

No. _____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

QUINCY MARQUICE TAYLOR,
Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

**APPENDIX TO THE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A:	Court of Appeals – Opinion and Judgment, June 16, 2026	1a
Appendix B:	District Court - Memorandum Opinion and Order, July 3, 2025	15a
Appendix C:	District Court – Judgment, November 3, 2025	25a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-6035

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

QUINCY MARQUICE TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant

Opinion and Judgment
Entered: June 16, 2026

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 26a0170p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

QUINCY MARQUICE TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 25-6035

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:22-cr-00137-1—Danny C. Reeves, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: June 16, 2026

Before: COLE, WHITE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Philip C. Lawson, TRUE GUARNIERI AYER, LLP, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Appellant. Amanda Harris Huang, Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.

MATHIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which COLE and WHITE, JJ., concurred. WHITE, J. (pg. 12), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

OPINION

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Quincy Taylor once again appeals his convictions for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. We reversed the convictions from his first trial after concluding that the district court violated his Confrontation Clause rights and

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 2

remanded for a new trial. A new jury convicted him on all charges. Taylor claims the district court violated his confrontation rights again. We disagree, and so we affirm his convictions.

I.

We previously summarized the facts underlying this matter as follows:

In the early morning hours of October 27, 2021, William Howell, a freight hauler, stopped on the side of the road to rest. Suddenly, he heard a car squealing tires and saw a car hit a ditch and flip over. Howell got out of his truck and called 911. As he approached the car, he saw Quincy Taylor struggling to get out. Taylor got out of the car and told Howell that he was not harmed. Taylor then asked Howell if he would take a small bag, like a sock cap, that was full of what appeared to be a small handgun, revolver, with some marijuana on top of it.

After Howell refused, Taylor hid the bag on the side of the road. Taylor asked Howell for a ride, and Howell declined. Soon after, Taylor flagged down the driver of a white Camaro. After speaking briefly with the driver, Taylor got in the Camaro and left the scene. Howell waited for the police to arrive, told them about the accident, and pointed out the bag. Inside the bag, officers found cocaine, a loaded revolver, and ammunition. Officers later determined that the wrecked vehicle was registered to Taylor.

A grand jury indicted Taylor for possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The case proceeded to trial.

Howell was the government's star witness, as he testified that Taylor had the bag containing the drugs and firearm in his hand when he exited his vehicle. Howell's testimony was the only evidence presented at trial that connected Taylor with the bag.

United States v. Taylor, 127 F.4th 1008, 1011 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

A jury convicted Taylor of all three offenses. *See id.* at 1012. Just three days after Taylor's first trial, the state prosecutor dismissed Howell's felon-in-possession charge and dismissed the motion to revoke Howell's diversion agreement in his drug-possession case. The prosecutor did not provide an explanation for doing so. Howell went on to complete his pretrial diversion program, and the felony drug-possession conviction (along with two related misdemeanors) was expunged from his record.

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 3

Taylor appealed, claiming that the district court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his ability to cross-examine Howell regarding: (1) Howell's felony drug-possession conviction, (2) Howell's then-pending felon-in-possession of a firearm charge, and (3) potential benefits for testifying. *Id.* at 1014. We agreed, concluding that the district court should not have improperly limited Taylor's "ability to cross-examine Howell about matters going to bias, prejudice, or his motivation to testify," *id.* at 1015, and that the limitation prevented the jury from having "enough information to make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on Howell's testimony," *id.* at 1017 (citation modified).

A.

On remand, Taylor sought more information about Howell's criminal conduct by serving the Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and the Gallatin Circuit Court Clerk's Office with subpoenas duces tecum, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, requiring production of the complete court file for Howell's expunged 2022 felony drug-possession case. In response, the Gallatin Circuit Court Clerk provided an affidavit, under Kentucky Revised Statutes § 431.076(6),¹ stating that "[n]o record exists on the matter referenced in [the] subpoena." R. 101-4, PageID 841. Taylor filed a motion to show cause as to why the Gallatin Circuit Court Clerk and the AOC should not be held in contempt for failing to produce the court file, claiming that "counsel for AOC . . . acknowledged . . . that the documents exist" and that Kentucky Revised Statutes § 431.076(7)² requires the Gallatin Circuit Court Clerk to maintain the court files. R. 101, PageID 811. The district court denied the motion but said that Taylor could subpoena witnesses from the AOC and the Gallatin Circuit Court Clerk's Office to testify at trial regarding Howell's court file.

Taylor later filed a renewed motion to show cause, claiming that he was entitled to the documents under Rule 17 and the Confrontation Clause.

¹After an offense is expunged, "the proceedings in the matter shall be deemed never to have occurred. . . . The court and other agencies shall reply to any inquiry that no record exists on the matter." Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.076(6).

²"Inspection of the records included in the order may thereafter be permitted by the court only upon petition by the person who is the subject of the records and only to those persons named in the petition." *Id.* § 431.076(7).

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 4

As Taylor sought additional information about Howell's criminal history, the government acted to limit the scope of the information that Taylor could present at trial. Specifically, the government moved in limine to limit the scope of Taylor's cross-examination of Howell. In its motion, the government asked the court to "exclude any discussion of the underlying facts" of Howell's dismissed and expunged offenses, which the government claimed would be unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. R. 98, PageID 800.

The district court granted the government's motion in part and denied Taylor's renewed show-cause motion. The court held that Rule 403 barred testimony about the nature of Howell's misdemeanor offenses and "any other speculative underlying facts that may support Taylor's alternative suspect/mirrored offenses theory . . . because any probative value [was] substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and of confusing the jury." R. 114, PageID 1001. Still, the court said that it would allow Taylor to cross-examine Howell about the penalties he faced for his 2022 drug charge, the penalty he would have faced had the state court not dismissed both the felon-in-possession charge and the motion to revoke diversion, and whether Howell sought or received any benefit in exchange for his testimony. The court denied Taylor's renewed show-cause motion because "[w]ith the scope of the inquiry allowed, the jury [would] have sufficient information to assess Howell's potential bias, prejudice, or motivation to testify." *Id.* The court also determined that the requested documents were unnecessary because Taylor already had access to myriad information to impeach Howell.

