


ORIGINAL

26-5844
No. _____



IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Respondent

vs.

William Peterman, Jr.

Petitioner, pro se

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- Whether a state license qualifies as a federal license for the purpose of regulatory oversight

In the context of 50 states comprising one nation, is a state license a federal license?

Does a state agency violate its scope of powers on interstate exchange of consequential information for the satisfaction of its administrative claim?

- Whether independence is a responsibility, not only a right

Does a state have legal capacity and authority to override its own premise of independence, to shirk the natural duties thereof?

Do the states have federal authority where a federal authority is absent? If so, then is each state required independently to evaluate such use of authority?

PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

William Peterman, Jr.

RELATED CASES

Commonwealth v. Peterman, CP-67-SA-[0391; 0392]-2024
Court of Common Pleas, York County Pennsylvania.
Judgment entered Feb. 13, 2025.

PROCEEDINGS

Court of Common Pleas of York County Pennsylvania

No. CP-67--SA-0000032-2025,

Commonwealth v. Peterman, 10 April 2025

Superior Court of Pennsylvania, No. 626 MDA 2025,

Commonwealth v. Peterman, 23 December 2025

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, No. 19 MAL 2026

Commonwealth v. Peterman, 18 August 2026

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OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is unreported, and reprinted in the Appendix at App. 1a.

Commonwealth v. Peterman, No. 19 MAL 2026;

18 August 2026

The Decision and Memorandum of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is unreported, and reprinted in the Appendix at App. 2a. *Commonwealth v. Peterman*, No. 626 MDA 2025; 23 December 2025

The opinion of the Court of Common Pleas of York County Pennsylvania is reprinted in the Appendix at App. 10a. *Commonwealth v. Peterman*, No. CP-67-SA-0000032-2025; 3 June 2025

JURISDICTION

The judgment of Pennsylvania's Supreme Court was entered on the 18th day of August, 2026.

It is a final judgment.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) and Supreme Court Rule 10.

This case involves a substantial federal question, and a conflict of state convictions dependent a conflict of interstate records, commencing at the Court of Common Pleas of York County Pennsylvania, who entered judgment on the 10th day of April 2025.

Appeal filed by the Defendant to Pennsylvania Superior Court, who affirmed the judgment on December 23, 2025.

Petition followed to Pennsylvania Supreme Court, denied the 18th of August 2026.

CONSTITUTIONAL / STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; **nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall** be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
(emphasis added)

U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, § 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. **No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities** of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; **nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.**
(emphasis added)

Pa. Const., Article 1, § 10, double jeopardy clause:

twice in jeopardy;

No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;

15 U.S.C. § 1692d /

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 806:

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, **oppress**, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. [...]

(emphasis added)

15 U.S.C. § 1692e /

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 807:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.

(2) The **false representation** of --

(A) the **character**, amount, or legal status of any debt; or [...]

(emphasis added)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Of general premise:

- The United States of America does not issue a federal driver's license.
- A state driver's license issues only to residents of the state.
- A driver's license is voluntary, regardless its exceptional privilege and common use.
(Driving is voluntary; then also its conditional compliance.)
- A suspension of driver's license (minimally at specific case) carries upon its expiration a reinstatement fee.
- A suspension-reinstatement is a suspension which depends only reinstatement by fee.
- Undue leverage is an illegal debt-collection practice.

Of specific case:

South Carolina DMV issued 1 termed suspension and reinstatement, and 2 additional suspension-reinstatements against Petitioner's driver's license in 2017. The term of suspension expired 07/01/2017. The suspension-reinstatements (3) do not expire.

New Jersey DMV issued driver's license to Petitioner on 04/04/2018, and required surrender of his South Carolina driver's license while effectively voiding it.

South Carolina DMV posted its reinstatement fees to the National Driver Register as suspensions.

Pennsylvania DOT refused to issue driver's license to Petitioner in July 2020 due to the NDR stating open suspension.

Pennsylvania DOT refused Petitioner's pleas for evaluation with disproof per alleged suspensions.

On November 3 and 6, 2024, Petitioner was cited twice, each of 4 deficiencies of driver compliance.

