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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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HENRY MONTGOMERY, :
Petitioner : No. 14-280

v. :

LOUISIANA. :

- - - - - x

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, October 13, 2015

The above-entitled matter came on for oral
argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
at 10:05 a.m.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:05 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument
4 first this morning in Case 14-280, Montgomery v.
5 Louisiana.

6 Mr. Bernstein.

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD D. BERNSTEIN

8 ON BEHALF OF THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE

9 MR. BERNSTEIN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
10 it please the Court:

11 The issue is whether to decide the question
12 of Miller's retroactivity in this case or in a Federal
13 habeas case such as Johnson v. Manis, No. 15-1 on this
14 Court's docket.

15 In today's case there is no jurisdiction
16 over that question because the point of Section 1257 is
17 to enforce the Supremacy Clause. And the Supremacy
18 Clause states that when, quote, "the laws of the
19 United States," unquote, apply, quote, "the judges" --
20 and this is -- these are the key words -- "in every
21 State shall be bound thereby."

22 There is no such thing as supreme Federal
23 law that depends on whether a particular State
24 voluntarily makes Federal precedence binding. When a
25 State does that, when a State voluntarily adopts

1 nonbinding Federal precedence, that creates no right
2 under Federal law, which is what 1257 requires, and
3 Michigan v. Long does not apply.

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So how would you describe
5 the adequate and independent State ground on which
6 the -- this decision rested?

7 MR. BERNSTEIN: I would say that the lack of
8 a binding Federal law question is an antecedent
9 requirement, to borrow the terminology of the S.G.'s
10 brief, before you get to the adequate and independent
11 State ground analysis.

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why don't we have
13 jurisdiction to answer that question?

14 MR. BERNSTEIN: You certainly have
15 jurisdiction to answer the question whether Teague is
16 constitutionally required in State collateral review
17 courts.

18 The second part of our brief said why it is
19 not constitutionally required in State collateral review
20 courts, and that's basically this Court's precedence
21 from Danforth back to the beginning in Desist, and in
22 Kaufman have said that the Teague -- what have become
23 the Teague exceptions are matters of equitable
24 discretion and not matters of the Constitution, and the
25 Federal habeas statute on its face only applies in

1 Federal court.

2 So the Federal habeas court can grant relief
3 if relief is warranted under the Teague exception.

4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: If a State says, we
5 acknowledge that we are holding a prisoner in
6 contravention of Federal law but we choose to do nothing
7 about it, then the answer is Federal habeas corpus;
8 there is not a second answer that the State can be
9 required under the Supremacy Clause, under its own
10 procedures, to enforce the Federal law?

11 And if -- if I'm -- and if I were to take --
12 to argue that second position, I'm not quite sure what
13 case I would have to support me. It wouldn't --

14 MR. BERNSTEIN: Well, I think that Your
15 Honor's opinion for the Court in Martinez v. Ryan --

16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Yeah.

17 MR. BERNSTEIN: -- in 132 Supreme Court at
18 1319 to 1320, suggested that there are advantages to
19 citing the Federal habeas right in the Federal habeas
20 statute rather than what the Court called a freestanding
21 constitutional claim. A major advantage here is if you
22 say that the State courts are bound by the Teague
23 exceptions by the Constitution, then when it goes to
24 Federal habeas, there will be very deferential AEDPA
25 review.

1 If you say that the redress question, as the
2 rationale of Danforth indicated, in State court is a
3 matter of State law, then when the issue goes to Federal
4 habeas, AEDPA will not apply because the State court
5 will not have decided the Federal issue. And that is --
6 is a major difference. You would actually be weakening
7 the Federal habeas statute to recognize jurisdiction in
8 this case.

9 And this Court will benefit from having de
10 novo percolation in the lower Federal courts, the lower
11 habeas courts, all of which will be out the window if
12 there's jurisdiction in this case, because the lower
13 Federal habeas courts will only be able, and the courts
14 reviewing them on appeal, to apply the highly
15 differential AEDPA review.

16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: In effect, are we saying
17 that the Supremacy Clause binds the States only in
18 direct criminal proceedings?

19 MR. BERNSTEIN: No.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, is that another
21 way of phrasing your argument?

22 MR. BERNSTEIN: It would be that the
23 Supremacy Clause only binds the states in direct
24 proceedings and in collateral proceedings where it's an
25 old rule, because that's the equivalent of a direct

1 proceeding. But if you are talking about the
2 retroactivity of a new rule, then the -- that's where
3 the Teague -- the two Teague exceptions apply. They
4 apply to new rules. They apply to collateral review.
5 And those are based in statutory equitable discretion
6 rather than the Constitution. But the Court has already
7 held that both direct review and the application of old
8 rules present Federal questions.

9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How do you differentiate
10 this case from Standard Oil?

11 MR. BERNSTEIN: Because in Standard Oil, the
12 issue was the underlying status of the Federal
13 government arm, and the Court said that question is
14 controlled by Federal law. Standard Oil is like Miller
15 itself, where the issue was: What does the Eighth
16 Amendment require. That's a Federal constitutional
17 issue that was applied.

18 In Standard Oil, as a combination of statute
19 regulations and Federal common law, Federal law
20 controlled the question. Here the statute doesn't apply
21 in State court, as Danforth and numerous other cases
22 have held, like the Federal Rules of evidence don't
23 apply in State court, even though many courts follow
24 similar provisions and certainly follow Federal
25 precedence in interpreting those similar rules.

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But we did say that that
2 State could define the exemption any which way it
3 wanted.

4 MR. BERNSTEIN: Correct.

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And so it could -- it's
6 almost identical here; we would announce what the
7 Federal law is, send it back. The State has already
8 said it's going to follow Teague, but I guess it might
9 or might not be free to change its mind about doing
10 that.

11 MR. BERNSTEIN: I think the difference and
12 what makes this case special is that this Court has held
13 since *Murdock v. City of Memphis*, almost a hundred fifty
14 years ago, 87 U.S. at 326 to 327, that the 1267
15 jurisdiction is question by question. It is not like
16 1331, case by case. It is question by question.

17 And I do not believe the Court has
18 jurisdiction to skip over the question of whether
19 Federal law applies and then answer the hypothetical if
20 Federal law applied, what would it be. I think the
21 question of whether Federal law applies is a
22 jurisdiction.

23 JUSTICE BREYER: How -- how -- suppose --
24 let's think of the first Teague exception. Suppose --
25 substantive matters. Suppose that many states had

1 sedition laws, make certain conduct unlawful so there
2 are a thousand people in prison. This Court in a new
3 rule holds you cannot criminalize that behavior. All
4 right. What is the law that would make that retroactive
5 to people in prison? It sounds to me that it isn't like
6 some kind of statutory discretion. Rather, there are
7 human beings who are in prison, who are there without
8 having violated any valid law, because it was always
9 protected by the First Amendment.

10 And if that's right, then it's the
11 Constitution, the due process clause, that says they are
12 being held -- even though they committed the crime 22
13 years ago, they are now being held in confinement
14 without due process of law because you cannot
15 criminalize their behavior.

16 MR. BERNSTEIN: Well --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: Do you see where I'm going?

18 MR. BERNSTEIN: Yes.

19 JUSTICE BREYER: That being so, it's a
20 Federal Constitution rule, the exceptions of Teague,
21 Teague drops out of the case. The only question is
22 whether to satisfy the two exceptions.

23 MR. BERNSTEIN: Well, in your hypothetical,
24 respectfully, I don't think that would be a new rule.
25 It would be an old rule --

1 JUSTICE BREYER: I've made it a new rule.
2 For purposes of my hypothetical, I'm making it a new
3 rule.

4 MR. BERNSTEIN: If it were a genuinely new
5 rule --

6 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah.

7 MR. BERNSTEIN: -- then under Danforth and
8 going all the way back. The -- justice Harlan's opinion
9 in Mackey said, we're not creating the substantive
10 exception because the Constitution requires that --

11 JUSTICE BREYER: Danforth was the case
12 saying that the states could be more generous. It
13 wasn't a case -- this is a case that's the opposite of
14 being generous: Can they be more stingy. And I cannot
15 find anything in -- in Harlan -- maybe I'll read it
16 again, but I can't find anything there, nor can I find
17 anything in Danforth that answers the question.

18 So I thought, it is a new question, hence,
19 that question I posed to you because I wanted to get
20 your response. I don't think you can answer it by means
21 of precedent. I think you have to try to figure it out
22 without the help of precedent.

23 MR. BERNSTEIN: Well, if it is a new rule,
24 the Court has held -- and sorry to cite a precedent --
25 Linkletter has held that retroactivity on collateral

1 review is not constitutional. That aspect --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: That's true. But then we
3 have Teague, and Teague is saying we don't like
4 Linkletter -- and -- and --

5 MR. BERNSTEIN: But Teague said, we don't
6 like Linkletter.

7 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. But you're
8 saying that we have -- then maybe that's wrong.

