


No. 26-5703



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

KENNETH R. TALLEY,
Petitioner,

v.

JUDITH C. HORN, and
DARREN W. HORN, SR.,
Respondents.

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF DELAWARE*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Kenneth R. Talley, *pro se*
28467 Pocahontas Avenue
Millsboro, DE 19966
Phone: (302) 249-0497

Petitioner

Submitted: October 2, 2026

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a state court judgment is void *ab initio* under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where the court's own mandatory rule (Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3)) required the appointment of a guardian *ad litem* for a person without capacity, the court failed to do so, and subsequent forensic evidence establishes the litigant lacked the cognitive capacity to participate.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



LIST OF PARTIES

All parties appear in the caption on the cover page. All parties to the proceeding whose judgment is sought to be reviewed shall be deemed parties in this Court, and all parties other than the petitioner shall be respondents as per Rule 12.6. A corporate disclosure statement is not required, see Rule 29.6.

(1) Petitioner Kenneth R. Talley is an 89-year-old citizen of the United States residing at 28467 Pocahontas Avenue, Millsboro, Delaware 19966. He proceeds *pro se* and *in forma pauperis*. His annual income is \$13,994.00.

(2) Respondent Judith C. Horn is Petitioner's daughter, residing at 719 Route 12, Westmoreland, New Hampshire 03467-4727. She is represented by Paul E. Bilodeau, Esq., Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP, 1521 Concord Pike, Suite 305, Wilmington, DE 19803.

(3) Respondent Darren W. Horn, Sr. is Petitioner's son-in-law, residing at 719 Route 12, Westmoreland, New Hampshire 03467-4727. He is represented by Paul E. Bilodeau, Esq., Reger Rizzo & Darnall LLP, 1521 Concord Pike, Suite 305, Wilmington, DE 19803.



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Appendix I Notarized Affidavits of Elder Abuse, Work, and Record Keeper (App. I)

Appendix J Index Of All 63 Legal Cases (App. J)

The appendix contains orders on rehearing, the judgments sought to be reviewed if its
entry date differs from the opinion or order, material required by Rule 14.1(f) or Rule
14.1(g)(i), and any other material the petitioner believes essential to understand this
application.



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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

1. Petitioner, an 89-year-old man with a first-to-second-grade reading and writing ability as established by forensic evaluation, seeks review of the Supreme Court of Delaware's August 27, 2025 order denying his interlocutory appeal from the Court of Chancery, C.A. No. 2021-0011-BWD. Petitioner purchased property in 1989 and paid \$47,250 in full by 1993. The original deed named him and his late wife as grantees. Respondent (daughter) applied correction fluid to remove their names, recorded the altered photocopy in 2014, ((App. H) and prevailed at a 2022 Chancery trial where Petitioner was forced to proceed *pro se* by the Court. The Court had on-record notice of his sixth-grade education. No guardian was appointed. No counsel was appointed. No accommodation was provided. In January 2025, a forensic psychologist found Petitioner's reading and writing skills were "only at the first to second-grade level" and that he "was not competent to represent himself during his past legal proceedings." A neuropsychologist corroborated. The Chancery refused to consider the evidence because it postdated the trial. The Delaware Supreme Court denied review. The 2022 judgment is the factual basis on which the District of Delaware, the Third Circuit, and this Court (C.A. No. 24-6912) declined to address Petitioner's § 1983 claims. If the 2022 judgment is void, each federal denial rests on a nullity. Petitioner asks this Court to grant certiorari; reverse the order of the Supreme Court of Delaware; remand with instructions to vacate the 2022 judgment as void, appoint a guardian *ad litem* pursuant to Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3) and 12 Del. C. § 3901(a), and grant IFP status consistent with the findings of the Delaware Supreme Court, the Third Circuit, and the District of

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Delaware. No court has addressed whether a judgment is void where the court's own mandatory rule required a guardian and the court failed to appoint one, and forensic evidence later proves the litigant lacked capacity. The question is of exceptional importance and has broad implications for elderly, indigent, and disabled litigants compelled to proceed *pro se* in civil court proceedings. (App. C) (App. D) (App. E)

