1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x 3 DONALD BULLCOMING, : 4 Petitioner : No. 09-10876 5 v. : 6 NEW MEXICO : 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 8 Washington, D.C. 9 Wednesday, March 2, 2011 10 11 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 12 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 13 at 10:15 a.m. • 14 APPEARANCES: 15 JEFFREY L. FISHER, ESQ., appointed by this Court, 16 Stanford, California; on behalf of Petitioner. 17 GARY K. KING, ESQ., Attorney General, Santa Fe, New 18 Mexico; on behalf of Respondent. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1

1	CONTENTS	
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	JEFFREY L. FISHER, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioner	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	GARY K. KING, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondent	30
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	JEFFREY L. FISHER, ESQ.	
10	On behalf of the Petitioner	57
11		
12		
13		
14	· · · · ·	
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (10:15 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We will hear 4 argument first this morning in Case 09-10876, Bullcoming v. New Mexico. 5 б Mr. Fisher. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY L. FISHER 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 9 MR. FISHER: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 10 please the Court: 11 The text, purpose, and history of the Confrontation Clause make it clear that the prosecution 12 cannot introduce one person's testimonial statements 13 14 through the in-court testimony of someone else. Thus, 15 having held in Melendez-Diaz that a lab analyst's statements in a forensic lab report are testimonial, 16 this is an easy case. 17 18 The State violated the Confrontation Clause 19 by introducing lab analyst Curtis Caylor's statements in 20 a forensic lab report without putting him on the stand. 21 The New Mexico Supreme Court resisted this analysis, 22 straightforward as it is, on the ground that 23 Mr. Bullcoming, as the defendant, had the opportunity to 24 cross-examine a substitute or a surrogate witness, 25 Mr. Razatos.

3

But a surrogate witness procedure violates all four components of the right to confrontation. It quite obviously violates the defendant's right to have the witness testify in his presence, in the presence of the jury so the jury can observe it, and under oath, as happened in this case.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Fisher, when you say "in the presence," do you -- do you mean it necessarily must be in the courtroom, or would a video-conferencing set-up be permissible so that the technician or the analyst could testify from the lab, rather -- but it would be screened in -- in the courthouse?

13 MR. FISHER: Well, the default rule under 14 the Confrontation Clause is in presence, in the 15 courtroom. Now, in Maryland v. Craig, this Court held in a child witness setting -- of course, very different 16 than this case -- that closed-circuit TV would be 17 permissible, and I believe, you know, in a future case, 18 19 if the State perhaps made some sort of showing that the 20 lab analyst couldn't come to court for some reason, and 21 certainly if the defendant stipulated, and maybe even if the defendant didn't stipulate, a court could 22

23 accommodate --

24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: The defendant didn't give
25 his consent, so we don't -- that's not a concern, but

4

1	let's let's suppose defendant doesn't stipulate. Is
2	this adequate to meet the Confrontation Clause?
3	MR. FISHER: I don't think it would be
4	adequate, Justice Ginsburg, with at least some absent
5	at least some showing of unavailability of the witness
6	or making the witness unable to come to court.
7	Now now, there is an amicus brief in the
8	case, I believe, that suggests some flexibility that
9	trial judges might employ in in accommodating lab
10	analysts' schedules.
11	JUSTICE SCALIA: What about police
12	witnesses? What about not requiring the officer who
13	who took the confession or who witnessed the alleged
14	crime not requiring him to appear because he's busy?
15	MR. FISHER: Well, that's never been
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: Can't make it. He's out on
17	the beat. So can we have him appear by television?
18	MR. FISHER: That's never been the rule,
19	Justice Scalia, and I don't think there would be a need
20	to
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why why is a lab
22	technician different?
23	MR. FISHER: I don't think I don't think
24	one is, and you don't have to reach that in this case,
25	because the State never attempted to make any showing

1	that Mr. Caylor was unavailable for any reason. This
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Fisher, what if
3	you had two people doing this procedure? They're
4	sitting in, you know, chairs right next to the other.
5	The one, you know, takes the blood samples from the
6	vials, puts them in another vial, and puts the aluminum
7	stuff on and crimps it. The other one then takes the
8	vials and puts them in the machine and runs it. Do you
9	have to have both of them testify?
10	MR. FISHER: Only if the State wants to
11	present statements from them both.
12	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, they want to
13	MR. FISHER: They both
14	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They want to present
15	the results of the blood analysis
16	MR. FISHER: I think
17	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: the numbers the
18	machine spits out.
19	MR. FISHER: I think in that scenario, if
20	both people were there for the whole thing, the State
21	could have either one of them testify. What the State
22	couldn't do
23	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Even though one
24	MR. FISHER: and this is the rule
25	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Even though one

1 didn't do it? Even though the question is going to be,
2 did you put the aluminum on and crimp it, and the answer
3 is going to be, no, Joe did it; he sits right next to
4 me?

5 MR. FISHER: That's right. The 6 Confrontation Clause is a purely procedural right, Mr. 7 Chief Justice.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. That's 9 right. Does -- do they both have to testify, then, or 10 not?

11 MR. FISHER: They do not have to. The 12 Confrontation Clause is a purely procedural right. It all depends on what -- whose statements the State wants 13 14 to introduce. So, if the State is satisfied to prove 15 its case by having somebody testify, saying, I watched 16 the thing go into the machine and I watched this result come out and I saw that it wasn't tampered with and it 17 18 was Mr. Bullcoming's sample, then that would be fine. 19 And in fact, what some labs do --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I don't understand that. How is that any different than the supervisor of the lab saying, I know what these people do, I -- I watch them on a day-to-day basis, and they perform their work correctly?

MR. FISHER: Again, the question, Justice

7

25

1	Kennedy, is not who the State has to bring in. The
2	question is whose statements the State wants to
3	introduce. Here, the State wanted to introduce
4	Mr. Caylor's statements, and so it therefore needs to
5	JUSTICE KENNEDY: What the State wanted to
6	introduce is the result of the exam, and the Chief
7	Justice gives you the hypothetical. Say, two people are
8	necessary for the exam. You say only one has to be
9	there if both saw it?
10	MR. FISHER: If only if the State is only
11	introducing one person
12	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But it but it's hearsay
13	as to what the first person did with with crimping
14	MR. FISHER: I don't
15	JUSTICE KENNEDY: crimping the thing.
16	It's not direct testimony from that person. You didn't
17	say, are you experienced in crimping? Did you use your
18	right hand or your left hand? Is there a danger of
19	spillage? And so on. All that is beyond the ability of
20	the defense to ask.
21	MR. FISHER: No, I Justice Kennedy, I
22	don't think it's hearsay. It's simply being an
23	eyewitness and saying: Here's what I watched. I
24	we have a black we want the table we able to said that is
24	watched this person put it into the machine, and this is

8

1	Now, again, the only question is whose
2	statements the State wants to introduce. By all means,
3	Mr. Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, if the State
4	wanted to introduce statements from both of the lab
5	analysts who worked together on the case, they would
6	need to bring them both in, but if they only want to
7	introduce one lab
8	JUSTICE SCALIA: The State takes its
9	chances, right? I mean, as to how much it has to bring
10	in, in order to persuade the jury?
11	MR. FISHER: That's right. That's the
12	decision the State makes in every case, whether it be
13	multiple police investigators, multiple eyewitnesses,
14	or
15	JUSTICE KENNEDY: You always take your
16	chances with a business record. That's a given, of
17	course. Of course, the State takes a chance with the
18	with the admission of any admissible hearsay testimony
19	that the jury will be that you'll make the argument
20	to the jury that you should discount it if the person
21	isn't there. That's always true.
22	MR. FISHER: I'm not sure I I disagree
23	with anything you said, but the rule of the
24	Confrontation Clause applies to a particular kind of
25	statements, testimonial statements. And our rule today

and the one that resolves this case is, if the State 1 2 wants to introduce a witness's testimonial statements, 3 it needs to bring that witness to court. 4 Now, footnote 1 in Melendez-Diaz --JUSTICE KENNEDY: Now, I take it it's a 5 testimonial statement that this blood that was taken at 6 7 the hospital was the blood of the defendant. That's a testimonial statement? 8 9 MR. FISHER: Yes, I believe it would be, 10 Justice Kennedy. 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And so I assume that in 12 this case, the nurse and the police officer were both 13 present. 14 MR. FISHER: Yes, and, in fact --15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I assume under your 16 position, you could not have a record showing that the -- the nurse withdrew the sample at 10:08 p.m. on 17 18 such-and-such a date and that she followed the regular 19 procedure. That would be insufficient if the State 20 wanted to introduce just a certificate or just -- just that record? 21 MR. FISHER: I think that's what footnote 1 22 in Melendez-Diaz says. If the defendant wants to 23 challenge the chain of custody, then the State needs to 24 25 bring in the witnesses. Now, I think it's an

10

1 interesting fact in this case, and it shows why that 2 rule isn't so --

3 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, that's not -- I don't 4 think that's what Melendez-Diaz' footnote 1 says. Ιt says that the State may be able to prove chain of 5 custody by testimony other than the actual individuals б 7 who handled the sample, and then it has to take its 8 chances as to whether the trier of fact is going to 9 believe -- is going to believe that. Isn't that right? 10 MR. FISHER: I think that's right. I think 11 what footnote 1 says is the defendant -- when the State 12 chooses whose testimony it wants to introduce, the defendant has the right to insist that that be done 13 14 live. 15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It does -- it does not --16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Does not Melendez-Diaz also say that if the defendant wants to challenge the -- the 17 18 chain of custody, the State can adopt rules that 19 requires the defendant to assert that challenge or his 20 intention to make that challenge, or his intention to 21 make that challenge, prior to the trial so that the 22 State will know whether it has to introduce any live 23 testimony?

24 MR. FISHER: Of course, that's correct under 25 the notice and demand regimes that Melendez-Diaz

11

approved of. And the Public -- the PDS brief in this
 case showed that many States do use those regimes. Now,
 Justice Kennedy, I did want to --

JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the chain -- the chain of custody does involve a testimonial statement that this is the blood, that I took it out at 10:05 p.m. on Saturday evening. That's a testimonial statement. It's the defendant's blood.

9 MR. FISHER: Yes, it can, Justice Kennedy, 10 but chain of custody is proved by live witnesses every 11 day in -- every day in courtrooms across the country --12 JUSTICE BREYER: But it's not just --13 MR. FISHER: -- long before Melendez-Diaz or 14 Crawford.

JUSTICE BREYER: It's not just chain of custody. I think the Chief Justice is trying to get at this problem, or I am: Lab technician Jones looks at a vial, and it's blue. She says to Smith, "it's blue." Smith turns a lever on a machine to B.

Jason sees the B and goes into court -- you make him go into court; that's our case. And what I wonder is, is the defendant now entitled to the following instruction: Jury, because he's in court, he can say that the machine read B, but that proves nothing about the vial, nothing. All it proves is what someone

12

1 said in the laboratory to another person, and those two
2 people aren't in court.

Now, that's -- you see, that's the problem, 3 4 I think, of the intermediate step. I'd either like to be told I'm wrong about that, you don't have to have 5 them, or explain whatever you'd like. 6 7 MR. FISHER: If I understand your 8 hypothetical correctly, I think that if the defendant wanted -- the defendant can certainly make that argument 9 to a jury, and the defendant, if he wanted to insist --10 if the prosecution wanted to tie the results -- let's 11 bring it back to the facts of this case -- wanted to tie 12 13 the .21 to Mr. Bullcoming by saying that was 14 Mr. Bullcoming's sample, then they'd need to bring 15 somebody into court if the defendant insisted upon it. 16 But the one thing I want to add is that the Public Defender Service brief makes clear, and the facts 17 18 of this case make clear, it's going to be very rare that 19 a defendant wants to do that. The defendant in this 20 case wanted to stipulate to the nurse's blood draw and 21 that it was his blood that was drawn in the hospital. 22 It was the State that insisted on putting her on the 23 stand. It happens in courtrooms all across the country. 24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but if you want to tell us, don't worry, it won't happen, I think that's an 25

13

unacceptable argument. You're saying the defense has certain rights, and we have to presume there is a defense attorney who's going to afford his client every right the Constitution has. So the fact that we're not supposed to worry because it won't happen very often is (a) it seems to me, an unlikely hypothetical; and (b) it seems to me, irrelevant to your argument.

MR. FISHER: Well, Justice Kennedy, I will 8 gladly accept (b) if we want to say that consequences 9 10 are irrelevant, because I think that's what -- the Sixth Amendment is what it is, but I think the only thing I 11 12 would add is that all I can say is, empirically, in the 13 States that have followed the rule we advocate today, 14 long before Crawford or Melendez-Diaz, it simply is a 15 manageable burden. I'm not saying it's no burden. But 16 it is a thoroughly manageable --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Fisher, I thought -- I thought the Court put this worry behind us in Crawford. Wasn't the same worry raised in Crawford?