B.

The case proceeded to trial. Howell testified that he had no criminal history until March 2022, when he was charged in state court with felony possession of a controlled substance and two misdemeanors. While the charges were pending, Howell met with federal agents about Taylor's case and asked them if he would "get anything out of . . . answering their questions" and cooperating with the investigation. R. 145, PageID 1442. Howell admitted that he told the agents that he would "testify at any kind of proceeding against" Taylor in exchange for a benefit. *Id.* at 1464. Howell pleaded guilty to the charges and entered into an eighteen-month diversion agreement.

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 5

Then, in January 2023, Howell was charged with possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, after which the state prosecutor moved to revoke Howell's diversion agreement. A few days after Howell testified at Taylor's first trial, the state court dismissed his felon-in-possession charge, and the state prosecutor dismissed the motion to revoke the diversion agreement. Some months later, Howell completed his diversion, leading to the dismissal and expungement of his possession conviction and two misdemeanors. As a result, Howell was no longer a convicted felon when he testified at Taylor's second trial.

Howell also testified that the maximum sentences for his felony drug-possession conviction and felon-in-possession charge would have been three years' imprisonment and ten years' imprisonment, respectively. Howell further testified that had the state prosecutor not withdrawn the motion to revoke the diversion, he would have been "subject to potentially 18 months in prison" and would be "a permanent convicted felon." *Id.* at 1467. Although Howell agreed that he avoided prison time, he testified that there was no quid pro quo "[d]espite the timing" of his cooperation and the dismissal of the felon-in-possession charge. *Id.* at 1468.

The jury again convicted Taylor on all counts. After the district court sentenced Taylor, this appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, Taylor argues that the district court erred by: (1) refusing to order the AOC and Gallatin Circuit Court Clerk to produce Howell's criminal file, and (2) prohibiting Taylor from cross-examining Howell about the underlying facts of his felony drug-possession conviction and felon-in-possession charge. According to Taylor, both actions violated the Confrontation Clause.

We review alleged Confrontation Clause violations de novo. *United States v. Blake*, 166 F.4th 611, 622 (6th Cir. 2026). If a constitutional violation occurred, we must consider whether "the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 6

III.

The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right protects two things. First, it allows defendants an opportunity for a “face-to-face confrontation” at trial with the witnesses against him. *Coy v. Iowa*, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988). Physically confronting adverse witnesses is “essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.” *Pointer v. Texas*, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). Second, the right of confrontation guarantees “an *opportunity* for effective cross-examination.” *United States v. Owens*, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court has described the cross-examination guarantee as “the main and essential purpose of confrontation.” *Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. at 678 (citation modified).

This appeal once again implicates the cross-examination guarantee. The Confrontation Clause does not entitle a defendant to “cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” *Delaware v. Fensterer*, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). Instead, a defendant states a Confrontation Clause violation “by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.” *Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. at 680 (citation modified). “Prototypical forms of bias include: (1) the witness’s criminal history or status as a parolee or probationer; (2) any immunity or plea deals involving the witness; (3) the witness’s inconsistent statements; and (4) other prejudices, or ulterior motives, that can undermine the witness’s reliability.” *Taylor*, 127 F.4th at 1013 (citation modified).

A.

We consider first whether the district court’s refusal to order the production of Howell’s criminal file violated Taylor’s Confrontation Clause rights. Taylor argues that without Howell’s criminal file, he could not effectively cross-examine Howell. Specifically, Taylor claims that he needed to investigate “whether there was *written evidence* of an agreement between Howell and

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 7

the state prosecutors” offering leniency in exchange for Howell’s testimony against Taylor. D. 18 at p.22. We reject this argument.

“The right to confrontation is basically a trial right.” *Barber v. Page*, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968); *see Ford v. Curtis*, 277 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 2002). It is “designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination.” *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 53 (1987) (plurality opinion). “Normally the right to confront one’s accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses.” *Id.*

The right to confrontation does not create a concomitant right to pretrial discovery. On this point, *Ritchie* is instructive. There, the defendant served a subpoena to obtain records from an agency charged with investigating child abuse, but the agency refused to comply with the subpoena. *Id.* at 43. The defendant argued that, without the records, he could not effectively cross-examine his daughter who had accused him of abuse. *Id.* at 51. A four-justice plurality determined that the right to confront witnesses does not “include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.” *Id.* at 53. Although the plurality recognized that “the right to cross-examine includes the opportunity to show that a witness is biased,” the agency’s refusal to produce the records did not prevent the defendant from cross-examining his daughter. *Id.* at 51, 54. So the plurality concluded that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred. *Id.* at 54.³

So too here. Taylor’s inability to obtain Howell’s criminal file from state-court officials does not infringe Taylor’s confrontation rights. *See id.* Taylor was able to confront Howell during his trial. And, through counsel, Taylor had the opportunity to cross-examine Howell, including about his criminal history and any incentives for his testimony.

³The Supreme Court has not definitively determined whether the Confrontation Clause creates any right to discovery. In *Ritchie*, four justices concluded that the Clause creates no such right, 480 U.S. at 51–54, three justices concluded that the denial of access to certain materials and information before trial could violate the Confrontation Clause, *id.* at 61–66 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); *id.* at 66–72 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.), and two justices did not weigh in.

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 8

Taylor says he needed access to the file to “meaningfully test Howell’s bias or credibility.” D. 18 at p.25. To be sure, “[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” *Maryland v. Craig*, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). The Court has never held, however, that this “rigorous testing” can take whatever form a defendant may choose.

