

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

PEOPLE NOT POLITICIANS AND RICHARD VON GLAHN,

Applicants,

v.

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT “BOB” ONDER; RICHARD “RICK” BRATTIN; PATRICIA “PAT”
THOMAS; AND DEBRA HAVENS,

Respondents,

and

STATE OF MISSOURI AND DENNY HOSKINS, *in his official capacity as Missouri*
Secretary of State,

Respondents.

**APPENDIX TO EMERGENCY MOTION TO CLARIFY
THIS COURT’S SEPTEMBER 10, 2026 ORDER
AND ALTERNATIVE EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING APPEAL**

ABHA KHANNA
Counsel of Record
ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
1700 Seventh Ave., Suite 2100
Seattle, WA 98101
(206) 656-0177
AKhanna@elias.law

KATIE CHAMBLEE-RYAN
LUCAS LALLINGER
ELIAS LAW GROUP LLP
250 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Suite 400
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 948-1135
KChambleeRyan@elias.law
LLallinger@elias.law

CHARLES W. HATFIELD
ALEXANDER C. BARRETT
ALIXANDRA S. COSSETTE
GRETA M. BAX
STINSON LLP
230 W. McCarty Street
Jefferson City, MO 65101
(573) 636-6263
chuck.hatfield@stinson.com
alexander.barrett@stinson.com
alix.cossette@stinson.com
greta.bax@stinson.com

Counsel for Applicants People Not Politicians and Richard von Glahn

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United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 26-2797

Congressman Robert Onder; Richard Ray Brattin; Patricia Thomas; Debra Havens

Plaintiffs - Appellees

v.

State of Missouri; Denny L. Hoskins, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary
of State

Defendants - Appellees

Richard Von Glahn; People Not Politicians

Intervenors - Appellants

Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities; Jake Maggard;
Gregg Lombardi; Campaign Legal Center; American Civil Liberties Union of
Missouri Foundation; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation; One Hundred
Ten Missouri Voters

Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s)

Club for Growth

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s)

No. 26-2827

Congressman Robert Onder; Richard Ray Brattin; Patricia Thomas; Debra Havens

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

State of Missouri; Denny L. Hoskins, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary
of State

Defendants - Appellees

Richard Von Glahn; People Not Politicians

Intervenors - Appellees

Club for Growth

Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation; American Civil Liberties Union of
Missouri Foundation; Campaign Legal Center; One Hundred Ten Missouri Voters

Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)

Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

Submitted: September 17, 2026
Filed: September 21, 2026
[Published]

Before LOKEN, STRAS, and JUSTIN D. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

On November 3, 2026, Missourians will vote for federal and state candidates in this year’s general election. Spirited congressional and ballot measure campaigns have intersected in federal and state courts. The question presented to this Court is which congressional district map Missouri should use for the November 2026 elections: the map adopted in 2025 and used in the August 2026 primary election, or the map adopted in 2022. The people of Missouri deserve an answer to this important question.

This Court holds that Missouri’s current plan to use the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election violates the Constitution. Only use of the 2025 map complies with the Constitution and federal law. We affirm the district court¹ and remand for entry of a permanent injunction.

I.

Pursuant to the process set forth by the Constitution, *see* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, the 2020 Census (like the 2010 Census before it) apportioned Missouri eight congressional seats. Before the next congressional election, in 2022, Missouri’s General Assembly truly agreed and finally passed House Bill 2909, which enacted new congressional district boundaries upon then-Governor Michael L. Parson’s signature (the “2022 map”). Missouri used the 2022 map in the primary and general elections in 2022 and 2024.

¹The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Missouri redrew its congressional district maps again in advance of the 2026 elections.² In an extraordinary session called by Governor Mike Kehoe more than one year ago,³ the Missouri General Assembly truly agreed and finally passed House Bill 1 (“H.B. 1”), which repealed the 2022 map and enacted new congressional district boundaries (the “2025 map”). The most prominent changes in the 2025 map related to Missouri’s Fifth Congressional District, which Missouri lawmakers expected to benefit Republicans. See Mitch Smith, *Missouri House Approves Map That Boosts Republicans*, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2025), <https://perma.cc/Z9GF-FUJ7>.⁴ H.B. 1 passed by a margin of 21 to 11 in the Missouri Senate and 90 to 65 in the Missouri House of Representatives. Governor Kehoe signed H.B. 1 on September 28, 2025. Unlike the 2022 map, the 2025 map lacked an emergency clause and thus would not take effect until 90 days after the General Assembly adjourned its extraordinary session on September 12, 2025. MO. CONST. art. III, § 29.

Under the state constitution, the people of Missouri have reserved the “power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly” that does not contain an emergency clause. *Id.* §§ 49, 52(a). A bill will be subject to a referendum

²Missouri is not the only State to redraw its congressional district maps “[w]ith an eye on the upcoming 2026 midterm elections.” *Abbott v. League of United Latin Am. Citizens*, 146 S. Ct. 418, 419 (2025). “Texas adopted the first new map, then California responded with its own map for the stated purpose of counteracting what Texas had done.” *Id.* Since 2025, nine States—California, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah—have redrawn their maps, and three other States have begun the process to do so—Maryland, Mississippi, New York. *Changing the Maps: Tracking Mid-Decade Redistricting*, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., <https://perma.cc/BJR4-24G4> (last visited Sept. 21, 2026).

³A session outside of the normal legislative session is an “extraordinary session” when convened by the governor, see MO. CONST. art. IV, § 9, and a “special session” when convened by super-majorities in both legislative chambers, see *id.* art. III, § 20(b).

⁴While “[d]isapproval of partisan gerrymandering dates back to the founding,” partisan advantage is “a constitutionally permissible criterion that States may rely on as desired.” *Louisiana v. Callais*, 146 S. Ct. 1131, 1156 (2026).

vote by filing with the Secretary of State “petitions signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state.” *Id.* § 52(a). According to Secretary Hoskins, this requirement thus requires signatures from approximately 3.3% of Missouri’s legal voters. State Br. 3, 16. The petition must be submitted within the 90-day period before the bill takes effect. MO. CONST. art III, § 52(a).

Some organizations and individuals dissatisfied with the outcome of the extraordinary session immediately pursued a statewide vote on the 2025 map. Before the ink dried on the governor’s signature, on September 29, 2025, People Not Politicians and its executive director, Richard von Glahn (collectively, “PNP”), submitted a petition to Secretary Hoskins seeking to force a referendum vote on H.B. 1. Prior to the 90-day deadline, PNP submitted, by its calculation, more than 300,000 referendum petition signatures to Secretary Hoskins on December 9, 2025. PNP Br. 11.

Upon receipt of a referendum petition, the Secretary bears responsibility for determining whether the petition may be certified for the ballot.⁵ *See* Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 116.120–116.150. The Secretary must determine that the petition “complies with the Constitution of Missouri” and applicable state law. *Id.* § 116.120.1. The Secretary also must verify that the petition has been signed by a sufficient number of Missouri voters. *Id.* § 116.130.1. The parties agree that, under state law, *see id.* § 116.150.3, Secretary Hoskins had until August 4, 2026, to issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency on the referendum petition for the 2025 map. *See* State Br. 11; PNP Br. 11.⁶

⁵Referendum measures are placed on the November general election ballot unless the General Assembly orders a special election. MO. CONST. art. III, § 52(b).

⁶One group of amici claim, without evidence, that “[t]here is no question that the Secretary violated Missouri law” in conducting the August 2026 primary election under the 2025 map. 110 Mo. Voters Br. 24. No party or amicus has identified any law that Secretary Hoskins violated in conducting the August 2026 primary election under the 2025 map.

PNP and its allies repeatedly—and unsuccessfully—filed cases in state court that would prevent the 2025 map from being used in the August 2026 primary election. Both a Missouri trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the governor’s ability to convene the extraordinary session that passed the 2025 map. *See NAACP Mo. State. Conf. v. Kehoe*, 734 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Mo. 2026). Both a Missouri trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the General Assembly’s ability to redistrict more than once per decade. *See Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567, 574 (Mo. 2026). Two Missouri trial courts and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected challenges to the 2025 map’s compactness, population division, and contiguity. *See Healey v. State*, 732 S.W.3d 827, 852 (Mo. 2026). And both a Missouri trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a challenge to Secretary Hoskins’ determination that the filing of a referendum petition did not automatically suspend the 2025 map under state law. *See Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 421 (Mo. 2026). Until September 3, 2026, the 2025 map withstood every legal challenge against it.

As a result, Missouri conducted virtually all of its 2026 congressional district elections to date under the 2025 map. Starting February 24, 2026, candidates began filing for Missouri’s eight congressional districts. *See* Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.349.2. When candidate filing closed on March 31, 2026, *id.* § 115.349.1, more than 60 candidates had filed to run for Congress, *see Certified Candidate List: 2026 Primary Election*, MO. SEC’Y STATE, <https://perma.cc/7VUD-8YK2> (last visited Sept. 20, 2026). By the time that the August 2026 primary election arrived, “[m]ore than \$6.5 million ha[d] been spent on broadcast ads to influence congressional primaries, mainly in the 1st, 5th and 6th Districts.” Rudi Keller, *Missouri turnout could hit 1.4 million as ballot measures drive primary interest*, MO. INDEP. (Aug. 3, 2026), <https://perma.cc/Q54N-TY8T>. Advocacy groups invested more than \$3.5 million in the Fifth Congressional District Republican primary election alone. Rudi Keller, *Missouri congressional incumbents flush with cash heading into primary election*, MO. INDEP. (July 24, 2026), <https://perma.cc/M3VA-58BK>.

More than 1.2 million Missourians voted in the primary election on August 4, 2026. Representative Robert “Bob” Onder won the Republican nomination for the Third Congressional District. Candidate Richard “Rick” Brattin won the Republican nomination for the Fifth Congressional District. Because they received the greatest number of votes in the August 2026 primary election, Representative Onder and Candidate Brattin “shall be the only candidate of that party for the office at the general election,” and their names “shall be placed on the official ballot at the general election unless [they are] removed or replaced as provided by law.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.343.

Also on August 4, 2026, Secretary Hoskins issued a certificate of insufficiency for the referendum petition “because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly.” See Stipulated Ex. 5, *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No. 26AC-CC00440 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 2026).⁷ Secretary Hoskins’ certificate of insufficiency incorporated by reference and attached an opinion by the Missouri Attorney General, which concluded that the “Constitution and federal law require Missouri election officials to enforce House Bill 1 during the November 2026 election.” See *id.*

Von Glahn sued Secretary Hoskins in state court one hour after Secretary Hoskins announced his decision. Von Glahn sought to enjoin the Secretary “and those acting in concert with him from taking any further steps to implement or mandate the use of HB 1.” Pet. ¶ 61, *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No. 26AC-CC00440 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 2026). The state trial court issued judgment in favor of Secretary Hoskins on August 19, 2026. See Judgment, *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No.

⁷PNP asks the Court to take judicial notice of the parties’ “filings in the state-court action and at the U.S. Supreme Court,” which “were not formally made part of the record at the district court” “[d]ue to the fast-moving nature of this case.” PNP Br. 9 n.1. “[F]ederal courts may *sua sponte* take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts if they relate directly to the matters at issue.” *Conforti v. United States*, 74 F.3d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The Court grants PNP’s request and takes judicial notice of filings and proceedings in other courts directly relating to this matter, which are referenced as appropriate in this opinion.

26AC-CC00440 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19, 2026). In its ruling, the state trial court found that using the 2022 map instead of the 2025 map in the general election “would move hundreds of thousands of voters into different districts for the imminent 2026 general election compared to the districts in which they cast their ballots in the August primary elections” *Id.* ¶ 20.

Von Glahn appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court on August 20, 2026, which ordered expedited briefing⁸ in advance of an expedited oral argument on September 2, 2026. The day after the oral argument, on September 3, 2026, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The Missouri Supreme Court ordered Secretary Hoskins “to issue a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition . . . to place the referendum petition on the November 2026 general election ballot, and to take any and all additional steps necessary to place the referendum petition on the ballot at that election before September 8, 2026.” *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, --- S.W.3d ---, 2026 WL 2628846, at *7 (Mo. Sept. 3, 2026). The Missouri Supreme Court also “restrained and enjoined” Secretary Hoskins “and all of those acting in concert with him . . . from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter unless and until HB 1 is approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election and takes effect 30 days thereafter.” *Id.* At the same time that it issued its judgment, which prohibited any post-judgment motions, the Missouri Supreme Court also issued its mandate.

Secretary Hoskins immediately sought to stay the Missouri Supreme Court’s ruling based on arguments under the Constitution that the Missouri Supreme Court declined to address. Within hours of the decision’s release, Secretary Hoskins asked the Missouri Supreme Court to stay its injunction while Secretary Hoskins pursued an emergency application to the Supreme Court. The Missouri Supreme Court overruled Secretary Hoskins’s stay motion on September 4, 2026, in an unreasoned

⁸The Supreme Court ordered von Glahn to file his brief by noon on August 25, 2026; Secretary Hoskins to file his brief by noon on August 27, 2026; and von Glahn to file his reply brief by noon on August 31, 2026.

order. Later that day, Secretary Hoskins filed an emergency application for stay and administrative stay pending appeal with the Supreme Court. Justice Kavanaugh, the circuit justice for the Eighth Circuit, denied Secretary Hoskins’s application on September 8, 2026. *See Hoskins v. Von Glahn*, No. 26A304, 2026 WL 2647016, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2026).

While Secretary Hoskins pursued his emergency stay application to the Supreme Court, Representative Onder, Candidate Brattin, and two voters, Patricia “Pat” Thomas and Debra Havens (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), filed this lawsuit against Secretary Hoskins in the district court. Representative Onder and Candidate Brattin (collectively, the “candidate Plaintiffs”) alleged that using the 2022 map for the November 2026 general election would significantly change their congressional districts from the August 2026 primary election. Thomas and Havens (collectively, the “voter Plaintiffs”) alleged that they voted in the Fifth Congressional District in the August 2026 primary election, but they would vote in the Third Congressional District if the 2022 map were used in the November 2026 general election. Plaintiffs alleged that using a different congressional district map in the general election than in the primary election would violate the Elections Clause, Article I, Section 2, and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to require use of the 2025 map in the November 2026 general election.

Shortly after Justice Kavanaugh denied Secretary Hoskins’ emergency application to stay the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision on September 8, 2026, the district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. The district court found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that using the 2022 map in the November 2026 general elections violated Article I, Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court “enjoin[ed], on federal law grounds, . . . Hoskins—as well as his officers, agents, employees, and attorneys—from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the HB 1 map for the November 3, 2026 general election.” R. Doc. 35 at 13. The temporary restraining order “remains in effect” through September 22, 2026.

PNP immediately sought to stay the district court's ruling. Both the district court and this Court denied PNP's emergency stay motions on September 9, 2026. However, on September 10, 2026, the Supreme Court granted PNP's emergency stay application in a short order. *See People Not Politicians v. Onder*, No. 26A326, 2026 WL 2659767, at *1 (U.S. Sept. 10, 2026). The Court stayed the district court's temporary restraining order "pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, if such a writ is timely sought." *Id.*

Because Secretary Hoskins advised local election authorities to use the 2025 map after receiving the district court's temporary restraining order, in the two days following the district court's temporary restraining order, the Missouri Supreme Court conducted expedited contempt proceedings. After the Supreme Court's stay, Secretary Hoskins advised local election authorities of the stay and directed them to use the 2022 map. PNP App. 738. The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately held Secretary Hoskins in contempt, but concluded that he purged the contempt by directing local election authorities to use the 2022 map.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's order, and in light of the looming November 2026 general election and associated deadlines, this Court scheduled expedited briefing and arguments on PNP's appeal of the district court's temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's decision on their claim under the Elections Clause.⁹

II.

