

APPENDIX

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Case No. 25-5634

FILED
Jun 23, 2026
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

OPINION

Appendix A

downward variance, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. Because we disagree with Brown, we **AFFIRM** his sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Inmates at Riverbend State Prison in Georgia ran a drug ring that moved methamphetamine between Georgia and Tennessee. The inmates would coordinate with associates outside of prison to orchestrate drug transactions. One of those associates was Defendant Ulrick Brown. Brown connected with the ring leaders while in jail for a separate offense, and once he was released, he began facilitating methamphetamine deals on their behalf.

One of those transactions took place on the day Brown was released from custody, May 16, 2022. Brown met up with Amanda Jacks—his romantic partner who was also involved in the drug ring—to travel to Georgia to obtain two kilograms of methamphetamine and an assortment of pills. Brown and Jacks then drove back to Tennessee to deliver the drugs to an accomplice who worked with the drug ring. For their trouble, they were compensated with ounces of methamphetamine and cash.

Apart from this trip to personally obtain methamphetamine, Brown also helped coordinate other transactions as a mid-level distributor. Brown arranged some methamphetamine deliveries for the drug ring, and he also let coconspirators use his car for other drug transportation. Brown knew that these accomplices were using his vehicle to transport methamphetamine, and he knew it was in furtherance of the drug ring's operations.

On June 22, 2022, Brown was arrested while en route to a methamphetamine transaction that was initiated by a confidential informant. Officers found a small amount of marijuana in Brown's car, and after he was transported to jail, officers found a small amount of a crystal substance in the backseat of the patrol vehicle, where Brown had been sitting.

After many of his coconspirators (including Jacks) started cooperating with law enforcement officers, Brown decided to do the same. He consented to an interview with investigators, waived his *Miranda* rights, and admitted to his involvement in the drug ring. He explained that he was part of a conspiracy to move drugs throughout Georgia and Tennessee, and he confirmed that he personally traveled with Jacks to pick up two kilograms of methamphetamine. He also admitted to letting others use his car for methamphetamine transactions, and he discussed some of his coconspirators' other activities that furthered the drug ring's operations.

B. Procedural History

Brown was charged with Conspiracy to Distribute 50 Grams or More of Methamphetamine (Actual) and 500 Grams or More of a Methamphetamine Mixture. He pled guilty to the lesser included offense of Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine (Actual). The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report to make an initial calculation of Brown's Sentencing Guidelines range. Brown's recommended range of incarceration would depend, in part, on the quantity and quality of drugs he conspired to distribute. *See* U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c).¹ The report attributed between 1.5 kilograms and 4.5 kilograms of "actual" methamphetamine to Brown. This attribution, which produced a Base Offense Level that the Probation Office described as a "conservative estimate," accounted for the two kilograms of methamphetamine that Brown transported on his trip to Georgia with Jacks. Addendum to PSR, R.524 at PageID 3470.

At his sentencing hearing, the district court entertained objections to the presentence investigation report, and Brown objected to the drug calculation. Specifically, Brown objected to the presumed purity of the methamphetamine. Brown argued that because law enforcement officers were unable to test the methamphetamine that he obtained on his trip to Georgia with

¹ References to the Sentencing Guidelines refer to the 2024 version, which was in effect when Brown was sentenced.

Jacks, the district court should give him “the benefit of the doubt,” and the drugs should be considered a “mixture instead of actual” methamphetamine. First Sentencing Hr’g Tr., R.559 at PageID 3785.

In response, the Government argued that the attribution was correct. The Government noted that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Brown distributed over 1.5 kilograms of “actual” methamphetamine, pointing to (1) statements from coconspirators that discussed the high potency of the methamphetamine from the drug ring’s other transactions, and (2) the lab test results of four other methamphetamine samples that were confiscated from the drug ring’s activity showing methamphetamine with 93% purity, 91% purity, 90% purity, and 94% purity, respectively. And, as the Government noted, the coconspirators caught with methamphetamine that had 91% purity and 90% purity stated that they received their drugs from Brown and Jacks.

The district court ruled in favor of the Government and found that the drug calculation was accurate. Citing the “specific evidence in the presentence report that indicates the quantity of the drugs and also the quality of the drugs that were used” in the conspiracy, and also noting a general observation that the Tennessee methamphetamine market had been saturated with high potency drugs, the district court determined that there was sufficient evidence tying Brown to more than 1.5 kilograms of “actual” methamphetamine. First Sentencing Hr’g Tr., R.559 at PageID 3785-89.