OPINIONS BELOW

2. The opinion under review is the order of the Supreme Court of Delaware, C.A. No. 429,2024, entered August 27, 2025, denying Petitioner's interlocutory appeal from the Court of Chancery, No. 2021-0011-BWD. (App. A) A petition for rehearing was denied in September 8, 2025. (App. B)

3. The interlocutory appeal sought review of the Court of Chancery's refusal to consider the 2025 forensic evaluations in connection with the Final Report entered October 4, 2022, and adopted as a final order on October 21, 2022. (App. C) (App. D) The Final Report denied Petitioner's claim for a life estate and constructive trust in the property at 28289 Broadkill Road, Milton, Delaware, based on proceedings in which Petitioner was compelled to proceed *pro se* without counsel, a guardian *ad litem*, or any accommodation, in violation of Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3). The Court made him proceed *pro se*. Ken asked for a continuance to obtain legal counsel but the request was denied by the court, he was given no choice.

4. The Supreme Court of Delaware denied the interlocutory appeal without addressing the question whether the 2022 judgment is void where the Court's own mandatory rule required the appointment of a guardian *ad litem* and the Court failed to do so,

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and whether the Due Process Clause is violated where a litigant is compelled to proceed pro se and subsequent forensic evidence establishes that the litigant lacked the cognitive capacity to participate. (App. C) (App. D)

JURISDICTION

5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. This petition seeks review of the order entered by the Supreme Court of Delaware on August 27, 2025, in C.A. No. 429,2024, denying Petitioner's interlocutory appeal from the Court of Chancery, No. 2021-0011-BWD. (App. A) A timely petition for rehearing was denied on September 8 2025. (App. B) This petition is timely filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.1.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

6. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process Clause).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil action for deprivation of rights under color of state law).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA Title II — prohibition on discrimination by public entities, including state courts).
9. Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(1) (defining "person without capacity" to include a "person with a disability"); Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3) ("The Court must appoint a guardian *ad litem* to represent a person without capacity who is unrepresented"); Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(6) (options where no guardian is identified).
10. 12 Del. C. § 3901(a) (Court of Chancery "shall have the power to appoint guardians for the person or property, or both, of any person with a disability"); § 3901(d)(1) (interim guardian where "imminent serious physical harm or substantial economic loss or expense").

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11. 10 Del. C. § 146 (tolling of limitations: time to appeal "shall begin to run at the ceasing of such disability and not at the time of signing the judgment or decree").

12. 10 Del. C. § 8803(c) (IFP denial where "the record subsequently reveals the action is factually frivolous, malicious or the action is legally frivolous").

13. 45 C.F.R. § 1611 (federal poverty guidelines).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. The Property and the 2022 Judgment

14. Petitioner is a 89-year-old man who purchased real property at 28289 Broadkill Road, Milton, Delaware, in November 1989. The original typed deed, dated November 22, 1989, named "Kenneth R. Talley and Janice A. Talley" as grantees for a consideration of \$1.00 (App. F). Petitioner paid the real estate contract in full — \$47,250.00 — by February 1993, as documented by the executed contract bearing Respondents' signatures and initials (App. G). Respondent Judith C. Horn additionally retained approximately \$330,586.00 in wages for work Petitioner performed from 1985 to 2017 as further payment for the property and engaged in acts of elder abuse against the elderly petitioner and his wife, Janice Talley, now deceased. (App. I)

15. Respondent Judith C. Horn applied correction fluid to Lines 9–10 of paragraph two of the original typed deed to remove the names "Kenneth R. Talley and Janice A. Talley," photocopied the altered document, and recorded the photocopy in the Sussex County Recorder of Deeds on October 6, 2014 — twenty-four years after execution — Book 1685, Page 327 (App. H). The altered photocopy was submitted into evidence at trial in the Court of Chancery and remains in the record of that matter. The original

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typed deed is in the possession of the Respondents and is available for inspection as per Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 (Requirement of Original).

