

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A - Order of Affirmance, Nevada Court of Appeals, No. 91619-COA (July 9, 2026)	1a
Appendix B - Order Denying Petition for Review, Supreme Court of Nevada, No. 91619 (Aug. 7, 2026)	7a
Appendix C - Petition for Review excerpts preserving federal questions	8a
Appendix D - Fast Track Statement excerpts preserving federal questions	12a
Appendix E - Constitutional and statutory provisions	16a



IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

PHILLIP GRIGALANZ,
Appellant,
vs.
ELIZABETH COPAS,
Respondent.

No. 91619-COA

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Phillip Grigalanz appeals from a district court order dismissing a petition for custody of minor children. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jerry A. Wiese, Judge; Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Mary D. Perry, Judge.

Grigalanz and respondent Elizabeth Copas were previously in a romantic relationship during which Grigalanz lived with Elizabeth and her three minor children: K.C., E.C., and J.G. Grigalanz is admittedly not the biological father of any of the children. Following the termination of the relationship, Grigalanz filed a petition seeking custody of the three minor children. The petition additionally named Jose Enrique Gonzalez-Alba¹ as a party, alleging he was the biological and legal father of J.G. Although the petition acknowledged that nonparty Gene Copas was the biological and legal father of K.C., he was not named as a party. Grigalanz generally alleged Elizabeth and Jose had failed to adequately care for the children, and it would be in the children's best interest to award him custody.

¹Although Alba was named in the petition below, Grigalanz failed to serve him and thus he is not a party to this appeal. As noted below, none of the parents were properly served.

Throughout the course of the proceedings, Grigalanz failed to serve the petition, or any other filing, on any of the parents. Ultimately, the district court held a hearing on Grigalanz's motion for a temporary custody order. At the hearing, the court orally dismissed Grigalanz's petition, finding he lacked standing to seek custody. Before the court entered a written order, Grigalanz filed a motion to disqualify the judge, arguing that during the hearing she raised her voice at him and unfairly judged him. Following the denial of the motion to disqualify, the court entered a written order dismissing Grigalanz's petition for lack of standing. Grigalanz now appeals.

On appeal, Grigalanz challenges the order dismissing his petition for custody and the denial of his motion to disqualify the district court judge.² Beginning with the dismissal order, Grigalanz argues the district court erred by dismissing his petition because the undisputed evidence demonstrated he had standing pursuant to NRS 125A.135, and

²Grigalanz's notice of appeal also designates a minute order issued on October 15, 2025, as a decision being challenged in this appeal. However, our review of the record confirms there was no minute order issued on that date, but there was a minute order issued October 16, 2026. To the extent Grigalanz intended to appeal the October 16, 2026, minute order, we note minute orders are not generally appealable. *Div. of Child & Family Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 120 Nev. 445, 454, 92 P.3d 1239, 1245 (2004) ("[D]ispositional court orders that are not administrative in nature, but deal with the procedural posture or merits of the underlying controversy, must be written, signed, and filed before they become effective."). To the extent the directives within the minute order are effective in the absence of a written order, no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal. See *Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC*, 129 Nev. 343, 346-47, 301 P.3d 850, 852-53 (2013) (form orders statistically closing a case are not final and appealable).

“persuasive nationwide authority” permits “psychological/de facto parent[s]” to seek custody.³ We disagree.

This court reviews dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing under the same rigorous, de novo standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim. *See Citizens for Cold Springs v. City of Reno*, 125 Nev. 625, 628-29, 218 P.3d 847, 849-50 (2009) (applying the standard for evaluating a dismissal for failure to state a claim to an order dismissing a complaint for lack of standing). NRS 125A.135 provides the definition of a “person acting as a parent” for the purposes of NRS Chapter 125A. However, simply providing the definition of a “person acting as a parent” does not, by its plain language, confer standing on Grigalanz to seek custody. Notably, “person acting as a parent” is used in only a handful of statutes, such as NRS 125A.325, which provides limitations on when a Nevada court can modify a custody determination issued by a different state court. Likewise, NRS 125A.465(1)(c) provides that a “person acting as a parent *who has been awarded custody or visitation*” may register a foreign custody determination in Nevada. (Emphasis added.)⁴ Thus, a review of NRS Chapter 125A and