With the Guidelines range established at 235-240 months (capped at the 20-year statutory maximum sentence), Brown started to second-guess his decision to plead guilty. After a colloquy in which he downplayed his role in the conspiracy, Brown decided to withdraw his guilty plea and seek a new lawyer. The district court continued the sentencing hearing to let Brown think through his options with the advice of counsel.

When Brown returned for his second sentencing hearing, he was represented by new counsel and ready to maintain his original guilty plea. After the district court explained that it would stick to its prior rulings about the drug calculation and the Sentencing Guidelines, Brown moved for a downward variance. Brown cited four reasons to support his motion: (1) a within-

Guidelines sentence would create a disparity compared to his codefendants, (2) a within-Guidelines sentence would create a disparity compared to national averages, (3) he only participated in the conspiracy for a short amount of time, and (4) he eventually made a cooperative statement to assist law enforcement officers in their investigation of the drug ring. The Government briefly responded to Brown's arguments, acknowledging that he gave a cooperative statement to law enforcement officers.

Consulting the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court denied Brown's motion, explaining that a within-Guidelines range was appropriate. The district court put considerable weight on Brown's extensive criminal history, the serious nature of the crime, and the harm Brown imposed on the community. The district court also emphasized deterrence: "people standing in Mr. Brown's shoes who may want to make some quick money by selling drugs should be deterred from engaging in that conduct because of what happens to Mr. Brown." Second Sentencing Hr'g Tr., R.602 at PageID 4293.

The district court announced Brown's 240-month sentence and asked each party if they had "any objection to the sentence the Court just announced." *Id.* at PageID 4299, 4303. Brown said no.

Brown now appeals his sentence, raising three issues. First, he challenges the district court's finding that the drugs he conspired to distribute contained at least 1.5 kilograms of "actual" methamphetamine, noting that the drugs he personally obtained in Georgia were never tested. Second, he argues that the district court did not adequately explain its decision to deny his motion for a downward variance. Third, he suggests that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We take each challenge in turn.

II. DRUG PURITY FINDING

Brown first challenges the district court's finding related to drug purity. Brown does not dispute that he is responsible for the two kilograms of methamphetamine that he admitted to

obtaining in Georgia on behalf of the drug ring; he merely argues that the district court did not have sufficient evidence to determine that he was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of “actual” meth.

The Sentencing Guidelines categorize methamphetamine by its quantity and quality. “Methamphetamine (actual)” refers to the “weight” of meth contained in a mixture. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) cmt. (B). It is calculated by multiplying the purity of the drug detected by the weight of the overall mixture. *Id.* For example, 10 grams of a mixture that contains methamphetamine at 50% purity equates to 5 grams of methamphetamine (actual). *Id.* “In the case of a mixture” of methamphetamine, courts are directed to use either the entire weight of the mixture or the calculation of methamphetamine (actual), whichever results in a greater offense level. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) cmt. (B). Here, Brown’s Guidelines range turns on whether he distributed between 1.5 kilograms and 4.5 kilograms of methamphetamine (actual).

A district court’s conclusions about drug quantity and purity are factual findings subject to clear-error review. *United States v. Reed*, 72 F.4th 174, 190 (6th Cir. 2023). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous only where, after considering all the evidence, the court is ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Sands*, 4 F.4th 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2021)).

The Government “must prove the weight of the drugs” attributable to Brown “by a preponderance of the evidence.” *United States v. Simpson*, 138 F.4th 438, 446 (6th Cir. 2025). This includes drugs for which Brown “was ‘directly involved’ in trafficking,” but “it can also include other narcotics, such as those that were ‘reasonably foreseeable’ to him to be distributed as part of the conspiracy.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Gardner*, 32 F.4th 504, 524 (6th Cir. 2022)). A district court can “sentence a defendant for conspiracy-wide drug quantities so long as it “make[s] ‘particularized findings as to why it is doing so.’” *Reed*, 72 F.4th at 191 (quoting *United States v. McReynolds*, 964 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2020)).

Importantly, the district court is not left without recourse if the specific drugs attributable to the defendant were unavailable for lab testing. “[T]he district court can make a reasonable estimate” on drug quantity or quality “based on physical evidence or testimony” so long as “the evidence underlying the district court’s estimate . . . ha[s] a minimal level of reliability.” *United States v. Hawkins*, 165 F.4th 442, 451 (6th Cir. 2026) (quoting *United States v. Histed*, 93 F.4th 948, 955 (6th Cir. 2024); *United States v. Sandridge*, 385 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also *United States v. Price*, 761 F. App’x 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2019). For example, this Court has held that a district court can extrapolate the purity of methamphetamine by referencing lab test samples of different methamphetamine that came from the same supplier. *United States v. Ibarra*, No. 24-5174, 2025 WL 1542319, at *10 (6th Cir. May 30, 2025); see also *United States v. Jackson*, 470 F.3d 299, 310-11 (6th Cir. 2006) (endorsing similar extrapolation of cocaine purity).