9 MR. BERNSTEIN: Because --

10 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, why doesn't it
11 violate the Constitution to hold a person in prison for
12 20 years, for conduct which the Constitution forbids
13 making criminal.

14 MR. BERNSTEIN: Well, it does violate the
15 constitution.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: It wasn't criminal at the
17 time -- I mean, it wasn't prohibited by the Constitution
18 at the time he was convicted, right?

19 MR. BERNSTEIN: Fair enough.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: That would be the reason.

21 MR. BERNSTEIN: Fair enough.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: That would be the reason.

23 MR. BERNSTEIN: Fair enough. But the -- the
24 Constitution, according to the cases, is satisfied by
25 the Federal habeas remedy. I think this is where

1 Schweiker --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: Is there anything else you
3 can say? Because I can say, witch is being a witch.
4 There were some people in Salem who were imprisoned for
5 being a witch. And low and behold in 1820, it was held
6 by this Court that that violated the Constitution.

7 Now, you see, I just make a more outrageous
8 example of the same thing. And -- and what I want you
9 to say, okay, I got your point. It didn't violate the
10 constitution at the time. I've also got the point you
11 have some authority.

12 Anything else?

13 MR. BERNSTEIN: This Court has been
14 reluctant, even when there is a violation of the due
15 process clause, to create a judicial remedy, an implied
16 judicial remedy on top of the Federal statutory remedy.
17 That's Schweiker v. Chilicky, cited in our briefs. And
18 I think you should be especially reluctant --

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: That's not what is happening
20 here, Mr. Bernstein. I mean, if you assume the premise
21 of Justice Breyer's question, which is that there is a
22 Constitutional violation for keeping somebody in prison
23 for some conduct that can't be criminalized. The State
24 has set up a collateral review mechanism. We're not
25 asking it to set up a new mechanism that it hasn't had

1 before. It has a collateral review mechanism, and the
2 only question is whether it's going to comply with
3 Federal constitutional law in that collateral review
4 mechanism.

5 MR. BERNSTEIN: And the other question is
6 whether that issue of retroactivity is itself a Federal
7 constitutional issue. If it is, obviously there's
8 jurisdiction. If it is not, I would submit there is not
9 jurisdiction, and that the proper remedy is Federal
10 habeas.

11 If I may reserve the remainder of my time.
12 Thank you.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
14 Mr. Plaisance.

15 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MARK D. PLAISANCE

16 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

17 MR. PLAISANCE: Mr. Chief Justice, and may
18 it please the Court:

19 Miller v. Alabama established a new
20 substantive rule prohibiting mandatory life without
21 parole for juveniles, which should be applied
22 retroactively.

23 This Court has jurisdiction to hear Henry
24 Montgomery's claim because the Louisiana Supreme Court
25 relied exclusively on Federal jurisprudence.

1 In Miller, this Court held that mandatory
2 life in prison was unconstitutional. It also held that
3 life in prison would be an uncommon, rare sentence, even
4 today.

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Isn't it just like a
6 State saying, we have a Fourth Amendment, and the
7 Federal Constitution has a Fourth Amendment. We are
8 going to apply our own Constitution, but in applying it,
9 we will follow the Federal precedent?

10 I think we would say, in that case, the case
11 has been decided on the State constitutional ground,
12 even though the State court, in interpreting that
13 ground, is looking to Federal decisions.

14 MR. PLAISANCE: In this case, Your Honor,
15 the Louisiana Supreme Court did not State that it was
16 exercising any independent grounds at all. Under
17 Michigan v. Long.

18 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought that the -- the
19 case it cited said that. I thought it cited an earlier
20 Louisiana Supreme Court case which made it very clear
21 that it was following the Federal rule as a matter of
22 discretion and not because -- not because it had to, and
23 it could in a later opinion decide not to follow Federal
24 law.

25 MR. PLAISANCE: It is my interpretation of

1 that earlier case that the Louisiana Supreme Court said,
2 we have a choice, and they made the choice to apply
3 Teague. In fact, they said in that opinion, we are
4 dictated by the Teague analysis. And that's what was
5 done in this case.

6 Under Michigan v. --

7 JUSTICE ALITO: Did they not say in Taylor
8 that they were not bound to follow Teague? Didn't they
9 say we're going to follow Teague but we want to make it
10 clear we're not bound to do that?

11 MR. PLAISANCE: They did say that.

12 JUSTICE ALITO: They've never -- they've
13 never retracted that have they.

14 MR. PLAISANCE: Correct, but the choice
15 itself is not necessarily a matter of State law. While
16 the Supreme Court had the authority to make that
17 decision, it said, we believe, by choosing Teague, we
18 believe that is the better law and, therefore, we will
19 follow the Federal guidelines from Teague, the Federal
20 jurisprudence in doing so.

21 And I believe that under Michigan v. Long,
22 unless they state a clear and independent ground, this
23 court can conclusively presume that they applied Federal
24 law as they believed this court would apply.

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought -- I thought it's

1 unless they clearly state otherwise, we will assume that
2 they're applying Federal law. And here they did clearly
3 state otherwise. They said, we don't have to follow
4 Federal law, but we're going to model our State law on
5 Federal law. It seems to me that satisfies the -- the
6 exception requirement of -- of Michigan.

7 MR. PLAISANCE: It is my opinion that
8 Michigan v. Long indicates the reverse, Your Honor, that
9 the State must say, we are following State law in making
10 this decision. We're applying State law rather than
11 Federal law.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, they did say that
13 here. They said that this is a matter of State law; we
14 don't have to follow Teague, but we choose to as a
15 matter of State law. I thought that's what they said.

16 MR. PLAISANCE: And I believe that that's
17 sufficient to indicate to this Court that it is applying
18 Federal law, it is not applying State law.

19 JUSTICE KAGAN: But Mr. Plaisance, I think
20 what people are saying to you is that this is different
21 from your standard Michigan v. Long question. It's a
22 different question. It's a State that says we're not
23 bound to follow Teague. We know we can do something
24 different, but we want to follow Teague. That's what we
25 want to do.

1 And then in all its particulars. All right?

2 And then the question is: If the State commits to
3 following Teague, it's not -- it doesn't think anybody
4 else has committed it. It self commits to following
5 Teague and to following Federal law. Then what happens?
6 Is there enough of a Federal question to decide this
7 case?

8 Now, that's not a Michigan v. Long question.
9 It's more like a Merrell Dow question or something like
10 that where Federal law is -- the State has chosen it,
11 but it's just part and parcel of the claim, because the
12 State is so committed to following Federal law in all
13 its particulars.

14 MR. PLAISANCE: I agree with Your Honor.
15 And even in Danforth this Court said that the question
16 of retro activity is a pure question of Federal law.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But I'm sorry, why
18 don't you finish.

19 MR. PLAISANCE: That's the answer to your --
20 to your explanation or hypothetical, that you said if
21 the State decided that they were choosing Federal law,
22 then what? What's the next step? And the next step is
23 the question is retroactivity, which both the majority
24 and the descent in Danforth said the question of
25 retroactivity is a pure question of Federal law.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Federal statutory
2 law, right. I thought that was the point of Danforth,
3 that the reason the States can go beyond what the
4 Federal interpretation is is because we're talking about
5 the Federal habeas statute. Right?

6 MR. PLAISANCE: That's correct, Your Honor,
7 but even in Yates, this Court said that on State habeas,
8 if the State considers the merits of the Federal claim.
9 And the merits of this claim are: Is Mr. Montgomery
10 serving an unconstitutional sentence? Is Miller
11 retroactive to address the fact that he's serving an
12 unconstitutional sentence?

13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: How do you deal with
14 Mr. Baxter's point that your client would be worse off
15 if -- if you are correct? That is, if the question
16 comes up on Federal habeas, then the Federal court
17 decide -- decides it without any AEDPA problem. But if
18 the State court goes first, then the Federal review is
19 truncated.

20 MR. PLAISANCE: That would be my
21 understanding, Your Honor. That while Mr. -- while
22 Henry -- while jurisdiction in this Court does not
23 depend on what has occurred so far, it depends upon what
24 this Court does decide. But again, whether he can go to
25 Federal court or this Court doesn't affect this

1 jurisdiction that this Court, I believe, has today. And
2 the question is: If --

3 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But in -- how do you
4 answer the argument? All right? Suppose you're right,
5 but your victory is going to leave your client in a
6 worse position because when he gets to the Federal
7 court, he will be saddled with AEDPA.

8 MR. PLAISANCE: Well, not if this Court
9 rules that it has jurisdiction and makes Miller
10 retroactive. Then obviously, at that point, he would
11 not be going to Federal court. And the question is: Is
12 Mr. Montgomery being held unconstitutionally? This
13 Court in Miller said that a mandatory life-in-prison
14 sentence is unconstitutional because it fails to address
15 the fact of the matter that this Court believed kids are
16 different.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Plaisance, on the
18 jurisdictional point, let me see if I understand what
19 you're arguing. A lot of State rules of procedure are
20 modeled after Federal Rules of procedure, and a lot of
21 State courts simply follow the Federal Rules. But they
22 follow it as a matter of choice and not because they
23 think they're bound by the Federal rules.

