

APPENDIX

Table of Contents

	Page
Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 25, 2026).....	1a
Order of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in No. 8:24-cv-1657 (Jan. 21, 2025).....	18a
Order of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in No. 8:23-cv-1045 (Dec. 10, 2024).....	21a
Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Denying Rehearing En Banc (June 29, 2026).....	36a

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

MAR 25 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

BRENDA HAGEMAN; RICHARD PRICE;
TIMOTHY SAGE; LISA PAGE;
LOUELLA WILSON; DAVID KOSTKA;
MARK SCHOFIELD, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 24-7823

D.C. No.

8:23-cv-01045-HDV-KES

MEMORANDUM*

DANA JAYE BAL; DONALD MICHAEL
WILLIAMS, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 25-656

D.C. No.

8:24-cv-01657-HDV-KES

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

Argued and Submitted December 10, 2025
Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Dissent by Judge FORREST.

These consolidated appeals concern class actions related to defective tow-hitch wiring harnesses in 2020–2022 model-year Hyundai Palisade vehicles. Defendant-Appellant Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (Hyundai) appeals the district court’s denial of its motions to compel arbitration in both cases. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1). “We review de novo a district court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration.” *Godun v. JustAnswer LLC*, 135 F.4th 699, 708 (9th Cir. 2025). Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do not recount them here except as necessary to provide context for our ruling. For the reasons that follow, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.

In both class actions, Hyundai moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms and conditions covering Hyundai’s “Bluelink” services—features that allow consumers to control various aspects of their Hyundai vehicles through their personal cellular devices (Connected Services). Hyundai’s provision of the Connected Services is governed by the Connected Services Agreement (CSA), which contains the relevant terms and conditions. Plaintiffs accepted the terms and conditions through a so-called “clickwrap” agreement that required Plaintiffs to

check a box agreeing to the terms before Plaintiffs could access their vehicles' Connected Services features. *See Godun*, 135 F.4th at 709 n.3.

At issue here is the CSA's arbitration agreement, which provides in pertinent part:

Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, your Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law.

The agreement "includes, but is not limited to[]" claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory" with the exception of claims relating to "intellectual property rights." And it imposes a one-year statute of limitations on all covered claims. Hyundai argues that Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate "any and all disputes" relating to their "Vehicle[s]" because Plaintiffs assented to the terms and conditions of the CSA. We disagree.

1. As a threshold matter, the district court correctly held that the arbitration agreement's delegation clause is not clear and unmistakable because it expressly reserves class issues to courts. "The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires courts

to compel arbitration of claims covered by an enforceable arbitration agreement.” *Oberstein v. Live Nation Ent., Inc.*, 60 F.4th 505, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2023); accord 9 U.S.C. § 3. Under the FAA, the court’s role is limited “to ‘determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and, if so, whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.’” *Oberstein*, 60 F.4th at 510 (quoting *Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc.*, 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004)). “In determining whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute,” we “apply state-law principles of contract formation.” *Berman v. Freedom Fin. Network, LLC*, 30 F.4th 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2022). The parties do not dispute that California law controls here.

The “question of who decides arbitrability is itself a question of contract.” *Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.*, 586 U.S. 63, 65 (2019). But “[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.” *AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Comm’n’s Workers of Am.*, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); see also *Henry Schein*, 586 U.S. at 69.

Here, the arbitration agreement purports to delegate threshold questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator: “All issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision as well as the Agreement’s other terms and conditions” The immediate next sentence, however, provides

that “if putative class or representative claims are initially brought by either party in a court of law, and a motion to compel arbitration is brought by any party, then the court shall decide whether this agreement permits class proceedings.” The phrase “whether this agreement permits class proceedings” in the delegation clause is sufficiently ambiguous that it cannot be clear and unmistakable. At the very least, the class-proceedings carveout is unclear as to whether, if a court decides that class proceedings are permitted, they must be arbitrated or the putative class litigation may proceed in court. These considerations are particularly relevant here because Plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class. *Cf. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc.*, 848 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016) (enforcing arbitration clause where delegation provisions were unambiguous). We agree with the district court that the agreement does not clearly and unmistakably delegate threshold arbitrability questions to the arbitrator where the case is a putative class action.

2. On the merits, the district court did not err in concluding that the parties’ dispute is not encompassed by the arbitration agreement “as a straightforward matter of contract interpretation.” Hyundai argues that because the agreement requires arbitration of all disputes related to “your Vehicle,” Plaintiffs’ warranty claims relating to their automobiles’ defective tow hitches are covered. We disagree. Though “Vehicle” is a defined term, it is used inconsistently throughout the CSA. A reasonable consumer reading the plain language of the CSA—a “relatively minor

Bluelink contract”—would not likely have been on notice of the apparently broad scope of the arbitration agreement contained therein.

For one, the CSA is the “Connected Services Agreement.” The first paragraph states “[w]elcome to Hyundai Blue Link for your Hyundai vehicle,” making clear that the CSA concerns Hyundai’s “provision of Connected Services.” The term “Vehicle” is defined to mean the “Hyundai . . . vehicle” that “come[s] with an authorized Hyundai Blue Link . . . telematics system . . . , which is the equipment, including hardware and software, used to provide Connected Services to [the] Vehicle.” Even in its definition, the term “Vehicle” is described in proximity to, and not in any way separately from, the Connected Services. The same paragraph provides that one “must have an active Connected Services subscription to receive the Connected Services.” Given that the CSA applies only to the Hyundai vehicles that offer Connected Services—and to the subscribed users of those Connected Services—we are not persuaded that “Vehicle” takes on as broad a meaning in the arbitration agreement as Hyundai advocates. This is especially so given that the warranty claim at the center of these class actions is entirely irrelevant to the Connected Services.

Other key provisions, including those that cover service requirements, payments, and service duration and cancellation, confirm that the purpose of the CSA is to set forth consumers’ rights and obligations related to the provision of

Connected Services, not to the entire automobile. And where the CSA makes a distinction between consumers’ rights with respect to the entire automobile and Hyundai’s provision of the Connected Services, that distinction is stated clearly—for example, in the warranty provision which specifies that the “vehicle’s limited warranty does not cover the Connected Services.”

