No. 26-5793

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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KENNETH R. TALLEY,
Petitioner,

v.

JUDITH C. HORN, and
DARREN W. HORN, SR.,
Respondents.

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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE

# SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 15.8

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Petitioner

Submitted: October 30, 2026

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Rule 15.8, Petitioner files this supplemental brief to bring to the Court's attention intervening matter not available at the time of the petition docketed October 8, 2026. New matter is not limited to the October 20, 2026 eviction of 90 year old Kenneth Talley in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay; emails and certified mail served on Ken's wife, Janice A. Talley, a deceased party; and a 143-act statistical analysis completed October 29, 2026, where docket data demonstrates that the 2022 Chancery judgment is jurisdictionally void, and that every subsequent act of deprivation across eight courts and thirty-five judicial officers is a downstream consequence of that single void judgment. Appendix A Statistical Analysis of 143 Documented Acts of Constitutional and Statutory Violation

## I. HIERARCHY OF LAW

The legal framework in the United States is hierarchical. Each level controls the one below it. At the apex is the Constitution. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, clause 2, makes the federal automatic stay the supreme law of the land. A state court writ that contravenes the stay is void *ab initio*. *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). The Fourteenth Amendment requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the seizure of property without a valid warrant. Below the Constitution is federal statute. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code operates automatically upon the filing of a petition. No court order is required. No notice is required. *In re Gruntz*, 166 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 1999). Any action taken in violation of the stay is void, not voidable. *Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Electric Corp.*, 894 F.2d 371, 372 (10th Cir. 1990); *In re Schwartz*, 954 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1992).

Section 362(k)(1) provides actual damages, costs, and attorney's fees for willful violations. Section 105(a) confers contempt jurisdiction on the Bankruptcy Court. Below federal statute are federal rules. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9013 provides the procedural vehicle for enforcement. At the bottom is state action. Where state action contravenes the Constitution, federal statute, or federal rules, it is void. A nullity. No legal effect. The state court had no authority. The 143 documented acts of constitutional and statutory violation in this controversy are measured against this hierarchy.

## II. THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT

The Court of Chancery is a court of equity. 10 Del. C. § 341. It "shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdiction of this State." 10 Del. C. § 342. The Delaware Code is explicit. Section 6701(a): "The legal title to lands or to any tenements whereon entry can be made may be tried in a civil action, based upon a cause of action in ejectment." Ejectment is tried in the Superior Court or the Justice of the Peace Court, where a jury is available. The right to recover possession of real property is a right ascertained and protected at common law. The Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury trial. *Pernell v. Southall Realty*, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974). The 2022 Chancery judgment did not adjudicate an ejectment. It did not adjudicate legal title. It did not enter a judgment of possession. It decided two equitable claims — constructive trust and life estate — and denied them. The Final Report's finding that Petitioner had "no interest in the property" is correctly read as a finding that Petitioner had no interest as a constructive trust or as a life estate. The court never said that Petitioner does not own the property. It had no

jurisdiction to say that. The proof is in Respondents' own litigation strategy. After the 2022 judgment, Respondents filed a separate ejectment action, C.A. No. S22C-12-013-MHC (Super. Ct.). If the Chancery judgment had determined title, no ejectment would have been necessary. Respondents' own counsel knew this. In S22C-12-013-MHC, the Superior Court granted ejectment by force without a trial in October 2023, in violation of Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 81. The related case, Clark v. Talley, C.A. No. S25C-02-029-RHR, now has a jury trial scheduled for May 2027 under Rule 81. The second case received the trial that the first case was denied. Rule 81 requires a trial. The first case was handled in violation of the rule. The order is void. When matters of fact proper to be tried by a jury arise in Chancery, the Court "may order such facts to trial by issues at the Bar of the Superior Court." 10 Del. C. § 369. The Chancery court did not make that referral. It decided the factual questions itself, without a jury, in a court that sits without juries, regarding a dispute over land. In six years, from March 2020 to October 2026, there has been one trial in Delaware, the two-day non-jury trial in the Court of Chancery. See Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Talley v. Horn, No. 24-6912 (U.S. filed Jan. 15, 2025) (Trial Transcript, May 3, 2022 Chancery Trial), on file with the Clerk of this Court. A judgment entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void *ab initio*. *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar federal review of a void judgment. The Third Circuit held in C.A. No. 24-2358 that Rooker-Feldman does not apply, vacated the dismissal as to the state law claims, and remanded. The federal denials that preceded that remand rest on the premise that the 2022 judgment is a valid, final determination of title. It is not. It is a determination of two equitable

claims, entered in a court that lacked jurisdiction to determine legal title, without the jury trial that the Seventh Amendment and Delaware law require.