20 MR. FISHER: Well, I think it was raised 21 even more pointedly in Melendez-Diaz when it comes to 22 lab analysts. I think in both places the Court, yes, 23 set that aside.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Said, yes, it may be something of a risk, but the States have managed it in

14

1 the past, and there's no reason to think they can't 2 manage it in the future. 3 MR. FISHER: I think that's what 4 Melendez-Diaz --5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, there are б different types of hearsay involved here or different 7 types of statements. There's the report itself, which 8 was Exhibit 1 that was introduced, and it has certain certifications by the analyst, that he followed certain 9 10 procedures, et cetera. I'm assuming that you're 11 claiming that those -- those are the Confrontation 12 Clause violations, that exhibit itself, because it is 13 attesting or certifying to something. 14 MR. FISHER: Yes. 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The witness is not at 16 trial here. MR. FISHER: Yes, Mr. Caylor's 17 certifications in this -- in the lab report, not only 18 19 that the blood -- that the blood had a .21 blood alcohol 20 content, but also that --21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, that's where I 22 want --23 MR. FISHER: Oh, but --24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That -- the "also" is what I summarized in saying that he followed certain 25

15

procedures, that it was in accordance with law, et 1 2 cetera. 3 MR. FISHER: And also that it was 4 Mr. Bullcoming's blood sample and that the sample had 5 not been tampered with. 6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Right. 7 MR. FISHER: That's the totality of the --8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. 9 JUSTICE ALITO: But as to those persons 10 who --11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Now -- if I might just 12 finish my question. 13 JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. Go ahead. Yes. 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Let's assume that the 15 raw data, the graphs that were made, were reviewed by a 16 separate witness, and he reviewed the data and says, 17 this data shows that the blood level concentration was 18 .21, or two-point whatever it was. Would that violate 19 the Confrontation Clause, using the raw data itself? 20 MR. FISHER: I want to be clear that raw --21 by "raw data," you mean the printout from a machine? 22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The printout from the 23 machine. 24 MR. FISHER: It's used a few different ways in the briefing. 25

16

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That wasn't introduced 2 here; am I correct? MR. FISHER: It was neither -- it was not 3 4 introduced, and there's nothing in the record to show that Mr. Razatos even reviewed it. 5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. But let's б 7 assume --8 MR. FISHER: So what he did is just read the 9 report. 10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Let's assume he just took the raw data at trial. I know we now have a chain 11 12 of custody, and someone will have to prove that this is 13 the data related --14 MR. FISHER: Right. 15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- to Mr. Bullcoming. 16 But if that expert then read that data and testified that this was of a certain amount or percentage of 17 18 alcohol, would that violate the Confrontation Clause? 19 MR. FISHER: Probably not. Provided, as you 20 say, the chain of custody had been either properly proved or stipulated to, I think an expert could take 21 22 the stand and say, I'm looking at a graph, and here's what the graph shows me. Now, you might get into --23 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And that's what -- that's the New Mexico Supreme Court suggested, didn't they? 25

17

They said bring the printout from the gas -- whatever -chromatograph, and then have an expert who was not the one who certified -- it was not Caylor -- but that here's the graph that came out of the machine, and this is the way this process operates.

б I -- in your answer to Justice Sotomayor, 7 did you mean to agree with the New Mexico Supreme Court 8 when they said printout plus an analyst who didn't do 9 this particular run but knows how the process works? 10 MR. FISHER: No, Justice Ginsburg. I'm 11 certainly not here today to agree with the New Mexico Supreme Court. What they said doesn't -- doesn't make 12 13 any sense in this case because (a) the printout was 14 never introduced into evidence or looked at, and (b) it 15 would matter a great deal -- and this is how I continue 16 my answer. It mattered a great deal what was on the printout. If the printout is nothing more than a graph, 17 18 then I don't think you can say that's a testimonial 19 statement. If a printout comes out of a machine that 20 also says at the top blood sample was Donald 21 Bullcoming's, here's the test that was run, et cetera, 22 those may well be testimonial statements that the 23 analyst triggered the machine to spit out. 24 So the Fourth Circuit has wrestled with this

25 issue in the Washington case, and you can -- you can

18

1	look at the majority and the dissenting opinions in that
2	case. I think that the question would arise in that
3	scenario, if the graphs were if the machine printouts
4	were introduced into evidence, the question would be,
5	are the machine printouts testimonial? And to the
6	extent they are, you'd have the same problem in this
7	case. To the extent they are not as the Fourth
8	Circuit suggested, at least to some degree they may not
9	be then you don't have a
10	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What part
11	MR. FISHER: Confrontation Clause
12	problem.
13	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What part do you see as
14	testimonial or not? What can an outside expert look at?
15	MR. FISHER: I think an expert can look at
16	anything. The only question is what's introduced into
17	evidence. There's no there's no Confrontation
18	Clause
19	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, I that
20	MR. FISHER: barring an expert from
21	reviewing whatever he wants.
22	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There's two different
23	issues: one, what can be introduced into evidence,
24	which is the reports themselves; and what can he or she
25	testify to is a different question. That's a form of

1	evidence. And so that's the line I'm trying to get you
2	to describe for me, which is, when does that testimony
3	become a violation of the Confrontation Clause?
4	MR. FISHER: In one of two scenarios,
5	Justice Sotomayor, the first which is the scenario we
6	have in this case, when the report is introduced and
7	it's testimonial. The second
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Let's assume the
9	hypothetical I proffered.
10	MR. FISHER: The second is that it's not
11	introduced. Then you have a Confrontation Clause
12	violation if the expert and this is the words many
13	lower courts have used is a mere conduit for
14	introducing the out-of-court testimonial statement.
15	So
16	JUSTICE ALITO: Could we break this down in
17	in this way? I see three things that the three
18	statements that the the State was attempting to to
19	prove. The first was that the sample that was tested
20	was the sample that was taken from the defendant.
21	Second was that the standard procedures were followed in
22	this case, and the third was that the result was .21.
23	Would you agree with that? Those are the three things?
24	MR. FISHER: I think there's one other
25	thing, Justice Alito, which is that the sample had not

1 been tampered with --2 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. 3 MR. FISHER: -- or contaminated. 4 JUSTICE ALITO: That the sample had not been tampered with. Now, as to the first three, in other 5 words, everything other than the results, could the б 7 State prove those things without having -- simply by 8 introducing testimony regarding the way things were 9 generally done in the lab, and ask the jury to infer 10 that the general procedures were followed in this 11 particular case? 12 MR. FISHER: I think that would be a question of State law, Justice Alito. 13 14 JUSTICE ALITO: It wouldn't be a 15 Confrontation --16 MR. FISHER: It wouldn't be a Confrontation Clause question. 17 18 JUSTICE ALITO: All right. Now, in this 19 case, as I read the record, it seems to me that's what 20 the prosecutor was attempting to do. This is on page 50 of the Joint Appendix. The analyst is beginning to 21 22 testify, the second answer on page 50: So what we do is 23 we will get the sample in the mail, et cetera. 24 The analyst is beginning to testify about standard lab procedures, and then defense attorney says, 25

21

1 "Your Honor, I'm going to object to what's done in the 2 status quo." I take that to mean what is generally done. "I don't object to what was done in this case." 3 4 So the defense attorney is preventing -- is objecting to the prosecution's attempting to discharge 5 its responsibility with respect to those first three 6 7 propositions through testimony about standard 8 procedures, and is insisting that the analyst provide the testimony that you say was a violation of the 9 10 Confrontation Clause; namely, testifying as to what was 11 done in this particular case.

12 MR. FISHER: Justice Alito, I think if you look earlier in the Joint Appendix, I believe it's at 13 14 page 40, where the State for the first time says we're 15 going to put Mr. Razatos on the stand instead of Mr. 16 Caylor, there's a -- there's an objection there as well 17 that says you can't then put the document into evidence 18 that Mr. Caylor wrote if he's not going to be on the 19 stand. That's the critical objection here.

Now, you're right, there's nothing wrong with Mr. Razatos having taken the stand in this case, there's nothing wrong with him having described typical procedures in the lab. I think the objection you're pointing was to the one that said -- again, as far as the State law objection, saying he can't testify to

22

something he doesn't have personal knowledge about, which is whether the procedures were followed in this case. But Mr. -- Mr. Razatos could certainly take the stand and testify to -- to general procedures. But at page 54 and 55 of the Joint Appendix, he -- he simply reads the report's results.

7 And so you have two Confrontation Clause 8 violations, really. You have the report being introduced in the first instance, and then you have -- I 9 10 believe it's at 54 and 55 of the Joint Appendix. You 11 have the prosecutor asking Mr. Razatos, what was the 12 result? He says the result was .21. As the State itself says at page 58, note 15 of its brief, there was 13 14 no independent analysis being applied there. All Mr. 15 Razatos was doing was repeating and giving the jury the 16 conclusions that Mr. Caylor had reached.

JUSTICE ALITO: But if the -- if the machine had expelled a piece of paper that said .21, that piece of paper would not be a -- introduction of that piece of paper, the contents of the piece of paper, would not be a violation of the Confrontation Clause?

MR. FISHER: If it said nothing more than the .21 coming out of the machine, I think probably not. Now, judge Michael in the First Circuit would disagree; and so that's an issue that's not in this case, and I

23

1 think you could debate whether that should -- even that
2 should be considered hearsay of the operator.
3 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, how can -- how can you
4 debate it? The purpose of the Confrontation Clause is
5 to allow cross-examination. How are you going to

6 cross-examine the machine?

MR. FISHER: Well -- well, the question that 7 8 would arise there would be whether the .21 should be treated as Mr. Caylor's statement. Let me -- if I give 9 10 you two hypotheticals, maybe it explains. On the one 11 hand, I don't think anyone would claim that a time stamp 12 on a fax machine, for example, is a human statement. It's a machine statement, and so therefore it can't be 13 14 testimonial. On the other hand, if someone types out an 15 affidavit on a word processor and hits print, you can't 16 say, well, that's the machine talking, not the human.

So the question arises in the lab context whether a .21 or anything else that comes out of the machine has enough human influence that it ought to be treated as the -- as the person's statement.

Now, you don't have to resolve that in this case, and what's important to emphasize is that that hypothetical of the .21, even though the State would like it to be this case, is really miles away for the reason you said, because the State proved a lot more

24

1	than .21 by Mr. Caylor's lab report, and that's why
2	these hypotheticals I think are important.
3	JUSTICE ALITO: But all of those other
4	things could potentially be proven by indirect evidence,
5	by establishing standard procedures and asking the jury
6	to infer that the standard procedures were followed in
7	this case. They might they might believe that; they
8	might not
9	MR. FISHER: The State could
10	JUSTICE ALITO: They might make the
11	inference; they might not.
12	MR. FISHER: The State could make that
13	choice, but it would be a considerably weaker case,
14	Justice Alito, not just because they wouldn't have
15	anyone saying that the procedures were actually followed
16	in this case, but also in this case it would be a far
17	weaker case because they'd have somebody on the stand
18	who would now be subject to cross-examination as to why
19	he had been recently put on unpaid leave.
20	JUSTICE ALITO: But as to this case, didn't
21	the defendant actually testify that he was drunk at the
22	time of at the time when the blood was extracted? He
23	took the stand and he testified that after the accident
24	he went off into the woods and he came upon people who
25	were drinking vodka and he drank, they drank what was

1	it a gallon of vodka together, and then he went back
2	to the scene and his blood was tested?
3	MR. FISHER: That was
4	JUSTICE ALITO: Isn't that correct?
5	MR. FISHER: That was his defense, Justice
6	Alito, and here's why the lab report is still important,
7	though. Because you're right, he did admit he was
8	drunk. But remember, he was not convicted simply of
9	DUI; he was convicted in New Mexico law of aggravated
10	DUI. And to have aggravated DUI you need to have up to
11	a .16 blood alcohol count. So the report is the only
12	the State could have proved over .16, even if Mr.
13	Bullcoming admitted that he had been drinking that day.
14	So that's why it's important in this case.
15	That's why he wanted to challenge that's one reason
16	why he wanted to challenge the report.
17	Let me come back to the to the important
18	point, I think, though, that what the State wants to be
19	able to do I don't want to ascribe a bad motive, but
20	what the State's rule would allow States to do is to
21	insulate people from cross-examination, not just Mr.
22	Caylor in this case, but but but please pay
23	attention to, for example, the Dungo case that's cited
24	in our opening brief, from California. That's a case
25	where a coroner had been fired from his job, blacklisted

by law enforcement, and prohibited from testifying in many counties because he falsified his reports, his autopsy reports, by writing them with the police report sitting right next to him.

5 JUSTICE ALITO: But the State can't --6 MR. FISHER: And --

JUSTICE ALITO: The State can't immunize those people from testifying. You could have subpoenaed Qaylor, couldn't you? You could have asked for a continuance and -- and a subpoena, and brought him in to testify? It's just a question of who has to take the step, right?

13 MR. FISHER: Well, we -- we could have, but 14 Melendez-Diaz makes clear that doesn't satisfy the 15 Confrontation Clause. And when you deal especially with 16 a garden variety DUI case there is only so much time and resources at issue, and that's why the Confrontation 17 18 Clause I think is especially important in a case like 19 this, that the prosecution bring its witnesses into 20 court.

And if I could just finish the Dungo story, in the -- in the California Court of Appeal, when they reviewed that case, they said the prosecutor's intent in that case had been to shield Mr. -- I'm sorry, the -the actual analyst in that case from cross-examination.

27

And, in fact, the supervisor when he took the stand at the preliminary hearing told -- told the court the reason why they have me here is the prosecutors find it too hard to have this person in court. So that would be perfectly permissible, if -- if the State win this case today and surrogate testimony were allowed.

7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How do you answer the 8 practical situation that Caylor, who did this particular run, does some dozens day in and day out, and he will 9 10 have no memory, in fact, of this particular test. So 11 having him there -- he knows how the process operates; he doesn't remember this particular one -- how does 12 13 having him there -- what could be elicited on 14 cross-examination of him that couldn't be from his 15 supervisor?

16 MR. FISHER: Let me give you two answers, Justice Ginsburg, but first let me say we don't know 17 18 whether somebody doesn't remember it until he's put on 19 the stand. What the NACDL brief says is that even 20 though analysts don't ordinary remember run-of-the-mill 21 tests like this, that do remember if something went 22 wrong or if something went haywire. So we don't know 23 that.

24But assuming you're right that --25JUSTICE SCALIA: Wasn't it the case that

28

these tests are unusual in this particular jurisdiction? MR. FISHER: That's my understanding, Justice Scalia. So that's another reason why he may have remembered. But even if he didn't, there's two things

6 that could be importantly probed here. One is his 7 credibility. And I've explained why that was a very 8 serious issue in this case, because he was put on unpaid 9 leave.