16. At trial in the Court of Chancery in May 2022, Petitioner was compelled to proceed *pro se*. Petitioner's sixth-grade education was in the court's record. Respondent's counsel affirmatively opposed Petitioner's request for time to obtain counsel and opposed the participation of Petitioner's daughter as a helper. The Court denied the request for Kenneth to receive help during the two-day trial, a denial of ADA Title II. Petitioner's daughter, Kristina, who was present in the courtroom, was not permitted to assist him in any capacity. No alternative accommodation was offered. No guardian *ad litem* was appointed. No attorney was appointed. No accommodation was provided. The Court failed to consider Kenneth's evidence when it entered a final report on October 4, 2022, denying Petitioner's claim for a life estate and constructive trust, with a final order on October 21, 2022.

II. The Mandatory Rule the Court Failed to Apply

17. Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(1) defines a "person without capacity" to include a "person with a disability." Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3) states: "The Court *must* appoint a guardian *ad litem* to represent a person without capacity who is unrepresented." The word "must" is mandatory, not permissive.

18. At the time of trial, the Court had on-record notice of Petitioner's sixth-grade education. The Court of Chancery did not appoint a guardian, in violation of its own rule. It did not appoint an attorney. It did not dismiss the action. It proceeded under Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(6)(B) — "permit the person without capacity to proceed without a



guardian *ad litem*" — without any evidentiary finding that Petitioner had capacity, this constitutes a denial of the Due Process Clause under the 14th Amendment .

19. Under 12 Del. C. § 3901(a), the Court of Chancery "shall have the power to appoint guardians for the person or property, or both, of any person with a disability." Under § 3901(d)(1), where a person with a disability "is in danger of incurring imminent serious physical harm or substantial economic loss or expense," the Court "may without notice and hearing appoint an interim guardian." The property at issue was Petitioner's sole residence. The economic loss was total. The statutory authority existed. The mandatory rule existed. Neither was invoked.

III. The Forensic Evidence

20. In January 2025, a forensic psychological evaluation by Laura Cooney-Koss, Psy.D., was completed. The evaluation found that Petitioner's "reading, spelling, and writing skills were found to be far lower than his intellectual abilities and were only at the first to second-grade level" (App. D, p. 7, line 28). The evaluation further concluded that Petitioner "was not competent to represent himself during his past legal proceedings" (App. D, p. 16, line 21). A corroborating neuropsychological evaluation by Robert L. Mapou, Ph.D., was the foundation for the forensic medical report (App. C). Both medical evaluations were filed in the related federal docket, District Court of Delaware, No. 23-982.

21. Judicial Officer Bonnie W. David stated on the record on April 24, 2024, that she believed Petitioner could read and write and represent himself. This finding was made without the benefit of the forensic evaluations, which were not completed until

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January 2025. The Court of Chancery declined to consider the forensic evaluations in connection with the 2022 judgment on the ground that they postdated the trial.

IV. The Interlocutory Appeal

22. Petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court of Delaware, C.A. No. 429,2024, seeking review of the Court of Chancery's refusal to consider the forensic evidence. (App. A) The Supreme Court of Delaware denied the appeal on August 27, 2025 (App. B). A petition for rehearing was denied in September 2025.

V. The Federal Consequence

23. The 2022 Chancery judgment is the factual basis upon which federal courts declined to address Petitioner's claims for denial of due process. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed Petitioner's § 1983 action (District Court of Delaware, C.A. No. 23-324) for lack of jurisdiction, relying on the Chancery's determination of title. The Third Circuit affirmed see United States Court of Appeals, No. 24-1734; United States Court of Appeals, No. 24-1917). This Court denied certiorari in C.A. No. 24-6912 on June 2, 2025. Each denial in the federal chain rests on the premise that the 2022 Chancery judgment is a valid, final determination of title. *The 2022 judgment is void, thus, each denial in the state and federal chain is built on a nullity.*

VI. The 2026 Developments

24. On July 20, 2026, the Court of Chancery, No. 2021-0011-BWD was reopened. The Court stated that "court staff made an error" in the process of reopening. Petitioner filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment under Del. Ct. Ch. R. 60(b)(2) and Del. Ct. Ch.

