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APPENDIX
App. 1

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LYLE W. CAYCE
CLERK

TEL. 504-310-7700
600 S. MAESTRI PLACE,
Suite 115
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130

July 30, 2026

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW:

No. 26-20208 In re: Joshua Woodson
USDC No. 4:25-CV-4700

Enclosed is an order entered in this case.

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk

Roeshawn Johnson

By: _____
Roeshawn Johnson, Deputy Clerk
504-310-7998

Mr. Nathan Ochsner
Mr. Joshua DeAnthony Woodson

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 30, 2026
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

No. 26-20208

IN RE JOSHUA DEANTHONY WOODSON,

Petitioner.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:25-CV-4700

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Before SOUTHWICK, HIGGINSON, and WILLETT, *Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:

Joshua DeAnthony Woodson seeks mandamus relief from several interlocutory rulings in his pending civil action. He also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The IFP motion is GRANTED.

Woodson challenges two orders entered by the magistrate judge: one restricting his ability to submit filings and another setting a case schedule. He contends that the filing restriction violates due process and conflicts with *Mendoza v. Lynaugh*, 989 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1993), and that the two orders operate together in a fundamentally unfair manner. He also challenges the district court's order adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny a temporary restraining order. Woodson asks us to revoke the magistrate judge's orders, vacate the district court's order, and order recusal.

"Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only in the clearest and most compelling cases." *In re Willy*, 831 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1987). To obtain it, Woodson must show both that he has no other adequate means of relief and that his right to the writ is "clear and indisputable." *Id.* (quoting *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal.*, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).

A magistrate judge acting under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) serves "subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court," which retains "total control and jurisdiction" over the referred matter. *United States v. Raddatz*, 447 U.S. 667, 681 (1980). This court does not directly supervise a magistrate judge's management of an ongoing case. Woodson must first present those objections to the district judge. And to the extent he challenges the district court's own interlocutory rulings, his case remains pending and those rulings may ordinarily be reviewed after final judgment. Mandamus does not exist to bypass that process. *See In re Willy*, 831 F.2d at 549.

Recusal fares no better. Although mandamus may provide a means to review a recusal ruling, such relief is available only "in exceptional circumstances." *In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997). Woodson identifies no order denying recusal, so we have nothing to review. Nor has he identified facts suggesting the personal, extrajudicial bias required under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. *See United States v. Scroggins*, 485 F.3d 824, 829–30 & n.19 (5th Cir. 2007). Nothing he alleges "reveal[s] an opinion based on an extrajudicial source" or "demonstrate[s] such a high degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible." *Id.* at 830.

* * *

Woodson has not carried the demanding burden required for mandamus relief. The petition for a writ of mandamus is DENIED, as are all other pending motions and requests for relief.

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

APPENDIX
App. 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

Joshua Deanthony Woodson, *Plaintiff*, v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, et al., *Defendants*.	§	Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-04700

ORDER ON PROLIFERATE FILINGS AND OTHER ISSUES

At the March 20, 2026 initial conference, the undersigned explained that Plaintiff Joshua DeAnthony Woodson has bombarded the Court and the other parties with dozens of filings that are redundant, improper, or otherwise meritless. Many of his submissions are invalid or improper on their face. Just as examples, Woodson filed a "Notice Regarding Potential Scope of Class Action," Dkt. 75, even though this is not a class-action case. He filed a motion essentially asking for a blank check to correct any defective filing that he may submit in the future, and for a categorical exemption from the requirement that he confer with other parties. *See* Dkt. 47. Woodson even filed a "notice" accusing one of defendant's attorneys of engaging in "unauthorized practice of law," Dkt. 62, despite Woodson's own recognition that the attorney is duly licensed to practice in this State, *see id.* at 1, and despite this Court's records

confirming that the attorney has been admitted to practice in this Court (indeed, the attorney otherwise could not have even filed documents in this case). And Woodson has filed motions for sanctions that merely dispute Defendants' positions on Woodson's claims or quibble with wholly immaterial information. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 24; Dkt. 41 at 2. Several times, Woodson filed a slew of documents, only to withdraw or supersede them—including after Defendants incurred the expense of responding to some of them. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 30 (detailing five such submissions); Dkt. 61 (withdrawing four submissions, Dkt. 24, 41, 29, and 50). This must stop.

Indeed, even excluding the numerous motions that this Court has already resolved, the docket reflects that Woodson has filed **twenty-seven** other motions and related supplements, notices, and requests for relief during the brief pendency of this case. A few of those motions are resolved below, and other others will be addressed via a separate opinion. Regardless, to prevent Woodson's continued unnecessary and improper proliferation of filings on the docket that have created unjustifiable burdens on Defendants and on this Court, Woodson is hereby barred from submitting any new filings without prior permission from this Court. And this Court will not allow Woodson to submit any new filings that revisit issues addressed in or that purport to supplement his earlier filings.