The district court did not err in finding the arbitration clause inapplicable to the parties’ dispute by applying the absurd results canon. The absurdity canon requires courts to apply the plain language of the text unless doing so would lead to an absurd result. *Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC*, 977 F.3d 713, 717–19 (9th Cir. 2020). The same principle is crystallized in California law: “[t]he language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, *if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.*” Cal. Civ. Code § 1638 (emphasis added). Here, even if “Vehicle” may ordinarily mean the entire automobile, we cannot “rely on the written terms alone” to “determine the mutual intention of the parties” because “absurd results follow from [Hyundai]’s preferred interpretation.” *Revitch*, 977 F.3d at 717 (citation modified). Under Hyundai’s reading, Bluelink subscribers agreed to arbitrate any dispute related to their Hyundai automobile,¹ even if the dispute has nothing to do with Connected Services. Hyundai’s position is untenable. *See id.* (concluding that

¹ The arbitration agreement excepts only claims either party “may have relating to copyrights or other intellectual property.”

DIRECTV's reading of the relevant arbitration agreement led to absurd results where consumer-plaintiff "would be forced to arbitrate any dispute with any corporate entity that happens to be acquired by AT&T, Inc.," as DIRECTV had been, "even if neither the entity nor the dispute has anything to do with providing wireless services to [plaintiff]"); *see also Wexler v. AT&T Corp.*, 211 F. Supp. 3d 500, 504 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (concluding that "no reasonable person would think that checking a box accepting the 'terms and conditions' necessary to obtain cell phone service would obligate them to arbitrate literally every possible dispute he or she might have with the service provider").

Courts apply the canon against absurdity "to discern the mutual intent of the parties based on their reasonable expectations at the time of contract." *Revitch*, 977 F.3d at 719. In doing so, courts consider the "circumstances under which [the contract] was made, and the matter to which it relates." *Id.* at 717–18. It is unlikely that Plaintiffs' reasonable expectation when subscribing to Bluelink Connected Services on a free and courtesy trial basis was that any and all claims related to their automobiles—including product defect claims—would be forced into arbitration. *See Wexler*, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 504 (concluding that "a reasonable person would be

expressing, at most, an intent to agree to arbitrate disputes connected in some way to the service agreement with [AT&T]”).²

We therefore affirm the district court’s determination that the arbitration agreement does not cover Plaintiffs’ warranty claims related to their automobiles’ defective tow hitches, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition.³

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

² The partial dissent takes us to say that “Vehicle” means the “Hyundai Blue Link . . . telematics system” itself. Dissent at 5. Not quite. The Hyundai automobile is certainly the vessel for, or the “thing that carries” the Connected Services. Dissent at 2 (emphasis omitted). But the role of the automobile in the Connected Services Agreement is, unsurprisingly, *vis-à-vis* the provision or receipt of Connected Services. To the extent that there are places in the CSA where “Vehicle” “refers to the entire automobile” separately from the Connected Services, Dissent at 2, that further proves our point that the term’s use throughout the CSA is inconsistent. Shapeshifting of this sort does not make the meaning of “Vehicle” clear and explicit.

³ Because our conclusion that the scope of the arbitration agreement does not encompass Plaintiffs’ claims is dispositive, we need not reach alternative grounds for affirmance. *See, e.g., Backcountry Against Dumps v. FAA*, 77 F.4th 1260, 1264 n.2 (9th Cir. 2023).

Hageman, et al. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., No. 24-7823
Bal, et al. v. Hyundai Motor America, Inc., No. 25-656
FORREST, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

MAR 25 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

I agree with the majority that the parties did not “clearly and unmistakabl[y]” delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. *Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.*, 586 U.S. 63, 65 (2019). I disagree, however, that Plaintiffs’ claims fall outside the scope of the parties’ arbitration provision. As such, I would reach Plaintiffs’ unconscionability challenge and conclude that the arbitration provision is enforceable subject to severance of its one-year statute of limitations, which is substantively unconscionable because it applies only to Plaintiffs. For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s denial of Hyundai Motor America, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration.

1. **Scope of Arbitration Provision.** California contract law gives effect to the parties’ outward manifestations of intent, of which the text of an agreement is the most important. *See Sellers v. JustAnswer LLC*, 289 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 12 (Ct. App. 2021) (citation modified) (“Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.”); accord *Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Ctr., Inc.*, 292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740, 749 (Ct. App. 2022). Whether the parties’ arbitration agreement in the Connected Services Agreement (Agreement) covers Plaintiffs’ claims comes down

to the meaning of “Vehicle” because the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes “arising out of or related to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, [or] your Vehicle . . . except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration.” The Agreement defines “Vehicle” to mean “Your Hyundai . . . vehicle” that “come[s] with an authorized Hyundai Blue Link . . . telematics system . . . , which is the equipment, including hardware and software, used to provide Connected Services to [the] Vehicle.” In other words, as the thing that *carries* the telematics system, rather than the telematics system itself.

The use of “Vehicle” throughout the Agreement is consistent with that meaning. *See Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch.*, 988 P.2d 568, 573 (Cal. 1999) (explaining that, where a term appears in multiple clauses of a contract, “it is reasonable to assume [the term] has the same meaning in both clauses” absent anything “suggest[ing] that these two clauses define [the term] differently”). The Agreement refers to “[t]he purchase or lease price of your Vehicle,” the “occupants of your Vehicle,” “your Vehicle’s . . . speed,” “your Vehicle’s . . . service data,” “your Vehicle’s . . . mechanical condition,” and “incidents involving your Vehicle.” In each instance, “Vehicle” obviously refers to the entire automobile, rather than just its telematics system. Because “Vehicle” is a defined term and there is no reason to

think that it means something different in the arbitration provision than it does throughout the rest of the Agreement, its meaning is unambiguous.

The majority reasons that construing “Vehicle” to mean what the Agreement defines it to mean would lead to “absurd results.” Maj Op. 7–8. Specifically, the majority contends that it is “unlikely that Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectation when entering into a contract of adhesion related to Connected Services was that any and all claims related to their automobiles . . . would be forced into arbitration.” Maj. Op. 8–9. Adhesion contract or not, the absurdity canon cannot bear the weight the majority places on it.

California courts do not look beyond the plain text to contextual indicators of meaning unless the text is ambiguous. *See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.*, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 694 (Ct. App. 2012) (“The doctrine of *ejusdem generis* is employed as an interpretive aid only when the language in the contract . . . is ambiguous.”); *accord Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula*, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 223 n.5 (Ct. App. 2008). This is because California Civil Code § 1637 requires a court to find that “the intention of the parties to a contract” is “doubtful” before looking to other principles. *See Eaton v. Thieme*, 59 P.2d 638, 640 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936). As explained, there is no ambiguity in the Agreement’s use of “Vehicle,” and, therefore, we need not ask whether the reading the parties gave it is absurd.