Defendants are not left without devices to try to obtain documents and witnesses in their favor. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 permits defendants to subpoena “books, papers, documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates” if they meet certain requirements. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1); *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974). And the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause gives defendants the right to subpoena “witnesses in [their] favor.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; *Washington v. Texas*, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967). But Taylor does not lodge a Rule 17 challenge or a compulsory-process challenge. In fact, Taylor subpoenaed two individuals from the Gallatin Circuit Court Clerk’s Office but did not call those individuals as witnesses at trial.

In sum, we conclude that the Confrontation Clause does not grant a defendant a pretrial right to compelled discovery of documents that might assist him in cross-examining a witness. *See Ritchie*, 480 U.S. at 52–54. In so concluding, we join several of our sister circuits. *United States v. Fattah*, 914 F.3d 112, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2019); *United States v. Osmakac*, 868 F.3d 937, 956–57 (11th Cir. 2017); *United States v. Celis*, 608 F.3d 818, 830–31 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); *United States v. Shrake*, 515 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2008); *Tapia v. Tansy*, 926 F.2d 1554, 1559–60 (10th Cir. 1991). *But cf. United States v. Arias*, 936 F.3d 793, 799–800 (8th Cir. 2019).

B.

We next address whether the district court violated Taylor’s right to confront Howell by limiting cross-examination. The Supreme Court has “recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” *Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. at 678–79 (quotation omitted). But the

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 9

Confrontation Clause does not prevent “a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.” *Id.* at 679. Trial courts have “wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits” on cross-examination to avoid “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,” or repetitive or “marginally relevant” interrogation. *Id.*

“The key issue is whether the jury had enough information” about the witness’s motives for testifying “despite the limits placed on cross-examination.” *United States v. Callahan*, 801 F.3d 606, 624 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). “So long as cross-examination elicits adequate information to allow a jury to assess a witness’s credibility, motives, or possible bias, the Sixth Amendment is not compromised by a limitation on cross-examination.” *Id.* (quotation omitted).

We use a three-step process to analyze whether a trial court has violated a defendant’s confrontation rights by limiting cross-examination. *Boggs v. Collins*, 226 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir. 2000).⁴ At the first step, we must decide whether the district court limited Taylor’s ability to cross-examine Howell about his “bias, prejudice[,] or motive to testify.” *See id.* If so, we move to the second step to consider whether, “despite the limits placed on” the cross-examination, the jury had “enough information” to assess Taylor’s “theory of bias or improper motive.” *See id.* If the jury lacked sufficient information to assess the theory, we go to the third step, which is “a balancing test” that weighs the government’s interests against Taylor’s right to confront Howell. *See id.*

We need not proceed past the first step. The district court did not err by prohibiting Taylor from cross-examining Howell about the underlying facts and circumstances of his 2022 drug-possession conviction and his 2023 felon-in-possession charge. The court allowed Taylor to try to establish Howell’s bias, prejudice, or motive to testify through cross-examination. *See id.* Taylor theorizes that Howell might have believed that “the police would have viewed him as the next best suspect” who possessed the incriminating bag at issue unless he testified against Taylor. D. 18 at pp.30–31. But the district court did not prohibit Taylor from asking Howell

⁴Taylor argues that *Boggs* is not good law. Although subsequent opinions have criticized *Boggs*’s holding that cross-examination as to general credibility is not protected, the three-step analysis has been reaffirmed in subsequent binding cases. *See Blake*, 166 F.4th at 622.

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 10

about his possible status as a suspect. The court's refusal to allow Taylor's inquiry into the underlying facts of his criminal charges to prevent prejudice or confusion of the issues under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 fell within its "wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits" on cross-examination. *See Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. at 679.

The district court gave Taylor significant leeway in his cross-examination of Howell. Unlike in Taylor's first trial, the district court allowed Taylor to cross-examine Howell about: (1) his conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance; (2) the resulting diversion agreement; (3) his felon-in-possession charge; (4) the dismissal of the felon-in-possession charge just days after he testified at Taylor's first trial; (5) the penalties Howell faced for his felony drug-possession conviction; (6) the penalties he would have faced if the state prosecutor had not dismissed his felon-in-possession charge and allowed him to complete his diversion agreement; and (7) whether Howell sought or received leniency for testifying against Taylor.

Taylor took full advantage. Taylor cross-examined Howell extensively about his drug-possession conviction and felon-in-possession charge. He elicited testimony that Howell faced prison time for possession of a controlled substance but received eighteen months of diversion. Howell testified that his felon-in-possession charge was dismissed, and that he was allowed to complete his diversion program. Howell also testified to the penalties he faced had he not completed his diversion agreement and that he sought "some benefit" in exchange for cooperating in Taylor's case. R. 145, PageID 1459. This testimony addressed "prototypical form[s] of bias," *see Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. at 680, and covered the very topics we determined the district court should have allowed on cross-examination in Taylor's previous trial, *see Taylor*, 127 F.4th at 1016.

Taylor's reliance on *United States v. Garrett*, 542 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1976), does not change things. There, the defendant was charged with distributing heroin and cocaine. *Id.* at 24. A police officer arranged the drug sales that became the subject of the defendant's charges. *Id.* By trial, the officer "had been suspended because he was suspected of using hard drugs himself and had refused to submit to a urine test." *Id.* at 26. The district court did not permit the defendant to question the officer about the reason for his suspension. *Id.* at 25. We reversed, concluding that the defendant should have been permitted to cross-examine the officer about the

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 11

reason for his suspension for two reasons. First, the questioning could have shown possible bias or a motive to testify because the officer could have believed a successful prosecution of the defendant would lead to the lifting of his suspension. *Id.* at 26. And second, the jury was entitled to know that the witness with whom the defendant participated in drug sales also had been accused of using drugs, which goes to the witness's credibility. *Id.*

Garrett is distinguishable. Taylor has not attempted to argue that Howell was on drugs during the incident. Nor did he ask Howell whether he was afraid that he would be prosecuted for the items in the bag. Also, Taylor sought to prompt testimony about the facts underlying Howell's criminal charges to suggest that Howell may have committed the criminal acts attributed to Taylor, not to show bias, prejudice, or a motive to testify, as was the case in *Garrett*. Finally, the jury heard that Howell was charged with drug possession, while the jury in *Garrett* was not told why the officer was under suspension.