## III. THE ANCHOR: THIRTY-THREE CHANCERY ACTS

The 143-act analysis begins with the Court of Chancery, where thirty-three documented acts are recorded. The first act is the anchor: the May 3, 2022, two-day non-jury trial before Officer Griffin, in which a 90-year-old man with a documented first-to-second-grade reading and writing ability was forced to proceed and direct that he must represent himself without counsel, without a guardian ad litem, and without any accommodation, in violation of Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3) and the Due Process Clause. The full trial transcript is on file with the Clerk of this Court as an appendix to Talley v. Horn, No. 24-6030 (U.S. filed Sept. 8, 2024). A copy was also filed in No. 24-6912 (U.S. filed Jan. 15, 2025). The objection was contemporaneous. At the very beginning of the trial, when Officer Griffin informed Petitioner that he must proceed without counsel, Petitioner had no due process. The challenge to the proceedings began at that moment. It has not stopped for six years. Every filing, every motion, and every appeal in the sixty-four related cases is a continuation of the denial of due process. The legal significance of the first act is not *only* that it was unfair, it is that it was void. A court that proceeds against a party who, under its own mandatory rule, "must" be represented by a guardian ad litem, and who in fact lacked the capacity to participate, has no jurisdiction over that party's person or property. A judgment entered without jurisdiction is void *ab initio*. *B. J. Hollingsworth Co. v. Cesarini*, 129 A.2d 768, 769 (Del. Super. 1957). As stated in paragraph 20 of the petition, Dr. Cooney-Koss concluded that Petitioner 'was not competent to represent himself during

his past legal proceedings.' The evaluation further concluded — a finding not in the petition — that 'Mr. Talley would have been competent to proceed with the assistance of an attorney,' and diagnosed four specific conditions: Specific Learning Disorder with impairment in reading (developmental dyslexia), moderate; Specific Learning Disorder with impairment in written expression, moderate; Mixed Receptive-Expressive Language Disorder, mild; and Mild Cognitive Impairment. In addition, Petitioner has documented severe hearing loss. No accommodation was provided at any hearing in any court. The remaining thirty-two Chancery acts are the enforcement of a void judgment. They are not independent errors. The frequency is the legal point: thirty-three acts of constitutional and statutory violation by a single court, over four years, against a single 90-year-old man who cannot read or write at a second-grade level, is not a pattern of individual mistakes. It is the predictable result of a court that entered a void judgment and then spent four years enforcing it. The acts include: the denial of a continuance when Janice Talley was bedridden; the striking of testimony about Kenneth's education level; the barring of Kristina from assisting during the trial; the denial of Janice Talley's right to introduce the original deed at the ejectment hearing; the acceptance of a white-out-altered photocopy over the original typed document and a corresponding notarized contract with a raised seal and initials by all of the changes; the reopening on July 20, 2026, due to "staff error" without notice; the confirmation in writing that certified mail was sent to a deceased party; Officer David's on-record statement on April 24, 2024, that she believed Petitioner could read and write just fine without any evaluation; the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem; the direction of emails to a deceased party after written notice; the scheduling of a hearing on

November 16th, the deceased's birthday; three "malicious" designations over twenty-eight months, all resting on the same April 24, 2024 oral statement; the denial of IFP despite $13,994 annual income; the documents demonstrating indigency sitting on a supervisor's desk; the acceptance of fees without docketing documents; the six communications sent to janiceatalley@gmail.com between October 8 and October 16, 2026; the filing of the neurological report and forensic evaluation with the Court; the failure to consider either in the August 4, 2026 designation; the pending Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem; the denial of the interlocutory appeal filed during the May 2022 trial; and the denial of the appeal of the ejectment and restoration of electrical power. Each act is documented in the Court's own docket, minute entries, orders, or written confirmations. Ken could not file an emergency motion, it was $500.