24 So let's say that there is a disagreement in
25 Federal court about what Federal Rule of Evidence 403

1 means. The State court says, well, you know, we're
2 going to follow the Federal rule, and we think that the
3 right course as between these two divergent Federal
4 courts of appeals is the Second Circuit. So we're going
5 to follow the Second Circuit's interpretation of Federal
6 rule 403. What -- would we have jurisdiction to review
7 that decision as -- as a decision on a question of
8 Federal law?

9 MR. PLAISANCE: If it was clear to this
10 Court that the State court made a conscious choice and
11 sent enough of a signal to this Court that it was
12 adopting Federal law to use as State law. But in this
13 case, there is no indication that the State of --
14 Supreme Court of Louisiana was making that decision.
15 They said that we are -- our analysis is dictated by
16 Teague, and in doing so, they found that Mr. -- they
17 would not apply Miller retroactive. That's the real
18 issue of this case.

19 JUSTICE ALITO: Suppose we hold that we can
20 review the -- the -- we have jurisdiction because the
21 State court said it was going to follow Teague. And
22 then we go on and we say that under Teague, Miller can
23 be applied on collateral review. And then the case goes
24 back to the Louisiana Supreme Court, and they said,
25 well, we said previously in Taylor we were going to

1 follow Teague, but that was based on our understanding
2 of Teague at that time. But now that we see what has
3 been interpreted to mean by the U.S. Supreme Court,
4 we're not going to follow Teague. Then what would
5 happen?

6 MR. PLAISANCE: I think Louisiana would be
7 bound to follow this Court's ruling as you set forth.

8 JUSTICE ALITO: It would be? Why? Because
9 it said that we would voluntarily follow it in Taylor?
10 That bound them?

11 MR. PLAISANCE: I think they made the
12 conscious choice to follow this Court's laws, this
13 Court's jurisprudence. In doing so, it must follow this
14 Court's jurisprudence, as I've said before.

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: They changed their mind.
16 They have now chosen the course not to follow our
17 jurisprudence. What forces them to stay where they
18 were? It's a matter of State law. They've decided
19 we're going to change State law.

20 MR. PLAISANCE: But they didn't do that in
21 this case, Your Honor. They didn't.

22 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, not yet, but if we
23 agree with you and then we send it back and they look at
24 it and say, oh, if that's what Teague means, we're not
25 going to follow Teague, what stops them from doing that?

1 And doesn't that make us look foolish?

2 MR. PLAISANCE: No, it doesn't, Your Honor.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: We rule decisions that can
4 be overruled by somebody else.

5 MR. PLAISANCE: If a State considers the
6 merits of a Federal claim, it must grant the relief the
7 Federal court --

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're not in.

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the question is what's
10 a Federal claim?

11 MR. PLAISANCE: The Federal claim.

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Why did you cite Standard
13 Oil versus Johnson in response to your questions to
14 Justice Scalia and Justice Alito?

15 MR. PLAISANCE: I believe my friend the
16 general --

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do I have --

18 MR. PLAISANCE: Perhaps.

19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And the name in the case
20 was Standard Oil v. Johnson.

21 MR. PLAISANCE: That was a case cited by the
22 Solicitor General. I believe my friend from the
23 Solicitor General's office can probably answer that
24 question a little bit better.

25 The point I'd like to make --

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Are you asking us to
2 decide the question left -- left open in Danforth?

3 Danforth said that it was a minimum -- there
4 could be a constitutional minimum, but it wasn't
5 answering that question.

6 Are you asking us to answer that question?

7 MR. PLAISANCE: I'm saying, Your Honor, I
8 don't believe you need to get to that question
9 because --

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But let's assume we --
11 all right.

12 MR. PLAISANCE: Under Michigan v. Long this
13 Court has jurisdiction.

14 I'll reserve the balance of my time.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel.

16 MR. PLAISANCE: Thank you.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Dreeben.

18 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. DREEBEN

19 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
20 SUPPORTING PETITIONER

21 MR. DREEBEN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,
22 and may it please the Court:

23 This Court does have jurisdiction to decide
24 the question of Miller's retroactivity, because
25 Louisiana has voluntarily incorporated into its law a

1 wholly Federal standard.

2 And in this Court's decisions in Standard
3 Oil, Merrell Dow, Three Affiliated Tribes, and most
4 recently Ohio v. Reiner, the Court has recognized that,
5 when a State chooses to adopt Federal law to guide its
6 decisions and binds itself to Federal law, there is a
7 Federal question.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: This might --

9 MR. DREEBEN: Does the United States --

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They can change
11 their mind; right? You said voluntarily chose to follow
12 it.

13 MR. DREEBEN: That's right.

14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And they can
15 voluntarily choose they're not going to follow it
16 anymore.

17 MR. DREEBEN: That's right.

18 And the same is true is in any Michigan v.
19 Long case. What Michigan v. Long said is that this
20 Court has jurisdiction under Section 1257 to resolve
21 State court resolutions of Federal law, and it will
22 presume that a State constitutional decision of a mirror
23 image, say of the Fourth Amendment, will be binding, but
24 recognized that the only circumstance in which the Court
25 will not treat Federal law as governing both questions

1 is when the State makes clear that it would reach the
2 same result under State constitutional law as it did
3 under Federal law.

4 It did not preclude the option of the State
5 going back and reaching a different decision once
6 enlightened by this Court as to the content of Federal
7 law.

8 Standard Oil is completely clear on this.
9 It says the State chose to use Federal law to determine
10 whether a Federal post exchange was a Federal
11 instrumentality. And we're going to correct its
12 understanding of Federal law.

13 But on remand, the State can now, freed from
14 its misapprehensions of Federal law, decide what it
15 thinks State law requires. And if it does that, then
16 there may be a Federal constitutional question.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: How does it work? It -- it
18 should be pretty elementary, but -- I mean, I looked at
19 the Indian case, and that seems a little far out.

20 The -- the -- the -- though it definitely
21 gives you support on your statement here, suppose you
22 took Justice Scalia's example: We have Iowa State Rule
23 56. We interpret Iowa State Rule 56 the same way as the
24 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That's our rule. And
25 now this is what it means in that case. And they say,

1 "But we're doing it under Iowa State rule."

2 Now, you say we can review that because they
3 said that Iowa State rule is the same as the Federal.

4 MR. DREEBEN: So I -- I --

5 JUSTICE BREYER: Is that right?

6 MR. DREEBEN: I --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, I just -- how do you
8 fit that in the words in 1257?

9 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I doubt -- I doubt that
10 that would satisfy the Court.

11 And there's a theoretical answer, and then
12 there's a practical answer. Let me give the practical
13 answer first.

14 The states that copy the Federal Rules of
15 Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil --

16 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah.

17 MR. DREEBEN: -- Procedure pretty uniformly
18 say, we will treat Federal precedent as guidance in our
19 decisions as -- for its persuasive value. They
20 recognize that there are State rules of procedure and
21 State rules of evidence that will belong to the State.

22 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, they say in a
23 particular case, it's guidance. It's great guidance.
24 We agree. Our interpretation is the Federal
25 interpretation.

1 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I -- I think that --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, can we review that
3 because, in fact, it wasn't the Federal interpretation?
4 But can we review it?

5 MR. DREEBEN: I -- I --

6 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes or no?

7 MR. DREEBEN: There -- there is a
8 distinction between this case and that, that may suggest
9 that this case the Court has jurisdiction over, and that
10 one, the Court does not.

11 JUSTICE BREYER: So you say the Court does
12 not, in the example of the Federal Rules of Civil
13 Procedure that Justice Scalia gave?

14 MR. DREEBEN: I think this is a stronger
15 case.

16 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay. It's a thought.

17 MR. DREEBEN: I'm doubtful that the Court
18 would have jurisdiction or choose to exercise it,
19 because -- I accept, for premises of the argument, Your
20 Honor's hypothetical. But in the real world, it doesn't
21 happen.

22 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, but when you say that
23 that's a doubtful case, I think you are implicitly
24 acknowledging that, if we adopt your argument, we are
25 going to get that case and lots of similar cases, and

1 we're going to have to parse the words that were --
2 were -- the words that were used by the State Supreme
3 Court: Well, we're following -- we're going to be
4 guided by it. We're going to be strongly guided by it.
5 We're going to adopt it. We're going to get all of
6 those cases.

7 Why should we go down that road --

8 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think the Court --

9 JUSTICE ALITO: -- when there's a perfectly
10 available and possibly superior remedy available to the
11 petitioner by filing a Federal habeas petition?

12 MR. DREEBEN: So there are several reasons,
13 Justice Alito.

14 First of all, I don't think that it is
15 that -- going to come up in that way to this Court,
16 because that's not the way States treat their own rules
17 of procedure. I don't think it will be very difficult.

