

No. 26-_____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ENID JANNETTE MELENDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

OMAR MUNOZ,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Colorado — Case No. 2026SC51

Address Withheld — VAWA Confidentiality, 34 U.S.C. § 12291(b)(2)


**APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULE 13.5**

ADA/LEP NOTE: Petitioner is a Spanish-dominant LEP litigant appearing pro se. This petition is submitted in English pursuant to court requirements. A Spanish-language version has been preserved for Petitioner's own comprehension pursuant to ADA Title II and Executive Order 13166. The English version controls.

**TO THE HONORABLE NEIL M. GORSUCH,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND CIRCUIT JUSTICE FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT:**

COMES NOW, Petitioner, Enid Jannette Melendez, appearing Pro Se, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.5 for an extension of 60 days in which to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The current deadline to file is July 19, 2026. Petitioner respectfully requests that the deadline be extended to September 18, 2026.

I. JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW



This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

This case arises from a domestic violence complaint filed on February 23, 2024, in Elbert County District Court, Colorado, in Case Nos. 2024C19 and 2024C20. Those proceedings were consolidated into the dissolution case, Case No. 2024DR21, on April 22, 2024, over Petitioner's express objection, documented at ROA Event 000009.

Petitioner expressly objected because: (1) consolidation eliminated specific protections applicable to domestic violence proceedings; (2) it deprived Jean-Paul Berrios Melendez and the family of independent protections under ADA Title II and the ADAAA; (3) it eliminated Petitioner's right to a separate domestic violence hearing, which was never held; and (4) it allowed Respondent to use the dissolution process to control marital assets while Petitioner was left without effective protection.

The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on December 18, 2025, in Case No. 2024CA1571. Petitioner filed motions for rehearing under C.A.R. 40 on December 19 and 22, 2025, both confirmed as received by the Clerk. Those motions were subsequently stricken or not accepted into the record or denied, as confirmed in writing by the Clerk. The Colorado Supreme Court denied *certiorari en banc* on April 20, 2026, in Case No. 2026SC51.

Pursuant to Rule 13.5, copies of the Colorado Court of Appeals opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court order denying certiorari, and available communications or orders related to the motions for reconsideration or rehearing are included herewith.

The deadline under Rule 13.1 is July 20, 2026, because the 90th day falls on Sunday, July 19, 2026, and under Rule 30.1, the deadline extends to the next business day. Petitioner requests a sixty (60) day extension, to September 18, 2026.

II. GROUNDS FOR EXTENSION

Each of the following grounds independently constitutes *good cause* for the requested extension.

A. ADA Title II, ADAAA, LEP, and Pending Accommodation Requests

Petitioner has documented disabilities and medical conditions under ADA Title II and the ADAAA, Pub. L. 110-325, that substantially limit her ability to prepare complex federal pleadings. She is also a Limited English Proficiency (LEP) individual, Spanish-dominant.

Petitioner filed formal ADA Title II, ADAAA, and Section 504 accommodation requests with this Court by certified mail on June 8, 2026, Tracking No. 9589 0710 5270 2662 8279 78, and by amended request on June 12, 2026. As of the date of this Application, the Court has not responded to either request. The absence of a response to pending accommodation requests impairs effective preparation of a complex federal petition and constitutes good cause for additional time.

These denials are not new. Since February 23, 2024, Petitioner requested a certified Spanish interpreter and ADA Coordinator at every stage of the proceedings, including contact with emergency services, the response of six Kiowa Police officers, and Elbert County District Court. Those requests were denied or not effectively addressed throughout Case Nos. 2024C19, 2024C20, and 2024DR21.

B. Reliance on Assistive Technology, Effective Communication, Bilingual Documents, and Verification/Translation Burden

Petitioner also relies on assistive technology to communicate effectively with courts, review court records, prepare pleadings, translate legal materials, organize evidence, and access electronic documents. Her disability-related limitations and limited English proficiency require the

use of translation tools, screen review, accessible PDF formats, email communication, and additional time to verify the accuracy of any document before filing with this Court.

This need is particularly important because several motions and documents filed during state proceedings were prepared in bilingual format, and certain documents related to domestic violence, declarations, forms, or supporting materials were prepared in Spanish or contain information originally written in Spanish. Although submissions directed to the Colorado Supreme Court were prepared in English, and Spanish versions were used primarily for personal review and effective comprehension, Petitioner must still review, compare, and verify the accuracy of English versions against original Spanish or bilingual materials.