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R. (b)(6) on August 4, 2026, seeking vacatur of the 2022 judgment based on the newly discovered forensic evidence. A Motion for Recusal of Judicial Officer Bonnie W. David was filed the same day. A Motion for Substitution of Kristina K. Talley as Personal Representative of the Estate of Janice A. Talley (deceased December 10, 2024) was filed on August 5, 2026.

25. On August 4, 2026, the Court of Chancery denied Kenneth's application to proceed *in forma pauperis* under 10 Del. C. § 8803(c), finding that he "engaged in a pattern of malicious litigation conduct." The Magistrate's report simultaneously found that Petitioner *meets the poverty guidelines* (45 C.F.R. § 1611). The "malicious conduct" finding is specifically from Judicial Officer Bonnie W. David. This bias against Kenneth was continually demonstrated even after the forensic and neurological expert medical evaluations were completed and provided to the Court of Chancery. A Notice of Exceptions was filed on August 14, 2026. An Opening Brief in Support of Exceptions was filed on September 8, 2026.

26. On September 1, 2026, Respondents filed a Motion to Cancel *Lis Pendens* and Impose Sanctions, seeking to cancel a Federal *Lis Pendens* recorded on September 30, 2024, in connection with District of Delaware, No. 23-982, and to impose civil contempt, sanctions, and a leave-of-court requirement under 10 Del. C. § 8803(e). The Federal *Lis Pendens* predates the order it allegedly violated by two days. Respondents' Motion fails to address the forensic and neurological medical reports filed in the federal docket in August 2026, six weeks before the Motion was filed.

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VII. The Ongoing Deprivation

27. Petitioner was removed from the 28289 Broadkill Road, Milton, Delaware, property by law enforcement on October 3, 2023. A trial on ejectment was denied in the Delaware Superior Court in 2024, see Delaware Superior Court, No. S22C-12-013-MHC (2024), a violation of Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 81, Ejectment. Actual proof of this error in the application of law and procedure is the fact that a trial on ejectment is scheduled in a related case, see Delaware Superior Court No. S25C-02-029-RHR, Trial by Jury May 2027. The 2022 judgment, cannot be allowed to stand, as it would set a precedent that is based on proceedings in which the petitioner was scientifically proven to have been incapable of participating. As of July 2026, Respondents are attempting to use the Court of Chancery to cancel the Federal *lis pendens* and sell the property prior to adjudication of in federal court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The Court of Chancery violated its own mandatory rule by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem.

28. Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3) is unambiguous: "The Court *must* appoint a guardian *ad litem* to represent a person without capacity who is unrepresented." Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(1) defines "person without capacity" to include a "person with a disability." The 2025 forensic evaluations establish that Petitioner is a person with a disability within the meaning of the Rule. At the time of trial, the Court had on-record notice of Petitioner's sixth-grade education. It did not appoint a guardian. It did not appoint an attorney. It did not dismiss the action. It chose Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(6)(B), "permit the person without capacity to proceed without a guardian *ad litem*", without any

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evidentiary finding that Petitioner had capacity.

29. This is not a discretionary failure. Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3) uses the word "must."

The Court's own rules created a mandatory obligation that it failed to perform. A judgment entered in violation of a mandatory procedural rule that exists to protect a party's fundamental right to be heard is not a valid exercise of the Court's equitable jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery is a court of equity. Equity does not permit a party to be stripped of property in a proceeding where the Court's own rules required a guardian to be appointed and the state refused despite requests from the petitioner, see Delaware Superior Court, No. S24C-10-022-CLS (formerly No. S24C-10-022-CAK).

30. Under 12 Del. C. § 3901(a), the Court of Chancery "shall have the power to appoint guardians for the person or property, or both, of any person with a disability." Under § 3901(d)(1), where a person with a disability "is in danger of incurring imminent serious physical harm or substantial economic loss or expense," the Court "may without notice and hearing appoint an interim guardian." The property at issue was Petitioner's sole residence. The economic loss was total. The statutory authority existed. The mandatory rule existed. Neither was invoked.