³We note Grigalanz devotes a substantial portion of his fast track statement to providing factual allegations which he admits were not provided to the district court. Because our review is limited to the record before us, we cannot consider Grigalanz’s additional allegations. *See Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev.*, 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981) (providing that this court lacks the “power to look outside of the record of a case” and “cannot consider matters not properly appearing in the record on appeal”). For the same reason, we deny Grigalanz’s pending motion to supplement the record on appeal with documents not provided to the district court.

⁴Given NRS 125A.465(1)’s reference to “[a] child custody determination *issued by a court of another state*,” (emphasis added), we

the plain language of NRS 125A.135 demonstrate this statute does not provide Grigalanz with standing to seek custody.

Likewise, Grigalanz's reliance on the *in loco parentis* doctrine is unavailing. Grigalanz has not identified any Nevada authority utilizing the *in loco parentis* doctrine to provide standing for an unrelated individual to seek custody of minor children. Instead, our review of Nevada caselaw demonstrates that this doctrine primarily arises within the context of equitable adoption. See *Sargeant v. Sargeant*, 88 Nev. 223, 230, 495 P.2d 618, 623 (1972) (holding the doctrine of equitable adoption does not apply even though the appellant placed himself in the "place of a parent (*in loco parentis*)" as there was no promise to adopt); see also *Frye v. Frye*, 103 Nev. 301, 303, 738 P.2d 505, 506 (1987) (discussing that an individual who places themselves *in loco parentis*, without a promise to adopt, is insufficient to establish equitable adoption). And we are not persuaded by Grigalanz's reliance on extra-jurisdictional authorities. Notably, the authorities Grigalanz cites do not consider or otherwise analyze Nevada laws and thus we conclude Grigalanz's arguments fail to establish he has standing to seek custody. See *Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest.*, 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that this court need not consider claims that are unsupported by cogent argument); cf. *Senjab v. Alhulaibi*, 137 Nev. 632, 633-34, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021) ("We will not supply an argument on a party's behalf but review only the issues the parties present.").

We further reject Grigalanz's argument that the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing or was otherwise required to

cannot read NRS 125A.465 as suggesting NRS 125A.135 provides standing for a non-parent to seek custody in the first instance in Nevada.

make best-interest findings before dismissing his petition. Specifically, Grigalanz maintains that even assuming his standing was disputed, the court was nevertheless required to hold a hearing and make “fact-based, best-interest findings” pursuant to NRS 125C.0035(4). Notably, the court did hold a motion hearing, and Grigalanz has failed to demonstrate he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding standing based upon his specific arguments asserted above. *See Myers v. Haskins*, 138 Nev. 553, 558, 513 P.3d 527, 533 (Ct. App. 2022) (holding “evidentiary hearings are designed with this purpose in mind: to resolve disputed questions of fact”). And because this case was resolved through the application of a purely legal question, as Grigalanz conceded he was not biologically related to the children, the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, NRS 125C.0035’s best interest findings are utilized when adjudicating a custody dispute, and because Grigalanz failed to establish he had standing to seek custody, the district court did not need to consider those factors. Thus, relief is unwarranted on this basis.


Because we conclude that Grigalanz failed to demonstrate he had standing based upon his specific arguments, we need not reach Grigalanz’s arguments regarding service or judicial bias.⁵ Accordingly, we

⁵Insofar as Grigalanz raises arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.

We further deny Grigalanz’s emergency motion filed July 6, 2026, as moot.

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.


Bulla, C.J.


Gibbons, J.


Westbrook, J.

cc: Chief Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court
Hon. Mary D. Perry, District Judge, Family Division
Phillip Scott Grigalanz
Elizabeth Marie Copas
Eighth District Court Clerk



FILED
Aug 07 2026
ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

PHILLIP GRIGALANZ,
Appellant,
vs.
ELIZABETH COPAS,
Respondent.