## IV. THE DOWNSTREAM EFFECT: ONE HUNDRED AND TEN ACTS

The remaining one hundred and ten documented acts are the downstream consequence of the 2022 Chancery judgment. A void judgment creates no preclusive effect. It cannot bind other courts. It cannot be the predicate for other judgments. Yet every subsequent Delaware court treated the 2022 judgment as binding. The result is one hundred and ten acts of deprivation across seven courts, each one a downstream consequence of the single void judgment. The 143-act analysis includes a side-by-side comparison of the Court of Chancery and the District Court. Over overlapping time periods, the two courts produced seventy combined documented acts (33 Chancery + 37 District), using different methods: the Chancery through active misconduct (service on a deceased party, "malicious" designations, IFP denials), the District Court through inaction (526 days of silence after the appellate mandate, bulk denials without

individual analysis, failure to rule on emergency motions, termination of a case without reaching a pending recusal motion or jury trial demand). The District Court's thirty-seven acts now exceed the Chancery's thirty-three. The simultaneous Magistrate referral placeholder in both C.A. No. 25-662 and C.A. No. 25-732 (both reversed April 1, 2026) and ex parte communications in both cases constitute documented cross-case coordination. The two courts, using different methods, produced the same result: the 2022 Chancery judgment remains unchallenged. The District Court accounts for thirty-seven acts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 requires the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action." The 175-day silence after a fully briefed Motion to Dismiss in 23-982 (January 16, 2024 – July 9, 2024), the 219-day silence after four motions (August 4, 2025 – March 17, 2026), the 192-day silence after nine motions in 25-662 (July 15, 2025 – January 23, 2026), the 411-day gap between the Third Circuit's mandate (April 18, 2025) and the first hearing (July 29, 2026), and the 526 days since the mandate with no substantive adjudication are not delays. They are the denial. The IFP contradiction — the same-week grant for Kenneth Talley and denial for Kristina Talley in 25-662 (July 3, 2025), the grant in 25-732 and denial in 25-662 for the same plaintiff and income, and the one-week gap between the Bankruptcy Court's denial (September 23, 2026) and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's grant (September 30, 2026) based on identical declarations — is a class-of-one equal protection violation. *Village of Willowbrook v. Olech*, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The denial of the Jury Trial Demand in 25-732 (D.I. 16, filed March 12, 2026) before terminating the case, without any order addressing the demand, violates the Seventh Amendment. *Tull v. United States*, 481 U.S. 412, 418 (1987). The Pennsylvania state

courts account for thirty-three acts. The $28,800 release to Law Associates, Inc. on August 25, 2026, in violation of the federal automatic stay, is void. The Municipal Court's grant of possession on June 2, 2026, notwithstanding the Fair Housing Commission's statutory bar under Philadelphia Health Code § 6-809(4), is void. The exclusion of all tenant evidence at the June 1–2, 2026 jury trial, the fifteen off-record sidebars, and the fictitious service of process in which a neighbor called herself "Francine" are not trial irregularities. A trial in which one party is permitted to present no evidence is not a trial. It is a proceeding that produces a judgment without a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The judgment is void. The Superior Court accounts for nine acts. Judge Conner's grant of ejectment by force without a trial in October 2023, in violation of Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 81, is void. The Justice of the Peace Courts account for eleven acts. Judicial Officer Kenneth S. Clark, Jr. serves simultaneously as the judicial officer presiding over the eviction and the landlord seeking possession. A judge who is the opposing party in the action has a direct financial interest in the outcome. *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009). The judgments entered by Judicial Officer Clark are void. The Delaware Supreme Court accounts for seven acts. The Family Court accounts for five acts. The Court of Common Pleas accounts for eight acts, including the filing of criminal trespass charges against Kristina Talley on the day of the October 3, 2023 ejectment, after she requested a trial and was told no, followed by the State's dismissal on August 21, 2024; and the filing of criminal trespass charges against Kenneth Talley after the Delaware State Police said they would help him retrieve his medication, then refused, then arrested him, after he requested a trial and was told no, followed by the State's

dismissal on January 11, 2024. The filing of criminal charges to enforce a civil ejectment, without a trial, followed by dismissal after the eviction is complete, is a deprivation of liberty under color of state law, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Appendix B Three-Instance Eviction Pattern Identical Mechanism Across Two States. The most frequently violated provisions across all 143 acts are: the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (83 acts); the Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 and ABA Model Code Rule 2.9(A) (23 acts); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130, ADA Title II (18 acts); Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (14 acts); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (9 acts); the Sixth Amendment (8 acts); and 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (7 acts). When the same constitutional violation is committed by thirty-five different judicial officers across eight different courts over six years, it cannot be attributed to individual bad actors. It must be attributed to the predicate, the 2022 Chancery judgment that every Delaware court relied on.