As we have explained, the key issue is whether the jury had sufficient information to assess Howell's alleged bias and motive for testifying against Taylor. We conclude that it did. *See, e.g., Callahan*, 801 F.3d at 624 (holding that the jury had sufficient information to evaluate a witness's motive and bias when the court allowed testimony "about whether [the witness] was facing more time under the substantive forced labor charge as opposed to the conspiracy charge" and whether he "expected a reduced sentence as a result of his cooperation"); *United States v. Fields*, 763 F.3d 443, 464–65 (6th Cir. 2014) (same conclusion based on testimony about a witness's prior convictions and that "he was at that time facing charges in state court amounting to up to 96 years' imprisonment").

"[T]he Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose . . . infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness[s] testimony." *Fensterer*, 474 U.S. at 22. Taylor got what the Constitution guarantees: the opportunity to effectively cross-examine Howell.

IV.

For these reasons, we **AFFIRM** the district court's judgment.

No. 25-6035

United States v. Taylor

Page 12

CONCURRENCE

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I agree that Taylor is not entitled to further relief and that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated. However, because the Supreme Court has not yet determined whether the Confrontation Clause encompasses any right to pretrial discovery, Majority Op. at 7 n. 3; *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (plurality opinion), and we all agree that Taylor was able to fully test Howell's credibility at trial, I would not foreclose the possibility that in a different case the denial of access to crucial information might so prejudice a defendant's ability to cross-examine a witness as to violate the Confrontation Clause.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-6035


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

QUINCY MARQUICE TAYLOR,

Defendant - Appellant.



Before: COLE, WHITE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district court and was submitted on the briefs without oral argument.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Handwritten signature of Kelly L. Stephens in cursive script.

Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Criminal Action No. 5:22-137-DCR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

v.

QUINCY MARQUICE TAYLOR,
Defendant

Memorandum Opinion and Order
Entered: July 3, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	Criminal Action No. 5: 22-137-DCR
	)	
V.	)	
	)	
QUINCY MARQUICE TAYLOR,	)	MEMORANDUM OPINION
	)	AND ORDER
Defendant.	)	

*** **

Defendant Quincy Taylor was convicted by a jury for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. [Record No. 48] Taylor appealed his conviction to the Sixth Circuit, arguing (in part) that this Court’s limitation on his ability to cross-examine William Howell violated his constitutional rights. [Record No. 87-1]; *United States v. Taylor*, 127 F.4th 1008 (6th Cir. 2025). The panel determined that those limitations violated the confrontation clause. More specifically, it noted that the jury did not have sufficient information to assess “Howell’s bias in seeking a benefit related to his felony [possession of a controlled substance] conviction or pending felon-in-possession [of a handgun] charge.” [Record No. 87-1 at 8] When weighing Taylor’s interests in providing the jury with sufficient information of Howell’s potential bias and motive against the government’s interest to prevent such questioning to avoid unfair prejudice and a “mini trial,” the panel emphasized that “without Howell, the government’s case against Taylor collapses.” *Id.* at 10–11. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit reversed Taylor’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. *Id.* at 13.

In preparation for Taylor’s second trial, the United States has moved *in limine* to “exclude any discussion of the underlying facts related to the now dismissed and expunged offenses [and] the specific nature of now-expunged misdemeanor offenses.” [Record No. 98 at 5] For the underlying facts of those underlying offenses, it contends that they are not relevant to Howell’s motive or bias. *Id.* at 6. It further argues that informing the jury that Howell was charged with the misdemeanor assault fourth degree (domestic violence) would be unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. *Id.* at 6–7. The government does not object to Taylor inquiring if “Howell received pretrial diversion based on a charge of ‘felony possession of a controlled substance,’ or if he “was later charged with ‘being a felon in possession of a firearm’ (thereby jeopardizing his diversion agreement)” or if that charge was dismissed just days after his testimony. *Id.* at 6.

But Taylor insists that the government’s suggested scope of inquiry fails to fully comply with the Sixth Circuit’s remand instructions. [Record No. 108 at 5] More specifically, he argues that the underlying facts regarding Howell’s 2022 and 2023 charges are “critical for the jury to get an understanding of the circumstances that led to the resolution of his cases” so that it can fully assess his motive and bias. *Id.* at 7. In addition to any benefits Howell may have hoped to receive for his testimony, Taylor claims that because Howell’s charged conduct mirrors that for which Taylor was charged—it is even more crucial that the jury have access to the underlying facts. *Id.* at 8. Taylor insists that he must be able to elicit testimony concerning those two motivations (to secure favorable treatment in his own pending criminal case and to distance himself from the bag that was allegedly left by Taylor). *Id.* at 8–9.

The exclusion of the misdemeanor offenses’ nature and underlying facts can be more easily resolved. For one, the Sixth Circuit did not address this issue on the merits because trial

counsel had not adequately preserved it for appeal. [Record No. 87-1 at 7] Second, to the extent that Taylor may assert that the facts surrounding the domestic violence charge are somehow relevant, Rule 403 cautions against its use. Any probative value of that information is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice of revealing the nature of this (highly inflammatory) charge to the jury. Likewise, the probative value of underlying details concerning the paraphernalia charge are substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues and wasting time.

While Taylor argues that Howell's pending charges mirrored his own, Taylor was not charged with possessing paraphernalia or for domestic violence assault. Under this mirror theory, only the controlled substance and handgun possession charges are arguably relevant. What does remain relevant is that Howell was facing those misdemeanor charges at the time of his ATF interview and had entered diversion on those charges (that was compromised following his firearm charge) at the time of his testimony. And that the state prosecutor withdrew the motion to revoke the diversion three days after Taylor was convicted by the jury. Therefore, Taylor may elicit from Howell the above but may only reference those misdemeanor charges and (now expunged) convictions as "two misdemeanors."

