

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DANIELLE TAYLOR,

Applicant,

v.

LSAC,

Respondent.

ON APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE JUDGMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

**APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME
WITHIN WHICH TO FILE A PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

DANIELLE TAYLOR

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RECEIVED

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**OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.**

To the Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit:

Pursuant to Rules 13.5, 22, and 30 of the Rules of this Court, Applicant Danielle Taylor respectfully requests a sixty-day extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in *Taylor v. LSAC*, No. 25-2478.

The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on July 14, 2026. Applicant's petition for a writ of certiorari is presently due on October 13, 2026. Applicant respectfully requests an extension of sixty days. The sixtieth day of the requested extension falls on Saturday, December 12, 2026. Pursuant to Rule 30.1, the filing period would therefore extend through Monday, December 14, 2026.

PARTY FOR WHOM EXTENSION IS SOUGHT

The extension is sought solely on behalf of Applicant Danielle Taylor.

JUDGMENT FOR WHICH REVIEW IS SOUGHT

The judgment for which review is sought is the July 14, 2026 judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in *Taylor v. LSAC*, No. 25-2478.

A copy of the Court of Appeals' July 14, 2026 opinion accompanies this Application.

JURISDICTION AND TIMELINESS

This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

The Court of Appeals entered judgment on July 14, 2026. No petition for rehearing was filed. Under Rule 13.1 of this Court, Applicant's petition for a writ of certiorari is due within 90 days after entry of the judgment. Because the ninetieth day, October 12, 2026, is a federal legal holiday, the current filing deadline is October 13, 2026, pursuant to Rule 30.1.

This Application is being filed more than ten days before the current filing deadline and is therefore timely under Rules 13.5 and 30.2.

REASONS JUSTIFYING AN EXTENSION OF TIME

Applicant respectfully requests a sixty-day extension of time to prepare and file her petition for a writ of certiorari. Good cause exists because Applicant is proceeding pro se and has experienced significant housing and financial hardship that has substantially limited the time and resources available to prepare her petition.

Applicant is presently experiencing homelessness and is preparing her petition without the assistance of counsel. Shortly before the Court of Appeals issued its decision, Applicant was robbed of valuables, and her vehicle was subsequently set on fire. These events significantly exacerbated Applicant's financial hardship and required substantial time and attention to address the resulting losses and circumstances. As a result, Applicant had substantially less time and fewer resources available to research, prepare, and write her petition for a writ of certiorari.

REASONS JUSTIFYING AN EXTENSION OF TIME (continued)

These circumstances have significantly limited Applicant's ability to conduct the legal research and preparation necessary for a petition for a writ of certiorari. Additional time would permit Applicant to research the legal questions presented, review and organize the relevant materials, prepare the required appendix for the petition, and ensure that her pro se petition complies with this Court's Rules.

The requested extension is not sought for purposes of delay. Applicant respectfully requests the additional time so that, notwithstanding the circumstances described above, she can adequately prepare and present her petition to this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Applicant respectfully requests a sixty-day extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. The sixtieth day of the requested extension falls on Saturday, December 12, 2026; accordingly, pursuant to Rule 30.1, the resulting filing deadline would be Monday, December 14, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,



DANIELLE TAYLOR

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Dated: Sept. 26, 2026

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-2478

DANIELLE TAYLOR,
Appellant

v.

LSAC

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-01312)
District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 8, 2026

Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and SCIRICA, *Circuit Judges*

(Opinion filed July 14, 2026)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.

Danielle Taylor appeals the District Court's dismissal of her complaint against the Law School Admission Council ("LSAC") and the denial of her motion for reconsideration. We will affirm the District Court's judgment.

I.

LSAC provides the Law School Admission Test ("LSAT"), a standardized test that law schools consider as part of the admissions process. According to Taylor's complaint, she took the LSAT "several years ago," but her score is now expired and is no longer reportable to law schools under LSAC's policy. Taylor sought an accommodation for this policy, explaining that she had experienced "severe emotional distress for several years" and had impaired speech. Taylor asked about alternatives to retaking the LSAT, such as recertifying her prior exam by submitting a writing sample. LSAC declined to consider any accommodation regarding its policy of how long an LSAT score is reportable.