## V. THE OCTOBER 20, 2026 EVICTION

On October 20, 2026 — eighteen days after the original petition was filed — Kristina Talley, Kurt Costello, and Kenneth Talley were evicted from their residence at 2353 East Cumberland Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where they have occupied the property since 2007, Ken has been with them after ejectment in Delaware. The automatic stay had been in effect since August 21, 2026. No court lifted the stay. No exception was invoked. The Mullans' own attorney appeared in the Bankruptcy Court on September 2, 2026. The Mullans filed a thirty-five-page response to the Motion for Declaration of Automatic Stay Violation on September 14, 2026. They knew the stay was in effect. They litigated the stay issue. And on October 20, 2026 — thirty-six days

after their own thirty-five-page response — they executed the writ, pretending that denied motions in the bankruptcy court lifted the stay. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1), a violation is "willful" where the actor knew of the stay and intended the actions that violated it. They litigated the stay. Then they executed the writ. That is willful. The writ is a state court document used to commit a federal crime. The proper jurisdiction over that crime is the federal court — the Bankruptcy Court under § 105(a) and the District Court under § 362(k)(1). The state court that issued the instrument is not the adjudicator of the federal crime. It is the instrument. The execution is void. The arrest is void. The seizure of property is void. *United States v. Jones*, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). No valid Alias Writ of Possession was produced. The tenants were never served with any court documents in advance, in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 400. During the eviction, Philadelphia Police Officers threatened to have Kurt Costello's vehicle impounded and threatened to have Kristina Talley's elderly father removed from the scene. Kristina Talley has cyclic vomiting syndrome, a rare and debilitating condition diagnosed in 2017. She requested to use the bathroom. The request was denied. All ADA Title II accommodation requests were denied. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) requires reasonable modifications to avoid discrimination. The landlords removed all personal belongings, including the original court documents for the federal bankruptcy proceedings and the 341 meeting of creditors. These documents are the evidence that the automatic stay was in effect on October 20, 2026. The seizure of the documents that prove the stay's existence, during an eviction that violated the stay, constitutes obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and destruction of records in a federal matter under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. The Bankruptcy Court maintains the official record under 11 U.S.C. §

152, but the originals seized contain signatures and annotations not reflected in the docket. A moving company now demands storage fees as a condition of return, constituting theft by extortion under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3923. The documents are being held hostage, where they refuse access to all important medication, court documents, and personal belongings. All eviction and ejectment actions in this controversy stem from the first act: the denial of due process at the May 2022 Chancery trial. The October 20 eviction is the 143rd act. It is the culmination of six years of enforcement of a void judgment.

## VI. THE REOPENING PATTERN

The 2021 Chancery case has been reopened for the second time in over two years: on February 12, 2024, at Defendants' motion, and on July 20, 2026, by court staff without a judicial officer's direction. A valid, final judgment does not need to be reopened. The repeated reopening of this case is evidence of the judgment's defect. The July 20, 2026 reopening was followed by the Court's statement that "court staff made an error," the placement of only Defendants' documents on the docket, and the one-week delay in docketing Plaintiff's filings. A court that reopens a case by "staff error" and processes only one party's filings is not exercising jurisdiction with the procedural regularity that due process requires.

## VII. NEW URGENT MATTER

Between October 8 and October 16, 2026, six official court communications were sent to janiceatalley@gmail.com, the email address of a party who died on December 10, 2024. A death certificate is on file. A Motion for Substitution was filed on August 5, 2026. The District Court has accepted the substitution. On October 13, 2026, Ken filed

a Motion for Reassignment specifically identifying this issue. On October 14, 2026 — one day after written notice — another email was sent to the deceased. On October 15, 2026, the estate representative contacted the Court. On October 16, 2026, Officer David confirmed in writing that certified mail was sent to Janice Talley with return signature cards. Petitioner insists these are personal incidents after the hearing was scheduled for November 16, 2026 — the birthday of the deceased party, Janice Talley. Ken cannot attend the hearing, is asking for relief from every court possible. *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950): notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action." Notice to a deceased person is void. The sequence — written notice on October 13, continued service on October 14, 15, and 16, and written confirmation on October 16 — is deliberate indifference to the constitutional right to notice. *County of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Any order entered at the November 16 hearing, if notice was deficient, is void for lack of due process. A hearing was scheduled for November 16, 2026, to consider Respondents' Motion to Cancel *Lis Pendens* and Impose Sanctions, filed September 6, 2026. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Continuance, Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem, Recusal, and Stay of Proceedings on October 22, 2026, before Officer David, seeking to continue the hearing to a date no earlier than ninety days from the date of the Order, with notice by first-class U.S. mail to all living parties. The motions petitioner filed for relief from Officer David's email messages and certified mail are pending. The legal principle is *DiSabatino v. Salicete*, 695 A.2d 1117 (Del. 1997): the court having jurisdiction to cancel a notice of *lis pendens* is the court exercising jurisdiction over the action upon

