

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DUSTIN BISHOP, PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT.

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, FOURTH DISTRICT*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Petitioner was deprived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury?

This is the same question presented as *Kian v. Florida*, No. 25-6623, in which this Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari on June 15, 2026. Briefing in *Kian* is in progress. Petitioner requests that this Court hold his case pending resolution of *Kian*.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The following is a list of all parties to the proceeding in both the court below and in this Court:

- Dustin A. Bishop
- State of Florida

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

The proceedings listed below are directly related to the above-captioned case in this Court:

Bishop v. State, 434 So. 3d 768 (Mem) (Fla. 4th DCA May 20, 2026).
Judgment entered May 20, 2020.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dustin Bishop respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal is reported as *Bishop v. State*, 434 So. 3d 768 (Mem) (Fla. 4th DCA May 20, 2026), and is reprinted in the appendix. A1.

JURISDICTION

Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences on May 20, 2026. A1.

The Florida Supreme Court is "a court of limited jurisdiction," *Mallet v. State*, 280 So. 3d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 2019) (citation omitted). The court "does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this Court." *Wells v. State*, 132 So. 2d 1110, 1112 (Fla. 2014) (quoting *Persaud v. State*, 838 So. 2d 529, 531-32 (Fla. 2003)).

The decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal merely cited to *Guzman v. State*, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), which at the time was not pending review in the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear this case, and Petitioner could not seek review in that court.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . .”

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution provides:

Trial by jury.—The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate. The qualifications and the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law.

Section 913.10, Florida Statutes, provides:

Number of jurors.—Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Dustin Bishop was charged with selling methamphetamine, and was subject to a sentencing enhancement for being a “Habitual Felony Offender.” A2. He was convicted by a six-person jury. A2. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison. A2.

On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Petitioner contended, *inter alia*, that he was denied his right to a twelve-member jury under the Sixth Amendment. A3-A15. The district court of appeal affirmed, only citing to a previous case in which it had held that *Williams v. Florida*, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), authorized six-person juries. A1.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS THE SAME QUESTION, IN THE SAME POSTURE, FROM THE SAME LOWER APPELLATE COURT, AS *KIAN v. FLORIDA*, No. 25-6623.

The question presented in this case is not unique to Petitioner. His conviction was the result of routine application of Florida law, allowing for the use of six-person juries in non-capital felony cases. This Court has already determined that it should, and will be, reviewing this question in *Kian v. Florida*, No. 25-6623. The petition for a writ of certiorari in that case was granted on June 15, 2026, and briefing is in progress. *Kian* comes to this Court from Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, just as Petitioner's case does.

There is no meaningful distinguishing feature between *Kian* and Petitioner's case. This Court should grant this petition for a writ of certiorari for the sake of consistency and fundamental fairness. Petitioner is not requesting additional briefing or oral argument beyond that which will occur in *Kian*, he simply requests that this Court apply whatever rule results in that case to his own.

The following section restates the argument made in the petition for a writ of certiorari filed in *Kian*, which this Court found compelling enough to grant.

II. THE REASONING OF *WILLIAMS v. FLORIDA* HAS BEEN REJECTED, AND THE CASE SHOULD BE OVERRULED.

In *Thompson v. Utah*, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), the Court considered “whether the jury referred to in the original constitution and in the sixth amendment is a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of twelve persons, neither more nor less,” and concluded that “[t]his question must be answered in the affirmative.” *Id.* at 349. It

noted that since the time of Magna Carta, the word “jury” had been understood to mean a body of twelve. *Id.* at 349–50. Because that understanding had been accepted since 1215, the Court reasoned, “[i]t must” have been “that the word ‘jury’ ” in the Sixth Amendment was “placed in the constitution of the United States with reference to [that] meaning affixed to [it].” *Id.* at 350.

