

No. 26A458

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

**K.M.K., by and through her mother and next friend, STEPHANIE LYNNE
BROWN, and STEPHANIE LYNNE BROWN,**
Applicants,

v.

WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Respondents.

To the Honorable Elena Kagan, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States and Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit

APPENDIX

RACHEL TALLON REYNOLDS

Counsel of Record

MARY C. BUTLER

Admission Application Pending

FATIMA AL-RIKABI

Pro Hac Vice Application to be filed

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Document	Record Reference	WIAA Supp. App.
Declaration of Mick Hoffman ISO WIAA's Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction (July 31, 2026)	D. Ct. Dkt. 48	1a–5a
Exhibit A to Hoffman Declaration: WIAA Annual Budget, FY 2025–26	D. Ct. Dkt. 48-1	6a–8a
WIAA Handbook appendix reproducing Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.600.200	D. Ct. Dkt. 36-6 at 128	9a
WIAA's response to the motion for injunction pending appeal (Aug. 28, 2026)	D. Ct. Dkt. 66	10a–15a
Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (excerpts)	D. Ct. Dkt. 36	16a–53a
Plaintiffs' proposed order on the preliminary-injunction motion	D. Ct. Dkt. 36-1	54a–59a
Plaintiffs' reply in support of the preliminary-injunction motion (excerpts)	D. Ct. Dkt. 53	60a–61a
Plaintiffs-Appellants' emergency motion for injunction pending appeal (excerpt)	CA9 Dkt. 17.1	62a
Declaration of James Meyerhoff	CA9 Dkt. 38.2	63a–68a
WIAA's joinder in the opposition briefs (Sept. 17, 2026)	CA9 Dkt. 40.1	69a–70a

THE HONORABLE DAVID G. ESTUDILLO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

K.M.K., by and through her mother, guardian,
and next friend, STEPHANIE LYNNE
BROWN; AND STEPHANIE LYNNE
BROWN,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC
ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION;
WASHINGTON OFFICE OF
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION; WASHINGTON
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION CHRIS REYKDAL in his
official and individual capacities; PUYALLUP
SCHOOL DISTRICT; PUYALLUP SCHOOL
DISTRICT TITLE IX COORDINATOR DR.
GORDON BROBBEY in his official and
individual capacity; ROGERS HIGH
SCHOOL PRINCIPAL JASON SMITH in his
official and individual capacities; and
EMERALD RIDGE HIGH SCHOOL COACH
JOHN MORRISON in his official and
individual capacities,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

**DECLARATION OF MICK
HOFFMAN IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT WASHINGTON
INTERSCHOLASTIC
ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

**NOTED ON MOTION CALENDAR
AUGUST 7, 2026
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED**

I, Mick Hoffman, declare as follows:

1. I am over the age of 18, have personal knowledge of the matters contained herein,
and otherwise competent to testify.

DECLARATION OF MICK HOFFMAN IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC
ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 1

Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

341510659v.1

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1 2. I am the Executive Director of the Washington Interscholastic Activities
2 Association (“WIAA”). I was named the WIAA’s fifth Executive Director in the spring of 2019.
3 I have served at virtually every level of the WIAA and most recently held the role of Assistant
4 Superintendent and Chief Operations Officer for Vancouver Public Schools. I graduated with a
5 Bachelor of Science in Education before earning a Master’s of Education all from the University
6 of Portland.

7 3. The WIAA is a private, nonprofit 501(c)(3) service organization and rule-making
8 body that was formed in 1905 to create equitable playing conditions between high school sports
9 teams in Washington. The Association consists of nearly 800-member high schools and
10 middle/junior high schools, both public and private, and is divided into nine geographic service
11 districts. The WIAA has a Representative Assembly consisting of 35 High School and 18 Middle
12 School delegates. The school delegates are typically athletic directors at member schools. Only
13 the WIAA Representative Assembly and Executive Board have the authority to approve rules for
14 the WIAA Handbook. The WIAA staff does not approve rules but simply helps member schools
15 understand and enforce the school’s adopted rules.

16 4. The WIAA oversees athletics and fine arts in Washington state and hosts 120
17 WIAA state championship events for the following sports and activities: baseball, basketball,
18 bowling, cheerleading, cross country, dance/drill, debate, drama, flag football, football, golf,
19 gymnastics, music, softball, swimming & diving, soccer, tennis, track & field, volleyball, and
20 wrestling. WIAA State Championships run from early November through late May.

21 5. The majority of the WIAA’s revenue comes from hosting the state championships
22 and fees from its member schools, but it does not receive any federal funding. A true and correct
23 copy of the WIAA’s budget for the 2025-2026 fiscal year is attached as **Exhibit A**.
24

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

By

Mick Hoffman

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on July 31, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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DECLARATION OF MICK HOFFMAN IN SUPPORT OF
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Executed on July 31, 2026, at Seattle, Washington.

/s/ Kathy Peters

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DECLARATION OF MICK HOFFMAN IN SUPPORT OF
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 ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION - 5
 Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

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EXHIBIT A



Washington Interscholastic Activities Association
Annual Budget
For Fiscal Year 2025-26

REVENUES

3010 Fees from Member Schools	\$903,000
3030 Interest on Bank Accounts	\$10,000
3040 Miscellaneous	\$500
3045 Rental Income	\$30,000
3060 Sale of School Publications	\$2,000
3061 Academic Awards	\$7,500
3065 Insurance Reimbursement - Districts	In 5063 below
3066 WOA Reimbursement - Operations	\$13,100
3070 State Tournament Income	\$3,505,000
3084 Coaches School	\$65,000
3085 General In-service	\$90,000

DEVELOPMENT REVENUES

3071 Special Events (Esports Revenues)	\$0
3072 Merchandise/Vendor Sales	\$455,000
3073 Hall of Fame	\$2,000
3074 Radio/TV/Social Marketing	\$325,000
3075 Corporate Sponsor	\$695,000
3076 Tournament Programs (Advertising and Sales)	\$76,500
3077 Development Contributions	\$145,000
3090 Foundation Games	\$40,000
Reserves Balancer	\$110,000
TOTAL REVENUES	\$6,474,600

EXPENDITURES**EXECUTIVE BOARD**

4040 Supplies, Materials	\$5,000
4271 Board Meetings/Travel	\$30,000
4470 National Federation Meetings	\$20,000

OPERATIONS

5001 Salaries, WIAA Full-Time Staff	\$1,640,000
5011 Salaries, Part-Time Employees	\$60,000
5013 1099 Contractual Fees	\$64,000
5021 Employment Security	\$29,500
5022 Workman's Comp	\$29,500
5023 Social Security	\$127,600
5024 Medical Benefits	\$275,500
5026 Retirement-Sick/Vac. Benefit	\$153,000
5028 Staff/Professional Development	\$7,500
5029 Staff In-service/Meetings	\$7,500
5030 Miscellaneous	\$5,000
5041 Supplies, Office	\$50,000
5042 Postage	\$60,000
5043 Technical Support	\$150,000
5063 Insurance - Auto, Property, Liability, D&O	\$362,000
5066 Contract Services	\$25,000
5067 Taxes/Tax Fees/Tax Prep.	\$17,500
5068 Annual Auditors Review	\$19,000
5069 Legal	\$250,000

5070	Staff Travel	\$56,500
5080	Capital Outlay	\$7,000
5134	Public Relations	\$7,000
5450	National Federation Fees	\$2,500
5470	National Federation Meetings	\$40,000

BUILDING OPERATIONS

5961	Office: Building Maintenance	\$47,000
5962	Office: Equipment Maintenance	\$10,000
5963	Office: Utilities	\$45,500
5964	Office: Telephone/Cable/Internet	\$53,500
5965	Office: Auto Lease/Maintenance	\$10,000

AFFILIATE ORGANIZATIONS

6550	Athletic Administrators Grant	\$0
6650	Coaches Administrative Grant	\$0
6655	WOA Training Grant	\$0

STATEWIDE ACTIVITIES

7540	Trophies	\$50,000
7541	Scholastic Awards	\$15,000
7550	State Tournament Expenses	\$2,392,500
7560	Insurance – Catastrophic – State Events	\$34,000
7561	WIAA Tournament L&I	\$30,000
7570	"Just Play Fair!"	\$15,000
7580	Athletic Directors Workshop	\$10,000
7581	Women's Sports Summit	\$0
7582	Coaches School	\$10,000
7583	General In-service	\$45,000

DEVELOPMENT

7861	Special Projects	\$10,000
7862	Scholarships – LEAP/Title	\$5,000
7865	Special Events (Esports)	\$0
7866	Hall of Fame	\$13,000
7867	Merchandise and Promotions / Apparel	\$10,500
7868	Radio/TV/Social Marketing	\$5,000
7870	Logo/Banner/Branding	\$13,000
7871	Student Relations/Outreach (LEAP)	\$13,000
7872	Tournament Programs	\$60,000

COMMITTEES

7671	Committee Meetings	\$11,000
7771	Winter Coalition/Assembly Meetings	\$1,000

MEMBER SCHOOLS

7834	Publications - NFHS	\$65,000
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RESERVE FUNDS / SPECIAL PROJECTS

7880	Strategic Planning	\$0
TOTAL EXPENDITURES		\$6,474,600

Q-2: As the athletic director, I want to appeal the ejection of my coach from yesterday's game. The coach notified the official of the intent to appeal at the time of the ejection. I agree with my coach that the official made the wrong judgment call. What is the appeal process I must follow?

A-2: The process for the appeal of a judgment call that led to an ejection by a game official is spelled out in the rule.

Q-3: During the contest last night, a player from the other team punched one of our players but it was not seen by the official. We have everything on video tape. Can this be reviewed and the correct suspension handed down to the player?

A-3: No. The WIAA Staff will not review a video of an incident to suspend another individual when it was not seen by the official, unless it is part of the appeal process for an ejection submitted by that school. The video should be sent to the opposing school's athletic director to be reviewed.

23.1.0 DEFINITION OF A HEAD COACH:

Q-1: Since we offer girls basketball during the fall for the middle level and during the winter for the high school, could we hire the same person to be the head coach at both levels?

A-1: Yes, provided the coach has a written agreement with the school district to coach at both levels during their specific, designated season.

23.2.2 COACHING STIPENDS AND GIFTS TO COACHES:

Q-1: Does the \$500 limit also apply for a coach conducting clinics and/or training sessions during the summer?

A-1: Yes. School board approval is required for any payments and/or gifts to a coach in excess of \$500 while conducting coaching duties or activities, including any year round activities, related to each sport **they coach** for that school. This includes payment by a booster club, individual(s) or group(s) for coaching involvement on behalf of the school.

23.5.1 STUDENTS AS VOLUNTEER COACHES:

Q-1: Could a high school senior assist with the middle level basketball program in the fall?

A-1: Yes. High school students may serve as middle level volunteer assistant coaches during the designated middle school season when under the direct supervision of the middle level coach. These high school students must meet WIAA Coaching Standards minimum requirements to hold a valid First Aid Certification and a valid CPR card.

23.5.11 LIFT CERTIFICATION FOR DANCE/DRILL COACHES:

Q-1: Does every dance/drill coach need to have this certification?

A-1: No. Each team must have at least one lift-certified coach on site during practice and competition in order for an athlete(s) to be eligible to perform lifts.

28.4.0 APPEAL OF PENALTY FOR USE OF INELIGIBLE PARTICIPANT:

Q1: My coach didn't realize until this morning that one of the students that played in the basketball game last night was ineligible. We understand that we must now forfeit the game, but we won by 40 points and believe this student did not affect the outcome of the game. Is a forfeit appealable?

A-1: Yes, your school can follow the steps outlined in 28.4.0 and also utilize the appeal timeline and process tracking form found at [Appeal Timeline & Process Tracking Form](#).

38.2.1.1 PRACTICE DURING THE SUMMER:

Q-1: If a school offers a full contact practice in the morning and one later in the day does that count as two contact practices for summer football?

A-1: Yes, regardless of which athletes are attending the practice, if two full contact practices are offered on the same day, both have to be counted toward the 10 total limit. an individual athlete can only participate in one contact practice per day, regardless of how many practices are held by the team overall.

THE HONORABLE DAVID G. ESTUDILLO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

K.M.K., by and through her mother, guardian,
and next friend, STEPHANIE LYNNE
BROWN; AND STEPHANIE LYNNE
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Plaintiffs,

vs.

WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC
ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION;
WASHINGTON OFFICE OF
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SCHOOL PRINCIPAL JASON SMITH in his
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EMERALD RIDGE HIGH SCHOOL COACH
JOHN MORRISON in his official and
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Defendants.

Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

**DEFENDANT WASHINGTON
INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES
ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS' EMERGENCY
MOTION FOR INJUNCTION
PENDING APPEAL**

Noted for Hearing August 28, 2026

Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal (Dkt. No. 63, hereinafter
"Emergency Motion") is seeking the same relief as their preliminary injunction did and should be

DEFENDANT WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC
ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING
APPEAL - 1

Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

343505972v.1

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1 denied for the same reasons. Indeed, this Emergency Motion acts more like a motion for
2 reconsideration. There are no new arguments or evidence put forth that would change the outcome.
3 Plaintiffs' request should be denied.

4 **A. The WIAA Relies Upon Its Argument, Briefing, and Evidence Already Submitted.**

5 The Washington Interscholastic Activities Association ("WIAA") relies upon the
6 arguments, briefing, and evidence already submitted to this Court in opposition to Plaintiffs'
7 preliminary injunction, at Dkt Nos. 47 to 48, which are incorporated herein by reference.
8

9 **B. Plaintiff K.M.K.'S Requested Relief Specific To The WIAA Is Not Ripe For This**
10 **Court's Consideration.**

11 The only relief that Plaintiffs seek for which the WIAA could realistically provide would
12 be granting her a hardship waiver to participate in varsity sports at her new school. This request
13 for relief is not ripe for this Court's consideration because the WIAA already has a process by
14 which K.M.K can obtain the relief she seeks once she transfers schools and she has not gone
15 through that process. In other words, she has not yet transferred schools and been denied eligibility
16 so her request that this Court mandate a hardship waiver that would provide her eligibility is
17 premature and not ripe for this Court's consideration.
18

19 In the Ninth Circuit, ripeness requires issues that are "definite and concrete, not
20 hypothetical or abstract," and constitutional ripeness substantially overlaps with the injury-in-fact
21 requirement that the alleged injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. *Clark v.*
22 *City of Seattle*, 899 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2018). Ripeness is "standing on a timeline," and a claim is
23 not ripe when it depends on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or may not
24 occur at all. *Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 698 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2012).
25

1 That is precisely the problem here. Plaintiff seeks, among other things, an injunction
2 granting her eligibility to play varsity sports at a new school, but she has not yet transferred to that
3 school and has not been deemed ineligible to play there. The requested relief therefore depends
4 on at least two future contingencies: that Plaintiff transfers and that someone then denies her
5 eligibility. Until those events occur, there is no concrete denial for the Court to remedy; there is
6 only speculation about what might happen later.
7

8 Nor can Plaintiffs avoid ripeness by characterizing the requested injunction as preventive.
9 The Ninth Circuit recognizes that a plaintiff need not always wait for threatened injury to be
10 consummated, but it still requires a real and imminent threat rather than a generalized or
11 speculative possibility. *Wolfson v. Brammer*, 616 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff
12 identifies no actual eligibility determination, no denial, and no final decision applying any rule to
13 her at the new school. No school, nor the WIAA has deemed Plaintiff ineligible yet. Once Plaintiff
14 K.M.K is at another school (either Puyallup or elsewhere) that school's Athletic Director ("AD")
15 determines her eligibility pursuant to WIAA Rule 18.0.0 et seq.¹ Multiple factors go into an
16 eligibility determination, including physical health, academic eligibility, and residence. Even if
17 she was determined ineligible, the local WIAA District Eligibility Committee could hear K.M.K's
18 hardship appeal and consider whether to grant her a hardship waiver (WIAA Rule 18.14.0 and
19 19.0.0 et seq.)—which she is asking for from this Court. If the WIAA District did not grant the
20 hardship waiver, K.M.K. could still appeal that decision to the WIAA's Executive Director. None
21 of those things has occurred.
22
23

24
25 ¹ In light of the quick turnaround for this response, a separate declaration was not obtained, but
26 the undersigned is general counsel for the WIAA and can attest to the process described here and
27 also cites to WIAA Handbook rules, which can be found on the WIAA's website,
<https://www.wiaa.com/wiaa-handbook/>

1 In other words, the WIAA's Rules already allow K.M.K. to seek the relief she requests.
2 She has not been denied eligibility, so this Court should not insert itself and decide a hypothetical
3 dispute on an undeveloped factual record, which ripeness doctrine is designed to prevent.
4 *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court should therefore reject the
5 eligibility-based injunction relief as unripe and premature.
6

7
8 DATED August 28, 2026.

9 WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ,
10 EDELMAN & DICKER LLP

11 /s/ Mary Butler

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24 I certify that this memorandum contains 716
25 words, in compliance with the Local Civil
26 Rules.

27 ***Attorneys for Defendant Washington
Interscholastic Activities Association***

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on August 28, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following:

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*Attorneys for State Defendants Office of the
 Superintendent of Public Instruction and
 Chris Reykdal*

Executed on August 28, 2026, at Seattle, Washington.

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DEFENDANT WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC
 ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
 EMERGENCY MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING
 APPEAL - 6
 Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

343505972v.1

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7 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
8 **WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**
9 **TACOMA DIVISION**

10 K.M.K., by and through her mother
11 and legal guardian, STEPHANIE
12 LYNNE BROWN; STEPHANIE
13 LYNNE BROWN,
14 *Plaintiffs,*

15 v.

16 WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC
17 ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, et al.,
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Defendants.

No.: 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

The Honorable David G. Estudillo

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:
August 7, 2026

Oral Argument Requested

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INTRODUCTION

Parents—not school officials—should decide what’s safe for their kids. But that doesn’t work when schools hide key information. Plaintiff Stephanie Brown saw that firsthand: officials matched her daughter, Plaintiff K.M.K., against a male in a “girls” wrestling match without telling her. And then the worst happened: the male sexually assaulted K.M.K. during the match.

Washington officials are responsible for that. Their policies allow female-identifying males to wrestle girls in the female category of WIAA-sponsored wrestling—without giving parents notice or a chance to opt girls out of matches with males. These policies put K.M.K. at risk of unknowingly wrestling a male again—unless K.M.K. leaves the sport she loves.

Plaintiffs thus move for a preliminary injunction. Washington officials should respect Ms. Brown’s right to direct K.M.K.’s upbringing by not matching K.M.K. against a male where feasible, and if not feasible, giving her notice and the right to opt out without penalty. It’s her fundamental right to decide whether K.M.K. should wrestle a male and risk harm. *See Mirabelli v. Bonta*, 607 U.S. 492 (2026) (per curiam).

Allowing males to compete in women’s sports also violates Title IX, so the Court should enjoin Defendants from allowing males in any matches in which K.M.K. participates. Wrestling is the ultimate contact sport with close, intimate physical contact. So “allowing biological males to play on women’s and girls’ sports teams can put female athletes at a serious disadvantage.” *West Virginia v. B.P.J.*, No. 24–38, 2026 WL 1868739, at *8 (June 30, 2026). This “hard reality ... cannot be ignored or swept under the rug.” *Id.* And given the hostile environment caused by officials’ failure to respond appropriately to K.M.K.’s sexual assault, K.M.K. seeks transfer and transportation to another high school without losing athletic eligibility.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. **Allowing biological males to secretly compete in girls' wrestling harms girls.**

If girls' sports involve competing with males, parents need to know—regardless of the male athlete's gender identity—because males have inherent athletic advantages. But Washington's policies shut parents out.

A. **Males have an athletic advantage over females in wrestling, even in the same weight class.**

Males have stronger bones, greater blood oxygenation efficiency, taller height, broader wingspan, and more lean body mass. Ex. 1, Brown Expert Decl. ¶¶ 86–125. This translates to greater speed, strength, and overall athletic advantage. *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *10. According to the International Olympic Committee, “male sex...confers performance advantage in *all* sports and events that rely on strength, power, and/or endurance,” so eligibility must be sex-based “[t]o protect fairness in such sports.”¹ See *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *4–*5.

The physical characteristics “most strongly associated with competitive success” in wrestling are “isometric strength, dynamic strength, anaerobic power, muscular endurance, aerobic endurance, and body composition.” Ex. 1, Brown Expert Decl. ¶ 128. For each, males have a substantial advantage over females. *Id.* ¶ 130. These advantages enhance males’ “ability to execute takedowns, maintain control positions, perform lifts and mat returns, resist an opponent’s attacks, recover from repeated high-intensity efforts, and sustain performance throughout a match and tournament.” *Id.* ¶ 167.

¹ See International Olympic Committee, *Policy on the Protection of the Female (Women's) Category in Olympic Sport* (March 2026) (emphasis added), <https://perma.cc/D9RR-63RS>.

1 Males have a large strength advantage, even when expressed relative to
2 body mass. *Id.* ¶¶ 132–40. For example, “males exhibit approximately 54% greater
3 relative upper-body strength” and “39% greater relative lower-body strength.” *Id.*
4 ¶ 133. Similarly, when normalized to body mass after puberty, males have 25–30%
5 stronger grip strength, *id.* ¶ 141, can perform about 600% more pull-ups, *id.* ¶ 144,
6 and generate greater anaerobic power than females, *id.* ¶ 154. These advantages
7 exist to some degree at all ages. *E.g., id.* ¶¶ 145, 168. And for competitive athletes,
8 the discrepancies are even larger. *Id.* ¶ 134.

9 Weight categories and body composition rules don’t erase the advantage:
10 “even when differences in body composition are accounted for, male performance
11 advantages persist.” *Id.* ¶ 153. For example, when lean body mass proportion is
12 controlled, males still have a 9.46% stronger handgrip, 15.7% greater back
13 strength, and 11.7% better jump performance. *Id.*

14 In addition to undermining fairness, male participation in women’s wrest-
15 ling is unsafe. Ex. 2, Carlson Expert Decl. at 2–3. Males’ greater speed and
16 strength “can result in greater risk of injury to females when males compete
17 against them.” *Id.* ¶ 57; *see also id.* ¶¶ 42–55. At the same time, “the female body
18 appears more vulnerable than the male body to certain types of injury.” *Id.* ¶ 57.
19 In particular, females are prone to more frequent, more severe, and longer-lasting
20 concussions. *Id.* ¶¶ 62–73. Likewise, females are “far more vulnerable to ACL
21 injuries.” *Id.* ¶¶ 74–82.

22 Given males’ greater strength and females’ greater susceptibility to injury,
23 sex differences matter in wrestling. Plus, wrestling involves close physical contact
24 that can make students uncomfortable wrestling against members of the opposite
25
26

sex.² For all these reasons, as WIAA’s assistant executive director acknowledged in 2011, “We need to have girls wrestling girls and guys wrestling guys.”³ But Washington’s rules ignore this need.

B. Washington policies allow biological males who identify as female to join “girls” wrestling.

1. The Washington Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI) requires schools to adopt policies that elevate the interests of males who identify as female over girls’ interests. That means males can compete in girls’ wrestling and girls’ soccer—K.M.K.’s two sports. Verified Complaint (Compl.) ¶¶ 14, 45, 173, Dkt. 1.

OSPI regulations prohibit schools from, based on “gender expression” or “gender identity,” “exclud[ing] any person from participation in, deny[ing] any person the benefits of, or otherwise discriminat[ing] against any person in any interscholastic, club, or intramural athletics or recreational activity.” WAC 392-190-025(1); *see also* RCW 28A.642.020; WAC 392-190-005. And mandatory OSPI guidance requires school districts to let students play on sports teams “consistent with their gender identity.” Ex. 3, OSPI 2012 Guidelines, p.30. Gender identity refers to the student’s “deeply felt internal sense of being male or female,” Ex. 3, p.28, and schools cannot require “proof of medical treatments,” Ex. 3, p.30.

School districts must adopt OSPI’s “model transgender student policy and procedure.” RCW 28A.642.080(1), (3). OSPI enforces school districts’ compliance. RCW 28A.642.030. It can terminate funding or programs, institute corrective action, and place districts on probation. RCW 28A.642.050.

² John Boyle, *Washington Isn’t Iowa*, HeraldNet.com (Feb. 19, 2011, at 21:58 PT), <https://perma.cc/7JBM-WER5> (relating one student’s discomfort).

