

No. _____

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

Xzavion Dayshaun Ragsdale,

Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

The supervised release statute provides that a court may revoke supervised release as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and must revoke supervised release when the violation conduct is of the type specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g).

Section 3583(e) lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when revoking and sentencing violations of supervised release. That list omits the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A)—the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense. Section 3583(e) also specifies maximum terms of imprisonment should a court decide to revoke supervised release.

Section 3583(g) mandates revocation for specified violations. It cross-references 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)'s statutory maximums for imprisonment but otherwise is silent on the how a revocation sentence should be imposed.

In *Esteras v. United States*, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), this Court held that a district court may not rely on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors as applied to the defendant's underlying criminal conviction when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e).

The question presented is: Does 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) govern sentences imposed after a finding of violations that trigger mandatory revocation under § 3583(g), and does § 3583(e) preclude the court from considering retribution for the supervised release violations?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Xzavion Dayshaun Ragsdale, who was the Defendant-Appellant in the court below. Respondent, the United States of America, was the Plaintiff-Appellee in the court below.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

- *United States v. Ragsdale*, No. 2:15-cr-00072-Z-BR, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Judgment entered on Nov. 21, 2025.
- *United States v. Ragsdale*, No. 25-11304, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Judgment entered on June 15, 2026.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented.....	i
Parties to the Proceeding	ii
Related Proceedings.....	ii
Table of Contents	iii
Appendices	iv
Table of Authorities	v
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari	1
Opinions Below	1
Jurisdiction	1
Provisions Involved.....	1
Statement of the Case	4
I. Facts and Proceedings in District Court.....	4
II. Proceedings on Appeal.....	5
Reasons for Granting this Petition	5
I. <i>Esteras</i> expressly left undecided whether a district court could consider retribution for violation conduct, especially where such conduct requires revocation.	6
II. The Fifth Circuit wrongly decided the questions <i>Esteras</i> left unresolved. .	8
III. Ragsdale respectfully requests that this Court hold his petition pending a plenary grant in another case.	9
Conclusion	10
Appendix	

APPENDICES

Appendix A Opinion

United States v. Ragsdale, No. 25-11304

(5th Cir. June 15, 2026) Pet. App’x a001–a002

Appendix B Judgment and Sentence

United States v. Ragsdale, No. 2:15-cr-00072-Z-BR

(N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2025) Pet. App’x a003–a007

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Federal Cases	
<i>Esteras v. United States</i> , 606 U.S. 185 (2025)	5, 6, 7, 8, 9
<i>Henderson v. United States</i> , 568 U.S. 266 (2013)	10
<i>Lawrence on Behalf Lawrence v. Chater</i> , 516 U.S. 163 (1996)	9
<i>Reed v. Taylor</i> , 923 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2019)	8
<i>United States v. Cano</i> , 981 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2020)	8
<i>United States v. Illies</i> , 805 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2015)	5, 8
<i>United States v. Miquel</i> , 444 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2006)	9
<i>United States v. Ragsdale</i> , No. 25-11304, 2026 WL 1724506 (5th Cir. June 15, 2026)	5
Federal Statutes	
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)	2, 6, 7, 9
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).....	1, 6, 7, 8
18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)	2, 7, 8
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)	1
Federal Sentencing Guideline Provisions	
U. S. Sent’g Comm’n, Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024).....	6

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Xzavion Dayshaun Ragsdale seeks a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished opinion is available at *United States v. Ragsdale*, No. 25-11304, 2026 WL 1724506 (5th Cir. June 15, 2026). It is reprinted in Appendix A to this Petition. The district court’s judgment and sentence in *United States v. Ragsdale*, No. 2:15-cr-00072-Z-BR (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2025), is reprinted in Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit entered judgment on June 15, 2026. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3):

(e) **Modification of conditions or revocation.**—The court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)—

(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, except that a defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required to serve on any such revocation more than 5 years in prison if the offense that resulted in the

term of supervised release is a class A felony, more than 3 years in prison if such offense is a class B felony, more than 2 years in prison if such offense is a class C or D felony, or more than one year in any other case[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3583(g):

(g) Mandatory revocation for possession of controlled substance or firearm or for refusal to comply with drug testing.—If the defendant—

(1) possesses a controlled substance in violation of the condition set forth in subsection (d);

(2) possesses a firearm, as such term is defined in section 921 of this title, in violation of Federal law, or otherwise violates a condition of supervised release prohibiting the defendant from possessing a firearm;

(3) refuses to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of supervised release; or

(4) as a part of drug testing, tests positive for illegal controlled substances more than 3 times over the course of 1 year;

the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3).

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a):

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines—

(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28);

(5) any pertinent policy statement—

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any

amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.¹

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Facts and Proceedings in District Court

On January 22, 2016, the district court sentenced Petitioner Xzavion Day-shaun Ragsdale to 120 months' imprisonment and ten years of supervised release for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(a) and 1591(a)(1). Record in the Court of Appeals (ROA). 51-56. Ragsdale commenced his supervised release on November 29, 2024. ROA.156.

On October 1, 2025, U.S. Probation sought a violator's warrant. ROA.132, 136. Probation alleged that Ragsdale violated his conditions by driving under the influence and continuously testing positive for marijuana. ROA.132-34. On October 8, 2025, the government filed a Motion to Revoke Ragsdale's supervised release, relying only on his marijuana use. ROA.137-38.

The court held the revocation hearing on November 20, 2025. ROA.232. The court asked for Ragsdale's plea to the allegations in the Motion to Revoke. ROA.236-37. Ragsdale pleaded true. ROA.237. On the issue of sentencing, the court stated it anticipated sentencing within a policy statement range of four to ten months.

ROA.238. The government advocated for a ten-month sentence because of Ragsdale’s “repeated use of drugs and his abuse of trust....” ROA.238-39. Ragsdale requested a sentence between four and seven months. ROA.240.

The court went with the government’s recommendation. ROA.243. Like the government, the court “focuse[d] on the breach of trust....” ROA.243. The court also reimposed five years of supervised release. ROA.244. In its justification of sentence, the court noted that Ragsdale “repeatedly possessed marijuana while on supervised release and... continued to breach the Court’s trust in extending supervision and the privilege of supervision.” ROA.248.

II. Proceedings on Appeal

On appeal, Ragsdale argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) precludes the district court from considering his breach of trust and retribution for the violation conduct when revoking his supervised release and imposing a revocation sentence. *See United States v. Ragsdale*, No. 25-11304, 2026 WL 1724506, at *1 (5th Cir. June 15, 2026). The Fifth Circuit applied precedent holding that § 3583(e) does not govern revocation sentences imposed for violations that trigger § 3583(g). *See id.* (citing *United States v. Illies*, 805 F.3d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 2015)).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

This Court should hold this petition pending any plenary grant of certiorari addressing the question presented, which *Esteras v. United States*, 606 U.S. 185, 202 (2025), reserved for decision in a future case.

I. *Esteras* expressly left undecided whether a district court could consider retribution for violation conduct, especially where such conduct requires revocation.

Esteras concerned whether 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) permitted a district court to consider retribution for a defendant’s original offense when revoking the supervised release term imposed for that offense. 606 U.S. at 194–95. According to the government, § 3583(e) *allowed* but did not *require* retribution for the original offense. *Id.* at 191–93. The government advanced two arguments in support of this interpretation that are relevant here. *See id.* at 193–94 & n.5, 201–02.

First, the government pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(B) and § 3553(a)(5). *See id.* at 194 n.5. According to the government, these “authorize courts to consider policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission that sound in retribution *for the violation of the conditions of the supervised release.*” *Id.* (citing Brief for United States 11, 34) (emphasis in original). “The Commission has adopted the view that ‘the sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended to sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.’” *Id.* (quoting United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(b) (Nov. 2024)). The *Esteras* majority, however, declined to take a “position on whether this is a permissible consideration.” *Id.*

Nevertheless, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Jackson wrote separately to explicitly reject the notion that retribution can play *any* role in revocation proceedings, even under the “breach of trust” theory. *See Esteras*, 606 U.S. at 204–08 (both opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). “In my view,” Justice Sotomayor wrote in an opinion Justice Jackson joined, “district courts revoking a term

of supervised release should not consider retribution for any purpose.” *Id.* at 204. “Congress studiously omitted all reference to retribution from the supervised-release statute, so retribution should play no role in revocation hearings.” *Id.* at 205. “As to either a supervised-release violation or the underlying offense, the backward-looking end of retribution is out of bounds.” *Id.* at 206. Justice Jackson added: “Sentences either ‘reflect,’ ‘afford,’ or ‘provide’ for...retribution, ...or they don’t.” *Id.* at 207 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)). “It is hard to fathom that Congress meant for retribution to be both operable and inoperable as it relates to the imposition of a single revocation sanction....” *Id.* at 207 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

Second, the government argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) must allow for consideration of retribution because 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) allowed for it. *See Esteras*, 606 U.S. at 201–02. *Esteras* disputed this interpretation of § 3583(g), arguing “for consistency in the other direction,” namely, “that § 3583(e)’s abbreviated list governs in both contexts.” *Id.* at 202. The *Esteras* majority left this dispute unresolved as it did not affect the outcome. *Id.* (“We need not resolve the dispute because it does not affect our analysis.”). The arguments made in Justice Sotomayor’s and Jackson’s concurrences, however, apply with equal force here. Either the supervised release scheme is forward-looking, or it is not. In the same way, either retribution plays a role in the revocation of supervised release—no matter the type of violation—or it does not.

II. The Fifth Circuit wrongly decided the questions *Esteras* left unresolved.

The Fifth Circuit has held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) does not govern sentencing for violations that trigger mandatory revocation under § 3583(g). *United States v. Illies*, 805 F.3d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 2015). It also has held that a court can and should consider a defendant’s “breach of trust” when revoking supervised release and imposing a revocation sentence. *United States v. Cano*, 981 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2020). Both positions are wrong.

First, statutory interpretation “must be attentive not to words standing alone but to surrounding structure and other contextual cues that illuminate meaning,” so that “accompanying words...are knit together” into “a harmonious whole.” *Reed v. Taylor*, 923 F.3d 411, 415–16 (5th Cir. 2019). Read as a whole, it becomes clear that § 3583(g) informs when revocation under § 3583(e) is required, and that § 3583(e) provides the rules for revocation sentences, no matter the type of violation. Section 3583(e) outlines not just the factors to consider in revocation proceedings—it also addresses what procedures to use and what burden of proof to apply. Section 3583(g), by contrast, is silent on the factors, the procedures, and the burden. If interpreted as a revocation provision wholly separate from § 3583(e), then all revocations would be subject to two different regimes: one where Congress specified the rules, and one where Congress specified no rules except mandatory revocation. Interpreting § 3583(g) as merely specifying where revocation under § 3583(e) is mandatory, however, resolves that anomaly.

Second, Esteras’ concurring opinions demonstrate the error with allowing for revocation to sanction a breach of trust. In short, the distinction between the forbidden § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors and the “breach of trust” consideration pushes the boundary past “subtle” to nonexistent. *Cf. United States v. Miobel*, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We recognize that the difference between sanctioning a supervised release violator for breach of trust and punishing him in order to promote respect for the law is subtle indeed.”). The more serious the violation, the bigger the breach; and the higher the sanction for the breach, the more it promotes the law. Indeed, even the *Esteras* majority acknowledged that the breach of trust theory “sound[s] in retribution.” 606 U.S. at 194 n.5.

III. Ragsdale respectfully requests that this Court hold his petition pending a plenary grant in another case.

Even so, Ragsdale recognizes that his lack of preservation before the trial court presents a vehicle issue for a plenary grant here.

Should the Court grant certiorari to decide this momentous issue in another case, however, Ragsdale respectfully requests that it hold the instant Petition pending the outcome. *See Lawrence on Behalf Lawrence v. Chater*, 516 U.S. 163, 166 (1996); *Stutson v. United States*, 516 U.S. 163, 181 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (“We regularly hold cases that involve the same issue as a case on which certiorari has been granted and plenary review is being conducted *in order that* (if appropriate) they may be ‘GVR’d’ when the case is decided.”) Even if any ultimate review will be conducted for plain error, the error may become “plain” at any time

while the case remains on direct appeal. *See Henderson v. United States*, 568 U.S. 266 (2013).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Xzavion Dayshaun Ragsdale respectfully requests that the Court hold this petition pending resolution of a case that presents the issue reserved in *Esteras*. Following that decision, he asks the Court to grant the petition, vacate the judgment below, and remand for reconsideration.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of September, 2026.

JASON D. HAWKINS
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/s/ Maria Gabriela Vega

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Xzavion Dayshaun Ragsdale

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

No. 25-11304
Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 15, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

XZAVION DAYSHAUN RAGSDALE,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:15-CR-72-1

Before RICHMAN, SOUTHWICK, and WILLETT, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM:*

Xzavion Dayshaun Ragsdale appeals the 10-month sentence imposed upon the revocation of his term of supervised release. For the first time on appeal, he contends that the district court plainly erred by considering his breach of trust when imposing the revocation sentence.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. *See* 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.

No. 25-11304

Because revocation here was mandatory, we reject Ragsdale's arguments. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1); *United States v. Illies*, 805 F.3d 607, 609 (5th Cir. 2015). Because our “summary affirmance procedure is generally reserved for cases in which the parties concede that the issues are foreclosed by circuit precedent,” and Ragsdale does not make that concession, we DENY the Government's motion for summary affirmance. *See United States v. Monshizadeh*, 679 F.App'x 359, 360 (5th Cir. 2017)(discussing *Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis*, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969)). Nevertheless, we dispense with further briefing and also DENY the Government's alternative motion for an extension of time to file a brief. *See United States v. Bailey*, 924 F.3d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir. 2019). We find no error in the district court's sentencing and AFFIRM.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Amarillo Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

Case Number: 2:15-CR-072-Z-BR(01)

XZAVION DAYSHAUN RAGSDALE

U.S. Marshal's No.: 50223-177

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
(For **Revocation** of Probation or Supervised Release)
(For Offenses Committed On or After November 1, 1987)

The defendant, XZAVION DAYSHAUN RAGSDALE, was represented by Felipe Zavala.

THE DEFENDANT:

Pled true to violating Paragraphs I and II of the Motion to Revoke, filed on October 8, 2025.

See Petitions for Offender Under Supervision.

Certified copy of the Judgment imposed on January 22, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division, is attached.

As pronounced on November 20, 2025, the defendant is sentenced as provided on page 2 of this Judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant shall notify the court and United States Attorney of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances.

Signed: November 21, 2025.


MATTHEW J. KACSMARK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of **Ten (10) months**.

The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

1. that the Defendant be allowed to participate in any and all substance abuse treatment available, if possible, if eligible, if consistent with security classification;
2. that the Defendant be assigned to FCI Seagoville, if possible, if eligible, if consistent with security classification.

Defendant is remanded to the custody of the US Marshal.

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of **Five (5) years**.