Under Supreme Court Rule 31, foreign-language materials within a record may require translation into English, unless the translation was made under authority of the court below or admitted as correct. Petitioner therefore requires additional time to identify whether Spanish-language materials exist within the Colorado record, determine which require translation or verification, confirm which documents were already submitted in English or bilingual format, and avoid presenting an incomplete, inaccurate, or inconsistent appendix.

The requested extension is necessary to ensure effective communication, meaningful access to this Court, and compliance with record translation and verification requirements, without penalizing Petitioner on account of disability, LEP status, lack of counsel, lack of stable housing, and reliance on assistive technology.

C. Lack of Stable Housing, Disability, and Extraordinary Circumstances

Petitioner does not have stable housing in Los Angeles, California. She is currently homeless living in a vehicle. This situation arises as a direct consequence of the September 10,

2024 decree, ROA Event 000096, which ordered Petitioner to vacate the marital residence within five (5) days, without ADA Title II or ADAAA accommodations, although Jean-Paul Berrios Melendez, an adult with Autism Spectrum Disorder under active legal guardianship in the Colorado District Courts, Case No. 2021PR116, resided in the home with his service dog.

Petitioner and Jean-Paul have remained without stable housing for more than 18 months. Preparing a petition before this Court under these conditions, without reliable access to printing, legal resources, secure internet, or stable space to organize records, requires substantially more time than the standard period allows.

Petitioner is also experiencing extreme medical and housing instability, and is currently in the process of obtaining admission or access to essential vital support services. Lack of stable housing and limited access to legal research tools severely impair her ability to compile, review, and present a complex federal record.

Petitioner must also fulfill her responsibilities as the uncompensated caregiver of her dependent son, including therapies, medical appointments, transportation, education, essential services, and legal matters. These obligations significantly reduce the time available to prepare an adequate petition for certiorari.

D. Complexity of Federal Questions and Incomplete Record

The Petition raises overlapping federal questions under ADA Title II, ADAAA, Section 504, Title VI, EO 13166, VAWA, ERISA, Due Process, Equal Protection, and *Griffin v. Illinois*, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

The appellate record is incomplete. The Register of Actions is truncated at Event 000169 in November 2025, and Events 000170 through 000187 are absent. These events correspond

precisely to the period when final decisions were issued and communications occurred regarding documents that were not uploaded or accepted into the record.

More than seven written communications from Colorado judicial officers document record access problems, including Clerk Mortier's written confirmation on February 6, 2026, that Petitioner's filings "were not uploaded," and Clerk Eichler's communication on May 4, 2026, regarding selective rejection of documents.

The requested extension is necessary to obtain certified copies of the missing materials and prepare a complete and accurate Appendix.

E. Systemic Pattern of Denial of Record Access and Housing

The constitutional violations at issue are not isolated events. They form part of a documented pattern across multiple simultaneous proceedings in Douglas County and Elbert County, Colorado, dating back to 2021, including eviction cases FED No. 2021C30478, 2022C33388, 2022CV102, 2022C99905, 2022CV40, and related cases; Guardianship Case No. 2021PR116; and the dissolution proceedings underlying this Petition.

Petitioner requires additional time specifically to document and adequately present this pattern as evidence that the incomplete record in Case No. 2024DR21 reflects systemic — not incidental — failures in access to court records and effective protection of federal rights.

The multiple eviction actions, combined with the continuous denial of access to vital court records, have directly affected the housing stability of Petitioner and her family. The requested extension is necessary to explain how these intertwined state actions constitute a systemic barrier to due process, basic housing security, and equal access to the courts.

F. Loss of Vital Documents and Record Reconstruction

In December 2023, Petitioner suffered the loss of vital documents related to her judicial and administrative proceedings, including materials connected to Police Report No. AC23-00616, Englewood, Colorado, and documents related to housing, guardianship, evidence of financial abuse, and ERISA-related assets, among others.

The loss encompassed physical records from several active proceedings. Reconstruction of these materials has required extraordinary and continuous effort. Petitioner requires additional time to reconstruct, certify, and organize these materials adequately for the Appendix.