³ *Id.*

OSPI hasn't been shy about enforcing these demands. Last year, OSPI investigated every school district in the state to make sure each had adopted OSPI's gender-identity policies. Compl. ¶ 278.⁴ For the 92 districts not in compliance, OSPI issued letters demanding "corrective actions" and threatening enforcement action. Compl. ¶¶ 279–90. Most districts adopted OSPI's policy, and OSPI reported the rest to the legislature and threatened them with losing all state funding. *Id.* ¶¶ 280–87.

OSPI isn't naïve to the harm these policies cause to girls. School districts have filed complaints explaining that allowing males to participate in girls' sports denies girls equal opportunities. *See id.* ¶¶ 265–67. Likewise, female athletes have filed complaints against OSPI and even met with Superintendent Reykdal to share how these policies harm girls. *Id.* ¶¶ 268–72. Despite knowing these problems, *id.* ¶¶ 273–74, OSPI refuses to change course.

2. WIAA is Washington's regulatory body for interscholastic sports. RCW 28A.600.200. Puyallup School District, like other municipalities, has delegated control over its interscholastic athletics programs to WIAA. *See id.* WIAA's rules bind the District and other member schools. Ex. 4, Handbook 3.3.0, pp.6–7. Because WIAA controls its recipient-members' athletics programs, it must comply with Title IX's funding conditions. *Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n*, 43 F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994); *see also, e.g., A.B. v. Haw. State Dep't of Educ.*, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1352, 1357–58 (D. Haw. 2019), *aff'd*, 30 F.4th 828 (9th Cir. 2022). It also must respect the Constitution's limitations on state action. *See Clark ex rel. Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n*, 695 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1982) ("associations like [this] are so intertwined with the state that their actions are considered state

⁴ Darryl Colman, OSPI, *Report to the Legislature: 2024–25 Statewide Civil Rights Review* 11–12 (2025), <https://perma.cc/W6HP-YW5Y>.

1 action”); *e.g.*, *Kanongata’a v. WIAA*, No. C05-1956C, 2006 WL 1727891, at *16 n.9
 2 (W.D. Wash. June 20, 2006).

3 WIAA policy, too, says that athletes “participate in programs consistent
 4 with their gender identity.” Ex. 4, Handbook 18.16.0, p.41; *see also id.*, Handbook
 5 19.6.2, p.46 (gender-identity eligibility policy), App. 3, p.91 (Gender Identity—
 6 Definitions). To that end, WIAA prohibits schools from asking students for “proof
 7 of gender, like a birth certificate or doctor’s statement.” Ex. 5, Gender Diverse
 8 Inclusivity Toolkit p.11. Indeed, it says a student’s gender identity—and thus
 9 athletic participation—can change from season to season, and that an athlete who
 10 identifies as “nonbinary” is free to “select the gendered team on which they feel
 11 most comfortable participating.” Ex. 5, Toolkit p.16.

12 WIAA recognizes boys’ wrestling and girls’ wrestling as independent sports,
 13 and its weight-management program—designed to protect athletes’ health and
 14 prevent unhealthy weight-loss efforts—mandates sex-differentiated body-fat
 15 percentage limits. Ex. 6, Washington Wrestling Weight Management Program p.2.
 16 But the policy exempts athletes if a physician certifies that “the athlete is
 17 naturally” below the minimum. *Id.* Since males naturally have a lower body-fat
 18 percentage than females, Brown Expert Decl. ¶¶ 109–15, a male could easily
 19 satisfy that standard and avoid the girls’ body-fat minimum.

20 When school districts petitioned to change WIAA’s policies, WIAA refused to
 21 hold a binding vote. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 307–18. And when school districts, parents,
 22 and girls protested, WIAA suggested that they stop “complaining.”⁵

23 3. The District’s policies also discriminate against girls. Its rules say
 24 students will “participate in ... athletic programs/opportunities in a manner that is

25 ⁵ Denise Whitaker, *Proposals to Ban Transgender Student-Athletes from Girls’*
 26 *Sports in Washington Fail*, KOMO News (Apr. 22, 2025), <https://perma.cc/V47V-AN6Y?type=image>; *see* Compl. ¶¶ 301–18.

1 consistent with their gender identity.” Ex. 7, Policy 3211R, p. 3; *see also* Ex. 8,
2 Policy 3211 p.1; Ex. 9, 2151 p.1; Compl. ¶¶ 192–96.

3 **II. Defendants put K.M.K. in harm’s way.**

4 Loss of fair competition isn’t the only harm caused by allowing males to
5 compete in girls’ sports—as K.M.K. learned.

6 **A. K.M.K. was sexually assaulted by a male competitor during a**
7 **girls’ wrestling tournament.**

8 In a match for third place at the WIAA Lady Jags Kickoff Tournament,
9 District officials instructed K.M.K. to wrestle an opponent, who, unknown to her,
10 was a male who identifies as a girl. Compl. ¶¶ 58, 89. During the match, the male
11 sexually assaulted her; the athlete’s fingers pushed hard through K.M.K.’s singlet,
12 her spandex shorts, and her underwear, and penetrated her vagina for several
13 seconds. *Id.* ¶¶ 67–68. K.M.K. felt violated and was in incredible pain. *Id.* ¶¶ 68–
14 69.

15 After being sexually assaulted, K.M.K. tried to lose the match. *Id.* ¶ 73. But
16 before she could, the male again groped forcefully around her vagina. *Id.* Seconds
17 later, K.M.K. allowed herself to be pinned to end the match. *Id.*

18 After the match, K.M.K. ran to her mother. *Id.* ¶ 81. While she was sobbing,
19 another team’s coach told her that her opponent was male. *Id.* ¶ 89. This deepened
20 her feeling of violation and shock. *Id.* ¶ 90. Neither she, nor her mother, had any
21 idea. *Id.* ¶¶ 58, 90. K.M.K. felt betrayed that she’d been told to wrestle a male
22 without her (or her mother’s) knowledge or consent. *Id.* ¶ 90.

23 Because of the sexual assault, K.M.K. suffered pain and emotional distress,
24 as well as ongoing anxiety that (among other harms) has caused her to miss
25 school. *Id.* ¶¶ 97–100; Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 20–35.

B. Defendants’ policies and actions have excluded K.M.K. from participating in wrestling at Rogers High School.

The following Monday, Ms. Brown notified the school that K.M.K. had been sexually assaulted by the male competitor during the match. Ex. 10. Because “professional school personnel” must report a sexual assault to law enforcement within 48 hours, Ms. Brown and K.M.K. relied on the District to report it right away. Compl. ¶¶ 93–94; RCW 26.44.030 (a) & (h); Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 14–15; Ex. 3, OSPI 2012 Guidelines pp.62–66; *see also* Ex. 11, Policy 3210 p.1. But that did not happen.

By January 2, 2026, the District had still taken no action. Compl. ¶¶ 102–103. So K.M.K. made the difficult decision to withdraw from wrestling until she was no longer in danger of wrestling a male—potentially the same male. *Id.* ¶ 104. She likewise could not compete in soccer, where the same safety concerns apply. *Id.* ¶ 173; *see also* Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 16–19.

On January 25, K.M.K. saw a video reporting that 13 girls from Emerald Ridge High School had complained to District officials that two males on the girls’ wrestling team made them uncomfortable in their locker room. Compl. ¶ 109. According to the reporter, school officials dismissed the girls’ complaints and gave them OSPI handouts on inclusivity. *Id.* ¶ 113. K.M.K. made the connection: One of these males was likely the person she wrestled, other girls were at risk, and the District would do nothing. *Id.* ¶ 110. So K.M.K. shared her story with that reporter. *Id.* ¶ 116.

On January 30, 2026—just one day after the outlet contacted the District for comment about K.M.K.’s assault—the District reported it to the Pierce County

Sheriff's Office.⁶ Compl. ¶ 135. A detective found probable cause for felony third-degree rape and referred charges to the prosecutor.⁷ The District delayed its investigation until 10 days later, after K.M.K.'s story became public and the U.S. Department of Education also opened an investigation. Compl. ¶¶ 139–41.

After going public about the sexual assault, K.M.K. encountered a worsening hostile environment at school. *Id.* ¶¶ 153–64. School officials, classmates, teammates, and even the wrestling coaches have mistreated her. *Id.* The District has done nothing to remedy this treatment or the sexual assault. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 16–23. Its investigation has yet to conclude over four months after it began. Compl. ¶¶ 165–72.

And even worse, four days before K.M.K. brought this case, the elected Pierce County District Attorney declined to bring charges—based on the startling theory that K.M.K. *consented* to being sexually assaulted. Ex. 13, pp.7–8.

III. Defendants refuse to protect K.M.K. from having to compete against males—or to notify her mother beforehand.

Despite the harm their policies have caused K.M.K., neither WIAA, OSPI, nor the District will protect her from being matched to wrestle a male again. They will not notify parents upon matching their daughters against males, or let parents opt their daughters out of these matches without penalty. *See supra* Pt.I.B. Even after the Supreme Court's order in *Mirabelli*, no Defendant will change its policies—not OSPI,⁸ not WIAA, Compl. ¶¶ 314–20, and not the District. *Id.* ¶ 183.

⁶ See Ex. 12, Conner Board, *Investigations Underway After Alleged Sexual Assault During Wrestling Match*, King5 (Feb. 13, 2026, at 20:49 PT) (quoting a statement from the Sheriff's Office).

⁷ See *supra* n.6.

⁸ Inside Olympia, *Inside Olympia—Chris Reykdal*, OSPI, YouTube, at 42:00 to 50:00 (Apr. 9, 2026), <https://youtu.be/em-Nn5SjBDM?si=j8bgnasWufoR9qsD>; see Compl. ¶¶ 291–94.

On March 27, 2026, Ms. Brown sent Dr. Brobbey a request for supportive measures. Ex. 14 (Brobbey email April 3, 2026). Among other things, she requested assurance that her daughter would “not have to compete against any biological males.” *Id.* at 5. Dr. Brobbey refused because “WIAA rule (18.15.0-18.15.5), state law (WAC 392-190-025), OSPI rules, and district policy allow students to participate in and compete in sports in alignment with their gender identity.” *Id.* at 2. Ms. Brown asked alternatively that she and K.M.K. receive notice and a chance to opt out “before any biological male participate[d] on [K.M.K.’s] wrestling team or an opposing wrestling team in her weight category.” *Id.* at 2–3. But Dr. Brobbey again refused, claiming, “WIAA rules[] and district policies” prohibit notice. *Id.* at 3. So even though District records show students’ legal sex, Ex. 7, Policy 3211R p.2, it refuses to use this information to let girls discreetly avoid wrestling males.

All this excludes K.M.K. from wrestling and soccer. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 10, 16–24, 36–41. While K.M.K.’s male opponent advanced to the state tournament, Defendants have made K.M.K. a spectator in her own sport. Compl. ¶¶ 77–78, 104, 143.

STANDARD FOR GRANTING THE MOTION

A plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction when she shows a likelihood of success on the merits; irreparable harm; that the balance of equities tips in her favor; and that an injunction is in the public interest. *See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). These factors are analyzed on a “sliding scale,” *Fellowship of Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.*, 82 F.4th 664, 684 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation modified), so “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another,” *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2011). A preliminary injunction is also

proper when the plaintiff shows “serious questions going to the merits” and a balance of hardships that “tips sharply” in her favor. *All. for the Wild Rockies*, 632 F.3d at 1135.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits.

Ms. Brown and K.M.K. are likely to succeed on their claims that Defendants’ policies violate Ms. Brown’s fundamental parental rights and K.M.K.’s Title IX protections.

A. Ms. Brown’s fundamental parental rights entitle her to notice and an opportunity to opt out of K.M.K. wrestling a male.

Parents shouldn’t be kept in the dark and misled when their child’s safety is at risk. But even now, school officials refuse to protect K.M.K. from wrestling a male again, or even to give Ms. Brown notice and an opportunity to opt her out of matches with males. Compl. ¶¶ 359–61; Ex. 14 (Brobby email April 3, 2026).

