


No. **26 - 5480**

ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES



In re Wyatt North Redfox,

Petitioner.

**PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
AD SUBJICIENDUM**

(28 U.S.C.S. § 1681; Supreme Court Rule 20)

In propria persona:

Wyatt North Redfox #729305

Spring Creek Correctional Complex

3600 Bette Cato Road

Seward, AK 99664

PETITION FOR COMMON LAW WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. On the facts stated in the petition, does a civil court have authority over a military tribunal?
2. On the facts stated in the petition and appendix, ought the writ of habeas corpus to be issued according to the prayer of said petitioner?
3. On the facts stated in the petition and exhibits, ought the said Redfox to be discharged from custody as in said petition prayed?
4. Whether, upon the facts stated in the petition and appendix, the military commission had jurisdiction legally to try and sentence said Redfox in manner and form, as in said petition and appendix as stated?
5. A question of jurisdiction, as 1. Whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the case there presented?
6. Whether the case sent up here by certificate of appealability was so sent up in conformity with the intention of the act of 1948? In other words, whether *this* court had jurisdiction of the questions raised by the petitioner?

RELIEF SOUGHT

Petitioner Prays for a common law writ of habeas corpus to be issued directing that governor Mike Dunleavy of the State of Alaska, his Attorneys General, and all other officials supervised under the authority of the State governor, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska and to the Honorable Judge of the District Court, directing and commanding that the body of Wyatt North Redfox is to be delivered from military custody, and if found guilty of any offense, to be turned over to the proper tribunal for inquiry and punishment; or, if not found thus probably guilty, to be discharged altogether, as was announced in this Court's decision in the Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866) case.

UNAVAILABILITY ON RELIEF IN OTHER COURTS

- 1. Circuit Court of Appeals (9th Cir.) denies to issue a COA;**
 - A. Docket No. 25-4025**
 - B. WYATT NORTH REDFOX v. SUPERINTENDENT ARLANDO HERNADEZ;**
 - C. Denied (dated Dec. 18, 2025)**
- 2. Circuit Court of Appeals (9th Cir.) refuses petitioner to address any other issues or seek any other relief;**
 - A. Docketing No. 25-4025;**
 - B. WYATT NORTH REDFOX v. SUPERINTENDENT ARLANDO HERNADEZ;**
 - C. Docketing Notice (dated June 27, 2025);**
- 3. United States District Court for the District of Alaska holds that the claims does not have constitutional or statutory grounds for relief;**
 - A. 3:24-cv-00285-SLG;**
 - B. WYATT NORTH REDFOX v. SUPERINTENDENT ARLANDO HERNADEZ;**
 - C. Dismissed May 12, 2025;**
- 4. State of Alaska – Supreme Court;**
 - A. filed by mail 10/28/2024**
 - B. In the matter of: Wyatt North Redfox (common law writ of habeas corpus);**
 - C. clerk did not file writ nor gave case number;**

5. State of Alaska – Superior Trial Court in Anchorage;
 - A. filed in open court 10/08/2024;
 - B. In the matter of: Wyatt North Redfox (common law writ of habeas corpus);
 - C. refused to issue writ or provide case number (filed by clerk);
6. State of Alaska – Supreme Court;
 - A. filed by mail 08/03/2024;
 - B. Common Law Writ;
 - C. clerk did not file writ nor provide case number;
7. State of Alaska – Trial Court in Anchorage;
 - A. filed by mail 08/03/2024;
 - B. Common Law Writ;
 - C. clerk did not file writ nor provide case number.

UNSUITABILITY OF ANY OTHER FORM OF RELIEF

No other form of relief will be sufficient to protect the rights of the petitioner or preserve the ability to seek review of lower court decision in this Court because other forms of relief, such as an appeal or petition for certiorari from final judgment are inadequate, in the *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) case, this Court announced that when the petition is filed and the writ prayed for, it is a suit, – the suit of the party making the application. If it is a suit under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act when the proceedings are begun, it is, by all analogies of the law, equally a suit under the 6th section of the act of 1802. Furthermore, authority is given to judges out of court to grant relief to any party, who could show, that, under the law, he should no longer be restrained of liberty. Subjecting petitioner to the burdens of the suit on the theory that the petitioner will ultimately prevail on the merits essentially nullifies the Judiciary Act recognized by this Court in the *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) case.