Here, the Government was unable to test the precise drugs that Brown obtained on his trip to Georgia. So the district court was free to extrapolate from reliable evidence. And that’s precisely what the district court did. The district court noted specific, reliable evidence in the record, like samples of methamphetamine confiscated from Brown’s coconspirators. The lab test results from those samples established purity ranging from 90%-94% methamphetamine. And, for two of those samples, the coconspirators whose drugs were tested stated that they got their supply from Brown and Jacks.² With evidence directly tying Brown to at least 2 kilograms of methamphetamine that was, at minimum, 90% pure, the district court did not err (let alone clearly err) by extrapolating that Brown was responsible for distributing at least 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine (actual). See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) cmt. (B).

² Brown challenged the accuracy of the coconspirators’ statements in the presentence investigation report that connected him to the high potency methamphetamine; he claimed that his coconspirators received their methamphetamine solely from Jacks. But the district court adopted the factual account as it was articulated in the report. And Brown did not challenge that finding on appeal. Still, even taking Brown’s account at face value, because Brown made clear that Jacks was also *his* source of methamphetamine, tying Jacks to methamphetamine with over 90% purity does not help his attempt to avoid a connection to high-purity meth. See *Ibarra*, 2025 WL 1542319, at *10.

Brown’s challenge ignores much of the district court’s rationale. He argues that the district court improperly extrapolated the drug purity and should not have relied on prosecutors’ general observations about the high-purity methamphetamine that has flooded the Tennessee market. Notably, had the district court relied solely on these general observations about the Tennessee drug market, and nothing more, it may have clearly erred. *See Reed*, 72 F.4th at 190-93. But here, the district court relied on “specific evidence in the presentence report that indicates the quantity of the drugs and also the quality of the drugs that were used” in Brown’s conspiracy. First Sentencing Hr’g Tr., R.559 at PageID 3788. And this evidence—lab tests from methamphetamine samples tied to Brown, Brown’s supplier, and Brown’s coconspirators—was reliable enough to establish the purity of the drugs Brown transported from Georgia to Tennessee.

III. DENIAL OF DOWNWARD VARIANCE MOTION

Next, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation in denying his motion for a downward variance. In particular, Brown argues that the district court erred by not specifically referencing one of his several proposed reasons that purportedly justified a downward variance: his cooperation with law enforcement.

When a defendant raises a procedural reasonableness challenge—like Brown’s “inadequate-explanation argument”—we typically review it for an abuse of discretion. *United States v. Judge*, 649 F.3d 453, 457-58 (6th Cir. 2011). However, “where a defendant asserts a procedural error on appeal that was not raised below when prompted by the district court in accordance with *United States v. Bostic*, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004), our review is limited to determining whether the sentencing court committed plain error.” *Id.* at 457.

Brown never objected to the district court’s explanation. After denying the motion for a downward variance, the district court asked Brown’s counsel if he had anything further to say on Brown’s behalf. Counsel made no objections. Then Brown spoke, reading a letter he wrote the district court. No objections there. And, after announcing Brown’s sentence, the district court

asked each party if there were any additional objections. Brown and his counsel said no. Because Brown did not object to this perceived procedural error, plain-error review applies. *Id.* at 457-58; *see also United States v. Messersmith*, 164 F.4th 523, 528 (6th Cir. 2026).

To succeed on plain-error review, Brown “must point to an ‘(1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected [his] substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” *United States v. Haile*, 157 F.4th 820, 830 (6th Cir. 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting *United States v. Vonner*, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). “‘Only in exceptional circumstances,’ when an error ‘is so plain that the trial judge was derelict in countenancing it’ will we find plain error.” *Id.* (quoting *Vonner*, 516 F.3d at 386).

Brown offered several reasons that, in his mind, justified a downward variance. And, as noted above, the district court failed to explicitly reference only one of them—Brown’s cooperation with law enforcement—in its explanation for denying Brown’s motion.

Brown’s four proffered justifications for the downward variance fit neatly into two main arguments. The first: a within-Guidelines sentence would create disparities. The second: his specific conduct (i.e., only participating in the conspiracy for a short amount of time and eventually making a cooperative statement to assist law enforcement officers) mitigated the harm he caused to society.

