

No. _____

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

WILLIAM VAN WADE,
Applicant,

v.

JOHN NITTI, et al.,
Respondents.

APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
WITHIN WHICH TO FILE A PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

To the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
and Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit:

Pursuant to Rules 13.5, 22, and 30 of the Rules of this Court, Applicant William Van Wade, proceeding pro se, respectfully requests a 60-day extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in *Wade v. Nitti*, No. 24-3036.

The Second Circuit denied Applicant's timely petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc on August 4, 2026. The petition for a writ of certiorari is currently due on November 2, 2026. A 60-day extension would extend the period through January 1, 2027. Because January 1 is a federal legal holiday and is followed by a Saturday and Sunday, the petition would be due on Monday, January 4, 2027, under Supreme Court Rule 30.1.

This application is being submitted more than 10 days before the present November 2, 2026 filing deadline.

The requested extension is supported by good cause, as explained below.

JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED

1. Applicant seeks review of the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in *Wade v. Nitti*, No. 24-3036.
2. On May 13, 2026, the court of appeals entered a summary order affirming the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. A copy of that summary order is attached as Appendix A.
3. Applicant timely sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.
4. On August 4, 2026, the court of appeals entered an order denying rehearing. A copy of the rehearing order is attached as Appendix B.
5. The court of appeals issued its mandate on August 12, 2026. Under Supreme Court Rule 13.3, however, the time to seek certiorari runs from the August 4, 2026 denial of the timely rehearing petition and not from the later issuance of the mandate.

JURISDICTION

6. This Court will have jurisdiction over a timely petition for a writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
7. Under Supreme Court Rules 13.1 and 13.3, the petition is currently due within 90 days of the August 4, 2026 order denying timely rehearing.
8. The current deadline is therefore November 2, 2026.
9. Supreme Court Rule 13.5 authorizes a Circuit Justice, for good cause, to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari for a period not exceeding 60 days.
10. This application is timely because it is being filed more than 10 days before the present deadline.

BACKGROUND

11. Applicant commenced the underlying action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. The action arose from harm Applicant alleged were caused by prolonged exposure to a gas leak and from related conduct by municipal officials, fire-district personnel, property-management employees, and other defendants.

12. The district court dismissed Applicant's federal claims, denied his request for entry of default against certain defendants, and denied leave to file a proposed second amended complaint asserting state-law claims through diversity jurisdiction.
13. In denying leave to amend, the district court concluded that Applicant's proposed citizenship allegations did not adequately allege that he is a citizen of Tennessee.
14. On appeal, Applicant challenged, among other things, the denial of leave to amend and the denial of his request for entry of default.
15. On May 13, 2026, the Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Applicant had not sufficiently clarified his basis for asserting Tennessee citizenship after the district court directed him to do so.
16. The Second Circuit also affirmed the denial of default, reasoning that the Fire District Defendants had responded to the amended complaint, although their response was filed after the applicable deadline.
17. The court of appeals did not reach Applicant's request that any remand be assigned to a different district judge.
18. Applicant timely sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, which the court of appeals denied on August 4, 2026.

REASONS FOR THE EXTENSION

19. Since the denial of rehearing, Applicant has made diligent and extensive efforts to obtain counsel experienced in Supreme Court practice. Applicant has contacted attorneys and legal organizations but has been unable to secure representation.
20. Applicant's efforts to obtain counsel have consumed a substantial portion of the period available for preparing the petition. Because the filing deadline continues to run while those efforts remain unsuccessful, Applicant must now prepare the petition, appendix, proof of service, and related papers without counsel while continuing to seek representation.
21. Applicant will proceed pro se if counsel cannot be secured. The requested extension will provide reasonable time either for retained or volunteer counsel to evaluate the extensive record and prepare the petition, or for Applicant to complete a focused, accurate, and rule-compliant petition on his own.

