


# ORIGINAL

No. 26-5493



IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

*Respondent*

vs.

William Peterman, Jr.

*Petitioner, pro se*

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO  
the Court of Common Pleas, York County Pennsylvania

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

William Peterman, jr  
230 Elizabeth Lane #4  
Manchester PA 17345  
484-219-4563

WPETERMANJR@GMAIL.COM

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- Whether a state license qualifies as a federal license for the purpose of regulatory oversight

In the context of 50 states comprising one nation, is a state license a federal license?

Does a state agency violate its scope of powers on interstate exchange of consequential information for the satisfaction of its administrative claim?

- Whether independence is a responsibility, not only a right

Does a state have legal capacity and authority to override its own premise of independence, to shirk the natural duties thereof?

Do the states have federal authority where a federal authority is absent? If so, then is each state required independently to evaluate such use of authority?

**PARTIES**

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

William Peterman, Jr.

**PROCEEDINGS**

Court of Common Pleas of York County Pennsylvania

No. CP-67--SA-0000391-2024,

No. CP-67--SA-0000392-2024,

*Commonwealth v. Peterman*, 13 February 2025

Superior Court of Pennsylvania, No. 351 MDA 2025,

*Commonwealth v. Peterman*, 25 July 2025

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, No. 520 MAL 2025

*Commonwealth v. Peterman*, 6 April 2026

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

|                                                 | <i>Page</i> |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Questions presented . . . . .                   | <i>i</i>    |
| Parties and Proceedings . . . . .               | <i>ii</i>   |
| Table of contents . . . . .                     | <i>iii</i>  |
| Table of authorities . . . . .                  | <i>iv</i>   |
| Opinions below . . . . .                        | 1           |
| Jurisdiction . . . . .                          | 2           |
| Constitutional / Statutory provisions . . . . . | 3           |
| Statement of facts . . . . .                    | 6           |
| Statement of case . . . . .                     | 9           |
| Reasons for granting writ . . . . .             | 27          |
| Appendix . . . . .                              | 29          |
| Appendix A through H . . . . .                  | 1a–15a      |

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

*Page*

**Constitutional provisions**

|                                              |        |
|----------------------------------------------|--------|
| U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5 . . . . .     | 11, 15 |
| U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, § 1 . . . . | 25     |
| Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 1, § 10   | 11     |

**Statutes**

|                                    |    |
|------------------------------------|----|
| 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d–1692e . . . . . | 22 |
| 28 U.S.C. § 1257 . . . . .         | 2  |

**Other Authorities**

|                               |    |
|-------------------------------|----|
| Pa. R. Crim. P. 109 . . . . . | 13 |
|-------------------------------|----|

## OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is unreported, and reprinted in the Appendix at App. *1a*.  
*Commonwealth v. Peterman*, No. 520 MAL 2025;  
6 April 2026

The Order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is unreported, and reprinted in the Appendix at App. *3a*.  
*Commonwealth v. Peterman*, No. 351 MDA 2025;  
25 July 2025

The statement of the Court of Common Pleas of York County Pennsylvania is reprinted in the Appendix at App. *6a*. *Commonwealth v. Peterman*,  
Nos. CP-67-SA-0000391-2024, 0000392-2024;  
4 April 2025

## **JURISDICTION**

The judgment of Pennsylvania's Supreme Court was entered on the 6<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2026.

It is a final judgment.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) and Supreme Court Rule 10.

This case involves a substantial federal question and a conflict of state convictions while also a challenge to a state rule, commencing at the Court of Common Pleas of York County Pennsylvania, who entered judgment on the 13<sup>th</sup> day of February 2025.

Appeal filed by the Defendant to Pennsylvania Superior Court, who ordered the Appeal quashed on July 25, 2025.

Petition followed to Pennsylvania Supreme Court, denied the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 2026.

## CONSTITUTIONAL / STATUTORY PROVISIONS

### U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; **nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.**  
(emphasis added)

### U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14, § 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. **No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.**  
(emphasis added)

Pa. Const., Article 1, § 10, double jeopardy clause:

**twice in jeopardy;**

No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;

15 U.S.C. § 1692d /

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 806:

A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, **oppress**, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. [...]

(emphasis added)

15 U.S.C. § 1692e /

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 807:

A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:

(1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.

(2) The **false representation** of --

(A) the **character**, amount, or **legal status** of any debt; or [...]

(emphasis added)

Pa. R. Crim. P. 109.