The district court covered all of that ground as it denied Brown’s motion. The district court recognized “all of the statistics that ha[d] been furnished to the Court” regarding disparities, but it clarified that “every individual case is different.” Second Sentencing Hr’g Tr., R.602 at PageID 4294. And due to Brown’s specific criminal history, the district court determined a downward variance would not advance the purposes of sentencing. The district court also rejected Brown’s attempts to downplay the harm he caused to society. Even though Brown’s participation in the conspiracy was short-lived in terms of duration, the district court measured the harm Brown caused by looking to the amount of drugs he trafficked throughout his community. The district court did not explicitly announce that Brown’s cooperation with law enforcement failed to move the needle.

But this omission does not amount to plain error. *See Judge*, 649 F.3d at 458-59. Our “inquiry is ‘whether the record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument, considered the supporting evidence, was fully aware of the defendant’s circumstances, and took them into account in sentencing him.’” *Id.* at 458 (brackets omitted) (quoting *Vonner*, 516 F.3d at 387). And even though “[t]he district court is required to *consider* each argument,” it need not “carve out and separately analyze each supporting statement.” *Id.* at 459 (emphasis added).

Importantly, the district court did explain that Brown’s attempts to minimize his role in the conspiracy were unpersuasive. And, by emphasizing the need to impose a term of imprisonment that (1) promotes respect for the law, and (2) deters others from resorting to similar crimes, the district court made clear that Brown’s purportedly minimal role in the conspiracy, and his post-crime cooperation, did not justify a downward variance. Brown’s corroborative statements to law enforcement officers did not undo the harm he caused. In reviewing the district court’s explanation, it is clear that “the district court considered the core thrust of all of the arguments that [Brown] actually presented,” so the “explanation of its sentence was adequate.” *See id.* at 460.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS

Finally, Brown suggests that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. “For a sentence to be substantively reasonable, it must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).” *United States v. Gates*, 48 F.4th 463, 476-77 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting *United States v. Curry*, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008)). A defendant challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence is “claim[ing] that [the] sentence is too long.” *United States v. Rayyan*, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). “It’s a complaint that the court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing the individual.” *Id.* Because sentencing “is a matter of reasoned discretion, not math,” we apply a “highly deferential” standard of review. *Id.* “We may reverse only if we find that the court abused its significant discretion.”

United States v. Thomas, 933 F.3d 605, 613 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing *United States v. Lanning*, 633 F.3d 469, 473-76 (6th Cir. 2011)). “Indeed, we presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable.” *United States v. Householder*, 137 F.4th 454, 485 (6th Cir. 2025) (per curiam).

The entirety of Brown’s substantive reasonableness argument is as follows:

[T]he district court was substantively unreasonable in placing undue weight on assumptions regarding purity, which produced an unreasonable sentencing range. . . . However, even if the Court finds that the district court’s process was procedurally reasonable, the length of Mr. Brown’s sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court’s failure to give any credit or variance at all due to his statements that were timely, corroborated, risk-bearing, and helpful, makes his sentence “greater than necessary” to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in § 3553(a).

Appellant Br. 19, 24, D.13.

Brown attempts to reframe his procedural reasonableness challenges as substantive reasonableness challenges; his efforts are unavailing. To start, “[a] party may not present a skeletal argument, leaving the court to put flesh on its bones.” *McGrew v. Duncan*, 937 F.3d 664, 669 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Ruffin v. Cuyahoga County*, 708 F. App’x 276, 278 (6th Cir. 2018)). But even excusing the conclusory nature of Brown’s brief argument, it does not even allude to which factors received disproportionate attention from the district court. Brown has not overcome the presumption of reasonableness for his 240-month within-Guidelines sentence.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we **AFFIRM** Brown’s sentence.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WINCHESTER DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

v.

Case Number: **4:22-CR-00035-CLC-MJD(8)**

ULRICK UNCEL BROWN
AKA BLACK, ULRICK UNCEL MILLER
USM#34796-510

Robert R Kurtz
Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

- ☒ pleaded guilty to count(s): One of the Indictment (Lesser Included Offense)
☐ pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which was accepted by the court.
☐ was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not guilty.

ACCORDINGLY, the court has adjudicated that the defendant is guilty of the following offense(s):

Title & Section and Nature of Offense	Date Violation Concluded	Count
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine (Actual)	06/24/2022	1

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553.

- ☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s).
☐ All remaining count(s) as to this defendant are dismissed upon motion of the United States.

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant shall notify the court and the United States attorney of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances.