The majority relies on *Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC*, 977 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 2020), for the proposition that a contract term must be read to avoid the “absurd” result that a “plaintiff would be forced to arbitrate any dispute related to [that term], even if the dispute has nothing to do with [the primary subject matter of the contract].” Maj. Op. 8. But that was not the holding in *Revitch*. The question there was whether the word “affiliate” in an arbitration provision could encompass a company that was not an affiliate at the time the agreement was made. 977 F.3d at 717. We only considered the absurdity canon in conjunction with that inquiry because “affiliate” was “not elsewhere defined in the contract,” requiring us instead to look to the word’s “ordinary definition.” *Id.* The ordinary definition of affiliate did not ultimately control, however, because we concluded it was absurd to think that the parties might have used the word that way given its sweeping implications. *Id.* at 717–18. California law reaches for the absurdity canon, in other words, only when a court must go beyond the four corners of a contract to ascertain the meaning of a term. Here, “Vehicle” is specifically defined, so we have no need to consider ordinary meaning—which means that we also have no need for the absurdity canon.

By hunting for ambiguity, the majority needlessly overcomplicates what should be a simple analysis. It suggests that because “‘Vehicle’ is described in proximity to, and not in any way separately from, the Connected Services,” that somehow alchemically transforms the word from one referring to the “Hyundai . . .

vehicle” that “come[s] with an authorized Hyundai Blue Link . . . telematics system” into one referring to the “Hyundai Blue Link . . . telematics system” itself. Maj. Op. 6. This transformation is supposedly catalyzed by the Agreement applying “only to the Hyundai vehicles that offer Connected Services . . . and to the subscribed users of those Connected Services.” *Id.* But that is irrelevant. While Plaintiffs only assented to the Agreement *because* they owned vehicles with access to Connected Services and they wanted to sign up for those services, to the extent this created an unequal bargaining relationship, that goes to procedural unconscionability and not to the construction of the Agreement itself. The same is true of the majority’s suggestion that the relationship of the arbitration provision to the underlying “purpose of the [Agreement]” supports the conclusion that “Vehicle” does not mean vehicle. Maj. Op. 6–7.¹

I would interpret the arbitration provision consistent with the meaning specified in the Agreement and conclude that it covers Plaintiffs’ claims against Hyundai Motor America related to their 2020–2022 Hyundai Palisade vehicles.

¹The majority seeks to evade this conclusion by suggesting the issue is “the role of the automobile” in the Agreement, which it defines “*vis-à-vis* the provision or receipt of Connected Services,” in contrast to the vehicle itself, which “is certainly the vessel for . . . the Connected Services.” Maj. Op. 9 n.2. But the only part of the automobile that operates “*vis-à-vis* the provision or receipt of Connected Services” is its telematics system—and redefining “Vehicle” to be limited to the automobile as it relates to that role is the same thing as redefining “Vehicle” to mean the automobile’s telematics system.

2. **Unconscionability.** Having concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the arbitration provision, I next consider whether this provision is unenforceable due to unconscionability. An agreement is unenforceable under California law if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, though both kinds of unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. *See Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC*, 333 Cal. Rptr. 3d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 2025); *Torrecillas v. Fitness Int’l, LLC*, 266 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181, 185 (Ct. App. 2020), *disapproved of on other grounds*, *Ramirez v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc.*, 551 P.3d 520, 539 (Cal. 2024); *Serafin v. Balco Props. Ltd., LLC*, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 160 (Ct. App. 2015).

The Agreement is an adhesion contract, which renders it necessarily procedurally unconscionable. *Ronderos v. USF Reddaway, Inc.*, 114 F.4th 1080, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 2024). Placing the broad arbitration provision within a contract otherwise related to Connected Services is also evidence of procedural unconscionability. *See Penilla v. Westmont Corp.*, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 482–83 (Ct. App. 2016). These factors alone indicate a significant degree of procedural unconscionability.

But substantive unconscionability is less clear. A contract term is substantively unconscionable when it is “overly harsh, unduly oppressive, unreasonably favorable,” or shocking to the conscience. *Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co.*, 846 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co.*, 353 P.3d 741,

748 (Cal. 2015)) (quotation modified). Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), we are precluded from finding substantive unconscionability without some fundamental unfairness in the design of the arbitration agreement itself. 9 U.S.C. § 2; *see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011). Here, the district court improperly concluded that the broad scope of the arbitration provision could itself be a basis for substantive unconscionability, because the FAA and California law require courts to “treat the substitution of arbitration for litigation as the mere replacement of one dispute resolution forum for another, resulting in no inherent disadvantage.” *Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc.*, 840 F.3d 1016, 1030 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation modified). Therefore, the only basis for finding substantive unconscionability here is the arbitration provision’s one-year limitations period, which applied exclusively to Plaintiffs.²

²Plaintiffs identify three additional possible sources of substantive unconscionability: the exception to the arbitration provision for disputes related to intellectual property, the potential abrogation of their warranties by the Agreement’s incorporation clause, and the breadth of the arbitration clause. None is substantively unconscionable. That the intellectual property exception mostly favors Hyundai does not matter, as “[a] contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be so one-sided as to shock the conscience.” *Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Market Dev. LLC*, 282 P.3d 1217, 1232 (Cal. 2012) (citation modified). And I do not think that a California court would construe the incorporation clause in such a way that it would nullify Plaintiffs’ warranties. *See Cione v. Foresters Equity Servs., Inc.*, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 167, 175 (Ct. App. 1997). Finally, as I note above, the FAA precludes us from finding substantive unconscionability based only on the fact that a topic is subject to arbitration.

This individual substantively unconscionable term does not warrant invalidating the arbitration provision in its entirety because the term can be severed. *See Ramirez*, 551 P.3d at 547 (holding severance is appropriate where an “illegality is collateral to the contract’s main purpose; it is possible to cure the illegality by means of severance; *and* enforcing the balance of the contract would be in the interests of justice”). Irrespective of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the agreement, “[r]equiring those who freely enter into a clear and unambiguous contractual obligation to honor that obligation . . . is both in the interests of justice and consistent with the law’s preference to favor the enforcement of contracts and, if feasible, to carry out the intentions of the parties.” *Kim v. Airstream, Inc.*, 335 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 376 (Ct. App. 2025) (citation modified). Therefore, I would sever the one-year limitations period and enforce the balance of the parties’ arbitration agreement.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. **8:24-cv-01657-HDV-PD** Date January 21, 2025

Title ***Dana Jaye Bal et al v. Hyundai Motor America***

Present: The Honorable **Hernán D. Vera**, United States District Judge

Wendy Hernandez
Deputy Clerk

Not Reported
Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s):
Not Present

Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
Not Present

**Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS—ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION [DKT. NO. 20]**

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Hyundai Motor America’s (“Hyundai” or “Defendant”), Motion to Compel Arbitration. (“Motion”) [Dkt. No. 20]. Hyundai argues that Plaintiff consented to arbitrate all claims related to her vehicle when he signed the Connected Services Agreement to activate Bluelink Services in his Hyundai Palisade.