This Court reviews de novo the legal issues underlying a district court's injunctive relief order, including questions of jurisdiction, abstention, and the merits of the underlying claims. *See Revenue Mgmt. Sols., LLC v. Com. Bank*, 183 F.4th

⁹Even though Plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the district court's decision, because this Court is resolving this case on the merits, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion to consolidate their appeal with PNP's appeal.

618, 624 (8th Cir. 2026). The Court reviews the district court’s decision to not require a bond for abuse of discretion. *Hill v. Xyquad, Inc.*, 939 F.2d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 1991).

A.

“The Judiciary Act of 1789 ‘established the general principle that only final decisions of the federal district courts would be reviewable on appeal.’” *Abbott v. Perez*, 585 U.S. 579, 594 (2018) (quoting *Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc.*, 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981)). Congress later created an exception that “gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over ‘[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts’ ‘granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,’ ‘except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.’” *Id.* (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). Pursuant to this exception, this Court has jurisdiction to review a district court’s interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction. *See La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Hldgs., Inc.*, 183 F.4th 606, 611 (8th Cir. 2026). Yet even under this exception, this Court generally lacks jurisdiction “to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s grant or denial of a TRO.” *In re Rutledge*, 956 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2020).¹⁰

However, in limited circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction over a temporary restraining order when it “has the ‘practical effect’ of granting an injunction.” *La Belle Dairy*, 183 F.4th at 611 (quoting *Abbott*, 585 U.S. at 594). The Supreme Court implicitly determined that it had jurisdiction when it granted PNP’s emergency stay application. *See People Not Politicians*, 2026 WL 2659767, at *1. Following the Supreme Court’s stay order, all parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction to review the appeal. PNP Br. 1; State Br. 1; Pls. Br. 12–13. The district court’s temporary restraining order effectively requiring use of the 2025 map in the November 2026 general election would have governed ballot printing and mailing

¹⁰The Court cited *Rutledge* when it denied PNP’s motion to stay the district court’s temporary restraining order, explaining alternative reasons that “we either lack jurisdiction over the appeal or, based on the briefing we have so far, the stay factors have not been met.”

of absentee ballots, which is “in practical effect a preliminary injunction.” *La Belle Dairy*, 183 F.4th at 612. Therefore, the Court concludes that this is a limited circumstance in which it has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Plaintiffs argue that PNP lacks both Article III and appellate standing because PNP has succeeded in its effort to place the 2025 map referendum on the November 2026 general election ballot.¹¹ This Court concludes that PNP has standing.

B.

PNP raises five arguments why this Court should not reach the merits of this appeal: three different jurisdictional arguments, an abstention argument, and a mootness argument. PNP also contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to require a bond. The Court rejects each argument.

1.

PNP first argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three-judge court was required. Under federal law, “[a] district court of three judges shall be convened ... when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts” 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). But unlike the previous version of Section 2284, the “duty to refer the matter for convening of a three-judge court” is not triggered upon the “‘filing of the application’ to enjoin an unconstitutional state law.” *Shapiro v. McManus*, 577 U.S. 39, 43–44 (2015). Instead, “the current § 2284(b)(1) triggers the district judge’s duty “[u]pon the filing of a *request* for three judges.’” *Id.* at 44 (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(1)). Congress’ amendment to the statute makes clear that a request must

¹¹At oral argument, counsel for PNP represented that, like the voter Plaintiffs, von Glahn resides in a different congressional district under the 2025 map than he did under the 2022 map. The Court has not found the factual support for this representation in the affidavit that von Glahn filed in support of PNP’s motion to intervene below or elsewhere in the record for this case.

be filed before the district court must refer the matter for convening of a three-judge court.

PNP claims that it “request[ed] a three-judge panel,” PNP Br. 16, but it never did. To support its assertion, PNP’s sole citation is to the motion to dismiss that it filed at the district court. *See id.* (citing PNP App. 55–74, R. Doc 12–4). On the last page of its motion to dismiss, PNP faulted Plaintiffs for not requesting a three-judge court. PNP App. 73. PNP did not file a stand-alone request for a three-judge court, nor has it identified any statement in the record in which it affirmatively requested such a court. Without a request for a three-judge court, the law did not require the district court to refer this matter for the convening of a three-judge court.

Nor would PNP prevail on this point even if it had filed a request for a three-judge court. While the Court doubts that an action contesting which map Missouri should use in the November 2026 election “challeng[es] the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts” handled by three-judge courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), federal law allows the district court to “grant a temporary restraining order” without referring the matter for convening of a three-judge court, *id.* § 2284(b)(3). Accordingly, the district court did not lack jurisdiction when it issued a temporary restraining order without referring the matter for the convening of a three-judge court.

2.

PNP next argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because this lawsuit is neither a case nor a controversy because Plaintiffs and Secretary Hoskins “take the same position on the constitutionality” of using the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election. *INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983). Contrary to PNP’s argument, adversity still exists between the government and a private party who agree on a litigation position if the government is bound to act in a way adverse to the legal interests of the private party. *Id.* at 939–40. “[I]t would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the courts

because the Attorney General of the United States”—or here, the Missouri Attorney General—“agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.” *Id.* at 939.

Notwithstanding any agreement between Plaintiffs and Secretary Hoskins on litigation positions, the Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction in *von Glahn* requires Secretary Hoskins to act in an adverse manner to Plaintiffs. Indeed, the day that Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, Secretary Hoskins advised local election authorities to use the 2022 map. See Hannah Falcon, *Missouri Supreme Court Decision to Block Republican-Drawn Map Leaves Questions*, KVFS News 12 (Sep. 4, 2026), <https://perma.cc/R5TN-BE8Q>. In the days since, Secretary Hoskins has formally directed local election authorities to use the 2022 map. PNP App. 738. This Court’s decision thus will have “real meaning,” *Chadha*, 462 at 939: if the Court rules for Plaintiffs, Missouri will use the 2025 map; if the Court rules against Plaintiffs, Missouri will use the 2022 map. Therefore, the parties are adverse.

3.

PNP also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine bars this action. The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine precludes suits in federal court that seek “what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment.” *T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.*, 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1749 (2026) (alteration in original) (quoting *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994)). *Rooker-Feldman* applies to “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

Rooker-Feldman does not apply here because Plaintiffs were not parties to the state-court action and because the complaint here raised only federal-law claims that the Missouri Supreme Court did not address in the state-court action. See *von Glahn*, 2026 WL 2628846, at *2 n.5 (Mo. Sept. 3, 2026) (expressly limiting its decision to an issue of state law). In a case remarkably similar to this action, the Supreme Court

emphasized that *Rooker-Feldman* is a “narrow doctrine” that “does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.” *Lance v. Dennis*, 546 U.S. 459, 464, 466 (2006). In *Lance*, Colorado citizens filed suit in federal district court to force the Colorado Secretary of State to use the Colorado General Assembly’s redistricting plan, rather than the plan imposed by the Colorado Supreme Court. *Id.* at 460–61. The district court ruled that *Rooker-Feldman* barred the suit on the theory that the citizen-plaintiffs were in privity with the Colorado General Assembly, which was a losing party in the earlier state-court action. *Id.* at 462. The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that “*Rooker-Feldman* is not simply preclusion by another name.” *Id.* at 466. At oral argument in this case, counsel for PNP acknowledged that “*Lance* is a problem for [their] *Rooker* analysis.” *Onder v. von Glahn*, No. 26-2797, Hearing at 23:51–56 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 2026).

Like *Lance*, Plaintiffs “were plainly not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding.” *Lance*, 546 U.S. at 465. Accordingly, the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine does not bar this action.

4.

PNP next argues that the district court should have abstained under *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). As a general rule, federal courts are “obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction,” even if “a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter.” *Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs*, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). “*Younger* abstention only applies to three ‘exceptional’ categories of cases: (1) ‘ongoing state criminal prosecutions;’ (2) ‘certain civil enforcement proceedings;’ and (3) ‘pending civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.’” *Wassef v. Tibben*, 68 F.4th 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting *Sprint Commc’ns*, 571 U.S. at 78). The Supreme Court recognized these three categories in *New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans* (“*NOPSI*”), 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989).

PNP only argues the third *NOPSI* category, relying on the Missouri Supreme Court's contempt proceedings to argue that state proceedings were "ongoing." However, the action before this Court does not interfere with the Missouri Supreme Court's contempt proceedings because those proceedings did not begin until after the district court issued its temporary restraining order, and they are not pending now. The Supreme Court has recognized that "the relevant principles of equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.'" *Steffel v. Thompson*, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (quoting *Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan*, 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972)). When no state proceeding "is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed," federal litigation does not duplicate or disrupt the state's legal system. *Id.* In this case, the Missouri Supreme Court issued its mandate before Plaintiffs filed their federal complaint, and no contempt proceedings were pending at that time. "Requiring the federal courts totally to step aside when no state [civil proceeding] is pending against the federal plaintiff would turn federalism on its head." *Id.* at 472.

Nor did Plaintiffs have the "opportunity to present their federal claims in the state proceedings." *Juidice v. Vail*, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977). They could not; Plaintiffs were not parties to the state proceedings. Secretary Hoskins also was prevented from asserting in the state proceedings any of the federal claims pending before this Court. *von Glahn*, 2026 WL 2628846, at *2 n.5 (noting that "claimed federal law violations and whether the congressional redistricting in HB 1 should or must remain in place through the 2026 election cycle" were arguments "outside the scope of Secretary Hoskins's authorized statutory review in section 116.120.1").¹²

¹²The Missouri Supreme Court also found that Secretary Hoskins did not properly preserve these federal arguments by attaching an opinion from the Attorney General of Missouri containing them. *See von Glahn*, 2026 WL 2628846, at *2 n.5. This finding does not affect this Court's analysis since the Missouri Supreme Court then explained that it would not have considered the federal arguments even had they been preserved. *See id.*

State proceedings ended before Plaintiffs filed their federal complaint initiating this action. Plaintiffs were not part of those proceedings, and Secretary Hoskins did not have the opportunity in the state proceedings to present the federal claims pending before this Court. Accordingly, *Younger* abstention is inapplicable here. Because no *NOPSI* category is present, the Court need not consider the *Middlesex* factors.¹³

5.

PNP also argues mootness. Article III limits federal-court jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A case becomes moot under Article III “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’” and “it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” *Chafin v. Chafin*, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (citations omitted). “[A]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” *Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000*, 567 U.S. 298, 307–08 (2012) (citation omitted). “A court with jurisdiction has a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to hear and resolve questions properly before it.” *FBI v. Fikre*, 601 U.S. 234, 240 (2024) (citation omitted).

In their brief, PNP identifies two factual developments that it believes render this appeal “likely moot.” PNP Br. 3. First, PNP argues that the Supreme Court’s stay of the district court’s temporary restraining order renders the order “unenforceable” on a timeline that “will likely extend beyond September 22, when the [temporary restraining order] expires.” *Id.* at 3–4. However, the Supreme Court did not vacate or modify the temporary restraining order or rule on its validity; it

¹³The district court also rejected arguments made by PNP that the court should abstain under *Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States*, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), and that the Anti-Injunction Act applied. PNP does not raise these arguments on appeal, and thus they are waived. *See Beadle v. City of Omaha*, 983 F.3d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 2020) (“by not briefing the issue, [the appellant] has waived review”).

merely stayed that order. *People Not Politicians*, 2026 WL 2659767, at *1. In addition, this Court is issuing a final judgment on the merits before September 22, 2026, which wholly removes the temporary restraining order’s expiration as a basis for mootness.

PNP’s second argument is that Secretary Hoskins “has now directed election officials to use the 2022 congressional map.” PNP Br. 4. This argument, which relies on *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam), “confuses mootness with the merits.” *Chafin*, 568 U.S. at 174. PNP does not cite any decision in which a court applied *Purcell* to find a case moot, and the Court declines to apply *Purcell* in that manner.

At oral argument, PNP also pointed to certain election deadlines that it claims affect mootness: the deadline for transmitting military and overseas ballots, and the commencement of absentee voting. The Court examines each in turn.

The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) requires Missouri to “transmit a validly requested absentee ballot to an absent uniformed services voter or overseas voter ... in the case in which the request is received at least 45 days before an election for Federal office, not later than 45 days before the election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)(A). While the federal deadline for UOCAVA ballot transmission for the November 3, 2026, general election fell on September 19, 2026, Missouri moved this Saturday deadline to the preceding business day, September 18, 2026. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.914.1.¹⁴ But as counsel for Plaintiffs noted at oral argument, UOCAVA itself contemplates circumstances in which a State cannot comply with that deadline: Congress authorized hardship waivers where, among other circumstances, a “legal contest” creates an undue

¹⁴If an absentee ballot application from a voter covered by UOCAVA arrives within 45 days of election, the ballot must be sent to the voter “not later than two business days after the application arrives.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.914.3. This deadline would arrive no sooner for any voter than September 22, 2026, and thus it has not yet passed.

hardship preventing timely transmission. 52 U.S.C. § 20302(g)(2)(B)(ii). A state may request such a waiver “as soon as practicable.” *Id.* § 20302(g)(3)(B). The Court need not decide whether Missouri would receive such a waiver.¹⁵ Instead, its availability demonstrates that UOCAVA ballot transmission on September 18, 2026, is not itself a jurisdictional point of no return and effectual relief remains available. *Chafin*, 568 U.S. at 172.