10 The other is his competence. Again, 11 Melendez-Diaz says it's important to have the person on 12 the stand to explain how he does his job, for the jury 13 to observe his professionalism, for him to explain 14 here's my understanding of these procedures, et cetera. 15 That could be very important, and if I could leave you 16 with one thing before I --

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I assume that even if he doesn't remember, his testimony is not worthless to 18 19 the prosecution. He -- the prosecution can bring out 20 his high qualifications, and he can testify: It -- this 21 is always the way I do it. I do it this way all the 22 time. I don't remember this particular incident. 23 All of that can be persuasive to the jury, can't it? 24

MR. FISHER: Of course, it can, Justice

29

25

1	Scalia. And on the flip side, even if he doesn't
2	remember, cross-examination is very important.
3	If I could leave you with one thing that I
4	think isn't highlighted in the brief maybe the way it
5	should have been. There's a line of cases from this
б	Court, California v. Green, Delaware v. Fensterer, and
7	United States v. Owens, that all hold that if a witness
8	takes the stand and doesn't remember anything, that the
9	Confrontation Clause is still is still satisfied, as
10	long as that witness is on the stand for the reason
11	Justice Scalia explained and because the jury can
12	observe them, et cetera.
13	And so, the flip side of that has to be
14	it's the holding of Owens most recently is that those
15	are meaningful things that the Confrontation Clause
16	requires. And so the flip side of those cases has to be
17	that if the witness takes the stand and doesn't
18	remember, the ineffectiveness potentially of a
19	cross-examination there doesn't matter, either.
20	If I could reserve what little time I have
21	left.
22	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
23	Mr. Fisher.
24	General King.
25	ORAL ARGUMENT OF GARY K. KING

1 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 2 MR. KING: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 3 please the Court: 4 As the Court said in Michigan v. Bryant, a police interrogation resembles an ex parte examination 5 when the primary purpose of the examination is to 6 7 create, quote, an out-of-court substitute for trial 8 testimony, end quote. 9 A public record not prepared by a police officer is not the product of structured interrogation. 10 11 It is neither exparte nor is it an examination. JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand that. 12 You mean so long as all -- all hearsay by non-police 13 14 officers can be admitted without, without confrontation, 15 just because they're not police officers? 16 MR. KING: No, Your Honor, I don't believe that that's the --17 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: I didn't think that was 19 your point, because it's certainly not true, is it? 20 MR. KING: It is not my point, Your Honor. 21 Your Honor, the point that I am making is 22 that in this case, the document, the report that we're 23 talking about is a public record, and that differentiates it from the affidavit in Melendez-Diaz, 24 and so the case that --25

31

1	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, could you
2	tell me what that means? Why is it different than the
3	affidavit? It's certified, and my understanding of the
4	dictionary meaning of certification is that that's an
5	attestation as to the truth of the statements contained
б	therein. That's the common definition.
7	So I'm assuming it's the equivalent of an
8	affidavit. So how is it different than the
9	Melendez-Diaz lab report?
10	MR. KING: Your Honor, and I understand, and
11	I'll answer your question with regard to your
12	expectation that the certification is the same as the
13	affidavit. It's not our position that they're exactly
14	the same, but there are several
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Tell me why not.
16	MR. KING: There are other distinguishing
17	distinguishing features that are significant between the
18	affidavit in Melendez-Diaz and the report in this case.
19	For one, the affidavit in Melendez-Diaz was prepared
20	pursuant to an statute in Massachusetts that called for
21	the preparation of an affidavit from the lab at some
22	point in time after the actual test was done, and it was
23	to be used specifically as an in-court statement to
24	replace the live in-court testimony of the affiant.
25	In our case, the report being a public

1 record was a record that is kept contemporaneously by 2 the analyst in the lab, it is, in this case, the .21 is 3 a single data point that is taken from the raw data in the machine and recorded on a standard document that's 4 5 provided by the --6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Can any --7 JUSTICE SCALIA: And that was prepared just 8 for fun, not for use in trial? 9 MR. KING: No, Your Honor. I believe 10 that -- that that statement is planned to be used in 11 trial, and --12 JUSTICE SCALIA: So what difference does it make whether the statute requires it to be taken to be 13 14 used at trial or whether the police send it over to be 15 used at trial as a use of the State? What difference 16 does that make? 17 MR. KING: Your Honor, I think the key is to look at the purpose of the analyst who was preparing the 18 19 report, who is a public employee, who is just carrying 20 out, as our court said, copying the information from the 21 machine onto the report. And so, that's significantly 22 different than the amount of analysis that was done by -- by the -- the witness in --23 24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. He's not simply looking at a number and putting it on a report. 25

33

1 He's certifying to certain things. He's certifying to 2 following certain steps, that the evidence wasn't 3 tampered with. He's certifying that he's complied with 4 all the requirements of New Mexico law with respect to the report, so he's just not copying a number. 5 б MR. KING: That's correct, Your Honor. 7 In -- in this case the certification doesn't necessarily 8 make the report testimonial. There -- there are several 9 other examples of -- of cases where -- where evidence is 10 introduced at court that -- that have certifications. 11 For instance, it may be necessary for a 12 public records custodian to provide a copy of a birth 13 certificate in -- in a trial, and in that case, the 14 custodian always has a certification that says I 15 certify --16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Isn't the difference between those two documents is that one was prepared 17 18 primarily for the purposes -- this lab report, for 19 prosecution purposes, and the birth certificate is not 20 prepared for that? It's prepared to mark the birth of a 21 person, then it's used for many other purposes besides 22 trial; is that correct? 23 MR. KING: That is correct with regard to 24 the birth -- birth certificate, Your Honor. 25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So tell me what makes

34

this certificate not primarily for the purpose of use in 1 2 the prosecution of an individual? Would they have 3 tested this blood if -- if it wasn't to prosecute him? 4 MR. KING: Your Honor, in -- in this case, This -- this case is all about a sample that was 5 no. sent to the lab to be tested for this. But I think you б 7 made it clear in Michigan v. Bryant that -- that there 8 might be a variety of purposes that should be analyzed 9 in order to decide whether or not the statement is 10 testimonial or not. 11 In this case, the purpose of the -- of the 12 lab analyst is significantly different from the purpose 13 of the police officer who requested the analysis. The 14 lab analyst does this for a living, and it's -- it's 15 their public duty. The lab in this case is -- is 16 operated by the State Department of Health, scientific lab division, and -- and they do a variety of different 17 18 kinds of analysis. 19 And so, the -- the analyst who does the test 20 wouldn't necessarily have the same purpose in -- in 21 creating their statement for that document. As a matter

22 of fact, the analyst would most likely be driven by the 23 desire as a scientist --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Does he do any testingexcept for the police?

35

1	MR. KING: Yes, Your Honor.
2	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Who else do they test
3	for?
4	MR. KING: This lab also tests for, in this
5	particular case, the gas chromatograph analyses of blood
6	alcohol, they test for the office of the medical
7	examiner and and under New Mexico law, interestingly
8	enough, the the defendant can also ask for a test.
9	They would use the same form to ask for this test.
10	So, the analysis might be being done for a
11	defendant as well as for the State.
12	JUSTICE ALITO: Are these lab analysts civil
13	service employees? Are the lab analysts civil service
14	employees?
15	MR. KING: Yes, Your Honor, they are. They
16	work for the New Mexico Department of Health.
17	JUSTICE ALITO: Is there any way in which
18	your office or prosecutors or the police could cause
19	them not to get promotions if they weren't producing the
20	kind of lab reports that the police and the prosecution
21	might like?
22	MR. KING: No, Your Honor, they could not.
23	As a matter of fact, there there is a separation
24	between the operation of the Department of Health lab
25	and the police that even extends to the point of a

physical separation. Police officers are not allowed 1 2 into the lab area where -- where they are --3 JUSTICE SCALIA: This analyst was fired, as 4 I recall. Was he fired, placed on administrative leave 5 or something? MR. KING: No, Your Honor, the record 6 indicates that -- that Mr. Caylor was not available for 7 8 court because he was on leave without pay, which --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: On leave without pay? MR. KING: Uh-huh. 10 11 JUSTICE SCALIA: And do we know why it was 12 leave without pay? 13 MR. KING: We don't know why, Your Honor. 14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Does the defense know why 15 it was leave without pay? Could the defense have found out in cross-examination that the reason he was leave 16 without pay because he was -- had shown himself to be 17 18 incompetent, and they were in the process of firing him? 19 I don't know whether that's true, but wouldn't that be 20 important to the defense? MR. KING: Your Honor, I -- I think that the 21 22 defense would like to know the answer to that question. 23 JUSTICE SCALIA: And didn't -- and didn't the prosecution intentionally set it up this way so that 24 25 this person would not have to testify, so that he could

37

1 not be cross-examined? Isn't that why they sent the 2 substitute to testify?

3 MR. KING: No, Your Honor. In this case, 4 that's -- that's not the case. I -- the -- this case came about in a little bit of an unusual circumstance, 5 б because both sides had been negotiating a plea agreement 7 and when the -- when the plea agreement was not 8 successful, the defendant asked for the trial to be 9 expedited and moved quickly to trial. So the defendant 10 didn't do as much discovery, I think, as you would 11 normally do in a case like that, but --

JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't know what the facts are, but boy, it smells bad to me. It really does. And even if that was not the case, the mere possibility that it could have been the case shows why you should have to bring this person in if you want to introduce his testimony.

18 MR. KING: Your Honor, I think that the key 19 here is that if you would not look at the -- at any of 20 the qualities of the declarant in deciding whether the statement is testimonial or not. And so once -- once 21 the Court makes the determination as to whether it is 22 testimonial or not, you wouldn't -- even if you would 23 like to ask those questions, you wouldn't have the 24 25 opportunity to ask those questions.

38

# Official - Subject to Final Review

1	In this case, factually, it might also be
2	that Mr. Caylor was on unpaid leave because he had run
3	out of his regular leave time, and he decided to do
4	that. We it would all be speculation
5	JUSTICE SCALIA: I agree that whether it's
6	testimonial does not depend upon whether there's
7	skullduggery or not, but the possibility of
8	skullduggery, even in machine machine situations such
9	as this, is a good reason for saying this is
10	testimonial.
11	MR. KING: Your Honor, I think that's why
12	it's it's important that this is a public records
13	case, because that is one of the assumptions that courts
14	have made for hundreds of years with regard to the fact
15	that there is there is a duty by the person who's
16	taking down the information to to observe in a
17	regular manner, to record in a regular manner, and so
18	that's important here.
19	JUSTICE GINSBURG: That was the principal
20	thrust of your brief, that this isn't testimonial at
21	all. You have not said because it was unsworn, because
22	you recognize the certification is the same, but you're
23	trying to equate it to a business record, public record?
24	MR. KING: Yes, Your Honor.
25	JUSTICE GINSBURG: You do have the hurdle

39

1 that this record was created for a specific purpose. It 2 was created to provide evidence for use in a criminal 3 prosecution.

4 MR. KING: Your Honor, I don't believe that 5 that is the only purpose that this form 705 could be used for. It is the common purpose for this form, but б 7 it is a form that the lab uses in every circumstance. And indeed, as I said, in New Mexico law, the defendant 8 can ask for a second test. They can have that done. 9 10 It's done at the State's expense. They can have it done 11 at any laboratory that they want to.

But if they have the report done at the State lab, and they're entitled to have that done, they would utilize the same form.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, does the --JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, what are the other --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Does the analyst Now whether he's being asked to do one for the prosecution or the defendant?

20 MR. KING: Not necessarily, Your Honor. I 21 -- I actually don't know the answer to that specifically 22 except that the form -- and if you look at it, it's in 23 the Joint Appendix -- does have some information in part 24 A that -- that indicates that there is a police officer 25 that -- that sent the test to the lab. There's a nurse

40

1 that did that in this case. 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, so they would 3 know the difference, right? 4 MR. KING: They -- I think that the same information would be on the form whether the defendant 5 submitted it or whether the -- or whether the б 7 prosecution submitted it, and --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, not the same information. One would say the police submitted it and 9 10 the other one would say the defendant submitted it, 11 right? 12 MR. KING: Your Honor --JUSTICE SCALIA: So if the police submitted 13 14 it, the -- the person doing the -- the test would know 15 that the police submitted it, I assume. 16 MR. KING: If you look at the form, Your Honor, it would have the same information, but we're 17 18 not -- we're not here today arguing that the analyst 19 wouldn't know that the police submitted this form. But 20 it is an arm's length request, and once again, the Court 21 addressed that in your most recent case, in Michigan v. 22 Bryant, I believe because the -- the question is whether 23 or not there was an interrogation. One of the key questions is whether there was an interrogation. 24 25 This clearly does not look like a case where

41

1 there was an interrogation by the police. It was a 2 request on a standard form that was -- that was sent. 3 And so the purpose test, it appears from Michigan v. 4 Bryant, would not even apply in cases where there's not a police interrogation. 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why is a key question б 7 whether this was an interrogation? Does the 8 Confrontation Clause apply only to confrontations? To interrogations? I mean, if a -- if a witness, before 9 10 the police ask any questions, blurts out, you know, 11 "Jones did it," can that statement get in because it has 12 not been in response to an interrogation? 13 MR. KING: Your Honor, the analysis would be 14 somewhat different. That's the point, is that --15 JUSTICE SCALIA: It would be different 16 because interrogation doesn't make any difference. That is not the condition for the application of the -- of 17 18 the Confrontation Clause. 19 MR. KING: Your Honor, we -- it appears that 20 it does make some difference with regard to Michigan v. 21 Bryant, and it's new to all of us. 22 JUSTICE SCALIA: If it were an 23 interrogation, the factors mentioned in Michigan v. Bryant would be relevant, presumably, but since this 24 25 wasn't an interrogation, I don't see how that has any --

42

1 any relevance whatever.

2 MR. KING: Well, the relevance, Your Honor, 3 I think, is since it's not an interrogation, then --4 then you have to look at, and I think the Court has set 5 this out, you have to look at the nature of the evidence 6 and to make a determination as to whether the evidence 7 that's being presented is merely a substitute for live, 8 in-court testimony.

9 And there, back to the difference between the affidavit in Melendez-Diaz and the report in this 10 11 case is, in our report, even if Mr. Caylor had been at 12 the trial and on the stand, it would have been necessary to have the report as well. I think Justice Ginsburg 13 14 raised this point, is that six months after the 15 examination was done, to cross-examine the analyst and 16 ask him, do you remember what the result was six months ago from this one test out of a hundred that he ran, he 17 18 will not remember without looking at the report. The 19 report is the best evidence in this case to prove the 20 point that is being made here, and --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, he'd look at the report and say, gee, I don't remember; you know, I do a lot of these reports. But then the prosecution in direct would say, well, how do you do them? And he would say, I always do this, I always do that, I always

43

do the other thing. Did you do it in this case? Well, I don't specifically remember this case, but I always do it. And that's the testimony that would go to the jury. It would be pretty persuasive. Not as good as if he did remember.

MR. KING: That's correct, Your Honor, and б 7 so that's why the analysis of whether this is 8 testimonial or not is such an important analysis, because if the -- the reasoning that the Court has had 9 for all of the hearsay exceptions, for excited 10 11 utterances or, in this case, for a public record, would look at whether or not that evidence was the best 12 13 evidence to support the truth-finding purpose of the 14 trial. That's our -- that's our analysis, at least, 15 Your Honor.