LIST OF PARTIES IN COURT BELOW

1. Petitioner, Ex parte;

A. Wyatt North Redfox

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review.....	2
Relief Sought.....	3
Unavailability of Relief in Other Courts.....	4 – 5
Unsuitability of Any Other Form of Relief.....	6
List of Parties in Court Below.....	7
Table of Authorities Cited.....	9
Jurisdictional Statement.....	10
Citation of Lower Court Decisions.....	11
Controlling Provisions, Statutes, and Regulations.....	12
Statement of the Case Governing Facts.....	16
ARGUMENT	
I. Civil Courts have Authority over Military Tribunals	
A. Distinction Between Civil and Military Authority.....	18
B. Presidential Authority under Expressed or Implied Acts of Congress.....	19
II. State of Alaska’s Jurisdiction Failing	
A. Superior Courts General Jurisdiction Ultra Vires and Void.....	20
B. State of Alaska Courts has not Constitutional Authority to Act.....	21
Conclusion.....	25
Appendix.....	26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).....	18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 ¹⁸⁻²³
Mills v. Martin, 18 Johns. 7 (1821).....	20, 21

Constituion, Statutes, Regulations, and Rules

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 9.....	20
U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1.....	20
28 U.S.C.S. § 81A.....	19, 24
48 U.S.C.S. § 21.....	24
1 Stat. 1789.....	24
62 Stat. 869.....	24
72 Stat. 339.....	19, 23
Executive Order Number 10867 of Feb. 20, 1960.....	19
Alaska Stat. 01.10.110.....	19
Declaration of Independence, Cl. 14.....	18

Texts, Treaties, and Law Review

1 Criminal Law Advocacy § 11.10[1].....	25
---	----

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested writ under supposed act 28 U.S.C.S. § 1651(a) and Supreme Court Rule 20.

CITATION OF LOWER COURT DECISION

The Order and Docketing Notice of the United States Court of Appeals 9th Cir. Court are attached to this written instrument on pages 1 – 2 of the Appendix, as noted above.

The decision of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Order are attached to this written intstrument on pages 3 – 15 of the Appendix, as noted above.

The Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus and the attached Affidavit/Declaration to the Territory of the District Court of Alaska are attached to this written instrument on pages 16 – 20 of the Appendix, as noted above.

The undocketed Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus are attached to this written instrument on pages 21 – 23 of the Appendix, as noted above.

The undocketed Common Law Writ are set out in the written petition attached to this written instrument on pages 24 – 25 of the Appendix, as noted above.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS

1. U.S. Const. Art. I § 8, Cl. 9 provides:

The Congress shall have Power...To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court

2. U.S. Const. Art. III § 1 provides:

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold there Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

3. 28 U.S.C.S. § 81A provides: “Alaska constitutes one judicial district. [¶] Court shall be held at

Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Ketchikan, and Nome.”

4. 48 U.S.C.S. § 21 provides: “[Omitted]”

5. 1 Stat. 1789 provides in part:

Sec. 25. *And be it further enacted*, That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of there being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity, (d) or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge or chancellor of the court rendering or passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect, as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a circuit court, and the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision as before provided, may at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution. But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.(a)

6. 61 Stat. 689 provides in part: “AN ACT [¶] To revise, codify, and enact into law title 28 of the United States Code entitled “Judicial Code and Judiciary”.”
7. 72 Stat. 339 provides in part: “Sec. 3 The constitution of the State of Alaska shall always be republican in form and shall not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.”
8. Executive Order Number 10867 of Feb. 20, 1960 provides:

WHEREAS the act of July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 339 [48 USCS § 21 note], relating to the admission of the State of Alaska into the Union, provides that the United States District Court for the Territory of Alaska shall continue to function as theretofore for a period of three years after the effective date of that act, unless the President, by executive order, shall sooner proclaim that the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, established in accordance with the provisions of that act, is prepared to assume the functions imposed upon it; and

WHEREAS that act further provides that its provisions relating to the termination of the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Territory of Alaska, the continuation of suits, the succession of courts, and the satisfaction of the rights of litigants in suits before such courts shall not be effective until the expiration of the above-mentioned three-year period or until such Executive order is issued; and that the tenure of the judges, the United States Attorneys, Marshals, and other officers of the United States District Court for the Territory of Alaska shall terminate at such time as that court shall cease to function; and

WHEREAS, I have appointed, by and with advice and consent of the Senate, and commissioned the Honorable Walter N. Hodge to be United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, and he has taken his oath of office; and

WHEREAS the United States District Court for the District of Alaska is now prepared to assume the functions imposed upon it:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 18 of the said act of July 7, 1958 [set out as a note above], I hereby proclaim that the United States District Court for the District of Alaska is prepared to assume the functions imposed upon it. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the District Court for the Territory of Alaska and the tenure of the judges, the United States Attorneys, Marshals, and other officers of that court are now terminated.