In addition to the citations as to this point in *Thompson*, one may note that Blackstone indicated that the right to a jury of twelve is even older, and more firmly established, than the unqualified right to counsel in criminal cases. 4 William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, ch. 27 (“Of Trial and Conviction”). Blackstone traced the right back to the ancient feudal system of trial by “a tribunal composed of twelve good men and true,” and wrote that “it is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can be enjoy or wish for, that he cannot be affected in his property, his liberty or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals.” 3 Blackstone, ch. 23 (“Of the Trial by Jury”).

After *Thompson*, the Court continued to cite the basic principle that the Sixth Amendment requires a twelve-person jury in criminal cases for another seventy years. In 1900, the Court explained that “there [could] be no doubt” “[t]hat a jury composed, as at common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” *Maxwell v. Dow*, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900). Thirty years later, this Court reiterated that it was “not open to question” that “the phrase ‘trial by jury’ ” in the Constitution incorporated juries’ “essential elements” as “they were recognized in this country and England,” including the requirement

that they “consist of twelve men, neither more nor less.” *Patton v. United States*, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). And as recently as 1968, the Court remarked that “by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases had been in existence for several centuries and carried impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta,” such as the necessary inclusion of twelve members. *Duncan v. Louisiana*, 391 U.S. 145, 151–152 (1968).

In *Williams v. Florida*, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), however, the Court retreated from this line of precedent, holding that trial by a jury of six does not violate the Sixth Amendment. However, Petitioner submits that *Williams* was incorrectly decided and is contrary to the understanding of the Sixth Amendment at the time of the Founding. See *Cunningham v. State*, 144 S. Ct. 1287–88 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Williams recognized that the Framers “may well” have had “the usual expectation” in drafting the Sixth Amendment “that the jury would consist of 12” members. *Id.*, 399 U.S. at 98–99. But it concluded that such “purely historical considerations” were not dispositive. *Id.* at 99. Rather, it focused on the “function” that the jury plays in the Constitution, concluding that the “essential feature” of a jury is it leaves justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen” and thus allows “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community participation and [with] shared responsibility.” *Id.* at 100–01. It wrote that “currently available evidence [and] theory” suggested that function could just as easily be performed with six jurors as with twelve. *Id.* at 101–102 & n.48; cf. *Burch v. Louisiana*, 441

U.S. 130, 137 (1979) (acknowledging that *Williams* and its progeny “departed from the strictly historical requirements of jury trial”).

Petitioner submits that *Williams* is contrary to the history and precedents discussed above, and cannot be squared with the subsequent ruling in *Ramos v. Louisiana*, 590 U. S. 83 (2020), that the Sixth Amendment’s “trial by an impartial jury” requirement encompasses what the term “meant at the Sixth Amendment’s adoption,” *id.* at 90. That term meant trial by a jury of twelve whose verdict must be unanimous. As the Court noted in *Ramos*, Blackstone recognized that under the common law, “no person could be found guilty of a serious crime unless ‘the truth of every accusation . . . should . . . be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors[.]’” *Ibid.* (emphasis added). “A ‘verdict, taken from eleven, was no verdict’ at all.” *Ibid.*

Ramos held that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict a person of a serious offense. In reaching that conclusion, it overturned *Apodaca v. Oregon*, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), a decision that it faulted for “subject[ing] the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment.” 509 U.S. at 100.

The reasoning of *Ramos* undermines the reasoning on which *Williams* rests. *Ramos* rejected the same kind of “cost-benefit analysis” undertaken in *Williams*, observing that it is not for the Court to “distinguish between the historic features of common law jury trials that (we think) serve ‘important enough functions to migrate silently into the Sixth Amendment and those that don’t.’” 590 U.S. at 98.

The Court wrote that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial must be restored to its original meaning, which included the right to jury unanimity:

Our real objection here isn't that the *Apodaca* plurality's cost-benefit analysis was too skimpy. The deeper problem is that the plurality subjected the ancient guarantee of a unanimous jury verdict to its own functionalist assessment in the first place. And Louisiana asks us to repeat the error today, just replacing *Apodaca*'s functionalist assessment with our own updated version. All this overlooks the fact that, at the time of the Sixth Amendment's adoption, the right to trial by jury *included* a right to a unanimous verdict. When the American people chose to enshrine that right in the Constitution, they weren't suggesting fruitful topics for future cost-benefit analyses. They were seeking to ensure that their children's children would enjoy the same hard-won liberty they enjoyed. As judges, it is not our role to reassess whether the right to a unanimous jury is "important enough" to retain. With humility, we must accept that this right may serve purposes evading our current notice. We are entrusted to preserve and protect that liberty, not balance it away aided by no more than social statistics.

Ramos, 590 U.S. at 100 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).

The same reasoning applies to the historical right to a jury of twelve: When the People enshrined the jury trial right in the Constitution, they did not attach a rider that future judges could adapt it based on latter-day social science views.

Further, even if one were to accept the functionalist logic of *Williams* — that the Sixth Amendment is subject to reinterpretation on the basis of social science — it invites, nay demands, that it be periodically revisited to determine whether the social science holds up. And here we encounter a serious problem: it was based on research that was out of date shortly after the opinion issued.

Williams "[f]ound little reason to think" that the goals of the jury guarantee, which included providing "a fair possibility for obtaining a representative[] cross-

section of the community,” were “in any meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury numbers six, than when it numbers 12.” *Id.* 399 U.S. at 100. It theorized that “in practice the difference between the 12-man and the six-man jury in terms of the cross-section of the community represented seems likely to be negligible.” *Id.* at 102.

Since *Williams*, that determination has proven incorrect. This Court acknowledged as much just eight years later in *Ballew v. Georgia*, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), when it concluded that the Sixth Amendment barred the use of a five-person jury. Although *Ballew* did not overturn *Williams*, it observed that empirical studies conducted in the intervening years highlighted several problems with its assumptions. For example, *Ballew* noted that more recent research showed that (1) “smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group deliberation,” *id.* at 233, (2) smaller juries may be less accurate and cause “increasing inconsistency” in verdict results, *id.* at 234, (3) the chance for hung juries decreases with smaller juries, disproportionately harming the defendant, *id.* at 236; and (4) decreasing jury sizes “foretell[] problems ... for the representation of minority groups in the community,” undermining a jury’s likelihood of being “truly representative of the community,” *id.* at 236–37. Moreover, the *Ballew* Court “admit[ted]” that it “d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and five,” effectively acknowledging that the studies it relied on also cast doubt on the effectiveness of the six-member jury. *Id.* at 239; *see also id.* at 245–46 (Powell, J.) (agreeing that five-member juries are unconstitutional, while acknowledging that “the line between five- and six-member

juries is difficult to justify”).

Post-*Ballew* research has further undermined *Williams*. As already noted, *Williams* itself identified the “function” of the Sixth Amendment as leaving justice to the “commonsense judgment of a group of laymen” and thus allowing “guilt or innocence” to be determined via “community participation and [with] shared responsibility.” 399 U.S. at 100–01. That function is thwarted by reducing the number of jurors to six. Smaller juries are perforce less representative of the community, and they are less consistent than larger juries. *See, e.g.,* Shamena Anwar, et al., *The Impact of Jury Race In Criminal Trials*, 127 Q.J. Of Econ. 1017, 1049 (2012) (finding that “increasing the number of jurors on the seated jury would substantially reduce the variability of the trial outcomes, increase black representation in the jury pool and on seated juries, and make trial outcomes more equal for white and black defendants”); Diamond et al., *Achieving Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge*, 6 J. of Empirical Legal Stud. 425, 427 (Sept. 2009) (“reducing jury size inevitably has a drastic effect on the representation of minority group members on the jury”); Higginbotham et al., *Better by the Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury*, 104 Judicature 47, 52 (Summer 2020) (“Larger juries are also more inclusive and more representative of the community. ... In reality, cutting the size of the jury dramatically increases the chance of excluding minorities.”).

Other important considerations also weigh in favor of the twelve-member jury. Twelve-member juries deliberate longer, recall evidence better, and rely less

on irrelevant factors during deliberation. See Smith & Saks, *The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida and the Six-Person Jury*, 60 Fla. L. Rev. 441, 465 (2008).

Minority views are also more likely to be thoroughly expressed in a larger jury, as “having a large minority helps make the minority subgroup more influential,” and, unsurprisingly, “the chance of minority members having allies is greater on a twelve-person jury.” Smith & Saks, 60 Fla. L. Rev. at 466. Finally, larger juries deliver more predictable results. In the civil context, for example, “[s]ix-person juries are four times more likely to return extremely high or low damage awards compared to the average.” Higginbotham et al., 104 *Judicature* at 52.

Importantly, the history of Florida’s rule can be traced to the Jim Crow era. Justice Gorsuch has observed that “[d]uring the Jim Crow era, some States restricted the size of juries and abandoned the demand for a unanimous verdict as part of a deliberate and systematic effort to suppress minority voices in public affairs.” *Khorrami v. Arizona*, 143 S. Ct. 22, 27 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citations omitted). He noted, however, that Arizona’s law was likely motivated by costs not race. *Id.* But Florida’s jury of six did arise in that Jim Crow era of a “deliberate and systematic effort to suppress minority voices in public affairs.” *Id.* The historical background is as follows:

In 1875, the Jury Clause of the 1868 constitution was amended to provide that the number of jurors “for the trial of causes in any court may be fixed by law.”

See Florida Fertilizer & Mfg. Co. v. Boswell, 34 So. 241, 241 (Fla. 1903). The common law rule of a jury of twelve was still kept in Florida while federal troops remained in the state. There was no provision for a jury of less than twelve until the Legislature enacted a provision specifying a jury of six in Chapter 3010, section 6, Laws of Florida (1877). *See Gibson v. State*, 16 Fla. 291, 297–98 (1877); *Florida Fertilizer*, 34 So. at 241.

The Florida Legislature enacted chapter 3010 with the jury-of-six provision on February 17, 1877. *Gibson*, 16 Fla. 294. This was less than a month after the last federal troops were withdrawn from Florida in January 1877. See Jerrell H. Shofner, *Reconstruction and Renewal, 1865–1877*, in *The History of Florida* 273 (Michael Gannon, ed., first paperback edition 2018) (“there were [no federal troops] in Florida after 23 January 1877”).

The jury-of-six thus first saw light at the birth of the Jim Crow era as former Confederates regained power in southern states and state prosecutors made a concerted effort to prevent blacks from serving on jurors.

On its face, the 1868 constitution extended the franchise to black men. But the historical context shows that that it was part of the overall resistance to Reconstruction efforts to protect the rights of black citizens. The constitution was the product of a remarkable series of events including a coup in which leaders of the white southern (or native) faction took possession of the assembly hall in the middle of the night, excluding Radical Republican delegates from the proceedings. See Richard L. Hume, *Membership of the Florida Constitutional Convention of 1868: A*

Case Study of Republican Factionalism in the Reconstruction South, 51 Fla. Hist. Q. 1, 5–6 (1972); Shofner at 266. A reconciliation was effected as the “outside” whites “united with the majority of the body’s native whites to frame a constitution designed to continue white dominance.” Hume at 15.

The purpose of the resulting constitution was spelled out by Harrison Reed, a leader of the prevailing faction and the first governor elected under the 1868 constitution, who wrote to Senator Yulee that the new constitution was constructed to bar blacks from legislative office: “Under our Constitution the Judiciary & State officers will be appointed & the apportionment will prevent a negro legislature.” Hume, 15–16. *See also* Shofner 266.