18 There is a principle in the Court's cases
19 that, when Federal law has been adopted as Federal law,
20 the Court will review it even if the State could have
21 chosen a different path.

22 So --

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Dreeben, what's the
24 problem --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Pardon me.

1 Did you misspeak? When -- when Federal law
2 is adopted as State law, the Federal courts can review
3 it. Isn't that what you meant to say? Or -- or -- I
4 mean, you're very -- you're very careful, and you don't
5 make mistakes, but I --

6 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I -- I think, Justice
7 Kennedy --

8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You -- you said --

9 MR. DREEBEN: This is -- this is what I'm
10 trying to say --

11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- when -- when State law
12 adopts Federal law as Federal law, then there's review.
13 Okay.

14 MR. DREEBEN: The State has adopted Teague
15 for a reason that does not exist in any of these civil
16 procedure cases, and that is that the State knows that
17 that Federal law will be applied to the very case in a
18 habeas case. So the State has decided consciously to
19 synchronize its law with the law that it knows will be
20 applied.

21 And this actually serves a very important
22 Federalism purpose. The State says, if we have to
23 rectify in -- a constitutional error in our case that's
24 become final, we would like the opportunity to do it.
25 And if the Federal habeas Court is going to treat this

1 decision as retroactive, we would like the first crack
2 at it.

3 California --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're -- you're -- you're
5 saying hurray that -- that the Federal habeas Court will
6 thereafter be bound by it --

7 MR. DREEBEN: No, because --

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- because the State got
9 there first.

10 MR. DREEBEN: No. There's an elementary
11 reason why that's not so, Justice Scalia, and this
12 answers Justice Ginsburg's question earlier.

13 2254(d) applies to State determinations on
14 the merits. That's the only time that the deference
15 provision kicks in.

16 And a determination under Teague is a
17 threshold determination that comes before the decision
18 on the merits. This Court has said that, in any number
19 of cases, it's not a merits resolution of the case. So
20 deference to a State determination on retroactivity
21 would never occur.

22 What I --

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you --

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I was just going to
25 suggest maybe we hear a little bit more on the merits.

1 MR. DREEBEN: Certainly, Mr. Chief Justice.

2 The -- the rule in *Miller v. Alabama*, in our
3 view, is a substantive rule because it goes far beyond
4 merely regulating the procedure by which youths are
5 sentenced for homicide crimes. It compelled the State
6 to adopt new substantive sentencing options, an option
7 that is less severe than life without parole.

8 The only other time that this Court has ever
9 invalidated a mandatory sentencing provision was
10 *Woodson v. North Carolina* in 1976. So we went something
11 like 36 years before we had another decision that
12 concluded that the law must change to accommodate the
13 compelling interests in having the characteristics of
14 youth that mitigate culpability considered in the
15 sentencing process.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Would it be
17 enough -- is -- is it enough if the States simply say,
18 okay. With respect to people who have been mandatorily
19 sentenced to life without parole, we're going to provide
20 parole?

21 MR. DREEBEN: Yes. I believe that it would
22 be. That would be the same remedy that the Court
23 ordered in a *Graham v. Florida* case for -- which is the
24 case that held that youths who do not commit homicide
25 but are convicted of other crimes cannot be sentenced to

1 life without parole at all.

2 And the Court's remedy for that problem
3 could either be a sentence of term of years, but it
4 could also be simply converting the life-without-parole
5 sentence to a life-with-parole sentence.

6 So that would be --

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Dreeben, how do you
8 explain how your articulation of your test wouldn't
9 apply to the guideline changes in Booker that we made?

10 MR. DREEBEN: So I -- I think, Justice
11 Sotomayor, the key difference is that, with respect to
12 the guidelines, there was always a -- a minimum and a
13 maximum set by statute. And the guidelines, even when
14 they were mandatory, did not preclude judges from
15 sentencing outside the guidelines, depending upon the
16 presence of aggravating or mitigating factors that
17 weren't taken into account.

18 And as Justice Alito's opinion for the Court
19 in United States v. Rodriguez recognized, even the top
20 of a mandatory guidelines range was not truly mandatory.
21 So even under the mandatory guidelines, which for Sixth
22 Amendment purposes were treated as if they established
23 elements of the offense, for the purposes that we're
24 looking at here, they are not mandatory in the same way,
25 so that Booker brought about a procedural change.

1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What is the substantive
2 difference -- pardon the use of that word -- between
3 your formulation and Petitioner's formulation? He says,
4 this is substantive because it did away with mandatory
5 life imprisonment. You're articulating it slightly
6 different. Tell me what you see as the difference and
7 why your articulation.

8 MR. DREEBEN: Justice Sotomayor, I don't
9 think there is any substantive, to use the word,
10 daylight between Petitioner's position and ours. The
11 description of the crime at issue as punishable by
12 mandatory life imprisonment and treating that as a
13 category, I think, sums up the reality of what is
14 happening. We broke it out into its component parts
15 because I think it facilitates the analysis of it to
16 understand that Miller does have a procedural component.

17 Sentencing courts must now consider the
18 mitigating characteristics of age, but it also, and more
19 fundamentally in our view, contains a substantive
20 component that required a change in the law.

21 Now, the change here was expanding the range
22 of outcomes. Previously when this Court has analyzed
23 substantive changes in the law, there have been changes
24 that restricted the form of outcome, say, for example,
25 in Justice Breyer's hypothetical forbidding punishment

1 at all.

2 But I think that if you trace back the
3 origins of the substantive category, to Justice Harlan's
4 opinion in Mackey, this is still faithful to what
5 Justice Harlan had in mind. Justice Harlan said, the
6 clearest case of injustice in not applying a rule
7 retroactively is when it puts off, limits altogether
8 criminal punishment. He did not say that it was the
9 only case.

10 And I think that if you consider what is
11 going on in Miller and the reasons for the rule, the
12 Court made very clear that it believed that of the 2,000
13 people that were in prison and under mandatory life for
14 juvenile homicide, the Court believed that that penalty
15 was frequently disproportionate, that it would be
16 uncommonly imposed in the future, and that it was not a
17 sentence that was consistent in most cases with the
18 mitigating characteristics of youth that have been
19 recognized in Roper and in Graham and then in Miller.

20 JUSTICE ALITO: Would it be accurate to say
21 that a rule is substantive if it makes a particular
22 outcome less likely or much less likely or much, much
23 less likely than was previously the case?

24 MR. DREEBEN: Probably the last, Justice
25 Alito. When -- when the Court characterized substantive

1 rules most recently in the Summerlin opinion --

2 JUSTICE ALITO: The difference between much
3 less likely and much, much less likely.

4 MR. DREEBEN: Well, I would put it in the
5 words the Court has used previously. The Court has said
6 that a substantive rule creates a significant risk that
7 the person is serving a sentence that's not appropriate
8 for that person, maybe not even legally available for
9 that purpose. It did not say absolutely conclusively
10 proves it. It says significant risk.

11 And in contrast, when the Court has talked
12 about procedural rules, rules that govern the manner in
13 which a case is adjudicated, it has said that the
14 likelihood or potential for a different outcome is
15 speculative.

16 And I think if you put this case on the
17 speculative significant risk axis, this case falls in
18 the significant risk domain precisely because of the
19 reasons why the Court said it was deciding Miller.

20 The reasons why the Court decided Miller had
21 to do with the reduced culpability of youth and the
22 capacity of youth to mature, change, and achieve a
23 degree of rehabilitation that is consistent with
24 something less than the most harsh sentence available
25 for youths who commit murder. A terrible crime, but

1 still the harshest sentence the Court thought would be
2 reserved for the worst of the worst, which is, in fact,
3 what Louisiana said when it amended its statutes
4 substantively to conform them to Miller. It said life
5 without parole should be reserved for the worst
6 offenders who commit the worst crimes.

7 So when you combine the fact that this is
8 not a rule that only governs procedure; it doesn't just
9 govern evidence. It also mandates changes in outcomes
10 as an available option with the very genesis of the
11 Miller rule in a conclusion that, for the people in this
12 class, the appropriateness of the punishment of the
13 harshest degree, life without parole, will be relatively
14 uncommon. It seems clear that the Miller rule falls on
15 the substantive side of the axis rather than on the
16 procedural side of the axis.

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And any States that have
18 treated Miller as retroactive --

19 MR. DREEBEN: Yes.

20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- on State habeas.

21 MR. DREEBEN: Yes. The majority of States,
22 it's a close call. I think it's maybe ten to seven or
23 ten to eight. But the majority of States that have
24 reviewed it have concluded that Miller is retroactive.
25 Most of them have done it as a matter of substantive

1 law. There are a couple of opinions that talk about the
2 watershed exception, which is not the way that we think
3 that this case should be analyzed.

4 But not only the States have done that, but
5 the United States has taken that position with respect
6 to the juveniles that were sentenced before Miller to
7 life without parole as a mandatory sentence. And in the
8 resentencings of those that have taken place so far --
9 it's only been about ten, but those -- those defendants
10 have almost uniformly received sentences that are terms
11 of years significantly shorter than the life.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So what is the population
13 we're dealing with if most States do apply Miller
14 retroactively? I think there was a figure of 2,000
15 people with life without parole.