To provide context to Taylor's argument that the specific facts surrounding the felony charges (controlled substance and handgun possession) must be provided to the jury, the undersigned will turn to Taylor's renewed motion for a show cause order. [Record No. 109] The Court granted Taylor's *ex parte* motion for a subpoena to obtain Howell's state court documents from his 2022 charges and now expunged convictions. [Record Nos. 95–96] However, Kentucky Revised Statute 431.076(6) mandates that, after expungement, the state court and other agencies "shall reply to any inquiry that no record exists in this matter." And

so, despite the subpoena duces tecum, the Gallatin County Clerk refused to confirm that the record existed and, therefore, refused to turn over any documents.

Taylor then submitted a motion for an order against the Gallatin County Clerk and Kentucky Administrative Office of the Courts which would require them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for failing to produce those records. [Record No. 101] During the June 16, 2025, pretrial conference, counsel for Taylor argued that these records were necessary because they may reveal direct evidence of a *quid pro quo* agreement between the state prosecutor and Howell. Counsel opined that perhaps those court files contained a record that exposes that Howell was promised leniency or other benefits for testimony. Avoiding the supremacy issue, the Court denied Taylor's first motion for an order to show cause during the hearing noting that, at this juncture, it is speculation that the court record would show more than what is already within Taylor's possession to impeach Howell. However, the Court made clear that Taylor was free to subpoena those individuals who refused to produce or acknowledge the state court files to testify.¹

Following that hearing, Taylor's response to the government's motion *in limine* raised an additional bias and motivation theory: Howell was trying to distance himself from Taylor's charges (and the drugs and firearm found at the scene of the accident) by cooperating with and testifying for the prosecution. [Record No. 108 at 8–9] And because Howell was later charged with controlled substance and handgun possessions (and Taylor was charged with similar offenses)—that provided motivation to testify against Taylor lest Howell be accused of

¹ Taylor later subpoenaed two individuals from the Gallatin County Courthouse to testify during trial. [Record No. 112]

planting those items for his own protection.² But Taylor presents no argument about what possibly could be unearthed in the court records that would make the specific facts surrounding the 2022 charges relevant to that theory.³

In the government's reply, it concedes that Taylor is free to present this "alternative suspect theory" to the jury. However, it argues that Taylor may not do that by using the underlying facts of Howell's charges that occurred *five months after* the car accident that was the impetus for Taylor's charges. [Record No. 110 at 4–5] It contends that this is a shrouded attempt to elicit impermissible propensity evidence upon which the jury could be led to conclude that because Howell was left alone with the back bag/sock cap and was later charged with similar crimes then perhaps he planted the items for which Taylor was charged. *Id.* at 5.

Notwithstanding the propensity issue, the United States asserts that Rule 403's balancing still weighs against allowing inquiry into the specific facts surrounding Howell's (now dismissed) controlled substance possession charge. [Record No. 110 at 5] Along with arguing that substantial prejudice would result, it also claims that such evidence would "spawn a mini-trial . . . just so that the jury could meaningfully determine what weight, if

² Presumably, Taylor's renewed motion for a show cause order against the state court clerk is premised on this mirror theory.

³ The undersigned is mindful of the fact that Taylor has been unable to procure the state court records for the 2022 charges. That said, the likelihood that his alternative suspect/mirror theory would be supported in those records is remote. Sure, it is possible that the underlying facts of the felony charge *could* reveal that the substance was found in a black sock cap after first being hidden by Howell. However, the confrontation clause has limits and does not entitle Taylor to a fishing expedition. Further, the Court is not inclined to raise a supremacy issue in ordering the Commonwealth of Kentucky to violate its own statute on the remote possibility that those records support Taylor's theory.

any, to give this evidence in assessing Defendant's guilt or innocence.'" *Id.* at 5–6 (quoting *United States v. Ekiyor*, 89 F.Supp.3d 928, 935 (E.D. Mich. 2015)).

During Taylor's first trial, his attorney was limited to asking Howell whether he had been convicted of a felony and whether he had been promised anything in exchange for his testimony. The Court did not allow inquiry concerning the pending firearm charge because it was not a conviction under Rule 609. The Sixth Circuit determined that the limitation prevented the jury from having enough information to assess Taylor's bias or improper motive theory. [Record No 87-1 at 9]

Following remand, the government does not object to Taylor inquiring whether (1) "Howell received pretrial diversion based on a charge of 'felony possession of a controlled substance'; (2) he "was later charged with 'being a felon in possession of a firearm' (thereby jeopardizing his diversion agreement)"; or (3) that charge was dismissed just days after his testimony. [Record No. 98 at 6] However, it does object to eliciting underlying facts to the now dismissed 2022 charges.

But the government's requested limitation does not account for the penalties Howell faced for his 2022 charges (and potential revocation of his diversion agreement). The Sixth Circuit's opinion explained that the limitations in the first trial "could not reveal the penalties Howell faced for the charge, the penalty he received, and whether Howell sought or anticipated leniency in exchange for his cooperation in Taylor's prosecution." [Record No. 87-1 at 9–10] In support, it referenced several cases in which the defendant was allowed to elicit the penalties the witness faced at the time of testifying. [Record No. 87 at 9–10] (citing *United States v. Callahan*, 801 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2015) (showing that defendant was allowed to cross-examine witness regarding whether he would receive more time for substantive offense than lesser

charge for which he was ultimately charged); *United States v. Fields*, 763 F.3d 443, 464 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that court still allowed “extensive testimony regarding [the witness’s] potential bias,” including that . . . “he was at that time facing charges in state court amounting to up to 96 years’ imprisonment”); *Latimer v. Burt*, 98 F. App’x 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no constitutional violation where court limited cross-examination to the existence of pending charges and their penalties, because that information “allowed the jury to know why [the witness] might be testifying for the prosecution—in return for leniency on those charges—and how strongly those pending charges might be motivating him”). Thus, Taylor will be permitted to elicit from Howell what penalties he faced for his 2022 charges and what penalty he faced if the state prosecutor had not dismissed his handgun possession charge and withdrawn its motion to revoke his diversion. These inquiries allow the jury to assess the *degree* of his potential motivation and bias. The same is true for whether Howell sought or received leniency in exchange for his testimony.