And what we are arguing in this case is that there is no difference between Mr. Caylor transferring the .21 data from the machine to the piece of paper than there would be if you took a photograph, for instance, of the machine data and --

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why did you give the data to the analyst at trial? If there wasn't a more persuasive power in the lab certification, why didn't you just have the new expert look at the printout from the graph and say, this is what it says?

44

1	MR. KING: Procedurally, in this case, Your
2	Honor, this the trial at the District Court level
3	occurred before the Court's opinion in Melendez-Diaz.
4	And so I think that at this point in time, that it would
5	be more normal behavior for the for the State to
6	present the raw data as well.
7	In this case, Mr. Razatos
8	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's that as well.
9	Don't you introduce the lab report because it it
10	gives more credence to the reliability of the result?
11	Because he's certifying that he followed certain
12	procedures, that he did certain things, that the sample
13	wasn't tampered with?
14	MR. KING: Yes, Your Honor.
15	JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is it you're looking
16	for that testimony, correct? You're looking, at trial,
17	to that testimony to bolster the test?
18	MR. KING: Not using testimony in the sense
19	that we're talking about testimony here. I mean, you
20	might want that very well want that evidence in, not
21	different from other cases where if you had a it was
22	necessary to submit the judgment of a felony, for
23	instance, to show that a person in a later trial was a
24	felon with a felon in possession of a firearm, you
25	would have a certification from the court clerk that

45

1 would say, I certify that the copy of this document that
2 I'm submitting to the court is a true copy of -- that's
3 also not testimonial from -- for the purposes of the
4 Confrontation Clause I don't believe.

JUSTICE BREYER: You might want that in order to show the machine says X, Y, Z, but that's only as good as the stuff that was put into it. So you're going to have to show that this was his blood put into it. And many, many people might have handled it, and there might be a routine so that they all check a box when it's sealed and they get it.

Is it your understanding if you lose these
cases -- this case that you then have to take into court
all those people?

15 MR. KING: That's certainly a concern, Your 16 I -- if you look at this document, there are six Honor. or seven people who have certifications on the -- on the 17 18 dire -- different statements on the document. There are 19 three certifications; there's one from the -- from the 20 woman who takes the samples into the lab that says she 21 received the samples; there's this one from Mr. Caylor; 22 there's one from -- from the reviewing analyst who 23 reviews it; and I gather that the -- that the Petitioner is only challenging the -- that one certification 24 25 from -- from -- from Mr. Caylor.

46

1	JUSTICE SCALIA: The chain of custody wasn't
2	wasn't contested here, was it?
3	MR. KING: It was not. And this document
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: Is it often contested? My
5	impression is it's not very often contested.
б	MR. KING: I'm not aware of it being
7	contested often, Your Honor, I and this form I think
8	is one of the things in New Mexico that really helps
9	with that. The reason that the court submitted the form
10	is that you have everything relating to the chain of
11	evidence on on one document, and and so indeed a
12	lot of those statements really help
13	JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, but the reason I asked
14	the question is because I don't think it is normally
15	contested. It's normally a business record of some
16	kind.
17	However, what I was looking for is a
18	distinction, because in the future I don't see why it
19	wouldn't be contested, unless there's a distinction.
20	MR. KING: Yes, Your Honor, and I think that
21	the distinction is that in this case the the analyst
22	is not essentially a party to the action. The analyst
23	works arm's-length transaction from from the from
24	the police and from the prosecutors, and so he's not
25	part of the prosecution team, is is how I've been

47

1 thinking about it.

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: General, I know your State takes a different view of it or you wouldn't be here, 3 4 but aren't there are a number of States that -- that do provide the testimony of the technician, who do require 5 the technician to come in and -- and testify? б Your Honor, I believe that there 7 MR. KING: 8 are other States that have statutes that -- that have different ways of presenting evidence. 9 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: And have they had, to your 11 knowledge, serious problems about defendants contesting 12 chain of custody simply because this other thing is required? Again, I'm -- I'm not aware that that's been 13 14 a problem. I think it's a boogeyman. 15 MR. KING: Your Honor, we -- we understand 16 that -- that the -- that the burden on the State is -is not an issue that comes directly into the analysis 17 18 relating to the Confrontation Clause. I -- in New 19 Mexico, for instance, one of the problems that we have 20 is that -- is that the lab's centrally located in 21 Albuquerque and the -- and in this case the trial was in 22 San Juan County, so -- so the witness has to drive for 23 about 3 hours to get to where the courthouse is. So 24 that's sort of different in New Mexico than, say, in Massachusetts or something like that. And -- and even 25

48

1 for 10 minutes worth of testimony, they might have to 2 drive 6 hours and take a whole day out of the lab. 3 So it -- it is a problem that -- that is 4 there, but I don't think that it is the seminal issue 5 that -б JUSTICE BREYER: Are there States -- are 7 there States that do require a -- a -- a prosecutor to 8 produce everyone who has handled something in a chain of custody at a -- at a laboratory, a criminal -- you know, 9

10 normal business? Are there States that do require that?
11 If so, could you tell me a couple, because I --

MR. KING: Your Honor, I'm not aware of any State that requires that everyone in the chain of custody appear in -- in trial. It is indeed normally up to the prosecutor with regard to chain of custody to determine who --who is going to be appearing.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: What about medical reports that are aimed at a particular known victim of a crime 18 19 and thus will end up in trial? For example, a graph, a 20 graph which the nurse keeps, which is a statement by the 21 nurse that the patient's temperature on such and such a 22 day was 98.6 or whatever, and normally that graph would 23 be introduced; but are there any States that wouldn't require -- would say, oh, no, you have to produce the 24 25 nurse? You have to produce the doctor for all medical

49

1	records? Which of course, are known by the keeper that
2	they will be used at the criminal trial.
3	Are there any States that require that?
4	MR. KING: There are none that I'm aware of,
5	Your Honor. I I don't I haven't
6	JUSTICE BREYER: Are there any States that
7	require ordinary business records perhaps of the most
8	ordinary kind, which always are statements that somebody
9	did something on a particular day? When those business
10	records happen to be kept before with the knowledge that
11	they'll probably be introduced at the trial, are there
12	States that require the man or woman who made the
13	business record to come into court?
14	MR. KING: No, Your Honor, and I think
15	that's the point of all of those. State law has their
16	their hearsay law that that analyzed whether those
17	statements are admissible.
18	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I I don't think
19	that's an accurate response, at least if you include the
20	qualification that Justice Breyer put in the question,
21	which is that the records were kept with the knowledge
22	that they would be introduced in in criminal trials.
23	I mean, you can say that all the records of
24	labs let's assume there's a there's a police lab
25	which which only does police testing of blood. Those

50

would be business records of the lab, but they certainly would not be introducible just because they're business records. If the record is made for the use in prosecution, surely it's -- it doesn't come under the business records exception, or else we wouldn't be here today.

MR. KING: Your Honor, I think the 7 8 hypothetical that -- that you say really shows where the 9 line is. If -- if the lab is a police lab and only doing the analysis for the police, then they -- they 10 11 look a lot more like a party to the -- to the lawsuit, 12 and certainly the hearsay exceptions have made it clear 13 that even though observations are -- are generally --14 that are public records are generally allowed, that 15 observations by police officers are not.

16 And -- and so --

JUSTICE SCALIA: It's an independent lab and police always send it to this independent lab, but in fact it's an independent business, it makes a profit; but all the stuff it does it knows is going to be used at trial. That wouldn't be admissible, would it? Even though it's a perfectly normal business record.

23 MR. KING: Your Honor, I think that that 24 depends on -- on how you look at the purpose and whose 25 purpose it is that -- that you're analyzing. Now first

51

### Official - Subject to Final Review

1 off that, would assume that the purpose test applies in 2 this case, and it seems to me since Michigan v. Bryant 3 that the purpose test may not apply to these kinds of 4 cases where -- where there's not a police interrogation. 5 But if -- if that is the case and the purpose test applies, then it -- it also appears to me 6 7 that the -- that the test now requires that -- that you 8 look not just at the purpose of the policeman who -who's asking the question, but that you look at the 9 purpose of the declarant, and in this case the purpose 10 11 of the labs clearly is -- is a purpose just to -- to get 12 the sample, do a good analysis, and -- and report that analysis to, in New Mexico's case, both parties. 13 14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel --15 MR. KING: The analysis that comes from our 16 State lab goes not only to the prosecution but also to the defendant. 17 18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: General --19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: General, we seem to be 20 describing -- this case seemed rather particular, that 21 is, there was no objection by New Mexico to having an 22 analyst show up, Razatos; so -- so he had to travel however long he said. It's just a question of one 23 employee's time rather than the other. 24 25 But -- and then you described how simple

52

this thing was, you just put it in a machine, you would get out a piece of paper. Why didn't New Mexico have this -- there was an additional sample that could have been -- it would have been si simple to just retest it. Having the witness come to the court, why don't you arm him with the additional test, and then there would be no controversy?

8 MR. KING: Your Honor, one of the problems 9 in New Mexico would be since -- since the court believed 10 that -- that that report was -- was admissible, if they 11 did a second sample and --- and tried to submit that it 12 would be cumulative evidence, and probably would be kept 13 out by -- by the rule in New Mexico in that case.

So Mr. Razatos did have an important purpose at this trial. In New Mexico you still I believe have to have a witness who -- who can authenticate the document to bring the document in. It might not have had to have been Mr. Razatos in this case.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, let's say that this Court holds that the Confrontation Clause requires the presence of the actual analyst to testify about the sample. Is there anything in the law that says that that testimony is suddenly excused, and you do not need the analyst if there's another sample available for the defendant to test? That's not the rule, is it?

53

1	MR. KING: It's not the rule, Your Honor,
2	although one of the things that we pointed out is that
3	is that the State always keeps two samples, that the
4	defendant has the right statutorily in New Mexico to
5	to have a sample retested at a lab
6	JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I'm saying that
7	analytically that does not bear on the question whether
8	or not the sample that's introduced by the State
9	requires the the analyst to be present. They're just
10	unrelated.
11	MR. KING: Correct, Your Honor.
12	JUSTICE KENNEDY: That may that may show
13	that the confrontation rule is a silly rule. But it
14	doesn't but it there's assuming confrontation
15	is required, it's not excused
16	MR. KING: Yes.
17	JUSTICE KENNEDY: by the presence of
18	another sample.
19	JUSTICE GINSBURG: I I don't follow that
20	because we have a substitute now. Caylor is out of the
21	picture; we know that it is the defendant's blood
22	because everything else is the same, and there's this
23	vial that has a certain amount of blood and there's a
24	certain amount left over, so it's not cumulative,
25	because Caylor's out of the picture. It is the

54

1 defendant's blood that has been lab tested by another 2 analyst.

MR. KING: I'm sorry, Your Honor, in -- in 3 4 your hypothetical, if -- if the State knew far enough ahead of time that they -- they would not be able to 5 submit the -- the -- that analyst's results, they could б 7 always -- because the blood sample continues to exist, 8 they could always retest that and -- and have another witness who could do that. Depending on how the Court 9 10 rules in this case, it might be that States will be 11 required to do that.

12 But at this point in time under -- under the current jurisprudence, it -- it didn't appear to the 13 14 State that they needed to retest the sample, and I think 15 you have to worry a little bit about -- about how many 16 people you might indeed have to have come into court and 17 testify if -- if the State -- if the burden on the State 18 is that you have to -- you have to sample twice just in 19 case you're going to lose one of your analysts, I -- I 20 think that that does indeed put a great burden on the State to do that. And so --21

JUSTICE SCALIA: General, I -- I don't want to eat up your -- your little remaining time, I think you can answer yes or no. Does New Mexico assert the same rule as applicable to ballistics testing?

55

1	MR. KING: No, Your Honor.
2	JUSTICE SCALIA: Why?
3	MR. KING: I think that you have to do the
4	analysis in each kind of statement that you're looking
5	at, Your Honor, to determine whether or not the
б	statement that's that's being made and that's being
7	proposed for trial is a substitute for live in-court
8	testimony. And so, with regard to ballistics, you know,
9	you would be looking at a little bit different set of
10	facts.
11	But in this case the facts are that that
12	the gas chromatograph gave us a printout that said that
13	the that the level of alcohol in the blood is .21
14	grams per 100 milliliters, Mr. Caylor transferred that
15	to a form, and that's what we are putting in.
16	I I think that that it proves the
17	point that I'm talking about, in a ballistics analysis,
18	you would have to have some analysis and someone to
19	reach a conclusion. And it's that that sets
20	Melendez-Diaz apart from this case, is is that there
21	was that there was some analysis by by by
22	the the declarant in that case. And in the
23	ballistics cases I think, most often, you would find
24	that.
25	Now, if the if in the ballistics case you

#### Official - Subject to Final Review

just took a photograph of the bullet and wanted to bring 1 2 that into the court and say here's what the bullet looks 3 like, the jury then could make a determination whether 4 they think that that bullet appears to be the same as the other. That wouldn't be covered by the 5 Confrontation Clause. 6 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Certainly not. 8 MR. KING: And -- and --9 JUSTICE SCALIA: But you -- you -- you think the result would be a -- the same if we could develop a 10 11 machine that you put the bullet in and -- and -- and --12 that's been fired from this gun, and the murder bullet, and the machine goes, blah, blah, blah, and it spits 13 14 out, you know, 99 percent, 99.9 percent match, that 15 would be okay? 16 MR. KING: May I answer the question, Your 17 Honor? 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sure. 19 MR. KING: In -- in that case, if -- if the machine were able to do all of that, the machine 20 21 essentially is giving you the best evidence, yes, I believe that that would be the case. 22 23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. 24 Mr. Fisher, you have 2 minutes remaining. 25 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JEFFREY L. FISHER

57

1	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
2	MR. FISHER: Thank you. Let me try to make
3	four quick points.
4	First, Justice Alito, I said the first
5	objection was at JA 40, it's actually 44-45 in the Joint
б	Appendix.
7	With regard to the State's argument about
8	whether this document is testimonial, I would simply
9	urge the Court to take a very close look at the lab
10	report itself. It's at JA 62. At the top it says,
11	Mr. Chief Justice, in response to your question,
12	arresting officer identification, and the officer
13	writes, check for blood alcohol concentration. That's
14	the order to the lab.
15	If you look at the bottom in the
16	certification of analyst, he certifies that the
17	following is true and correct, signs his name, and
18	perhaps the most critical thing is at the very bottom,
19	the actual rules of the New Mexico evidence law and
20	criminal procedure law are referenced. So, it's exactly
21	like Melendez-Diaz. This is a document that is
22	expressly prepared for substitute live testimony.
23	JUSTICE SCALIA: Not under oath, though,
24	that's the only difference?
25	MR. FISHER: Not under oath if a

58

certification is actually different than an oath, that just makes this worse, as in Crawford this Court said that it would be implausible that trial by affidavit would be prohibited but trial by unsworn affidavit would be okay.

