

Docket No.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG, *Petitioner*

versus

ANDY BESHEAR, KENTUCKY DEMOCRATIC
PARTY, FAYETTE COUNTY DEMOCRATIC
PARTY, ANDY BARR, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF
KENTUCKY, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF FAYETTE
COUNTY, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF CLARK
COUNTY, KENTUCKY EDUCATIONAL
TELEVISION, and JEREMY MATTOX,
Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Appendix to Petition for Certiorari

Petitioner: Geoffrey M. Young, *pro se*
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Lexington, Kentucky 40503
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* * * * *

Appendix 1 – Entered on May 12, 2026

No. 25-5467
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG,	)	
Plaintiff-Appellant,	)	
	)	
v.	)	ORDER
	)	
ANDY BESHEAR, et al.,	)	
Defendants-Appellees.	)	

BEFORE: GRIFFIN, MURPHY, and RITZ,
Circuit Judges.

The court received a petition for rehearing en

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banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. The petition was then circulated to the full court. No judge has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

s/ Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

* * * * *

Appendix 2 – Entered on May 6, 2026

No. 25-5467
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

)
)
)
)

ORDER

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ANDY BESHEAR, et al.,)
Defendants-Appellees.)

Before: GRIFFIN, MURPHY, and RITZ, Circuit
Judges.

We previously granted the motions for
monetary sanctions by five appellees against pro se
appellant Geoffrey M. Young for filing a frivolous
appeal. Two of those appellees—the Republican
Party of Clark County, Kentucky, and the
Republican Party of Fayette County, Kentucky—now
seek \$8,127.93 in attorneys' fees and costs. The
other three appellees—Governor Andy Beshear, the
Kentucky Democratic Party, and the Fayette County,
Kentucky Democratic Party—seek \$13,952.76 in
attorneys' fees and costs. Young opposes both
requests. For the reasons below, we grant the two
requests in full and order Young to pay attorneys'
fees and costs in those amounts.

Young sued politicians, political parties, and others, alleging that they conspired against him to rig elections in Kentucky from 2014 to 2023. He has filed many similar lawsuits over the years without success. The district court dismissed his amended complaint here because most of his claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations for civil-rights claims in Kentucky and the remaining claims failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *Young v. Beshear*, No. 3:23-CV-00024-GFVT, 2024 WL 3969352, at *2-4 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2024). The district court denied the defendants' motion for monetary sanctions but imposed filing restrictions on Young. *See id.* at *5; *Young v. Beshear*, No. 3:23-CV-00024-GFVT, 2025 WL 1348917, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2025).

Young appealed the district court's judgment,

even though several courts had repeatedly warned him for years that if he continued making frivolous filings he would receive monetary sanctions. *See, e.g., id.; Young v. Overly*, No. 3:16-CV-00062-GFVT, 2017 WL 4355561, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2017).

He made several arguments on appeal, all groundless, including that the district court was biased against him. Five appellees moved for monetary sanctions in this court, arguing that Young's frivolous appeal caused them to incur unnecessary expenses on top of those already imposed by his frivolous district court proceedings.

We granted those motions, holding that his appeal was frivolous under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 because it was "filed out of 'sheer obstinacy [as] the only issues in the case clearly have been resolved against [him].'" *Larry E. Parrish, P.C.*

v. Bennett, 989 F.3d 452, 457-58 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Anderson v. Dickson*, 715 F. App'x 481, 489 (6th Cir. 2017)). We directed the moving appellees to file affidavits detailing their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred due to Young's appeal and gave Young the opportunity to respond.

The affidavit from counsel for the Clark and Fayette County Republican Parties stated that they incurred \$7,800 in attorneys' fees and \$327.93 in costs related to the appeal, for a total of \$8,127.93. Counsel submitted bills in support, showing that she charged \$300 per hour and performed 26 hours of legal work on the appeal.

The affidavit from counsel for Beshear and the Kentucky and Fayette County Democratic Parties stated that they incurred \$13,404 in attorneys' fees and \$548.76 in costs related to the appeal, for a total

of \$13,952.76. Counsel also submitted supporting bills, which showed that a partner at the law firm charged \$450 per hour and performed 5.1 hours of work, totaling \$2,295; that an associate charged \$300 per hour and performed 29.2 hours of work, totaling \$8,760; and that a law clerk charged \$185 per hour and performed 14.4 hours of work, totaling \$2,664.

Footnote 1:

These totals come to 48.7 hours of work costing \$13,719, which is slightly more than the 48 hours of work costing \$13,404 that the appellees seek here.

In response, Young presents arguments that almost entirely concern his lawsuit and appeal. He reiterates that he believes that his suit was meritorious and that the district court and this panel applied the wrong law and is biased against him. His arguments are not relevant to the appellees'

filings supporting their already-granted motions for sanctions.

"The party seeking attorney fees bears the initial burden to substantiate 'the hours worked and the rates sought.'" *Nat'l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Bannum, Inc.*, 102 F.4th 358, 362 (6th Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (quoting *The Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted*, 831 F.3d 686, 702 (6th Cir. 2016)). To support its motion, a party must provide "documentation...of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of the litigation." *Id.* (quoting *United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Ass'n, Loc. 307 v. G&M Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.*, 732 F.2d 495, 502 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984)).