Smaller juries and non-unanimous verdicts were part of a Jim Crow era effort “to suppress minority voices in public affairs.” *Khorrami v. Arizona*, 143 S. Ct. 22, 27 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also *Ramos*, 590 U.S. at 126–27 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (non-unanimity was enacted “as one pillar of a comprehensive and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures against African-Americans, especially in voting and jury service.”). The history of Florida’s jury of six arises from the same historical context.

And when the Florida Legislature reduced the size of juries from twelve to six in 1877, it also re-established the “integrity, fair character, sound judgment and intelligence” test for jury service. Ch. 3010, Laws of Fla. (1877). This discretionary standard was “used to eliminate almost every black citizen from the southern trial venire.” Douglas L. Colbert, *Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a*

Prohibition against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 Corn. L. Rev. 1, 89-90 (1990). So rare was it for an African American to serve on a jury that it was worthy of a news article, and this was so well into the twentieth century:

“It is strange that the presence of a negro on the jury should not have attracted sufficient attention to have caused an inquiry into his eligibility as a jury man.” *That Federal Jury*, Panama City Pilot, Nov. 27, 1924, at 1.

“At one point it looked as though the first negro juror in Monroe County was to be selected.” *Child Molesting Trial Jury Chosen*, Key West Citizen, Dec. 11, 1952, at 1, 3.

“A negro juror was picked today to try Felix Combs, a negro roustabout, for raping a Clearwater woman. Selection of Henry Davis of Tarpon Springs marked one of the few times a negro has been selected for jury duty.” *Negro Juror*, Sanford Herald, Oct. 4, 1948, at 1.

“The names of several Negroes were included in the 1950 jury list. Last fall, the county’s first Negro juror served when Calvin Smith was named on the venire which heard a cattle rustling case in Circuit Court.” *First Two Women are Picked for Possible Jury Duty in County*, Citrus Cnty. Chron., Feb. 16, 1950, at 1.

“The trio are charged with misappropriation of funds. A jury was completed this morning, consisting of eleven white men and one negro.” *One Negro on the Jury*, DeLand Daily News, March 3, 1915, at 3.

To top it off, the Legislature in that same session established convict leasing. Ch. 3034, Laws of Fla. (1877) (state prisoners); Ch. 2090, Laws of Fla. (1877)

(county prisoners). “By 1900, the South’s judicial system had been wholly reconfigured to make one of its primary purposes the coercion of African Americans to comply with the social customs and labor demands of whites.” Douglas A. Blackmon, *SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II* 7-8 (2008); *see also* Matthew J. Mancini, *ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866-1928* (1996) (noting the steady growth of Southern prison populations after the establishment of convict leasing: “Florida, with 125 prisoner in 1881, had 1,071 by 1904.”).

This sad history casts into relief another negative consequence of smaller juries: it denies a great number of citizens the “duty, honor, and privilege of jury service.” *Powers v. Ohio*, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). Many consider jury service an “amazing and powerful opportunity and experience—one that will strengthen your sense of humanity and your own responsibility.” United States Courts, *Juror Experiences*.¹ Jury service, like civic deliberation in general, “not only resolves conflicts in a way that yields improved policy outcomes, it also transforms the participants in the deliberation in important ways—altering how they think of themselves and their fellow citizens.” John Gastil & Phillip J. Weiser, *Jury Service as an Invitation to Citizenship: Assessing the Civic Values of Institutionalized Deliberation*, 34 *Pol’y Stud. J.* 605, 606 (2006). Jury service is a “means of affording every citizen the chance to step into the state’s shoes, to see the inner workings of

¹ Available at: <https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/learn-about-jury-service/juror-experiences>

the justice system, and to feel first-hand the power of self-government. In other words, the jury is a sacred, institutionalized opportunity for citizens to experience the transformative power of public deliberation.” *Id.* at 619.

In view of the foregoing, this Court should grant the petition, recede from *Williams*, restore the ancient right to a jury of twelve and reverse Petitioner’s convictions.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted or held pending the disposition of *Kian v. Florida*, No. 25-6623.

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