22. The issue requires careful examination of the district court record, including a March 1, 2021 federal complaint filed before the commencement of the underlying action. That earlier complaint expressly stated that Applicant is “a citizen of the State of Tennessee,” listed a Nashville, Tennessee address, and described his New York residence as temporary.
23. Applicant recently obtained and reviewed additional record materials directly relevant to the proposed petition, including the earlier federal complaint and the district court’s October 4, 2023 text order directing Applicant to clarify his citizenship allegations.
24. Applicant requires additional time to determine the proper treatment of those materials under this Court’s rules, accurately cite the record, verify the authorities relied upon, and present the jurisdictional issue without overstating the record.
25. The proposed petition also presents a procedural question concerning the district court’s retroactive acceptance of a late defense response. The relevant defendants were served on February 27, 2023; their response was due on March 20, 2023; and they filed their motion to dismiss on March 23, 2023.
26. The district court later extended the response deadline *nunc pro tunc*. Applicant intends to address whether a post-deadline extension may be granted without the showing and finding of excusable neglect contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B).
27. The underlying litigation involves numerous defendants represented by several different groups of attorneys. The district-court record is extensive and includes multiple dispositive motions, proposed amended pleadings, motions concerning default, post-judgment proceedings, and several decisions and orders.
28. Additional time is necessary to identify the portions of that record essential to the questions presented, assemble an accurate appendix, prepare a complete list of parties and related proceedings, and ensure that the petition complies with Supreme Court Rules 14, 29, 33.2, 34, and 39.
29. The additional time will allow Applicant to narrow and present the questions in a manner that focuses on their national significance rather than merely requesting correction of alleged error in this particular case.
30. Applicant is specifically examining the recurring issue of how 28 U.S.C. § 1653 applies when a self-represented litigant uses legally defective citizenship terminology but the jurisdictional fact may have existed at the time of filing.

31. The requested extension is not sought for delay. It is sought to permit preparation of a focused, accurate, and rule-compliant petition addressing the federal questions presented by the record.
32. Granting the requested extension will not prejudice Respondents. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment below, no stay is being requested, and the extension will affect only the time for Applicant to seek this Court's discretionary review.
33. A 60-day extension is reasonable in light of Applicant's pro se status, the size and procedural complexity of the record, the number of separately represented respondents, the need to verify the record and authorities, and the requirements for preparing and serving the petition and appendix.
34. This is Applicant's first extension request in good faith with good cause for an extension of the time to file the contemplated petition for a writ of certiorari. The requested extension is based on Applicant's diligent but unsuccessful efforts to obtain counsel, the size and procedural complexity of the record, the recent identification and review of significant jurisdictional materials, and the time reasonably required to prepare an accurate petition and appendix.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Applicant William Van Wade respectfully requests that the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari be extended by 60 days from November 2, 2026. Because the 60th day falls on Friday, January 1, 2027, a federal legal holiday, followed by a Saturday and Sunday, the petition would be due on Monday, January 4, 2027, under Supreme Court Rule 30.1.

Respectfully submitted,



WILLIAM VAN WADE
Applicant, Pro Se
P.O. Box 9146
Springfield, Illinois 62791
Telephone: (615) 506-7097
Email: justiceforwade91@gmail.com
Dated: October 7, 2026

APPENDIX ATTACHED

Appendix A — Summary Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, entered May 13, 2026

Appendix B — Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denying panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, entered August 4, 2026

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, William Van Wade, declare under penalty of perjury that on October 7, 2026, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Application for an Extension of Time Within Which to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, including its appendices, upon counsel for each separately represented group of Respondents by depositing a copy in the United States mail, with first-class postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Sanjeev Devabhakthuni
Barclay Damon LLP
2000 Five Star Bank Plaza, 100 Chestnut Street, Rochester, NY 14604
Counsel for Respondents Nitti, Merrick, Ivers, Seeley, and Fitzpatrick

Nicholas M. Hriczko
Chelus Herdzik Speyer & Monte, P.C.
438 Main Street, 10th Floor, Buffalo, NY 14202
Counsel for Respondent Trotta


Audrey O. Anyaele
Maron Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy LLC
Harborside Plaza 10, Suite 202, 3 Second Street, Jersey City, NJ 07311
Counsel for Respondents Carver, Cook, Hetrick, and Wallace

Aime Lafeber Koch
Osborn Reed & Burke, LLP
120 Allens Creek Road, Suite 150, Rochester, NY, 14618
Counsel for Respondents DeWitt, Dyrland, Shafer, Turner, and Wilczewski

All parties required to be served have been served.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 7, 2026, at Nashville, Tennessee.