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do the rules of б 7 criminal -- do the rules of criminal procedure in New 8 Mexico say it should be prima facie evidence? 9 MR. FISHER: They say much the same thing. There are -- there are several rules referenced at the 10 11 bottom that all make this automatically admissible, 12 notwithstanding the hearsay rule to prove the truth of 13 the matter asserted.

14 With respect to Justice Ginsburg's question 15 about retesting, you are exactly right. The State had 16 many choices in the case -- in this case about how to proceed. But if it wanted Mr. Razatos to be its 17 18 witness, all it had to do was have him do a -- retest it 19 and write a new report and have him be the witness. 20 There is no reason it would have to introduce 21 Mr. Caylor's report then and come up against any State 22 law issue. Mr. Razatos could have been the live 23 witness.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it depends on25 when they do it, of course. I mean, you have the right

59

to look at their evidence presumably so -- so far in advance of trial, whatever, and if they had to get a new -- new technician, that would have to put off the trial --

5 MR. FISHER: And I think that -- I'm sorry. I think that goes to my last point, which is, Justice 6 7 Breyer, you're talking about States that do this -- I'll 8 combine my answer to these two things. A continuance would have been perfectly -- perfectly appropriate if 9 10 that scenario had arisen, Mr. Chief Justice, and that's 11 what -- one thing the public -- Public Defender Service brief it talks about 23 -- 26 jurisdictions encompassing 12 13 23 different States that follow the rule that we're 14 advocating today. And it -- we're not asking for more 15 witnesses. It's important that we're -- this isn't a 16 multiple witness problem, we're just asking for a different witness. 17

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
 19 MR. FISHER: In other words, the State just
 20 brought the wrong witness. Thank you.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
22 The case is submitted.

23 (Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the case in the24 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

25

A	<b>agree</b> 18:7,11	35:19,22 37:3	arguing 41:18	automatically
ability 8:19	20:23 39:5	40:17 41:18	44:16	59:11
<b>able</b> 11:5 26:19	agreement 38:6	43:15 44:22	argument 1:12	autopsy 27:3
55:5 57:20	38:7	46:22 47:21,22	2:2,5,8 3:4,7	available 37:7
above-entitled	<b>ahead</b> 16:13 55:5	52:22 53:21,24	9:19 13:9 14:1	53:24
1:11 60:24	<b>aimed</b> 49:18	54:9 55:2 58:16	14:7 30:25	aware 47:6 48:13
absent 5:4	Albuquerque	analysts 5:10 9:5	57:25 58:7	49:12 50:4
accept 14:9	48:21	14:22 28:20	arisen 60:10	<b>a.m</b> 1:13 3:2
accident 25:23	alcohol 15:19	36:12,13 55:19	arises 24:17	60:23
accommodate	17:18 26:11	analyst's 3:15	<b>arm</b> 53:5	
4:23	36:6 56:13	55:6	<b>arm's</b> 41:20	<u> </u>
accommodating	58:13	analytically 54:7	arm's-length	<b>b</b> 12:19,20,24
5:9	Alito 11:3 16:9	analyzed 35:8	47:23	14:6,9 18:14
accurate 50:19	16:13 20:16,25	50:16	arresting 58:12	<b>back</b> 13:12 26:1
action 47:22	21:2,4,13,14	analyzing 51:25	<b>ascribe</b> 26:19	26:17 43:9
actual 11:6 27:25	21:18 22:12	answer 7:2 18:6	aside 14:23	<b>bad</b> 26:19 38:13
32:22 53:21	23:17 24:3 25:3	18:16 21:22	asked 27:9 38:8	ballistics 55:25
58:19	25:10,14,20	28:7 32:11	40:18 47:13	56:8,17,23,25
add 13:16 14:12	26:4,6 27:5,7	37:22 40:21	asking 23:11	barring 19:20
additional 53:3,6	36:12,17 58:4	55:24 57:16	25:5 52:9 60:14	basis 7:23
addressed 41:21	alleged 5:13	60:8	60:16	<b>bear</b> 54:7
adequate 5:2,4	allow24:5 26:20	answers 28:16	assert 11:19	<b>beat</b> 5:17
administrative	allowed 28:6	<b>apart</b> 56:20	55:24	beginning 21:21
37:4	37:1 51:14	Appeal 27:22	asserted 59:13	21:24
admissible 9:18	<b>aluminum</b> 6:6 7:2	<b>appear</b> 5:14,17	assume 10:11,15	<b>behalf</b> 1:16,18
50:17 51:21	Amendment	49:14 55:13	16:14 17:7,10	2:4,7,10 3:8
53:10 59:11	14:11	APPEARANC	20:8 29:17	31:1 58:1
admission 9:18	amicus 5:7	1:14	41:15 50:24	behavior 45:5
<b>admit</b> 26:7	amount 17:17	appearing 49:16	52:1	<b>believe</b> 4:18 5:8
admitted 26:13	33:22 54:23,24	appears 42:3,19	assuming 15:10	10:9 11:9,9
31:14	analyses 36:5	52:6 57:4	28:24 32:7	22:13 23:10
adopt 11:18	analysis 3:21	Appendix 21:21	54:14	25:7 31:16 33:9
advance 60:2	6:15 23:14	22:13 23:5,10	assumptions	40:4 41:22 46:4
advocate 14:13	33:22 35:13,18	40:23 58:6	39:13	48:7 53:15
advocating 60:14	36:10 42:13	applicable 55:25	attempted 5:25	57:22
affiant 32:24	44:7,8,14 48:17	application 42:17	attempting 20:18	believed 53:9
affidavit 24:15	51:10 52:12,13	applied 23:14	21:20 22:5	<b>best</b> 43:19 44:12
31:24 32:3,8,13	52:15 56:4,17	<b>applies</b> 9:24 52:1	attention 26:23	57:21
32:18,19,21	56:18,21	52:6	attestation 32:5	beyond 8:19
43:10 59:3,4	analyst 3:19 4:11	<b>apply</b> 42:4,8 52:3	attesting 15:13	<b>birth</b> 34:12,19,20
afford 14:3	4:20 15:9 18:8	appointed 1:15	attorney 1:17	34:24,24
aggravated 26:9	18:23 21:21,24	appropriate 60:9	14:3 21:25 22:4	<b>bit</b> 38:5 55:15
26:10	22:8 27:25 33:2	approved 12:1	authenticate	56:9
<b>ago</b> 43:17	33:18 35:12,14	<b>area</b> 37:2	53:16	blacklisted 26:25
				<b>blah</b> 57:13,13,13
	1	1	1	1

blood 6:5,15 10:6         Bullcoming's         46:13 4           10:7 12:6,8         7:18 13:14 16:4         48:21 5	
10.7 12.6 8 7.18 13.14 16.4 48.21 5	t7:21 <b>certify</b> 34:15 <b>claim</b> 24:11
10.712.0,0 $7.1013.1410.4$ $40.21.2$	52:2,5,10 46:1 <b>claiming</b> 15:11
	20 53:13 certifying 15:13 Clause 3:12,18
15:19,19 16:4 <b>bullet</b> 57:1,2,4 53:18 5	55:10,19 34:1,1,3 45:11 4:14 5:2 7:6,12
16:17 18:20 57:11,12 56:11,2	20,22,25 <b>cetera</b> 15:10 9:24 15:12
25:22 26:2,11 <b>burden</b> 14:15,15 57:19,2	22 59:16 16:2 18:21 16:19 17:18
35:3 36:5 46:8 48:16 55:17,20 59:16 6	50:22,23 21:23 29:14 19:11,18 20:3
50:25 54:21,23 <b>business</b> 9:16 <b>cases</b> 30	:5,16 30:12 20:11 21:17
55:1,7 56:13 39:23 47:15 34:9 42	2:4 45:21 <b>chain</b> 10:24 11:5 22:10 23:7,21
58:13 49:10 50:7,9,13 46:13 5	52:4 11:18 12:4,4,10 24:4 27:15,18
<b>blue</b> 12:18,18 51:1,2,5,19,22 56:23	12:15 17:11,20 30:9,15 42:8,18
<b>blurts</b> 42:10 <b>busy</b> 5:14 <b>cause</b> 36	
bolster 45:17 Cavlor 6	
	18 23:16 <b>chairs</b> 6:4 <b>clear</b> 3:12 13:17
	27:9 28:8 <b>challenge</b> 10:24 13:18 16:20
	0:2 43:11 11:17,19,20,21 27:14 35:7
	46:21,25 26:15,16 51:12
<b>box</b> 46:10 30:6 54:20 5	
boy 38:13 called 32:20 Caylor's	8 8 <b>.</b>
	24:9 25:1 <b>chance</b> 9:17 <b>clerk</b> 45:25
Breyer 12:12,15 case 3:4,17 4:6 54:25 5	
46:5 47:13 49:6 4:17,18 5:8,24 centrally	,
49:17 50:6,20 7:15 9:5,12 certain 1	
60:7         10:1,12         11:1         15:9,25	
	45:11,12 <b>Chief</b> 3:3,9 6:2 <b>combine</b> 60:8
13:17 23:13 13:18,20 18:13 54:23,2	
26:24 28:19 18:25 19:2,7 certainly	· · · ·
	3:11 23:3 9:3 12:16 30:22 48:6 50:13 51:4
60:12     21:19 22:3,11     31:19 4	
briefing 16:25 22:21 23:3,25 51:1,12	,
bring 8:1 9:6,9 24:22,24 25:7 certificat	
10:3,25 13:12 25:13,16,16,17 34:13,1	
13:14 18:1 25:20 26:14,22 35:1	<b>child</b> 4:16 48:17 52:15
27:19 29:19 26:23,24 27:16 <b>certifica</b>	
38:16 53:17 27:18,23,24,25 32:12 3	8
57:1     28:5,25     29:8     39:22	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
brought 27:10 31:22,25 32:18 45:25 4	
60:20         32:25         33:2         34:7         58:16         5	
Bryant 31:4 35:7 34:13 35:4,5,11 certificat	
41:22 42:4,21 35:15 36:5 38:3 15:9,18	-
	-
42:24 52:2 38:4,4,11,14 46:17,1	18:3 38:5 40:7 16.17 58.13
42:24 52:2       38:4,4,11,14       46:17,1         Bullcoming 1:3       38:15 39:1,13       certified	
42:24 52:238:4,4,11,1446:17,1Bullcoming 1:338:15 39:1,13certified3:5,23 13:1341:1,21,2532:3	<b>cited</b> 26:23 <b>concern</b> 4:25
42:24 52:238:4,4,11,1446:17,1Bullcoming 1:338:15 39:1,13certified3:5,23 13:1341:1,21,2532:3	<b>cited</b> 26:23 <b>concern</b> 4:25

Γ

conclusion 56:19	controversy 53:7	48:23	12:16 17:12,20	14:1,3 21:25
conclusion 50.19	convicted 26:8,9		47:1 48:12 49:9	22:4 26:5 37:14
23:16	convicted 20.8,9 copy 34:12 46:1	courtroom 4:9,15 courtrooms		37:15,20,22
	46:2		49:14,15	<b>definition</b> 32:6
<b>condition</b> 42:17		12:11 13:23	D	
<b>conduit</b> 20:13	<b>copying</b> 33:20	courts 20:13	<b>D</b> 3:1	degree 19:8
confession 5:13	34:5	39:13	<b>danger</b> 8:18	Delaware 30:6
confrontation	coroner 26:25	Court's 45:3	<b>data</b> 16:15,16,17	demand 11:25
3:12,18 4:2,14	correct 11:24	covered 57:5	16:19,21 17:11	Department
5:2 7:6,12 9:24	17:2 26:4 34:6	Craig 4:15	17:13,16 33:3,3	35:16 36:16,24
15:11 16:19	34:22,23 44:6	Crawford 12:14		depend 39:6
17:18 19:11,17	45:16 54:11	14:14,18,19	44:18,20,22	<b>Depending</b> 55:9
20:3,11 21:15	58:17	59:2	45:6	depends 7:13
21:16 22:10	correctly 7:24	create 31:7	date 10:18	51:24 59:24
23:7,21 24:4	13:8	<b>created</b> 40:1,2	day 12:11,11	describe 20:2
27:15,17 30:9	counsel 15:5	creating 35:21	26:13 28:9,9	described 22:22
30:15 31:14	52:14 57:23	<b>credence</b> 45:10	49:2,22 50:9	52:25
42:8,18 46:4	60:18,21	credibility 29:7	day-to-day 7:23	describing 52:20
48:18 53:20	<b>count</b> 26:11	<b>crime</b> 5:14 49:18	<b>deal</b> 18:15,16	<b>desire</b> 35:23
54:13,14 57:6	counties 27:2	criminal 40:2	27:15	determination
confrontations	<b>country</b> 12:11	49:9 50:2,22	<b>debate</b> 24:1,4	38:22 43:6 57:3
42:8	13:23	58:20 59:7,7	decide 35:9	determine 49:16
consent 4:25	<b>County</b> 48:22	<b>crimp</b> 7:2	decided 39:3	56:5
consequences	<b>couple</b> 49:11	crimping 8:13,15	deciding 38:20	develop 57:10
14:9	<b>course</b> 4:16 9:17	8:17	decision 9:12	dictionary 32:4
considerably	9:17 11:24	crimps 6:7	declarant 38:20	difference 33:12
25:13	29:25 50:1	critical 22:19	52:10 56:22	33:15 34:16
considered 24:2	59:25	58:18	default 4:13	41:3 42:16,20
Constitution	<b>court</b> 1:1,12,15	cross-examina	defendant 3:23	43:9 44:17
14:4	3:10,21 4:15,20	24:5 25:18	4:21,22,24 5:1	58:24
contained 32:5	4:22 5:6 10:3	26:21 27:25	10:7,23 11:11	different 4:16
contaminated	12:20,21,23	28:14 30:2,19	11:13,17,19	5:22 7:21 15:6
21:3	13:2,15 14:18	37:16	12:22 13:8,9,10	15:6 16:24
contemporane	14:22 17:25	cross-examine	13:15,19,19	19:22,25 32:2,8
33:1	18:7,12 27:20	3:24 24:6 43:15	20:20 25:21	33:22 35:12,17
content 15:20	27:22 28:2,4	cross-examined	36:8,11 38:8,9	42:14,15 45:21
contents 23:20	30:6 31:3,4	38:1	40:8,19 41:5,10	46:18 48:3,9,24
contested 47:2,4	33:20 34:10	cumulative 53:12	52:17 53:25	56:9 59:1 60:13
47:5,7,15,19	37:8 38:22	54:24	54:4	60:17
contesting 48:11	41:20 43:4 44:9	current 55:13	defendants	differentiates
<b>context</b> 24:17	45:2,25 46:2,13	Curtis 3:19	48:11	31:24
continuance	47:9 50:13 53:5	custodian 34:12	defendant's 4:3	<b>dire</b> 46:18
27:10 60:8	53:9,20 55:9,16	34:14	12:8 54:21 55:1	direct 8:16 43:24
continue 18:15	57:2 58:9 59:2	custody 10:24	<b>Defender</b> 13:17	directly 48:17
continues 55:7	courthouse 4:12	11:6,18 12:5,10	60:11	disagree 9:22
		11.0,10 12.0,10	<b>defense</b> 8:20	
	l	l		