Thus, to the extent that the government seeks to exclude underlying facts of the 2022 conviction which include the penalties Howell faced and what he hoped to gain in exchange for this testimony, its motion will be denied. The motion, however, will be granted with respect to identifying the nature of his two misdemeanor convictions and any other speculative underlying facts that may support Taylor’s alternative suspect/mirrored offenses theory under Rule 403 because any probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and of confusing the jury.

As a result, Taylor’s renewed motion for an order to show cause will also be denied. With the scope of the inquiry allowed, the jury will have sufficient information to assess Howell’s potential bias, prejudice, or motivation to testify. Further, even without the

additional state court records, Taylor has sufficient information at his disposal to impeach Howell, if needed. For example, Taylor has at the ready: (1) Howell's state felony possession of a controlled substance law enforcement citation, subsequent guilty plea and pretrial diversion agreement, and expungement order; (2) a certified video copy of Howell's May 19, 2023 (three days after Taylor's guilty verdict) hearing during which the state prosecutor dismissed his felon in possession of a handgun charge and withdrew the corresponding diversion violation; (3) an audio recording of the interview between Howell and ATF agents wherein Howell inquired twice concerning what he will receive in exchange for his cooperation and testimony; (4) Howell's state CourtNet docket for the 2022 and 2023 cases which lists the charged offenses; and (5) subpoenaed witnesses from the Gallatin County Court. And finally, the government asserted during the pretrial conference that if Howell denied the authenticity of the documents he provided, the federal agent who received them could be called to testify. Therefore, in addition to the potential constitutional issue that would arise in granting Taylor's motion, the state court records are unnecessary under these circumstances.

Having considered the matter and being sufficiently advised, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

1. The United States' motion *in limine* [Record No. 98] is **GRANTED**, in part, and **DENIED**, in part, consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
2. Defendant Quincy Taylor's renewed motion for a show cause order [Record No. 109] is **DENIED**.

Dated: July 3, 2025.



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Danny C. Reeves". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first and last names being more prominent.

Danny C. Reeves, District Judge
United States District Court
Eastern District of Kentucky

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Criminal Action No. 5:22-137-DCR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff

v.

QUINCY MARQUICE TAYLOR,
Defendant

Judgment
Entered: November 3, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Eastern District of Kentucky – Central Division at Lexington

FILED

NOV 03 2025

AT LEXINGTON
Robert H. Carr
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

Quincy Marquice Taylor

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01

USM Number: 43036-510

Philip C. Lawson
Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

- ☐ pleaded guilty to count(s) _____
- ☐ pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) _____
which was accepted by the court.
- ☒ was found guilty on count(s) 1, 2, and 3
after a plea of not guilty.

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Offense Ended	Count
21:841(a)(1) & 851	Possession with Intent to Distribute a Mixture or Substance Containing a Detectable Amount of Cocaine	October 21, 2021	1
18:924(c)(1)(A)	Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime	October 27, 2021	2
18:922(g)(1) & 924(e)(1)	Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon	October 27, 2021	3

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 7 of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

- ☐ The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) _____
- ☐ Count(s) _____ ☐ is ☐ are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

November 3, 2025

Date of Imposition of Judgment

Signature of Judge

Honorable Danny C. Reeves, U.S. District Judge

Name and Title of Judge

November 3, 2025

Date

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN OF THE
ENTRY OF THIS ORDER OR JUDGMENT

ON 11/03/2025

ROBERT R. CARR, CLERK

BY: [Signature] DC

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

Three Hundred (300) Months on each of Counts 1 and 3, to run concurrently, and Sixty (60) Months on Count 2, to run consecutively to Counts 1 and 3, for a total term of **THREE HUNDRED SIXTY (360) MONTHS**

- ☒ The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:
- That the defendant participate in any job skills and vocational training program for which he qualifies.
 - That the defendant participate in a substance abuse treatment program.
 - That the defendant be designated to a facility closest to Lexington, Kentucky for which he qualifies.

- ☒ The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

- ☐ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

- ☐ at _____ ☐ a.m. ☐ p.m. on _____.
- ☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.

- ☐ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

- ☐ before 2 p.m. on _____.
- ☐ as notified by the United States Marshal.
- ☐ as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____ to _____
at _____, with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By _____
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of:

**Six (6) Years on Count 1 and Five (5) Years on each of Counts 2 and 3,
all to run concurrently, for a total term of SIX (6) YEARS**

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.
2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.
3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court.
 - ☐ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you pose a low risk of future substance abuse. *(Check, if applicable.)*
4. ☐ You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of restitution. *(Check, if applicable.)*
5. ☒ You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. *(Check, if applicable.)*
6. ☐ You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, *et seq.*) as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where you reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. *(Check, if applicable.)*
7. ☐ You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. *(Check, if applicable.)*

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the attached page.

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.
2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.
3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.
4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.
5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.
7. You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.
8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the probation officer.
9. If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.
10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).
11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without first getting the permission of the court.
12. If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.
13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.
14. You must comply strictly with the orders of your physicians or other prescribing source with respect to the use of any prescribed controlled substances. You must report any changes regarding your prescriptions to your probation officer immediately (i.e., no later than 72 hours). The probation officer may verify your prescriptions and your compliance with this paragraph.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see *Overview of Probation and Supervised Release Conditions*, available at: www.uscourts.gov.

