

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Everett McKinley Dirksen
United States Courthouse
Room 2722 - 219 S. Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604



Office of the Clerk
Phone: (312) 435-5850
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ORDER

APPENDIX A

April 6, 2026

Before

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, *Circuit Judge*AMY J. ST. EVE, *Circuit Judge*NANCY L. MALDONADO, *Circuit Judge*

No. 26-1630	IN RE: LEONARD NYAMUSEVYA, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Simeon Underhill Bihesi, deceased, Petitioner
Petition for Writ of Mandamus	
District Court No: 1:25-cv-12128	
District Judge Edmond E. Chang	

The following are the before the court:

1. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION, filed on March 31, 2026, by the pro se petitioner.
2. MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS, filed on March 31, 2026, by the pro se petitioner.

In light of the district court's April 3, 2026, order,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition and motion are **DENIED**.

form name: c7_Order_3J (form ID: 177)

CERTIFIED COPY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LEONARD NYAMUSEVEYA *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICHARD DEWINE, *et al.*,

Defendants.

No. 1:25-CV-12128

Judge Edmond E. Chang

APPENDIX B

ORDER

In a prior order, Leonard Nyamusevya's original complaint was dismissed on screening review, R. 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), though with leave to submit an amended complaint. As explained in the order, even with the benefit of liberal construction for *pro se* pleadings, the complaint's 250 pages and 1,041 paragraphs were too prolix to comply with the two rules of civil procedure that work together to require comprehensible complaints. R. 7 at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring "a short and plain statement of the claim"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (requiring claims in numbered paragraphs, "each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances")). The initial complaint was so long and scattered that it was unintelligible. *See Kadamovas v. Stevens*, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013); *U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).

The amended complaint is still 31 pages (though it is single-spaced, so the equivalent of 62 double-spaced pages) and 129 paragraphs, and it still jumps around back and forth in time (sometimes by years). R. 10. But at least it is in the ballpark of an acceptable length for a pleading.

Having said that, the venue provisions of the amended complaint still do not adequately explain how venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois. R. 10 ¶¶ 15–18, 20–23. The amended complaint still names as defendants individuals and institutions located in Ohio (and two in California), but no *conduct* of those defendants happened here. The prior order explained that venue is proper only in (1) a

district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) a district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. R. 7 at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)). As noted in the prior order, Nyamusevya's current residence in Illinois does not establish proper venue here. *Ford-Reyes v. Progressive Funeral Home*, 418 F. Supp. 3d 286, 290 (N.D. Ill. 2019). It remains the *Defendants'*—not the Plaintiff's—residences that matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), and the amended complaint still does not allege that any of the Defendants reside in this District.

Nor does Nyamusevya's son's death here in Illinois, R. 10 ¶¶ 56–57, establish venue here. Again, the Defendants—all in located in Ohio and California—did not commit any alleged *conduct* here in this District. Instead, Nyamusevya's claims allegedly arise out of bankruptcy proceedings, foreclosure proceedings, and other events that took place in *Ohio*, not this District. R. 10 ¶¶ 32–35 (bankruptcy filed in the Southern District of Ohio); *id.* ¶¶ 38–39 (foreclosure proceeding in Franklin County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas); *id.* ¶ 42 (foreclosed property located in Columbus, Ohio). So “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” did not happen in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Instead, as noted in the prior order, R. 7 at 3, Ohio would be the proper venue for the claims (to the extent that the claims are even legally viable).

There are likely jurisdictional and immunity defects as well. Any injury arising out of the foreclosure judgment on the Ohio home—which appears to be all of the alleged injuries—would be barred by the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. *Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans*, 647 F.3d 642, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2011). This lower federal court would have no subject matter jurisdiction over the foreclosure judgment. Also, the state court judges would be protected by absolute judicial immunity from money damages for their judicial actions. *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991). Neither of the exceptions to immunity apply. *Id.* (non-judicial actions and complete absence of jurisdiction). In any event, the amended complaint is dismissed for lack of proper venue. The dismissal is without prejudice (given the venue-based reason), but this is

a final decision. The status hearing of April 17, 2026, is vacated.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: April 3, 2026

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Leonard Nyamusevya,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

Richard Michael Dewine, et al.,

Defendant(s).