Though uncommon, this situation is not unprecedented. Courts around the country have ordered ballot changes after absentee ballots already have been distributed under UOCAVA. For example, on October 2, 2002—just 34 days before the general election—the New Jersey Supreme Court granted a request by the New Jersey Democratic State Committee to replace U.S. Senator Robert Torricelli on the November 2002 general election ballot. *See New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson*, 814 A.2d 1028, 1031 (N.J. 2002). The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that approximately 1,700 absentee ballots had been mailed “and few had been returned.” *Id.* at 1039. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court was “[c]onvinced that the absentee ballots can be handled in a manner that will not disenfranchise absentee voters,” including “preparation of an explanatory letter to all voters to whom a revised ballot has been sent” and “military and civilian absentee ballots to be given first priority in preparation and mailing.” *Id.* at 1040. Because most new absentee ballots “could be prepared and mailed within five business days,”

¹⁵Guidance for UOCAVA specifically identifies “a ballot legality challenge” as an “emergent circumstance[]” justifying a hardship waiver. *Guidance on Procedures and Processes for Submitting Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act Undue Hardship Waivers*, Memorandum for Chief State Election Officials, DOD-UPR-00003 (Apr. 18, 2022), <https://perma.cc/JGG8-QWDE>. In 2022, for example, the Department of Defense determined that Ohio established an undue hardship due to a legal contest in which the Ohio Supreme Court required the redrawing of Ohio’s congressional district map, which prevented local election authorities from meeting UOCAVA’s 45-day deadline in advance of a primary election. Letter from Under Secretary of Defense Gilbert R. Cisneros, Jr. to Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose (Mar. 4, 2022), <https://perma.cc/2QA3-RLVU> (denying hardship waiver on other grounds by finding Ohio’s comprehensive plan insufficient).

id. at 1039, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Republican nominee’s UOCAVA arguments because “the expeditious handling of amended absentee ballots will assure that the voters who use those ballots will have their votes counted in the general election,” *id.* at 1041.¹⁶

Other courts also have concluded that ballot changes may be made after UOCAVA ballots have been distributed. *See State ex rel. DeMora v. LaRose*, 217 N.E.3d 715, 726 (Ohio 2022) (“While we are mindful of the burdens it may place on a few boards to prepare a new ballot after the UOCAVA date has passed, we will not hesitate to order that a wrongly excluded candidate be added to the ballot, notwithstanding the passage of the UOCAVA date.”); *Wilson v. Hosemann*, 185 So. 3d 370, 380 (Miss. 2016) (UOCAVA “does not ‘govern ballot content’”) (quoting *United States v. Pennsylvania*, No. 1:CV-04-830, 2004 WL 2384999, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2004)); *see also Hawkins v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n*, 948 N.W.2d 877, 896 (Wis. 2020) (Ziegler, J., dissenting) (“Ballots already sent by e-mail [to UOCAVA voters] could be quickly and easily retrieved by sending another e-mail directing the voter to ignore or destroy the first ballot as the court has ordered ballots reprinted and instructing that as soon as the new ballot is available, it will be e-mailed.”). Here, the alleged harm did not arise until September 3, 2026, only two months before the November 2026 general election; Plaintiffs did not cause the harm from which they seek relief and are instead seeking to restore the status quo under which the candidate Plaintiffs campaigned for approximately one year and under which the voter Plaintiffs voted in the August 2026 primary election; Plaintiffs expeditiously sought injunctive relief the day after the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision; and local election authorities transmitted ballots under UOCAVA just one business day before this Court’s decision. In light of these considerations and the

¹⁶The Supreme Court denied the Republican nominee’s stay application and petition for a writ of certiorari. *See Forrester v. New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc.*, 537 U.S. 1083 (2002). The Republican nominee raised UOCAVA compliance as a question presented. *See Pet., Forrester v. New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc.*, No. 02-555 (U.S. Oct. 8, 2002).

cases previously cited, the transmission of ballots on September 18, 2026 does not moot this case.

For all Missouri voters not covered by UOCAVA, absentee ballots may be requested and cast beginning on September 22, 2026. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.281.1. That deadline has not yet arrived, and thus general absentee voting has not yet begun. Accordingly, the September 22, 2026, absentee ballot commencement date does not moot this case.¹⁷

6.

Finally, PNP argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to require a bond under Rule 65(c). PNP lacks standing to raise this argument because it was not the party “enjoined or restrained.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). In addition, PNP’s argument is moot since this Court is entering a final judgment.

¹⁷Other courts have ordered ballot changes that delayed the commencement of absentee voting because ballots had to be reprinted. For example, three days after absentee ballots were supposed to be mailed under state law, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-227.10, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued a decision requiring Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.’s name to be removed as a presidential candidate on the 2024 general election ballot. See *Kennedy v. N. Carolina State Bd. of Elections*, 905 S.E.2d 55, 58 (N.C. 2024). The North Carolina State Board of Elections estimated that the process to update the ballots would “take at least two weeks to complete.” *Id.* at 70 (Riggs, J., dissenting). However, the North Carolina Supreme Court ordered the printing of new ballots despite the “considerable time and effort by our election officials and significant expense to the State.” *Id.* at 58; see also *Holloway v. Byrne*, 874 A.2d 504, 505 (N.J. 2005) (ordering, 20 days before a municipal election, new ballots prepared and absentee ballots “reprinted and remailed to absentee voters with appropriate instructions to the voters on the need to submit the revised ballot even if the prior version had been returned”).

III.

Having dismissed PNP's procedural objections, the Court now considers Plaintiffs' claims. Before the Court is a purely legal issue of whether Missouri should use the 2025 map or the 2022 map. No discovery or further hearing is needed to decide this case, and the Court is not presented with "a tentative and provisional record with conflicting material facts." *Campaign for Fam. Farms v. Glickman*, 200 F.3d 1180, 1187 (8th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, this Court may reach the merits and issue a final judgment. *See id.* (citing cases).

In reaching its decision, this Court does not review the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court. That court rendered a decision interpreting Missouri's state constitutional referendum provision. Secretary Hoskins may appeal that decision in a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Instead, this Court reviews whether using the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election after using the 2025 map in the August 2026 primary election violates the United States Constitution.

A.

In their verified complaint, Plaintiffs allege that "[h]olding a general election under a different congressional map than the one used in the August 4 primary would violate Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution." R. Doc. 1 ¶ 75. The district court agreed, concluding that "[b]ecause voters have already cast their ballots in the primaries . . . , replacing the applicable map for the general election would disenfranchise voters of their votes in the primary election, in clear violation of Article I, Section 2." R. Doc. 35 at 9. The district court further found that "[v]oters reassigned to [a] different district would have cast their votes in vain for candidates now connected to other districts, effectively nullifying their votes." *Id.*

The Court begins with the constitutional text. Article I, Section 2 provides that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every

second Year by the People of the several States” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. This provision creates a “right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congressional elections.” *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941). The Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, Section 2 to mean that “no matter where he live[s], each voter should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Congress.” *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).

These principles are not limited to general elections. Instead, Article I, Section 2 “applies to the entire process by which federal legislators are chosen.” *Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.*, 479 U.S. 208, 227 (1986). Thus, “[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice,” Article I, Section 2 encompasses “the right to choose at a primary election, a candidate for election as representative.” *Classic*, 313 U.S. at 315, 318. “If primaries were not subject to the requirements” in Article I, Section 2, “the fundamental principle of free electoral choice would be subject to the sort of erosion these prior decisions were intended to prevent.” *Tashjian*, 479 U.S. at 227.

Missouri has made its primary “an integral part of the general election laws of the state for the election of public officers, including Members of Congress.” *Klein v. United States*, 176 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1949). State law requires “all candidates for elective office” to be nominated at a primary election, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.339, and provides that the candidate receiving the most primary votes becomes the party’s sole candidate for that office at the general election, *id.* § 115.343. In Missouri, “[i]t is clear that the vote at the primary election determines the name of the candidate of a political party to appear on the ballot at the general election, and we think it follows that the right to vote at such a primary for the nomination of candidates for Congress, and to have the vote counted as cast, is a right secured by the Federal Constitution.” *Klein*, 176 F.2d at 187. Missouri’s primary and general elections are thus “fused” “into a single instrumentality for choice of officers.” *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944).

Secretary Hoskins reports that PNP has “never contested that—if Missouri’s congressional map changes—over one million Missourians will vote for representatives in the General Election that they never had the opportunity to consider in the Primary Election.” State Br. 41. Based on 2020 Census population data, Amicus Club for Growth calculates that “1,419,242 Missourians—approximately 23.1 percent of the State’s population—reside in different districts under the two maps.” Club for Growth Br. 14. The Club for Growth further estimates that approximately 284,000 Missourians “voted in one district but will receive a general-election ballot for another,” which again is about one-fourth of all Missouri voters who cast a congressional primary ballot. *Id.* at 15. If these estimates are correct, more than 1.4 million Missourians could not vote for the congressional district nominees who will appear on their November 2026 general election ballot, and more than a quarter-million Missourians who voted in the August 2026 primary election cast a vote for a congressional district candidate who now cannot represent them.

The result is that, if the 2022 map is used in the November 2026 general election, some Missouri voters will have more say than others on who represents them in Congress. For example, more than half of the Missourians living in the Fifth Congressional District under the 2025 map used in the August 2026 primary election—57%—will find themselves in other districts if the 2022 map is used in the November 2026 general election. *Id.* at 14–15. As a result, a majority of residents in the Fifth Congressional District had no voice in who will appear on their November 2026 ballot; they will be forced to choose from nominees selected by a minority of residents in the district as well as voters who are no longer in the district.¹⁸ The Supreme Court has rejected this outcome: “It would defeat the

¹⁸Underscoring this issue, some Missouri voters and unsuccessful primary candidates have challenged Secretary Hoskins’ certification of the August 2026 primary election results for the Fifth Congressional District. See Pet. ¶ 37, *Hueffmeier v. Hoskins*, No. 26AC-CC00613 (Mo. Cole Cnty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 17, 2026) (“A majority of the electorate that was eligible to participate in the August 4, 2026 Republican primary for the ‘Fifth District’ will not be eligible to vote in the

principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise—equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people—for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others.” *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 14. Yet some voters will have a greater voice if the 2022 map is used for the November 2026 general election.

PNP argues that Article I, Section 2 has not been violated because all qualified Missouri voters “had the opportunity to vote in the primary, the primary votes were counted and used to select nominees, and all nominees will appear on the general election ballot.” PNP Br. 47. PNP overlooks the important fact that one-in-four Missourians had no opportunity to choose the congressional nominees that will appear on their November 2026 ballot. In addition to those problems already discussed, many districts are drawn in a manner where the primary is the only election that matters. In the 2024 general election, conducted under the 2022 map, the winners of five of Missouri’s eight congressional districts received more than 70% of the vote, and two others received more than 60%. *General Election Results – November 5, 2024*, MO. SEC’Y STATE, <https://perma.cc/Z2AX-SX6K>. “[W]e cannot close our eyes to the fact already mentioned that the practical influence of the choice of candidates at the primary may be so great as to affect profoundly the choice at the general election even though there is no effective legal prohibition upon the rejection at the election of the choice made at the primary and may thus operate to deprive the voter of his constitutional right of choice.” *Classic*, 313 U.S. at 319; see also *Klein*, 176 F.2d at 186 (“success in the primary was said to be tantamount to election so that the primary was in effect an election”). Denying approximately one-fourth of Missourians the ability to vote for the nominees that will appear on their November 2026 general election ballot deprives these voters of their constitutional right of choice under Article I, Section 2.

November 3, 2026 general election for the Fifth District. Conversely, a substantial body of Republican voters who reside in the Fifth District as it actually exists, and who will cast ballots for that seat in November, were given no opportunity to participate in the selection of the nominee they will be presented with.”).

The people's freedom to choose their congressional representatives "was one of the great purposes of our Constitutional scheme of government." *Classic*, 313 U.S. at 316. That free choice is made by a defined constituency. A congressional primary selects the candidates who will compete to represent a particular district, and the general election determines which of those candidates will represent that same district. Article I, Section 2's right to participate in the procedure of choosing a member of Congress requires continuity in the constituency throughout all stages of a single election. Changing district lines between the primary and general election prevents an affected voter from participating in either district's complete procedure of choice.¹⁹

"No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live." *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 17. Missouri's primary is "the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers." *Storer v. Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974). Missouri cannot deprive more than 1.4 million of its residents of their choice in half of that process without violating Article I, Section 2. "Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right," such that "no matter where he live[s], each voter should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Congress." *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 10, 17–18.²⁰

¹⁹A voter transferred from District A to District B after the primary participated in selecting District A's nominees but cannot participate in the general election choice between them. At the same time, that voter must make a general election choice between District B's nominees without having participated in their selection. The voter participates in the first stage of the procedure for choosing District A's representative and the second stage of selecting District B's representative but in the complete procedure for neither. The protected right of participation in the choice of representatives cannot be satisfied by giving voters two halves of two different procedures.

²⁰This opinion does not hold that voters have the right to vote for a particular candidate or class of candidates. *Contra* PNP Br. 45–46. Neither does this opinion freeze congressional district lines indefinitely or restrict Missouri's authority to

Therefore, this Court holds that, because Missouri used the 2025 map in the August 2026 primary election, using the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election violates Article I, Section 2.

B.

For the same reasons, Plaintiffs make a colorable argument that using the 2022 map in the November 2026 general election also violates the Equal Protection Clause. Based on this provision, the Supreme Court has held that “[o]nce the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.” *Gray v. Sanders* 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963). “The fact that an individual lives here or there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote.” *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). In other recent redistricting litigation, at least one amicus supporting PNP has argued that changing district maps between the primary election and the general election violates the Equal Protection Clause.²¹

redraw them for future elections. Instead, the Court requires continuity of constituency during the 2026 election already underway.

²¹Under a 2026 plan adopted by Galveston County, Texas, “the precinct lines applicable to the upcoming November general election, for both county commissioners and justices of the peace, would be different from the lines used for the March primary election.” *In re Rose*, No. 26-0916, 2026 WL 2672098, at *1 (Tex. Sept. 11, 2026). In an emergency petition on behalf of voters filed with the Texas Supreme Court in August 2026, the Campaign Legal Center argued that changing the district maps between the primary election and the general election violated the Equal Protection Clause “by precluding certain voters and potential candidates from participating in the primary election on an equal basis as others.” Original Emergency Pet. for Writ of Mandamus at 1, 14–15, *In re Rose*, No. 26-0916 (Tex. Aug. 4, 2026), <https://perma.cc/3WKM-2YWJ>; see also *id.* at 14–15 (relying on *Gray*, 372 U.S. at 380). The Texas Supreme Court agreed that “the implicit claim that a governmental authority may unsettle the electoral map during an ongoing election for any reason (or none at all) implicates serious constitutional concerns.” *In re Rose*, 2026 WL 2672098, at *1. The Texas Supreme Court ultimately found in

However, in light of the Court’s decision in favor of Plaintiffs on their Article I, Section 2 claim, it is unnecessary to reach the parties’ Equal Protection Clause arguments. Moreover, no party has explicitly addressed the applicable standard of review, and PNP did not argue what state interests might apply (or what discovery, if any, might be needed to support those state interest arguments). Although the Court finds the district court’s Equal Protection Clause analysis compelling, given the posture of this case, the Court declines to reach this claim. Similarly, it is unnecessary to reach the parties’ arguments on the Elections Clause.

IV.

PNP contends that “the *Purcell* principle bars interference in Missouri’s election machinery at this late date.” PNP Br. ii. The *Purcell* principle “reflects a bedrock tenet of election law: When an election is close at hand, the rules of the road must be clear and settled.” *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879, 880–81 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for stays); *Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature*, 592 U.S. 1039, 1043 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (same). This principle recognizes that “‘late judicial tinkering’ ... ‘can lead to disruption and to unanticipated and unfair consequences for candidates, political parties, and voters, among others.’” *Malliotakis v. Williams*, 146 S. Ct. 809, 811 (2026) (Alito, J., concurring in grant of stay) (brackets accepted) (quoting *Merrill*, 142 S. Ct. at 881) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of application for stays). “Judicial restraint” thus “not only prevents voter confusion but also prevents election administrator confusion.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 592 U.S. at 1044 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (brackets accepted). Therefore, Missouri has an

favor of the Campaign Legal Center’s clients on state law grounds and held that a primary could not be “[d]ecoupl[ed]” from the general election without “chang[ing] the nature of both.” *Id.* at *3. In its amicus brief to this Court, the Campaign Legal Center does not mention the Texas Supreme Court’s decision or the Equal Protection Clause. *See generally* Campaign Legal Ctr. Br.