No. 91619


ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REVIEW

Review denied. NRAP 40B(a), (g).

It is so ORDERED.


Herndon, C.J.


Pickering, J.


Parraguirre, J.


Bell, J.


Stiglich, J.


Cadish, J.


Lee, J.

cc: Hon. Mary D. Perry, District Judge
Hon. Jerry A. Wiese, District Judge
Phillip Scott Grigalanz
Elizabeth Marie Copas
The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, in and for the
County of Clark, District Court Clerk

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. WHETHER NEVADA RECOGNIZES, OR SHOULD RECOGNIZE, STANDING FOR A PSYCHOLOGICAL, *DE FACTO*, OR *IN LOCO PARENTIS* PARENT TO COMMENCE AN ORIGINAL CUSTODY OR VISITATION PROCEEDING WHEN A LEGAL PARENT CONSENTED TO AND FOSTERED THE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP, THE PETITIONER AND CHILDREN LIVED TOGETHER, THE PETITIONER UNDERTOOK SUBSTANTIAL PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITHOUT COMPENSATION, AND A BONDED AND DEPENDENT PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP RESULTED.
2. WHETHER NRS 125A.135'S EXPRESS RECOGNITION OF A "PERSON ACTING AS A PARENT," READ TOGETHER WITH THE OPERATIVE JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS OF NRS CHAPTER 125A, NEVADA CUSTODY LAW, AND EQUITABLE FAMILY-LAW PRINCIPLES, PERMITS OR SUPPORTS STANDING TO COMMENCE AN ORIGINAL NEVADA CUSTODY PROCEEDING.
3. WHETHER NEVADA MAY RECOGNIZE A "PERSON ACTING AS A PARENT" FOR PURPOSES OF INTERSTATE CUSTODY JURISDICTION, REGISTRATION, RECOGNITION, AND ENFORCEMENT, YET CATEGORICALLY DENY AN IDENTICALLY SITUATED PERSON ACCESS TO AN ORIGINAL NEVADA CUSTODY PROCEEDING MERELY BECAUSE NO SISTER STATE ENTERED A CUSTODY DETERMINATION FIRST.
4. WHETHER THAT DISPARATE TREATMENT RAISES SUBSTANTIAL CONCERNS UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF INTERSTATE TRAVEL, AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT PRINCIPLES, WARRANTING A CONSTRUCTION THAT GIVES MEANINGFUL EFFECT TO THE STATUTORY STATUS RATHER THAN MAKING ACCESS TO NEVADA COURTS DEPEND UPON PRIOR ADJUDICATION IN ANOTHER STATE.

The practical availability of legal recognition therefore depends upon whether a different state's court adjudicated the status first.

Petitioner recognizes that this is not express discrimination based solely upon state citizenship. The existence of a prior judgment is not identical to citizenship or residence. Petitioner therefore does not contend that the Fourteenth Amendment automatically creates a substantive custody right.

The resulting disparity nevertheless raises substantial constitutional questions and strongly supports review.

1. Equal protection.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally requires similarly situated persons to receive like treatment unless the distinction is constitutionally justified.

Two persons may satisfy the same UCCJEA definition, have performed the same parental functions, and possess the same relationship with a child. Under the affirmance, however, they may receive radically different access to Nevada courts depending upon whether one obtained an adjudication in another state first.

This Court should determine whether Nevada law actually requires that result or whether Chapter 125A and Nevada's family-law principles should be harmonized

to provide a lawful original-action pathway subject to demanding threshold requirements.

2. Procedural due process and meaningful access to adjudication.

Once Nevada expressly recognizes a “person acting as a parent” as a legally relevant participant in child-custody jurisdiction, an interpretation denying that person every procedural mechanism for establishing the claimed status risks rendering the statutory recognition illusory.

Petitioner does not claim an automatic entitlement to custody. He claims an entitlement to a constitutionally adequate opportunity to establish threshold status before the court rejects the claim on its merits.

3. Interstate travel and equal citizenship.

The constitutional right to interstate travel includes a component protecting citizens who enter another state against discriminatory treatment as disfavored newcomers. *Saenz v. Roe*, 526 U.S. 489, 500–04 (1999).