16 MR. DREEBEN: I haven't broken it down
17 numerically -- may I answer, Mr. Chief Justice?

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sure.

19 MR. DREEBEN: I have not broken it down
20 numerically, Justice Ginsburg, but Michigan has not
21 applied it retroactively, and it has a very large
22 population of juveniles who are in the Miller class.
23 And I don't think that Pennsylvania has resolved it,
24 certainly not favorably yet for the defendants.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

1 MR. DREEBEN: Thank you.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Duncan.

3 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MR. S. KYLE DUNCAN

4 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

5 MR. DUNCAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it
6 please the Court:

7 I was going to begin by saying I would
8 proceed directly to the merits, but I gather from the
9 drifts of the argument that the Court has serious
10 questions about jurisdiction, and so I'd like to briefly
11 begin there.

12 We're in an odd position with respect to
13 jurisdiction because we won below and we win in the
14 Fifth Circuit on Federal habeas, which has found that
15 Miller is not retroactive. Why then do we not contest
16 jurisdiction?

17 We believe and still believe that this is a
18 straightforward case. Not -- Justice Kagan, it's not a
19 standard Michigan v. Long case, but it's an interwoven
20 case, meaning that the -- the State court took Teague
21 lock, stock, and barrel.

22 Now, there is no doubt, Justice Scalia, that
23 in the Taylor -- in previous Louisiana Supreme Court
24 opinions that the State said we are voluntarily adopting
25 Teague. There is no doubt about that. So we think the

1 question is whether that raises the possibility of an
2 advisory opinion from this Court. And why do we say it
3 doesn't?

4 Well, because in cases like *Coleman v.*
5 *Thompson and Hickman v. Oklahoma*, the Court said, "Where
6 the Federal law holding is integral to the State court's
7 disposition of the matter, there is no risk of an
8 advisory opinion."

9 And later in *Coleman* the Court said, "Only
10 if resolution of the Federal issue court could it not
11 affect the judgment is it a risk of an advisory
12 opinion."

13 So here we don't think there is a risk of an
14 advisory opinion. Of course, it is within the realm of
15 possibility. We doubt that it's going to happen, but it
16 could happen that on remand the Louisiana Supreme Court
17 could say, well, we have seen what you think about
18 *Teague*. We're going to adopt our own retroactivity
19 standards, as some States have done. They could do
20 that. The question is: Does that make this Court's
21 opinion advisory? And we think not.

22 The Solicitor General -- the Assistant
23 Solicitor General has talked about cases like *Standard*
24 *Oil v. Johnson* where the State was under no obligation
25 to tether its State law to Federal standards.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: It didn't say so, though.
2 In -- in Standard Oil, the -- this is a quote from the
3 opinion, "the relationship between post exchanges and
4 the government of the United States is controlled by
5 Federal law."

6 MR. DUNCAN: Right. That's right. My
7 point, Justice Scalia, is that the -- that was embedded
8 in a tax-exemption statute. The tax exemption made
9 certain taxes exempt from the statute, and -- and the
10 exemption --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that would have been
12 true no matter what the State did, right?

13 MR. DUNCAN: Well, no, the State --

14 JUSTICE SCALIA: We're deciding a question
15 of Federal law that would have applied on its own.

16 MR. DUNCAN: Well, no -- well, with respect
17 to Standard Oil, I think the -- my point is that the
18 State didn't have to make its tax-exemption statutes
19 turn on a Federal question. It did, and so the Court
20 had jurisdiction to resolve it. That's all --

21 JUSTICE ALITO: Don't you think that the
22 State made its tax-exemption law turn on Federal law
23 because there are Federal constitutional requirements in
24 that area? Could the State have taxed -- I mean, there
25 was the question of whether or not the Supremacy Clause

1 would permit the State to tax sales to the post
2 exchanges.

3 MR. DUNCAN: I think that's possible, but
4 this court didn't make its jurisdiction dependent on
5 that. So take a case like Ohio v. Reiner --

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: In the provision I just
7 quoted, it said that the relationship between post
8 exchanges and the United States is controlled by Federal
9 law. That's what our opinion says.

10 MR. DUNCAN: Well, so take the -- the
11 Assistant Solicitor General brought up the case of Ohio
12 v. Reiner where State made its transaction on unity
13 statute turn on the validity of a Fifth Amendment
14 privilege. This Court -- this Court addressed that
15 embedded and discrete Federal issue.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: And Mr. Duncan, isn't it
17 quite similar when Justice Scalia used this "controlled"
18 language that the Louisiana Supreme Court has used
19 similar language? It's dictated by Teague. Now, it's
20 only dictated by Teague because they've chosen to make
21 it dictated by Teague, but once that choice has been
22 made, all outcomes are dictated by Teague. It's the
23 same issue.

24 MR. DUNCAN: Well, we think -- we agree with
25 that. We think it's binding -- quote/unquote, "binding"

1 within the meaning of binding Federal law, because the
2 State has chosen to do it and it's never shown that it
3 wouldn't do it. You know, so -- we -- we think that
4 look, if the court disagrees with us on that --

5 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, in Ohio v. Reiner,
6 which you just cited, was there any other way in which
7 the State could have obtained review of the State
8 supreme court's erroneous determination that the witness
9 in question there did not have a Fifth Amendment
10 privilege because she said that she didn't commit the
11 crime?

12 MR. DUNCAN: I don't think so because
13 this --

14 JUSTICE ALITO: And do you think that's not
15 a distinction between that case and this case?

16 MR. DUNCAN: Well, if -- if the Teague -- if
17 the Teague standard is a discrete Federal standard that
18 the State has made -- has incorporated, then the only
19 way -- well, the Louisiana Supreme Court could -- the
20 defendant could go to Federal habeas, sure, and you
21 could get an interpretation that way.

22 But it doesn't seem to us that the
23 difference between Federal habeas and review of the
24 State supreme court decision makes any difference with
25 respect to this Court's jurisdiction. It might mean

1 that this Court would wait, you know, for -- for -- I
2 don't know a more robust split to develop and take a
3 Federal case that way.

4 But in this case -- and this goes to the
5 second reason why we haven't strongly contested
6 jurisdiction at all, because there is a robust split on
7 this direct -- on this specific issue that extends to
8 something like 21 State and Federal courts. They're all
9 deciding the same Federal issue. So it seems to us that
10 as a practical matter, this Court ought to weigh in.
11 It's going to weigh in sooner or later either on a
12 Federal habeas court or State court.

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: We weigh in when we have
14 jurisdiction. You don't think that matters at all?

15 MR. DUNCAN: Of course it matters, Justice
16 Scalia, of course it does.

17 JUSTICE SCALIA: What you said doesn't make
18 much sense.

19 MR. DUNCAN: I think it makes sense.

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Let's get in there quickly,
21 whether we have jurisdiction or not. You're not saying
22 that, are you?

23 MR. DUNCAN: We're not saying that. We're
24 saying the Federal issue is generally interwoven with
25 and State law and there's no independent State grounds,

1 then this Court has jurisdiction to decide the case.

2 Otherwise, wait for a Federal habeas case.

3 Proceeding to the merits. In Miller this
4 Court was invited --

5 JUSTICE BREYER: We clearly have
6 jurisdiction, don't we? I'm trying to figure this out.
7 In my mind we have jurisdiction where there is a
8 person -- that's the defendant -- and the defendant says
9 the Court's decision -- that's your court's decision --
10 is contrary to the Constitution or statute of the
11 United States. That's just what they say.

12 MR. DUNCAN: That answers the question.

13 JUSTICE BREYER: So we have jurisdiction to
14 answer the question.

15 Now, the question is how do we dispose of
16 the case in which we have jurisdiction? And we have
17 three cases, I guess, in which the Court has done in
18 disposing of such a case what the Solicitor General
19 says. Namely, they have said, we are -- we are not
20 going to say whether he's right in saying it's contrary
21 to the Constitution. That's because there might be an
22 adequate State ground; there might not be. Their
23 adequate State ground was one that was -- was elucidated
24 or explained as being flowing from a certain
25 interpretation of Federal law.

1 MR. DUNCAN: Well, that's --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: We will say their
3 interpretation of Federal law was wrong, and now we'll
4 send it back to see what they do. Is that right? Have
5 I got it right?

6 MR. DUNCAN: That's our position. And by
7 the way --

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the Federal law
9 you're talking about?

10 MR. DUNCAN: The application of Teague to
11 Miller.

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: And Teague is an
13 interpretation of that Federal law.

14 MR. DUNCAN: Well --

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Was that Federal law at
16 issue in this case?

17 MR. DUNCAN: The Teague -- the Teague
18 standard --

19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course it wasn't.

20 JUSTICE BREYER: But the Teague standard --
21 the Teague exceptions could well be constitutionally
22 required. The Teague exception --

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Have we ever said that?