31. The consequence of this failure is that the 2022 judgment is void. A court that proceeds against a party who, under its own rules, "must" be represented by a guardian *ad litem*, and who in fact lacked the capacity to participate, has no jurisdiction over that party's person or property. A judgment entered without jurisdiction is void ab initio. See *Co. v. Cesarini*, 129 A.2d 768, 769 (Del. Super. 1957) ("A voidable judgment is, of course, deemed valid until set aside; one which is void

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cannot be made good"). A void judgment is not subject to res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the statute of limitations. *See* 10 Del. C. § 146 (time to appeal "shall begin to run at the ceasing of such disability and not at the time of signing the judgment or decree").

II. The state court's refusal to consider the forensic evidence created an irreconcilable conflict between the factual record and the judgment.

32. The 2022 judgment rested on the implicit factual finding that Petitioner was capable of representing himself. Vice Chancellor David's April 24, 2024 statement — that she believed Petitioner "could read and write" — was a personal, untested belief that was directly contradicted by the 2025 forensic evaluations. The state court's refusal to consider the evaluations on the ground that they postdated the trial creates a catch-22: the evidence could not have been obtained before the trial because the evaluation was not performed until after the judgment, and the judgment cannot be challenged because the evidence postdates the judgment.

33. This is precisely the type of "extraordinary circumstances" that Del. Ct. Ch. R. 60(b)(6) and the Due Process Clause are designed to address. The Delaware Supreme Court's denial of the interlocutory appeal left Petitioner without a state-court forum to resolve this conflict. A Motion for Relief from Judgment is pending in the Court of Chancery, but the Court that entered the 2022 judgment is the same Court asked to vacate it, and the judicial officer who entered the judgement has been asked to recuse. This Court's review would provide the neutral forum that the state process has not provided.



III. The "malicious litigant" finding is contradicted by the record.

34. The IFP denial rests on 10 Del. C. § 8803(c), which requires that "the record subsequently reveals the action is factually frivolous, malicious, or the action is legally frivolous and that even a *pro se* litigant, acting with due diligence, should have found well settled law disposing of issue(s) raised." The Magistrate's report simultaneously found that Petitioner meets the poverty guidelines (45 C.F.R. § 1611). The financial prong of the IFP test is satisfied. The only basis for denial is the "malicious" characterization.

35. The "malicious" finding was based on the April 24, 2024 oral statement, where the judicial officer gave her personal, untested belief. It was not a finding supported by evidence. The 2025 forensic evaluations, completed by a licensed psychologist and corroborated by a neuropsychologist, directly contradict Judicial Officer Bonnie W. David's judgements in the Court of Chancery. The Magistrate's August 2026 report relied on the April 2024 statement without considering the forensic and neurological medical reports.

36. A person who reads and writes at a first-to-second-grade level, who was compelled to proceed without counsel or a guardian in violation of the Court's own mandatory rule, and who was told by the Court that he must represent himself, is not "maliciously" litigating. The volume of filings is the predictable result of an incapacitated person being forced to litigate without counsel against a represented opponent. The "malicious" label inverts the power dynamic: the party with counsel and a \$1.2 million net worth is not "malicious." The 89-year-old man with a first-to-second-grade reading level who cannot stop filing because he cannot read the orders telling

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him to stop is "malicious." This is not a finding supported by the record. It is a finding contradicted by the record.

IV. The question presented is of exceptional importance and is not resolved by existing precedent.

37. This Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires "alternative procedural safeguards" when an indigent litigant is not provided counsel in a civil proceeding that may result in the deprivation of a fundamental interest. *Turner v. Rogers*, 564 U.S. 431, 445 (2011). In *Turner*, the interest at stake was physical liberty. Here, the interest is property, specifically, the right to retain ownership of real property that Petitioner paid for in full.

38. No court has addressed the specific question whether a state court of equity judgment is void where the court's own mandatory rule required the appointment of a guardian *ad litem*, the court failed to do so, and subsequent forensic and neurological medical reports established that the litigant lacked the cognitive capacity to participate. The Delaware Supreme Court declined to address this question in C.A. No. 429,2024. The question is therefore presented for the first time to this Court.