In a separate action, *Hageman v. Hyundai Motor America*, case no. 8:23-cv-1045-HDV-KES, this Court analyzed the same Connected Services Agreement in relation to a motion to compel arbitration. In *Hageman*, this Court found that the arbitration provision was unconscionable and unenforceable, that the delegation clause did not clearly and unmistakably delegate the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that Plaintiff’s claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. See December 10, 2024 Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration (the “*Hageman* Order”). [Dkt. No. 57].

For the very same reasons detailed in the *Hageman* Order, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case mirror those of *Hageman v. Hyundai*. The tow hitch wiring modules in the 2020–2022 Hyundai Palisade vehicles are allegedly defective, causing them to short circuit and catch on fire. *See* Complaint ¶¶ 1, 4 [Dkt. No. 1]. Plaintiff asserts that Hyundai failed to replace the defective tow wiring harness modules forcing many owners to pay for after-market solutions to fix their car's towing ability. *Id.* ¶ 6.

Hyundai maintains that Plaintiff enrolled in Hyundai's Bluelink services, a communication and technology feature in their cars, during a dealer-assisted enrollment process. Motion to Compel Arbitration ("Motion") at 2–3 [Dkt No. 20]. To enroll in Bluelink services, Plaintiff agreed to the Connected Services Agreement ("CSA") Terms and Conditions which contained an arbitration agreement. *See id.* at 6. Hyundai contends that Plaintiff assented to the terms of the CSA to arbitrate "any and all disputes" relating to "the vehicle." *Id.* Plaintiff here purportedly agreed to the Terms and Conditions four times—once at initial enrollment, twice using Hyundai's Customer Web Portal, and a fourth time when signing into the Hyundai's smart phone application. *Id.* at 5.

Hyundai filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration on October 7, 2024. On January 14, 2025, the Court heard oral argument and took the matter under submission. [Dkt. No. 38].

III. DISCUSSION

The Court concludes that there is no appreciable difference between the facts of this dispute and the *Hageman* case as it relates to the arbitration clause. At oral argument, the Court asked Hyundai's counsel (who also represents Hyundai in *Hageman*) to identify any substantive differences between the arbitration agreements in these two actions. Hyundai's counsel conceded that there was none. Indeed, the clauses are identical.

Factually, the only distinction between this case and *Hageman* is that the Plaintiff here agreed to the Terms and Conditions more than once. To use the common phrase, however, that is a distinction without a difference.

The Court hereby adopts in full all the findings and conclusions of the *Hageman* Order, which is attached here for the convenience of the parties and which is fully incorporated by reference in the present Order. In summary, the arbitration provision in the CSA is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, does not clearly and unmistakably delegate the issue of arbitration to the arbitrator, and does not cover the claims brought by the Plaintiff.

For all the reasons discussed at length in *Hageman*, the Court denies Hyundai's Motion to Compel Arbitration.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA HAGEMAN et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No. 8:23-cv-01045-HDV-KES

**ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
[DKT. NO. 37]**

1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 This putative class action involves allegedly defective tow hitch wiring in Hyundai’s Palisade
3 vehicles. Before the Court is Hyundai Motor America’s (“Hyundai”) Motion to Compel Arbitration
4 (the “Motion”) [Dkt. No.37]. Hyundai maintains that when Plaintiffs signed up for optional
5 Bluelink services at a local dealership, they agreed to arbitration of all claims relating in any way to
6 their vehicles.

7 The Motion presents three distinct legal questions. First, does the delegation clause in the
8 parties’ arbitration agreement require this Court to refer all questions—including that of
9 arbitrability—to a third-party arbitrator? Second, is the arbitration agreement itself valid? And
10 third, does the agreement by its terms cover the claims alleged here?

11 As to the initial foundational issue, the Court concludes that the delegation clause does *not*
12 contain “clear and unmistakable” language sufficient to refer all questions to an arbitrator because
13 the agreement expressly reserves class issues to the Court. On the second question of validity, the
14 Court finds that the Hyundai arbitration agreement is a contract of adhesion—rife with both
15 procedural and substantive unconscionability—that if interpreted as Hyundai cynically suggests
16 would potentially cause enormous surprise and prejudice to its broader customer base.

17 Most importantly, on the substantive merits of the third question, Hyundai’s interpretation of
18 the arbitration agreement is patently absurd. Under no reasonable reading of the plain language of
19 this agreement can Plaintiffs’ product defect claims be covered under the arbitration provisions
20 simply because the relatively minor Bluelink contract—a contract that offers “concierge services”
21 and has nothing to do with the rest of the Hyundai Palisade—used the term “vehicle.” To the
22 contrary, accepting Hyundai’s breathtakingly broad reading would contravene hundreds of years of
23 contract interpretation principles going back to William Blackstone.¹ Hyundai’s Motion is denied.

24
25
26 ¹ In making this argument, Hyundai joins Disney and others in the rogues’ gallery of corporate
27 weaponization and abuse of the arbitration agreement. See Jessie Yeung & Jon Passantino, *Disney*
28 *Reverses Course on Bid to Block Wrongful Death Lawsuit by Widower Who had Disney +*, CNN
(Aug. 19, 2024), www.cnn.com/2024/08/19/business/disney-arbitration-wrongful-death-lawsuit-intl-hnk/index.html.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Hyundai sold Plaintiffs and putative class members 2020–2022 Hyundai Palisade vehicles with allegedly defective tow hitch wiring modules. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 1 [Dkt. No. 19]. Plaintiffs and class members paid approximately \$475–\$750 for optional tow hitch and tow wiring harness module accessories to operate an attached trailer’s turn signals and brake lights. *Id.* ¶ 2. As alleged in the FAC, the tow wiring harness modules contain defects causing them to short circuit and catch on fire. *Id.* ¶ 4.

Hyundai issued a recall on August 22, 2022 and admitted that “debris and moisture accumulation on the tow hitch harness module printed circuit board may cause an electrical short, which can result in a fire and that a fire while parked or driving can increase the risk of injury.” *Id.* (cleaned up). After issuing the recall, Hyundai directed purchasers to return their vehicles to Hyundai for repairs. *Id.* ¶ 5. But the repairs only disabled the tow hitch wiring such that the turn and brake signals no longer worked. *Id.* As a result, many purchasers can no longer use their vehicles to tow.

Plaintiffs brought this action on June 14, 2023 and filed a First Amended Complaint on October 16, 2023. *See* Complaint [Dkt. No. 1]; FAC. Plaintiffs assert eleven claims against Hyundai for (1) unjust enrichment, (2) breach of implied warranty under New Jersey law, (3) breach of express warranty under New Jersey law, (4) breach of implied warranty under Pennsylvania law, (5) breach of express warranty under Pennsylvania law, (6) breach of express warranty under Utah law, (7) breach of express warranty under Minnesota law, (8) breach of express warranty under South Carolina law, (9) breach of implied warranty under New Hampshire law, (10) breach of express warranty under New Hampshire law, and (11) breach of express warranty under Arizona law. *See* FAC.

Hyundai filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 30, 2023 seeking dismissal of all claims. [Dkt. No. 22]. The unjust enrichment claim was stricken and the breach of express warranty claims were dismissed. [Dkt. No. 35]. The case was previously before District Judge Cormac J. Carney and was transferred to this Court on May 31, 2024.

On April 24, 2024, Hyundai filed its Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration. *See* Motion.

1 Hyundai asserts that Plaintiffs enrolled in Hyundai Bluelink Services,² a communication and
2 technology feature in their cars, during a Dealer-Assisted enrollment process. *Id.* at 1. To enroll in
3 the Bluelink services, Plaintiffs had to agree to a Connected Services Agreement (“CSA”). *Id.*
4 Plaintiffs were required to click a box acknowledging that they have read and agree to the Bluelink
5 Terms and Conditions, which included a hyperlink to the then effective Connected Services
6 Agreement. Declaration of Vijay Rao (“Rao Decl.”) Exhibit I. The terms and conditions of the CSA
7 contained an arbitration provision, which states as follows:

8 Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of
9 or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service
10 Plans, your Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll
11 in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or
12 through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not
13 subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to
14 arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us
15 subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law.

16 Rao Decl. Ex. E-F ¶ 15.C.(a), Ex. G-H ¶ 14.C.(a)). “Hyundai” is defined in the CSA to include
17 “Hyundai Motor America.” Rao Decl. Ex. E-H at p.1. “You” is defined as any person who
18 “purchased, leased, [or subscribed] to a Vehicle equipped with ... the Connected Services and/or has
19 activated the Connected Services.” *Id.*

20 The arbitration clause goes on to state that “You agree that, by entering into this Agreement,
21 you and Hyundai are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate in a class or
22 representative action to the maximum extent permitted by law.” Rao Decl. Ex. E-F ¶ 15.C.(a), G-H
23 ¶ 14.C.(a). And “ARBITRATION UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL TAKE PLACE ON AN
24 INDIVIDUAL BASIS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW; CLASS
25 ARBITRATIONS, CLASS ACTIONS OR REPRESENTATIVE ARBITRATIONS ARE NOT
26

27 ² Hyundai describes Bluelink services as an optional connected services systems that has various
28 features such as remote start, remote door lock, remote care finders, on demand diagnostics and
alerts, enhanced roadside assistance, and emergency assistance. FAC at ¶ 4.

1 PERMITTED.” *Id.* (all caps in original). The arbitration provision also contains a delegation clause
2 which represents that:

3 [a]ll issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this
4 arbitration provision as well as the Agreement’s other terms and conditions, and the arbitrator
5 shall have exclusive authority to resolve any such dispute relating to the scope and
6 enforceability of this arbitration provision or any other term of this Agreement including, but
7 not limited to any claim that all or any part of this arbitration provision or Agreement is void
8 or voidable. However if putative class or representative claims are initially brought by either
9 party in a court of law, and a motion to compel arbitration is brought by any party, then the
10 court shall decide whether this agreement permits class proceedings. For the avoidance of
11 doubt, the court and arbitrator shall be bound by the terms of this Agreement, including with
12 regard to the class and representative waiver provision.

13 *Id.* The parties did not submit with their Motion papers any of the standardized purchase contracts
14 that customers typically sign when purchasing a Hyundai vehicle. At oral argument, counsel for
15 Hyundai essentially conceded that such contracts do not normally contain an arbitration provision.

16 On August 1, 2024, the Court heard oral argument on the Motion. [Dkt. No. 50]. The Court
17 then ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of unconscionability, which the parties filed
18 simultaneously on September 10, 2024. [Dkt. Nos. 55, 56].

19 **III. LEGAL STANDARD**

20 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “governs arbitration agreements in contracts evincing
21 ‘a transaction involving commerce.’” *Zoller v. GCA Advisors, LLC*, 993 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir.
22 2021) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). It “declares ‘a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration’ and provides
23 that such agreements ‘shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
24 law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” *Id.* (quoting *AT&T Mobility LLC v.*
25 *Concepcion*, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) and 9 U.S.C. § 2).

26 The FAA allows “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
27 arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration [to] petition any United States district court ... for
28 an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”

1 9 U.S.C. § 4. A district court’s role is “limited to ‘determining (1) whether a valid agreement to
2 arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.’” *Revitch*
3 *v. DIRECTV, LLC*, 977 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting *Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic*
4 *Sys., Inc.*, 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). “If the answer to both questions is yes, then the
5 FAA requires a court ‘to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.’” *Id.*
6 (quoting *Chiron Corp.*, 207 F.3d at 1130). “In construing an arbitration agreement, courts must
7 ‘apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.’” *Wolsey, Ltd. v.*
8 *Foodmaker, Inc.*, 144 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting *First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.*
9 *Kaplan*, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). “[A]mbiguities about the scope of an arbitration agreement must
10 be resolved in favor of arbitration.” *Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela*, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418 (2019); *see*
11 *also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.*, 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983).

12 Pursuant to Section 2 of the FAA, there are two types of challenges to arbitration agreements:
13 “One type challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate, and the other challenges
14 the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the
15 agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s
16 provisions renders the whole contract invalid.” *Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson*, 561 U.S. 63, 70
17 (2010) (quoting *Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna*, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2010)). If a party
18 challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement under Section 2, then the court “must consider
19 the challenge before ordering compliance with that agreement.” *Id.* at 71.

20 **IV. DISCUSSION**

21 **A. Delegation Clause**

22 The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he delegation provision is an agreement to
23 arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.” *Rent-A-Center*, 561 U.S. at 68.
24 Parties may agree to arbitrate the gateway question of arbitrability, as the principle of arbitration is a
25 matter of contract law. *Id.* at 69. For an issue to be delegated, ‘it must be shown by ‘clear and
26 unmistakable’ evidence that the parties intended to delegate the issue to the arbitrator.” *Ajamian v.*
27 *CantorCO2e*, 203 Cal. App. 4th 771, 781, (2012); *see also Brennan v. Opus Bank*, 796 F.3d 1125,
28 1130 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying same standard). Clear and unmistakable is a “heightened standard.”

1 *Rent-A-Center*, 561 U.S. at 70 n. 1.

2 Here, the CSA’s arbitration provision contains a delegation clause, which states “[a]ll issues
3 are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision as
4 well as the Agreement’s other terms and conditions, and the arbitrator shall have exclusive authority
5 to resolve any such dispute relating to the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision or
6 any other term of this Agreement. . . .” Rao Decl. Ex. E-F ¶ 15.C, G-H ¶ 14.C. Therefore, before
7 determining whether the arbitration agreement itself is valid, the Court must first determine whether
8 Plaintiffs agreed to delegate the gateway question of arbitrability to the arbitrator where, as here, the
9 case is a putative class action.

10 After reviewing the relevant language of the parties’ agreement, the Court concludes that the
11 CSA does **not** meet this heightened standard. Although Section 14.C. states that “all issues are for
12 the arbitrator to decide”, it goes on to say **in the same section**, “[h]owever if putative class or
13 representative claims are initially brought by either party in a court of law, and a motion to compel
14 arbitration is brought by any party, then the court shall decide whether this agreement permits class
15 proceedings.” *Id.* That is exactly the situation here. So which is it? Does an arbitrator or the Court
16 decide if a Plaintiff in a putative class action must go to arbitration? Or does the Court first decide
17 the question of whether the agreement permits class treatment (presumably including the question of
18 class certification) and, if so, then leave the case to proceed as a class action in arbitration?³ The
19 language is the very opposite of “clear and unmistakable.” To the contrary, it is convoluted at best
20 and contradictory at worst.

21 Moreover, the delegation language in the CSA is inconsistent with the severability clause in
22

23 ³ The Court can imagine many other possible interpretations and variations on how to attempt to
24 reconcile these two clauses. What is clear is that Hyundai wants to have its cake and eat it too—*i.e.*,
25 to require the arbitrator to decide (almost) everything but to create a huge carve-out benefitting
26 Hyundai so that only a judge—and not an arbitrator—can allow a case to proceed as a class
27 (presumably so that an appeal can be filed, if necessary). But that still leaves the initial question up
28 in the air because it is unclear who decides if a **class plaintiff** must go to arbitration in the first
instance? And if this Motion is granted and the case goes to an arbitrator, when exactly would the
Court decide “whether this agreement permits class treatment”?

1 Section 16(E), which states that “[i]f any part of this Agreement is considered invalid *by a court* or
2 arbitrator, the rest of it will remain enforceable.” Rao Decl. Ex. E-F ¶ 16.E, G-H ¶ 15.E (emphasis
3 added). These contradictory provisions are similar to those in *Baker v. Osborne Dev. Corp.*, 159
4 Cal. App. 4th 884 (2008). In *Baker*, the California Court of Appeal refused to enforce a delegation
5 clause that read “[a]ny disputes concerning the interpretation or enforceability of this arbitration
6 agreement, including without limitation, its revocability or voidability for any cause . . . shall be
7 decided by the arbitrator.” 159 Cal. App. 4th at 888–89. A severance provision in the same
8 agreement maintained that severance was allowed if “any provision of this arbitration agreement
9 shall be determined by the arbitrator *or by any court* to be unenforceable.” *Id.* at 891 (emphasis
10 added). The Court in *Baker* found that the arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably
11 reserve to the arbitrator the determination of whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable
12 because one provision stated that these issues were to be decided by the arbitrator while a separate
13 provision implied that a court could find it unenforceable. *See id.* at 893–94. Many other California
14 courts have similarly held that, where (as here) arbitration agreements that include severability
15 clauses imply a role for the court, gateway issues of arbitrability are not clearly and unmistakably
16 referred solely to the arbitrator. *See, e.g., Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc.*, 204 Cal. App. 4th
17 1425, 1444 (2012) (“[W]e conclude the inconsistency between the Agreement's delegation and
18 severability provisions indicates the parties did not clearly and unmistakably delegate enforceability
19 questions to the arbitrator.”); *Parada v. Superior Court*, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1554, 1566 (2009)
20 (cleaned up) (“Use of the term ‘trier of fact of competent jurisdiction’ instead of ‘arbitration panel’
21 or ‘panel of three (3) arbitrators’ suggests the trial court also may find a provision, including the
22 arbitration provision, unenforceable. The arbitration provisions of the [relevant agreement], as the
23 one in *Baker*, did not ‘clearly and unmistakably’ reserve to the arbitration panel the issue whether
24 those arbitration provisions were unenforceable.”).

25 In summary, Hyundai has not demonstrated clear and unmistakable language delegating the
26 question of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The Court must therefore address these issues.

27 **B. Unconscionability**

28 “Federal law provides that arbitration agreements generally shall be valid, irrevocable, and

1 enforceable except when grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
2 *Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor*, 335 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). When
3 evaluating the validity of an arbitration agreement, “federal courts ‘apply ordinary state-law
4 principles that govern the formation of contracts.’” *Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.*, 763 F.3d 1171,
5 1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting *First Options of Chicago*, 514 U.S. at 944). Because
6 unconscionability is a defense that applies to contracts, a court may refuse to enforce an
7 unconscionable arbitration agreement. *See id.*

8 “Under California law, unconscionability has both procedural and substantive elements, and
9 both elements must be present for a court to invalidate a contract on the ground of
10 unconscionability.” *Baker*, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 894. But both elements need not be present in the
11 same degree, because “procedural unconscionability must be measured in a sliding scale with
12 substantive unconscionability.” *Parada*, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 1569–70. Therefore, “the more
13 substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is
14 required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” *Armendariz v.*
15 *Found. Health Psychcare Servs, Inc.*, 24 Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000).