which the notice is predicated. The motion targets, two documents: the Notice of Pendency of Action recorded September 16, 2026, predicated on C.A. No. 23-982 (D. Del.); and the Official Document *Lis Pendens* filed September 30, 2024, in C.A. No. 24-2358 (3d Cir.). Neither is predicated on the Court of Chancery's own proceeding. The Court of Chancery lacks jurisdiction to cancel either. The irreparable injury is the loss of the property itself which occurred on October 3, 2023, which can be restored. On October 16–17, 2026, Emergency Motions for TRO and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction were filed in C.A. No. 25-662 and C.A. No. 23-982. As of October 26, 2026, no ruling has been entered. The only protection for the property is the court's own *lis pendens*, which the respondents are actively seeking to cancel. An Emergency Motion for Stay was filed in this Court on October 19, 2026. On October 23, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the E.D. Pa., Talley v. State of Pennsylvania, No. 2:26-cv-08159-AMP, with an Emergency Motion for TRO under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The Bankruptcy Court denied IFP on September 23, 2026. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted IFP on the same declarations on September 30, 2026. The Court called Petitioner "malicious" three times. He said "that's not fair" on page 4. That is the entire record. The PA Superior Court's 1925(a) deadline expired October 13, 2026, without the opinion being filed. The Bankruptcy Court stated on the record that there is "no appeal presently pending." There are two.

## VIII. THE SYSTEM AND THE OFFICERS

Section 1983 exists to hold officers accountable when they violate constitutional rights. Petitioner is using it for that purpose. The Talley family has been in America since 1686. They are not malicious. They are the oldest thread in the fabric of this country,

and they are being told they are the problem. Officer David called Petitioner "malicious" three times. Ken is not malicious. See Exhibit C Statements Of Petitioners

## IX. CONCLUSION

The 2022 state court judgment was the only trial in six years. It was the wrong court, the wrong procedure, and the wrong remedy. It did not determine who owns the property. It decided two equitable claims and denied them. The property was never lawfully taken. The record demonstrates a three-court pattern in which the same constitutional right — the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the question of one's own land — was denied at each stage: In the Court of Chancery (2022), Petitioner was denied counsel, a guardian ad litem, and any accommodation, and was compelled to represent himself at the two-day non-jury trial. The judgment is void for lack of due process and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over legal title. In the Superior Court (2023), Petitioner was denied the trial that Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 81 requires for ejectment. The ejectment by force in Delaware was granted without a trial. The order is void. In Philadelphia, the petitioners were denied all evidence at a jury trial. A trial in which only one party is permitted to present no evidence, is not a trial. The order is void. The following laws independently prohibit the October 20, 2026 execution: (1) 68 P.S. § 250.501 (no notice given); (2) 68 P.S. § 250.503 (no valid Order for Possession produced); (3) 68 P.S. § 250.503(b) (no 11-day writ service); (4) Philadelphia Code § 9-811 (no Eviction Diversion Program completed due to improper service on neighbor Kathy "Francine"); (5) Philadelphia Code § 6-809(4) (no valid lead-safe certification; no valid rental license 2012–2024); (6) Philadelphia Code § 9-3902 (no valid rental license); (7) 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (federal

automatic stay in effect since 8/21/26); and (8) the FHC Final Order of May 7, 2024 (eviction denied; statutory bar established). Any one of these is independently sufficient to render the execution void. All eight were violated simultaneously. Three different courts. Three different procedural mechanisms. The same result: the party is denied the means to present their case, and a judgment is entered on the incomplete record. See Appendix B Three-Instance Eviction Pattern Identical Mechanism Across Two States. The 143 documented acts of constitutional and statutory violation confirm that this is not a pattern of individual errors. See Appendix A Statistical Analysis of 143 Documented Acts of Constitutional and Statutory Violation. It is the predictable consequence of a single void judgment that every Delaware court treated as valid. The federal court continues to used the Chancery Court's decision in its decision(s) to deny Ken a trial. The related Superior Court case now has a jury trial scheduled for May 2027, confirming that the proper procedure prior to ejectment by the police requires a jury trial, with due process, and that the 2022 judgment cannot stand as a substitute. The question presented is not theoretical. It is the actual, ongoing result. The intervening matter confirms that the harm is imminent and irreparable. The right to recover possession of real property is a right ascertained and protected at common law, and the Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury trial. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974). Petitioner, Kenneth Talley has been denied a jury trial on the question of forced removal from his own land for six years.

Ken has waited 1,638 days.

Respectfully submitted,

By Kenneth R. Talley

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This proof of service, in the form of a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, has been served on the following Respondents via the address provided:

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