Ms. Brown is likely to succeed in her claim against Superintendent Reykdal, WIAA, and the District that these policies violate her fundamental parental rights. To ensure that Ms. Brown can exercise her parental rights without penalty, she needs injunctive relief that prohibits Defendants from matching her daughter against a male. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 36–40. If impossible—say, because of a bracket matchup—Defendants must at least give Ms. Brown notice before the match and the chance to opt K.M.K. out of the match without athletic penalty (without posting a loss or forfeit) in that or future competition. *Id.*

“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.” *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). That right “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e Supreme] Court.” *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality); *see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska*,

1 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). Under this “long-established precedent, parents—not the
2 State—have primary authority with respect to ‘the upbringing and education of
3 children.’” *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 497 (quoting *Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters*, 268 U.S.
4 510, 534–35 (1925)). A parent has authority to direct the conditions under which
5 her child interacts with others, even at school—especially when physical safety
6 and bodily privacy are at issue. *See id.*; *cf. Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 70 (plurality). If the
7 state infringes on this fundamental right, it must show that its policy is narrowly
8 tailored to a compelling state interest. *See Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S.
9 702, 720 (1997).

10 In *Mirabelli*, the Court approved an injunction that forbids California school
11 officials from withholding information about children’s gender-dysphoria
12 symptoms from their parents. 607 U.S. at 496–97. Under a long line of precedent,
13 the Fourteenth Amendment protects parents’ “right not to be shut out of
14 participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health.” *Id.* at 496
15 (citing *Pierce*, 268 U.S. at 534–35; *Meyer*, 262 U.S. at 400; *Parham v. J.R.*,
16 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)). So the Supreme Court held that schools cannot conceal
17 information like this with “an important bearing on a child’s mental health”—
18 much less “facilitate a degree of gender transitioning” without consent. *Id.* at 497.

19 After all, a parent has the right to make “consequential decisions” about her
20 child’s well-being, including her safety. *See id.* at 497. Parents “can and must
21 make those judgments” about the “*physical* or mental health” of their child “even
22 in adolescence.” *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added). Here, the
23 consequential decision that belongs to Ms. Brown is whether her daughter will
24 wrestle competitively against males. Just as California shut parents out of a
25 mental-health decision in *Mirabelli* by concealing gender-dysphoria information
26 and facilitating social transitions, Defendants shut Ms. Brown out of a physical-

1 health decision by concealing whether K.M.K. will wrestle a male and facilitating
2 those matches without parental consent. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 36–40. But the
3 Constitution does not carve out physical safety from parents’ fundamental right to
4 direct their children’s care. *Parham*, 442 U.S. at 602.

5 The District has the information to give Ms. Brown notice, and it knows how
6 to accommodate parents’ choices—it already requires parental permission for
7 extracurricular or off-campus activities, including girls’ wrestling. Ex. 9, Policy
8 2151 p.2; Ex. 15, Student Athletic Handbook 2025–2026 p.5. Ms. Brown consented
9 to K.M.K.’s participation in “girls’ wrestling”; she never consented to K.M.K.
10 wrestling a male. Compl. ¶ 371. Nor did she receive notice that “girls’ wrestling”
11 meant wrestling males. Compl. ¶ 359.

12 That violates Ms. Brown’s “right not to be shut out of participation in
13 [consequential] decisions.” *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 497. Whether to engage in a
14 high-contact, physically demanding sport is consequential to any child’s well-
15 being, and competitors’ sex is a crucial factor. Title IX regulations have long
16 recognized the need for “separate teams for members of each sex” in “contact
17 sport[s]” like “wrestling.” *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *7. Male participation on
18 female wrestling teams is based solely on the male’s “deeply felt internal sense of
19 being ... female,” regardless of *any* inherent physical risks from their participation.
20 Ex. 3, p.28. A league that includes both biological male and female athletes
21 deviates from longstanding safety practices and requires parental consent. But
22 Ms. Brown cannot make that decision if Defendants hide the male’s participation.
23 Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 36–40.

24 The District represented that K.M.K. “would be able to forfeit any such
25 matches [with a biological male] without any adverse consequences *imposed by the*
26 *district*.” Ex. 14 (Brobbeey email April 3, 2026) (emphasis added). But that’s not a

1 meaningful option—if she doesn’t know which matches have males, she’s essentially
 2 excluded from wrestling to preserve her safety. And the consequences don’t come
 3 mainly from the district, but from WIAA counting a forfeit against her record.⁹

4 Without specific notice when K.M.K. is set to wrestle a male, Ms. Brown
 5 must either cede decision-making to the government or pull her daughter from the
 6 sports she loves. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶ 37. Such a penalty independently
 7 violates Ms. Brown’s parental rights. “[W]hen the government chooses to provide
 8 public benefits, it may not condition the availability of those benefits upon a
 9 recipient’s willingness to surrender” her fundamental constitutional rights.

10 *Mahmoud v. Taylor*, 606 U.S. 522, 561 (2025) (citation modified); *see also*
 11 *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 496–97. Just as general notice that LGBTQ books would be
 12 taught was not enough in *Mahmoud*, general notice that males compete in girls’
 13 sports is not enough here. *See* 606 U.S. at 560. Specific notice before matches is
 14 necessary to ensure K.M.K.’s full participation in a public benefit—school sports.

15 Defendants lack any compelling interest in withholding notice from Ms.
 16 Brown. The District claims that “FERPA requirements, WIAA rules, and district
 17 policies require districts to maintain confidentiality of a student’s gender identity
 18 information.” Ex. 14 (Brobbeey email April 3, 2026). But privacy interests don’t
 19 justify “cut[ting] out the primary protectors of children’s best interests: their
 20 parents.” *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 496–97. And because “allowing biological males to
 21 play on women’s and girls’ sports teams can put women and girls at significant risk
 22 of injuries,” giving notice of that risk is paramount—especially for the “particularly
 23 severe” safety risk “in contact sports” like wrestling. *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at
 24 *8.

25
 26 ⁹ See NFHS, *Wrestling Points of Emphasis—2024–25* (Sept. 24, 2024),
<https://perma.cc/4U8A-CK4H>.

1 In any event, refusing Ms. Brown’s request is not narrowly tailored to the
2 interests asserted. Ms. Brown asks Defendants not to match her daughter against a
3 male and, at minimum, to give notice. If Defendants honor that request, it’s
4 unlikely anyone’s confidentiality interests are implicated. Notice could be discreet
5 and handled with compassion and appropriate confidentiality safeguards. Indeed,
6 the male wrestlers’ sex was no secret—K.M.K. learned her opponent’s sex from a
7 coach at another District school, and Emerald Ridge students evidently know that
8 two of the girls’ wrestling team members are male. Compl. ¶¶ 89, 109. But
9 Defendants refuse notice regardless of whether the information is publicly known.

10 An in-the-moment forfeiture would also require K.M.K. to make a snap
11 judgment in the heat of competition. All this is avoidable. Defendants could avoid
12 matching her with male wrestlers. Compl. ¶ 49. If that’s ever impossible, advance
13 notice would draw *less* attention to a competitor’s gender identity than an on-the-
14 mat forfeit. Ms. Brown requests the most narrowly tailored option—an injunction
15 that prohibits Defendants from (1) assigning K.M.K. to compete against a male, and
16 (2) making such an assignment without notice and the chance to opt out without
17 penalty if the match-up can’t be avoided. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 36–40.

18 **B. Gender-identity-based athletics policies violate Title IX.**

19 Title IX demands similar relief. Defendants made two decisions that together
20 constitute intentional discrimination under Title IX. First, they created separate
21 girls’ sports teams. That deliberate, sex-based choice recognized “the inherent
22 physical differences between biological men and biological women—as well as the
23 safety and competitive fairness concerns that would arise if males were allowed to
24 compete in female sports.” *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *8. That’s why the Title IX
25 regulations expressly bless this approach, and why nearly every athletics authority
26 subject to Title IX has used it for decades. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)(2) & (c).

1 But then, WIAA, the District, and OSPI adopted policies that put some males
2 into the previously protected girls' category, pulling themselves out of compliance
3 with the separate-teams safe harbor. That is also a sex-conscious decision, and it's
4 intentional discrimination because it represents a choice to take the benefit of
5 female-only sports away from girls and instead to elevate the interests of males who
6 identify as girls. At the least, it's deliberate indifference—Defendants know that
7 male participation harms girls, yet they “disregarded a strong likelihood that [their
8 policies] would result in a violation of federally protected rights.” *A.J.T. ex rel. A.T.*
9 *v. Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279*, 605 U.S. 335, 345 (2025) (citation
10 modified). This violates Title IX in at least four independent ways.

11 1. Defendants intentionally discriminate based on sex in their athletics
12 programs. Title IX prohibits sex-based discrimination, which occurs when “there is
13 no justification for the difference in treatment.” *CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of*
14 *Revenue*, 562 U.S. 277, 287 (2011). But in sports, there is justification for treating
15 the sexes differently—“namely, the inherent physical differences between biological
16 women and biological men.” *See B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *8. So regulations
17 have long recognized that recipients’ athletics “programs” must provide equal
18 “participation” and “benefits” to both sexes, and cannot “discriminat[e]” based on
19 sex. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a). Defendants’ failure to provide equal treatment for girls’
20 sports violates Title IX.

21 In determining equal treatment, practicalities like “the nature of particular
22 sports” matter. Educ. Amends. of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612
23 (1974) (“Javits Amend.”). For decades, Title IX has recognized that males’ inherent
24 athletic advantage justifies “[sex] conscious allocation of [athletic] opportunities.”
25 *Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs.*, 198 F.3d 763, 772 n.8 (9th Cir. 1999); *accord*
26 *Mercer v. Duke Univ.*, 190 F.3d 643, 646 (4th Cir. 1999). That is why schools can

1 have “separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is
2 based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.” 34 C.F.R.
3 § 106.41(b). Without girls’ teams, “boys would dominate the girls’ programs and
4 deny them an equal opportunity to compete in interscholastic events.” *B.P.J.*, 2026
5 WL 1868739, at *8 (quoting *O’Connor v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 23*, 449 U.S. 1301,
6 1307 (1980) (Stevens, J., in chambers)). So when Title IX took effect, WIAA, OSPI,
7 and the District—like school authorities around the country—chose sex-based
8 separation for most sports.

9 Creating separate teams, rather than making all sports co-ed, was an
10 intentional choice made for sex-based reasons. Inherent male advantage means that
11 co-ed teams exclude girls from competition, denying them meaningful athletic
12 opportunity. Wrestling’s development highlights the problem. Before girls’ wrestling
13 existed as a separate sport, some girls competed on boys’ teams because that was
14 their only option. Females have no physiological advantage, so the co-ed sport
15 remained fair and safe for the boys. But as girls’ interest in wrestling grew, WIAA
16 sanctioned and promoted girls’ wrestling as its own sport to extend wrestling’s
17 benefits to girls. That was because of inherent male advantage—girls-only sports
18 create a level playing field that doesn’t exist in co-ed competitions. Defendants can
19 offer no other rationale for creating girls’ wrestling instead of leaving it a co-ed
20 sport.

21 But Defendants’ gender-identity policies upended all that. They intentionally
22 elevate the interests of males identifying as female over the interests of girls in
23 previously protected, girls-only sports. That intentional discrimination against girls
24 violates Title IX. *See Pederson v. La. State Univ.*, 213 F.3d 858, 881 (5th Cir. 2000).
25 Motive doesn’t matter, *id.* at 880, and a school “need not have intended to violate
26 Title IX, but need only have intended to treat women differently.” *Id.* at 881 (finding

1 LSU liable under Title IX for intentionally treating women differently by providing
 2 larger budgets for male sports, even though LSU claimed it neither intended to
 3 harm females nor knew it was violating Title IX); *see also Mansourian v. Regents of*
 4 *Univ. of Cal.*, 602 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified) (official decisions
 5 “to add or decrease roster slots for male or female athletes” are “always—by
 6 definition—intentional”). Defendants treated women differently here—their policies
 7 expanded athletic opportunities for males by contracting those of women.

8 **2.** Defendants also violate Title IX through deliberate indifference to their
 9 failure to provide equal athletic opportunity for girls. *See* 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
 10 When a heightened *risk* of injury is “obvious,” a recipient’s “failure to remedy that
 11 risk constitute[s] an official policy of deliberate indifference that violate[s] Title IX.”
 12 *Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 956 F.3d 1093, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
 13 *Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder*, 500 F.3d 1170, 1178, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007)).
 14 “Allowing a biological male athlete to compete on a girls’ team *necessarily* displaces
 15 or disadvantages a female athlete—replacing her on the roster, knocking her out of
 16 the starting lineup, reducing her playing time, depriving her of a medal, and the
 17 like.” *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *8.

18 Defendants’ own statements about the importance of sex designation in
 19 wrestling reveal their deliberate indifference to the risk to girls. Males weren’t
 20 harmed when a female athlete’s only opportunity in wrestling was on the boys’
 21 team, but the unfairness to *girls* led WIAA to establish girls’ wrestling as its own
 22 sport. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 36–38.

23 Although boys’ teams are theoretically also subject to gender-identity policies,
 24 that doesn’t make these policies sex-neutral. The whole system is sex-based, not
 25 sex-neutral. For example, under WIAA policy (followed by the District), girls and
 26 boys are treated differently when a team exists for one sex, but not the other.

1 Females generally can try out for such a team; males cannot. Ex. 4, Handbook App'x
2 2, p.90–91. The reason for the distinction is male athletic advantage.

3 And Defendants know their policies harm females, not males. After all, it's
4 “undisputed” that “biological males generally possess inherent physical advantages
5 in sports—in height, weight, strength, speed, endurance, jumping ability, and the
6 like.” *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *10. If an exceptional female succeeds in boys'
7 athletics, that's no harm to the boys. *Cf. O'Connor*, 449 U.S. at 1306 n.4 (“The fact
8 that an eighth grader must face competition from talented seventh graders without
9 reciprocal rights,” because his “participation [on seventh-grade teams] would be
10 unfair to the younger students,” shows “there is no necessary reason why boys may
11 not be required to compete with talented girls without reciprocal rights.”). A female
12 lacks athletic advantage regardless of gender identity, so gender-identity policies
13 don't create competitive injury or loss of opportunity for boys.

14 But for girls, gender-identity participation eliminates the competitive fairness
15 and safety that justified the separate teams. As one school predicted over four
16 decades ago, if males could try out for girls' teams, “the boys would dominate the
17 girls' programs and ultimately deprive girls of a fair opportunity to engage in
18 competitive athletics.” *Id.* at 1303; *see id.* at 1307 (crediting this argument). The
19 Ninth Circuit has recognized this, too. *See Clark ex rel. Clark v. Ariz. Interscholastic*
20 *Association*, 886 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1989). Gender identity doesn't affect
21 males' athletic advantage because the latter is based in physiology, not internal
22 sense of self. *See supra* at 6. Under a gender-identity policy, a program cannot
23 “provide equal athletic opportunity” for females. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).

24 Defendants have seen the results in real time. For example, a male runner
25 recently won back-to-back WIAA girls' track-and-field championships, and a male
26 basketball player sidelined girls who reasonably feared for their safety (and

evidently injured one teammate who played anyway). *See* Compl. ¶¶ 301–06. That’s not to mention other high-profile incidents across the nation—from the NCAA D-1 women’s swimming championship in 2022¹⁰ to recent California Interscholastic Federation track-and-field finals.¹¹

Defendants have also heard the objections. Compl. ¶¶ 255–325. Parents and school boards have filed Title IX complaints. Compl. ¶¶ 266–69. The U.S. Department of Education has launched Title IX investigations. Compl. ¶¶ 140, 287. Two Washington female athletes met with OSPI Superintendent Reykdal to share the harms they endured.¹² WIAA has acknowledged girls’ protests and knows about the discrimination its policies cause. Compl. ¶¶ 301–21. Superintendent Reykdal acknowledged that this is “a big issue.”¹³ But he declares that he is “absolutely committed” to gender-identity participation. Compl. ¶ 276.

B.P.J. held that Title IX’s meaning and regulations reflect a “hard reality” that “cannot be ignored or swept under the rug”: “allowing biological males to play on women’s and girls’ sports teams can put female athletes at a serious disadvantage.” 2026 WL 1868739, at *8. Yet Superintendent Reykdal replied that OSPI’s position hasn’t changed.¹⁴

¹⁰ Karie Barnes, *Amid protests, Penn swimmer Lia Thomas Becomes First Known Transgender Athlete to Win Division I National Championship*, ESPN (March 17, 2022, at 19:23 ET), <https://perma.cc/KP6F-TV5R?type=image>.

¹¹ *See* Kerry Mannix, *Tensions Continue at CIF Track and Field Championships Over Competing Transgender Athlete*, ABC 30 News (May 30, 2026), <https://perma.cc/AKP8-4VK8>; Jackson Thompson, *LGBTQ Press Conference at Track Meet Involving Trans Athlete Descends into Chaos, Police Summoned*, Fox News:OutKick (May 30, 2026, at 22:14 ET), <https://perma.cc/YE5D-QAFZ>.

¹² Brandi Kruse, *Another Meaningless EO?*, at 3:13–18:00 (YouTube, Apr. 1, 2026), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DL7HFn0StVo>; *see* Compl. ¶¶ 271–75.

¹³ Inside Olympia, *Inside Olympia—May 22, 2025*, YouTube, at 12:00 to 22:00 (May 22, 2025), <https://youtu.be/PCzL1Ak5-LY?si=VZWnp-aY0U1SC706>.

¹⁴ Press Release, OSPI, *SCOTUS Decisions Uphold Longstanding Civil Rights Protections and States’ Rights* (June 30, 2026), <https://perma.cc/8TWS-D73B>.

1 Defendants' combination of actual knowledge and continued inaction is a
2 hallmark of deliberate indifference, a form of "intentional discrimination," and it
3 requires no "showing of... ill will or animosity." *A.J.T.*, 605 U.S. at 344–45 & n.4.
4 When the harm resulted from an "official policy," actual knowledge is not required.
5 *Mansourian*, 602 F.3d at 967.

6 3. Washington's policies also do not comply with Title IX's longstanding
7 athletics regulations, which were "issued contemporaneously with the statute,"
8 have "remained consistent over time," and are "especially useful in determining
9 the statute's meaning." *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *7 (quoting *Loper Bright*
10 *Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)).

11 Under these longstanding regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 sets up two
12 compliance pathways for athletics programs. Section 106.41(a) "establishes a
13 baseline prohibition against sex discrimination in intercollegiate [and
14 interscholastic] athletics." *Mercer*, 190 F.3d at 646. That could have "require[d]
15 covered institutions to integrate all of their sports teams." *Id.* But recognizing male
16 athletic advantage in contact and competitive sports, § 106.41(b) allows "separate
17 teams" for each sex. And whether the school complies with (a) or with (b), it must
18 provide "equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes" under § 106.41(c).

19 Here, wrestling doesn't comply with either (a) or (b), much less (c). It violates
20 subsection (a)'s general antidiscrimination rule because wrestling teams aren't open
21 to all, regardless of sex. For example, girls' wrestling teams exclude boys unless
22 they identify as female. But neither are there "separate teams for the members of
23 each sex" under § 106.41(b). "[I]n the 1972 Title IX statute, the 1974 Javits
24 Amendment, and the 1975 Title IX regulations," sex means "biological sex and not
25 gender identity, particularly in the sports context." *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *7.
26 Yet under Defendants' policies, students "whose gender identity differs from their

1 assigned sex,” Ex. 5, Toolkit p.6, have access to teams designated for the other sex.
 2 Because of these policies, the Emerald Ridge girls’ wrestling team—and thus the
 3 Lady Jags Tournament—included both males and females. This means girls’
 4 wrestling doesn’t qualify for the § 106.41(b) “separate teams” safe harbor either.

5 The result is an incomplete sex-designation that falls outside the bounds of
 6 § 106.41(a) and (b). That, too, is intentional discrimination against girls because
 7 Washington intentionally stepped outside the safe harbor that it knew protected
 8 girls. Plus, it’s not “equal athletic opportunity” under 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) because
 9 it removes the female-only teams that Defendants created for that purpose.

10 4. Agency guidance confirms this understanding of § 106.41(c) and brings
 11 the violation into sharper relief: that this is an instance where separate teams are
 12 required, not just permitted. As regulators explained decades ago, effectively
 13 accommodating girls “means that if an institution sponsors a team for members of
 14 one sex in a contact sport, it must do so for members of the other sex,” provided
 15 (1) opportunities for the excluded sex were historically limited and (2) there’s
 16 sufficient interest for a viable team and interschool competition. Policy Interpreta-
 17 tion: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11,
 18 1979). Failing to do so violates Title IX under § 106.41(c) and the “Selection of
 19 Sports” portion of the Policy Interpretation, which is subject to *Auer* deference.
 20 *Berndsen v. N.D. Univ. Sys.*, 7 F.4th 782, 787 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding failure to
 21 provide women’s ice hockey stated plausible claim and deferring to “Selection of
 22 Sports” portion of Policy Interpretation).¹⁵

23 It’s indisputable that girls’ opportunities were historically limited. And
 24 because the District’s (and the state’s) female athletes have shown interest and

25 ¹⁵ The Ninth Circuit has long afforded deference to the Policy Interpretation, *see*
 26 *Mansourian*, 594 F.3d at 965 & n.9, and that remains proper today, *see B.P.J.*, 2026
 WL 1868739, at *7.

ability in wrestling today, Defendants must provide that opportunity. *See* 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). In 2007, WIAA complied with this obligation by sanctioning girls' wrestling as a separate sport, and schools like the District promoted and expanded girls' teams. The rules now generally exclude girls from boys' wrestling—unless they assert a male gender identity, they cannot participate. *See supra* at 6. So, to accommodate girls' interests and abilities and provide equal opportunity, WIAA and the District *must* “sponsor a separate team” for girls. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. They haven't done that, though, because girls' wrestling teams include boys. *See supra* at 6. By intentionally opening girls' wrestling up to boys—particularly in the face of the Policy Interpretation—they violate Title IX.

C. The District violated Title IX through deliberate indifference to the sexual assault K.M.K. suffered and the hostile environment she continues to endure.

The District's response to Ms. Brown's report also violated Title IX. Its deliberate indifference to the sexual assault and its ongoing failure to protect K.M.K. from sex-based harassment excludes her from educational opportunities and creates a hostile environment. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 16–23. She needs the chance to play safe girls' sports, as well as a transfer to a safer school. *Id.* ¶¶ 24–34; Ex. 19 at 2 (District email).

A recipient violates Title IX when it acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of employee-on-student or student-on-student sexual harassment, including sexual assault. *Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). A plaintiff must show that (1) the recipient exercised substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred; (2) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred the victim's access to an educational opportunity or benefit; (3) a person with authority to address the harassment and take corrective measures

1 had actual knowledge; (4) the recipient’s response (or lack thereof) was deliberately
2 indifferent; and (5) that deliberate indifference caused or made students vulnerable
3 to harassment. *Brown v. Arizona*, 82 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2023); *Gebser v. Lago*
4 *Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). Failing to investigate or take any
5 corrective action is a violation. *See Karasek*, 956 F.3d at 1105; *Oden v. N. Marianas*
6 *Coll.*, 440 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006).

7 K.M.K. meets all five requirements. *First*, the District exercised substantial
8 control over the context in which the sexual assault occurred and the perpetrator.
9 The entire competitive context—scheduling, match assignments, officiating, and
10 supervision—is within the District’s control. Compl. ¶¶ 54–60, 297–99; *e.g.*, Ex. 15,
11 Student Handbook p.5–6. So too is the campus environment where K.M.K. has
12 suffered hostility from coaches and students over reporting the sexual assault.
13 Compl. ¶¶ 153–64.

14 *Second*, the harassment was so severe and pervasive that it denied K.M.K.
15 access to educational opportunities. To end the match, she let herself be pinned,
16 losing third place. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 73–78. Following the sexual assault, District
17 officials first took no action and then tolerated hostility towards K.M.K. from other
18 students and even coaches. Compl. ¶¶ 105–91, 326–35. That, too, violates Title IX.
19 *See, e.g., Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.*, 477 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th
20 Cir. 2007) (victim’s withdrawal from university “was reasonable and expected,” and
21 then the school “failed to take any precautions that would prevent future attacks”).
22 And the District refuses to protect her in the future. Compl. ¶¶ 175–84. K.M.K. thus
23 cannot participate in WIAA or District sports. *Id.*; Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 16–23,
24 36–41. The resulting anxiety causes her to miss school, too. *Id.* ¶¶ 97–100;
25 Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 20–35. That denial of educational benefits is
26 discrimination.

1 *Third*, the District had actual knowledge of the sexual assault and the
 2 resulting hostile environment. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 14–15. District employees
 3 witnessed the match. Compl. ¶¶ 54–96, 105. Ms. Brown wrote a complaint to Coach
 4 Scott on December 8, 2025—the Monday after the sexual assault. Ex. 10; *see* Compl.
 5 ¶¶ 92–96. She even sent the video. Compl. Exs. 1–2, Dkt. 1-10 and Dkt. 1-11.
 6 Coaches Scott and Carlson, as well as Principal Smith—officials with authority to
 7 take corrective measures—had actual knowledge of the facts. Compl. ¶¶ 92–105,
 8 114–20, 133. By at least February 17, the school board did, too. *Id.* ¶¶ 148–152. And
 9 Coach Scott (and other officials) know about the hostile environment K.M.K. has
 10 suffered at school—they created it. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 153–161; Ex. 19 at 1–2 (District
 11 email).

12 *Fourth*, the District’s response was deliberately indifferent. Stephanie Brown
 13 Decl. ¶¶ 14–23. The District did not report the sexual assault to law enforcement
 14 until January 30, 2026—only after a journalist’s questions made concealment
 15 impossible—in violation of the 48-hour mandatory reporting requirement. Compl.
 16 ¶¶ 132–137. It did not open a Title IX investigation until February 20, 2026—more
 17 than two and a half months after the sexual assault—and that investigation
 18 remains incomplete. Compl. ¶¶ 165–74. This is a far cry from remedial action.
 19 *Vance ex rel. Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist.*, 231 F.3d 253, 259–61 (6th Cir.
 20 2000). Meanwhile, school officials “minim[ized] ... the discriminatory import of ...
 21 [the] assault.” *S.S. v. Alexander*, 177 P.3d 724, 739 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008). That, too,
 22 is evidence of deliberate indifference. *Id.* (collecting cases). The same is true for
 23 treating the abuser and the abused equally—let alone for treating the abuser better.
 24 *Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp.*, 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D. Ind.
 25 2007). The District has also taken no meaningful steps to remedy the hostile
 26 environment, protect K.M.K., or facilitate her safe return to school sports. Compl.

¶¶ 175–84; *see Williams*, 477 F.3d at 1296–97. Instead, it refused to let her transfer schools. Ex. 19 at 1 (District email).

Fifth, the District’s response has caused sex-based harassment—and it makes K.M.K. vulnerable to more. Compl. ¶¶ 175–84; Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 14–23, 36–41. Its policies have created “a sexually hostile environment in which female students are more prone to [sexual] assault.” *Doe v. Univ. of Tenn.*, 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 812–14 (M.D. Tenn. 2016). By taking no corrective action (to the reported assault or to Emerald Ridge girls’ concerns, Compl. ¶¶ 109–10), the District seems to condone the sexual assault and harassment. That has led to a further hostile environment from students and employees. Compl. ¶¶ 105–91. Without relief, K.M.K. cannot participate in wrestling for fear of wrestling a male again—including the one who sexually assaulted her. *Id.* ¶¶ 104, 173.

The District’s conduct here—inaction and ongoing hostility from school personnel—establishes a strong likelihood of success. *All. for the Wild Rockies*, 632 F.3d at 1135. The remedy is to allow K.M.K. to avoid wrestling males and to facilitate transfer to a safer school, such as Puyallup High School, without athletic penalties. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 20–35.

II. K.M.K. and Ms. Brown will suffer irreparable harm unless the Court issues injunctive relief.

Ms. Brown will suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. When constitutional rights are at stake, “likelihood of success on the merits... is the most important (and usually decisive)” factor. *Baird v. Bonta*, 81 F.4th 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2023). Here, “denial of [Ms. Brown’s] constitutional rights during the potentially protracted [litigation] process constitutes irreparable harm,” *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 497. As long as Ms. Brown cannot ensure that K.M.K. will not wrestle a male, Defendants force Ms. Brown either to cede her parental decision-making

1 rights or to let K.M.K. be excluded from wrestling—potentially for the rest of her
2 high school career. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 36–39.

3 In the Title IX context, deprivation of educational opportunities and athletic
4 participation constitutes irreparable harm because such losses—training,
5 competition, ranking, and personal development—cannot be remedied by money
6 damages. *Mansourian*, 602 F.3d at 971 (loss of opportunity to compete in athletics
7 cannot be undone); *McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck*, 370
8 F.3d 275, 302 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶41.

9 K.M.K. will also suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief. She has
10 two years of high school remaining. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 4–9. She wants to
11 compete in soccer and wrestling, Compl. ¶ 174, but she “understandabl[y]” cannot
12 do so because Defendants make it unsafe and unfair. *See B.P.J.*, 2026 WL
13 1868739, at *11. She will continue to lose competitive experience, opportunities to
14 advance, recognition, and educational opportunities—as well as the benefits of
15 teamwork and coaching. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶ 41.

16 The girls’ soccer season starts August 24, 2026, and wrestling starts
17 November 16. Ex. 4, Handbook pp.88, 95. Unless this Court intervenes, K.M.K.’s
18 exclusion from athletics will continue because she cannot risk unknowing
19 competition with males. Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 39–40. She also needs to escape
20 the hostile environment at Rogers High, without losing varsity eligibility under
21 WIAA rules. Ex. 4, Handbook 18.12.2.9, p.37–40; Stephanie Brown Decl. ¶¶ 24–34.
22 The District and WIAA should be ordered to facilitate a transfer and
23 transportation to Puyallup High School with a hardship waiver allowing her to
24 remain varsity eligible. *Id.*; Ex. 16, Policy 2151R p.2.

1 **III. The balance of equities and public interest favor Plaintiffs.**

2 “[C]hildren’s safety is the overriding equity.” *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 497. And
3 where injunctive relief compels compliance with federal law, the balance of equities
4 favors plaintiffs. *Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal.*, 840 F.2d 701, 710–11
5 (9th Cir. 1988). The public interest always favors preventing constitutional,
6 *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation modified), or
7 statutory civil rights violations. *Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y.*, 76 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
8 1996).

9 Defendants lack any interest in interfering with Ms. Brown’s right to direct
10 K.M.K.’s education and upbringing. Respecting Ms. Brown’s right to notice and opt-
11 out does not require barring any student from wrestling or disclosing that a
12 particular individual identifies as female—officials can manage match assignments
13 and eligibility behind the scenes. *Supra* Pt.I.A.

14 Congress enacted Title IX to protect students from sex discrimination. The
15 public has a strong interest in ensuring that athletic opportunities are safe, that
16 young female student-athletes need not fear sex-based violence, and that officials
17 respond promptly to harassment. Permitting Defendants to ignore a reported
18 sexual assault, delay investigations for months, and allow hostile environments to
19 persist undermines Title IX.

20 **CONCLUSION**

21 K.M.K. needs protection from competing against males and a transfer to
22 another school by soccer’s start on August 24, 2026. *See* Proposed Order.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 2026.

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the motion contains 8,383 words, in compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(e)(4).

s/ Katherine L. Anderson
Katherine L. Anderson
Counsel for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 10th day of July, 2026, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using the ECF system, which will send a notification to all counsel of record.

s/ Katherine L. Anderson
Katherine L. Anderson
Counsel for Plaintiffs

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6
7 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
8 **WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**
9 **TACOMA DIVISION**

10 K.M.K., by and through her mother
11 and legal guardian, STEPHANIE
12 LYNNE BROWN; STEPHANIE
13 LYNNE BROWN,

14 *Plaintiffs,*

15 v.

16 WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC
17 ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, et al.,

18 *Defendants.*

Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE

The Honorable David G. Estudillo

**[PROPOSED] ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION**

19 Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Having
20 considered the motion, response and reply briefs, evidence of record, and arguments
21 of counsel, the Court concludes that the motion should be **GRANTED**.

22 **BACKGROUND**

23 Defendants Office of Superintendent of Public Schools (OSPI) and Puyallup
24 School District are subject to Title IX's requirements as direct recipients of federal
25 educational funding.
26

1 Defendant Washington Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA) is
2 subject to Title IX's requirements because it exercises controlling authority over
3 federal funding recipients' athletic programs, including through delegations of
4 authority from the District and other member school districts.

5 Policies adopted by WIAA, OSPI, and the District allow biological males who
6 identify as female to compete in girls' sports, including girls' wrestling and soccer.
7 Defendants Superintendent Reykdal; Dr. Gordon Brobbey, Puyallup School
8 District's Title IX Coordinator; Rogers High School Principal Jason Smith; and
9 Emerald Ridge High School Coach John Morrison participate in enforcing these
10 policies.

11 Under their current policies, WIAA, OSPI, the District, and the other
12 Defendants will allow Plaintiff K.M.K. to be matched against biological males in
13 girls' sports, and they will not provide Plaintiff Ms. Brown with reasonable notice
14 and an opportunity to opt her daughter out of such competition without penalty.

15 For three reasons, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claims that
16 Defendants' policies violate the Constitution, unlawfully exclude K.M.K. from
17 interscholastic athletics, deny her its benefits, and discriminate against her in
18 them.

19 First, Ms. Brown is likely to succeed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in showing that
20 these policies violate her fundamental parental rights. Whether an adolescent
21 daughter should compete in a contact sport like wrestling against biologically male
22 athletes is a consequential decision that belongs to parents, not the government.
23 *Mirabelli v. Bonta*, 607 U.S. 492, 497 (2026) (per curiam). "[A]llowing biological
24 males to play on women's and girls' sports teams can put women and girls at
25 significant risk of injuries," so giving notice of that risk is paramount—especially for
26

1 the “particularly severe” safety risk “in contact sports” like wrestling. *W. Virginia v.*
2 *B.P.J.*, No. 24–38, 2026 WL 1868739, at *8 (U.S. June 30, 2026).

3 Second, the policies likely violate Title IX. 42 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Since 1975,
4 Title IX regulations have recognized that athletic programs must provide equal
5 “participation” and “benefits” to both sexes, cannot otherwise “discriminat[e]” based
6 on sex, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a), and must provide “equal opportunity” to both sexes,
7 *id.* § 106.41(c). This requires accounting for “the inherent physical differences
8 between biological women and biological men.” *B.P.J.*, 2026 WL 1868739, at *8.
9 Recognizing those inherent differences, allowing biological males into girls’
10 wrestling and soccer diminishes girls’ athletics opportunities without diminishing
11 boys’ opportunities and thus violates Title IX.

12 Third, K.M.K. is likely to succeed in showing that she suffers a hostile
13 environment from officials and peers at Rogers High School that discriminates
14 against K.M.K., that deprives K.M.K. of the benefits of educational opportunities,
15 and that excludes her from educational opportunities, all in violation of Title IX. *See*
16 *Brown v. Arizona*, 82 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2023). The District did not adequately
17 respond to Ms. Brown’s report that K.M.K. suffered sex-based harassment during a
18 District-sponsored WIAA event—specifically, that K.M.K. was assaulted by a
19 biological male wrestling opponent at a girls’ wrestling tournament. The District
20 also refuses to adequately respond to sex-based harassment from officials and peers
21 or to protect K.M.K. going forward.

22 Plaintiffs face irreparable harm, and the balance of equities and the public
23 interest favor granting Plaintiffs’ motion.
24
25
26

ORDER

For these reasons and the reasons stated in this Court's accompanying opinion, **IT IS ORDERED** that:

I. Unless Ms. Brown first receives notice and the right to opt out without academic or athletic penalty to K.M.K., Superintendent Reykdal, WIAA, and the District are prohibited from

a. matching K.M.K. against a biological male in girls' wrestling or,

b. in girls' soccer, allowing any biological male to participate with K.M.K.

An impermissible academic or athletic penalty includes posting a loss or forfeit for K.M.K. or her team as a forfeit or loss in that competition or a future competition, or requiring K.M.K. to sit out any competition, including any WIAA soccer game or wrestling match.

II. Defendants OSPI, WIAA, and the District are prohibited from allowing any biological male to compete with or against K.M.K. in girls' wrestling, girls' soccer, or other contact sports or sports involving competitive athletic skill that are designated for girls or women.

III. WIAA and the District must provide K.M.K. access to their educational programs and activities, including girls' wrestling and soccer, in an environment free of harassment, hostility, or other discrimination. Accordingly:

a. The District must approve K.M.K.'s transfer from Rogers High School to Puyallup High School and provide suitable, no-cost transportation for K.M.K. to and from Plaintiffs' residence.

b. The District must facilitate K.M.K.'s participation in girls' soccer and girls' wrestling at Puyallup High School, without athletic eligibility penalty, such as by submitting or supporting an application for waiver

1 that would exempt K.M.K. from WIAA's varsity-eligibility rules for
2 transferring students. *See* Puyallup School District Policy 2151R.