Case No. 25 C 12128
Judge Edmond E. Chang

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

Judgment is hereby entered (check appropriate box):

☐ in favor of plaintiff(s)
and against defendant(s)
in the amount of \$ _____,

which ☐ includes pre-judgment interest.
☐ does not include pre-judgment interest.

Post-judgment interest accrues on that amount at the rate provided by law from the date of this judgment.

Plaintiff(s) shall recover costs from defendant(s).

☐ in favor of defendant(s)
and against plaintiff(s)

Defendant(s) shall recover costs from plaintiff(s).

☒ other: Case dismissed without prejudice for lack of venue.

This action was (*check one*):

- ☐ tried by a jury with Judge _____ presiding, and the jury has rendered a verdict.
☐ tried by Judge _____ without a jury and the above decision was reached.
☒ decided by Judge Edmond E. Chang.

Date: 4/3/2026

Thomas G. Bruton, Clerk of Court

/s/ Michael Wing, Deputy Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

LEONARD NYAMUSEVEYA *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICHARD DEWINE, *et al.*,

Defendants.

No. 1:25-CV-12128

Judge Edmond E. Chang

APPENDIX C

ORDER

On review of Leonard Nyamusevya's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis*, R. 4, the motion is granted due to financial indigency. But Nyamusevya is seeking to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the complaint is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires the dismissal of (1) "frivolous" claims, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), *see Vey v. Clinton*, 520 U.S. 937, 937 (1997); (2) complaints that fail to state a claim, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), *Jaros v. IDOC*, 684 F.3d 667, 669 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); *Rowe v. Shake*, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999); and (3) complaints that seek monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from such damages, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Section 1915(e)(2) applies to all litigants who seek to proceed in forma pauperis, not just prisoners. *See Vey*, 520 U.S. at 937 (denying *in forma pauperis* status to file certiorari petition from appeal and applying § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) to non-inmate); *Jaros*, 684 F.3d at 669 n.1 (explaining that § 1915(e)(2) screening applies to non-prisoner suits); *Rowe*, 196 F.3d at 783. In addressing any pro se litigant's complaint, the Court must construe the complaint liberally. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). If there is an arguable basis for a claim in fact or law, then leave to proceed will be granted. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). But dismissal of the complaint is the proper course where it is clearly baseless or fanciful, *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992), or fails to state a claim, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from damages, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

Even given the expansiveness with which courts view pro se filings, the current complaint must be dismissed for two reasons. The first is that the complaint's sheer

prolixity makes it virtually impossible to screen the complaint: the complaint spans 250 pages and 1,041 paragraphs. Two rules of civil procedure work together to require comprehensible complaints: first, Civil Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Second, Rule 10(b) requires a party to state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, “each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The primary purpose of these rules “is to give defendants fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds supporting the claims.” *Stanard v. Nygren*, 658 F.3d 792, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2011).

The upshot of those two rules is that a complaint is subject to dismissal if it is unduly long or if it is unintelligible. See *Kadamovas v. Stevens*, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013); *U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). In an ideal world, courts would have infinite resources to devote to each case. But in a world constrained by limited resources, it is not feasible for a court to read through 250 pages of single-spaced allegations consuming 1,041 paragraphs, and try to pluck out the facts and claims that are truly pertinent at the pleading stage. Any amended complaint must comply with the directive that it contain only a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief.

