

Application No. - - - - -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PEYMAN ROSHAN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MELANIE J. LAWRENCE, GEORGE S. CARDONA, AND OFFICE OF
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,


Defendants and Appellees.

On Application for an Extension of Time to File Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Case No. 24-7429

**APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI BY SIXTY (60) DAYS**

Peyman Roshan, SB#303460
1757 Burgundy Place
Santa Rosa, CA 95403
(415) 305-7847
roshan@pursuelegal.com



APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This Application is made to the Honorable Elena Kagan, as Circuit Justice for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see S.Ct.R. 30.3 (hereafter “Rule”). On May 5, 2026, the Ninth Circuit issued a Memorandum Disposition and entered judgment affirming the District Court’s dismissal of this case.

Pursuant to Rules 13.5, 22, and 30.2, Appellant Peyman Roshan (“Roshan”) respectfully requests that the time to file his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this matter be extended by sixty (60) days based on the necessity for Roshan to incorporate into this appeal a dismissal based on the application of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, this Court’s recent decision in *Pung v. Isabella County, Mich.*, No. 25-95 (Decided June 23, 2026), which impliedly held the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine inapplicable in a case with similar circumstances. In addition, Roshan’s petition will discuss issues relating this Court’s recent decision in *T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.*, No. 25-197 (Decided June 18, 2026). While the issue this Court decided in *T.M.* does not affect this appeal, Roshan will be raising issues that were discussed by

the petitioner and the Court but were not decided because they were not properly included in the questions presented by the petitioner in T.M. and which issues will affect this case.

Roshan therefore respectfully requests a 60-day extension.

Dated this 20th day of July, 2026.

Respectfully submitted:



Peyman Roshan
In Pro Per

DECLARATION OF PEYMAN ROSHAN

1. I am an attorney admitted in California. I am the plaintiff and appellant. The following matters are from personal knowledge.
2. On May 5, 2026, the Ninth Circuit issued a Memorandum Disposition and entered judgment affirming the District Court's dismissal of this case in part based on the application of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine.
3. In addition, Roshan's petition will discuss issues relating this Court's recent decision in *T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corp.*, No. 25-197 (Decided June 18, 2026). While the issue this Court decided in T.M. does not affect this appeal, Roshan will be raising issues that were discussed by the petitioner and the Court but were not decided because they were not properly included in the questions presented by the petitioner in T.M. and which issues will affect this case.

I declare, under penalty of perjury of the law of the United States that the foregoing statements of fact are true and correct.
Dated this July 20, 2026 in Santa Rosa, California.



Peyman Roshan
In Pro Per

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

MAY 5 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

PEYMAN ROSHAN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MELANIE J. LAWRENCE, in her official
capacity as Chief Trial Counsel; GEORGE
S. CARDONA; STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA - OFFICE OF CHIEF
TRIAL COUNSEL, named as Office of
Chief Trial Counsel, individuals whose
capacity in unknown,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 24-7429

D.C. No.

4:21-cv-01235-JST

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 30, 2026**

Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Peyman Roshan appeals the district court's order dismissing his claims

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

against Melanie Lawrence, George Cardona, and the Office of Chief Trial Counsel (“OCTC”) of the California State Bar. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *Searle v. Allen*, 148 F.4th 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2025). We also review de novo a dismissal for lack of Article III standing. *Satanic Temple v. Labrador*, 149 F.4th 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2025). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

1. The majority of Roshan’s claims are barred by the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. This doctrine “prohibits federal district courts from considering ‘de facto appeals’—suits in which ‘the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.’” *Searle*, 148 F.4th at 1128 (quoting *Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam*, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). We have held that an attorney’s as-applied claims challenging the State Bar’s attorney discipline system constituted “a de facto appeal of the Supreme Court of California’s denial of [a] petition for review” barred by the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *Scheer v. Kelly*, 817 F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 2016).¹ The district court therefore correctly barred Roshan’s claims that challenged “the application of the state bar rules at issue . . . during specific

¹ The Supreme Court’s brief reference to the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine in *Reed v. Goertz*, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), did not overrule *Scheer*, see *id.* at 234–35. Nor did *Pell v. Nuñez*, 99 F.4th 1128 (9th Cir. 2024), which did not involve a state court judgment, *id.* at 1131, 1135 n.3.

attorney disciplinary proceedings” or sought “to overturn Roshan’s own prior disciplinary order.”

2. Roshan’s general challenges for prospective relief fail for lack of Article III standing. The suspension and revocation of Roshan’s professional licenses, while having a continuing adverse effect on Roshan, are not redressable by judicial relief due to the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine and therefore cannot be cited to establish standing. *See Stavrianoudakis v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 108 F.4th 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2024) (injuries cited to establish standing need to “likely be redressed by judicial relief”). Nor did Roshan’s conjecture that the OCTC may bring further disciplinary actions against him establish a sufficient likelihood of future injury required to support Article III standing. *See id.* at 1142. The district court therefore correctly dismissed Roshan’s general challenges for prospective relief.

AFFIRMED.²

² Roshan’s motion to expedite (Dkt. No. 36) is **DENIED** as moot.