16 Applying this standard as discussed below, the Court concludes that the CSA’s arbitration
17 agreement—if read broadly to cover all mechanical issues relating to the vehicle, as Hyundai
18 suggests—would be unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.

19 **1. Procedural unconscionability**

20 The California Supreme Court in *Armendariz* explained that procedural unconscionability
21 focuses on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. *Armendariz*, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.
22 “Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and
23 an absence of meaningful choice. Surprise involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon
24 terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the
25 disputed terms.” *Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc.*, 226 Cal. App. 4th 231, 245 (2014) (cleaned up).

26 The oppression element is generally satisfied when the contract is one of adhesion.
27 *Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, Inc.*, 143 F. Supp. 3d 930, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2015). A contract of adhesion
28 “signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining

1 strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”
2 *Armendariz*, 24 Cal. 4th at 113 (quoting *Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos.*, 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694
3 (1961)).⁴

4 Here, the CSA is undoubtedly a contract of adhesion. Plaintiffs were required to sign the
5 CSA to access the Bluelink services presented to them by the Hyundai dealerships. Plaintiffs did not
6 have any bargaining power when they signed, and the CSA was certainly not the subject of any
7 negotiation. To the contrary, it was presented on a standardized form, drafted, and imposed by a
8 party of superior bargaining strength that left Plaintiffs only with the option of adhering to it or
9 rejecting it. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not have a right to opt-out of the CSA. *See Cobarruviaz*, 143
10 F. Supp. 3d at 941.

11 The finding that the CSA is an adhesion contract “heralds the beginning, not the end, of our
12 inquiry into its enforceability.” *Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp*, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1319
13 (2005). Procedural unconscionability also requires a determination of the factors of surprise and
14 oppression. *Parada*, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 1571. The analysis on surprise involves the extent to
15 which the “challenged term is hidden in a prolix printed form or is otherwise beyond the reasonable
16 expectation of the weaker party.” *Morris*, 128 Cal. App. 4th at 1321.

17 The arbitration provisions in the CSA were not hidden. They consist of 11 paragraphs under
18 the large font heading of “Resolving Disputes.” *See Rao Decl. Ex. E-F* ¶ 15, G-H ¶ 14. But it is
19 unclear whether Plaintiffs were provided ample time to read and study the CSA. There are simply
20 not enough facts in the parties’ submissions regarding the “Dealer Assisted Process” used to sign the
21 CSA. Without more, the Court must assume that a reasonable consumer had time and opportunity to
22

23 ⁴ In analyzing whether an arbitration provision is oppressive, courts look not only to an absence of
24 power to negotiate the terms of a contract, but also to the absence of reasonable market alternatives.
25 The oppression factor may be defeated if the complaining party had a meaningful choice of
26 reasonably available alternative sources of supply from which to obtain the desired goods and
27 services free of the terms claimed to be unconscionable.” *Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp*, 128
28 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1320 (2005) (quoting *Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 211 Cal.
App. 3d 758, 772 (1989)). That cannot be shown here since the Hyundai telematics by all accounts
only operates on the Bluelink platform.

1 read the relevant language; nothing to the contrary has been shown.

2 But surprise here comes in another form. While the arbitration terms themselves were not
3 hidden, the counter-intuitive interpretation that Hyundai advances (that this arbitration agreement
4 commits the consumer to arbitration involving all mechanical issues relating to the car) certainly was
5 not explained or disclosed prior to the Bluelink onboarding process.⁵ It is safe to assume that any
6 reasonable consumer would be surprised (nay, shocked) to learn that a Bluelink services agreement
7 was intended to shorten the statute of limitations and require binding arbitration of serious physical
8 injuries (including wrongful death) so long as the tort involved the “vehicle.”

9 If that is what Hyundai truly intended, it should have made that point crystal clear. To that
10 end, California courts have consistently maintained that “where a contractual provision would defeat
11 the strong expectation of the weaker party, it may also be necessary to call his attention to the
12 language of the provision.” *Parada*, 176 Cal. App. 4th at 1571 (quoting *Wheeler v. St. Joseph*
13 *Hosp.*, 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 359–360 (1976)). There is no evidence to indicate that Hyundai called
14 attention to the broader scope that its reading of the arbitration provision requires.

15 In short, the Court concludes that the CSA contains a significant degree of procedural
16 unconscionability.

17 2. Substantive unconscionability

18 “Substantive unconscionability centers on the terms of the agreement and whether those
19 terms are so one-sided as to shock the conscience.” *Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.*, 328 F.3d 1165,
20 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting *Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs. Inc.*, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1330
21 (1999)). Plaintiffs contend that various provisions in the CSA meet this test, including the shortened
22 statute of limitations and the overbroad “vehicle” language. Supplemental brief to Opposition at 8–9
23 [Dkt. No. 55].

24 The Court agrees. Plaintiffs assert warranty claims under the laws of seven states. Each of
25 _____

26 ⁵ In truth, the Court doubts that Hyundai’s lawyers and executives themselves envisioned this broad
27 reading when it was first drafted. Indeed, if that was the intent, why not include the language in the
28 purchase contract rather than in an optional service agreement?

1 these states has adopted the UCC, and outside of South Carolina, each state provides statutes of
2 limitation of *four years* for breach of warranty claims.⁶ But the CSA provides that “except where
3 prohibited by law, you are not allowed to bring any claim against Hyundai (or any other third party
4 beneficiary) more than *one year* after the claim arises.” See Rao Decl. Ex. E-F ¶ 15.B, G-H ¶ 14.B
5 (emphasis added). Hyundai’s interpretation of the Bluelink statute of limitation provision would
6 therefore supersede the UCC, supersede California’s Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act as well
7 as parallel laws of other states, and severely decrease the time in which consumers could bring
8 warranty claims for literally anything relating to the vehicle—from defective engine parts to faulty
9 brake systems to design defects in the transmission. This statute of limitation as proposed
10 unquestionably shocks the conscience.

11 Moreover, the *entire* arbitration agreement is unconscionable if read broadly to cover the
12 entire vehicle. As discussed above, by adding the two words “the vehicle” into the CSA, Hyundai
13 purports to force consumers to arbitrate every conceivable claim. Reading the CSA in this way
14 would eliminate a consumer’s right to a jury trial for every possible *tort* claim against Hyundai,
15 including multi-million-dollar personal injury claims. Again, it is difficult to imagine a more
16 unconscionable result flowing from a relatively unknown and nondescript onboarding contract
17 relating to concierge and emergency calling services.