Taylor's complaint alleged that LSAC discriminated against her and failed to make reasonable accommodations for her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), *see* 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, 12189, and that LSAC was negligent by refusing to make an exception to its score reporting policy. On LSAC's motion, the District Court dismissed Taylor's complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Taylor filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. Instead of filing an amended complaint, Taylor filed a notice of appeal, and she informed this Court that she intended to stand on her complaint.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.¹ We review the District Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. *See Doe v. Princeton Univ.*, 30 F.4th 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2022). We may affirm the District Court’s judgment for any reason supported by the record. *See Murray v. Bledsoe*, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Because Taylor is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her claims liberally, but her complaint still must contain sufficient facts to support a claim for relief. *See Vogt v. Wetzel*, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).

The ADA provides a “national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).² Title III of the ADA prohibits public accommodations from engaging in discrimination. *See Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc.*, 936 F.3d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 2019). Title III also contains a specific rule—set

¹ Because Taylor has clearly and unequivocally declined amendment and has stated that she seeks to proceed with this appeal by standing on the allegations in her complaint, the District Court’s judgment is final and reviewable. *See Borelli v. City of Reading*, 532 F.2d 950, 951–52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); *see also Weber v. McGrogan*, 939 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[A] clear and unequivocal intent to decline amendment and immediately appeal that leaves no doubt or ambiguity can allow us to exercise jurisdiction.”).

² For purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding that Taylor adequately alleged she has a “disability” as defined by the ADA. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 12102; 28 C.F.R. § 35.108.

forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12189—for cases involving alleged “discrimination by providers of examinations” like LSAC. *Doe v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examr’s*, 199 F.3d 146, 154–55 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that § 12189, as opposed to § 12182, governs “what Title III requires in the context of examinations”). Under this rule, LSAC must offer its examinations “in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12189.

The rule mandates such arrangements “so that disabled people who are disadvantaged by certain features of standardized examinations may take the examinations without those features that disadvantage them.” *Doe*, 199 F.3d at 156. For example, examiners must ensure that their exams are administered in accessible facilities, they must offer examinations “designed for individuals with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills” at locations that are “equally convenient” as other locations, and they must ensure that such “examination results accurately reflect the individual’s aptitude or achievement level.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(1)(i)–(iii). And a required exam modification may also “include changes in the length of time permitted for completion of the examination and adaptation of the manner in which the examination is given.” *Id.* § 36.309(b)(2).

According to Taylor, LSAC violated the ADA by denying her request to report her expired score in lieu of her retaking the exam. But “neither the language of [§ 12189] nor the regulation interpreting it” required LSAC to take such action. *Doe*, 199 F.3d at 156. Taylor did not allege in her complaint that she sought and was denied any

accommodation to assist her in taking the exam. Thus, Taylor failed to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 12189.³

We also discern no error in the District Court’s dismissal of Taylor’s negligence claim. Taylor alleged that “LSAC has a special duty to ensure [LSAT] administration is conducted fairly and without discrimination.” Even if that were true, Taylor alleged no facts from which we could plausibly infer that LSAC breached such a duty. *See Grove v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty.*, 218 A.3d 877, 889 (Pa. 2019). In fact, Taylor’s complaint is devoid of any nonconclusory allegation that LSAC unjustly administered an exam.

Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion by denying Taylor’s motion for reconsideration. *See United States ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P.*, 769 F.3d 837, 848 (3d Cir. 2014). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Taylor’s motion to file her letter to the Court under seal is denied. *See* 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 106.1(a).

³ Taylor also sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 12182, “which sets forth general provisions prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations.” *Doe*, 199 F.3d at 154. LSAC maintains that it is not bound by this statute because it is not a place of public accommodation, and because we have already explained in *Doe* that claims involving discrimination by examination providers are governed by § 12189. Regardless, even if § 12182 were an appropriate section to apply, Taylor’s claim could not survive because she did not sufficiently allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that LSAC provided her a service in a discriminatory or unequal manner. *See Doe*, 199 F.3d at 154–55, 157.

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FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

I, Danielle Taylor, declare that on Sept. 26, 2026, I served one copy of the
Application for an Extension of Time Within Which to File a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, together
with the accompanying copy of the July 14, 2026 opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, upon counsel for Respondent by depositing the documents with the United States Postal
Service for delivery by Priority Mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Caroline M. Mew

Ashurst Perkins Coie

700 Thirteenth Street, N.W., Suite 800

Washington, DC 20005-3960

Telephone: (202) 654-1767

Email: caroline.mew@ashurstperkins.com

Counsel for Respondent LSAC

At or reasonably contemporaneously with the mailing described above, I also transmitted an
electronic PDF copy of the Application and accompanying Court of Appeals opinion to counsel for
Respondent at caroline.mew@ashurstperkins.com.

All parties required to be served have been served.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on Sept. 26, 2026.

Dt

DANIELLE TAYLOR

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