Defects in Form, Content, or Procedure

A defendant shall not be discharged nor shall a case be dismissed because of a defect in the form or content of a complaint, citation, summons, or warrant, or a defect in the procedures of these rules, **unless the defendant** raises the defect before the conclusion of the trial in a summary case or before the conclusion of the preliminary hearing in a court case, and the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.

(emphasis added)

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

### *Of general premise:*

- The United States of America does not issue a federal driver's license.
- A state driver's license issues only to residents of the state.
- A driver's license is voluntary, regardless its exceptional privilege and common use.  
(Driving is voluntary; then also its conditional compliance.)
- A suspension of driver's license (minimally at specific case) carries upon its expiration a reinstatement fee.
- A suspension-reinstatement is a suspension which depends only reinstatement by fee.
- Undue leverage is an illegal debt-collection practice.

*Of specific case:*

South Carolina DMV issued 1 termed suspension and reinstatement, and 2 additional suspension-reinstatements against Petitioner's driver's license in 2017. The term of suspension expired 07/01/2017. The suspension-reinstatements (3) do not expire.

New Jersey DMV issued driver's license to Petitioner on 04/04/2018, and required surrender of his South Carolina driver's license while effectively voiding it.

South Carolina DMV posted its reinstatement fees to the National Driver Register as unpaid suspensions.

Pennsylvania DOT refused to issue driver's license to Petitioner in July 2020 due to the NDR stating open suspension.

Pennsylvania DOT refused Petitioner's pleas for evaluation with disproof per alleged suspensions.

Though voided by and surrendered at subsequent active driver's license, Petitioner's South Carolina driver's license expired 04/14/2026.

Petitioner's New Jersey driver's license expired 12/31/2021.

Without driver's license, the state of Pennsylvania denies car insurance.\*

Without car insurance (or financial responsibility), the state of Pennsylvania denies registration.

Without either driver's license or both financial responsibility and registration, the state of Pennsylvania denies inspection.

**STATEMENT OF CASE**

Upon the claim of South Carolina rightly not paid, the Petitioner's circumstance reached fullest consequence, of which the lack of registration prompted automated alert for traffic stop, which resulted citations (3):

Driving While Operating Privilege Suspended,  
Operating Vehicle Without Required Financial  
Responsibility, and  
Driving Unregistered Vehicle.

The citations arose to court appearance, which the Courts of Pennsylvania have errantly favored, prompting Petition to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In below Courts, Petitioner argued the dependence of inspection, registration, and financial responsibility on the issuance of driver's license via Pennsylvania statute inherently. For example, a car insurance policy is not issued by state-licensed agent without a driver's

license on the policy\*; the state does not process payment of registration without proof of insurance; a car dealership does not issue inspection sticker without requisite documentation. The dealership only abides the law, the registration is handled directly by the state, and the insurance provider only abides the law. Competition and profit pose a hypothetical supply for insurance and inspection, naturally not self-restricting. Therefore, constriction on each compliance is by the statute inherently.

---

\*There is exception to the criterion of driver's license to comply insurance in Pennsylvania. It is afforded by one insurance provider. Being the only provider to unlicensed drivers, it is the exception and not the rule. Prior to this knowledge, a state-licensed agent represented otherwise: without license a policy is ineligible to write, which Petitioner retained as written representation and proof. Being licensed by the state to represent insurance products per state requisites, and without a true awareness otherwise advertised, the notice suffices cause not to seek further. Pennsylvania effectively prerequired license for insurance, and continues practice.

The Petitioner at most committed one offense:  
driving while not licensed to drive, and was forced by  
law to be without financial responsibility, registration,  
and inspection because the non-issuance of license.

These successive citations constitute double jeopardy,  
through multiplicity, for their exclusive dependence  
on a single fault already charged: the absent license,  
which is protected in the Constitutions of the  
United States and Pennsylvania, respectively  
the 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment and Article 1 at Section 10.

Due to Pennsylvania statute interfering with the  
independence of its prerequisite criteria, the Petitioner  
is faultless their charges. Faultless means not guilty.

A state has no right to convict independent per  
noncompliance unless the compliance is independently  
achievable, because the potential, as at case, for a

faultless deficiency of corequisite.

Petitioner does not owe to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania more than citation per driver's license.

However, Petitioner also does not owe per deficiency of license because the citation errantly cited code, while also because a conflict of justice per adjacent conviction, and further because the flaws of administration to deny in-state license, having federal significance and application.

The Commonwealth cited Driving While Operating Privilege Suspended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a).