While on supervised release, in compliance with the Standard Conditions of supervision adopted by the United States Sentencing Commission at Section 5D1.3(b), the defendant shall:

1. The defendant shall report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside within 72 hours of release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs the defendant to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
2. After initially reporting to the probation office, the defendant will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when to report to the probation officer, and the defendant shall report to the probation officer as instructed.
3. The defendant shall not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where he or she is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
4. The defendant shall answer truthfully the questions asked by the probation officer.
5. The defendant shall live at a place approved by the probation officer. If the defendant plans to change where he or she lives or anything about his or her living arrangements (such as the people the defendant lives with), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

6. The defendant shall allow the probation officer to visit the defendant at any time at his or her home or elsewhere, and the defendant shall permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of the defendant's supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
7. The defendant shall work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant does not have full-time employment he or she shall try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so. If the defendant plans to change where the defendant works or anything about his or her work (such as the position or the job responsibilities), the defendant shall notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
8. The defendant shall not communicate or interact with someone the defendant knows is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony, the defendant shall not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
9. If the defendant is arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, the defendant shall notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
10. The defendant shall not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person, such as nunchakus or tasers).
11. The defendant shall not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
12. If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require the defendant to notify the person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that the defendant has notified the person about the risk.
13. The defendant shall follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

Also, as set forth in the Notice of Intent to Impose Conditions of Supervised Release signed and dated November 20, 2025, the Defendant shall comply with the below-listed other conditions of supervised release, which are derived from Sections 5D1.3(a) and (b), in relevant part:

1. The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local offense (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).
2. The defendant shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).

3. The defendant who is convicted for a domestic violence crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3561(b) for the first time shall attend a public, private, or private non-profit offender rehabilitation program that has been approved by the court, in consultation with a State Coalition Against Domestic Violence or other appropriate experts, if an approved program is available within a 50-mile radius of the legal residence of the defendant (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).
4. The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance, but the condition stated in this paragraph may be ameliorated or suspended by the court for any individual defendant if the defendant's presentence report or other reliable information indicates a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).
5. If a fine is imposed and has not been paid upon release to supervised release, the defendant shall adhere to an installment schedule to pay that fine (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)).
6. The defendant shall (A) make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A, or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution; and (B) pay the assessment imposed in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3013. If there is a court-established payment schedule for making restitution or paying the assessment (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)), the defendant shall adhere to the schedule.
7. If the defendant is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, the defendant shall comply with the requirements of that Act (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).
8. The defendant shall submit to the collection of a DNA sample from the defendant at the direction of the United States Probation Office if the collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (34 U.S.C. § 40702).
9. The defendant is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act; the defendant shall comply with the requirements of that Act (*see* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).
10. The defendant shall participate in an outpatient treatment program approved by the U.S. Probation Office for treatment of narcotics, drug, or alcohol dependency, which will include testing for the detection of substance use or abuse. The defendant shall abstain from the use of alcohol and/or all other intoxicants during and after completion of treatment. The defendant shall contribute to the costs of services rendered (copayment) at a rate of at least \$40 per month.
11. The defendant shall participate in sex offender treatment services as directed by the probation officer until successfully discharged. These services may include psycho-physiological testing (i.e., clinical polygraph, plethysmograph, and the ABEL screen) to monitor the defendant's compliance, treatment progress, and risk the community. The defendant shall contribute to the costs of services rendered (copayment) at a rate of at least \$40 per month.
12. The defendant shall register with state and local enforcement, as directed by the probation officer, in each jurisdiction where the defendant resides, is employed, or is a student. The defendant shall provide all information required in accordance with state registration guidelines. Initial registration shall be completed within 3 business days after sentencing/release from confinement. The defendant shall provide written verification of registration to the probation officer within 3 business days following registration. This registration shall be renewed as required. By the defendant's assigned tier. The

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Page 5 of 5

Defendant: XZAVION DAYSHAUN RAGSDALE

Case Number: 2:15-CR-072-Z-BR(1)

defendant shall, no later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status, appear in person in at least one jurisdiction and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the information required in the sex offender registry.

RESTITUTION

The Court does not order a fine or costs of incarceration because the defendant does not have the financial resources or future earning capacity to pay a fine or costs of incarceration.

Restitution is not ordered because there is no victim other than society at large.

RETURN

I have executed this Judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____ to _____
at _____, with a certified copy of this Judgment.

United States Marshal

By

Deputy Marshal