39. The question has broad implications. State courts routinely compel indigent litigants to proceed *pro se* in civil proceedings. Where, as here, the litigant is elderly, illiterate, and without a guardian, and the court's own rules mandate the appointment of a guardian, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of property is not theoretical, it is the actual result.

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V. The property interest is documented and the deprivation is ongoing.

40. Petitioner's ownership interest is documented by the original 1989 deed (naming both Petitioner and his late wife as grantees), (App. F) the 1993 contract showing full payment of \$47,250.00, (App. G) and receipts for \$330,586.00 in work retained by Respondent as payment. Appendix I Notarized Affidavits of Elder Abuse, Work, and Record Keeper (App. I) The document in the public record is an altered photocopy with correction fluid applied to remove Petitioner's name. The property is the subject of active litigation, a pending *lis pendens*, and a demand for jury trial in the Federal District Court and Delaware Superior Court. Kenneth demands that the issues in this matter be heard by a jury. When issues of fact to be tried by a jury arise, the Court of Chancery may order such facts to trial by issues at the Bar of the Delaware Superior Court (10 Del. C., 369)

VI. The state and federal chain of denials relied on the 2022 judgment as valid.

41. The District Court, the Third Circuit, and this Court's prior denial of certiorari in C.A. No. 24-6912 each relied on the 2022 Chancery judgment as a valid, final determination of title. Where the 2022 judgment is void, as the forensic evidence and the violation of the Court's own mandatory rule establish, each denial in the state and federal chain d based on a decision that is void. The federal courts did not independently adjudicate the title question. They accepted the Chancery's determination and dismissed Petitioner's § 1983 claims on that basis. This Court's review would resolve not only the state-court question but the consequence of that question in the federal courts.

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RELATED CASES

42. The foregoing cases demonstrate a single, continuous legal controversy spanning six years, four states' worth of courts, and over sixty-one related actions. The common thread is the 2022 judgment in Court of Chancery, No. 2021-0011-BWD, which every subsequent state and federal proceeding has treated as a valid, final determination of title. The forensic and neurological medical reports ((App. D) (App. C)) establishing that Petitioner lacked the cognitive capacity to participate in the 2022 proceedings, and the Court of Chancery's own mandatory rule requiring the appointment of a guardian *ad litem* (Del. Ct. Ch. R. 17(b)(3)) are the two facts that, taken together, render the 2022 judgment void. Every denial in every court above rests on the premise that the 2022 judgment is valid. If it is void, the premise fails.

43. The IFP denials in the Court of Chancery (R. 80; R. 118; R. 128; and the August 4, 2026 Magistrate's report) are inconsistent with the IFP grants by the Supreme Court of Delaware, No. 175,2024; Supreme Court of Delaware, No. 429,2024, the Third Circuit, Nos. 24-1917, 24-2358, 26-1847, the District of Delaware, No. 25-732. The Magistrate's report simultaneously found that Petitioner meets the poverty guidelines (45 C.F.R. § 1611) and that he engaged in a "pattern of malicious litigation conduct." The 2025 forensic evaluations contradict the "malicious" finding. The Court of Chancery's own admission of "staff error" in reopening the case, and its failure to process Petitioner's filings for one week after the reopening, undermine the "clear notice" prerequisite for any sanctions or contempt finding.

44. This petition is the vehicle by which this Court can resolve the threshold question — whether the 2022 judgment is void — and thereby break the cycle of denials that

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result in continual eviction and ejectment that has continued for six years. Petitioners address the Rule 29.6 requirement to identify related cases. See Appendix J Index Of All 63 Legal Cases (App. J).

CONCLUSION

45. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, reverse the order of the Supreme Court of Delaware, and remand with instructions to vacate the 2022 judgment and appoint a guardian *ad litem* to represent Petitioner's interests. Kenneth demands that the issues in this matter be heard by a jury in the County of New Castle, Delaware.

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Respectfully submitted,

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