3 c. WIAA must grant K.M.K. a hardship waiver as described in its current
4 policies or otherwise approve her immediate varsity eligibility. *See*
5 WIAA Policy Handbook 2025-2026, 18.12.2.9.

6 To prevent irreparable harm that would otherwise begin at the start of the
7 girls' soccer season on August 24, 2026 and the start of the 2026-2027 school year on
8 September 2, 2026, Defendants must comply with this order before August 24, 2026.

9 This order shall remain in effect during the pendency of this case or until
10 further order of this Court.

11
12 APPROVED AND SO ORDERED:

13 Dated this ____ day of _____, 2026.

14
15 _____
16 David G. Estudillo
United States District Judge

1 Presented by:

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1 numbers instead of the integrity of the female category misses the forest for the
2 trees. *E.g.*, WIAA.Resp.16–19; District.Resp.17.

3 **B. Title IX does not permit males in female-designated sports.**

4 Defendants say that Title IX *allows* without *requiring* sex-designated
5 athletics. OSPI.Resp.14. But Plaintiffs aren't saying that a co-ed team *always*
6 violates Title IX. Plus, that's not Defendants' policy.

7 Title IX's "default rule" under 106.41(a) "is that athletics must *not* be
8 separated by sex, and a recipient cannot restrict one's ability to participate on an
9 athletic team based on sex." OSPI.Resp.15 (citing *Mercer v. Duke Univ.*, 190 F.3d
10 643, 646 (4th Cir. 1999); *accord* WIAA.Resp.17. Under that default rule, a team
11 must be completely open to both sexes.

12 But Defendants' teams aren't. The WIAA has detailed rules for separating
13 boys' and girls' teams. Handbook App'x 2. They use biological distinctions—that's
14 obviously why they allow girls to play on boys' teams when there's no girls' team,
15 but not vice-versa. *Id.* And boys who identify as boys can't join girls' wrestling. *Id.*
16 So Defendants make *some* sex distinctions and thus fail 106.41(a).

17 What's left is the exception allowing "separate teams for members of each
18 sex." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b). But by allowing boys on girls' teams, they don't comply
19 with that either. MPI.21–22. So they violate 106.41(a) without satisfying the
20 106.41(b) exception.

21 They also violate 106.41(c), which requires "equal athletic opportunity" for
22 girls. Given the sexes' "inherent physical differences related to athletic
23 performance," allowing males into every single female sport with no protection for
24 women plainly violates that mandate. *B.P.J.*, 146 S. Ct. at 2367.

25 Defendants nonetheless insist that teams need not be "*completely* separated
26 by sex" under 106.41(b) because it uses the word "may." OSPI.Resp.15. But the
27 exception allows separate teams for "each sex"—a biological term. And it goes on to
28

1 specify exceptions to that rule. So under the negative-implication canon, 106.41(b)
2 requires complete sex separation to qualify.

3 Defendants' counterarguments fail.

4 *Parents for Privacy*, for example, concluded Title IX does not *require* schools
5 to maintain separate restrooms. 949 F.3d at 1227. WIAA (at 17) and OSPI (at 15)
6 argue the same for athletics. But even if *Parents for Privacy* remains good law post-
7 *B.P.J.* (it doesn't), Title IX's different text and structure for athletics presume a sex-
8 conscious system. *Compare* 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a)–(c), *with* 20 U.S.C. § 1686, 34
9 C.F.R. § 106.33. Defendants refuse to grapple with those textual differences.

10 *Tennessee v. Department of Education*, 104 F.4th 577 (6th Cir. 2024),
11 observed that the Title IX “regulations permit, but do not require” schools to
12 organize “athletics programs ... by biological sex.” *Id.* at 610–11; *see* OSPI.Resp.15.
13 But in *Tennessee*, that point was uncontested and irrelevant to the notice-and-
14 comment holding, making the statement (unpersuasive) dicta. 104 F.4th at 610–11.
15 And Defendants have not created a pure co-ed or gender-identity system anyway.
16 They separate partially by sex.

17 OSPI next argues (at 15–16) that Plaintiffs' interpretation would require
18 “sex-segregated teams, with no possible crossover,” and points out that girls do
19 “compete (and win) on boys' teams.” That again ignores 106.41. As *Mercer* noted,
20 when schools allow girls on (previously) boys teams, that makes them 106.41(a)
21 teams, which are compliant provided the school otherwise accords girls equal
22 opportunity. 190 F.3d at 646. So OSPI is wrong to claim (at 16) Plaintiffs'
23 interpretation would put 106.41(c) in conflict with 106.41(a).

24 And it misses the point. Sex-designation isn't to protect males from
25 extraordinary females. *See* OSPI.Resp.16.⁴ Girls who succeed on boys' teams don't

26
27
28 ⁴ Plaintiffs' reading would not exclude the girls OSPI references. Girls making
the football team (Doc. 44-6), succeeding in boys wrestling (Doc. 44-7, 44-8), or

ARGUMENT

To obtain an injunction pending appeal, the movant must show a likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and a favorable balance of the equities and the public interest. *United States v. California*, 173 F.4th 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2026). Plaintiffs satisfy each factor.

I. This Court should grant Brown an injunction pending appeal to protect her parental rights.

Brown seeks a prohibitory injunction. She asks the District to withdraw her daughter from matches against males or tell her when such a match is set so she may withdraw K.M.K. herself. This relief is materially indistinct from that ordered in *Mahmoud v. Taylor*, which directed a school to notify parents before certain books were “to be used in any way” and to excuse their child from the instruction. 606 U.S. 522, 569 (2025). The District told Brown that K.M.K. may sit out matches; then Defendants refused every way of realizing that.

A. Brown is likely to succeed on the merits.

Parents have a fundamental right to direct “the care, custody, and control of their children.” *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality). That right applies “at school” and “during school hours.” *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 497. A State may not infringe it unless its policy is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).

Case: 26-5488, 09/14/2026, DktEntry: 38.2, (1 of 6)

No. 26-5488

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE LYNNE BROWN, as mother, guardian,
and next friend of minor K.M.K.; in her own capacity,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Case No. 3:26-cv-05616-DGE
Hon. David G. Estudillo, District Judge

**DECLARATION OF JAMES MEYERHOFF
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL**

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I, James Meyerhoff, declare as follows:

1. I am the Director of Instructional Leadership for Athletics, Health & Fitness for the Puyallup School District (the “District”). I am also the State Tournament Director for 3A boys wrestling and the South Puget Sound League 4A wrestling commissioner.

2. Student athletes are required to provide a physical exam form to their school, completed by their physician. A blank copy of the Medical Eligibility form recommended by the WIAA is attached as **Exhibit 1**. Some physicians have their own form that they provide with similar information.

3. The Medical Eligibility Form and almost all physical exam forms that we receive only provide information as to whether the student is medically eligible for all sports with or without restrictions, or whether their eligibility is limited to only certain sports. The form does not include any physician indication of the student’s biological sex, nor does it require any genital exam.

4. The information I have, as the District’s Athletic Director, regarding student athletes in my District is limited to whether they are male or female in a field titled “Legal gender” in their digital file. I have no indication within the files for any particular student as to whether they are cisgender or transgender. I do not have access to information about the gender of wrestlers in other districts.

5. Students are not required to identify whether they are transgender to participate in sports.

6. Wrestling matches are typically determined in one of three ways. Saturday tournaments are set up by individual schools where wrestlers are able to compete in up to six matches per day. The host invites other schools to participate in these tournaments that usually take place on a Saturday. Tournament Directors set up the bracket for these matches, which is often randomized based on weight class. Eight to thirty or more schools will usually compete in a Saturday tournament. Some larger tournaments may extend to two days.


7. League membership is determined by the size of the school district, pursuant to WIAA criteria. Puyallup School District is a large school district and is within the 4A classification. It is part of the South Puget Sound League, which is made up of twelve schools. The 4A South Puget Sound League (“SPSL”) creates a schedule of dual matches, which are determined by the league commissioner and approved by the athletic directors each year. In the SPSL 4A schedule, each school will participate against the other eleven teams over six dates. A dual match consists of two schools competing against each other at each of the fourteen weight classes. There are varsity and sub-varsity levels for each dual meet.

8. For league tournaments in the post-season, the coaches are responsible for seeding brackets. Seeding is determined by the wrestler’s wins and losses during

the regular season. Seeding is not randomized, rather, wrestlers are matched against each other to intentionally provide the best wrestlers – the athletes with the best records – with the highest seeds. To oversimplify this, that largely means that the best wrestler in the league (#1) is usually matched against the least-best wrestler in the league (#16). The top place winners of the league tournament advance to compete further in the postseason, i.e. state wrestling championships. Allocations to the state tournament are determined by WIAA calculations based on the number of teams in each league by classification.

9. Forfeits are governed by the National Federation of High Schools (NFHS) Wrestling rule book. Section 5-13 of the NFHS rule book states “It shall be considered a forfeit when the opponent, for any reason, fails to appear for a match.”

10. If a wrestler forfeits, that means they lose that match. In a tournament, the winner of a match will continue competing for first or second place within the championship bracket. The loser of a match will go from the championship bracket to the consolation bracket to continue to compete, until they reach three losses or they reach the end of the tournament with the third through seventh placing matches. The image inset below is an example of a tournament championship and consolation bracket, with children’s names redacted for privacy:

WIAA District 3 Girls 4A SPSL**125**

11. Injuries may result in forfeits. If a wrestler is unintentionally injured in the course of a match and must forfeit, they take the loss. If a wrestler is intentionally injured by their competitor, and the injury results in a penalty against the competitor, the competitor takes the loss. If the intentionally injured wrestler is unable to compete in their next match, however, they take the loss.

12. There is no way to permit K.M.K. to forfeit matches without penalty. This would be in violation of the NFHS rules. It would also displace another wrestler

who did not forfeit, because it would change how the tournaments are conducted, giving K.M.K. a competitive advantage that she had not earned, at the expense of another wrestler who had earned their competitive advantage.

I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

DATED at Puyallup, Washington, this 11th day of September 2026.

s/James Meyerhoff

James Meyerhoff

INTRODUCTION

Appellants Stephanie Lynne Brown and minor K.M.K. seek the extraordinary remedy of an emergency mandatory injunction pending appeal.¹ Appellants request that this Court override the District Court's well-reasoned orders denying preliminary injunctive relief and an injunction pending appeal to impose immediate statewide and district-level operational mandates.²

Appellants fail to satisfy the demanding standard for injunctive relief pending appeal. First, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(i), Defendant-Appellee Washington Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA) joins and incorporates the oppositions filed by Co-Defendants State Defendants and Puyallup School District, which demonstrate that Appellants cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits, imminent irreparable harm, or favorable equities.³ Second, as to WIAA specifically, Appellants' claims are completely unripe because K.M.K. has never availed herself of, nor been denied eligibility under, WIAA's established administrative hardship procedures.⁴ Third, Appellants cannot establish municipal liability against WIAA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because WIAA acted in accordance

¹ See Fed. R. App. P. 28(i); State Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion (USDC Dkt. 36.1); Response of Puyallup School District to Emergency Motion (USDC Dkt. 38.1).

² Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction, SER_338-399; USDC Dkt. 58; Order Denying Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, SER_003-007; USDC Dkt. 71.

³ USDC Dkt. 36.1 at pp. 2-5; USDC Dkt. 38.1 at pp. 4-8.

⁴ WIAA-SER_50; WIAA Handbook Rules 18.14.0 & 18.27.0.

with binding state non-discrimination laws and committed no underlying constitutional violation.⁵

Accordingly, WIAA respectfully requests that Appellants' Emergency Motion be denied.

ARGUMENT

I. THE WIAA JOINS CO-DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITIONS ESTABLISHING THAT APPELLANTS SEEK A DISFAVORED MANDATORY INJUNCTION AND CANNOT DEMONSTRATE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS, IRREPARABLE HARM, OR FAVORABLE EQUITIES.

Pursuant to FRAP 28(i), the WIAA formally joins and adopts by reference the arguments, authorities, and evidentiary records set forth in the opposition filings of Co-Defendants State Defendants and Puyallup School District.⁶

Appellants fail to satisfy the rigorous standard required for the extraordinary remedy of an injunction pending appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 27-3.⁷

A. Appellants Seek an Impermissible Mandatory Injunction That Would Overhaul Statewide Educational Policies Rather Than Preserve the Status Quo.