24 MR. DUNCAN: You have not. And that's why
25 we do not take a position on that. That's

1 particularly --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: You want us to hold that in
3 this case.

4 MR. DUNCAN: We do not want you to say that
5 in this case.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Did we say that in
7 Danforth?

8 MR. DUNCAN: You left the question open in
9 Danforth.

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you tell me why
11 you would think that something like Atkins would not be
12 retroactive to States?

13 MR. DUNCAN: Come --

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As a compulsion, meaning
15 not as by election of Teague retroactivity.

16 MR. DUNCAN: That is a difficult question
17 that we don't take a position on.

18 But to answer your question, Justice
19 Sotomayor, the -- the -- the argument goes that Danforth
20 made clear that Teague is an -- is an equitable
21 interpretation to Federal habeas statute, it's not
22 constitutionally binding on the states, and that the
23 Court left open whether the exceptions are binding, but
24 the exceptions were part and parcel of Justice Harlan's
25 Mackey understanding of -- of how he thought Federal

1 habeas ought to apply.

2 And so whereas -- whereas Atkins -- I mean,
3 Atkins creates a binding constitutional right. The
4 question of remedy, though. The question of the State
5 constitutionally bound to offer that remedy. And this
6 Court has recognized, in cases like Pennsylvania v.
7 Finley, for example, that States have wide discretion in
8 structuring their post conviction.

9 And the -- the next point, though, has to do
10 with Finality.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It has to do something
12 different because, as Justice Breyer pointed out, you
13 have wide discretion to structure it as you want. But
14 if you structured it in a way that you're going to say
15 "I'm offering due process," isn't there a check, a
16 substantive check by due process --

17 MR. DUNCAN: Well --

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- that you have to
19 offer the minimum?

20 MR. DUNCAN: Well, I mean, that is -- that
21 is the question. So this Court has found that there's a
22 substantive check on due process in Griffith where we're
23 talking about direct review.

24 When we're talking about collateral
25 review -- I mean, our view, although we haven't taken a

1 position on it, collateral review is a different animal
2 for purposes of --

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But we have any number
4 of cases where States have viewed the exceptions as
5 controlling the fact that they have to offer the
6 constitutional minimum.

7 MR. DUNCAN: But this Court has never held
8 that.

9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Hasn't yet.

10 MR. DUNCAN: Unless --

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And why shouldn't we?

12 MR. DUNCAN: I understand.

13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's really the
14 serious question.

15 MR. DUNCAN: It -- it -- it is a serious
16 question. We -- we -- and, again, we have not taken a
17 position on that question because we feel that this case
18 is interwoven of Federal law as a matter of State
19 retroactivity.

20 In Miller this -- on to the merits: In
21 Miller this Court was invited to categorically bar the
22 penalty of life without parole for juveniles who commit
23 murder, but it decided not to do so.

24 Now, that decision leads directly to the
25 conclusion, in our view, that Miller is not a

1 substantive rule under Teague's first exception.
2 Consideration of the Teague framework, Teague policies,
3 and Teague precedent points instead to the conclusion
4 that Miller is a procedural and not a substantive rule.

5 So we think Summerlin most helpfully sets
6 out the framework that ought to govern this question.

7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Duncan --

8 MR. DUNCAN: Yes.

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- can I give you just a
10 hypothetical? I mean --

11 MR. DUNCAN: Sure.

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- suppose that there is a
13 State and it has a -- a mandatory minimum for a theft.
14 It says the mandatory minimum for theft is 20 years.

15 And suppose a court looks at that and says,
16 you know what? That's incredibly disproportionate to a
17 lot of theft, and so strikes the mandatory minimum.
18 Says, you just can't have a mandatory minimum like that.
19 Make it lower.

20 Would that be a substantive ruling?

21 MR. DUNCAN: We don't think so, Justice
22 Kagan, because the mandatory aspect of it goes to the
23 manner of imposing a penalty.

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: It does not go to the manner
25 of imposing. It says nothing about the manner of

1 imposing.

2 What it does is it just increases the range
3 of sentencing possibilities. It actually leaves it to
4 the -- to the courts. It says absolutely nothing about
5 what factors ought to be taken into account. Nothing
6 about that at all.

7 All it says is, you can't have a mandatory
8 minimum of 20 years for theft. Make it lower.

9 MR. DUNCAN: Well, so in -- in -- if in that
10 hypothetical that doesn't go to the manner of imposing
11 the penalty, then it's different than Miller because
12 Miller made very clear that the mandatory aspect of the
13 penalty goes to the manner of imposing the penalty --

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: But I think --

15 MR. DUNCAN: -- not any substance.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: So if you're saying, no,
17 that's different because there was something else in
18 Miller. There is something else in Miller. There is a
19 bunch. There -- there is -- there is a process
20 component of Miller, no question about it, where the
21 Court says what courts are supposed to look at is -- are
22 the characteristics of youth and are supposed to try to
23 figure out whether these terrible crimes are functions,
24 in part, of immaturity or -- or -- or not, whether
25 you -- you really are looking at an incorrigible

1 defendant.

2 So there is that process component. But
3 that process component does not take away the fact that
4 there is a completely separate, self-sufficient
5 component as to what the range of punishment has to be.
6 That's completely on all fours with the hypothetical
7 that I gave you.

8 MR. DUNCAN: Well, your -- Justice Kagan,
9 the -- the relevant difference in terms of the Teague
10 analysis is that this Court in Miller did not take the
11 punishment of life without parole, the distinction
12 category of punishment of life without parole off the
13 table. This Court has never held that a noncategorical
14 rule is substantive under Teague.

15 And it's done that for good reasons:
16 Because that would fly in the face of the policies that
17 inform the Teague analysis.

18 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, you're exactly right.
19 It did not take LWOP punishment off the table. But,
20 similarly, in my hypothetical a 20-year sentence for
21 theft has not been taken off the table.

22 What the Court has done is to say, there
23 have to be other options. There has to be an option of
24 ten years or five years or two years -- whatever it is.

25 So they've expanded the range of

1 possibilities. They've just made the sentences
2 different because the sentence is defined both by its
3 upper end and by its lower end.

4 MR. DUNCAN: I under --

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: So they made the sentence
6 different.

7 MR. DUNCAN: I understand that. But making
8 the sentence different doesn't necessarily mean it make
9 it substantive under the Teague framework.

10 Here's another way of looking at it: The
11 defendant in a -- a juvenile murderer who committed --
12 who committed murder and is serving a
13 life-without-parole sentence today, pre-Miller, is not
14 facing a punishment that the law cannot impose on him.
15 And we know that from Miller because Miller said the
16 Court's decision does not preclude that punishment.

17 And so that goes to Finality. The Finality
18 interests underlying convictions do not yield where the
19 State still has the power to impose that punishment.
20 Finality interests yield -- Justice Harlan explained in
21 Mackey and this Court adopted in Teague, Finality
22 interests yield only where the State lacks the power.
23 That's where the Finality interests crumble, so to
24 speak, because the State no longer can impose that
25 category of penalty.

1 So that would go for Roper. It would go for
2 Graham. It would go for Justice Breyer's sedition or
3 witch crimes.

4 If -- if -- if somebody's in jail because
5 they were accused of being a witch, then the State has
6 no Finality interest in keeping that person in jail.
7 But by the same token, if -- if -- if the punishment is
8 death for a juvenile, the State has no Finality
9 interests in doing that.

10 So leaving the punishment on the table is
11 crucial. If he doesn't take it off, it's not
12 substantive.

13 The second policy reason for Teague is
14 avoiding the adverse consequences of retrial. And we
15 think Miller is even more clearly not substantive under
16 that standard because categorical rules apply
17 retroactively, as Justice Harlan explained, because they
18 don't carry the adverse consequences of retrial. They
19 don't make you go back and redo the trial and unearth
20 old facts and -- and drain State resources and come up
21 with a distorted -- distorted retrials.

22 Miller, by its nature, envisioned a
23 fact-intensive hearing that considers multiple
24 characteristics at the time of the crime.

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you don't have a

1 distorted new trial if you're just granted parole
2 hearing.

3 MR. DUNCAN: That's right. That -- that's
4 right. But that's, of course, not what Miller would
5 require. That's what Graham would require, Justice
6 Kennedy, because Graham is obviously a categorical rule
7 that says you can no longer impose that punishment so
8 you have to give them a parole hearing or some
9 meaningful way of release.

10 Miller is about the step before whether to
11 give a parole hearing. Whether the person can be
12 eligible for parole at the outset. That's the inquiry
13 that we're talking about in Miller, and that's quite
14 different from a parole hearing.

15 The fact of the matter is, though, is that
16 applying Miller retroactively inevitably turns the
17 Miller -- the retroactive Miller hearing into a parole
18 hearing which -- which shows that it doesn't quite work
19 in terms of adverse --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: You were going to say -- at
21 some point you started: Suppose you look at the
22 watershed procedural change. My -- my impression from
23 the case you cited, Summerlin, is that deciding whether
24 that's retroactive has to you parts.