At that time, the Petitioner had no valid license.

A valid license is primary to a suspended license. To activate or void a license is permanent; to suspend is temporary. A fact of no valid license is heavier than a fact of suspension. For this reason, the citation is error.

To reconcile terms, the operating privilege has singular reference to, and is exclusively dependent on, driver's license, at both compliance and citation.

The privilege directly refers to license, and not to an account with the state. Though an operating privilege implies different definition than driver's license, its exclusive reference or the exclusive cause at incident limits the interpretation to the status of the license.

Without a driver's license, the incorrect citation is a suspended driver's license. At trial hearing, Petitioner raised the issue of the defect in the content of the complaint, and the defect is prejudicial to the rights of the Defendant, of due process and defense; protected by Pa. R. Crim. P. 109.

Further of the failure which is Pennsylvania, a second and third incident occurred resulting the

same citations and of the same exact circumstance of Petitioner.

Those citations also arose to court, at Pennsylvania's Supreme Court, No. 19 MAL 2026, of Pennsylvania's Superior Court, No. 626 MDA 2025, of the Court of Common Pleas, York County, No. CP-67-SA-0000032-2025. One officer conducted both of those incidents (tried as one summary appeal), and made the same mistake as the officer conducting at first incident, but corrected the mistake at the third incident. The result was a subsequent and equal citation of Driving While Operating Privilege Suspended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a), which the officer withdrew, and a citation of Driving Without A License, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1501(a), which the same Courts convicted and upheld.

The equal circumstance and same Defendant in all incidents means that either of these convictions legally necessitates acquittal of the other. The convictions are legally defective. The verdicts cannot stand.

However, an acquittal is inviolate and final, barred from overturn on the basis of inconsistent verdict by the 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A withdrawal of charge holds the same effect as acquittal, at parallel case. The withdrawal similarly can't be overturned, and it matches the conviction at case, which by consistency requires the conviction to overturn. Such withdrawal has to count as does an acquittal because it deprived the Defendant of its equal verdict.

Per the matter of license and summarily to the incident, Petitioner was wrongly disallowed a driver's license. Therefore, it can't count against him that he

did not have one.

The federal question at the cause of incident is whether a state license has authority to exercise as a federal license, not only its privilege to affect reciprocal within the federal boundary but also enforcement against.

Without such answer, the collective administration on driving privilege is flawed profusely, innately demanding intervention.

1. A reinstatement as a suspension is a failed practice.

It is in fact a reinstatement to the state license. It has no federal grounds to prevent licensing in other states. It thereby fails as a suspension, which communicates interstate.

2. A suspension-reinstatement has no merit because a driver's license is voluntary.

It is a suspension only until the reinstatement, and reinstatement is not mandatory because a driver's license is not mandatory.

The suspension has no genuine purpose because its singular condition is optional. By the nature of its only cause, the suspension has to be inabsolute, or not effectively a suspension. You can't put a lien on an optional payment. Therefore, a suspension-reinstatement has no authentic premise to suspend. The suspension is actually vacant and ineligible to effect.

3. A suspension-reinstatement has no merit to report to the National Driver Register, on several counts:
  - › A suspension-reinstatement is a claim for reinstatement, which pertains the state license, and thereby isolates to only the state.

The report has no use nationally; and a debt pertaining only a state can't serve by national network.

- › Reinstatement is optional. Therefore, no debt exists.

The reinstatement can't enforce because it is optional, and it is the only requisite to fulfill suspension, which then requires its suspension not to obligate fulfillment. An option to pay is not a claimable debt, nor subsequently also a reportable suspension.

- › Driver licensing is not a federal regulation.

A reinstatement fee reported to a national database for the purpose of regulation treats a state license as a federal license, a natural conflict of law by the premise of independent state and agency.

Depending other states' use of information on the NDR, the information can prevent licensing, inappropriate for the reinstatement of a state license.

- › An out-of-state license can't justify to reinstate.

The purpose of reinstatement can't qualify to a national database.

- › The NDR self-expresses as purposed on 'problem drivers'.

A reinstatement of license is optional, and can't be a problem not to pay. Therefore, a suspension-reinstatement is not a problem, and its report can't suffice the standard of the NDR.

As happened at case, PADOT refused to issue license because the report on the NDR, which leverages the applicant to pay reinstatement fee to South Carolina to reinstate South Carolina license to obtain license from

Pennsylvania. The report to the NDR, thereby, is effectively as though South Carolina issues a federal license, while Pennsylvania's practice reinforces the same. South Carolina does not issue a federal license, rather issues a state license. Because South Carolina is not the federacy, but rather a state, its issuance only could be not federal.