WILLIAM VAN WADE
Applicant, Pro Se

Appendix A

24-3036-cv
Wade v. Nitti

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 13th day of May, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT:

**GUIDO CALABRESI,
MICHAEL H. PARK,
MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,**
Circuit Judges.

William Van Wade,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

24-3036

**John Nitti, Personally and as
employee of Town of Irondequoit,
Gregory Carver, Personally and as**

employee of 1700 Hudson Ave, LLC, Heather Cook, Personally and as employee of Hudson Ave, LLC, Gregory Merrick, Kerry Ivers, Personally and as employee of Town of Irondequoit, Dave Seeley, Personally and as employee of Town of Irondequoit, Raymond Francis Trotta, aka Ray Trotta DBA president of the Holland Trotta Project combined with derivatives and all successors and assigns and personally and as employee of The Holland Trotta Project, Charlie Hetrick, Personally and as employee of Hudson Ave, LLC, Terry Wallace, Personally and as employee of Hudson Ave, LLC, Jay DeWitt, Personally and as employee of St. Paul Boulevard Fire Association, Inc., William Dyrland, AKA Bill Dyrland, Personally and as employee of St. Paul Boulevard Fire Association, Inc., James Turner, Personally and as employee of St. Paul Boulevard Fire District, Jim Shafer, dba Chairman of the St. Paul Boulevard Fire District combined with derivatives, successors and assigns, Walt Wilczewski, dba President of St. Paul Boulevard Fire Association, Inc. combined with derivatives and all successors and assigns, John Doe 1-10, Rory Fitzpatrick, DBA Supervisor of Town

of Irondequoit, dba Supervisor of
Town of Irondequoit combined with
derivatives and all successors and
assigns,

Defendants-Appellees,

Rodney Mastro Simone, Personally and
as employee of American Plumbing HVAC
/Mechanical Inc., Town of Irondequoit,
1700 Hudson Ave, LLC, American Plumbing
HVAC/Mechanical Inc.,

*Defendants.**

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:

WILLIAM VAN WADE, pro se, Nashville,
TN.

**FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
NITTI, MERRICK, IVERS, SEELEY,
AND FITZPATRICK:**

SANJEEV DEVABHAKTHUNI, Barclay
Damon LLP, Rochester, NY (James P.
Evans, Barclay Damon LLP, Syracuse,
NY, *on the brief*).

**FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
TROTТА:**

NICHOLAS M. HRICZKO, Chelus
Herdzik Speyer & Monte PC, Buffalo,
NY.

**FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
CARVER, COOK, HETRICK, AND
WALLACE:**

AUDREY O. ANYAELE (Timothy
Coughlan, *on the brief*), Maron Marvel

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth
above.

Bradley Anderson & Tardy LLC, Jersey City, NJ.

**FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
DeWITT, DYRLAND, SHAFER,
TURNER, AND WILCZEWSKI:**

AIMÉE LAFEVER KOCH, Osborn Reed & Burke, LLP, Rochester, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Elizabeth A. Wolford, *Chief Judge*).

**UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that the judgment of the district court is **AFFIRMED**.

William Van Wade, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's dismissal of his amended complaint, denial of entry of default, denial of leave to amend, and denial of reconsideration. Wade sued officials and employees of the Town of Irondequoit, New York and of the St. Paul Boulevard Fire District (the "Fire District"), owners and employees of his apartment complex, and others, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging that he suffered injury from a gas leak at his apartment building. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and Wade sought to (1) further amend his

complaint to invoke diversity jurisdiction and raise purely state law claims and (2) compel the entry of default against Jay DeWitt, William Dyrland, Jim Shafer, James Turner, and Walt Wilczewski (the “Fire District Defendants”). The district court denied leave to amend as futile because Wade did not allege diversity of citizenship, denied Wade’s motion to compel the entry of default, and granted the motions to dismiss. *Van Wade v. Nitti*, 720 F. Supp. 3d 219, 229, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 2024).¹ Wade moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. *Van Wade v. Nitti*, 2024 WL 4578977, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2024). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.²