The second apparent flaw in the complaint is that venue is almost surely improper in the Northern District of Illinois. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), an action may be brought only in (1) a district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) a district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

Nyamusevya alleges that this District is a proper venue because he resides here and his son’s wrongful death took place in the District. R. 1 ¶ 46. But the *Plaintiff’s* Nyamusevya’s residence here cannot establish that it is a proper venue for this case. *Ford-Reyes v. Progressive Funeral Home*, 418 F. Supp. 3d 286, 290 (N.D. Ill. 2019). It is the *Defendants’*—not the *Plaintiffs’*—residences that matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), and the complaint does not allege that any of the Defendants reside in this District. And it does not appear that the Plaintiff’s son’s tragic death here in Illinois is based on conduct that the Defendants allegedly committed *here*. Instead, Nyamusevya’s claims allegedly arise out of bankruptcy proceedings and other events that took place in *Ohio*, not this District. R. 1 ¶ 38. So it does not appear that “a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Instead, Ohio would be the proper venue for the claims (to the extent that the claims are even legally viable). In any amended complaint, Nyamusevya must set forth any additional basis for venue in this District. The amended complaint, if filed, is due by **November 5, 2025**.

One final point on the complaint: to the extent that the lawsuit seeks money damages from the State of Ohio, there is no subject matter jurisdiction over in federal court for a suit against a State for money damages (absence congressional abrogation under a pertinent constitutional amendment). U.S. Const., amend. XI. Nyamusevya should not include a claim for money damages against Ohio.

Lastly, Nyamusevya’s motion for attorney representation, R. 5, is denied without prejudice. He has a post-graduate education, R. 5 at 2, and at this stage of the case—when he must narrow (rather than expand) the complaint so that it is comprehensible, he should be able to handle filing an amended complaint. Also, it must be said that gist of the allegations claims (to the extent that they are even discernable right now), even when viewed generously, would present a novel legal claim: that those who obtained the Plaintiff’s former residence in a bankruptcy proceeding, thus forcing him to move to Illinois, are responsible for his son’s death in Illinois. R. 1 ¶ 50. Federal courts may consider, as one factor in recruiting counsel, the likely merits—or lack thereof—of the case. *See Watts v. Kidman*, 42 F.4th 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2022).

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: October 19, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EXHIBIT 4

LEONARD NYAMUSEVEYA *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICHARD DEWINE, *et al.*,

Defendants.

No. 1:25-CV-12128

Judge Edmond E. Chang

ORDER

On review of Leonard Nyamusevya's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis*, R. 4, the motion is granted due to financial indigency. But Nyamusevya is seeking to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the complaint is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires the dismissal of (1) "frivolous" claims, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), *see Vey v. Clinton*, 520 U.S. 937, 937 (1997); (2) complaints that fail to state a claim, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), *Jaros v. IDOC*, 684 F.3d 667, 669 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); *Rowe v. Shake*, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999); and (3) complaints that seek monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from such damages, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Section 1915(e)(2) applies to all litigants who seek to proceed in forma pauperis, not just prisoners. *See Vey*, 520 U.S. at 937 (denying *in forma pauperis* status to file certiorari petition from appeal and applying § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) to non-inmate); *Jaros*, 684 F.3d at 669 n.1 (explaining that § 1915(e)(2) screening applies to non-prisoner suits); *Rowe*, 196 F.3d at 783. In addressing any pro se litigant's complaint, the Court must construe the complaint liberally. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972). If there is an arguable basis for a claim in fact or law, then leave to proceed will be granted. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). But dismissal of the complaint is the proper course where it is clearly baseless or fanciful, *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992), or fails to state a claim, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from damages, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

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substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” in this District. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Instead, Ohio would be the proper venue for the claims (to the extent that the claims are even legally viable). In any amended complaint, Nyamusevya must set forth any additional basis for venue in this District. The amended complaint, if filed, is due by **November 5, 2025**.

➔ One final point on the complaint: to the extent that the lawsuit seeks money damages from the State of Ohio, there is no subject matter jurisdiction over in federal court for a suit against a State for money damages (absence congressional abrogation under a pertinent constitutional amendment). U.S. Const., amend. XI. Nyamusevya should not include a claim for money damages against Ohio.