As for Woodson's current motions that remain outstanding—they are too numerous to list individually here—Defendants' response deadlines are stayed until the Court requests a response.

***Woodson's motion to reconsider denial of e-filing privileges*, Dkt. 46**. This Court has already denied Woodson's original motion for leave to e-file. Dkt. 30 at 3-4. Woodson's submission of an egregious number of unnecessary or baseless filings even without access to e-filing only reinforces why he should not be allowed to e-file. His request for reconsideration is therefore **DENIED**.

Woodson's requests for emergency or expedited relief. On March 2, 2026, the undersigned issued an opinion recommending that Woodson's request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to block the scheduled March 3, 2026 foreclosure sale be denied, for a host of reasons. *See* Dkt. 73 (Memorandum and Recommendation). Although Woodson filed objections, *see* Dkt. 81 (March 5, 2026), by then the foreclosure sale had already occurred. Both before and after that date, Woodson filed a series of documents asking for "emergency" relief to unwind the foreclosure sale. *See* Dkts. 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 89; *see also* Dkt. 80 ("Supplemental Notice" related to other foregoing filings); Dkt. 86 ("Memorandum"); Dkt. 90 (affidavit).

There can be no "emergency" at this point. Woodson never obtained relief that would have prevented the foreclosure sale, and that request is now

moot. *See, e.g., Christopher Village, Ltd. P'ship v. Retsinas*, 190 F.3d 310, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding a foreclosure sale "effectively moot[s]" a plaintiff's request "for an injunction ... because of th[e] court's inability to fashion adequate relief"). Even if Woodson could ultimately show that the foreclosure sale was invalid, that would simply comprise one aspect of the relief he seeks in this suit and would be addressed alongside his request for damages.

There is no good cause for expedited discovery, much less to revisit the Court's previous denial of Woodson's similar request. *See* Dkt. 48 (December 15, 2025 renewed request for expedited discovery); Dkt. 38 (December 12, 2025 order denying Woodson's request for expedited discovery, Dkt. 27). Nor is Woodson entitled to expedited resolution of any relief he seeks. His requests for relief on an emergency or expedited basis are therefore denied.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is **ORDERED** that

(a) Woodson **is barred from submitting new or supplemental filings addressing the issues that he has already raised**, including any new requests or arguments supporting emergency relief concerning the foreclosure sale, and

(b) **Woodson cannot submit any new notice, supplement, motion, or other request for relief without first obtaining the Court's permission.** To obtain permission, Woodson must first confer with the opposing parties and obtain their position on the matter[1] and then send (not file) a letter (maximum two pages)

[1] It is not enough to email or leave a voice message for counsel on the day of filing and state that no response was received.

to the undersigned's case manager explaining why he seeks leave to submit the filing. **Failure to comply with this directive will result in the immediate striking of the unauthorized filing and could result in further sanctions that include dismissal of all claims**; and

(c) **The clerk of court is directed to reject all submissions from Woodson unless this Court has explicitly authorized the filing.**

It is further **ORDERED** that Defendants' response deadlines to any of Woodson's motions to which they have yet to respond are hereby **STAYED** unless and until the Court requests a response.

It is further **ORDERED** that Woodson's motion to reconsider the denial of e-filing privileges and for leave to file electronically (Dkt. 46) is denied.

It is further **ORDERED** that Woodson's request for expedited discovery (Dkt. 48) and for "emergency" resolution of his various requests for relief (Dkts. 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 89, 90) are **DENIED**.

Signed on March 20, 2026, at Houston, Texas.

Yvonne Y. Ho

Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge

United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

APPENDIX
App. 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

Joshua DeAnthony Woodson, Plaintiff,	§	CIVIL ACTION NO 4:25-cv-04700
vs.	§	JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, Robertson, Anschutz, Schneid, Crane & Partners, PLLC, Shiann Shinella Woodson, and LoanCare, LLC, Defendants.	§	

SCHEDULING AND DOCKET CONTROL ORDER

The following schedule will control disposition of this case. For further information, see Section 10 of this Court's procedures.

The parties are ADVISED that (i) no continuance will be granted, even upon joint motion, absent a showing of actual diligence and extraordinary cause, and (ii) discovery failures may result, at the appropriate time, in dismissal of claims or the striking of evidence or defenses. Proceed accordingly.

1. **04/20/2026** **MOTIONS TO ADD NEW PARTIES OR FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADINGS**

   The party causing the addition of a new party must provide copies of this Order and all previously entered Orders to the new party.

   Any party seeking leave to amend pleadings after this date must show good cause.

2a. **05/20/2026** **EXPERTS (other than attorney's fees)**

Additional material from this filing is available in the Clerk's Office.