In evaluating a motion for an injunction pending appeal, courts apply a standard similar to that governing preliminary injunctions.⁸ The moving party must

⁵ RCW 49.60.040 (WLAD); RCW 28A.642.010; *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

⁶ Fed. R. App. P. 28(i); USDC Dkt. 36.1; USDC Dkt. 38.1.

⁷ Fed. R. App. P. 8(a); 9th Cir. R. 27-3.

⁸ *Feldman v. Arizona Sec'y of State's Off.*, 843 F.3d 366, 367 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

Spending Clause statutes, including Title IX.¹⁹ In *Roe v. Critchfield*, this Court affirmed that Spending Clause recipients cannot be subjected to judicial remedies under Title IX unless the statute provided unambiguous notice that the specific conduct at issue was unlawful.²⁰ Here, Title IX contains no clear statement prohibiting gender-inclusive participation rules that comply with state civil rights laws.²¹

E. Appellants Lack Article III Standing to Seek Retroactive Alterations to Wrestling Match Results Under *Steel Co. and Clapper*.

Appellants rely on *Soule v. Connecticut Ass'n of Schools, Inc.* to argue that K.M.K. has standing to seek an injunction retroactively altering past wrestling match records.²² However, unlike track-and-field race times which represent independent numerical variables on a leaderboard, high school wrestling involves interdependent 1-on-1 bracket elimination pairings.²³ A court cannot retroactively rewrite a completed wrestling bracket without engaging in pure speculation.²⁴ Retroactively editing historical records to award a moral victory yields only non-cognizable 'psychic satisfaction' under *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment*.²⁵

¹⁹ *Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); *Roe v. Critchfield*, 137 F.4th 912, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2025).

²⁰ *Roe v. Critchfield*, 137 F.4th at 929–30; *West Virginia v. B.P.J.*, 146 S. Ct. 2356, 2367 n.1 (2026).

²¹ USDC Dkt. 36.1 at pp. 20–24.

²² *Soule v. Conn. Ass'n of Schs., Inc.*, 90 F.4th 34, 47 (2d Cir. 2023) (en banc).

²³ App_ 004-077; USDC Dkt. 1 ¶ 49; WIAA Handbook Rule 18.16.0.

²⁴ Order Denying PI, WIAA-SER_054-115; USDC Dkt. 58 at 52–54.

²⁵ *Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't*, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998); *Soule*, 90 F.4th at 82 (Chin, J., dissenting).

Furthermore, under *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA* and *Chung v. WIAA*, future athletic matchups remain entirely speculative.²⁶

II. APPELLANTS' ATHLETIC ELIGIBILITY CLAIMS AGAINST WIAA ARE UNRIPE UNDER ARTICLE III BECAUSE K.M.K. HAS NEVER SOUGHT OR BEEN DENIED ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF UNDER WIAA HARDSHIP RULES.

Appellants' motion seeking a judicial order compelling WIAA to grant K.M.K. immediate varsity athletic eligibility at Puyallup High School is unripe for judicial adjudication under Article III of the United States Constitution because Appellants have failed to apply for or exhaust WIAA's established administrative hardship waiver procedures.²⁷

A. Article III Limits Federal Jurisdiction to Concrete Disputes, Barring Judicial Review of Contingent Administrative Events.

Article III limits federal court jurisdiction to actual, ongoing cases and controversies.²⁸ Ripeness is a constitutional doctrine drawn from Article III and prudential principles designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies.²⁹ A claim is not ripe for judicial review if it rests upon

²⁶ *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013); *Chung v. WIAA*, 538 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2021); USDC Dkt. 47 at 25.

²⁷ Appellants' Emergency Motion (USDC Dkt. 17.1 at pp. 26–27).

²⁸ U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; *Patel v. Facebook, Inc.*, 932 F.3d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2019).

²⁹ *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Abbott Labs. v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)); *Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin.*, 698 F.3d 774, 793 (9th Cir. 2012).

contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.³⁰

B. Appellants Failed to Utilize WIAA's Established Administrative Hardship Waiver Process Under Rules 18.14.0 and 18.27.0.

WIAA's governing framework incorporates a clear administrative structure. WIAA is a voluntary non-profit organization of member schools delegated authority to regulate interscholastic sports under state statute.³¹ Under WIAA Handbook Rules 18.0.0 through 19.0.0, transfer student eligibility is evaluated initially by the receiving school's Athletic Director.³² When a student transfers without a corresponding change of family residence, WIAA Handbook Rule 18.14.0 and Rule 18.27.0 establish a comprehensive administrative process to petition for a Hardship Waiver before the local WIAA District Eligibility Committee.³³ If a hardship waiver is denied, Rule 19.0.0 provides a direct administrative appeal to the WIAA Executive Director.³⁴ Here, Appellants have never submitted an application for a WIAA hardship waiver, nor has any WIAA committee or official issued a decision regarding K.M.K.'s eligibility.³⁵

³⁰ *Texas v. United States*, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998); *City of Seattle v. FERC*, 899 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2018).

³¹ RCW 28A.600.200; SER_006.

³² WIAA Handbook Rule 18.0.0, SER_078-127; SER_050.

³³ WIAA Handbook Rule 18.14.0; WIAA Handbook Rule 18.27.0, WIAA_SER_116-249

³⁴ WIAA Handbook Rule 19.0.0, WIAA_SER_116-249

³⁵ WIAA-SER 048-053.

C. Appellants Cannot Claim Futility to Bypass WIAA's Specialized Hardship Review Committees.

Appellants contend that pursuing WIAA administrative remedies would be futile because WIAA Handbook Rule 18.12.2.9 restricts transfer eligibility. This argument misconstrues WIAA's regulatory framework. Rule 18.12.2.9 sets the general rule for transfer students, but Rule 18.14.0 and Rule 18.27.0 specifically empower WIAA committees to grant hardship waivers overriding Rule 18.12.2.9 upon a showing of unique physical, emotional, or safety circumstances.³⁶ Appellants cannot claim futility when they have refused to submit the very hardship packet designed to address such circumstances.³⁷

III. APPELLANTS CANNOT ESTABLISH MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AGAINST WIAA UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 OR TITLE IX BECAUSE WIAA ACTED PURSUANT TO MANDATORY STATE LAWS AND COMMITTED NO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION.

Appellants cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits against WIAA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Title IX because WIAA's gender-inclusive participation policy was adopted to comply with mandatory Washington state anti-discrimination statutes, and Appellants fail to establish an underlying constitutional or statutory violation.³⁸

³⁶ WIAA Handbook Rule 18.14.0; WIAA Handbook Rule 18.27.0, WIAA_SER_116-249

³⁷ *Stormans*, 586 F.3d at 1122.

³⁸ USDC Dkt. 36.1 at pp. 25–28.

A. WIAA’s Gender-Inclusive Participation Policy Complies Directly with Mandatory Washington Non-Discrimination Statutes.

To establish liability against a state actor or voluntary association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of *Monell v. Department of Social Services*.³⁹ Where a municipal entity or state actor merely complies with non-discretionary state statutory mandates, its compliance does not constitute an unconstitutional custom or deliberate indifference under Section 1983.⁴⁰ WIAA Rule 18.16.0 provides that all students shall have the opportunity to participate in WIAA athletics in a manner consistent with their gender identity.⁴¹ This policy was adopted to comply directly with binding Washington statutes that prohibit discrimination in public schools on the basis of gender identity and expression.⁴²

B. Following Mandatory State Anti-Discrimination Law Is Not an Intentional Statutory Violation Under *Mansourian* and *Roe v. Critchfield*.

Appellants rely on *Mansourian v. Regents of the University of California* to argue that Spending Clause notice does not apply when an entity adopts an official policy.⁴³ *Mansourian* is readily distinguishable. In *Mansourian*, UC Davis intentionally eliminated female varsity wrestling in direct violation of established Title IX regulations.⁴⁴ By contrast, WIAA Rule 18.16.0 was enacted to comply with

³⁹ 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); *Dougherty v. City of Covina*, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011).

⁴⁰ *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694; *Dougherty*, 654 F.3d at 900.

⁴¹ WIAA Handbook Rule 18.16.0, WIAA_SER_116-249

⁴² RCW 28A.642.010; RCW 28A.642.080; RCW 49.60.040(28); WAC 392-190-025.

⁴³ *Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 602 F.3d 957, 967 (9th Cir. 2010).

⁴⁴ *Mansourian*, 602 F.3d at 967.

mandatory state civil rights statutes, including the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD, RCW 49.60) and RCW 28A.642.010.⁴⁵ Enforcing a facially neutral state anti-discrimination statute in good faith is not an intentional violation of clear statutory conditions under *Roe v. Critchfield*.⁴⁶

C. Appellants Identify No Recognized Fourteenth Amendment Right to Dictate Extracurricular Eligibility Rules or Compel Private Identity Disclosures.

Appellants claim that Rule 18.16.0 violates Plaintiff Stephanie Brown's Fourteenth Amendment parental rights. As the District Court correctly held, substantive due process does not grant parents an absolute right to dictate extracurricular athletic policies or compel public entities to disclose private gender-identity information regarding other minor students.⁴⁷ Because no underlying constitutional right was violated, WIAA cannot be liable under Section 1983.⁴⁸

D. Title IX Deliberate Indifference Liability Cannot Attach to WIAA Because WIAA Exercised No Operational Control Over Local Event Staff.

WIAA maintains no operational authority over local school district investigations or day-to-day student discipline.⁴⁹ WIAA was not notified of K.M.K.'s underlying incident until long after it occurred, and WIAA possesses no authority under its handbook to conduct local Title IX investigations.⁵⁰ Because WIAA lacked

⁴⁵ RCW 49.60.040; RCW 28A.642.010; WAC 392-190-025.

⁴⁶ *Roe v. Critchfield*, 137 F.4th 912, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2025); *Soule*, 90 F.4th at 91–92 (Chin, J., dissenting).

⁴⁷ *Mirabelli v. Bonta*, 607 U.S. at 498; *Parents for Privacy v. Barr*, 949 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 2020); SER_362–366.

⁴⁸ *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 694; SER_366.

⁴⁹ WIAA Handbook Rule 18.0.0, WIAA_SER_116-249

⁵⁰ WIAA_SER_116-249

operational control over the local athletic event staff and took no unreasonable action, Title IX liability cannot attach under *Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education*.⁵¹

IV. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST STRONGLY DISFAVOR MANDATORY RELIEF THAT WOULD DISRUPT STATEWIDE INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETICS AND VIOLATE STUDENT PRIVACY.

The final Winter factors—the balance of equities and the public interest—weigh decisively against granting Appellants' requested emergency injunction pending appeal.⁵²

A. An Emergency Injunction Would Cause Severe Mid-Season Operational Disruption Across Hundreds of Washington Public Schools.

When evaluating a motion for injunctive relief pending appeal, courts must balance the competing claims of injury and consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief, giving significant weight to the public interest.⁵³ Compelling WIAA to modify its athletic participation rules mid-season would disrupt established eligibility expectations for hundreds of member schools and thousands of student-athletes.⁵⁴

⁵¹ 34 C.F.R. § 106.41; *Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999); *Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.*, 956 F.3d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 2020).

⁵² *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20; SER_396–398.

⁵³ *Winter*, 555 U.S. at 24; *United States v. California*, 173 F.4th at 1066.

⁵⁴ USDC Dkt. 36.1 at pp. 30–32.

B. Compelling Private Identity Surveillance Violates Federal and State Privacy Protections, Including FERPA.

Ordering WIAA or school districts to investigate and disclose private gender-identity information regarding third-party minor student-athletes would force educational entities into direct conflict with federal and state privacy statutes, including FERPA (20 U.S.C. § 1232g) and state vital statistics protection laws.⁵⁵ Forcing member schools to exclude student-athletes based on gender identity would expose school districts to enforcement actions and funding penalties under state law.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, as well as those presented in the joined oppositions of State Defendants and Puyallup School District, Defendant-Appellee Washington Interscholastic Activities Association respectfully requests that Appellants' Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal be DENIED.

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⁵⁵ 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (FERPA); RCW 70.58A.540; PSD-SER_042-044.

⁵⁶ RCW 28A.642.050; 4-ER-616; USDC Dkt. 36.1 at pp. 30-32.

DATED September 17, 2026.

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