➔ Lastly, Nyamusevya’s motion for attorney representation, R. 5, is denied without prejudice. He has a post-graduate education, R. 5 at 2, and at this stage of the case—when he must narrow (rather than expand) the complaint so that it is comprehensible, he should be able to handle filing an amended complaint. Also, it must be said that gist of the allegations claims (to the extent that they are even discernable right now), even when viewed generously, would present a novel legal claim: that those who obtained the Plaintiff’s former residence in a bankruptcy proceeding, thus forcing him to move to Illinois, are responsible for his son’s death in Illinois. R. 1 ¶ 50. Federal courts may consider, as one factor in recruiting counsel, the likely merits—or lack thereof—of the case. *See Watts v. Kidman*, 42 F.4th 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2022).

ENTERED:

➔ s/Edmond E. Chang
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: October 19, 2025

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, OHIO
DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Leonard Nyamusevya,
PLAINTIFF,

VS.

Consolata Nkurunziza,
DEFENDANT.

EXHIBIT 6

CASE NO. 09 DR 1832

JUDGE JAMISON

Order to Enforce Sale

This cause came on for hearing on May 26, 2021, before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce the Sale of the Marital Property. Previously, the parties agreed that:

They were owners of real property at 2064 Worcester Court, Columbus, Ohio 43232. The property was valued at approximately \$178,000 with a mortgage of approximately \$100,000.

The property was foreclosed in Case No. 10 CVE 09 13480. Subsequently Defendant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Ohio, Case 2:15-bk-53820, in which she averred her intention to surrender the real estate. A discharge under 11 U.S.C. 727 was granted to Defendant on January 21, 2016. Exhibit A attached.

In the Agreed Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce, this Court retained jurisdiction over the property, further stating: if it does not sale [sic] within six months from signing with a realtor, by allowing a short sale as agreed by the parties After six months, the property should be listed as a short sale as soon as possible.


Also in the Agreed Decree, the Court provided: Pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 70, each party shall execute any and all deeds, mortgages, promissory notes, titles, bills of


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FRANKLIN CO., OHIO
2021 MAY 26 PM 1:33
CLERK OF COURTS

sale endorsements, forms, conveyances or other documents, and perform any act which may be required or necessary to carry out or effectuate all the purposes and provisions set forth herein. **Upon the failure of either party to execute and deliver** any such deed, mortgage, promissory note, title bill of sale, endorsement, form conveyance or other document to the other party when due, this Decree shall constitute and operate as such properly executed document. The County Auditor, County Recorder and any and all other public and private officials are authorized and directed to accept this Decree or a properly certified copy hereof in lieu of the document regularly required for the conveyance or transfer. Exhibit B, attached.

Plaintiff at this time has a buyer for the property. Defendant has surrendered her interest in the real estate and Plaintiff is unaware of her whereabouts. Plaintiff moves the Court enforce the Agreed Decree, in order to fully effectuate the parties' agreement.

→ Therefore, the Court awards Plaintiff the property as sole owner, removing the requirement for Defendant's cooperation and signature, and giving Plaintiff authority to effectuate the sale. IT IS SO ORDERED.


JUDGE TERRI JAMISON

THE STATE OF OHIO Franklin County, ss	} I, MARYELLEN O'SHAUGHNESSY, Clerk OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS WITHIN AND FOR SAID COUNTY, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING IS TRULY TAKEN AND COPIED FROM THE ORIGINAL.
NOW ON FILE IN MY OFFICE WITHIN AND FOR SAID COUNTY THIS 31 DAY OF MAY, 2026.	 MARYELLEN O'SHAUGHNESSY, Clerk By _____ Deputy

[Cite as *TPI Asset Mgt., L.L.C. v. Ealey*, 2015-Ohio-740.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

TPI Asset Management, LLC, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, :

v. :

Dawna J. Ealey et al., :

Defendants-Appellees. :

No. 14AP-525
(C.P.C. No. 09CV-15665)

(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

EXHIBIT 13

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 3, 2015

Bryan B. Johnson, for appellant.

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

TYACK, J.

{¶ 1} TPI Asset Management, LLC, is appealing from a judgment entry entered in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. A single error is assigned for our consideration:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR- THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED BY REFUSING TO ORDER APPELLANT'S COURT
COSTS AND TITLE INSURANCE PREMIUM COSTS TO BE
PAID FROM THE SALE PROCEEDS.