Defendant's Signature _____

Date _____

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1. You may not consume alcohol, marijuana, or marijuana products.
2. You must participate in urinalysis testing, or any other form of substance abuse testing, as directed by the United States Probation Office. You must refrain from obstructing or attempting to obstruct or tamper, in any fashion, with the efficiency and accuracy of any substance abuse testing required as a condition of your release. You may not knowingly use or consume any substance that interferes with the accuracy of substance abuse testing.
3. You must submit your person, offices, properties, homes, residences, vehicles, storage units, papers, computers, telephones and other electronic devices to a search conducted by the United States Probation Office. Failure to submit to a search is grounds for revocation of supervision. You must warn all occupants that the premises is subject to searches according to this condition.
4. You must provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information.

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

	<u>Assessment</u>	<u>Restitution</u>	<u>Fine</u>	<u>AVAA Assessment*</u>	<u>JVTA Assessment**</u>
TOTALS	\$ 300.00 (\$100/Count)	\$ Community Waived	\$ Waived	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00

- ☐ The determination of restitution is deferred until _____. An *Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C)* will be entered after such determination.
- ☐ The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

<u>Name of Payee</u>	<u>Total Loss***</u>	<u>Restitution Ordered</u>	<u>Priority or Percentage</u>
----------------------	----------------------	----------------------------	-------------------------------

TOTALS	\$ _____	\$ _____
--------	----------	----------

- ☐ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement \$ _____
- ☐ The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than \$2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
- ☐ The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:
- ☐ the interest requirement is waived for the ☐ fine ☐ restitution.
- ☐ the interest requirement for the ☐ fine ☐ restitution is modified as follows:

* Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

*** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

- A ☒ Lump sum payment of \$ 300.00 due immediately, balance due
- ☐ not later than _____, or
☒ in accordance with ☐ C, ☐ D, ☐ E, or ☒ F below; or
- B ☐ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with ☐ C, ☐ D, or ☐ F below); or
- C ☐ Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or
- D ☐ Payment in equal _____ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of \$ _____ over a period of _____ (e.g., months or years), to commence _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a term of supervision; or
- E ☐ Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within _____ (e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that time; or
- F ☒ Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

Criminal monetary penalties are payable to:
Clerk, U. S. District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky
101 Barr Street, Room 206, Lexington, KY 40507

INCLUDE CASE NUMBER WITH ALL CORRESPONDENCE

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

- ☐ Joint and Several

Case Number

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names

(including defendant number)

Total Amount

Joint and Several Amount

Corresponding Payee, if appropriate

- ☐ The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
- ☐ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
- ☒ The defendant shall forfeit the defendant's interest in the following property to the United States:
As listed in the Preliminary Judgment of Forfeiture [DE #132], to wit: a) Smith & Wesson, Model: Airweight 637, Cal.: .38 S&W Special, revolver SN: CNJ6009; and b) assorted ammunition.

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment, (5) fine principal, (6) fine interest, (7) community restitution, (8) JVTa assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01
DISTRICT: Eastern District of Kentucky – Central Division at Lexington

STATEMENT OF REASONS

(Not for Public Disclosure)

Sections I, II, III, IV, V, and VII of the Statement of Reasons form must be completed in all felony and Class A misdemeanor cases.

I. COURT FINDINGS ON PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT

- A. ☒ The court adopts the presentence investigation report without change.
- B. ☐ The court adopts the presentence investigation report with the following changes. *(Use Section VIII if necessary.)*
(Check all that apply and specify court determination, findings, or comments, referencing paragraph numbers in the presentence report.)
1. ☐ Chapter Two of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual determinations by court:
(Briefly summarize the changes, including changes to base offense level, or specific offense characteristics.)
 2. ☐ Chapter Three of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual determinations by court:
(Briefly summarize the changes, including changes to victim-related adjustments, role in the offense, obstruction of justice, multiple counts, acceptance of responsibility, or Early Disposition Program.)
 3. ☐ Chapter Four of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual determinations by court:
(Briefly summarize the changes, including changes to criminal history category or scores, career offender status, criminal livelihood determinations, or zero-point offender status.)
 4. ☐ Additional Comments or Findings: *(Include comments or factual findings concerning any information in the presentence report, including information that the Federal Bureau of Prisons may rely on when it makes inmate classification, designation, or programming decisions; any other rulings on disputed portions of the presentence investigation report; identification of those portions of the report in dispute but for which a court determination is unnecessary because the matter will not affect sentencing or the court will not consider it.)*
- C. ☐ The record establishes no need for a presentence investigation report pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.
Applicable Sentencing Guideline: *(If more than one guideline applies, list the guideline producing the highest offense level.)* _____

II. COURT FINDINGS ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE *(Check all that apply)*

- A. ☒ One or more counts of conviction carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and the sentence imposed is at or above the applicable mandatory minimum term.
- B. ☐ One or more counts of conviction carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, but the sentence imposed is below a mandatory minimum term because the court has determined that the mandatory minimum term does not apply based on:
- ☐ findings of fact in this case: *(Specify)* _____
 - ☐ substantial assistance (18 U.S.C. § 3553(e))
 - ☐ the statutory safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f))
- C. ☐ No count of conviction carries a mandatory minimum sentence.

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01
DISTRICT: Eastern District of Kentucky – Central Division at Lexington

STATEMENT OF REASONS

III. PLEA AGREEMENT DETERMINATION *(Check only one)*

- A. ☐ There is a non-binding plea agreement in this case *(Rule 11(c)(1)(A), Rule 11(c)(1)(B); oral or written)*
B. ☐ There is a binding plea agreement accepted by the court in this case *(Rule 11(c)(1)(C); oral or written)*
C. ☒ There is no plea agreement in this case *(conviction after trial; plea without agreement)*

IV. COURT DETERMINATION OF GUIDELINE RANGE: *(BEFORE APPLICATION OF §5K1.1 OR VARIANCES)*

Total Offense Level: 34

Criminal History Category: VI

Guideline Range: *(after application of §5G1.1 and §5G1.2)* 360 Months on Cts. 1&3; 60 months on Ct. 2, consecutive to Cts. 1&3

Supervised Release Range: 6 years on Ct. 1; 5 Years on Cts. 2&3

Fine Range: \$ 35,000.00 to \$ 2,000,000.00

☒ Fine waived or below the guideline range because of inability to pay.