G. Concurrent Proceedings Necessary to Preserve Rights and Subsistence

Simultaneously, Petitioner is managing complex property, compliance, and rights-preservation matters necessary to protect her basic subsistence. These include matters related to the marital home, the Lis Pendens, property title, enforcement of pending economic orders, 401(k) retirement assets, and ERISA-related matters.

Petitioner requires the requested extension to compile these records safely, avoid irreparable errors, and ensure meaningful access to justice under extraordinary circumstances.

III. TIMELINESS

The Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 20, 2026. The 90-day deadline under Rule 13.1 falls on Sunday, July 19, 2026. Under Rule 30.1, the deadline extends to Monday, July 20, 2026.

This Application is filed more than ten (10) days before that deadline and is timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.5.

IV. RELIEF REQUESTED

Petitioner respectfully requests that the Circuit Justice extend the deadline to file the Petition for Writ of Certiorari by sixty (60) days, to and including September 18, 2026.

In the alternative, Petitioner requests such extension as the Circuit Justice deems just and proper.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the extension of time pleaded herein be granted.

Date: 07-02 2026

Respectfully submitted,


Enid Jannette Melendez

Petitioner, Pro Se

Email: kalalovekm@gmail.com

Address Withheld — VAWA Confidentiality, 34 U.S.C. § 12291(b)(2)

Phone: (787) 483-3191

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Enid Jannette Melendez, do hereby certify that on this 2 day of July, 2026, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29, I have served the enclosed Application for Extension of Time to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari—along with the accompanying lower court orders:

EXHIBIT A - COA Opinion — Judgment Affirmed, dated December 18, 2025-

EXHIBIT B - CO Supreme Court – Certiorari Denied En Banc, dated April 20, 2026

EXHIBIT C - COA Order Denying Petition For Rehearing, dated January 8, 2026;

Upon the Respondent's counsel of record by depositing a true and correct copy of the same in the United States Mail, priority mail with tracking, addressed as follows:

To Respondent's Counsel:

Leonard Berenato, Esq.

1626 N. Washington St.

Denver, CO 80203-1407

Phone: (303) 831-1669

Email: lberenato@1626washingtonlaw.com

I further certify that all parties required to be served have been served. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on July 02, 2026, at Los Angeles, California.



Enid Jannette Melendez

Petitioner, *Pro Se*

Address Withheld — VAWA Confidentiality, 34 U.S.C. § 12291(b)(2)

Email: kalalovekm@gmail.com

Phone: (787) 483-3191

EXHIBIT A

24CA1571 Marriage of Melendez 12-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

DATE FILED

~~December 18, 2025~~

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1571
Elbert County District Court No. 24DR21
Honorable Theresa Slade, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Enid Jannette Melendez,

Appellant,

and

Omar Munoz,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 18, 2025

Enid Jannette Melendez, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellee

Enid Jannette Melendez (wife) appeals the district court's judgment dissolving her marriage with Omar Munoz (husband). We affirm.

I. Background

2 In early 2024, wife filed a motion for a civil protection order against husband. The court entered a temporary protection order and set a hearing to determine whether it should be made permanent. Then, in a separate case, wife filed a petition to dissolve the four-year marriage between her and husband. The court consolidated the dissolution case and the protection order case, and it continued the temporary protection order.

3 In late 2024, the court held a final hearing to dissolve the marriage and determine the permanent protection order. Wife didn't appear at the hearing. After hearing testimony from husband, the court dissolved the marriage and entered permanent orders. In doing so, the court adopted husband's trial management certificate as its permanent orders, which allocated to each party approximately \$30,000 of marital equity, and it ordered husband to pay wife maintenance. The court dismissed the protection order.

II. Discussion

Wife contends that the district court's permanent orders should be reversed on numerous grounds. We address and reject her arguments as best we understand them.

A. Preliminary Matters

Wife represents herself on appeal, and we, therefore, liberally construe the arguments she raises. *See Adams v. Sagee*, 2017 COA 133, ¶ 10. Nonetheless, “pro se parties must comply with procedural rules to the same extent as parties represented by attorneys.” *Id.* Under C.A.R. 28, an appellant’s opening brief must include, among other things, a statement on “the applicable standard of review with citation to authority”; a statement on “whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved, the precise location in the record where the issue was raised and where the court ruled”; and “a clear and concise discussion of the grounds upon which the party relies in seeking a reversal . . . , with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.” C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A)-(B).

