 14 JUSTICE BREYER: I don't want to miss 15 anything. 16 MR. WAX: Yes, Your Honor. What we have in this record is highly unusual combination of four facts 17 appearing at three different stages in the proceeding. 18 19 First, from his attorney, who articulated this in the 20 sentencing -- it's in the supplemental appendix at page 21 Mr. Moore had a very difficult time accepting the 7: 22 fact that this was a felony murder charge, or a felony murder offer. That leads directly to the fact that Mr. 23 Moore did not plead guilty. 24 This is only a nolo plea. And while in some 25

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circumstances the court will equate a nolo plea with a plea of guilty, in these circumstances the fact that he entered a nolo plea only is highly significant on the question of whether or not he would have rolled the dice.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And a competent -- and a б 7 competent counsel is supposed to accept their irrational 8 client, who doesn't want to understand the law, and let 9 him risk getting an aggravated felony charge brought 10 against him, or a capital murder charge brought against 11 him, and not -- and just go ahead? And try the case 12 because he's not going to recommend to the client, go to trial, take the plea, because you're irrational? 13

14 MR. WAX: Your Honor --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's really what you are saying, that a competent attorney would not recommend to his client take the plea, and that his client wouldn't ultimately accept the plea, because the objective reality is his upside horrible and his downside is almost a given.

21 MR. WAX: Your Honor, a competent counsel 22 might advise his counsel to accept a plea. The question 23 of the irrational client is however one with which I 24 regrettably deal on a regular basis. Clients do not 25 always accept my advice, and for whatever it is worth in

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1 the footnote toward the end of his opinion, Judge 2 Reinhardt responds to Judge Bybee by saying: Look, he 3 may not be better off by pursuing this habeas corpus 4 action; it is, however, his choice. 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, but Judge Reinhardt and the court of appeals did not in fact apply the test б 7 of Hill, which you are asserting. The test is whether 8 he would have gone to trial. I -- I didn't read the 9 opinion as ever saying that he would have gone to trial. The opinion says he could have gotten a better deal. 10 11 That's quite a different -- quite a 12 different question, and I -- I'm not prepared to make 13 that the test. 14 MR. WAX: Your Honor --15 JUSTICE SCALIA: But it's not the test 16 that -- that Hill prescribed. 17 MR. WAX: I am not advocating for the test articulated by Judge Berzon; I believe that it is a 18 19 sound approach but it is not what we are advocating for 20 here. We believe that this record shows that Mr. Moore 21 would have gone to trial. 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Did he say that? Is there a statement in the record that Moore said he would 23 have insisted on going to trial had he been advised that 24 25 the suppression motion had merit?

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1 MR. WAX: There is -- there is no direct 2 statement to that effect. In all the cases where we have found where there is such a direct statement, the 3 4 courts almost always discount them. What we have here, we submit, is something more significant, and that is he 5 did not want to enter a plea. He did not enter a plea, б 7 and then at the first opportunity that he learned that his attorney had been ineffective, he moved to undo the 8 9 conviction. And we submit that the decision in 10 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, in which this Court found it 11 highly significant that Flores-Ortega moved to initiate 12 an appeal at the first opportunity that he learned that 13 the appeal had been lost, is applicable here. 14 That is an objective fact that this Court 15 has found relevant -- and --16 JUSTICE BREYER: That is an irrelevant I don't see how we could go back to a 17 question. 18 possibly irrational state of mind. I mean, don't --19 when you're trying to figure out what a defendant would 20 have done in the absence of an error in respect to a 21 plea, don't you have to ask a question: What would a 22 rational person have done. 23 I mean, I would say that's a good question. I don't know the answer, but if we are trying to figure 24

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out he might have been totally irrational and would have