Г

22.24	1 100 12		20.12.56.10.11	20.0.05.20.02
23:24	elicited 28:13	examiner 36:7	38:12 56:10,11	29:2,25 30:23
discharge 22:5	emphasize 24:22	example 24:12	factually 39:1	57:24,25 58:2
discount 9:20	empirically	26:23 49:19	falsified 27:2	58:25 59:9 60:5
discovery 38:10	14:12	examples 34:9	far 22:24 25:16	60:19
dissenting 19:1	employ 5:9	exception 51:5	55:4 60:1	flexibility 5:8
distinction 47:18	employee 33:19	exceptions 44:10	<b>fax</b> 24:12	<b>flip</b> 30:1,13,16
47:19,21	employees 36:13	51:12	<b>Fe</b> 1:17	<b>follow</b> 54:19
distinguishing	36:14	excited 44:10	features 32:17	60:13
32:16,17	employee's	<b>excused</b> 53:23	<b>felon</b> 45:24,24	followed 10:18
District 45:2	52:24	54:15	felony 45:22	14:13 15:9,25
division 35:17	encompassing	<b>exhibit</b> 15:8,12	Fensterer 30:6	20:21 21:10
<b>doctor</b> 49:25	60:12	<b>exist</b> 55:7	<b>find</b> 28:3 56:23	23:2 25:6,15
document 22:17	enforcement	expectation	<b>fine</b> 7:18	45:11
31:22 33:4	27:1	32:12	finish16:12	following 12:23
35:21 46:1,16	entitled 12:22	expedited 38:9	27:21	34:2 58:17
46:18 47:3,11	40:13	expelled 23:18	<b>firearm</b> 45:24	footnote 10:4,22
53:17,17 58:8	equate 39:23	<b>expense</b> 40:10	fired 26:25 37:3	11:4,11
58:21	equivalent 32:7	experienced	37:4 57:12	forensic 3:16,20
documents 34:17	especially 27:15	8:17	firing 37:18	form 19:25 36:9
doing 6:3 23:15	27:18	expert 17:16,21	first 3:4 8:13	40:5,6,7,14,22
41:14 51:10	<b>ESQ</b> 1:15,17 2:3	18:2 19:14,15	20:5,19 21:5	41:5,16,19 42:2
<b>Donald</b> 1:3 18:20	2:6,9	19:20 20:12	22:6,14 23:9,24	47:7,9 56:15
dozens 28:9	essentially 47:22	44:24	28:17 51:25	found 37:15
drank 25:25,25	57:21	<b>explain</b> 13:6	58:4;4	four 4:2 58:3
<b>draw</b> 13:20	establishing 25:5	29:12,13	<b>Fisher</b> 1:15 2:3,9	Fourth 18:24
<b>drawn</b> 13:21	et 15:10 16:1	explained 29:7	3:6,7,9 4:7,13	19:7
drinking 25:25	18:21 21:23	30:11	5:3,15,18,23	<b>fun</b> 33:8
26:13	29:14 30:12	explains 24:10	6:2,10,13,16	future 4:18 15:2
<b>drive</b> 48:22 49:2	evening 12:7	expressly 58:22	6:19,24 7:5,11	47:18
driven35:22	evidence 18:14	extends 36:25	7:25 8:10,14,21	
drunk 25:21 26:8	19:4,17,23 20:1	extent 19:6,7	9:11,22 10:9,14	G
<b>DUI</b> 26:9,10,10	22:17 25:4 34:2	extracted 25:22	10:22 11:10,24	<b>G</b> 3:1
27:16	34:9 40:2 43:5	eyewitness 8:23	12:9,13 13:7	<b>gallon</b> 26:1
<b>Dungo</b> 26:23	43:6,19 44:12	eyewitnesses	14:8,17,20 15:3	garden27:16
27:21	44:13 45:20	9:13	15:14,17,23	GARY 1:17 2:6
<b>duty</b> 35:15 39:15	47:11 48:9		16:3,7,20,24	30:25
<b>D.C</b> 1:8	53:12 57:21	$\frac{\mathbf{F}}{\mathbf{F}}$	17:3,8,14,19	gas 18:1 36:5
	58:19 59:8 60:1	facie 59:8	18:10 19:11,15	56:12
$\frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathbf{E}}$	<b>ex</b> 31:5,11	fact 7:19 10:14	19:20 20:4,10	gather 46:23
<b>E</b> 2:1 3:1,1	exactly 32:13	11:1,8 14:4	20:24 21:3,12	gee 43:22
earlier22:13	58:20 59:15	28:1,10 35:22	21:16 22:12	general 1:17
easy 3:17	<b>exam</b> 8:6,8	36:23 39:14	23:22 24:7 25:9	21:10 23:4
eat 55:23	examination	51:19	25:12 26:3,5	30:24 48:2
either 6:21 13:4	31:5,6,11 43:15	factors 42:23	27:6,13 28:16	52:18,19 55:22
17:20 30:19		facts 13:12,17		generally 21:9
	1		l	

		1	1	1
22:2 51:13,14	happens 13:23	hundreds 39:14	instance 23:9	<b>in-court</b> 3:14
Ginsburg 4:7,24	hard 28:4	hurdle 39:25	34:11 44:19	32:23,24 43:8
5:4 17:24 18:10	haywire 28:22	hypothetical 8:7	45:23 48:19	56:7
28:7,17 39:19	Health 35:16	13:8 14:6 20:9	instruction 12:23	irrelevant 14:7
39:25 43:13	36:16,24	24:23 51:8 55:4	insufficient	14:10
52:19 54:19	<b>hear</b> 3:3	hypotheticals	10:19	issue 18:25
Ginsburg's 59:14	hearing 28:2	24:10 25:2	insulate 26:21	23:25 27:17
<b>give</b> 4:24 24:9	hearsay 8:12,22		intent 27:23	29:8 48:17 49:4
28:16 44:21	9:18 15:6 24:2	<u> </u>	intention 11:20	59:22
given 9:16	31:13 44:10	identification	11:20	issues 19:23
<b>gives</b> 8:7 45:10	50:16 51:12	58:12	intentionally	
<b>giving</b> 23:15	59:12	immunize 27:7	37:24	J
57:21	held 3:15 4:15	implausible 59:3	interesting 11:1	<b>JA</b> 58:5,10
gladly 14:9	help 47:12	important 24:22	interestingly	<b>Jason</b> 12:20
<b>go</b> 7:16 12:21	<b>helps</b> 47:8	25:2 26:6,14,17	36:7	<b>JEFFREY</b> 1:15
16:13 44:3	high 29:20	27:18 29:11,15	intermediate	2:3,9 3:7 57:25
goes 12:20 52:16	highlighted 30:4	30:2 37:20	13:4	<b>job</b> 26:25 29:12
57:13 60:6	history 3:11	39:12,18 44:8	interrogation	<b>Joe</b> 7:3
going 7:1,3 11:8	hits 24:15	53:14 60:15	31:5,10 41:23	<b>Joint</b> 21:21 22:13
11:9 13:18 14:3	hold 30:7	importantly 29:6	41:24 42:1,5,7	23:5,10 40:23
22:1,15,18 24:5	holding 30:14	impression 47:5	42:12,16,23,25	58:5
46:8 49:16	holds 53:20	incident 29:22	43:3 52:4	<b>Jones</b> 12:17
51:20 55:19	<b>Honor</b> 22:1	include 50:19	interrogations	42:11
<b>good</b> 39:9 44:4	31:16,20,21	incompetent	42:9 <sup>、</sup>	<b>Juan</b> 48:22
46:7 52:12	32:10 33:9,17	37:18	introduce 3:13	<b>judge</b> 23:24
grams 56:14	34:6,24 35:4	independent	7:14 8:3,3,6 9:2	judges 5:9
graph 17:22,23	36:1,15,22 37:6	23:14 51:17,18	9:4,7 10:2,20	judgment 45:22
18:4,17 44:25	37:13,21 38:3	51:19	11:12,22 38:16	jurisdiction 29:1
49:19,20,22	38:18 39:11,24	indicates 37:7	45:9 59:20	jurisdictions
graphs 16:15	40:4,20 41:12	40:24	introduced 15:8	60:12
19:3	41:17 42:13,19	indirect 25:4	17:1,4 18:14	jurisprudence
great 18:15,16	43:2 44:6,15	individual 35:2	19:4,16,23 20:6	55:13
55:20	45:2,14 46:16	individuals 11:6	20:11 23:9	<b>jury</b> 4:5,5 9:10
<b>Green</b> 30:6	47:7,20 48:7,15	ineffectiveness	34:10 49:23	9:19,20 12:23
ground 3:22	49:12 50:5,14	30:18	50:11,22 54:8	13:10 21:9
gun 57:12	51:7,23 53:8	infer 21:9 25:6	introducible 51:2	23:15 25:5
8	54:1,11 55:3	inference 25:11	introducing 3:19	29:12,23 30:11
Н	56:1,5 57:17	influence 24:19	8:11 20:14 21:8	44:3 57:3
hand 8:18,18	hospital 10:7	information	introduction	<b>Justice</b> 3:3,9 4:7
24:11,14	13:21	33:20 39:16	23:19	4:24 5:4,11,16
handled 11:7	hours 48:23 49:2	40:23 41:5,9,17	investigators	5:19,21 6:2,12
46:9 49:8	human 24:12,16	<b>insist</b> 11:13	9:13	6:14,17,23,25
happen 13:25	24:19	13:10	involve 12:5	7:7,8,20,25 8:5
14:5 50:10	hundred 43:17	<b>insisted</b> 13:15,22	involved 15:6	8:7,12,15,21
happened4:6		insisting 22:8		9:3,3,8,15 10:5
			1	

10 10 11 15		12 22 19 2 10 0	27.16.20.0.2	7160041010
10:10,11,15	<b>KAGAN</b> 40:16	43:22 48:2 49:9	37:16 39:2,3	7:16 8:24 12:19
11:3,15,16 12:3	keeper 50:1	54:21 56:8	left 8:18 30:21	12:24 16:21,23
12:4,9,12,15	keeps 49:20 54:3	57:14	54:24	18:4,19,23 19:3
12:16 13:24	Kennedy 7:20	knowledge 23:1	length 41:20	19:5 23:17,23
14:8,17,24 15:5	8:1,5,12,15,21	48:11 50:10,21	<b>let's</b> 5:1,1 13:11	24:6,12,13,16
15:15,21,24	9:3,15 10:5,10	<b>known</b> 49:18	16:14 17:6,10	24:19 33:4,21
16:6,8,9,11,13	10:11,15 11:15	50:1	20:8 50:24	39:8,8 44:18,20
16:14,22 17:1,6	12:3,4,9 13:24	knows 18:9	53:19	46:6 53:1 57:11
17:10,15,24	14:8 53:19 54:6	28:11 51:20	<b>level</b> 16:17 45:2	57:13,20,20
18:6,10 19:10	54:12,17 59:6		56:13	<b>mail</b> 21:23
19:13,19,22	kept 33:1 50:10	$\frac{L}{L}$	lever 12:19	majority 19:1
20:5,8,16,25	50:21 53:12	L 1:15 2:3,9 3:7	line 20:1 30:5	making 5:6 31:21
21:2,4,13,14	<b>key</b> 33:17 38:18	57:25	51:9	<b>man</b> 50:12
21:18 22:12	41:23 42:6	<b>lab</b> 3:15,16,19,20	little 30:20 38:5	manage 15:2
23:17 24:3 25:3	kind 9:24 36:20	4:11,20 5:9,21	55:15,23 56:9	manageable
25:10,14,20	47:16 50:8 56:4	7:22 9:4,7	<b>live</b> 11:14,22	14:15,16
26:4,5 27:5,7	kinds 35:18 52:3	12:17 14:22	12:10 32:24	managed 14:25
28:7,17,25 29:3	King 1:17 2:6	15:18 21:9,25	43:7 56:7 58:22	manner 39:17,17
29:17,25 30:11	30:24,25 31:2	22:23 24:17	59:22	March 1:9
30:22 31:2,12	31:16,20 32:10	25:1 26:6 32:9	living 35:14	<b>mark</b> 34:20
31:18 32:1,15	32:16 33:9,17	32:21 33:2	located 48:20	Maryland 4:15
33:6,7,12,24	34:6,23 35:4	34:18 35:6,12	long 12:13 14:14	Massachusetts
34:16,25 35:24	36:1,4,15,22	35:14,15,17	30:10 31:13	32:20 48:25
36:2,12,17 37:3	37:6,10,13,21	36:4,12,13,20	52:23	match 57:14
37:9,11,14,23	38:3,18 39:11	36:24 37:2 40:7	look 19:1,14,15	matter 1:11
38:12 39:5,19	39:24 40:4,20	40:13,25 44:23	22:13 33:18	18:15 30:19
39:25 40:15,16	41:4,12,16	45:9 46:20 49:2	38:19 40:22	35:21 36:23
40:17 41:2,8,13	42:13,19 43:2	50:24 51:1,9,9	41:16,25 43:4,5	59:13 60:24
42:6,15,22	44:6 45:1,14,18	51:17,18 52:16	43:21 44:12,24	mattered 18:16
43:13,21 44:21	46:15 47:3,6,20	54:5 55:1 58:9	46:16 51:11,24	<b>mean</b> 4:8 9:9
45:8,15 46:5	48:7,15 49:12	58:14	52:8,9 58:9,15	16:21 18:7 22:2
47:1,4,13 48:2	50:4,14 51:7,23	laboratory 13:1	60:1	31:13 42:9
48:10 49:6,17	52:15 53:8 54:1	40:11 49:9	looked 18:14	45:19 50:23
50:6,18,20	54:11,16 55:3	labs 7:19 50:24	looking 17:22	59:25
51:17 52:14,18	56:1,3 57:8,16	52:11	33:25 43:18	meaning 32:4
52:19 53:19	57:19	<b>lab's</b> 48:20	45:15,16 47:17	meaningful
54:6,12,17,19	knew 55:4	<b>law</b> 16:1 21:13	56:4,9	30:15
55:22 56:2 57:7	<b>know</b> 4:18 6:4,5	22:25 26:9 27:1	looks 12:17 57:2	means 9:2 32:2
57:9,18,23 58:4	7:22 11:22	34:4 36:7 40:8	lose 46:12 55:19	medical 36:6
58:11,23 59:6	17:11 28:17,22	50:15,16 53:22	lot 24:25 43:23	49:17,25
59:14,24 60:6	37:11,13,14,19	58:19,20 59:22	47:12 51:11	meet 5:2
60:10,18,21	37:22 38:12	lawsuit 51:11	lower 20:13	Melendez-Diaz
	40:18,21 41:3	leave 25:19 29:9		3:15 10:4,23
K	41:14,19 42:10	29:15 30:3 37:4	M	11:4,16,25
<b>K</b> 1:17 2:6 30:25		37:8,9,12,15	machine 6:8,18	
	l	l	l	l