In 2025, via SCDMV, Petitioner successfully vacated 1 of 3 suspension-reinstatements.

Though voided by and surrendered at subsequent active driver's license, Petitioner's South Carolina driver's license expired 04/14/2026. Petitioner's New Jersey driver's license expired 12/31/2021.

Without driver's license, the state of Pennsylvania denies car insurance.*

Without car insurance (or financial responsibility), the state of Pennsylvania denies registration.

Without registration, the state of Pennsylvania denies inspection.

STATEMENT OF CASE

This case parallels and conflicts conviction at Petition No. 26-5493, such related case.

Upon the claim of South Carolina rightly not paid, the Petitioner's circumstance reached fullest consequence, of which the lack of registration prompted automated alert for traffic stops, which resulted citations (7):

Drivers Required To Be Licensed (1),

Required Financial Responsibility (2),

Registration Required (2),

Operation Without Inspection (2),

Driving While Suspended (withdrawn by officer).

The citations arose to court appearance, which the Courts of Pennsylvania have errantly favored, prompting Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In below Courts, Petitioner argued the dependence of inspection, registration, and financial responsibility* on the issuance of driver's license via Pennsylvania statute inherently.

The Petitioner at most committed one offense: driving while not licensed to drive, and was forced by law to be without financial responsibility, registration, and inspection because the non-issuance of license.

These successive citations constitute double jeopardy, through multiplicity, for their exclusive dependence

*There is exception to the criterion of driver's license to comply insurance in Pennsylvania. It is afforded by one insurance provider. Being the only provider to unlicensed drivers, it is the exception and not the rule. Prior to this knowledge, a state-licensed agent represented otherwise: without license a policy is ineligible to write, which Petitioner retained as written representation and proof. Being licensed by the state to represent insurance products per state requisites, and without a true awareness otherwise advertised, the notice suffices cause not to seek further. Pennsylvania effectively preredquired license for insurance, and continues practice.

on a single fault already charged: the absent license, which is protected in the Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania, respectively the 5th Amendment and Article 1 at Section 10.

Due to Pennsylvania statute interfering with the independence of its prerequisite criteria, the Petitioner is faultless their charges. Faultless means not guilty.

The Petitioner is not guilty 6 of 7 charges.

A state has no right to convict independent per noncompliance unless the compliance is independently achievable, because the potential, as at case, for a faultless deficiency of corequisite.

Petitioner does not owe to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania more than citation per driver's license.

However, Petitioner also does not owe per deficiency of license because the conviction conflicts

a previous conviction by the same court, which even attested at trial hearing. Both convictions pertain the Petitioner and of exactly equal circumstance.

At Petition No. 26-5493, Petitioner states that the conviction upheld an errant citation: driving while suspended, and refers to the current case as validation.

At current Petition, Petitioner states that the order of operations, such prior conviction, makes the latter conviction legally defective.

Both convictions are defective, but this latter conviction is certainly a conflict to the fulfillment of justice: 2 different citations were convicted on 3 separate incidents of the exact same violation.

The violation is so limited of interpretation because it is an administrative noncompliance only (forced upon Petitioner, not voluntary).

The failure toward dual interpretations is the states' recordkeeping: driver status as suspended while driver is without license, by voidance and expiration prior licenses.

An administrative record should clearly define to a single interpretation, because it is a matter of explicit record, which can't produce more than a single interpretation nor ever has unequivocal context across time, unlike separate incidents of behavior.

There's no subjectivity possible from a question of record, a material fact yes or no. Such a record is only objective. This particular and official record is two mutually exclusive facts both yes. Objectivity can't attain nor justify vagueness, while an official record can't suffice to ambiguity.

Like the question: black or white, an official status is one or another and not more than. The recordkeeping,

which produced divergent citations, is vague while inherently and professionally compelled not to be.

The vagueness doctrine prevents arbitrary enforcement, appropriate to this case.

However also, that failure toward dual interpretations perfects to definition by the same officer at case withdrawing 1 of 2 parallel charges. Under the flexibility of interpretation (that the Petitioner violated both ways), both charges by a same officer were valid. On process of elimination to include appropriate conduct of police, the officer withdrew one charge because the own persuasion that one charge were invalid or that the two conflicted.