I. Motion to Compel Entry of Default

We perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to compel the entry of default against the Fire District Defendants. *See Enron Oil Corp. v.*

¹ The district court also denied Wade’s motion to strike, motion to stay, and motion to seal. *See Van Wade*, 720 F. Supp. 3d at 236. Wade has not appealed those rulings.

² We grant Defendants’ motion to strike with respect to the portions of Wade’s appendix that were not first filed in the district court. We deny Wade’s motions to strike, for sanctions, and for other relief.

Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The dispositions of motions for entries of defaults and default judgments . . . are left to the sound discretion of a district court.”). An entry of default is generally automatic “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Here, however, the Fire District Defendants did respond, albeit belatedly, to the amended complaint by filing a motion to dismiss. Nor were the Fire District Defendants absent from the litigation—they had previously appeared and filed a motion to dismiss before they were properly served. “[B]ecause defaults are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions,” *Enron*, 10 F.3d at 96, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to enter default against the Fire District Defendants.

II. Dismissal of Due Process Claim

Wade challenges the dismissal of his substantive due process claim against the Fire District Defendants.³ “We review *de novo* a district court’s dismissal of

³ Wade does not challenge the dismissal of his substantive due process claim against the non-Fire District Defendants, nor does he challenge the dismissal of the other claims in his amended complaint. He thus has abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of those claims. See *Green v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of New York*, 16 F.4th 1070, 1074 (2d Cir. 2021).

a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." *Mazzei v. The Money Store*, 62 F.4th 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).

Substantive due process protects against "certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." *County of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (quotation marks omitted). To constitute a substantive due process violation, the government action "must have occurred under circumstances warranting the labels 'arbitrary' and 'outrageous.'" *Natale v. Town of Ridgefield*, 170 F.3d 258, 262 (2d Cir. 1999). The conduct must be "so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority." *Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola*, 273 F.3d 494, 505 (2d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). "It is not enough that the government act be incorrect or ill-advised; it must be conscience-shocking." *Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist.*, 654 F.3d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must show that he (1) "had a valid property interest . . . ; and (2) defendants infringed on that property right in an arbitrary or irrational manner."

Royal Crown Day Care LLC v. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene of City of N.Y., 746 F.3d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

Even assuming that Wade alleged a property interest in a correct version of the Fire District's incident report, he has not adequately alleged that the Fire District Defendants' refusal to correct the report was outrageously arbitrary or irrational.

Wade alleged that the Fire District Defendants refused to correct their incident report even after he informed them that it was inaccurate—*i.e.*, that the report referred to a 911 call that was never made and falsely stated Wade had suffered no harm. While possibly negligent, this conduct does not rise to the level of “conscience-shocking.” *See Cox*, 654 F.3d at 276 (report to children and family services was not conscience-shocking because plaintiffs did not demonstrate that defendant acted with malice). While Wade asserts that he never made a 911 call, the Fire District did respond to his residence in November 2019 after Wade called for emergency maintenance at his apartment, thereby resulting in the report. Additionally, while the report may have inaccurately stated Wade was unharmed, there is no suggestion in the record that the

omission was in any way conscience-shocking. Therefore, the failure to correct any inaccuracies in the report does not rise to a constitutional deprivation of due process. The district court did not err by dismissing Wade's substantive due process claim.

III. Denial of Leave To Amend

Wade next contends that the district court erred by denying him leave to file a second amended complaint. "We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend based on futility *de novo*." *Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc.*, 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).