25 I think we were unanimous on this point.

1 The two parts were: Is it implicit in the concept of
2 ordered liberty? And here it would seem to be because
3 it's applicable to the States. And the second is, is it
4 central to an accurate determination that life without
5 parole is a legally appropriate punishment? And the --
6 the -- the rule that mandatory can't exist is central to
7 making that -- that was the whole point of the Miller
8 opinion.

9 So if that's the correct analysis for
10 watershed rule, procedural rule that's retroactive -- if
11 I'm accurate about that, why doesn't it fit within that
12 category?

13 MR. DUNCAN: Well, let's take the first one,
14 the point: It's not just implicit in the concept of
15 ordered liberty. The way that the -- the watershed rule
16 has been stated and the first, the first prong of it is
17 it has to alter our understanding of bedrock procedural
18 elements necessary to fundamental fairness.

19 And this would be a strange case to find
20 that in because Miller itself doesn't represent a
21 bedrock revolution in sentencing practices. It takes a
22 sentencing practice from another area and puts it in
23 this new area.

24 So it's an incremental change in that sense.
25 It's not a wholesale discovery of a new bedrock

1 procedural element the way we had in -- in a case like
2 Gideon v. Wainwright.

3 So -- and -- and I think this Court
4 explained in Whorton v. Bockting that it's not enough
5 that the rule be fundamental in some -- in some abstract
6 sense. Right? But it has to itself represent a change
7 in bedrock procedural understandings.

8 And we don't think Miller does that.

9 We also don't think it's necessary to an
10 accurate determination of a sentence. It would enhance
11 the accuracy of a sentence, but it's not necessary.

12 And the other point there is this Court has
13 never hold that a -- held that a pure sentencing rule
14 can qualify under watershed because, after all, this
15 Court has, on many occasions, said that a watershed rule
16 is necessary to the accurate determination of guilt or
17 innocence, and here we're talking about a sentence.

18 So we -- we agree with the United States
19 that watershed procedural analysis is not the way to go
20 here, but it does raise an interesting question.

21 In Summerlin -- because, after all, we do --
22 we do part company quite strongly from the United States
23 when -- when the United States says we need an
24 outcome-expanding alteration to the definition of
25 substantive rules under Teague. We say that's -- that's

1 not just a slight tweak to Teague. What that is is a
2 change in the understanding of what a substantive rule
3 is. Substantive rules under Teague analysis have never
4 depended on the frequency with which new outcomes
5 might -- might come about under the new procedures.

6 In fact, in Summerlin -- and this goes back
7 to my original point about the framework. Summerlin
8 explained that a criminal defendant under a procedural
9 rule does have the opportunity of getting a more lenient
10 outcome under the new procedures. So -- and
11 nonetheless, Summerlin said that such procedural rules
12 are not applied retroactively.

13 And so, as -- Justice Alito, as you were
14 saying, the difference between a substantive and a
15 procedural rule under Teague is not whether it's very
16 likely or very, very likely to result in a new outcome.
17 It's about whether the new rule categorically removes
18 the power of the State to impose a category of
19 punishment. That's what a -- that's what a categorical
20 rule does. That is not what Miller does.

21 Right? Miller may express an expectation
22 about the way that Miller hearings will come out. And
23 that may or may not come -- come to pass in the future.
24 Who knows; right? We can point to cases where criminal
25 defendants have had Miller hearings and have still

1 received life without parole. And I can point to
2 several in particular from the State of Louisiana under
3 its new Miller procedures.

4 But the point being is that the idea of
5 changing outcomes, which is what the United States'
6 entire argument depends on, is built into the procedural
7 side of Teague and not the substantive side. The
8 substantive side is about --

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Duncan, I -- I -- I
10 think not. I think by your own definition this fits on
11 the substantive side. You said you -- you categorically
12 remove a certain outcome.

13 And -- and -- and that's exactly what Miller
14 does. If you -- as long as you understand a sentence,
15 which I think you agreed with, as defined both by its
16 upper and -- and by its lower end, effectively what the
17 Court said in Miller was that that sentence, which was
18 the mandatory LWOP sentence, cannot control for
19 juveniles.

20 MR. DUNCAN: And --

21 JUSTICE KAGAN: There has to be a different
22 sentence. One that includes other punishments.

23 MR. DUNCAN: Well, there's no doubt --

24 JUSTICE KAGAN: That -- that increases the
25 range.

1 MR. DUNCAN: Right.

2 Miller -- Miller quite clearly said, as you
3 know, Justice Kagan, that it does not categorically bar
4 a penalty but -- and -- and so -- and what did it mean
5 by that penalty? It's --

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: It allows something within
7 the range, but it has -- it has completely changed the
8 range that's -- that is -- that is given for any
9 juvenile defendant.

10 MR. DUNCAN: Well, we think that's --

11 JUSTICE KAGAN: And the range is important.
12 It's not just the top end. This is what we said in
13 Alleyne, that you can't think about a sentence without
14 thinking about both parts of the sentence, both the
15 maximum and the minimum. And when you decide whether a
16 substantive change in that sentence has been made, you
17 look at both: the maximum and the minimum.

18 MR. DUNCAN: Well, I -- look, I -- I -- I -- I
19 hope this is responsive. I mean, I think after Miller
20 we would see two categories of punishment on the table.
21 We would see a life-without-parole category and a
22 life-with-parole, for example.

23 But my point is is that Miller doesn't ban
24 the first category, and that is determinative for
25 whether something is a substantive rule or not.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm -- I would -- I would
2 not describe changing the range of sentences available
3 as changing the sentence.

4 MR. DUNCAN: It -- it puts element on the
5 table, I think, is the most you could say.

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: It doesn't change the
7 sentence --

8 MR. DUNCAN: Yes.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- necessarily.

10 MR. DUNCAN: Right.

11 JUSTICE KAGAN: But this is what we --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: You still get the same
13 sentence.

14 MR. DUNCAN: You could still -- absolutely
15 still.

16 And what -- what did you --

17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Which is what we said last
18 year. We said, it's possible to disassociate the floor
19 of a sentencing range from the penalty affixed to the
20 crime. And similarly we said, criminal statutes have
21 long specified both the floor and ceiling of sentencing
22 ranges, which is evidence that both define the legally
23 prescribed penalty.

24 MR. DUNCAN: Well --

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: That is the penalty.

1 MR. DUNCAN: Right.

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is the range.

3 MR. DUNCAN: It -- it -- life without parole
4 has the same floor and ceiling, of course. It's --
5 it's -- it's got the same floor and ceiling. What
6 Miller does is create the -- the -- the procedural
7 circumstances for finding -- for putting a new penalty
8 on the table, which is the -- the -- that's the point of
9 the United States' argument: There is a new
10 possibility.

11 And our point is to say that putting a new
12 possibility on the table doesn't take away the State's
13 power to impose the old category of punishment.

14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Winsor --
15 Mr. Winsor --

16 MR. DUNCAN: Duncan. I'm sorry.

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- I know that we didn't
18 ever look at this issue.

19 I'm sorry. Reading the wrong one. I
20 apologize.

21 But do you really think that we -- that any
22 State would have not applied Woodson retroactively?

23 MR. DUNCAN: That -- that --

24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They all did.

25 MR. DUNCAN: Probably -- probably not, Your

1 Honor. But the -- the question -- that -- that, of
2 course, is a pre-Teague case. It raises the question:
3 Is Woodson substantive or procedural under Teague? And
4 our argument is it's a procedural rule.

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why?

6 MR. DUNCAN: It's a procedural rule --

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It just said you
8 couldn't have mandatory death penalties. Just like
9 here, you can't have mandatory life without parole.

10 MR. DUNCAN: Right. It required an
11 individualized sentencing --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: It says this exactly --

13 MR. DUNCAN: -- process which we say is
14 procedure.

15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And to give sentences
16 less than --

17 MR. DUNCAN: It -- it would put new --

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- mandatory death. But
19 they could have still given death.

20 MR. DUNCAN: They certainly could have, so
21 the question is whether it's substantive or procedural
22 under the Teague rubric, which, of course, it was a
23 pre-Teague case. I think the most we can say about it
24 is it's not substantive under Teague for the reasons
25 that we have said.

1 Now raise the question is it a watershed
2 procedural rule? Perhaps that's --

3 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. But that's the
4 language -- bedrock is, I don't think it is the right
5 language, because that was the language he referred to
6 in a sentences in Mackey, correct. I've just been
7 looking it up.

8 And -- and but then in Teague itself,
9 Justice O'Connor tries to get the right words, and --
10 which he ends up with here is that, the procedural is
11 the first test, first part, is -- can be addressed by
12 limiting the scope of the second exception -- that's the
13 Watershed rule -- to those new procedures without which
14 the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
15 diminished. Okay.

16 MR. DUNCAN: That's the first one.

17 JUSTICE BREYER: And that's joined by the
18 Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and the fourth, I can't
19 remember.