9. Alaska Stat. § 01.10.110 provides: “No amendment (enacted after September 16, 1976) that affects an interest of the state under the Alaska Statehood Act (72 Stat. 339) is effective as to the state unless approved by law enacted by the legislature or the people of the state.”
10. Declaration of Independence, Cl. 14 provides in part:

....History of repeated injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct object and Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these states. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

[Cl. 14] He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.”

TEXTS, TREATIES, AND LAW REVIEWS

1 Criminal Law Advocacy § 11.10[1] provides:

[1] Lack of Jurisdiction...The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, exclusive of state courts, over all offenses against the laws of the United States. Therefore, all federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction, whenever a defendant violates a federal criminal law.

But for the district court to have subject matter jurisdiction, Congress must have had the constitutional authority to pass the law in the first place. The Constitution limits Congress' power to create federal offenses. If Congress passed a federal criminal law which exceeds its powers, then the defendant will succeed on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the jurisdictional issue can be raised by motion in arrest of judgment, for subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. [See *Smith v. United States*, 360 U.S. 1, 10, 79 S. Ct. 991, 3 L. Ed. 2D 1041 (1959)] (citations omitted)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND GOVERNING FACTS

1. On August 3, 2024, Petitioner Wyatt North Redfox submitted a Common Law Writ (App. p. 24 – 25) by mail from his confined place to the Alaska Supreme and Superior Court; no response was made by clerk or court regarding to issue writ a docketing number nor deficiency notice.
2. October 8, 2024, Petitioner filed, both in open court and by mail to Alaska Supreme Court and Superior Court, a Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus (App. p. 21 – 23); no response was made by clerk of court regarding to issue the writ nor provide a docketing number nor deficiency notice.
3. December 19, 2024, Petitioner filed a Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus (App. p. 16 – 20) and was issued a case number.
4. May 12, 2025 Sharon L. Gleason, dismissed petitioners Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus (App. p. 3 – 15) confounding the record, and without giving petitioner a proper opportunity to be heard, dismissing petitioners writ – in part – that it did not state a valid constitutional or statutory claim for relief.
5. Writ of Error submitted, the Ninth Circuit on June 27th 2025 issued a Docketing Notice (App. p. 2) informing petitioner’s request for relief will be “stayed pending a determination on the request for a certificate of appealability” and “[n]o briefing schedule will be set out until this court and/or district court determines whether a certificate of appealability should issue.

6. December 18, 2025, Order by the 9th Cir. Court (App. p. 1) denies a COA on grounds that “appellant has not shown that a “jurist of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
7. The question here is – twofold: Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal and (2) can a judge deny or delay justice?
8. Short answer: (1) Civil courts can question into the legality of a military commission or presidentially commissioned courts; and (2) the judicial department cannot deny or delay justice. Such courts acting outside the United States Constitution can be held liable for trespass and replevin resides.

ARGUMENT

I. Civil Courts have Authority over Military Tribunals

A. *Distinction Between Civil and Military Authority*

The State of Alaska's executive branch is vested in Governor Mike Dunleavy who supervises all principle departments – this includes the court's of the State of Alaska – which any “criminal” action is initiated by the Department of Law; thus, all prosecutions by the State of Alaska are in courts that are under the will of the military commander-in-chief, who supervises the principle departments such as his executive agency.

The Declaration of Independence (DOI), cl. 14 recognizes only two powers, Civil and Military; it is hardly seen that any agency acting under the will of the military commander-in-chief can be seen as a civil act of power, and any assertion that they act under a criminal jurisdiction is not recognized by DOI, e.g., criminal, administrative, adjudicative, or any other mode. In the *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) case, this court recognized Mr. Garfield's argument giving distinction between civil and martial law; from presidential power of the executive branch and the governor's authority under the president – also the acts of Congress and the legislative will in declaring military law – and proper military functions being subordinate to civil courts.¹ such distinction, also, specifically provides that officers under the authority of the governor are military persons.