The inherent non-federal license violated its premise as a state license, and the report to the NDR naturally violated the independence of the states. Pennsylvania, which independently issues driver's license, conditioned itself on resolution of suspension per the NDR, which was only a reinstatement to license out-of-state.

The condition in essence is a federal license, which violates the presumption and standard where federal license does not exist.

A report which violates legal premise has no merit to commence nor sustain.

4. It is unlawful to unduly leverage payment of a debt.

Depending individual state practice, a resolution of suspension is the only means to eliminate its record on the NDR. Of the particular criteria at case, the suspension-reinstatements only resolve by paying reinstatement fee.

(Inherent and presumptive is the alternate route of prevalent justice, through representation of error. The Petitioner attempted such repeatedly to SCDMV, NDR, NHTSA, and PADOT, and then to the Pennsylvania Courts. All either excused responsibility or favored the status quo.)

A resolution of record restricted to payment and reported to national consequence qualifies as a debt

collection practice, even if the debt is an error.

A report of suspension-reinstatement to the NDR is violation of law by inherent qualification to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, §§ 806 and 807: to oppress (by consequence against the driving privilege elsewhere) and falsely to represent the character or legal status of a debt.

A national database should have oversight independent from the states for the purpose of integrity in the public interest. Informed through contact with the NDR, which is managed by the NHTSA, there is no such oversight nor any oversight pertaining dispute of the record. The states are permitted to report what they will as though it is valid per the NDR.

An individual state agency, being the only agency to regulate a privilege, should not neglect a valid dispute of the information. The states are independent for the service of independence –one’s own evaluation– and do not have the legal capacity to deny that responsibility. An individual should not be prevented independent evaluation pertaining a privilege nor a prerequisite to another state; but further, an individual should not be precluded a dispute of the information directly with the independent state.

The Petitioner very simply claimed to the PADOT that the NDR report was errant, while offering documentary proof, and was denied the potential.

A state license should not have been conditioned reinstatement to an out-of-state license because

there isn't a federal license, but a dispute of the facts should not have been denied pertaining an independent privilege.

SCDMV should not have reported a suspension-reinstatement to the NDR.

NDR should not have accepted report of a suspension-reinstatement.

NDR and NHTSA should provide dispute resolution per its own record.

All state agencies should receive application for licensing independently to evaluation. There should not exclusively and ignorantly depend unregulated out-of-state information.

The Courts should compute simple conflicts of law.

Anywhere in the chain of consequence could have alleviated the fault of administrations, but it is the

home-state that is most crucial to justice. No one of genuine truth should be denied, and it is what Pennsylvania did on a premise unknown more than 'suspension'.

The 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the U.S. Constitution clearly stipulates that no state shall enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges of the citizen. Driving privilege very clearly was abridged.

It is also the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania holding claim against the Petitioner per traffic citations resulting, serving prompt for Petition.

On the basis thoroughly explicated to conflicts and deficiencies of simple government, the Petitioner does not owe to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on all counts at case.

In summary, PADOT faulted not to issue license; Pennsylvania statute precluded compliance to all driving-privilege requisites on condition of license; citation per license is incorrect; and conviction per license conflicts withdrawal of equal citation.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Petition.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed Appeal because an error admittedly by the Clerk of Courts – York, resulting 2 docket numbers when only 1 was appropriate, and because Defendant rightly did not comply the Court's preceding direction to amend and twice pay. The Defendant did alert the Court 3 times of the error, last with proof of written admission and each timely.

The Court of Common Pleas, York County

Pennsylvania convicted the traffic citations as charged.

### REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

- By definitive interpretation, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania can't be favored, compelling Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- There is no legitimate potential resolution consistent to Pennsylvania's Entry of Judgment. Faults, flaws, and excessive hardship are abundantly clear. The sensibility is irrefutable.
- The administrative flaws have no other correction potential than a higher Order, while injustice overtly demonstrates; all below avenues have been exhausted.
- The injustice is universally applicable and significantly unacceptable. All citizens should not have to suffer nor endure the penalty that has been the oppression of a common privilege.

- The premise at Petition is effectively widest-reaching, serving all drivers in the United States.
- To deny Petition leaves a burden on the public, as the flaws would remain. A best intention can't result of a less-than-best affordance; America currently can't self-actualize.