V. GUIDELINE SENTENCING DETERMINATION *(Check all that apply)*

- A. ☒ The sentence is within the guideline range *(If the difference between the maximum and minimum of the guideline range exceeds 24 months, state the reason(s) the sentence was imposed as required by 18 U.S.C. §3553(c). Use Section VIII if necessary.)*
- B. ☐ The sentence is below the guideline range. *(Also complete Section VI)*
- ☐ The government sought a sentence below the guideline range and the sentence imposed was not below the government's recommendation.
 - ☐ The government sought a sentence below the guideline range and the sentence imposed was below the government's recommendation.
 - ☐ The government did not oppose a sentence below the guideline range.
 - ☐ The government opposed a sentence below the guideline range.
- C. ☐ The sentence is above the guideline range. *(Also complete Section VI)*
- ☐ The government sought a sentence above the guideline range.
 - ☐ The government did not seek a sentence above the guideline range.
 - ☐ The government opposed a sentence above the guideline range.

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01
DISTRICT: Eastern District of Kentucky — Central Division at Lexington

STATEMENT OF REASONS

VI. COURT REASONS FOR IMPOSING A SENTENCE OUTSIDE THE GUIDELINE RANGE: (§5K1.1 OR VARIANCES) *(If applicable, check all that apply)*

- A. ☐ The defendant's substantial assistance (§5K1.1)
- B. ☐ The nature and circumstances of the offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1):
- ☐ Dismissed/Uncharged Conduct ☐ Mens Rea ☐ Victim Impact
 - ☐ Extreme Conduct ☐ Role in the Offense
 - ☐ Other Aggravating or Mitigating Factors: *(Specify)* _____

☐ Chapter Two Offense Level overstates or understates the seriousness of the offense: *(Specify)* _____

- ☐ The history and characteristics of the defendant pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1):
- ☐ Aberrant Behavior ☐ Family Ties and Responsibilities
 - ☐ Advanced Age ☐ Lack of Youthful Guidance/Troubled Childhood
 - ☐ Application of §4B1.1 (Career Offender) ☐ Mental and Emotional Conditions
 - ☐ Charitable Service/Good Works ☐ Military Service
 - ☐ Child Abuse Victim ☐ Non-Violent Offender
 - ☐ Community Ties ☐ Physical Condition
 - ☐ Diminished Capacity ☐ Pre-sentence Rehabilitation/Potential for Future Rehabilitation
 - ☐ Drug or Alcohol Dependence ☐ Remorse/Lack of Remorse
 - ☐ Education or Vocational Skills ☐ Youthfulness of Defendant
 - ☐ Employment Record ☐ Other: *(Specify)* _____

☐ Criminal history category overrepresents or underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history:
(Specify) _____

- ☐ To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A))
- ☐ To afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B))
- ☐ To protect the public from further crimes of the defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C))
- ☐ To provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D))
- ☐ To provide the defendant with medical care (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D))
- ☐ To provide the defendant with other correctional treatment in the most effective manner (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D))
- ☐ To avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6))
- ☐ To provide restitution to any victims of the offense (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7))
- ☐ Acceptance of Responsibility
- ☐ Conditions of Confinement
- ☐ Conduct Pre-trial/On Bond
- ☐ Cooperation Without Government Motion for Departure
- ☐ Deportable Status
- ☐ Early Plea Agreement
- ☐ Global Plea Agreement
- ☐ Time Served Not Counted in Sentence
- ☐ Waiver of Appeal
- ☐ Waiver of Indictment
- ☐ Policy Disagreement with the Guidelines: *(Specify)* _____
- ☐ Other: *(Specify, using Section VIII if necessary.)* _____

DEFENDANT: Quincy Marquice Taylor
CASE NUMBER: 5:22-CR-137-DCR-01
DISTRICT: Eastern District of Kentucky – Central Division at Lexington

STATEMENT OF REASONS

VII. COURT DETERMINATIONS OF RESTITUTION

A. ☐ Restitution Not Applicable.

B. Total Amount of Restitution: \$ _____

C. Restitution not ordered: *(Check only one)*

1. ☐ For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is not ordered because the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(A).
2. ☐ For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, restitution is not ordered because determining complex issues of fact and relating them to the cause or amount of the victims' losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim would be outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)(B).
3. ☐ For other offenses for which restitution is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 and/or required by the sentencing guidelines, restitution is not ordered because the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of a restitution order outweigh the need to provide restitution to any victims under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).
4. ☐ For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593, 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327 or 3663A, restitution is not ordered because the victim(s)' losses were not ascertainable (18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5)).
5. ☐ For offenses for which restitution is otherwise mandatory under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593, 2248, 2259, 2264, 2327 or 3663A, restitution is not ordered because the victim(s) elected to not participate in any phase of determining the restitution order (18 U.S.C. § 3664(g)(1)).
6. ☒ Restitution is not ordered for other reasons. *(Explain)*
Community restitution is waived due to the defendant's inability to pay.

D. ☐ Partial restitution is ordered for these reasons *(18 U.S.C. § 3553(c))*:

VIII. ADDITIONAL BASIS FOR THE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE *(If applicable)*

The sentence reflects: (1) the seriousness of the offenses; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including his likelihood of committing additional offenses in the future; (3) the need to promote respect for the law; (4) just punishment; and (5) the need to protect the public.

Defendant's Soc. Sec. No.: 402-29-7082

Defendant's Date of Birth: 6/13/1986

Defendant's Residence Address: Woodford County Detention Center
204 Beasley Road
Versailles, Kentucky 40383

Defendant's Mailing Address: Same as above

Date of Imposition of Judgment: November 3, 2025

Signature of Judge

Honorable Danny C. Reeves, U.S. District Judge
Name and Title of Judge

Date: November 3, 2025