Wife’s opening brief doesn’t comply with C.A.R. 28. These requirements are necessary to facilitate our appellate review, and

wife's arguments are difficult to discern. *See Cikraji v. Snowberger*, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10. We exercise our discretion to review wife's contentions, but we are limited by the information wife provided in her brief. *See id.* We therefore won't develop her arguments or search the record for the relevant facts that may support her claims. *See id.*; *see also Castillo v. Koppes-Conway*, 148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that it's not the appellate court's task to locate and synthesize the relevant facts, arguments, and legal authority). Nor will we consider any material that wife referenced or relied on that was not included in the appellate record. *See In re Marriage of McSoud*, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App. 2006) ("Only facts appearing in the record can be reviewed"); *McCall v. Meyers*, 94 P.3d 1271, 1272 (Colo. App. 2004) ("[W]e are bound by the record presented and may consider only arguments and assertions supported by the evidence in the record.").

Wife also didn't provide transcripts of the district court hearings. *See C.A.R. 10(d)(3)* (It is the appellant's responsibility to "include in the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for considering and deciding the issues on appeal."). In the absence of the transcripts, we must presume that the missing portions of the

record support the court's findings and conclusions. *See In re Marriage of Beatty*, 2012 COA 71, ¶ 15; *McSoud*, 131 P.3d at 1223.

B. Due Process

- 8 Wife contends that the district court violated her due process rights by (1) denying her accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), *see* 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, during the proceedings; and (2) striking “properly submitted exhibits.” We disagree.
- 9 The essence of due process is fundamental fairness. *A.M. v. A.C.*, 2013 CO 16, ¶ 28. It requires that a party be provided with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. *Am. Heritage Rys., Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm’n*, 2025 CO 27, ¶ 48. But “due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); *accord A.M.*, ¶ 28.
- 10 We review de novo whether a party was accorded sufficient procedural due process. *See People in Interest of C.J.*, 2017 COA 157, ¶ 25.
- 11 First, wife argues that the court’s refusal to grant her requests for ADA accommodations, “including bilingual access, remote

filings, assistive technology, and access to transcripts,” violated federal law and denied her due process rights. Wife doesn’t direct us to the location in the record where she made any specific requests for an ADA accommodation or where the court denied her an accommodation that she had requested. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A); *Castillo*, 148 P.3d at 291; see also *O’Quinn v. Baca*, 250 P.3d 629, 631 (Colo. App. 2010) (noting that we are “under no obligation” to scour the record to determine whether, and if so how, an issue was raised and resolved by the district court).

12 Nonetheless, on our review of the record, it appears that, early in the dissolution case, wife informed the court that she experienced “language barriers to effective communication” and was “identified as LEP (Limited English Proficiency) and ESL (English as a Second Language).” She also told the court that she needed a Spanish interpreter. In line with her disclosure, the court provided wife with an interpreter during the court hearings. Additionally, wife noted her language barrier when she asked the court for an award of prospective attorney fees so that she could hire an attorney. The court granted her request and directed husband to pay \$5,000 to the attorney of wife’s choosing. (However, an

attorney never entered an appearance for wife in the dissolution case.) The record, therefore, reveals that the court provided wife with resources that allowed her to participate in the proceedings in accordance with her due process rights.

13 Wife asserts that federal law entitled her to more, but she doesn't explain why the provisions on which she relies required the court to provide her with any of the resources or accommodations she mentions that went beyond those discussed above. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2025); Exec. Order 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50121 (Aug. 11, 2000), *revoked by*, Exec. Order 14,224, 90 Fed. Reg. 11363 (Mar. 1, 2025). And wife doesn't direct us to any other legal authority to establish that the court violated federal law. See *In re Marriage of Drexler*, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (noting the appellant's burden to provide legal authority to support a contention of error).

14 Second, wife argues that the court "struck 180 pages of properly submitted exhibits" that "included critical evidence related to ADA violations, financial abuse, guardianship rights, and domestic violence" "without notice, hearing, . . . justification," "or any articulated legal basis" in violation of her due process rights.

However, wife doesn't identify when she submitted the purported exhibits to the court or when the court purportedly struck them from the record. Nor does she direct us to anything in the record demonstrating that the court engaged in improper conduct concerning the purported exhibits. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A); *O'Quinn*, 250 P.3d at 631; *Castillo*, 148 P.3d at 291. Our review is limited to the appellate record, and the record doesn't reveal any ruling by the court striking 180 pages of exhibits. See *McSoud*, 131 P.3d at 1223; *McCall*, 94 P.3d at 1272. We therefore reject wife's claim of a due process violation on this basis.

- 15 Moreover, to the extent wife intended to present these exhibits at the permanent orders hearing, the record reveals that she uploaded forty-nine pages of exhibits for the hearing. Wife failed to appear at the hearing to admit those exhibits, and it's unclear whether any of these exhibits were part of the 180 pages purportedly stricken by the court. A party who chooses not to appear at a hearing despite advance notice isn't deprived of due process. *In re Petition of Taylor*, 134 P.3d 579, 584 (Colo. App. 2006).

• 16 In sum, we conclude that based on the record before us, wife was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and we therefore aren't persuaded that the court violated her due process rights. *See, e.g., Ortega v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off.*, 207 P.3d 895, 899 (Colo. App. 2009) ("Due process . . . calls for no specific procedure as long as the basic opportunity for a hearing and judicial review is present.").

C. Attorney Withdrawal

• 17 Wife next contends that her "retained attorney withdrew without motion, consent, or substitution," and that the attorney "met with opposing parties without [her] authorization, gave harmful legal advice, and knowingly placed [wife] in financial and procedural jeopardy." We discern no reversible error.

• 18 As best we can understand, wife refers to the attorney who represented her in the earlier county court case concerning her motion for a protection order against husband. *See Harriman v. Cabela's Inc.*, 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (acknowledging that an appellate court may take judicial notice of the court file and a court file in a related proceeding). Wife's former attorney indicated that her representation was limited to that county court case. After wife

filed her pro se petition to dissolve the marriage, her former attorney filed a motion to withdraw in the county court case. Wife didn't oppose the attorney's motion. The temporary protection order from the county court case was then consolidated into the dissolution of marriage case. And wife litigated the dissolution of marriage case without an attorney.

19 Even if we were to assume, without deciding, that wife's former attorney improperly withdrew her representation, a litigant in a dissolution of marriage case has no constitutional right to be represented by an attorney. *See People v. Cobb*, 944 P.2d 574, 576-77 (Colo. App. 1996). And wife develops no argument to explain how the withdrawal of her former attorney impacted the dissolution of marriage proceedings or warrants reversal of the court's judgment. *See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S.*, 2022 COA 105, ¶ 29 (declining to address a legally and factually undeveloped argument); *People in Interest of A.C.*, 170 P.3d 844, 845 (Colo. App. 2007) (an alleged error, without a valid allegation of prejudice, is not grounds for reversal). We therefore won't disturb the court's judgment based on wife's allegations concerning her former attorney.

D. Wife's Adult Son

20 Wife contends that the “court failed to include” her adult son in its “decisions involving the marital estate,” arguing that the court’s exclusion of her son violated section “14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI), [C.R.S. 2025,] the ADA, and federal guardianship protections under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.” Section 14-10-124 concerns the allocation of parental responsibilities for “the minor children of the marriage.” § 14-10-124(1); see § 14-10-106(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025; see also *In re Marriage of Tibbetts*, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 21 (concluding that “the parties’ eighteen-year-old child is no longer subject to the dissolution court’s jurisdiction”). Wife’s adult son isn’t a minor, and the record doesn’t show that he is a child of the marriage. Wife also fails to legally and factually develop her suggestion that the court violated federal law. See *S.Z.S.*, ¶ 29. Wife therefore hasn’t established that the court erred by not including her adult son in the dissolution proceedings.

Wife also contends that the court erred by excluding her adult son from the “protective orders.” She develops no argument in support of this assertion. See *id.* Moreover, in a separately filed

county court case, wife's son filed his own motion for a protection order against husband. *See Harriman*, ¶ 64. That court considered and denied his motion in early 2024. Wife can't now challenge that decision in this appeal of the district court's judgment. *See, e.g.*, C.R.C.P. 411.

E. Alleged Discrimination and Bias

- 22 Wife contends that she was “subjected to threats, discrimination, and obstruction by Colorado public officials, court staff, and law enforcement based on her Puerto Rican origin, [limited English proficiency] status, and disability.” Wife directs us to nothing in the record supporting that claim. *See McSoud*, 131 P.3d at 1223; *McCall*, 94 P.3d at 1272. She fails to describe what specific “threats, discrimination, and obstruction” she experienced or when such purported conduct occurred. She also gives us no explanation for how the alleged misconduct related to the dissolution of marriage proceedings or why it warrants reversal of the court’s judgment. *See S.Z.S.*, ¶ 29; *A.C.*, 170 P.3d at 845.
- 23 To the extent wife suggests that the district court exhibited bias against her, for such a claim to succeed the record must clearly demonstrate that “the judge’s conduct departed from the

required impartiality to such an extent as to deny [wife] a fair trial.” *People v. Coria*, 937 P.2d 386, 391 (Colo. 1997). Her bare assertions and speculative statements of bias, unsupported by the record, are insufficient. *See id.*

F. Remaining Contentions

Wife generally asserts that the court disregarded evidence of domestic violence, dismissed her financial and legal contributions, and forced the parties to mediate, and she claims that “[d]ocuments” were manipulated, improperly accessed, and ignored. Because wife failed to develop any argument in support of these assertions, we won’t further address them. *See S.Z.S.*, ¶ 29.

III. Disposition

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

Court of Appeals

STATE OF COLORADO
2 East 14th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
(720) 625-5150

PAULINE BROCK
CLERK OF THE COURT

NOTICE CONCERNING ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE

Pursuant to C.A.R. 41(b), the mandate of the Court of Appeals may issue forty-three days after entry of the judgment. In worker's compensation and unemployment insurance cases, the mandate of the Court of Appeals may issue thirty-one days after entry of the judgment. Pursuant to C.A.R. 3.4(m), the mandate of the Court of Appeals may issue twenty-nine days after the entry of the judgment in appeals from proceedings in dependency or neglect.

Filing of a Petition for Rehearing, within the time permitted by C.A.R. 40, will stay the mandate until the court has ruled on the petition. Filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court, within the time permitted by C.A.R. 52(b), will also stay the mandate until the Supreme Court has ruled on the Petition.

BY THE COURT: Gilbert M. Román,
Chief Judge

DATED: January 6, 2022

Notice to self-represented parties: You may be able to obtain help for your civil appeal from a volunteer lawyer through the Colorado Bar Association's (CBA) pro bono programs. If you are interested in learning more about the CBA's pro bono programs, please visit the CBA's website at <https://www.cobar.org/Appellate>

EXHIBIT B

Colorado Supreme Court 2 East 14th Avenue Denver, CO 80203	SUPREME COURT STATE OF COLORADO Certified to be a full, true and correct copy DATE FILED JUN 08 2026 April 20, 2026
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, 2024CA1571 District Court, Elbert County, 2024DR21	MARIZELA CANO Clerk of the Supreme Court By: <i>[Signature]</i> Deputy Clerk
In re the Marriage of Petitioner: Enid Jannette Melendez, and Respondent: Omar Munoz.	Supreme Court 2026SC51 
ORDER OF COURT	

Upon consideration of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals and after review of the record, briefs, and the judgement of said Court of Appeals,

IT IS ORDERED that said Petition for Writ of Certiorari shall be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

BY THE COURT, EN BANC, APRIL 20, 2026.

EXHIBIT C

Colorado Court of Appeals 2 East 14th Avenue Denver, CO 80203	DATE FILED January 08, 2026
Elbert County 2024DR21	
In re the Marriage of Appellant: Enid Jannette Melendez, and Appellee: Omar Munoz.	Court of Appeals Case Number: 2024CA1571
ORDER OF THE COURT	

To: All Parties

A petition for rehearing was filed on December 19, 2025. An amended petition for rehearing, containing 8 pages scanned, was filed on December 22, 2025. A second amended petition for rehearing, containing 16 pages scanned, was also filed on December 22, 2025. The court STRIKES the petition for rehearing and the amended petition for rehearing and ACCEPTS the second amended petition for rehearing. The division will consider the second amended petition for rehearing.

The Second Amended Petition for Rehearing, filed by appellant Enid Jannette Melendez, is DENIED.

Issuance of the Mandate is stayed until February 6, 2026.

If a Petition for Certiorari is timely filed with the Supreme Court of Colorado, the stay shall remain in effect until disposition of the cause by that Court.

BY THE COURT
Welling, J.
Gomez, J.
Sullivan, J.