A court martial was appointed, and in order to give it the semblance of civil law, the governor-general appointed the chief justice of the district as a staff officer, and then detailed him as president of the court to try the accused. All the members of the court were military men, and he was made a military officer for the special occasion.²

¹ *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, *42 - *61, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866)

² *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, *53, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866)

 Presidential Authority under Expressed or Implied Acts of Congress

All criminal prosecutions against petitioner were filed by the MILITARY GOVERNMENT, as it can be easily understood that the State of Alaska's authority supersedes the local law by which they exercise their authority under the direction of the President. The Alaska Statehood Act, AS 01.10.110 "(72 Stat. 339)", where authority is derived, is either an expressed or implied act of Congress under 18 U.S.C.S. § 81A. Alaska which recognizes only 5 cities of judicial districts at "Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, Ketchikan, and Nome." However, Congress' purported political act providing the organization of courts in Alaska under 28 U.S.C.S. § 81A is ineffectual, as its function is established by the acts of the president under Executive Order Number 10867 of Feb. 20, 1960, with the "advice and consent of the Senate" directing that the judge, "acting United States Attorney, and acting United States Martial, and other court officers" are to assume the functions imposed by the president. This type of action falls under the U.S. Constitution's military jurisdiction, to wit; the MILITARY GOVERNMENT as announced by this court in the *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, *141 - *142, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866).

There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction:....one[]to be exercised in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion and civil war within the states or districts occupied by rebels treated [*142] as belligerents;MILITARY GOVERNMENT, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the military commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress.

I. State of Alaska Penal Laws Ineffectual

A. Superior Courts General Jurisdiction Ultra Vires and Void

The State of Alaska's Trial Courts, namely, the superior judges, have declared that their jurisdiction will not be explained, but that they get it from general jurisdiction. Essentially, petitioner has raised specifically that the State of Alaska's Courts have infringed Petitioner's basic rights under U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1 as it has not been ordained and established by Congress, nor composed of judges appointed during good behavior. It can be further argued that Congress has not constituted tribunals inferior to the supreme Court within the geographical area of the State of Alaska, thus, infringing petitioner's rights under the U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 9. From the State of Alaska's judicial officer's declaration announcing that they have general jurisdiction is ultra vires and void as they could not dispute the petitioner's claims that the contrary appears before them as announced in the *Mills v. Martin*, 19 Johns. 7, *33 (1821) a cases cited by this court in the *Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, *43, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866)

[I]t is essential that the Court of the state of *Vermont, Thompson*, Ch. J. said, "that to give any binding effect to a judgment, it is essential that the Court should have jurisdiction of the person, and of the subject matter; and the want of jurisdiction is a matter that may always be set up against a judgment, when sought to be enforced, or where any benefit is claimed under it. The want of jurisdiction makes it utterly void and unavailable for nay purpose." There is, however, a marked and decided distinction between Superior Courts of general jurisdiction, and inferior Courts, or Courts of special and limited jurisdiction. In the former case, the intendment of the law is, that they had jurisdiction, until the contrary appears; (emphasis added)

B. State of Alaska Courts Possess No Ordained and Established Authority to Act

Consistent with the showing of ineffectual laws as shown above, the State of Alaska was not granted authority either by the U.S. Const. or the principles of DOI to punish supposed crimes – or pretended offenses – by military commissions or presidentially constituted courts. Militia authority being the only force of the state, acting under the will of governor Mike Dunleavy, are prosecuted by the State of Alaska's Department of Law against its citizens; therefore the states action falls within the 4 prong definition of a military commission as held in this court of the Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, ***20 – ***21 (1866) case.

“1. A military commission derives its power and authority wholly from martial law; and by that law and by military authority only are its proceedings to be judged or reviewed.

2. Martial law is the will of the commanding officer of an armed force, or geographical military department, expressed in time of war within the limits of his military jurisdiction, as necessity demands and prudence dictates, restrains or enlarged by the orders of his military chief, or supreme executive ruler.

3. Military law is the rules and regulations made by the legislative power of the State for the government of its land and naval forces.

4. The laws of war (when this expression is not used as a generic term) are the laws which govern the conduct of belligerents toward each other and other nations, *flagranti bello*.” (citations omitted)

See also, Martin v. Mills, 18 Johns. 7 (1821) “The militia is the state force, and the only force under the power of the state.”

The State of Alaska's actions in prosecuting supposed crimes or pretended legislation clearly shows that of which it seeks relief, is not to deliver justice in a manner that punishes treason or conspiracy to commit treason, but to punish simple crimes against the United States to which they have neither jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter.

It is unimportant whether the petitioner was intended to be charged with treason or conspiracy, or with some other offense of which the law takes no notice. Either or any way, the men who undertook to try him had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter.