Г

10.12 14.14 01		50.1		29.16 20.15
12:13 14:14,21	necessary 8:8	59:1	out-of-court	38:16 39:15
15:4 27:14	34:11 43:12	<b>object</b> 22:1,3	20:14 31:7	41:14 45:23
29:11 31:24	45:22	objecting 22:5	<b>Owens</b> 30:7,14	personal 23:1
32:9,18,19	<b>need</b> 5:19 9:6	objection 22:16	<u> </u>	persons 16:9
43:10 45:3	13:14 26:10	22:19,23,25	<b>P</b> 3:1	person's 3:13
56:20 58:21	53:23	52:21 58:5		24:20
<b>memory</b> 28:10	needed 55:14	observations	<b>page</b> 2:2 21:20 21:22 22:14	persuade 9:10
mentioned 42:23	needs 8:4 10:3	51:13,15		persuasive 29:23
<b>mere</b> 20:13	10:24	observe 4:5	23:5,13	44:4,23
38:14	negotiating 38:6	29:13 30:12	paper 23:18,19	<b>Petitioner</b> 1:4,16
merely 43:7	neither 17:3	39:16	23:20,20 44:18	2:4,10 3:8
<b>Mexico</b> 1:6,18	31:11	obviously 4:3	53:2	46:23 58:1
3:5,21 17:25	<b>never</b> 5:15,18,25	occurred 45:3	part 19:10,13	photograph
18:7,11 26:9	18:14	office 36:6,18	40:23 47:25	44:19 57:1
34:4 36:7,16	<b>new</b> 1:6,17 3:5	<b>officer</b> 5:12	parte 31:5,11	physical 37:1
40:8 47:8 48:19	3:21 17:25 18:7	10:12 31:10	particular 9:24	<b>picture</b> 54:21,25
48:24 52:21	18:11 26:9 34:4	35:13 40:24	18:9 21:11	<b>piece</b> 23:18,18
53:2,9,13,15	36:7,16 40:8	58:12,12	22:11 28:8,10	23:19,20 44:18
54:4 55:24	42:21 44:24	officers 31:14,15	28:12 29:1,22	53:2
58:19 59:8	47:8 48:18,24	37:1 51:15	36:5 49:18 50:9	placed 37:4
<b>Mexico's</b> 52:13	52:13,21 53:2,9	<b>oh</b> 15:23 41:2	52:20	places 14:22
<b>Michael</b> 23:24	53:13,15 54:4	49:24	parties 52:13	planned 33:10
Michigan 31:4	55:24 58:19	okay 16:13 57:15	<b>party</b> 47:22	<b>plea</b> 38:6,7
35:7 41:21 42:3	59:7,19 60:3,3	59:5	51:11	please 3:10
42:20,23 52:2	non-police 31:13	once 38:21,21	<b>patient's</b> 49:21	26:22 31:3
miles 24:24	normal 45:5	41:20	<b>pay</b> 26:22 37:8,9	<b>plus</b> 18:8
milliliters 56:14	49:10 51:22	<b>opening</b> 26:24	37:12,15,17	point 26:18 31:19
<b>minutes</b> 49:1	normally 38:11	operated 35:16	<b>PDS</b> 12:1	31:20,21 32:22
57:24	47:14,15 49:14	operates 18:5	<b>people</b> 6:3,20	33:3 36:25
months 43:14,16	49:22	28:11	7:22 8:7 13:2	42:14 43:14,20
morning 3:4	<b>note</b> 23:13	operation 36:24	25:24 26:21	45:4 50:15
<b>motive</b> 26:19	<b>notice</b> 11:25	operator 24:2	27:8 46:9,14,17	55:12 56:17
moved 38:9	notwithstanding	opinion 45:3	55:16	60:6
multiple 9:13,13	59:12	opinions 19:1	<b>percent</b> 57:14,14	pointed 54:2
60:16	<b>number</b> 33:25	opportunity 3:23	percentage	pointedly 14:21
murder 57:12	34:5 48:4	38:25	17:17	pointing 22:24
	numbers 6:17	oral 1:11 2:2,5	perfectly 28:5	points 58:3
<u> </u>	nurse 10:12,17	3:7 30:25	51:22 60:9,9	police 5:11 9:13
<b>N</b> 2:1,1 3:1	40:25 49:20,21	order 9:10 35:9	perform 7:23	10:12 27:3 31:5
NACDL 28:19	49:25	46:6 58:14	permissible 4:10	31:9,15 33:14
name 58:17	nurse's 13:20	ordinary 28:20	4:18 28:5	35:13,25 36:18
<b>nature</b> 43:5		50:7,8	person 8:11,13	36:20,25 37:1
necessarily 4:8	0	ought 24:19	8:16,24 9:20	40:24 41:9,13
34:7 35:20	<b>O</b> 2:1 3:1	outside 19:14	13:1 28:4 29:11	41:15,19 42:1,5
40:20	oath 4:5 58:23,25		34:21 37:25	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

42:10 47:24	printouts 19:3,5	22:7	52:1,3,6,8,10	R
50:24,25 51:9	<b>prior</b> 11:21	prosecute 35:3	52:10,11 53:14	<b>R</b> 3:1
51:10,15,18	probably 17:19	prosecution 3:12	purposes 34:18	raised 14:19,20
52:4	23:23 50:11	13:11 27:19	34:19,21 35:8	43:14
policeman 52:8	53:12	29:19,19 34:19	46:3	ran 43:17
position 10:16	probed 29:6	35:2 36:20	pursuant 32:20	rare 13:18
32:13	problem 12:17	37:24 40:3,19	<b>put</b> 7:2 8:24	raw16:15,19,20
possession 45:24	13:3 19:6,12	41:7 43:23	14:18 22:15,17	16:21 17:11
possibility 38:14	48:14 49:3	47:25 51:4	25:19 28:18	33:3 45:6
39:7	60:16	52:16	29:8 46:7,8	Razatos 3:25
potentially 25:4	problems 48:11	prosecution's	50:20 53:1	17:5 22:15,21
30:18	48:19 53:8	22:5	55:20 57:11	23:3,11,15 45:7
<b>power</b> 44:23	procedural 7:6	prosecutor 21:20	60:3	52:22 53:14,18
practical 28:8	7:12	23:11 49:7,15	<b>puts</b> 6:6,6,8	59:17,22
preliminary 28:2	Procedurally	prosecutors 28:3	putting 3:20	reach 5:24 56:19
preparation	45:1	36:18 47:24	13:22 33:25	reached 23:16
32:21	procedure 4:1	prosecutor's	56:15	read 12:24 17:8
prepared 31:9	6:3 10:19 58:20	27:23	<b>p.m</b> 10:17 12:6	17:16 21:19
32:19 33:7	59:7	prove 7:14 11:5		reads 23:6
34:17,20,20	procedures	17:12 20:19	Q	really 23:8 24:24
58:22	15:10 16:1	21:7 43:19	qualification	38:13 47:8,12
preparing 33:18	20:21 21:10,25	59:12	50:20	51:8
<b>presence</b> 4:4,4,8	22:8,23 23:2,4	proved 12:10	qualifications	reason 4:20 6:1
4:14 53:21	25:5,6,15 29:14	17:21 24:25	29:20	15:1 24:25
54:17	45:12	26:12	qualities 38:20	26:15 28:3 29:3
present 6:11,14	proceed 59:17	proven25:4	question 7:1,25	30:10 37:16
10:13 45:6 54:9	process 18:5,9	proves 12:24,25	8:2 9:1 16:12	39:9 47:9,13
presented 43:7	28:11 37:18	56:16	19:2,4,16,25	59:20
presenting 48:9	processor 24:15	provide 22:8	21:13,17 24:7	reasoning 44:9
presumably	<b>produce</b> 49:8,24	34:12 40:2 48:5	24:17 27:11	<b>REBUTTAL</b> 2:8
42:24 60:1	49:25	provided 17:19	32:11 37:22	57:25
presume 14:2	producing 36:19	33:5	41:22 42:6	recall 37:4
pretty 44:4	<b>product</b> 31:10	<b>public</b> 12:1 13:17	47:14 50:20	received 46:21
preventing 22:4	professionalism	31:9,23 32:25	52:9,23 54:7	recognize 39:22
prima 59:8	29:13	33:19 34:12	57:16 58:11	<b>record</b> 9:16
primarily 34:18	proffered 20:9	35:15 39:12,23	59:14	10:16,21 17:4
35:1	profit 51:19	44:11 51:14	questions 38:24	21:19 31:9,23
primary 31:6	prohibited 27:1	60:11,11	38:25 41:24	33:1,1 37:6
principal 39:19	59:4	<b>purely</b> 7:6,12	42:10	39:17,23,23
<b>print</b> 24:15	promotions	<b>purpose</b> 3:11	quick 58:3	40:1 44:11
<b>printout</b> 16:21,22	36:19	24:4 31:6 33:18	quickly 38:9	47:15 50:13
18:1,8,13,17	properly 17:20	35:1,11,12,20	<b>quite</b> 4:3	51:3,22
18:17,19 44:24	proposed 56:7	40:1,5,6 42:3	<b>quo</b> 22:2	recorded 33:4
56:12	propositions	44:13 51:24,25	<b>quote</b> 31:7,8	records 34:12
	1	1	1	1

39:12 50:1,7,10	27:2,3 36:20	16:16 17:5	35:5 45:12	<b>scene</b> 26:2
50:21,23 51:1,3	43:23 49:17	27:23	52:12 53:3,11	schedules 5:10
51:5,14	report's 23:6	reviewing 19:21	53:22,24 54:5,8	scientific 35:16
referenced 58:20	request 41:20	46:22	54:18 55:7,14	scientist 35:23
59:10	42:2	<b>reviews</b> 46:23	55:18	screened 4:12
regard 32:11	requested 35:13	<b>right</b> 4:2,3 6:4	samples 6:5	sealed 46:11
34:23 39:14	require 48:5 49:7	7:3,5,6,9,12	46:20,21 54:3	second 20:7,10
42:20 49:15	49:10,24 50:3,7	8:18 9:9,11	<b>San</b> 48:22	20:21 21:22
56:8 58:7	50:12	11:9,10,13 14:4	<b>Santa</b> 1:17	40:9 53:11
regarding 21:8	required 48:13	16:6,8 17:6,14	satisfied 7:14	see 13:3 19:13
regimes 11:25	54:15 55:11	21:2,18 22:20	30:9	20:17 42:25
12:2	requirements	26:7 27:4,12	satisfy 27:14	47:18
regular 10:18	34:4	28:24 41:3,11	Saturday 12:7	sees 12:20
39:3,17,17	requires 11:19	54:4 59:15,25	saw7:17 8:9,25	seminal 49:4
<b>related</b> 17:13	30:16 33:13	<b>rights</b> 14:2	saving 7:15,22	send 33:14 51:18
relating 47:10	49:13 52:7	<b>risk</b> 14:25	8:23 13:13 14:1	sense 18:13
48:18	53:20 54:9	<b>ROBERTS</b> 3:3	14:15 15:25	45:18
relevance 43:1,2	requiring 5:12,14	6:2,12,14,17	22:25 25:15	sent 35:6 38:1
relevant 42:24	resembles 31:5	6:23,25 7:8	39:9 54:6	40:25 42:2
reliability 45:10	reserve 30:20	30:22 40:15,17	says 10:23 11:4	separate 16:16
remaining 55:23	resisted 3:21	41:2 57:18,23	11:5,11 12:18	separation 36:23
57:24	resolve 24:21	59:24 60:18,21	16:16 18:20	37:1
remember 26:8	resolves 10:1	<b>routine</b> 46:10	21:25 22:14,17	serious 29:8
28:12,18,20,21	resources 27:17	<b>rule</b> 4:13 5:18	23:12,13 28:19	48:11
29:18,22 30:2,8	<b>respect</b> 22:6 34:4	6:24 9:23,25	29:11 34:14	service 13:17
30:18 43:16,18	59:14	11:2 14:13	44:25 46:6,20	36:13,13 60:11
43:22 44:2,5	<b>Respondent</b> 1:18	26:20 53:13,25	53:22 58:10	set 14:23 37:24
remembered	2:7 31:1	54:1,13,13	Scalia 5:11,16,19	43:4 56:9
29:4	response 42:12	55:25 59:12	5:21 9:8 11:16	sets 56:19
repeating 23:15	50:19 58:11	60:13	14:17,24 28:25	setting 4:16
replace 32:24	responsibility	rules 11:18 55:10	29:3,17 30:1,11	<b>set-up</b> 4:10
<b>report</b> 3:16,20	22:6	58:19 59:6,7,10	31:12,18 33:7	<b>seven</b> 46:17
15:7,18 17:9	result 7:16 8:6	run 18:9,21 28:9	33:12 37:3,9,11	<b>shield</b> 27:24
20:6 23:8 25:1	8:25 20:22	39:2	37:14,23 38:12	<b>show</b> 17:4 45:23
26:6,11,16 27:3	23:12,12 43:16	<b>runs</b> 6:8	39:5 41:8,13	46:6,8 52:22
31:22 32:9,18	45:10 57:10	run-of-the-mill	42:6,15,22	54:12
32:25 33:19,21	results 6:15	28:20	43:21 47:1,4	showed 12:2
33:25 34:5,8,18	13:11 21:6 23:6		48:2,10 50:18	showing 4:19 5:5
40:12 43:10,11	55:6	S	51:17 55:22	5:25 10:16
43:13,18,19,22	retest 53:4 55:8	<b>S</b> 2:1 3:1	56:2 57:7,9	<b>shown</b> 37:17
45:9 52:12	55:14 59:18	sample 7:18	58:23	shows 11:1 16:17
53:10 58:10	retested 54:5	10:17 11:7	scenario 6:19	17:23 38:15
59:19,21	retesting 59:15	13:14 16:4,4	19:3 20:5 60:10	51:8
reports 19:24	reviewed 16:15	18:20 20:19,20	scenarios 20:4	<b>si</b> 53:4
		20:25 21:4,23		
	1		I	l