The decision below does not expressly classify parties by the duration of their Nevada residence. *Saenz* therefore does not independently decide this case. It nevertheless reinforces the need for review where access to recognition may effectively depend upon which state the family occupied, whether the caregiver moved across state lines, or whether another state entered an order first.

4. Article IV Privileges and Immunities.

Article IV, Section 2 restricts discrimination against citizens of other states concerning fundamental activities and access to important state institutions. See *Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper*, 470 U.S. 274, 279–82 (1985).

The affirmance does not expressly state that a Colorado citizen may not file. Petitioner therefore presents Article IV as a constitutional-avoidance and interstate-uniformity concern, not as an independently dispositive rule.

Uniform interstate custody legislation should not be construed to leave an out-of-state citizen categorically unable to establish a status that Nevada would recognize after another jurisdiction entered judgment.

5. Full Faith and Credit.

Full Faith and Credit gives strong protection to final sister-state judgments. *Baker v. General Motors Corp.*, 522 U.S. 222, 232–35 (1998). A state may not ordinarily close its courts to a sister-state claim merely because its own policy differs. *Hughes v. Fetter*, 341 U.S. 609, 611–13 (1951).

Petitioner does not presently rely upon a sister-state judgment declaring him a parent. Full Faith and Credit therefore does not itself compel Nevada to recognize his claimed status.

II. ROUTING STATEMENT

Routing to the Nevada Court of Appeals is appropriate under NRAP 17(b)(5) and (7) because this appeal concerns child custody, statutory interpretation, constitutional due-process issues, and judicial-disqualification matters.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court erred in denying Appellant standing despite undisputed evidence that he acted *in loco parentis* for eight months, performed all daily parental duties, and was accepted by all three children as Dad/Father/Papi; improperly limited standing to biological parents, contrary to nationwide psychological-parent and *in loco parentis* authority, including *V.C. v. M.J.B.*, *Holtzman v. Knott*, *In re Custody of C.C.R.S.*, and *T.B. v. L.R.M.*
2. Whether the district court erred by refusing to apply NRS 125C.0035, NRS 125C.0035(4)(a)–(l), NRS 128.012 and NRS 128.0126 by making no best-interest findings whatsoever and by ignoring evidence of sexual abuse, domestic violence, neglect, parentification, the children’s expressed wishes, and risk of harm.
3. Whether the court violated due process by refusing to review or admit Appellant’s proffered evidence, including documents, sworn statements, CPS records, police information, and forensic-interview related materials; truncating the September 10, 2025 hearing to approximately three minutes, thereby depriving

Appellant of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on standing, best interests, and child safety; and relying on NRCP 78 “on the papers” procedures to resolve disputed factual issues.

4. Whether the court erred by permitting unauthorized participation by an out-of-state attorney without compliance with SCR 42 and without a pro hac vice order.

5. Whether judicial hostility—raising her voice, interrupting Appellant, misstating facts, refusing to view evidence, and telling Appellant “They’re not your kids” and “They do not need you”—constituted bias requiring disqualification under NRS 1.235 and applicable case law.

6. Whether the judge’s categorical refusal to consider Appellant for custody because he is “someone on the registry” constituted unconstitutional prejudgment of fitness and violating federal due process, equal-protection and anti-bias principles under *Stanley v. Illinois* and *Santosky v. Kramer* and *Palmore v. Sidoti* by eliminating individualized assessment of parental fitness and allowing stigma and status-based prejudice to substitute for findings of fact while also violating the individualized-assessment requirement reaffirmed in *Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County* (11th Cir. 2025), which prohibits automatic, registry-based disqualification especially in light of Appellant’s ongoing collateral attack on his

C. The registry-based categorical bar was unconstitutional; federal law requires individualized assessment, not status-based disqualification.