Nor had they jurisdiction of the party. The case, not having been one of impeachment, or a case arising in the land or naval forces, is either nothing at all or else it is a simple crime against the United States, committed by private individuals not in the public service, civil or military. Persons standing in that relation to the government are answerable for the offenses which they may commit only to the civil courts of the country. So says the Constitution, as we read it; and the act of Congress of March 3d, 1863, which was passed with reference to persons in the exact situation of this man, declares that they shall be delivered up for trial to the proper civil authorities.

There being no jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the party, you are bound to relieve the petitioner. It is as much of a duty of a judge to protect the innocent as it is to punish the guilty.³

3 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, ***103 – *** 104 (1866)

Because the State of Alaska has convicted petitioner – a United States Citizen not of the land or naval forces – of a supposed crime or pretended legislation, with no constitutional authority to support it, the petitioner is immune to suffer any punishment by the government as the “laws” it acts on is ineffectual.

“[F]or it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to law. The power of punishment is, alone through the means which the laws have provided for that purpose, and if they are ineffectual, there is an immunity from punishment, no matter how great an offender the individual may be, or how much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country, or endangered its safety. By the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people. If there was law to justify this military trial, it is not our province to interfere; if there was not, it is our duty to declare the nullity of the whole proceedings. The decision of this question does not depend on argument or judicial precedents, numerous and highly illustrative as they are. These precedents inform us of the extent of the struggle to preserve liberty and to relieve those in civil life from military trials. *See Ex parte Milligan*, 71 U.S. 2, 119 (1866)

Now that it is shown that the State of Alaska courts, acting under the Alaska Statehood Act (72 Stat. 332) is a government whom acts judicially outside the boundaries of the U.S.

Constitution, although their constitution is not to be repugnant to the United States

Constitution or the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power; and from what source did the military commission that tried him derive their authority? Certainly no part of the judicial power of the country was conferred on them; because the Constitution expressly vests it “in one supreme court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” and it is not pretended that the commission was a court ordained and established by Congress. They cannot justify on the mandate of the President; because he is controlled by the law, and his appropriate sphere of duty, is to execute, not to make, the laws; and there is “no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction.” One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed during good behavior. We agree in proposition that no department of the government of the United States – neither the President, nor Congress, nor the Courts – possesses any power not given by the Constitution.

See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 – 122, 137 (1866)

Even if the State of Alaska were to invoke 28 U.S.C.S. § 81A as its source of jurisdiction, the U.S. Code is founded upon 62 Stat. 869 which states that it is a an Act of Congress that needs to be enacted into law, as it has not done so for the “Judicial Code and Judiciary.”


If the U.S. District Court were to rely upon the Judiciary Act in denying petitioner’s common law writ of habeas corpus under 1 Stat. 1789, it would favor petitioner to review and re-examine petitioner’s state convictions. 48 U.S.C.S. § 21 establishing Alaska’s organization and administration of the Territory of Alaska has been omitted as obsolete in view of the admission of Alaska to the Union of the United States of America. When reading all context of the law, be it by the United States Constitution, the Acts of Congress, the Constitution of Alaska, or any treaties, it favors petitioners position that the State of Alaska wholly lacks subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Even if the petitioner has plead guilty, or been found guilty, jurisdiction arguments cannot be waived if Congress had no authority to pass criminal offenses in the first place. *See* 1 Criminal Law Advocacy § 11.10[1]

CONCLUSION

Under the treatie text of 1 Criminal Law Advocacy § 11.10[1], jurisdiction cannot be waived, although petitioner found guilty or pleads guilty to an alleged crime. WHEREFORE, the reasons stated, Petitioner prays that this Court grant the required Extraordinary Writ – Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus – and direct that Governor Mike Dunleavy of the State of Alaska, his Attorneys General, and all other officials supervised under the authority of the state governor, the United States District Court for the District of Alaska and to the Honorable Judge of the U.S. District Court, direct and command that the body of Wyatt North Redfox be delivered from military custody, and if found guilty of any offense, to be turned over to the proper tribunal for inquiry and punishment; or, if not found thus probably guilty, to be discharged altogether; or directing that a writ of prohibition or mandamus be issued to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska to dismiss the State court criminal actions filed in state court against petitioner, with prejudice, immediately and without condition. In the alternative, while pending before this court, petitioner prays further that he be released on his own recognizance, or issue bail affordable to ensure his appearance at court.

Dated July 25, 2026

Respectfully submitted,



Wyatt North Redfox #729305 (in propria persona)
Anchorage Correctional Complex West
1300 East 4th Avenue
Anchorage, AK 99501