<b>side</b> 30:1,13,16	specific 40:1	33:10 35:9,21	subpoena 27:10	34:3 45:13
<b>sides</b> 38:6	specifically	38:21 42:11	subpoenaed 27:8	<b>team</b> 47:25
significant 32:17	32:23 40:21	49:20 56:4,6	substitute 3:24	technician 4:10
significantly	44:2	statements 3:13	31:7 38:2 43:7	5:22 12:17 48:5
33:21 35:12	speculation 39:4	3:16,19 6:11	54:20 56:7	48:6 60:3
signs 58:17	spillage 8:19	7:13 8:2,4 9:2,4	58:22	television 5:17
silly 54:13	<b>spit</b> 18:23	9:25,25 10:2	successful 38:8	<b>tell</b> 13:25 32:2,15
<b>simple</b> 52:25	<b>spits</b> 6:18 57:13	15:7 18:22	such-and-such	34:25 49:11
53:4	stamp 24:11	20:18 32:5	10:18	temperature
simply 8:22	stand 3:20 13:23	46:18 47:12	suddenly 53:23	49:21
14:14 21:7 23:5	17:22 22:15,19	50:8,17	suggested 17:25	test 18:21 28:10
26:8 33:25	22:21 23:4	<b>States</b> 1:1,12	19:8	32:22 35:19
48:12 58:8	25:17,23 28:1	12:2 14:13,25	suggests 5:8	36:2,6,8,9 40:9
single 33:3	28:19 29:12	26:20 30:7 48:4	summarized	40:25 41:14
sits 7:3	30:8,10,17	48:8 49:6,7,10	15:25	42:3 43:17
sitting 6:4 27:4	43:12	49:23 50:3,6,12	supervisor 7:21	45:17 52:1,3,6
situation 28:8	standard 20:21	55:10 60:7,13	28:1,15	52:7 53:6,25
situations 39:8	21:25 22:7 25:5	State's 26:20	<b>support</b> 44:13	<b>tested</b> 20:19 26:2
<b>six</b> 43:14,16	25:6 33:4 42:2	40:10 58:7	suppose 5:1	35:3,6 55:1
46:16	Stanford 1:16	status 22:2	supposed 14:5	testified 17:16
<b>Sixth</b> 14:10	State 3:18 4:19	statute 32:20	<b>Supreme</b> 1:1,12	25:23
skullduggery	5:25 6:10,20,21	33:13	3:21 17:25 18:7	<b>testify</b> 4:4,11 6:9
39:7,8	7:13,14 8:1,2,3	statutes 48:8	18:12	6:21 7:9,15
<b>smells</b> 38:13	8:5,10 9:2,3,8	statutorily 54:4	sure 9:22 57:18	19:25 21:22,24
Smith 12:18,19	9:12,17 10:1,19	step 13:4 27:12	surely 51:4	22:25 23:4
somebody 7:15	10:24 11:5,11	steps 34:2	surrogate 3:24	25:21 27:11
13:15 25:17	11:18,22 13:22	<b>stipulate</b> 4:22 5:1	4:1 28:6	29:20 37:25
28:18 50:8	20:18 21:7,13	13:20		38:2 48:6 53:21
somewhat 42:14	22:14,25 23:12	stipulated 4:21	T	55:17
sorry 7:8 27:24	24:23,25 25:9	17:21	<b>T</b> 2:1,1	testifying 22:10
32:1 33:24 55:3	25:12 26:12,18	story 27:21	take 9:15 10:5	27:1,8
60:5	27:5,7 28:5	straightforward	11:7 17:21 22:2	testimonial 3:13
sort 4:19 48:24	33:15 35:16	3:22	23:3 27:11	3:16 9:25 10:2
Sotomayor 15:5	36:11 40:13	structured 31:10	46:13 49:2 58:9	10:6,8 12:5,7
15:15,21,24	45:5 48:2,16	stuff 6:7 46:7	<b>taken</b> 10:6 20:20	18:18,22 19:5
16:6,8,11,14	49:13 50:15	51:20	22:21 33:3,13	19:14 20:7,14
16:22 17:1,6,10	52:16 54:3,8	subject 25:18	takes 6:5,7 9:8	24:14 34:8
17:15 18:6	55:4,14,17,17	<b>submit</b> 45:22	9:17 30:8,17	35:10 38:21,23
19:10,13,19,22	55:21 59:15,21	53:11 55:6	46:20 48:3	39:6,10,20 44:8
20:5,8 32:1,15	60:19	submitted 41:6,7	talking 24:16	46:3 58:8
33:6,24 34:16	statement 10:6,8	41:9,10,13,15	31:23 45:19	testimony 3:14
34:25 35:24	12:5,7 18:19	41:19 47:9	56:17 60:7	8:16 9:18 11:6
36:2 44:21 45:8	20:14 24:9,12	60:22,24	talks 60:12	11:12,23 20:2
45:15 52:14,18	24:13,20 32:23	submitting 46:2	tampered7:17	21:8 22:7,9
			16:5 21:1,5	
	I	I	I	I

28:6 29:18 31:8	43:4,13 45:4	45:16,23 48:21	<b>United</b> 1:1,12	16:20 26:19
32:24 38:17	47:7,14,20	49:14,19 50:2	30:7	38:16 40:11
43:8 44:3 45:16	48:14 49:4	50:11 51:21	<b>unpaid</b> 25:19	45:20,20 46:5
45:17,18,19	50:14,18 51:7	53:15 56:7 59:3	29:8 39:2	55:22
48:5 49:1 53:23	51:23 55:14,20	59:4 60:2,4	unrelated 54:10	wanted 8:3,5 9:4
56:8 58:22	55:23 56:3,16	trials 50:22	<b>unsworn</b> 39:21	10:20 13:9,10
testing 35:24	56:23 57:4,9	tried 53:11	59:4	13:11,12,20
50:25 55:25	60:5,6	trier 11:8	unusual 29:1	26:15,16 57:1
tests 28:21 29:1	thinking 48:1	triggered 18:23	38:5	59:17
36:4	third 20:22	<b>true</b> 9:21 31:19	urge 58:9	wants 6:10 7:13
<b>text</b> 3:11	thoroughly 14:16	37:19 46:2	<b>use</b> 8:17 12:2	8:2 9:2 10:2,23
<b>Thank</b> 30:22	thought 14:17,18	58:17	33:8,15 35:1	11:12,17 13:19
57:23 58:2	three 20:17,17	truth 32:5 59:12	36:9 40:2 51:3	19:21 26:18
60:18,20,21	20:23 21:5 22:6	truth-finding	<b>uses</b> 40:7	Washington 1:8
<b>they'd</b> 13:14	46:19	44:13	<b>utilize</b> 40:14	18:25
25:17	thrust 39:20	try 58:2	utterances 44:11	wasn't 7:17
thing 6:20 7:16	<b>tie</b> 13:11,12	trying 12:16 20:1		14:19 17:1
8:15 13:16	<b>time</b> 22:14 24:11	39:23	V	28:25 34:2 35:3
14:11 20:25	25:22,22 27:16	<b>turns</b> 12:19	<b>v</b> 1:5 3:5 4:15	42:25 44:22
29:16 30:3 44:1	29:22 30:20	<b>TV</b> 4:17	30:6,6,7 31:4	45:13 47:1,2
48:12 53:1	32:22 39:3 45:4	<b>twice</b> 55:18	35:7 41:21 42:3	watch 7:23
58:18 59:9	52:24 55:5,12	<b>two</b> 6:3 8:7 13:1	42:20,23 52:2	watched 7:15,16
60:11	55:23	19:22 20:4 23:7	<b>variety</b> 27:16	8:23,24
things 20:17,23	today 9:25 14:13	24:10 28:16	35:8,17	way 18:5 20:17
21:7,8 25:4	18:11 28:6	29:5 34:17 54:3	<b>vial</b> 6:6 12:18,25	21:8 29:21,21
29:5 30:15 34:1	41:18 51:6	60:8	54:23	30:4 36:17
45:12 47:8 54:2	60:14	<b>two-point</b> 16:18	<b>vials</b> 6:6,8	37:24
60:8	told 13:5 28:2,2	types 15:6,7	<b>victim</b> 49:18	ways 16:24 48:9
think 5:3,19,23	top 18:20 58:10	24:14	video-confere	weaker 25:13,17
5:23 6:16,19	totality 16:7	typical 22:22	4:9	Wednesday 1:9
8:22 10:22,25	transaction		<b>view</b> 48:3	went 25:24 26:1
11:4,10,10	47:23	U	violate 16:18	28:21,22
12:16 13:4,8,25	transferred	<b>Uh-huh</b> 37:10	17:18	weren't 36:19
14:10,11,20,22	56:14	unable 5:6	violated 3:18	we're 14:4 22:14
15:1,3 17:21	transferring	unacceptable	violates 4:1,3	31:22 41:17,18
18:18 19:2,15	44:17	14:1	<b>violation</b> 20:3,12	45:19 60:13,14
20:24 21:12	travel 52:22	unavailability	22:9 23:21	60:15,16
22:12,23 23:23	treated 24:9,20	5:5	violations 15:12	win 28:5
24:1,11 25:2	trial 5:9 11:21	unavailable 6:1	23:8	withdrew10:17
26:18 27:18	15:16 17:11	understand 7:20	<b>vodka</b> 25:25 26:1	witness 3:24 4:1
30:4 31:18	31:7 33:8,11,14	13:7 31:12		4:4,16 5:5,6
33:17 35:6	33:15 34:13,22	32:10 48:15	<u>W</u>	10:3 15:15
37:21 38:10,18	38:8,9 43:12	understanding	want 6:12,14 9:6	16:16 30:7,10
39:11 41:4 43:3	44:14,22 45:2	29:2,14 32:3	12:3 13:16,24	30:17 33:23
		46:12	14:9 15:22	
	1	1	l	Ι

42:9 48:22 53:5	years 39:14	6	
53:16 55:9		<b>6</b> 49:2	
59:18,19,23	Z	<b>62</b> 58:10	
60:16,17,20	<b>Z</b> 46:6	<b>02</b> 50.10	
witnessed 5:13		7	
witnesses 5:12	$\frac{0}{00,1007(1,4,2,4)}$	<b>705</b> 40:5	
10:25 12:10	<b>09-10876</b> 1:4 3:4		
27:19 60:15	1	9	
witness's 10:2	<b>1</b> 10:4,22 11:4,11	<b>98.6</b> 49:22	
<b>woman</b> 46:20	15:8	<b>99</b> 57:14	
50:12	<b>10</b> 49:1	<b>99.9</b> 57:14	
<b>wonder</b> 12:22	<b>10:05</b> 12:6		
woods 25:24	<b>10:08</b> 10:17		
word 24:15	<b>10:15</b> 1:13 3:2		
words 20:12 21:6	<b>100</b> 56:14		
60:19	<b>11:16</b> 60:23		
work 7:24 36:16	<b>15</b> 23:13		
worked 9:5	<b>16</b> 26:11,12		
works 18:9 47:23			
<b>worry</b> 13:25 14:5 14:18,19 55:15	$\frac{2}{2105724}$		
worse 59:2	<b>2</b> 1:9 57:24		
worse 39.2 worth 49:1	<b>2011</b> 1:9 <b>21</b> 13:13 15:19		
worthless 29:18	16:18 20:22		
wouldn't 21:14	23:12,18,23		
21:16 25:14	24:8,18,23 25:1		
35:20 37:19	33:2 44:18		
38:23,24 41:19	56:13		
47:19 48:3	<b>23</b> 60:12,13		
49:23 51:5,21	<b>26</b> 60:12		
57:5			
wrestled 18:24	3		
write 59:19	<b>3</b> 2:4 48:23		
writes 58:13	<b>30</b> 2:7		
writing 27:3	4		
wrong 13:5 22:20			
22:22 28:22	<b>40</b> 22:14 58:5 <b>44-45</b> 58:5		
60:20	44-43 38:3		
wrote 22:18	5		
X	<b>50</b> 21:20,22		
<b>x</b> 1:2,7 46:6	<b>54</b> 23:5,10		
·	<b>55</b> 23:5,10		
<u>Y</u>	<b>57</b> 2:10		
<b>Y</b> 46:6	<b>58</b> 23:13		