18 And there can be no question that, in practice at least, the provision would be entirely one-
19 sided since it is inconceivable that a Bluelink customer would invoke this arbitration clause over a
20 serious mechanical issue unconnected to the Hyundai telematics module. The Ninth Circuit has
21 frowned upon these one-way contracts. In *Ingle*, for example, the Ninth Circuit found that an
22 arbitration provision in an employment contract was substantively unconscionable because the
23 benefit of the arbitration agreement flowed effectively in one direction. *Ingle*, 328 F.3d at 1173–75.

24
25
26 ⁶ See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-725(1) (“An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
27 commenced within four years”); 13 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2725(a) (same); UT Code §
28 70A-2-725(1) (same); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 336.2-725(1) (same); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 382-A:2-
725(1) (same); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47-2725(A) (same); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(1)
 (“an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability. . .” must be filed within three years.).

1 Although the arbitration agreement at issue subjected the employer and employee to the same terms,
2 the Court found that the possibility that Circuit City would initiate an action against one of its
3 employees was so remote as to render the provision unilateral in practice. *See id.* at 1174–75. The
4 same result must be said to apply here.

5 **C. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement**

6 But even assuming, *arguendo*, that the arbitration provision is *not* unconscionable, Hyundai’s
7 Motion should be denied as a straightforward matter of contract interpretation. The Court would
8 then have to examine the question of “whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”
9 *Chiron Corp.*, 207 F.3d at 1130. The question would thus become: Does the Bluelink-related
10 arbitration agreement cover the Plaintiffs’ warranty claims regarding the defective tow hitches? The
11 Court concludes that it does not.

12 Because arbitration agreements are governed by contract law, when “enforcing an agreement
13 to arbitrate or construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must ‘give effect to the
14 contractual rights and expectations of the parties.’” *Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.*,
15 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting *Volt v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.*, 489 U.S. 468,
16 479 (1989)). In interpreting a contract, courts look to (a) the ordinary and popular meaning of the
17 terms; (b) give effect to surrounding provisions to avoid superfluity; (c) read the contract as a whole;
18 and (d) avoid an absurd or inequitable result. *See Schertzer v. Bank of America*, 109 F.4th 1200,
19 1208 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). “In cases of uncertainty . . . the language of a contract
20 should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist.” *Int’l Bhd.*
21 *of Teamsters, Local 396 v. NASA Servs.*, 957 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cal. Civ.
22 Code § 1654).

23 One of the cornerstone principles of contract interpretation is the “absurd-results canon”,
24 which requires courts to apply the plain language of the text unless doing so would lead to an
25 absurdity. *See Revitch*, 977 F.3d at 718–19 (“By contrast, we use the absurd-results canon to discern
26 the mutual intent of the parties based on their reasonable expectations at the time of contract.”);
27 *Thomas v. Cricket Wireless, LLC*, 506 F. Supp. 3d 891, 902 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“Under California
28 law, the mutual intent of the contracting parties must be ascertained from the written terms of the

1 contract alone unless it would lead to absurd results.”); *see also* Cal. Civ. Code § 1638 (“The
2 language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does
3 not involve an absurdity.”). Indeed, this maxim has its roots in the English common law going back
4 hundreds of years. *See* Williams Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 70 (A. Strahan
5 and W. Woodfall, 12th ed., 1793) (“The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules
6 must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust . . .”).

7 For all the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Hyundai’s proposed reading of
8 the arbitration clause would lead to precisely the type of absurdity that the law abhors. Doing so
9 would elevate form over substance far beyond the bounds of acceptable advocacy. And it would
10 render utterly farcical the foundational principle—already stretched in the context of arbitration
11 agreements—that contracts are to be interpreted to give effect to the mutual intentions of the parties.

12 Were this not enough, Hyundai’s argument also fails under the whole-text canon. *See*
13 Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012)
14 (Under the “whole-text” canon of interpretation, if practicable, a text should be read in a manner that
15 gives meaning to every part, and “[c]ontext is a primary determinant of meaning.”). Under this well-
16 known guide to contract interpretation, courts are tasked with considering the entirety of the
17 document—including its context—to determine its meaning. *See id.* Hyundai’s interpretation of the
18 disputed language is entirely inconsistent with this hermeneutical principle because it turns a blind
19 eye to the extensive language indicating very clearly that the CSA is all about the “Connected
20 Services.” To give just one example, the first three sentences of the CSA state:

21 Welcome to Hyundai Blue Link for your Hyundai vehicle, or Genesis Connected Services for
22 your Genesis vehicle (collectively “Connected Services”). You are choosing to enroll in a
23 Connected Services service plan (“Service Plan”). These Terms and Conditions are the
24 agreement between us *regarding our provision of Connected Services to you.*
25 *See* Rao Decl. Ex. E-H (emphasis added). Reading the CSA in context and in its entirety, everything
26 in the relevant language—from the titles, to the definitions, to the discussion of remedies—makes
27 clear to a customer that the contract is about (and is *only* about) the Bluelink services.


28 In short, the Court concludes that the arbitration provision in the CSA does not cover the

1 Plaintiffs' warranty claims in the present action.⁷

2 **V. CONCLUSION**

3 For the reasons discussed above, Hyundai's Motion to Compel Arbitration is denied.

4
5 Dated: December 10, 2024


6 Hernán D. Vera
7 United States District Judge

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 ⁷ The parties devote significant discussion to the question of whether the provisions in dispute can
26 be severed. But that argument misses the point. Hyundai's motion is denied for two reasons—
27 because the arbitration provision would be unconscionable if applied as Hyundai suggests, and
28 because Plaintiffs' claims nonetheless fall outside the scope of the arbitration provision under a
proper interpretation of the CSA. Severing all or a portion of the offending language is immaterial
to this analysis.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILED

JUN 29 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

BRENDA HAGEMAN; et al.,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 24-7823

D.C. No.

8:23-cv-01045-HDV-KES

Central District of California,
Santa Ana

ORDER

DANA JAYE BAL and DONALD
MICHAEL WILLIAMS, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA, INC.,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 25-656

D.C. No.

8:24-cv-01657-HDV-KES

Central District of California,
Santa Ana

Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously votes to deny Appellant's petition for rehearing en banc (Dkt. No. 67). Judge Forrest would grant the petition for panel rehearing (Dkt. No. 67). The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter. Fed. R. App. 40. The petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc is accordingly **DENIED**. The

panel further unanimously votes to deny the request for publication (Dkt. Nos. 68, 69, 70). The request is **DENIED**.