The court's stated premise—"someone on the registry" means "you're not getting these kids"—is an unconstitutional categorical presumption. Due process requires individualized fitness determinations. *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645, 656–58 (1972) (invalidating a categorical presumption of unfitness and requiring individualized hearings). *Santosky v. Kramer*, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982) (due process requires fundamentally fair procedures in adjudications affecting parental interests). *Palmore v. Sidoti*, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1984) (status-based bias cannot substitute for factual best-interest findings).

Consistent with those principles, the Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed that automatic, registry-based disqualification schemes violate the requirement for individualized assessment. *Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa Cnty.*, 135 F.4th 1271, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2025) (discussing constitutional limits on blanket presumptions and emphasizing that conviction/registry status alone is not a substitute for individualized dangerousness findings).

Here, the district court did not weigh any evidence, did not permit Appellant to be heard on safety or best interests, and instead announced a blanket rule based on

registry status—exactly the type of unconstitutional prejudgment condemned in *Stanley*, *Santosky*, and *Palmore*.

D. Interstate flight and concealment were objectively corroborated and legally relevant to jurisdiction, safety, and the need for prompt evidentiary hearing.

Mother's unilateral removal of the children from Nevada after actual notice of impending litigation—and her concealment of their whereabouts—was legally relevant under NRS Chapter 125A (UCCJEA) and to the children's welfare.

The Progressive Snapshot telematics data corroborates rapid interstate flight. The six-day, continuous travel pattern totaling 1,888 miles (July 25–30) supports the inference of immediate relocation away from Nevada jurisdiction and evasion of service. This objective evidence is particularly important because it does not depend on witness credibility; it corroborates (1) service evasion, (2) instability, and (3) interference with the children's continuity of care.

When a parent flees and conceals children, a court's refusal to allow evidence, refusal to authorize workable service alternatives, and dismissal of the petition on categorical grounds creates a procedural trap: the very conduct requiring swift adjudication becomes the reason the caregiver cannot litigate.



1 NEO

2
3
4 **DISTRICT COURT; FAMILY DIVISION**
5 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

6 * * * * *

7 Phillip Grigalanz) Case No.: D-25-713639-P
8 Plaintiff,) Dept. P
9 -vs.-)
10 Elizabeth Copas)
11 Defendant.) **NOTICE OF ENTRY**

12
13 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order, a copy of which is attached
14 hereto, was entered by the Court on October 15, 20215, 2025.

15 Date: October 15, 2025

16
17 /s/ Marj Arena
18 Marj Arena, JEA - Dept. P

19 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

20 I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Nevada Electronic
21 Filing and Conversion Rules a copy of this document was electronically served,
22 on the date filed, to all registered users on this case in the Eighth Judicial District
23 Court Electronic Filing System; or via US Mail or regular email to the last
24 known mail/email addresses on file with the court.

25 Phillip Grigalanz Elizabeth Copas
26 Ayanafranks6@gmail.com hairem617@gmail.com
27 Plaintiff Defendant

28 /s/ Marj Arena
Marj Arena, JEA - Dept. P

Heather B. Shinn
CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **ORDR**
2
3

4 **DISTRICT COURT; FAMILY DIVISION**
5 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

6 *****

7 Phillip Grigalanz) Case No.: D-25-713639-P
8) Dept. P
9) Date: 9/10/25
10 Elizabeth Copas) Time: 11:00 am
11) Defendant.)

12 **ORDER**

13 This matter having come before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for
14 Reconsideration, and Plaintiff's Motion for Custody; Plaintiff, self-represented
15 personally appeared in Courtroom 23; and the Plaintiff, making only a special
16 appearance, appeared via Zoom Video Conference, with an attorney to observe; and
17 the Court discussed the issues with the parties.

18 The Court, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, any
19 testimony provided, and being duly and fully advised in the premises, issues the
20 following Findings and Orders:

21 The Court Finds that on the Motion to Reconsider, there was no order
22 actually entered to reconsider from.

23 The Court Finds that in the Complaint for Paternity, (7/22/25- Doc.#2),
24 with the matter assigned to Department P. Plaintiff later filed a Complaint for
25 Custody (7/30/25- Doc.#9), as well as a Motion to Modify Custody (7/30/25-
26 Doc.#10).