The officer is the state to make that decision for withdrawal, and the state depends the officer's citations for conviction, that the withdrawal creates sufficient conflict external to its own case – or as it relates to

other convictions. The withdrawal of charge eliminates that charge from the potential interpretations. Of two potential interpretations, then only remains one: driving without a license.

Clearly, the application of law is inconsistent, by previous conviction per driving while suspended. The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that individuals should not experience inconsistency in an application of law. See *Winters v. New York*, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).

The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the Petitioner at case, namely by immunity to multiple interpretation of a single cause, and by equal protection of the laws necessarily to include service—upon claimant's mission to serve and protect. These rights are violated in the Pennsylvania courts upon conflicting convictions.

Additionally per the matter of license and summarily of incidents, Petitioner was wrongly disallowed a driver's license. Therefore, it can't count against him to be without one. Petitioner is not guilty, either and both: driving without a license or while suspended. The convictions, however, establish, by their real and substantial penalty, the violation by the state to abridge the privilege of a citizen to license and drive.

The same federal question remains at this Petition as at No. 26-5493.

At the cause of incident is whether a state license has authority to exercise as a federal license, not only its privilege to affect reciprocal within the federal boundary but also enforcement against. Without such answer, the collective administration on driving privilege is flawed profusely, innately demanding intervention.

1. A reinstatement as a suspension is a failed practice.

It is in fact a reinstatement to the state license.

It has no federal grounds to prevent licensing in other states. It thereby fails as a suspension, which communicates interstate.

2. A suspension-reinstatement has no merit because a driver's license is voluntary.

It is a suspension only until the reinstatement, and reinstatement is not mandatory because a driver's license is not mandatory.

The suspension has no genuine purpose because its singular condition is optional. By the nature of its only cause, the suspension has to be inabsolute, or not effectively a suspension. You can't put a lien on an optional payment. Therefore, a suspension-reinstatement has no authentic premise to suspend. The suspension

is actually vacant and ineligible to effect.

3. A suspension-reinstatement has no merit to report to the National Driver Register, on several counts:

- › A suspension-reinstatement is a claim for reinstatement, which pertains the state license, and thereby isolates to only the state.

The report has no use nationally; and a debt pertaining only a state can't serve by national network.

- › Reinstatement is optional. Therefore, no debt exists.

The reinstatement can't enforce because it is optional, and it is the only requisite to fulfill suspension, which then requires its suspension not to obligate fulfillment. An option to pay is not a claimable debt, nor subsequently also a reportable suspension.

- › Driver licensing is not a federal regulation.

A reinstatement fee reported to a national database for the purpose of regulation treats a state license as a federal license, a natural conflict of law by the premise of independent state and agency. Depending other states' use of information on the NDR, the information can prevent licensing, inappropriate for the reinstatement of a state license.

- › An out-of-state license can't justify to reinstate.

The purpose of reinstatement can't qualify to a national database.

- › The NDR self-expresses as purposed on 'problem drivers'.

A reinstatement of license is optional, and can't be a problem not to pay. Therefore, a suspension-reinstatement is not a problem, and

its report can't suffice the standard of the NDR.

As happened at case, PADOT refused to issue license because the report on the NDR, which leverages the applicant to pay reinstatement fee to South Carolina to reinstate South Carolina license to obtain license from Pennsylvania. The report to the NDR, thereby, is effectively as though South Carolina issues a federal license, while Pennsylvania's practice reinforces the same. South Carolina does not issue a federal license, rather issues a state license. Because South Carolina is not the federacy, but rather a state, its issuance only could be not federal.

The inherent non-federal license violated its premise as a state license, and the report to the NDR naturally violated the independence of the states. Pennsylvania, which independently issues driver's license, conditioned

itself on resolution of suspension per the NDR, which was only a reinstatement to license out-of-state.

The condition in essence is a federal license, which violates the presumption and standard where federal license does not exist.

A report which violates legal premise has no merit to commence nor sustain.