20 But so is it seriously diminished? Now, we
21 read through Miller, it's pretty hard to say. I mean,
22 my goodness, Miller is just filled with paragraph after
23 paragraph about how a mandatory requirement for life
24 without parole fails to take account of all the
25 characteristics or many characteristics adherent in

1 youth.

2 And it's pretty hard to come away from that
3 without thinking, Gee, accuracy under a mandatory life
4 without parole does seriously diminish the accuracy of
5 imposing life without parole when you apply the
6 mandatory to a youth.

7 MR. DUNCAN: But in every Eighth Amendment
8 sentencing rule goes to accuracy in some significant --

9 JUSTICE BREYER: No, no. But you have to
10 say the accuracy is seriously diminished. And she says,
11 Then I don't think there will be too many such cases.

12 MR. DUNCAN: Well, again, take -- we haven't
13 talked about the capital sentencing cases, but take a
14 case like O'Dell where the capital jury was not informed
15 of the defendant's parole and eligibility while
16 considering its future dangerousness. I mean, one could
17 easily say that the accuracy of the resulting death
18 sentence under the old rule was seriously diminished,
19 and yet this Court said in O'Dell that that is not a
20 watershed procedural rule. And you go down the line
21 with those cases, the Beard case, and the Sawyer case.
22 Those are cases in which the defendant could have said,
23 Well, seriously diminished accuracy. And yet the Court
24 found no watershed rule. And, of course, the bedrock is
25 what the word that this Court has used in referring to

1 that exception particularly in *Whorton v. Bockting*.

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is there any watershed
3 procedural rule other than *Gideon*?

4 MR. DUNCAN: Well, this Court said, it's
5 doubtful that any will emerge. So we think this case is
6 an implausible case for a new watershed rule to emerge
7 since this rule -- and back to the bedrock point -- it's
8 not a creating a -- it's not -- it's not a revolution in
9 bedrock under standing of procedure. It's -- it's an
10 incremental step in sentencing juveniles. So if a case
11 like *Crawford* is not a watershed procedural rule, then
12 it's difficult to understand how this one would be.

13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: We have one brief that
14 tells us this Court has never barred punishment as cruel
15 unusual under the Eighth Amendment, but refused to make
16 a the decision retroactive.

17 MR. DUNCAN: Well, we disagree with that.
18 There are cases -- take the -- take the case that
19 refused to make retroactive the rule in *Caldwell v.*
20 *Mississippi*. That's an Eighth Amendment case that goes
21 to the accuracy of a capital jury sentence in
22 determination of death. And this Court didn't make that
23 rule retroactive and found that it was procedural and
24 non-watershed at the same time. So we take issue with
25 that.

1 Just a few more words about the
2 United States proposed expansion of Teague. It would --
3 it would shift the whole focus of what a substantive
4 rule is from the categorical nature of the rule to the
5 effects of the rule. And so that -- if any defendant in
6 these capital sentencing cases we've just been talking
7 about, O'Dell and Sawyer and Beard, would now have the
8 argument handed to them by the United States new rule
9 that says, Well, that new rule gave me the opportunity
10 for a better outcome. I might have not gotten the death
11 penalty if my jury had been properly instructed.

12 We don't understand how the United States
13 new rule in this case can be cabined only to where a
14 mandatory sentence is taken off the table.

15 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but I think that you,
16 yourself, cabined it when you said that the difference
17 is one -- there is some category of cases that do refer
18 to process, to how a decisionmaker makes a particular
19 result, and another category of cases which refer to
20 what we've called substance, which is what results are
21 on the table, what category of punishment is on the
22 table. And that's the difference between this and all
23 the other kinds of things that you're mentioning.

24 MR. DUNCAN: Well, I --

25 JUSTICE KAGAN: This is not about the how --

1 or it's partly about the how, but there's also about
2 what punishments are on the table.

3 MR. DUNCAN: Well, I just have to push back
4 on the premise a little bit, where -- our position is
5 not that a substantive rule is about what punishments
6 are on the table. A substantive rule is about whether a
7 State categorically no longer has the power to impose a
8 category of punishment. Here it's clear from the Miller
9 opinion and from the Grayer -- from the Graham opinion
10 that the relevant category is life without parole. The
11 State still has the ability to impose that punishment,
12 and that's what -- that's a sharp distinction from what
13 a procedural rule is. And the United States' new
14 conception of what a substantive rule is would blur
15 that -- would blur that.

16 And it would call into question all of the
17 capital sentencing cases -- and I heard a question -- I
18 don't remember which justice asked it -- about Booker.
19 And my reaction to that is, but Booker as a matter of
20 the Sixth Amendment made a sentencing underline
21 mandatory, and it surely opened up new sentencing
22 outcomes.

23 And so by what reason could a Federal habeas
24 petitioner now not say under the United States' new test
25 Booker is now retroactive, or a Alleyne for that matter.

1 Alleyne overturned the mandatory minimum under the Sixth
2 Amendment, opening up new sentencing outcomes. Why
3 couldn't a Federal defendant on Federal habeas say, Now
4 I ought to get the benefit of that rule retroactively?

5 Our position is those cases, Booker,
6 Alleyne, Apprendi are clearly procedural, as this Court
7 explained in -- in Summerlin -- Sierra v. Summerlin.
8 They're clearly procedural under the Teague rubric. And
9 what the United States would do is blur those
10 categories.

11 If there are no further questions.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel.

13 Mr. Bernstein, you have three minutes
14 remaining.

15 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF RICHARD D. BERNSTEIN

16 ON BEHALF OF THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS CURIAE

17 MR. BERNSTEIN: What this fantastic
18 discussion has shown is why the Court, as it always has
19 in the past, should keep the Teague exceptions a matter
20 of equitable discretion, rather than constitutional
21 requirement. The Court has much more freedom, generally
22 speaking, on the matter of equitable discretion than it
23 does on constitutional requirements. There is no way to
24 look at the prior precedents of the Court in Teague in
25 any of those courts to say, oh, here's what our

1 equitable discretion is. The only time you get
2 retroactivity is when the Constitution requires it.
3 That would have been a really short opinion. And that
4 was not that.

5 Now, to turn quickly to the cases that have
6 been cited. The critical difference between this case
7 on the one hand and Merrill Dow and three affiliated
8 tribes on the other hand is that jurisdiction under this
9 statute is question by question under Murdock. In
10 Merrill Dow, the question of whether the defendant's
11 conduct had violated the Federal drug labeling laws was
12 a Federal question.

13 The Court never would have gone on to say,
14 and we're also going to federalize the remedy. We're
15 going to decide whether it's lost profits or
16 out-of-pocket costs.

17 Similarly, in three affiliated tribes, there
18 was no question that there was a Federal statute that
19 limited State court jurisdiction. The only issue was
20 the scope of that statute.

21 Here we have the opposite. There is no
22 question that the Federal statute does not apply to the
23 State court, and yet people say you should decide the
24 scope question even though the underlying issue may be
25 one of State law.

1 And then, finally, to this list of General's
2 new cake-and-eat-it-too argument that is going to be
3 reviewed in this Court and de novo review on habeas, the
4 statutory language in 2254 D is pretty broad. It,
5 quote, "Any claim that was adjudicate indicated on the
6 merits in State court proceeding."

7 The only claim in this case is remedy. This
8 case was filed after Miller was decided. The only issue
9 in this case is redress. And it would be very wonderful
10 turn if you could say on the one hand that 2254 D
11 doesn't apply but on the other hand 2757 applies when it
12 re -- when it requires a, quote, "right claimed under
13 Federal law," which gets to your question, Justice
14 Kagan.

15 Is it enough that a State court says, we
16 voluntarily want to be bound? And the best answer to
17 that is, not only in the cases I would recommend, Moore,
18 which is cited in Merrill Dow, which goes out of its way
19 to show how Federal law is binding on the intrastate
20 commerce conduct in that case before saying the Court
21 could review it, but it's also plain in the language of
22 the Supremacy Clause. Binding Federal law means binding
23 in all 50 states, and that's why the statute also says
24 right under Federal law.

25 Thank you.

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel.

2 And, Mr. Plaisance, you have three minutes
3 remaining.

4 MR. PLAISANCE: Your Honors, I'd like to
5 make two quick points.

6 First of all, in jurisdiction. Resolving
7 this case under Teague avoids the serious constitutional
8 question of whether due process requires retroactivity
9 activity for Miller.

10 A second point on the merits. Miller said
11 that juvenile homicide offenders should not have to die
12 in prison with no chance for rehabilitation and no
13 consideration of youth. That important rule changed the
14 substantive outcomes available. Indeed, this Court said
15 that life without prison should be uncommon.

16 The individual sentence before Miller that
17 remains about 1500 deserve a chance at redemption.

18 Thank you.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Counsel.

20 Mr. Bernstein, the court appointed you as an
21 amicus curiae to brief and argue this case against this
22 Court's jurisdiction. You have ably discharged that
23 responsibility, for which the Court is grateful. The
24 case is submitted.

25 (Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the case in the

1 above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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