1 The Court Finds in the Complaint for Paternity, Phillip admits that he is not
2 the biological parent of any of the subject children: Kimber Copas, Enrique Copas
3 and John Luka Gonzalez. He goes on to state that the Defendant ("Elizabeth"), was
4 involved in legal proceedings and has custody of all three of her children.
5

6 The Court Finds that a review of the Complaint for Paternity indicates
7 Phillip's attentiveness as to issues regarding Kimber. Further, Phillip stated that as
8 soon as Defendant Gonzalez was removed from Elizabeth's home, he immediately
9 moved himself in.

10 The Court Finds Phillip asserted that Elizabeth took all three children with
11 her and went to Indiana.

12 The Court Finds that Phillip filed a Complaint for Custody (7/30/25-
13 Doc.#9).

14 The Court Finds that Phillip filed multiple Subpoenas (7/30/25-Doc #'s 14-
15 24) all seeking medical records of the children, Social Security Administration,
16 school records, financial information, all in connection with the children and their
17 mother. These subpoenas were stricken from the record (minute Order 8/1/25). The
18 Court Finds that these subpoenas seek were issued at a time in which discovery had
19 not begun. In fact the Defendants had not been served, and they sought information
20 in which he had no right to, at that time. He still does not have any rights to this
21 information.

22 The Court Finds that Phillip has had issues regarding service, and the Court
23 indicated in an email that he obtain the services of a professional process service to
24 attempt service and thereafter do a proper Affidavit of Due Diligence. Phillip first
25 sought a Writ with the Nevada Supreme Court, which was denied due to lack of
26 service (8/6/25). It should be noted that Phillip filed another Affidavit of Due
27 Diligence (9/10/25-Doc.#43), prior to the hearing, and while it is signed by a
28 professional process server, the form was not completely filled out as required to
obtain an Order for Alternate Service.

1 The Court Finds that Phillip filed a Notice of Pending UCCJEA Action in
2 Another State (8/14/25-Doc#30), wherein Phillip commenced a Petition for
3 Temporary Jurisdiction and Custody, under Case No.: 19C01-2508-DC-596, in
4 Dubois County Circuit Court, Indiana 8/13/25). His application was denied
5 (8/19/25), and Phillip appealed that order, the result of which is unknown. It should
6 be noted that this Petition also first centers around Elizabeth's 15 year old daughter,
7 Kimber, which is concerning, as it states Kimber being coached to say whatever
8 sexual occurrence was did not happen.

9
10 The Court Finds that due to text messages with his brother stating that
11 Timothy would testify against him, Phillip filed a Motion in Limine, which the
12 Court denied in its Order (9/8/25-Doc.#40).

13 The Court Finds that Phillip sought a Temporary Protection Order
14 ("TPO") against his brother, Timothy, under Case No.: T-25-257751-T, also
15 regarding the text messages with Timothy. The TPO was denied. A review of the
16 TPO Application (9/5/25- Doc.#2), at page 1, indicates that he sought a TPO for
17 both himself and the three subject children in the custody matter, and that he listed
18 Elizabeth Copas as the mother and himself as the father, and he signed that
19 application under the penalties of perjury, knowing that he was not the father to
20 these children.

21 The Court Finds that at the hearing on September 10, 2025, Elizabeth
22 stated that Phillip is listed in the National Sex Offender Registry, to which Phillip
23 acknowledged he was on the National Sex Offender Registry.

24 The Court Finds that Phillip claimed in loco parentis as his ability to have
25 standing. The Court Finds that the children have a mother and father, and does not
26 require Phillip's assistance with the children. Phillip's reliance on the doctrine is
27 misplaced.

28 The Court Finds that moving into the same household and staying there for
a period of six (6) months, does not give rise to Phillip developing a meaningful
relationship that would warrant at a minimum visitation, much less custody.

1 The Court Finds that Phillip does not have the requisite standing to bring a
2 matter seeking sole custody of children which are not his biological children, or
3 related by familial bloodlines, as such extended family Elizabeth could rely upon if
4 necessary.