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gone to trial even though he was likely to end up in 1 jail for life as opposed to 25 years, we should then 2 reverse it and give him a trial? I'm rather disturbed 3 4 by that. 5 MR. WAX: Your Honor, I am not suggesting that the -б 7 JUSTICE BREYER: What do you actually think 8 about this? 9 MR. WAX: I believe that Mr. Moore was making a reasoned judgment. His codefendant brother who 10 11 brought the gun to the scene, who by the confessions, is 12 the one who pistol-whipped the victim, received the 13 10-year manslaughter sentence that Mr. Moore believed he 14 should have obtained. Mr. Salyer, who went to trial, 15 received the same sentence that Mr. Moore received. 16 Mr. Moore's judgment that this should be viewed as an accident and that it was a highly mitigated 17 18 situation --19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I think you -- I think 20 General Kroger brought up that Moore carried the gun. 21 It was cocked, and he shot -- who was it? Roger. 22 MR. WAX: Your Honor, the gun is brought to 23 the scene -- and this is in the record -- by the codefendant, Lonnie Woolhiser. He has the gun when he 24 25 goes into the trailer and assaults Mr. Rogers.

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1	What the district attorney said, the
2	prosecutor on the scene who understood what was
3	happening, the prosecutor's description at pages 227 and
4	228 of the appendix is: This is an accident. The
5	prosecutors states: They had no intent to kill. The
б	sole intent here was to put the fear of God into
7	Mr. Rogers for his having ripped off his friend
8	Mr. Salyer.
9	The prosecutor describes the incident on the
10	hill as follows: That Mr. Woolhiser, with the gun, is
11	pushing Mr. Rogers up the hill. This is a wet and muddy
12	Oregon day and a wet and muddy Oregon hill. And
13	Mr. Rogers and Mr. Woolhiser go down
14	JUSTICE ALITO: Excuse me. Where was the
15	citation for this?
16	MR. WAX: Pages 227 and 228 in the appendix.
17	And he also reiterates the fact in the sentencing, which
18	I believe is at at page 3 and 4, the sentencing
19	proceeding in the
20	JUSTICE BREYER: They believe it. The jury
21	believes it was an accident. Now, how does that get him
22	a lighter sentence?
23	MR. WAX: If he goes to trial, the
24	likelihood, first, of a death penalty needs to be put
25	off the table.

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1 JUSTICE BREYER: No. The sentence is 2 25 years mandatory for felony murder. Now, the jury believes just as you said. It believes it was an 3 accident; he never intended to pull the trigger. 4 5 How does that get him a lighter sentence? That's my question. 6 7 MR. WAX: If he is convicted solely of the 8 kidnapping, if he is convicted of an assault, he can receive a lighter sentence. If he is convicted of the 9 10 felony murder, to be sure the mandatory --11 JUSTICE BREYER: Isn't kidnapping a felony? 12 MR. WAX: Yes. But if he --13 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, then, if he is 14 kidnapped -- if he is convicted of the kidnapping and 15 there was an accidental murder that took place, I believe that that would be felony murder. 16 17 MR. WAX: If the jury finds him guilty of that, his sentence will --18 19 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. And the defense to 20 kidnapping was what? 21 MR. WAX: Mere presence. He could have argued a mere presence defense. In the absence --22 23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But four witnesses put him at the scene to kidnap this guy and scare him to 24 death. Or scare him. 25

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MR. WAX: Well, Your Honor, the record shows there was one witness who put him at the scene. The record shows that one of the issues that was previously raised, and that in our winnowing of the issues is not currently before this Court, is a challenge to the admissibility of the eyewitness identification at the Rogers trailer.

8 One witness there only, and that would be 9 subject to challenge, and does not put him into the 10 trailer or participating in the kidnapping or the 11 assault.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Wax, as far as the confession is concerned and its excludability, what 13 14 effect do you think we ought to give to this passage in 15 the -- in the defendant's agreement to the plea: "I 16 understand that any admissions, statements, or confessions which I may have made or any evidence 17 18 obtained by virtue of the search and seizure of my 19 property may well be inadmissible against me in 20 evidence, unless my constitutional rights have been 21 safeguarded. I understand that if I would like to speak 22 to an attorney concerning my constitutional rights, that the Court will grant me time for that purpose." 23 24 I believe you should give no MR. WAX: credit to that, because that statement by Mr. Moore is 25

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1 based on the incorrect advice of his attorney. And we
2 believe that the record here --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, wait. Wait. This is not the attorney speaking. I mean, this is what he said. He said, "I understand that any admissions, statements or confessions which I have made may well be" -- "may well be inadmissible against me in evidence."

9 MR. WAX: Your Honor, he had previously been 10 told by his attorney that they were not. And when he 11 was questioned in the post-conviction proceeding before 12 the point of the prejudice under Hill, he says: I acted 13 and entered this nolo plea on the advice of counsel. 14 Now, to be sure there is a boilerplate 15 statement to the contrary.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, boilerplate -- I mean, the man signed it. How can a prosecutor ever protect himself against the person who signs a plea agreement later -- later coming in and saying: Oh, my attorney misadvised me.

I don't care what your attorney advised you. The plea agreement itself advises you that this stuff may be inadmissible.

24 MR. WAX: Your Honor, what Mr. Moore has 25 said is: I enter this plea on the advice of my

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attorney. That advice is conceded by the State to have 1 been incorrect, and the full record of the case includes 2 3 that plea petition document. It includes the State's concession that the advice provided was incorrect. 4 And while a plea petition form is standard 5 in many State courts, as it is in the Federal court, the б 7 reality is that those forms often include statements that are not consistent with the facts that have been 8 9 presented or that have occurred previously. 10 JUSTICE ALITO: Could I just clarify 11 something? 12 Is it your position that the prosecutor, in making his offer of proof at the plea on 227 to 228, 13 14 affirmatively said that this was an accident or did 15 not -- did not allege that it was intentional? 16 MR. WAX: He affirmatively states that there was no intent to kill. 17 18 JUSTICE ALITO: Where is that? I --19 MR. WAX: I believe it's on page 228, where 20 he comes back in and says one more thing. 21 It is on 228. And just something that I missed early on: "The indicated intent of the defendant 22 was to instill fear to the point that the victim would 23 not again rip them off. " The description --24 JUSTICE ALITO: You read that as a -- as a 25

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1 claim that there was no intent to kill? 2 MR. WAX: Yes, sir. And I believe it is 3 also consistent with the statement of the judge at the 4 sentencing, who described this as a case involving two tragedies. Everyone who participated -- the lawyers for 5 the defendants, the prosecutor, and the judge -б 7 recognized this was an accident. 8 This was a tragedy. The judge saying, 9 Mr. Moore, the person who had led a good, law-abiding life, a person who had been a productive member of --10 11 JUSTICE ALITO: I have to say, I think 12 that's a very aggressive reading of what was said here. It was not necessary for the plea to this offense to 13 14 prove an intent to kill, and the statement that the 15 intent that was necessary, which is lesser intent but 16 sufficient to support this plea, was present is not a 17 statement that a greater mens rea was absent. 18 And I thought you argued to us that the 19 prosecutor said this was not intentional. It was an 20 accident. 21 MR. WAX: Well, I believe, Your Honor, that 22 is the portion to the record to which I am referring at 23 page 228. He also described at the sentencing the facts of the case as facts involving and consistent with the 24 slip and the fall. 25

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1	His description of the incident is a
2	description of Mr. Rogers falling back into the gun. He
3	did that both at the plea, which I believe is on page
4	227, and he did it again at the sentencing. And then he
5	is followed by the judge, who articulates the
6	circumstances of this case as involving two tragedies:
7	To be sure, the death of Mr. Rogers, but also the
8	tragedy of Mr. Moore having accidentally killed his
9	friend.
10	If there are no further questions, I thank
11	the Court.
12	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
13	General Kroger, you have eight minutes
14	remaining.
15	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GENERAL JOHN R. KROGER
16	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
17	MR. KROGER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
18	please the Court:
19	The Court of Appeals here did not apply
20	clearly established Federal law, but applied, for the
21	first time in a way that is non-mandated by the
22	decisions of this Court, Fulminante to a collateral
23	proceeding.
24	The State court's adjudication of this claim
25	was eminently reasonable on both prongs of Strickland.

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1	Accordingly, we would ask this Court to reverse the
2	judgment of the Ninth Circuit and to affirm the judgment
3	of the district court.
4	I would be happy to answer any additional
5	questions that the Court may have.
6	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
7	Counsel, the case is submitted.
8	(Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the case in the
9	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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