“extraordinarily strong interest in avoiding late, judicially imposed changes to its election laws and procedures.” *Merrill*, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J. concurring in grant of application for stays).

Advancing an absolute prohibition on federal-review of last-minute state-court decisions, PNP argues that this Court must reverse because “*Purcell* does not govern whether *state* courts may interpret their own election laws,” but “forbids” the district court from “prohibiting implementation of Missouri law as unanimously interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court.” PNP Br. 21 (emphasis in original). Yet “under the U. S. Constitution, the state courts do not have a blank check to rewrite state election laws for federal elections.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 592 U.S. at 1048 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay). “The Constitution provides that state legislatures—not federal judges, not state judges, not state governors, not other state officials—bear primary responsibility for setting election rules.” *Id.* at 1041 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). “The provisions of the Federal Constitution conferring on state legislatures, not state courts, the authority to make rules governing federal elections would be meaningless if a state court could override the rules adopted by the legislature simply by claiming that a state constitutional provision gave the courts the authority to make whatever rules it thought appropriate for the conduct of a fair election.” *Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar*, 592 U.S. 1068, 1070 (2020) (statement of Alito, J., joined by Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ.). Allowing state courts to issue, without any federal-court review, last-minute decisions affecting the conduct of federal elections would increase the volume of last-minute requests to state courts, decrease the public’s confidence in the election results, and potentially allow a handful of state judges to render decisions that decide the outcome of a presidential election or party control of Congress. Refusing to correct an erroneous, “late-breaking” state court decision based on the *Purcell* principle would “turn *Purcell* on its head.” *Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 592 U.S. at 1044 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay).

For these reasons, “[t]he *Purcell* principle is a presumption against disturbing the status quo.” *Carson v. Simon*, 978 F.3d 1051, 1062 (8th Cir. 2020). “The Constitution’s answer” for the status quo “is generally the state legislature,” *id.*, which in this case would be the 2025 map codified in H.B. 1. PNP argues that the 2025 map “was never the legal status quo.” PNP Br. 41 (citing *von Glahn*, 2026 WL 2628846 at *6 n.8). But that imagines away all the lawful activity conducted under the 2025 map. More than 60 congressional candidates filed under the 2025 map. Candidates and their supporters invested countless hours and millions of dollars implementing primary and general election strategies designed for the 2025 map. More than 1.2 million Missourians voted for congressional candidates under the 2025 map. The 2025 map was the status quo for virtually all of this election cycle until the Missouri Supreme Court issued its September 3, 2026 ruling in *von Glahn*. The Missouri General Assembly “set the status quo,” the Missouri Supreme Court “upset it,” “and it is our duty, consistent with *Purcell*, to at least preserve the possibility of restoring it.” *Carson*, 978 F.3d at 1062.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, the *Purcell* principle is not “absolute.” *Merrill*, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of application for stays). Justice Kavanaugh has refined the *Purcell* principle into a four-part test, *see id.*, each of which supports our ruling in favor of Plaintiffs here.

First, “the underlying merits are entirely clearcut in favor of the plaintiff[s].” *Id.* As set forth in Part III of this opinion, the merits are “entirely clearcut” in favor of Plaintiffs on their claims under Article I, Section 2 and the Equal Protection Clause.

Second, “the plaintiff[s] would suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction.” *Id.* The voter Plaintiffs are irreparably harmed if they are forced to vote in different districts in the November 2026 general election than the districts in which they voted in the August 2026 primary election. The candidate Plaintiffs are irreparably harmed if they are forced to campaign in different geographic districts with different voters for the November 2026 general election than in the August 2026 primary election.

This harm is “certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” *Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson*, 725 F.3d 885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Third, “the plaintiff[s] ha[ve] not unduly delayed bringing the complaint to court.” *Merrill*, 142 S. Ct. at 880 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of application for stays). Plaintiffs filed this action and moved for injunctive relief just one day after the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in *von Glahn*.

Finally, “the changes in question are at least feasible before the election without significant cost, confusion, or hardship.” *Id.* In an amicus brief, the Missouri Association of County Clerks & Election Authorities (“MACCEA”) raises concerns relating to implementing a new congressional district map. See MACCEA Br. 8–11. It is unclear from the local election authorities’ brief how many jurisdictions would need to change ballots if this Court ordered use of the 2025 map. *Id.* at 11 n.2 (“Not every election authority would be required to reprint its ballots because some would be in the same congressional district regardless of map used.”) It also is unclear from the local election authorities’ brief how much cost would be incurred to change the maps. *Id.* at 9 (discussing “in-house ballot printers”), 11 (“*Amicus* members expect that these costs would range anywhere from a couple hundred dollars in a smaller jurisdiction to \$15,000 to \$30,000 to reprint ballots per county, not including the cost of staff time for reprogramming and proofing.”).

The local election authorities do not identify any specific length of time that it would take to implement a new congressional map. Presumably, local election authorities needed only a few days to implement the 2022 map following the rapid activity in the state and federal courts this month. In fact, two MACCEA executive board members, including a signatory to the amicus brief to this Court, assured the Missouri Supreme Court that “[w]hile it is true that the redistricting process is manual and time-intensive for local election officials, ... the Court need not consider that concern in this case.” Br. of Amici Curiae Rachel Lightfoot, County Clerk & Election Authority of Polk County and Brianna L. Lennon, County Clerk & Election

Authority of Boone County (“Lightfoot and Lennon State Amicus Br.”) at 5, *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No. SC101805 (Mo. Aug. 24, 2026).²²

Using the 2025 map also will lead to the least amount of confusion for voters subjected to a string of changes this month. For approximately one year, Missouri operated under the 2025 map. During that time, Missourians filed to run for Congress, met candidates, watched campaign advertisements, received campaign mail, and voted under the 2025 map. Any confusion stems from the last-minute decision by a state court to switch the congressional map. “When the constitutionally mandated locus for election decisions is disregarded, whether by a federal court, a state court, a state agency, or a state official, the same rationale that works to prevent election interference by federal courts also works to prevent interference by other entities as well.” *Carson*, 978 F.3d at 1062.

Therefore, the Court concludes that *Purcell* supports, not prevents, its decision in favor of Plaintiffs.

V.

Secretary Hoskins has respectfully requested “direct guidance on what effect a federal injunction—issued on federal legal grounds—has on a conflicting state-law injunction issued on state-law grounds.” State Br. 33. This is understandable considering Secretary Hoskins’s compliance with the district court’s temporary restraining order resulted in a contempt proceeding before the Missouri Supreme Court. Although PNP concedes to this Court that the district court’s temporary restraining order “effectively nullifie[d]” the Missouri Supreme Court’s judgment, PNP Br. 54, PNP argued the opposite in its contempt briefing. *See, e.g.*, Emergency Application for Order Holding Secretary of State in Contempt at 4, *von Glahn v.*

²²The state court amicus brief explained that the Missouri Centralized Voter Registration system allows local election officials to choose either the 2022 or 2025 maps for the November 2026 general election. Lightfoot and Lennon State Amicus Br. at 6.

Hoskins, No. SC101805 (Mo. Sept. 8, 2026) (“This Court should make clear that regardless of other orders (except from the United States Supreme Court) the Missouri Secretary of State must comply with this court’s injunction”); Suggestions Regarding Contempt at 12, *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No. SC101805 (Mo. Sept. 9, 2026) (claiming the Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction “is in full force”).

The Supremacy Clause provides that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by the Federal Constitution, “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. As the Supreme Court has explained, “this Clause creates a rule of decision” directing state courts that they “must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal law[].” *Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue*, 591 U.S. 464, 488 (2020) (quoting *Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015)). After all, the “historical record makes clear that the Supremacy Clause’s exclusive function is to disable state laws that are substantively inconsistent with federal law.” *Haywood v. Drown*, 556 U.S. 729, 752 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Given the conflict between Article I, Section 2 with an interpretation of Missouri law that would suspend a congressional district map for a general election after its use in a primary election, the “supreme law of the land,” *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (emphasis in original), prohibits using a different congressional district map in the general election than in the primary election.

Nor does this Court’s ruling leave Missouri without a congressional district map. *Contra* Campaign Legal Ctr. Br. 11–13. The Constitution requires Missouri to choose its members to the U.S. House this year. *See* U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. These elections must be conducted pursuant to a congressional district map established by law. *See* 2 U.S.C. § 2c. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision to suspend the 2025 map must yield to the Constitution’s prohibition on using a congressional district map in the general election different from the congressional district map in the primary election. *See Espinoza*, 591 U.S. at 488.

The Court recognizes that election preparations must be made sooner rather than later. The Court is ordering the district court to administratively stay the permanent injunction for seven days to allow for Supreme Court review. If the Supreme Court has not stayed or otherwise altered the permanent injunction by that time, Secretary Hoskins and all others bound by this judgment must fully implement the 2025 map for the November 2026 general election. The Court trusts that the Missouri Supreme Court will respect this Court’s decision under the Supremacy Clause.²³ See *Testa v. Katt*, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (“a state court cannot ‘refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.’”) (quoting *Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Bombolis*, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916)).

VI.

The Constitution does not permit Missouri to use a different congressional district map in the November 2026 general election than it used in the August 2026 primary election. Accordingly, the Court holds that use of the 2022 map in the November 2022 general election violates the Constitution. The Court therefore affirms the district court’s temporary restraining order and remands to the district court for entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting Secretary of State Hoskins—as well as Secretary Hoskins’s officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with Secretary of

²³The Missouri Supreme Court restrained and enjoined Secretary Hoskins from “implementing, using, or mandating the use of the” 2025 map. *von Glahn*, 2026 WL 2628846, at *7. The Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction did not restrict advocacy by Secretary Hoskins and his counsel in this litigation or his public comments (so long as they are not directives to local election authorities to implement the 2025 map), and any attempt to do so would raise freedom of speech concerns under the state and federal constitutions, see U.S. CONST. amend. I, MO. CONST. art. I, § 8, and separation of powers concerns under state law, see *State Auditor v. Joint Comm. on Legis. Rsch.*, 956 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Mo. 1997).

State Hoskins or his officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys²⁴—from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the 2025 map for the November 3, 2026, general election.

To allow for appellate review, the district court should administratively stay its permanent injunction until September 28, 2026, at 5 p.m. Central Daylight Time. Without any stay, Secretary Hoskins and local election authorities would be required to immediately begin implementing the 2025 map before the Supreme Court receives or decides any appeal. And without a limit to the stay, PNP could wait to file its petition for a writ of certiorari until the December 21, 2026, due date, *see* SUP. CT. R. 13.1, thus preventing the Supreme Court from considering the merits of this case until after Missouri has conducted the November 2026 general election. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

There are multiple problems with this appeal. The court names one: a probable violation of Article I, section 2 of the Constitution as interpreted. *See ante*,

²⁴PNP emphasizes that Secretary Hoskins is the defendant in both this case and in the Missouri Supreme Court’s *von Glahn* case. *See, e.g.*, PNP Br. 13–17, 34. Neither case included local election authorities as parties. To the Missouri Supreme Court, PNP suggested that a difference in language between the Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction (“acting in concert”) and the district court’s temporary restraining order (“agents” and “officers”) required local election authorities to follow the Missouri Supreme Court’s injunction, but not the district court’s temporary restraining order. *See* Suggestions Regarding Contempt at 9 n.2, *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No. SC101805 (Mo. Sept. 9, 2026). The “in active concert” language here reaches at least as far as the Missouri Supreme Court’s “acting in concert” language, which PNP acknowledged “undoubtedly covered” local election authorities. *Id.* The Court trusts that counsel will not instruct local election authorities to violate the Constitution as clearly established by this opinion. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3).

at 23–27. But I would not even get that far because People Not Politicians and Richard von Glahn lack standing. For that reason, I would dismiss the appeal.²⁵

I.

Cases and controversies are our bread and butter. Anyone suing *or* appealing needs standing. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. At each stage, a “personal stake in the outcome” must exist, *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (citation omitted), a way for the person invoking federal jurisdiction to answer “[w]hat’s it to you?” *FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med.*, 602 U.S. 367, 379 (2024). This “irreducible constitutional minimum” requires an injury “particularized” enough to set a party apart from everyone else. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338, 340 (2016) (citation omitted). A “generally available grievance seeking . . . relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [a party] than it does the public at large” does not cut it. *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992).

Sometimes overlooked is that standing must “persist throughout all stages of the litigation,” even on appeal. *Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill*, 587 U.S. 658, 662 (2019) (citation omitted). It “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” *Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona*, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). Intervenors, who often join the litigation only because someone else had enough of a stake to bring the case in the first place, are no exception. “As the [Supreme] Court has repeatedly recognized, to appeal a decision that the primary party does not challenge, an intervenor must independently demonstrate standing.” *Bethune-Hill*, 587 U.S. at 663.

Only two parties possibly qualify here, both intervenors, who decided to bring their own appeal when Missouri’s Secretary of State decided against it. The first,

²⁵I agree with the court, however, that nothing requires us to remand to the district court with directions to dismiss the case. See *ante*, at 12–21.

People Not Politicians, is the organization that proposed the ballot referendum. The other, Richard von Glahn, is both a Missouri voter and the organization's executive director who litigated until the Supreme Court of Missouri put it up for a vote this November. *See von Glahn v. Hoskins*, ___ S.W.3d ___, SC101805, slip op. at 13 (Mo. banc Sept. 3, 2026). Nearly all the briefing in this case focused on whether they have a special status to litigate in federal court based on their "'distinct' role in the [referendum] process." *Hollingsworth v. Perry*, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013).

For the answer, the starting point is *Hollingsworth v. Perry*, which sets the ground rules. There, the appealing intervenors claimed that their "'unique,' 'special,' and 'distinct' role in the initiative process" under California law gave them the right to defend the law they helped enact, even after it became law. *Id.* The Supreme Court said no, mostly because they had "no role—special or otherwise—in the [law's] enforcement." *Id.* at 707. Missing, in other words, was a "personal stake" different from the "general interest of every citizen of California." *Id.* (citation omitted).

The timing here is different, but the underlying problem is the same. Referendum proponents in Missouri may well have a "'unique,' 'special,' and 'distinct' role in" getting a measure on the ballot, just like in California. *Id.* at 706; *see, e.g.*, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 116.180, 116.332 (requiring certain notices to be sent to the proponent's designee). Or maybe not. *See id.* § 116.200.1 (allowing "any citizen," not just the proponents, to bring suit challenging the Secretary of State's decision not to certify a referendum petition). But either way, the district court's temporary restraining order will have *no* effect on whether the referendum appears on the ballot in November. Neither will this appeal. *See Campaign for Fam. Farms v. Glickman*, 200 F.3d 1180, 1186 (8th Cir. 2000) ("An appellate court, upon an appeal from an order granting or denying a temporary injunction, will ordinarily *not* consider the merits of a case further than is necessary to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); *see also* 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 3921.1

(3d ed. 2026) (“Appellate consideration of interlocutory injunction appeals under [28 U.S.C.] § 1292(a)(1) ordinarily focuses on the injunction decision itself.”).

At oral argument, People Not Politicians and von Glahn were candid about their only referendum-related interest: its *current* effect under Missouri law. *See* Mo. Const. art. III, § 52(b) (“Any measure referred to the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.”). They want to delay the implementation of H.B. 1 pending the November vote. But this interest, which is merely to enforce Missouri law,²⁶ is “[in]distinguishable from the general interest of every citizen” in the state. *Hollingsworth*, 570 U.S. at 707; *see* Mo. Rev. Stat. § 116.200.1 (allowing “any citizen” to sue to challenge the decision not to certify a petition) (emphasis added); *see also* Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, *People Not Politicians v. Onder*, No. 26A326 (U.S. Sept. 10, 2026). It is no way to get standing in federal court.²⁷ *See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War*, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (rejecting “[t]he

²⁶No one questions the standing of the parties who originally brought the case. Robert Onder and Richard Brattin must now run for election in different-looking districts. *Cf. Bost v. Ill. Bd. of Elections*, 607 U.S. 71, 76 (2026) (“[A] candidate has a personal stake in the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election.”). Along with them were two voters who were negatively affected by the map change. *See Gill v. Whitford*, 585 U.S. 48, 65–66 (2018) (“alleg[ing] facts showing disadvantage to [voters] as individuals” is enough for standing (citation omitted)).

²⁷The *Purcell* principle, as powerful as it may be, cannot be a shortcut around jurisdiction. *See Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam) (cautioning federal courts about changing election laws in the period leading up to an election). It is only “a sensible refinement of ordinary stay principles for the election context,” *Merrill v. Milligan*, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), not an ironclad rule that allows *anyone* to advocate for its application. *See Ex parte McCardle*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”); *Curtis v. City of Des Moines*, 995 F.2d 125, 128 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Standing is a fundamental element of federal court jurisdiction, without which federal courts are powerless to act.”). Even those who have no right to be here.

proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions”).

Von Glahn has one other interest that the organization does not share: his status as a voter. As clear as it is that a generalized interest in upholding the law does not satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, it is equally clear that voters who allege “facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals” do. *Gill*, 585 U.S. at 67 (2018) (citation omitted). But nowhere in the filings are there any allegations about *how* his interests as a voter would be harmed by using H.B. 1’s map in November’s general election. See *Jensen v. Minn. Bd. of Med. Prac.*, ___ F.4th ___, No. 25-1812, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Sept. 15, 2026) (holding that general factual allegations can be sufficient to confer standing); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, *supra*, at 6 (noting the absence of factual allegations sufficient for standing).

The closest he gets is the following statement: he is “a qualified voter registered to vote in the State of Missouri” who lives in St. Louis County. He does not allege that his vote has been diluted, see *Gill*, 585 U.S. at 66 (holding that vote dilution can create standing), or that he will be unable to elect the candidate of his choice, see *McLain v. Meier*, 851 F.2d 1045, 1048 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that limiting the ability of a voter to elect the candidate of his choice was sufficient for standing). Nor do the filings say whether changing maps would require him to vote in a different race or for a different candidate. If he has been injured as a voter, he has not told us how. And as the “party invoking federal jurisdiction” by appealing, it was his burden to do so. *Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 338 (requiring a party to “‘clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating’ each element” of standing (quoting *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975))); see *Bethune-Hill*, 587 U.S. at 663 (“As the Court has repeatedly recognized, to appeal a decision that the primary party does not challenge, an intervenor must independently demonstrate standing.”).

II.

I have no doubt that both People Not Politicians and von Glahn are “deeply committed” to “zealous[ly]” challenging the district court’s order. *Hollingsworth*, 570 U.S. at 707 (citation omitted). But the plea heard throughout oral argument—“if not us, then who?”—not only ignores obvious alternatives, but has never been “a reason to find standing.” *Schlesinger*, 418 U.S. at 227. Regardless of whether they “would rather . . . fight on,” neither can do so without it.²⁸ *Bethune-Hill*, 587 U.S. at 671.

²⁸The cross-appeal must go too, because the candidates and voters are “not aggrieved” after receiving a temporary restraining order that gave them exactly what they requested. *United States v. Northshore Mining Co.*, 576 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see *Lloyd v. Hardin County*, 207 F.3d 1080, 1082 n.2 (8th Cir. 2000) (dismissing a cross-appeal that “merely assert[ed] . . . additional grounds upon which the district court’s order arguably could be affirmed”).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT “BOB”

ONDER et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF MISSOURI and DENNY
HOSKINS,


Defendants.

Case No. 4:26-cv-01424-SRC

Order

On September 21, 2026, the Eighth Circuit issued its disposition in *Onder v. von Glahn*, No. 26-2797 (8th Cir. Sep. 21, 2026). In accord with the Eighth Circuit’s order, the Court enters a permanent injunction prohibiting Secretary of State Hoskins—as well as Secretary Hoskins’s officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with Secretary of State Hoskins or his officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys—from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the 2025 map for the November 3, 2026, general election. In further accord with the Eighth Circuit’s order, to allow for appellate review, the Court administratively stays its permanent injunction until September 28, 2026, at 5 p.m. Central Daylight Time.

So ordered this 21st day of September 2026.


STEPHEN R. CLARK

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



Supreme Court of Missouri

en banc

SC101805

Richard von Glahn,

Appellant,

v.

Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity,
et al.,

Respondents.

FILED

SEP 03 2026

CLERK, SUPREME COURT

Appeal from the Cole County Circuit Court
The Honorable Daniel R. Green, Judge

Overview

This case involves a straightforward question of law: Does the Missouri Constitution permit a referendum on a congressional redistricting act passed by the General Assembly? There is no dispute the referendum petition (2026-R004) seeking a referendum on House Bill 1 (“HB 1”) was timely filed.¹ Likewise, there is no dispute the referendum petition has the number of signatures required by the Missouri Constitution. The only issue is whether the Missouri Constitution authorizes the referendum petition as a matter of law. About one hour before the statutory deadline of 5:00 p.m. on August 4, 2026, Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins

¹ H.B. 1, 103d Gen. Assembly, 2d Extraordinary Sess. (2025).

held a press conference and issued a “Certificate of Insufficiency of Petition” finding “the referendum petition is insufficient under the Missouri Constitution because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly.” The secretary directed the referendum petition should not be placed on the November 2026 general election ballot.

Because the plain language of article III, section 49 of the Missouri Constitution authorizes a referendum as to “any act of the general assembly” and no exception applies, the referendum petition was legal, sufficient, and timely. This Court reverses the circuit court’s judgment. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, this Court enters judgment ordering the secretary to issue a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition (2026-R004) (attaching a copy of this opinion thereto), to place the referendum petition on the November 2026 general election ballot, and to take any and all additional steps necessary to place the referendum petition on the ballot at that election before September 8, 2026. The secretary and all of those acting in concert with him are restrained and enjoined from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter unless and until HB 1 is approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election and takes effect 30 days thereafter. Mo. Const. art. XII, sec. 2(b).

Factual Background and Procedural History

The circuit court held a bench trial on the following joint stipulated facts and exhibits. On September 12, 2025, the General Assembly passed HB 1, which, if it becomes effective, will repeal the congressional districts established in 2022 and establish new congressional districts.

On September 29, organizers submitted a referendum petition form to the secretary. The secretary approved the referendum petition for circulation. On December 9, the organizers

submitted to the secretary 691 boxes purporting to contain more than 300,000 signatures in support of the referendum petition.

The December 9 filing triggered several obligations of the secretary. First, the secretary had to “examine the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter [116].” Sec. 116.120.1.² Second, the secretary had to issue a certificate of sufficiency or insufficiency as to the petition within the statutory timeframe. Sec. 116.150.1-.3. There is no dispute the secretary could have issued his certificate any time after the December 9 filing but had to issue it by August 4 at 5:00 p.m. At about 4:00 p.m. on August 4, the secretary issued a “Certificate of Insufficiency of Petition” finding “the referendum petition is insufficient under the Missouri Constitution because the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly.” The secretary directed the referendum petition should not be placed on the November 2026 general election ballot.

On the same day, Richard von Glahn timely sued under section 116.200.1 in the Cole County circuit court, seeking reversal of the secretary’s certification decision and an injunction restraining the secretary from using, implementing, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1. Von Glahn is one of the referendum petition proponents, a Missouri

² All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, and all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2026).

citizen, a St. Louis County resident, a taxpayer, and a qualified Missouri voter.³ The circuit court upheld the secretary's insufficiency certification. Von Glahn appealed.⁴

Standard of Review

"This Court will affirm a declaratory judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." *Maggard v. State*, 733 S.W.3d 411, 413-14 (Mo. banc 2026) (internal quotation omitted). "Because the facts are stipulated, this Court's review is limited to determining whether the circuit court properly declared and applied the law." *Id.* at 414 (internal quotation omitted). "Questions of law involving constitutional interpretation are reviewed *de novo*." *Id.* (internal quotation omitted).

³ The circuit court permitted the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the Missouri Republican State Committee to intervene in defense of HB 1. *See* Rule 52.12. Von Glahn challenges this ruling, citing *Committee for Educational Equality v. State*, 294 S.W.3d 477, 487 (Mo. banc 2009) (holding the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing permissive intervention when the intervenors merely repeated the state's arguments and failed to show the state could not defend its interests adequately), and *Toder v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 129, 135-37 (Mo. App. 2026) (holding the circuit court erred in granting intervention because the intervenor would not lose by direct operation of the judgment and offered only defenses already asserted by the secretary). Because von Glahn prevails on other grounds, this Court declines to address this issue.

⁴ Because of the general interest and importance of the legal issue involved, this Court, on its own motion, granted discretionary transfer of this case under Rule 83.01 and article V, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. As a result, this Court need not decide whether any defense asserted by the secretary invokes this Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction, as von Glahn contends.

Court Document Not an Official Court Document Not an Official Court Document Not an Official Court Document

Analysis

The secretary's sole basis for declaring the referendum petition insufficient is that the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly.⁵

The secretary correctly limited his analysis to the Missouri Constitution because both: (1) under section 116.120.1 the secretary's review is limited to "examin[ing] the petition to determine whether it complies with the Constitution of Missouri and with this chapter [116]" and

⁵ The secretary attached to his certificate a seven-page "opinion" signed by the attorney general. In his certificate, the secretary states: "The grounds for insufficiency are more fully articulated in the attached opinion ..., which is incorporated by reference into this certificate." This does not comply with section 116.150.2, which provides the secretary "shall issue a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency[.]" and does not authorize the secretary to delegate his statutory duty by attaching and incorporating by reference a document prepared and signed by another person or entity. Sec. 116.150.2. See *Mesker Bros. Indus., Inc. v. Leachman*, 529 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Mo. 1975 (noting it is well-settled "an opinion of the Attorney General is not binding upon the courts or the citizenry")). The secretary must state in his certificate "the reason for the insufficiency." *Id.* In this case, the secretary stated a single reason: "the Missouri Constitution does not authorize a referendum on congressional redistricting plans passed by the General Assembly." As a matter of law, this is the only reason preserved for this Court's review, and this Court considers only the single reason set out in his certificate. Therefore, to the extent the secretary, by attaching the attorney general's "opinion" or through subsequent briefing, has attempted to raise other arguments beyond those set out in his certificate, those arguments have been waived and abandoned. This includes claimed federal law violations and whether the congressional redistricting in HB 1 should or must remain in place through the 2026 election cycle, which are also outside the scope of the secretary's authorized statutory review in section 116.120.1. In raising hypothetical scenarios and arguments wholly unrelated to whether the Missouri Constitution authorizes a referendum as to congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly, the secretary also requests an advisory opinion, which this Court lacks the authority to issue. *Graves v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., Div. of Prob. & Parole*, 630 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. banc 2021). Likewise, by failing to include in his certificate any reason for insufficiency related to the filing deadline or signature requirement for referendum petitions, the secretary has waived and abandoned any argument as to noncompliance with either requirement and has conceded the referendum petition was timely filed and contained at least the minimum number of signatures required under article III, section 52(a) (requiring the petition be filed "not more than ninety days after" the General Assembly adjourns the session and be signed by "five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state"). In fact, the secretary concedes in his answer the petition met the signature requirement in article III, section 52(a).

does *not* extend to whether the referendum petition complies with the United States Constitution or other federal laws; and (2) the United States Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions the United States Constitution permits a state to authorize a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts. *See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt*, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (rejecting as “plainly without substance” the argument that a state constitution’s authorization of a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts violates the Elections Clause)⁶; *see also Hawke v. Smith*, 253 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1920) (noting *Hildebrandt* held “the referendum provision of the state [c]onstitution, when applied to a law redistricting the state with a view to representation in Congress, was not unconstitutional”); *Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 805 (2015) (“In upholding the state court’s decision [in *Hildebrandt*], we recognized that the referendum was part of the legislative power in Ohio, legitimately exercised by the people to disapprove the legislation creating congressional districts.” (internal citation and quotation omitted)); *id.* at 840 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“*Hildebrandt* simply approved a [s]tate’s decision to employ a referendum *in addition to* redistricting by the Legislature. The result of the decision was to send *the Ohio Legislature* back to the drawing board to do the redistricting.” (internal citation omitted)); *Luther v. Hoskins*, 730 S.W.3d 567, 582 n.7, 583 (Mo. banc 2026) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting the United States Supreme Court has approved the use of both the referendum process and a gubernatorial veto for

⁶ The Ohio constitutional provision at issue in *Hildebrandt* provided:

[T]he people reserve to themselves the power to propose to the General Assembly laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls on a referendum vote as hereinafter provided. They also reserve the power to adopt or reject any law ... passed by the General Assembly, except as hereinafter provided[.]

State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 114 N.E. 55, 56 (Ohio 1916) (quoting Ohio Const. art. II, sec. 1, as amended Sep. 3, 1912).

legislative acts purporting to draw new congressional districts, with Missouri using the former in 1922 and the latter in 1932).

A mere three years ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed *Hildebrandt* and again rejected the argument the Elections Clause prohibits a state referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts. *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2023) (concluding “redistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the [s]tate’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include the referendum and the Governor’s veto” and rejecting “the contention that the Elections Clause vests state legislatures with exclusive and independent authority when setting the rules governing federal elections” (internal quotation omitted)). The Supreme Court affirmed: “A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws.” *Id.* at 26 (internal quotation omitted).

The secretary asserts the Missouri Constitution does not permit a referendum as to HB 1 because the Missouri Constitution has no plain, clear statement subjecting legislation drawing new congressional districts to a referendum. But this ignores article III, section 49, which provides: “The people ... reserve power to approve or reject by referendum *any act of the general assembly*, except as hereinafter provided.” Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 49 (emphasis added).

The language in article III, section 49 subjects “any act of the general assembly” to a referendum as the default. This Court has held congressional redistricting by the General Assembly “is a legislative act.” *State ex rel. Carroll v. Becker*, 45 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Mo. banc 1932). HB 1 is an act of the General Assembly. There is no meaningful difference between article III, section 49 and the Ohio constitutional provision the Supreme Court upheld in *Hildebrandt* in 1916. See *supra* note 6.

This Court has recognized in *dicta* that the right of referendum applies to legislation drawing new congressional districts. *See Preisler v. Hearnese*, 362 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. banc 1962) (upholding congressional redistricting dividing the state into 10 districts and noting: “the people of this state have a remedy for even valid redistricting, which they do not like, through our initiative and referendum provisions”); *State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman*, 250 S.W.2d 701, 703, 706 (Mo. banc 1952) (noting, in the context of considering whether a referendum petition as to congressional redistricting could be supplemented outside of the constitutional time periods, “[i]t seems clear that the intentment of the framers of the Constitution was that all laws, except those declared non-referable, should be subject to referendum if petitions to refer them were duly filed before their effective date” and noting the circuit court had held the redistricting was subject to the referendum provisions of the Missouri Constitution).

This Court holds that the referendum and initiative petition power in article III, section 49, like the Governor’s veto power in article III, section 31, is an essential part of the state’s lawmaking process under the Missouri Constitution.

The secretary next asserts even if legislation drawing new congressional districts might otherwise be subject to a referendum under article III, section 49, one of the exceptions in article III, section 52(a) applies. Article III, section 52(a) excepts from referendum “laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, and laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions and for the support of public schools[.]”

First, the secretary asserts in his brief, with no supporting authority, that “the immediate preservation of the public peace” exception “exempts election laws, such as the HB 1 map, from referendum challenges.” HB 1 did not have an attached emergency clause as required for the

“immediate preservation” exception. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 29; *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 414 n.8; *Inter-City Fire Prot. Dist. of Jackson Cnty. v. Gambrell*, 231 S.W.2d 193, 199-200 (Mo. banc 1950) (noting the emergency clause requirement applies to article III, sections 29 and 52 and, even with an emergency clause, “[w]hether or not the act is one necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety is a judicial question”). Further, the plain language of article III, section 52(a) does not support the secretary’s argument. This Court cannot rewrite the Missouri Constitution to substitute “all election laws” for “the immediate preservation of the public peace[.]” The secretary’s argument is even less persuasive in this case, involving an optional, mid-decade redistricting in no way necessary for “the immediate preservation of the public peace” because the 2022 congressional districts established by the General Assembly remain in place unless and until repealed by HB 1.

Second, the secretary asserts, with no supporting authority, that suffrage is a state institution, congressional redistricting is required by the state and federal constitutions, and congressional redistricting is necessary to maintain the suffrage right as populations change, invoking the “for the maintenance of state institutions” exception. The secretary’s argument ignores that this exception applies only to “laws making appropriations ... for the maintenance of state institutions[.]” See *Heinkel v. Toberman*, 226 S.W.2d 1012, 1013, 1016 (Mo. banc 1950) (concluding it was unnecessary to decide whether the state highway system is a “state institution” under the exception in article III, section 52(a) after determining the bill at issue did not make an appropriation); *State ex rel. Harvey v. Linville*, 300 S.W. 1066, 1068 (Mo. 1927) (concluding “the provision relating to laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions, and for the support of public schools, means that the word ‘appropriation’ applies to each of those conditions[.]” and “it must be an act

making appropriations for the support of public schools, which are excluded from the referendum, not merely any act which tends to support public schools”). Even if the exception were to apply absent an appropriation, applying the right of referendum to congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly does not eliminate suffrage generally or the General Assembly’s right to redistrict. Instead, if by referendum vote the voters reject the new redistricting in HB 1, the General Assembly’s prior redistricting in 2022 remains in effect. The General Assembly also remains free to go “back to the drawing board to do [new] redistricting.” *Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. at 840 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

That the broad language in article III, section 49 subjecting “any act of the general assembly” to referendum applies to legislation drawing new congressional districts is even more obvious when one considers article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h), which explicitly exclude redistricting plans proposed by independent bipartisan citizens commissions drawing new *state* representative districts and new *state* senate districts, respectively, from the right of referendum. Because no such explicit exception for legislation drawing new congressional districts is found anywhere in the Missouri Constitution, the broad default language in article III, section 49 subjecting “any act of the general assembly” to referendum applies.⁷

⁷ The secretary contends article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h), each of which provide that “[n]o redistricting plan shall be subject to the referendum,” apply to HB 1. This argument ignores that the phrase “redistricting plan” appears 13 times in section 3 and 12 times in section 7 and, therefore, refers solely to commission-drawn redistricting plans for state house and state senate districts. The phrase “redistricting plan” does not appear in article III, section 45, however, and this omission is significant. Section 45 provides “the general assembly shall *by law* divide the state into [congressional] districts.” Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 45 (emphasis added). By “law” and not by “plan.” This language takes an act of the general assembly purporting to draw new congressional districts out of the ambit of article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h), and places it squarely within the provision in article III, section 49 allowing for a referendum on “any act of the general assembly[.]” The secretary’s argument also ignores the plain language of article III, section 49 subjecting to referendum “any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.”

The secretary also asserts the Missouri Constitution must not permit a referendum on congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly because this year the *last* date on which he could make his certification decision under chapter 116 was August 4, the day of the primary election. Section 116.150.3, the statute setting out the certification deadline, took effect in June 1999, more than 50 years *after* adoption of the 1945 Missouri Constitution setting out current article III, section 49 and more than 90 years *after* Missouri voters first adopted a constitutional amendment setting out a right of referendum. *No Bans on Choice v. Ashcroft*, 638 S.W.3d 484, 486 (Mo. banc 2022). This Court need not speculate about why the General Assembly chose the statutory deadline or whether the statute is valid in every case because a later-enacted statute has *no* bearing on the constitution's plain language. The plain language of the constitution permits a referendum as to "any act of the General Assembly" regardless of any statutory deadlines set by the General Assembly decades later. Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 49.

Having concluded the Missouri Constitution authorizes a referendum on congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly, this Court need look no further than *Maggard*, in which it explained in May of this year what result would follow if the referendum petition was deemed sufficient after the secretary issued his certificate and any judicial review authorized by the General Assembly in section 116.200 had occurred:

If, however, the December 9 referendum petition filing is ultimately determined to be sufficient, article III, section 52(b) applies. In that case, because a "legal, sufficient, and timely" referendum petition was filed on December 9—*before* HB 1 went into effect on December 11—HB 1 did not take effect on December 11, HB 1 was "referred to the people" as of December 9, and HB 1 "shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise." Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 52(b).

Article III, sections 3(i) and 7(h) precede article III, section 49 and do not appear "hereinafter." Accordingly, the secretary's argument is rejected.

Maggard, 733 S.W.3d at 420 (footnote omitted); *see also NAACP Mo. State Conf. v. Kehoe*, 734 S.W.3d 338, 341 n.4 (Mo. banc 2026) (noting *Maggard* held “if the December 9, 2025 referendum petition is sufficient after any judicial review—HB 1 never went into effect and will not go into effect unless and until approved by the voters, but—if the petition is insufficient after such review—HB 1 went into effect on December 11, 2025, and remains so”).⁸

⁸ The secretary devotes a significant portion of his briefing to discussing the confusion, expense, and practical difficulties that may result from not utilizing the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 election. Besides being irrelevant to the secretary’s sole basis for declaring the referendum petition insufficient, these arguments are particularly misplaced given the secretary’s delay created the confusion, expense, and practical difficulties of which he complains. In December 2025, a federal district court advised the secretary and the state that, if the referendum petition is sufficient, “the new map will be frozen until after the referendum, which could significantly disrupt the 2026 elections.” *Mo. Gen. Assembly v. Von Glahn*, No. 4:25-CV-1535-ZMB, 2025 WL 3514277, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2025). At the same time, the federal district court noted the secretary had the ability to declare the petition insufficient based on his argument in the federal litigation—identical to his argument now—that the Missouri Constitution does not permit a referendum as to congressional redistricting passed by the General Assembly. *Id.* at *4. “[T]here is no apparent reason why [the secretary] would incur the significant cost of signature verification given his stated belief that the petition is constitutionally deficient.” *Id.* at *2 n.2. In two separate cases in May, this Court stated it could not determine whether the congressional redistricting in HB 1 was in effect until the secretary issued his certification and the judicial review authorized by the General Assembly was complete. *Maggard*, 733 S.W.3d at 419-20; *NAACP*, 734 S.W.3d at 341 n.4. Despite this clear guidance from the federal district court and this Court, the secretary chose to delay his certification until the last possible day—August 4—and, in the meantime, utilized the congressional redistricting in HB 1 while incurring the time and expense of signature verification despite having represented to the federal district court he believed the referendum petition was constitutionally deficient. The secretary also chose to request verification of every signature, making the signature verification deadline July 28, when he could have chosen random sampling verification, with a deadline of not more than 30 days from the date the election authority received the petition from the secretary. *See* sec. 116.130.2. The secretary delayed certification until the last possible date and chose not to seek resolution of the constitutional question despite having been told at least as early as December 2025 he had the unique ability as secretary to do so under Missouri statutes. Given these undisputed facts, the secretary’s arguments about confusion, expense, and practical difficulties are wholly unpersuasive.

Perhaps worse, these arguments fundamentally misunderstand the status of HB 1 pending the referendum vote. HB 1 is not the law and has never been the law. There is only one valid congressional redistricting in effect—the congressional redistricting the General Assembly established in 2022. Under article III, section 52(b), HB 1 “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” Unless and until the voters approve HB 1

In summary, this Court reaffirms *Maggard*. Because the referendum petition was legal, sufficient, and timely, HB 1 never took effect and was referred to the voters as of December 9, 2025. The congressional districts the General Assembly established in 2022 remain in full force and effect for the November 2026 general election, and HB 1 will not take effect unless and until approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election.

Conclusion

This Court reverses the circuit court's judgment. The referendum petition was legal, sufficient, and timely, and the secretary incorrectly concluded otherwise. HB 1 did not go into effect and will not go into effect unless and until approved by the voters. The congressional redistricting the General Assembly established in 2022 remains in full force and effect for the November 2026 general election.

Pursuant to Rule 84.14, this Court enters judgment ordering the secretary to issue a certificate of sufficiency as to the referendum petition (2026-R004) (attaching a copy of this opinion thereto), to place the referendum petition on the November 2026 general election ballot, and to take any and all additional steps necessary to place the referendum petition on the ballot at that election before September 8, 2026. The secretary and all of those acting in concert with him are restrained and enjoined from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter

at the November 2026 general election, HB 1 is of no force and effect and did not take effect on December 11 because it is subject to a sufficient referendum petition filed on December 9. Regardless of any confusion, expense, or practical difficulties caused by the secretary's delay and incorrect assumption about whether the referendum petition would be deemed sufficient, simply continuing to utilize the congressional redistricting in HB 1 does not comport with the Missouri Constitution because the 2022 map is the only map in effect.

unless and until HB 1 is approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election and takes effect 30 days thereafter. Mo. Const. art. XII, sec. 2(b).⁹ No Rule 84.17 motions are permitted.



Ginger K. Gooch, Judge

All concur.

⁹ The ballot summary statement to be used is set out in *People Not Politicians v. Hoskins*, 736 S.W.3d 518, 535 (Mo. App. 2026).

Subject: Fw: Fourth Supplemental Certification (Amendment 6 and Prop A) and Congressional District Information

External Email – Use Caution

From: Elections-1 <Elections-1@sos.mo.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2026 4:42 PM

Subject: Fourth Supplemental Certification (Amendment 6 and Prop A) and Congressional District Information

CAUTION: This email originated outside of **boonemo.gov**. ONLY use links and attachments which are familiar.

Good afternoon,

To ensure compliance with the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling, attached are the certifications for Proposition A and Amendment 6.

Additionally, the Secretary of State's Office has tied the candidates to Congressional District 20 (CD 20) in MCVR's Election Management in accordance with the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling.

The U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed whether to STAY the Missouri Supreme Court ruling. Just now, the Motion to Stay was denied.

Thank you,

Elections Division

Office of the Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins

Kirkpatrick State Information Center

600 West Main Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101

elections@sos.mo.gov

Office Phone: 573-751-2301 / 1-800-669-8683



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT “BOB”	)	
ONDER et al.,	)	
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. 4:26-cv-01424-SRC
	)	
STATE OF MISSOURI and DENNY	)	
HOSKINS,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

Memorandum and Order

On August 4, 2026, Missouri concluded its primary elections using the congressional districts laid out in House Bill 1 (“HB 1”). Missouri voters and candidates for federal office in Missouri request that the Court issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the use of any congressional district map other than HB 1, *see generally* doc. 2. All parties, including Intervenor People Not Politicians and Richard von Glahn, had notice and submitted briefing. Docs. 2, 12, 19–20, 29–30. Having considered the Verified Complaint, the affidavit attached to it, the parties’ and intervenors’ briefs, and applicable law, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order.

I. Facts and Background

The Court treats the following uncontroverted facts, drawn from Plaintiffs’ verified complaint, docs. 1, 4, as true for the sake of resolving this motion for a TRO. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Only a very narrow set of facts bear on the resolution of Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO. On September 12, 2025, the Missouri General Assembly passed HB 1, replacing the prior congressional district map enacted in 2022. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15–16; doc. 12-4 at 11 (The Court cites to

page numbers as assigned by CM/ECF.); doc. 19 at 7. People Not Politicians and its executive director Richard von Glahn (who moved to intervene in this case, doc. 12) circulated a referendum petition seeking to suspend HB 1 until it passed a statewide vote. Doc. 1 ¶ 18; doc. 12 at 1–2. On August 4, 2026, the statutory deadline for doing so, the Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins issued a certificate of insufficiency for the referendum petition. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 20, 25; *see* Mo. Rev. Stat. § 116.150(3) (setting the statutory deadline to issue a certificate of insufficiency at “5:00 p.m. on the thirteenth Tuesday prior to the general election”).

The Complaint alleges, supported by a verified affidavit sworn under penalty of perjury, that Missouri’s primary election took place on August 4, 2026. Doc. 1 ¶ 21; doc. 1-1 ¶ 4. The primary election used the HB 1 map. Doc. 1 ¶ 21; doc. 12-1 at 5, 7. Neither Defendants nor Intervenor have disputed those facts; Intervenor’s briefing acknowledges that Missouri concluded its congressional primary elections on August 4, 2026. Doc. 12-1 at 7. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiffs Patricia Thomas and Debra Havens would cast votes in a different congressional district under the 2022 map than the one in which they cast their primary-election votes under the HB 1 map. Doc. 1 ¶ 17. The Complaint further alleges that the HB 1 congressional districts in which Plaintiffs Congressman Robert Onder and Richard Brattin won nominations would change. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 2, 4, 37.

On September 3, 2026, the Missouri Supreme Court issued an opinion in *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, determining that, as a matter of state law, the Missouri Constitution authorizes referenda on the General Assembly’s adoption of new congressional district maps. *von Glahn v. Hoskins*, --- S.W.3d ---, No. SC101805, at *3 (Mo. Sep. 3, 2026) (en banc). The court enjoined Secretary of State Hoskins from using the HB 1 map for the November general election, retroactively deeming under state law that HB 1 “is not the law and has never been the law.” *Id.*

at *13–14, 12 n.8. Because the court concluded that any “claimed federal law violations” had been “waived and abandoned” by the Secretary of State, the court limited its holding to the single state-law issue of whether the Missouri Constitution authorized referendums on congressional redistricting plans. *Id.* at *5 n.5.

On September 4, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court, alleging claims under the Elections Clause; Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution; and the Equal Protection Clause. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 50–109. Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction and requested a “[TRO] and preliminary injunction hearing as expeditiously as possible.” Doc. 2 at 2. Plaintiffs moved to expedite the briefing and hearing schedule, asking the Court to resolve their motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction “as expeditiously as possible.” Doc. 3 at 2. Also on September 4, 2026, the Secretary of State filed an Emergency Application for Stay and Administrative Stay Pending Appeal before the Supreme Court, raising the same federal law claims. Emergency Appl. for Stay and Admin. Stay Pending Appeal, *Hoskins v. von Glahn*, No. 26A304 (U.S. Sep. 4, 2026). Justice Kavanaugh denied the application on September 8, 2026. *See Hoskins v. von Glahn*, No. 26A304 (U.S. Sep. 8, 2026). On September 5, Intervenors moved to intervene, requesting oral argument and the opportunity to “participate fully” in any hearings on Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction. Doc. 12-1 at 18.

Missouri law sets the deadline for finalizing the general-election ballot at 5:00 p.m. on the eighth Tuesday before the general election. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.125(2). The State has set the general election for November 3, 2026, meaning that the deadline for finalizing the ballot is 5:00 p.m. today, September 8. Doc. 1 ¶ 33; doc. 12-1 at 8; doc. 12-4 at 12.

Because no party or intervenor has disputed the facts described above and because many of those facts are matters of public record, the Court accepts the above facts as true for the purpose of this TRO.

II. Discussion

Before issuing a TRO, the Court must consider (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant (2) the balance between that harm and the injury that granting the injunction would inflict, (3) the movant's probability of success on the merits, and (4) the public interest. *Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys, Inc.*, 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981); *see Tumey v. Mycroft AI, Inc.*, 27 F.4th 657, 665 (8th Cir. 2022). No single factor is dispositive, but the probability of success on the merits is the most important. *Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance*, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013). The relevant inquiry is “whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined.” *Dataphase*, 640 F.2d at 113. The movant bears the burden of proving the necessity of injunctive relief. *Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners*, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1987).

A. Irreparable harm

Demonstrating irreparable harm requires showing “that the harm is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” *Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson*, 725 F.3d 885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The party facing the harm must have “no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” *Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown's, LLC*, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs meet that burden here.

Plaintiffs face irreparable harm absent a TRO because many Missouri voters would have to cast their general-election votes for candidates whom they had no role in nominating.

Candidates who had no choice but to campaign and raise money in the HB 1 districts that Missouri’s highest election authority presented to them, have spent their funds and campaign efforts in districts that would no longer exist. Using a map other than HB 1’s would disenfranchise primary-election voters and undermine the nominations of candidates chosen in the primaries, leading to “certain” and “great” harm, *Novus Franchising, Inc.*, 725 F.3d at 895, not merely “speculative” or “possible” harm, *MPAY Inc. v. Erie Custom Comput. Applications, Inc.*, 970 F.3d 1010, 1020 (8th Cir. 2020) (alteration and citation omitted). The primary ballots cannot simply be recounted under the 2022 districts, as the district boundaries and candidates would not be the same for all voters. And the harm could not be more imminent: under state law, the deadline for finalizing the ballot is today, September 8. *See* Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.125(2).

B. Balance of Harms

Conducting state elections in accordance with the Missouri Constitution undoubtedly qualifies as an important interest. But the Eighth Circuit has observed that “there can be little harm to other parties where . . . ‘a stay preserves the status quo and promotes confidence in our electoral system.’” *Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft*, 978 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting *New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger*, 976 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020)). Preserving the status quo entails using the same map for the general election that Missouri used for its primaries—the HB 1 map. *See* doc. 1 ¶ 21. Whatever harm Defendants, Intervenor, or others might suffer under a TRO pales in comparison to the irreparable harm that Plaintiffs and, palpably notable here, the public would suffer if the Court does not issue a TRO.

C. Probability of success on the merits

i. Elections Clause

Article I, Section 4 of the federal Constitution gives to state legislatures the ability to establish “the Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.” U.S. Const. art I, § 4, cl. 1. While it recognizes the “need for congressional oversight,” the Elections Clause doesn’t “disarm States from adopting modes of legislation that place the lead rein in the people’s hands.” *Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n*, 576 U.S. 787, 816 (2015). Because the “dictionaries of the founding era . . . capaciously define[d] the word legislature,” *Moore v. Harper*, 600 U.S. 1, 25 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted), “includ[ing] the referendum within state legislative power for the purpose of apportionment” does not offend the Elections Clause, *Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916); *see also Hawke v. Smith*, 253 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1920) (describing *Hildebrant*’s holding).

In *Hildebrant*, the Supreme Court considered an Elections-Clause challenge to Ohioans’ rejection of new congressional districts by popular referendum. *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 566–67. The Ohio Constitution permitted its voters “to approve or disapprove by popular vote any law enacted by the General Assembly.” *Id.* at 566; *see* Ohio Const. Art. II, § 1 (1912) (“[T]he people reserve to themselves the power . . . [to] reject [laws] at the polls on a referendum vote.”). The Court held that the referendum, as part of the state’s legislative power, did not violate the Elections Clause. *Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 569.

Missouri’s Constitution grants the people of Missouri the “power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly.” Mo. Const. Art. III, § 49. Interpreting its own Constitution, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that redistricting is “subject . . . to a

referendum as the default” because “redistricting by the General Assembly is a legislative act.” *Von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No. SC101805, at *7 (Mo. Sep. 3, 2026) (en banc).

Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their Elections-Clause claim because the referendum is a licit part of the legislative power in Missouri. States may choose to vest parts of the legislative power in bodies other than the General Assembly, and Missouri has so chosen. *See Ariz. State Legis.*, 576 U.S. at 813; *Moore*, 600 U.S. at 23; Mo. Const. Art. III, § 49. In turn, states may permit their voters to challenge redistricting maps by referendum without running afoul of the Elections Clause. *See Hildebrant*, 241 at 569.

Plaintiffs argue that a state constitutional provision must, under the Elections Clause, “supply [a] clear, deliberate statement” to “divest its legislature of redistricting authority.” Doc. 2-1 at 6 (citing *Ariz. State Legis.*, 576 U.S. at 843 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). This argument is unavailing for two reasons.

First, the referendum doesn’t *divest* the Missouri legislature of redistricting authority, as the people are part of the Missouri legislature through the referendum process. *See* Mo. Const. Art. III § 49 (locating referendum provision in article on “legislative department”); *von Glahn*, No. SC101805, at *8 (“[T]he referendum and initiative petition power . . . is an essential part of the state’s lawmaking process under the Missouri Constitution.”). Second, to the extent a clear statement rule applies in the Elections-Clause context, the Missouri Constitution’s referendum provision is as clear as the Ohio Constitution’s provision upheld in *Hildebrant*—both referendum powers apply to any law of the General Assembly. *Compare* Mo. Const. Art. III, § 49 *with* Ohio Const. Art. II, § 1 (1912); *see Hildebrant*, 241 U.S. at 566.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their Elections-Clause claim. Next, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ Article I, Section 2 claim.

ii. Article I, Section 2

Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has stated that, “[w]here the state law has made the primary an integral part of the procedure of choice, . . . the right of the elector to have his ballot counted at the primary, is likewise included in the right protected by Article I, Section 2.” *United States v. Classic*, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941).

Missouri law dictates that “all candidates for elective office shall be nominated at a primary election” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.339. Afterwards, “[t]he person receiving the greatest number of votes at a primary election as a party candidate for an office shall be the only candidate of that party for the office at the general election.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.343. Using such a structure for elections renders the primary an “integral part of the election process. *See Morse v. Republican Party of Va.*, 517 U.S. 186, 207 (1996) (describing a primary election as “an ‘integral part of the election machinery’” when a state “effectively divided its election into two stages, the first consisting of the selection of party candidates and the second being the general election (quoting *Classic*, 313 U.S. at 318)); *Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.*, 479 U.S. 208, 211, 226–27 (1986) (treating primary elections that led to the nomination of a party’s candidate as integral parts of the election process). The Eighth Circuit held in 1949 that Missouri’s then-existing primary election system—which, like the present system, provided that “no one can be elected to office without receiving nomination at a primary election”—was “an integral part of the general election laws of the state for the election of public officers, including Members of Congress.” *Klein v. United States*, 176 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1949).

Because voters have already cast their ballots in the primaries, doc. 1 ¶ 21, replacing the applicable map for the general election would disenfranchise voters of their votes in the primary election, in clear violation of Article I, Section 2. Voters reassigned to different district would have cast their votes in vain for candidates now connected to other districts, effectively nullifying their votes.

Intervenors' only rebuttal is that Plaintiffs' Article I, Section 2 claim "rest[s] entirely on the premise that HB 1 was lawfully in effect when the August 4, 2026 primary was conducted." Doc. 12-4 at 18. But Plaintiffs' Article I, Section 2 claim does not depend on the legal status of the HB 1 map. Whether or not HB 1 was the governing law during the primary election, voters—including Plaintiffs—voted in primary elections within the congressional districts drawn by HB 1. *See* doc. 1 at ¶¶ 21–22, 24. And they didn't do so of their own accord. Instead, they did so based on the parameters set by Missouri's highest election authority, the Secretary of State. Mo. Const. Art. IV, § 14.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have a high probability of success on the merits of their claim under Article I, Section 2.

iii. Equal Protection Clause

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Included in equal protection is "a citizen['s] . . . right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." *Dunn v. Blumstein*, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (collecting cases). And "[o]nce the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote . . . wherever their home may be in that geographical unit." *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).

The Equal Protection Clause’s aegis covers the rights not only of voters but also of candidates: a state cannot “unfairly or unnecessarily burden . . . an individual candidate’s equally important interest in the continued availability of political opportunity” because “voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties.” *Lubin v. Panish*, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). Primary-election procedures, as “state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . must be . . . consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.” *Bullock v. Carter*, 405 U.S. 134, 140–41 (1972). And when a state “limit[s] the choices available to voters, [it] impairs the voters’ ability to express their political preferences,” requiring the “[s]tate [to] establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest.” *Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party*, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).

Plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their Equal Protection Clause claim. In the August primaries, voters have already cast their ballots and candidates already ran using the HB 1 map. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 21–24. Replacing the HB 1 map after the primary would sort “hundreds of thousands” of voters into different districts and cause candidates to run in districts covering voters to whom those candidates have not campaigned. *Id.* at ¶¶ 36–37. Using any map other than HB 1’s for the general election creates two classes of voters: those who happen to stay in their HB 1 congressional districts, and those who do not. Likewise, it divides candidates between those who retain the same electorate, and those who do not. In both situations, those who “do not” are divested of their fundamental electoral rights.

Switching maps now would deprive many Missourians of their equal vote in the primaries and “impair the voters’ ability to express their political preferences” by foisting new candidates on them on the eve of the election. *See Socialist Workers Party*, 440 U.S. at 184. Defendants have not offered an interest to establish the necessity of these arbitrary geographic

classifications, nor do they want to. *See generally* doc. 11. So these classifications burden or outright divest the right to vote—“the essence of a democratic society” and “the heart of representative government”—without justification. *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).

Like their response to Plaintiffs’ Article I, Section 2 claim, Intervenor’s argue that the Equal-Protection claim presumes the lawfulness of the HB 1 map when the primary occurred. That contention is irrelevant to the Equal-Protection claim as it was to the Article I, Section 2 claim. The primary already happened, and the clock cannot be turned back, so Missouri must honor the equal right to vote of all its eligible voters, regardless of geography.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs have shown a high probability of success on the merits of their Equal-Protection-Clause claim. Because the Court finds an adequate likelihood of success for two out of the three claims, the Court turns to the public’s interest in temporary relief.

D. Public interest

The public interest favors enjoining the Secretary from using the 2022 map for the general election. Disenfranchising voters across the state and denying them their constitutional right to have their primary votes counted significantly harm the public interest. “[I]t is always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights.” *Phelps-Roper v. Nixon*, 545 F.3d 685, 690 (8th Cir. 2008), *overruled on other grounds*, *Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester*, 697 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

On top of that, “[t]he public has an interest in the fair and orderly operation of election[s]” *Org. for Black Struggle*, 978 F.3d at 609. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” *Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.*, 589 U.S. 423, 423 (2020) (per curiam) (citing *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam)); *Merrill v. Milligan*,

142 S. Ct. 879, 880 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of application for stays) (“When an election is close at hand, the rules of the road must be clear and settled.”); *Allen v. Milligan*, 146 S. Ct. 1377, 1381 (2026). In *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, the Supreme Court explained that “[c]ourt orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls,” a risk that grows “[a]s an election draws closer.” *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 4–5.


Admittedly, courts normally invoke the *Purcell* principle to caution against federal-court intervention in the election decisions of state legislatures, and no federal court has ordered the use of the 2022 map. But *Purcell* does not cut against injunctive relief here. This case presents *Purcell* in reverse, but with no less weight. Injunctive relief “may be inequitable if it is issued shortly before an election, when candidates, election officials, and voters have relied on the rules in place at that time.” *Malliotakis v. Williams*, 146 S. Ct. 809, 811 (2026) (Alito, J., concurring in grant of stay). Issuing a TRO here would preserve, rather than disturb, the election rules that candidates, election officials, and voters have relied on. If anything, the public interest concerns that the *Purcell* principle invokes—avoiding voter confusion, disincentivizing voting, and preserving the fair and orderly operation of elections—support issuing a TRO. Missouri already held its primaries using the HB 1 map. Doc. 1 ¶ 21. Using a different map for the general election would wreak havoc on the fairness and orderliness of Missouri’s congressional elections, calling into question the candidacy of those nominated in the primaries and the votes of those who voted in the primaries. Widespread voter confusion would inevitably follow. The public interest factor thus weighs in favor of a TRO.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs' [2] motion for a temporary restraining order and enjoins, on federal law grounds, Secretary of State Hoskins—as well as his officers, agents, employees, and attorneys—from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the HB 1 map for the November 3, 2026 general election. The Court finds that a hearing is not necessary because all parties have participated fully through their briefing, and because all parties agree on the material facts. The Court also denies Plaintiffs' [3] Motion to Expedite as moot.

This order remains in effect for 14 days from the date of issuance. The Court will set a preliminary injunction hearing by separate order. Neither Defendants nor Intervenor Defendants asks the Court to set a bond, and having considered the issue, the Court finds a bond unnecessary on these unique facts and circumstances. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). As provided in Rule 65(d)(2), this temporary restraining order binds “only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).”

So ordered this 8th day of September 2026.


STEPHEN R. CLARK
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Importance: High

External Email – Use Caution

From: Elections-1 <Elections-1@sos.mo.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2026 6:19 PM

Subject: NEW DEVELOPEMENT - Temporary Restraining Order

CAUTION: This email originated outside of **boonemo.gov**. ONLY use links and attachments which are familiar.

The Eastern District has issued a Temporary Restraining Order, requiring the use of the CD25 Missouri First Map.

CD25 candidates are already in the Election Management module.

Information provided by the litigation team is that the federal court's ruling, based on federal law, takes precedence over the Missouri Supreme Court's order, which is based on state law. This is in accordance with the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause.

This order is attached.

Thank you!

Elections Division

Office of the Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins

Kirkpatrick State Information Center

600 West Main Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101

elections@sos.mo.gov

Office Phone: 573-751-2301 / 1-800-669-8683



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External Email – Use Caution

----- Forwarded message -----

From: **Missouri AG Press** <press@ago.mo.gov>

Date: Tue, Sep 8, 2026 at 5:43 PM

Subject: Attorney General Hanaway Releases Statement Following TRO Ruling in Congressional Maps Case

[View this email in your browser](#)



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 8, 2026

Email: press@ago.mo.gov

**Missouri Attorney General Hanaway Releases Statement
Following TRO Ruling in Congressional Maps Case**

JEFFERSON CITY, Mo. – Today, Missouri Attorney General Catherine Hanaway released the following statement after Chief Justice Clark granted the plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order in *Onder v. Missouri*:

"Missouri is prepared to follow and comply with Chief Judge Clark's order that binds the state to using the Missouri First map for the November General Election. We appreciate Judge Clark's support of the rights of Missouri voters, and intend to comply with this federal ruling. We maintain that changing the congressional map in between the primary and general elections is simply not feasible and profoundly unjust to Missouri voters," **said General Hanaway.**

###



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Governor Mike Kehoe ✓

@GovMikeKehoe

...

We are grateful for Chief Judge Clark's decision to provide much-needed clarity for Missouri voters and the election process.

With today marking the deadline for changes to the November ballot, the Missouri First Map will be used in the general election.

Voters and candidates deserve consistency, certainty, and not to have the rules changed between elections.

Case: 4:26-cv-01424-SRC Doc. #: 35 Filed: 09/08/26 Page: 1 of 13 PageID #: 455

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
EASTERN DIVISION

CONGRESSMAN ROBERT "BOB"
ONDER et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF MISSOURI and DENNY
HOSKINS,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:26-cv-01424-SRC

Memorandum and Order

On August 4, 2026, Missouri concluded its primary elections using the congressional districts laid out in House Bill 1 ("HB 1"). Missouri voters and candidates for federal office in Missouri request that the Court issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the use of any congressional district map other than HB 1, *see generally* doc. 2. All parties, including Intervenor People Not Politicians and Richard von Glahn, had notice and submitted briefing. Docs. 2, 12, 19–20, 29–30. Having considered the Verified Complaint, the affidavit attached to it, the parties' and intervenors' briefs, and applicable law, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order.

I. Facts and Background

The Court treats the following uncontroverted facts, drawn from Plaintiffs' verified complaint, docs. 1, 4, as true for the sake of resolving this motion for a TRO. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Only a very narrow set of facts bear on the resolution of Plaintiffs' request for a TRO. On September 12, 2025, the Missouri General Assembly passed HB 1, replacing the prior congressional district map enacted in 2022. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15–16; doc. 12–4 at 11 (The Court cites to

7:07 PM · Sep 8, 2026 · **24.4K** Views

89

120

App. 75a 672

35



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Richard von Glahn,	)	
	)	
<i>Appellant,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	Case No. SC101805
	)	
Denny Hoskins, Secretary of State,	)	
	)	
<i>Respondent.</i>	)	

**EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR ORDER HOLDING SECRETARY OF
STATE IN CONTEMPT**

Secretary of State Denny Hoskins has announced that he intends to violate this court’s Judgment and Order of September 3, 2026, which “restrained and enjoined [him] from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter.” The Attorney General also claims that state officials must use the HB 1 maps in November.

Earlier today, the Honorable Brett Kavanaugh declined the state's request for a stay of this Court's Judgment. Immediately thereafter, a federal court in the Eastern District of Missouri entered a temporary restraining order saying "Secretary of State Hoskins- as well as his officers, agents, employees, and attorneys- from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the HB 1 map for the November 3, 2026 general election." 4:26-cv-01424-SRC Onder et al v. State of Missouri et al (E.D. Mo.). The order does not purport to overrule this court's injunction and does NOT mandate the Secretary to use HB1, although on its face it enjoins the use of any map other than HB 1.

Although nothing in that order requires the Secretary to use the HB 1 maps, he immediately announced that he intends to do so. He sent the following email to Missouri's Election officials:

Sent: Tuesday, September 8, 2026 6:19 PM
Subject: NEW DEVELOPEMENT - Temporary Restraining Order

CAUTION: This email originated outside of boonemo.gov. ONLY use links and attachments which are familiar.

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CD25 candidates are already in the Election Management module.

Information provided by the litigation team is that the federal court's ruling, based on federal law, takes precedence over the Missouri Supreme Court's order, which is based on state law. This is in accordance with the U.S Constitution's Supremacy Clause.

This order is attached.

Thank you!

Elections Division
Office of the Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins
Kirkpatrick State Information Center
600 West Main Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101
elections@sos.mo.gov
Office Phone: 573-751-2301 / 1-800-669-8683

The Missouri Attorney General also issued the following statement:

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 8, 2026

Email: press@ago.mo.gov

Missouri Attorney General Hanaway Releases Statement Following TRO Ruling in Congressional Maps Case

JEFFERSON CITY, Mo. – Today, Missouri Attorney General Catherine Hanaway released the following statement after Chief Justice Clark granted the plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order in *Onder v. Missouri*:

"Missouri is prepared to follow and comply with Chief Judge Clark's order that binds the state to using the Missouri First map for the November General Election. We appreciate Judge Clark's support of the rights of Missouri voters, and intend to comply with this federal ruling. We maintain that changing the congressional map in between the primary and general elections is simply not feasible and profoundly unjust to Missouri voters," said General Hanaway.

###

Of course, nothing in the actual text of the federal order is “requiring the use of the CD25 Missouri First Map [aka HB 1]” as the Secretary says, nor does the language of the federal order “bind the state to using the Missouri First map for the November General Election.” And the federal court has no authority to overrule the Missouri Supreme Court’s determination that HB 1 is not and has never been the law. Nor does anything in the federal court’s order claim to “take precedence over the Missouri Supreme Court’s order.”

"District courts may not review state court decisions, even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional, because federal jurisdiction to review most state court judgments is vested exclusively in

the United States Supreme Court." *Ballinger v. Culotta*, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003).

The Secretary's direction to local election authorities to use HB 1 is a direct violation of this court's injunction. He should be ordered to immediately show cause and be held in contempt. This Court should make clear that regardless of other orders (except from the United States Supreme Court) the Missouri Secretary of State must comply with this court's injunction. The Court should instruct all local election authorities that HB 1 is not the law and has never been the law.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Charles W. Hatfield

Charles W. Hatfield #40363
230 W. McCarty St.
Jefferson City, MO 65101
Chuck.hatfield@stinson.com

Attorney for Appellants



Supreme Court of Missouri

SC101805

September 8, 2026

Richard von Glahn,
Appellant,
vs.

Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al.,
Respondents.

Order

Respondent Denny Hoskins is hereby ordered to show cause, if any, why he should not be held in contempt for violating this Court's injunction dated September 3, 2026, entered before the statutory deadline of September 8, 2026, and before the temporary restraining order entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri of that same date. Respondent is ordered to specifically address why: (1) his e-mail on September 8, 2026, instructing use of the HB 1 map is not an affirmative violation of this Court's injunction; (2) how this Court's injunction is not still in full force and effect in light of the Supreme Court of the United States' overruling of Respondent's emergency application for stay and administrative stay pending appeal; and (3) if he is not willing to comply with this Court's injunction, he should take no action in all things related to the congressional district map until guidance is received from a higher court with jurisdiction to review this Court's judgment and injunction and the United States district court's injunction, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1257; *Ballinger v. Culotta*, 322 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 2003).

Respondent's response is due on or before 12:00 p.m., September 9, 2026. Movant Richard von Glahn's response, if any, is due on or before 4:00 p.m., September 9, 2026. The Court will not allow filings from any other parties on this matter or allow for any briefing or filings from amicus curiae. Oral argument on this matter is set for September 10, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. Respondent Denny Hoskins is ordered to appear in person.

By: _____

Chief Justice

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

No. 26-2797

Congressman Robert Onder, et al.

Appellees

v.

State of Missouri and Denny L. Hoskins, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State

Appellees

Richard Von Glahn and People Not Politicians

Appellants

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
(4:26-cv-01424-SRC)

ORDER

Before LOKEN, STRAS, and JUSTIN D. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

The motion for a stay pending appeal is denied because we either lack jurisdiction over the appeal or, based on the briefing we have so far, the stay factors have not been met. *See Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26 (2009); *see also In re Rutledge*, 956 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “we . . . ordinarily lack jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s grant . . . of a TRO”). The motion for summary reversal is also denied, and the motion for an administrative stay is denied as moot.

September 09, 2026

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler



Supreme Court of Missouri

en banc

SC101805

Richard von Glahn,

Issued September 10, 2026

Appellant,

v.

Denny Hoskins, in His Official
Capacity, et al.,

Respondents.

Judgment of Civil Contempt

On September 3, 2026, this Court issued its opinion in *Von Glahn v. Hoskins*, No. SC101805, __ S.W.3d __, slip op. at *13-14 (Mo. banc Sep. 3, 2026), in which this Court ordered:

The secretary and all of those acting in concert with him are restrained and enjoined from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1¹ for the November 2026 general election or at any other time thereafter unless and until HB 1 is approved by the voters at the November 2026 general election and takes effect 30 days thereafter.

No higher court with jurisdiction to review this Court's directive has set aside or disturbed this Court's ruling.

¹ House Bill 1.

On September 3, Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins complied with the Court's September 3 injunction by sending notice to local election authorities to use the 2022 congressional district map, but, on September 8, the secretary reversed course. The secretary sent an e-mail to the same local election authorities directing them to utilize the HB 1 congressional district map pursuant to a temporary restraining order entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Later that day, Richard von Glahn filed an emergency motion for contempt alleging the secretary's September 8 e-mail violated this Court's order. In response, this Court entered an order directing the secretary to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for violating this Court's injunction.

To establish a prima facie case for civil contempt, the movant must establish: "(1) that the contemnor has an obligation to ... perform an action as required by the court's judgment, and (2) that the contemnor failed to meet this obligation." *Davis v. Davis*, 475 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Mo. App. 2015); *see also Landewee v. Landewee*, 515 S.W.3d 691, 696 (Mo. banc 2017) (citing *Davis*, 475 S.W.3d at 182). "Once a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to contemnor to prove his or her inability to ... perform an action and that non-compliance was not an act of contumacy." *Brown v. Brown*, 680 S.W.3d 507, 524 (Mo. App. 2023) (internal quotation omitted). The purpose of civil contempt "is to coerce compliance with the relief granted." *State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert*, 887 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Mo. banc 1994).

This Court's order enjoined the secretary "from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election" *Von Glahn*, No. SC101805, __ S.W.3d __, slip op. at *13. His e-mail directive to local election authorities mandating the use of the HB 1 map, therefore, is contrary to this Court's order

enjoining him from implementing, using, or mandating the use of HB 1 for the November 2026 general election.

In response to the show cause order, the secretary did not deny or dispute that his e-mail to the local election authorities conflicts with this Court's order enjoining use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1. Instead, he insisted he was no longer required to comply with this Court's order or was incapable of doing so because of the federal district court's temporary restraining order. On September 10, 2026, after the secretary filed his response to the show cause order, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a stay of the federal district court's temporary restraining order.

In light of this stay, the secretary's response does not justify his failure to comply with this Court's injunction. Regardless, the federal district court's temporary restraining order never rendered the secretary incapable of complying with this Court's order and certainly did not relieve him of any obligation to comply with an order of this Court.²

The federal district court's temporary restraining order "enjoin[ed], on federal law grounds, Secretary of State Hoskins – as well as his officers, agents, employees, and attorneys – from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the HB 1 map for the November 3, 2026 general election." *Onder v.*

Missouri, No. 26-cv-01424, slip op. at 13 (E.D. Mo. Sep. 8, 2026). Despite the secretary's assertions to the contrary, such language did not require him to order local election authorities to

² It should be noted the secretary consented to the request for a temporary restraining order from the federal district court and advocated for the federal district court's intervention in spite of this Court's clear directive enjoining him from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election. Accordingly, any assertion that he was not attempting to defy this Court's order but merely trying to comply with a federal court order is disingenuous.

implement the HB 1 map for the 2026 general election. In fact, the temporary restraining order did not require the secretary to affirmatively act at all. Rather, it simply enjoined him from implementing, using, publishing, distributing, or mandating the use of any congressional district map other than the HB 1 map for the November 3, 2026, general election for 14 days from the date of the order. The secretary offers no explanation as to why he could not comply with both this Court's order and the federal district court's temporary restraining order by simply telling the local election authorities to take no action until further clarification was received from the courts.

The secretary, therefore, has failed to meet his burden of establishing his failure to comply with this Court's order was not an act of contumacy. This Court finds the secretary was in contempt of its September 3, 2026, order enjoining him from implementing, using, or mandating the use of the congressional redistricting in HB 1 for the November 2026 general election.

At all times, however, a civil contemnor has the power to purge him or herself of any contempt by complying with the order of the court. *See Chassaing*, 887 S.W.2d at 578. The Court finds the secretary has since corrected his contumacious conduct by informing local election authorities the only governing order in effect is from this Court and directing local election authorities to use the 2022 congressional district map. The secretary, therefore, has purged himself of said contempt.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court hereby finds Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins was in civil contempt and, pursuant to section 476.120, RSMo 2016, he could be subject to punishment. Finding, however, that the secretary has purged himself of said contempt, the Court hereby enters no order of commitment and imposes no fine in relation to its contempt finding.



W. Brent Powell
Chief Justice

All concur.

STATE OF MISSOURI – SCT.:

I, BETSY LEDGERWOOD, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Missouri, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the order of said court, entered on the 10th day of September, 2026, as fully as the same appears of record in my office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Supreme Court. Done at office in the City of Jefferson, State aforesaid, this 10th day of September, 2026.



Betsy Ledgerwood, Clerk

ashlee auger, Deputy Clerk

From: Elections-1 <Elections-1@sos.mo.gov>

Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2026 12:34 PM

Subject: Congressional District Map Update

Importance: High

Good afternoon,

Following the United States Supreme Court's stay, the only governing court order in effect is from the Missouri Supreme Court. In accordance with that order, my Office is directing local election authorities to use the 2022 congressional map.

To ensure compliance with the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling, the Secretary of State's Office has tied the candidates to Congressional District 20 (CD 20) in MCVR's Election Management.

Thank you,

Elections Division

Office of the Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins

Kirkpatrick State Information Center

600 West Main Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101

elections@sos.mo.gov

Office Phone: 573-751-2301 / 1-800-669-8683



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**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

No. 26-2797

Congressman Robert Onder, et al.

Appellees

v.

State of Missouri and Denny L. Hoskins, in his official capacity as Missouri Secretary of State

Appellees

Richard Von Glahn and People Not Politicians

Appellants

Missouri Association of County Clerks and Election Authorities, et al.

Amici on Behalf of Appellant(s)

Club for Growth

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s)

No. 26-2827

Congressman Robert Onder, et al.

Appellants

v.

State of Missouri, et al.

Appellees

Club for Growth

Amicus on Behalf of Appellant(s)

American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, et al.

Amici on Behalf of Appellee(s)

App. 89a

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
(4:26-cv-01424-SRC)

ORDER

The emergency motion to recall the mandate and for stay of this court's order is denied.

September 22, 2026

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler

VERIFICATION OF RICHARD VON GLAHN

I, Richard von Glahn, hereby declare as follows:

1. I reside in St. Louis County, Missouri.
2. Under HB 1, I resided in District 1. I voted in the District 1 primary in August 2026.
3. Under the 2022 map, I reside in District 2.
4. On September 22, 2026, I voted in person absentee, pursuant to Missouri law.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 22, 2026.


Richard von Glahn
Executive Director, People Not Politicians