"While the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest, a pro se plaintiff still bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." *Logan v. Town of Windsor*, 833 F. App'x 919, 920 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (cleaned up). Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and citizenship is "determined by . . . domicile," *Palazzo ex rel. Delmage v. Corio*, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000). Moreover, "all litigants, including pro ses, have an obligation to comply with

court orders,” and “[w]hen they flout that obligation they, like all litigants, must suffer the consequences of their actions.” *McDonald v. Head Crim. Ct. Supervisor Officer*, 850 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1988).

The district court did not err in denying leave to amend as futile. Wade submitted a letter requesting leave to file a second amended complaint invoking diversity jurisdiction, Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 86, and he filed a proposed second amended complaint alleging that the defendants are “citizens of the State of New York” and that he is “a national of the State of Tennessee.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 87, at 1. In a text order, the district court directed Wade to file a formal motion for leave to amend and instructed that the motion “shall clarify his basis for invoking this Court’s diversity jurisdiction In particular, [Wade] shall define his alleged status as a ‘national of the State of Tennessee’ as set forth in his proposed second amended complaint, and explain how, if at all, this differs from being a citizen of the State of Tennessee.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 98. But Wade did not clarify the basis for diversity jurisdiction. Wade’s subsequent motion for leave to amend did not address diversity jurisdiction. And rather than indicate whether he is a citizen of Tennessee, the proposed complaint accompanying the

motion obliquely alleged that he is “a Free Inhabitant in Tennessee” and “a peaceful man, indigenous to the land Tanasi that is now commonly known as Tennessee (the Republic), not the State of Tennessee; a free inhabitant per Article IV of the Articles of Confederation 1781.” *Van Wade*, 720 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (quotation marks omitted). Despite receiving a clear order from the court to “clarify his basis for invoking this Court’s diversity jurisdiction,” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 98, Wade failed to do so in the motion for leave or in the accompanying proposed second amended complaint.⁴ The district court thus appropriately denied leave to amend for failure to allege diversity jurisdiction.⁵

* * *

⁴ The district court also raised the lack of an assertion of diversity jurisdiction, in a prior action, when it dismissed Wade’s state law claims against several of the Fire District Defendants without prejudice. See *Van Wade v. St. Paul Boulevard Fire Dist.*, 2022 WL 486911, at *5 & n.3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2022) (“Alternatively, [Wade] does not appear to be asserting diversity jurisdiction as grounds to pursue his claims in this Court.”).

⁵ Wade later submitted an affidavit with his motion for reconsideration averring that he is domiciled in Tennessee. But “a motion for reconsideration” may not be used “to relitigate an issue already decided.” *Contant v. AMA Cap., LLC*, 66 F.4th 59, 67 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).

We have considered Wade's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we **AFFIRM** the judgment of the district court.⁶

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

The image shows a handwritten signature, "Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe", written in cursive. The signature is positioned over a circular official seal. The seal contains the text "UNITED STATES" at the top, "SECOND CIRCUIT" in the center, and "COURT OF APPEALS" at the bottom, with small stars on either side of the central text.

⁶ In light of our decision affirming, we do not address Wade's request to remand the case to a different district court judge.

Appendix B

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT**

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of August, two thousand twenty-six.

William Van Wade,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

John Nitti, Personally and as employee of Town of
Irondequoit, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER

Docket No: 24-3036

Appellant, William Van Wade, filed a petition for panel rehearing, or, in the alternative, for rehearing *en banc*. The panel that determined the appeal has considered the request for panel rehearing, and the active members of the Court have considered the request for rehearing *en banc*.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk


Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe



WILLIAM VAN WADE

Applicant, Pro Se

Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court of the United States
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543

Re: *William Van Wade v. John Nitti, et al.*

Second Circuit No. 24-3036

Application for Extension of Time to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari


Dear Mr. Harris:

Enclosed for filing are the original and two copies of Applicant William Van Wade's Application for an Extension of Time Within Which to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, together with a separate proof of service and the following appendices:

1. The Second Circuit's May 13, 2026 summary order; and
2. The Second Circuit's August 4, 2026 order denying rehearing.

Applicant respectfully requests that the application be transmitted to the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, Circuit Justice for the Second Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,


October 7, 2026

William Van Wade

Applicant, Pro Se

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