4. It is unlawful to unduly leverage payment of a debt.

Depending individual state practice, a resolution of suspension is the only means to eliminate its record on the NDR. Of the particular criteria at case, the suspension-reinstatements only resolve by paying reinstatement fee.

(Inherent and presumptive is the alternate route of prevalent justice, through representation of error. The Petitioner attempted such repeatedly to

SCDMV, NDR, NHTSA, and PADOT, and then to the Pennsylvania Courts. All either excused responsibility or favored the status quo.)

A resolution of record restricted to payment and reported to national consequence qualifies as a debt collection practice, even if the debt is an error.

A report of suspension-reinstatement to the NDR is violation of law by inherent qualification to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, §§ 806 and 807: to oppress (by consequence against the driving privilege elsewhere) and falsely to represent the character or legal status of a debt.

A national database should have oversight independent from the states for the purpose of integrity in the public interest. Informed through contact with the NDR, which is managed by the

NHTSA, there is no such oversight nor any oversight pertaining dispute of the record. The states are permitted to report what they will as though it is valid per the NDR.

An individual state agency, being the only agency to regulate a privilege, should not neglect a valid dispute of the information. The states are independent for the service of independence —one's own evaluation— and do not have the legal capacity to deny that responsibility. An individual should not be prevented independent evaluation pertaining a privilege nor a prerequisite to another state; but further, an individual should not be precluded a dispute of the information directly with the independent state.

The Petitioner very simply claimed to the PADOT that the NDR report was errant, while offering documentary proof, and was denied the potential.

A state license should not have been conditioned reinstatement to an out-of-state license because there isn't a federal license, but a dispute of the facts should not have been denied pertaining an independent privilege.

SCDMV should not have reported a suspension-reinstatement to the NDR.

NDR should not have accepted report of a suspension-reinstatement.

NDR and NHTSA should provide dispute resolution per its own record.

All state agencies should receive application for licensing independently to evaluation. There should

not exclusively and ignorantly depend unregulated out-of-state information.

The Courts should compute simple conflicts of law.

Anywhere in the chain of consequence could have alleviated the fault of administrations, but it is the home-state that is most crucial to justice. No one of genuine truth should be denied, and it is what Pennsylvania did on a premise unknown more than 'suspension'.

The 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution clearly stipulates that no state shall enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges of the citizen.

Driving privilege very clearly was abridged.

It is also the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania holding claim against the Petitioner per traffic citations resulting, serving prompt for Petition.

On the basis thoroughly expositied to conflicts and deficiencies of simple government, the Petitioner does not owe to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on all counts at case.

In summary, PADOT faulted not to issue license; Pennsylvania statute precluded compliance to all driving-privilege requisites on condition of license; and conviction per license conflicts alternate conviction by the same court.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Petition.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. However, it did so impractically.

Pennsylvania's Superior Court cited procedural deficiency as a waiver of the issues for review (which was extremely minor, having reference to a formatted distinction of question --which is subject to a fair

suggestion otherwise and had fulfilled).

To forego the exception, the Court then complained without support an incomprehensibility of Appellant's argument, while demonstrating its own partiality against the basis for Appeal, to prefer dependence exclusively on rebuttal by legal authority.

An Appeal is valid to say that you did it wrong; not only to say that the right thing is instead this. The question is not concealed.

On the basis of imposed waiver, the Court discarded Appellant's brief as any factor to a decision, and sided by default to the presiding Order.

The Court of Common Pleas, York County Pennsylvania convicted the traffic citations as charged.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

- By definitive elimination, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can't be favored, compelling Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- There is no legitimate potential resolution consistent to Pennsylvania's Entry of Judgment. Faults, flaws, and excessive hardship are abundantly clear. The sensibility is irrefutable.
- The administrative flaws have no other correction potential than a higher Order, while injustice overtly demonstrates; all below avenues have been exhausted.
- The injustice is universally applicable and significantly unacceptable. All citizens should not have to suffer nor endure the penalty that has been the oppression of a common privilege.

- The premise at Petition is effectively widest-reaching, serving all drivers in the United States.
- To deny Petition leaves a burden on the public, as the flaws would remain. A best intention can't result of a less-than-best affordance; America currently can't self-actualize.