5 The Court Finds that Phillip was informed that if he believed something
6 wrong was happening, he should have called the authorities (police, CPS), and let
7 them do their respective jobs. Otherwise it is not his business, and certainly not a
8 reason to seek custody of someone else's children.

9 The Court Finds that everything which has occurred, as well as Phillip
10 being on the National Sex Offender's Registry, he should not be given custody of
11 the children.

12 The Court Finds that immediately following the hearing, Phillip filed a
13 Affidavit (Motion) to Disqualify (9/10/25-Dpc.#43) the undersigned Judicial
14 Officer, which delayed the filing of the within Order. The District Court Chief
15 Judge reviewed this matter and issued his Order (10/2/25-Doc.#57) denying the
16 Motion to Disqualify.


17 The Court Finds that immediately following the issuance of the Order
18 Denying the Motion to Disqualify, Phillip filed a Writ Petition with the Nevada
19 Supreme Court (Case No. 91396-COA), which was denied on October 9, 2025.

20 *NOW, THEREFORE*, with the Court having reviewed the pleadings and papers on
21 file in this matter, admissions and findings made herein, and good cause appearing,
22 It Is Hereby

23 ORDERED that due to lack of standing, this matter shall be Dismissed,
24 with prejudice.

25 **SO ORDERED**

Dated this 15th day of October, 2025

26 
27
28

MARY PERRY
DISTRICT JUDGE
FAMILY DIVISION, DEPT. P
LAS VEGAS, NV 89101-2408

Page 4 of 4

EF4 392 58A5 AE46
Mary Perry
District Court Judge

1 CSERV

2 DISTRICT COURT
3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
4

5
6 In the Matter of the Petition by: CASE NO: D-25-713639-P
7 Phillip Grigalanz, Petitioner. DEPT. NO. Department P
8

9 **AUTOMATED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

10 This automated certificate of service was generated by the Eighth Judicial District
11 Court. The foregoing Order was served via the court's electronic eFile system to all
12 recipients registered for e-Service on the above entitled case as listed below:

13 Service Date: 10/15/2025

14 PHILLIP GRIGALANZ

pgrigalanz1@gmail.com

15 Elizabeth Copas

lizbalash1979@gmail.com

APPENDIX E - CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125A.085 - "Home state" defined.

"Home state" means:

(1) The state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6 consecutive months, including any temporary absence from the state, immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.

(2) In the case of a child less than 6 months of age, the state in which the child lived from birth, including any temporary absence from the state, with a parent or a person acting as a parent.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125A.135 - "Person acting as a parent" defined.

"Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who:

(1) Has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody of the child for a period of 6 consecutive months, including any temporary absence, within 1 year immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding; and

(2) Has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to legal custody pursuant to the law of this state.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125A.305(1)-(3) - Initial child custody jurisdiction.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125A.335, a court of this State has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:

(a) This State is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this State;

(b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (a) or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate forum pursuant to NRS 125A.365 or 125A.375 and:

(1) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this State other than mere physical presence; and

(2) Substantial evidence is available in this State concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships;

(c) All courts having jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this State is the more appropriate forum; or

(d) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction pursuant to the criteria specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

(2) Subsection 1 is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this State.

(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125A.315 - Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.

(1) Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125A.335, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with NRS 125A.305 or 125A.325 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:

(a) A court of this state determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training and personal relationships; or

(b) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.

(2) A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination pursuant to NRS 125A.305.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125A.345 - Notice; opportunity to be heard; joinder.

(1) Before a child custody determination is made pursuant to this chapter, notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with NRS 125A.255 must be given to all persons entitled to notice pursuant to the law of this state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person having physical custody of the child.

(2) The provisions of this chapter do not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard.

(3) The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a child custody proceeding conducted pursuant to this chapter are governed by the law of this state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state.

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125A.465(1) - Registration of child custody determination.

A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to a court of this state which is competent to hear custody matters:

(a) A letter or other document requesting registration;

(b) Two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and

(c) Except as otherwise provided in NRS 125A.385, the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered.