
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

BRIDGET DOYLE,
Applicant,

v.

WILLIAM MARTIN,
Respondent.

**APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO
FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

**To the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit:**

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 13.5, 22, and 30, applicant Bridget Doyle respectfully requests a 60-day extension of time, up to and including January 8, 2027, in which to file her petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

The Eleventh Circuit entered judgment in this action on June 12, 2026. *See* App. 1a–18a. Applicant filed a timely petition for rehearing en banc, which was denied on August 11, 2026. *See* App. 19a–20a. The jurisdiction of this Court will be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari will expire without an extension on November 9, 2026. This application is thus timely because it is filed more than ten days prior to that date. Sup. Ct. R. 13.5, 30.

1. This case presents an important question of federal law involving the wrongful deprivation of qualified immunity to a police officer for a second taser cycle

delivered immediately after the first cycle the district court held was lawful. This Court, extolling the “importance of qualified immunity ‘to society as a whole,’” has remarked that it “often corrects lower courts when they wrongly subject individual officers to liability.” *City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan*, 575 U.S. 600, 611 n.3 (2015) (quoting *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)). That it “often” corrects lower courts is not an understatement: over the last fifteen years, it has issued twenty decisions reversing lower court opinions denying qualified immunity to individual officers.¹

That correction is warranted here because the decision below revives a rule the Court abolished. Two Terms ago, in *Barnes v. Felix*, a unanimous Court rejected the moment-of-threat rule, under which a court “looks only to the circumstances existing at the precise time an officer perceived the threat” in determining whether a use of force was excessive. 605 U.S. 73, 76 (2025). *Barnes* held that a court “cannot ... ‘narrow’ the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry[] to focus on only a single moment”; it “must look too, in ... all excessive-force cases, at any relevant events coming before.” *Id.* at 83.

After faithfully reciting *Barnes*’s command, the Eleventh Circuit asked whether anything “occurred in the time leading up to the first taser deployment that would go towards justifying the second taser use,” and answered ‘no’ based on

¹ See *Zorn v. Linton*, 146 S. Ct. 926 (2026); *City of Tahlequah v. Bond*, 595 U.S. 9 (2021); *Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna*, 595 U.S. 1 (2021); *City of Escondido v. Emmons*, 586 U.S. 38 (2019); *Kisela v. Hughes*, 584 U.S. 100 (2018); *District of Columbia v. Wesby*, 583 U.S. 48 (2018); *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, 582 U.S. 120 (2017); *County of Los Angeles v. Mendez*, 581 U.S. 420 (2017); *White v. Pauly*, 580 U.S. 73 (2017); *Mullenix v. Luna*, 577 U.S. 7 (2015); *Taylor v. Barkes*, 575 U.S. 822 (2015); *Sheehan*, 575 U.S. 600; *Carroll v. Carman*, 574 U.S. 13 (2014); *Plumhoff v. Rickard*, 572 U.S. 765 (2014); *Wood v. Moss*, 572 U.S. 744 (2014); *Stanton v. Sims*, 571 U.S. 3 (2013); *Reichle v. Howards*, 566 U.S. 658 (2012); *Messerschmidt v. Millender*, 565 U.S. 535 (2012); *Ryburn v. Huff*, 565 U.S. 469 (2012); *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. 731 (2011).

the observations that William “laid, on his back with both arms extended over his torso” at the instant of the second trigger press and that “there had been no change in circumstances between Lieutenant Duran and Michael.” App. 10a. Both observations describe a single frozen moment, and neither engages the events preceding the force. Contrary to *Barnes*, the Eleventh Circuit “‘put on chronological blinders’ and assess[ed] the ... reasonableness of the seizure without proper ‘consideration of prior events’ that led to the interaction.” *Watkins v. Davis*, 156 F.4th 1084, 1108 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting *Barnes*, 605 U.S. at 82). William lay on his back with his arms over his torso because the first tase—which the district court held was lawful—put him there. The opinion nevertheless made that posture the reason the second tase was unlawful. Under that logic, lawful force defeats itself: the first tase created the only fact the opinion relied on to condemn the second.

And the error exposes a gap in *Barnes*. *Barnes* requires courts to weigh the “events coming before” the force under review. 605 U.S. at 83. It did not say whether those events include the officer’s own lawful use of force. That question will arise whenever force comes in sequence, and only the Court can answer it.

The decision also conflicts with *Feagin v. Mansfield Police Department*, 155 F.4th 595 (6th Cir. 2025), *cert. denied*, 608 U.S. — (2026). Applying *Barnes* to the tasing of a resisting arrestee, the Sixth Circuit refused to “focus narrowly on whether [the arrestee] resisted just before being tased” and looked instead to “all of the events that foreseeably led to the use of force.” *Id.* at 610–12. The Eleventh Circuit isolated the instant of the trigger press. *See* Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). It then held applicant’s January 2018 conduct clearly unlawful on the strength of decisions issued months and years afterward, which “are of no use in the clearly established inquiry.” *Brosseau v. Haugen*, 543 U.S. 194, 200 n.4 (2004) (*per curiam*).

2. Applicant's counsel is her sole attorney of record, and his obligations in other matters will consume nearly all of the time remaining before the current deadline. He is likewise sole counsel in five employment discrimination cases pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, all of which are in active discovery: *Braithwaite v. Miami-Dade County*, No. 25-cv-25665; *Everett v. Miami-Dade County*, No. 26-cv-23148; *Bryan v. Miami-Dade County*, No. 26-cv-25415; *Jones v. Miami-Dade County*, No. 26-cv-25585; and *Capote v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County*, No. 2026-8572-CA-01. Discovery closes in *Everett* on December 9 and in *Braithwaite* on December 15, and counsel expects to take or defend multiple depositions in those cases over the next six weeks. The deposition of one of the principal County witnesses in *Braithwaite* has been noticed for November 9, the day the petition for writ of certiorari is presently due. Summary judgment motions are due in *Everett* on December 23 and in *Braithwaite* on December 15, the same day discovery closes in that case.

Counsel also represents Miami-Dade County in *In re Arbitration Between South Florida Police Benevolent Ass'n & Miami-Dade County Corrections & Rehabilitation Department*, AAA No. 01-26-0003-0513. The hearing took place on October 15, 2026, and counsel is now drafting the post-arbitration brief, which is due November 29. And counsel must prepare a position statement responding to a charge of discrimination pending before the EEOC, No. 510-2026-6872, due October 20, and a position statement responding to a complaint of discrimination pending before the Florida Commission on Human Relations, No. 122485, due October 29.

These obligations have conflicted and will continue to conflict with counsel's ability to prepare and file a petition by the current deadline. Because it is

impossible to competently and fully meet all client obligations, and because the requested extension would neither prejudice the respondent nor meaningfully delay the Court's consideration of the petition, good cause exists to grant it. A shorter extension would not cure the conflict. Thirty days would make the petition due December 9, the day discovery closes in *Everett*, and less than a week before discovery closes and summary judgment motions are due in *Braithwaite*. Forty-five days would make it due December 24, the day after summary judgment motions are due in *Everett*.

Wherefore, applicant respectfully requests that an order be entered extending the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari for 60 days, to and including January 8, 2027.

Dated: October 16, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

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