{¶ 2} R.C. 2329.191(B) requires the filing of preliminary and final judicial reports in foreclosure actions. The preliminary report must contain the property's legal description, address, parcel number, owner's name, a reference to the volume and page where the deed was recorded, and the names and addresses of lienholders. R.C. 2329.191(B)(1) through (7).

{¶ 3} The statute further provides that:

No. 14AP-525

2

Prior to submitting any order or judgment entry to a court that would order the sale of the residential real estate, the party submitting the order or judgment entry shall file with the clerk of the court of common pleas a final judicial report that updates the state of the record title to that real estate from the effective date of the preliminary judicial report through the date of *lis pendens* and includes a copy of the court's docket for the case. The cost of the title examination necessary for the preparation of both the preliminary judicial report and the final judicial report together with the premiums for those reports computed as required by the department of insurance, based on the fair market value of the real estate, or in the case of a foreclosure, the principal balance of the mortgage or other lien being foreclosed on or any other additional amount as may be ordered by the court shall be taxed as costs in the case.

R.C. 2329.191(B)(1) through (7).

{¶ 4} The purpose of the final report is to update the state of the record title to the property at issue. R.C. 2329.191(B). The legislature's decision to include this mandatory language in the statute evidences the legislature's understanding of the importance of establishing a definitive record of title in a foreclosure action prior to the ultimate sale or disposition of the property. *GMAC Mgt., L.L.C. v. Jacobs*, 196 Ohio App.3d 167, 172-73, 2011-Ohio-1780, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.).

{¶ 5} Here, this foreclosure case was initiated by appellant to foreclose on its judgment lien against property owned by defendants Rueben and Dawn Ealey. Appellant paid the court cost deposits, the title search, and the preliminary and final judicial reports. An order of sale was issued, but later withdrawn because the defendants filed for bankruptcy. Appellant's judicial lien was avoided in the bankruptcy proceeding because it impeded the debtors' homestead exemption.

{¶ 6} After the debtors were discharged in bankruptcy, appellee, Huntington National Bank ("Huntington"), sought to reactivate the case and, was given leave to file an amended answer, counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint.

{¶ 7} Counsel for Huntington circulated a proposed motion for default judgment and decree of foreclosure which appellant's counsel refused to approve unless appellant's court costs and judicial report premiums were included. Huntington's counsel refused,

No. 14AP-525

3

and appellant filed a memorandum contra to Huntington's motion requesting that its costs be included in the entry granting the motion. Huntington opposed the motion, arguing that it was solely entitled to obtain judgment on its own behalf and was not required to reimburse appellant for costs it incurred in filing for foreclosure on its more junior lien. Huntington also filed its own preliminary and final judicial reports.

{¶ 8} On June 20, 2014, the trial court issued its entry granting default judgment and decree of foreclosure without including appellant's costs in the entry granting the motion.

{¶ 9} Appellant is the only party who filed a brief in this appeal. No other party has filed a brief. We therefore are permitted by App.R. 18(C) to accept the appellant's statement of the facts and issues as correct. We find that in this case, appellant's brief reasonably appears, based on R.C. 2329.191(B), to sustain reversal of the entry in the trial court which failed to order appellant's court costs and title insurance premiums be paid to appellant from the proceeds of the sheriff's sale. To refuse reimbursement of appellant's out-of-pocket court costs would provide a windfall to Huntington who, as far as we can tell from the record, has not paid anything in court costs. Since both appellant and Huntington filed preliminary and final judicial reports, R.C. 2329.191(B) mandates that appellant's court costs and title insurance premiums be reimbursed from the sale proceeds as well as those of Huntington.

{¶ 10} We sustain the single assignment of error and remand the case to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas to enter a corrected entry.

Case remanded with instructions.

BROWN, P.J., and BRUNNER, J., concur.

**Additional material
from this filing is
available in the
Clerk's Office.**