June 25, 2025

Date of Imposition of Judgment

/s/

Signature of Judicial Officer

Curtis L. Collier, United States District Judge

Name & Title of Judicial Officer

June 27, 2025

Date

DEFENDANT: ULRICK UNCEL BROWN
CASE NUMBER: 4:22-CR-00035-CLC-MJD(8)

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IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

240 months. This sentence shall run concurrently with any sentences imposed in the Coffee County (Tennessee) Circuit Court, Docket Numbers 2022-CR-48,590M and 2022-CR-48,591M (Count Three).

- ☒ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: The Court recommends that the defendant receive 500 hours of substance abuse treatment from the Bureau of Prisons' Institution Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program. The Court also recommends that the defendant obtain his GED and participate in job or vocational training while incarcerated. The Court further recommends that the defendant be placed at FCI Manchester, KY.
- ☒ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
- ☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:
- ☐ at ☐ a.m. ☐ p.m. on
- ☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.
- ☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
- ☐ before 2 p.m. on .
- ☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.
- ☐ as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on
to ,
at ,
with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: ULRICK UNCEL BROWN
CASE NUMBER: 4:22-CR-00035-CLC-MJD(8)

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SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of **three (3) years**.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.
2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
 - ☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk of future substance abuse. *(check if applicable)*
4. ☐ You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentencing of restitution. *(check if applicable)*
5. ☒ You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. *(check if applicable)*
6. ☒ You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. *(check if applicable)*
7. ☐ You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. *(check if applicable)*

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached page.

DEFENDANT: ULRICK UNCEL BROWN
CASE NUMBER: 4:22-CR-00035-CLC-MJD(8)

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STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.
5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.
13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the mandatory, standard, and any special conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see *Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions*, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature _____

Date _____

DEFENDANT: ULRICK UNCEL BROWN
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SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

- 1) The defendant must comply with the special conditions for sex offenders as adopted by this Court in Standing Order 15-06, specifically conditions one through five, and eight through ten.
- 2) The defendant must participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for drug and/or alcohol abuse, as directed by the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer.
- 3) The defendant must participate in a program of mental health treatment, as directed by the probation officer, until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer.
- 4) The defendant must waive all rights to confidentiality regarding mental health and substance abuse treatment in order to allow release of information to the supervising United States Probation Officer and to authorize open communication between the probation officer and the treatment providers.
- 5) The defendant must submit his property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, computers or office, to a search conducted by a United States Probation Officer or designee. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. The defendant must warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition. An officer may conduct a search pursuant to this condition only when a reasonable suspicion exists that the defendant has violated a condition of his supervision, and the areas to be searched contain evidence of this violation. Any search must be conducted at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner.

DEFENDANT: ULRICK UNCEL BROWN
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CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

	Assessment	Restitution	Fine	AVAA Assessment*	JVTA Assessment **
TOTALS	\$100.00	\$.00	\$.00	\$.00	\$.00

- ☐ The determination of restitution is deferred until *An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO245C)* will be entered after such determination.
- ☐ The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

- ☐ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options under the Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

- ☐ The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:
- | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|--|
| ☐ the interest requirement is waived for the | ☐ fine | ☐ restitution |
| ☐ the interest requirement for the | ☐ fine | ☐ restitution is modified as follows: |

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

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SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

- A** ☒ Lump sum payment of \$ 100.00 due immediately, balance due
☐ not later than _____, or
☒ in accordance with ☐ C, ☐ D, ☐ E, or ☒ F below; or
- B** ☐ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with ☐ C, ☐ D, or ☐ F below); or
- C** ☐ Payment in equal _____ (*e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly*) installments of \$ _____ over a period
of _____ (*e.g., months or years*), to commence _____ (*e.g., 30 or 60 days*) after the date of this judgment; or
- D** ☐ Payment in equal _____ (*e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly*) installments of \$ _____ over a period
of _____ (*e.g., months or years*), to commence _____ (*e.g., 30 or 60 days*) after release from imprisonment to a term of
supervision; or
- E** ☐ Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within _____ (*e.g., 30 or 60 days*) after release from
imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or
- F** ☒ Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to **U.S. District Court, 900 Georgia Avenue, Joel W. Solomon Federal Building, United States Courthouse, Chattanooga, TN, 37402**. Payments shall be in the form of a check or a money order, made payable to U.S. District Court, with a notation of the case number including defendant number.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

- ☐ Joint and Several
See above for Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (*including defendant number*), Total Amount, Joint and Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.
☐ Defendant shall receive credit on his restitution obligation for recovery from other defendants who contributed to the same loss that gave rise to defendant's restitution obligation.
- ☐ The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
- ☐ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
- ☐ The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVT Assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.