The moving appellees submitted detailed documentation demonstrating that they performed a reasonable amount of work, charged reasonable rates, and incurred reasonable cost litigating the appeal. Given that Young "does not dispute," *Bannum*, 102 F.4th at 363, the amount of work performed, the rates charged, or the costs incurred, the appellees' requests are well-taken.

Therefore, we **GRANT** in full the moving appellees' requests and **ORDER** Young to pay the Republican Party of Clark County, Kentucky, and the Republican Party of Fayette County, Kentucky \$8,127.93, and to pay Governor Andy Beshear, the Kentucky Democratic Party, and the Fayette County, Kentucky Democratic Party \$13,952.76.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

s/ Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

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Appendix 3 – Entered on December 22, 2025

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 25-5467

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG,)	
Plaintiff-Appellant,	) ON APPEAL FROM
	) THE UNITED STATES
v.	) DISTRICT COURT FOR
	) THE EASTERN
ANDY BESHEAR, et al.,)	DISTRICT OF
Defendants-Appellees.	) KENTUCKY

ORDER

BEFORE: GRIFFIN, MURPHY, and RITZ,
Circuit Judges.

Pro se litigant Geoffrey M. Young appeals the district court's dismissal of his civil suit and imposition of filing restrictions. Several appellees move for monetary sanctions against Young. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that,

upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). For the reasons below, we affirm the district court's judgment and grant the motion for sanctions.

In his amended complaint, Young alleged that nine defendants—politicians, political parties, a public television station, and a county judge—conspired against him to rig elections in Kentucky from 2014 to 2023. He asserted 46 claims, invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and state law. He sought over \$20 million in damages per claim. Young has filed many similar lawsuits before; one defendant counted at least 11 suits, all dismissed, and 40 appeals. *See, e.g., Young v. Edelen*, No. 2019-SC-000625-I, 2020 WL 1291421, at *4 (Ky. Feb. 20, 2020) ("Young has wasted more than his fair share of judicial resources

filing numerous complaints with no legal basis over the last five years."); *Young v. Overly*, No. 17-6242, 2018 WL 5311408, at *1 (6th Cir. July 2, 2018).

The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), rejecting Young's first 41 claims as time-barred and the remaining five because they failed to state a claim. *Young v. Beshear*, No 3:23-CV-00024-GFVT, 2024 WL 3969352, at *2-4 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 28, 2024). The district court denied the defendants' motions for monetary sanctions against Young, but the court ordered Young to show cause why he should not be placed on filing restrictions for his vexatious litigation. *Id.* at *5. Young failed to respond and instead moved to vacate the order dismissing his suit. The district court denied Young's motion to vacate and imposed filing

restrictions, joining the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Fayette Circuit Court in doing so. *Young v. Beshear*, No. 3:23-CV-00024-GFVT, 2025 WL 1348917, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2025).

Young makes five arguments on appeal—two about the district court's dismissal of his amended complaint, two about its post-judgment order, and one claiming that the district judge was biased.

We review de novo Young's arguments that the district court erred in dismissing his amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). *See Moshi v. Kia Am., Inc.*, 155 F.4th 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2025). Young maintains that the district court failed to review his amended complaint under the proper pleading standards in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), including by failing to accept his allegations as true.

In support, he merely quotes the allegations for claim 34 (which involved matters from 2019 and 2020), asserts that they are representative of his other claims, and declares that they give fair notice of his grounds for relief. But the district court "accept[ed] [Young's] allegations as true, *Young*, 2024 WL 3969352, at *1 (quoting *Directv, Inc. v. Treesh*, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)), and determined that claim 34, along with 40 other claims, were barred by the one-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Kentucky, *see Wright v. Louisville Metro Gov't*, 144 F.4th 817, 824 (6th Cir. 2025). Thus, Young fails to show that the district court used incorrect standards or inadequately explained its decision.

Young also argues that the district court incorrectly dismissed those 41 claims as time-barred.

He argues that he alleged a conspiracy and thus the statute of limitations runs from the last overt act of the conspiracy. Because his allegations include matters from 2023, Young concludes that his claims originating from as far back as 2014 are timely. But Young has "not plausibly alleged" a conspiracy—"an agreement between two or more persons to injure [him] by unlawful action"—connecting the claims dismissed as untimely to those about matters within the one-year limitations period. *Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff's Off.*, 109 F.4th 864, 872 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting *Revis v. Meldrum*, 489 F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007)), *cert. denied*, 145 S. Ct. 1901 (2025). Young did not plausibly allege a connection, for example, between his allegations that that the Fayette County Democratic Party threatened to arrest him and banned him from its meeting in 2014

and his allegations that the Kentucky Democratic Party rigged the 2023 Democratic primary for governor by allowing him only the incumbent governor and no other candidates to speak at an executive committee meeting. As the district court explained in its post-judgment order, Young offered "conclusory allegations" that the defendants engaged in a "singular conspiracy." *Young*, 2025 WL 1348917, at *2. "We need not credit 'a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation' or a 'naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.'" *United States ex rel. Angelo v. Allstate Ins.*, 106 F.4th 441, 448 (6th Cir.) (quoting *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), *cert. denied*, 145 S. Ct. 550 (2024).

We review for an abuse of discretion Young's arguments that the district court erred in denying his post-judgment motion and by sanctioning him

with filing restrictions. *See Jones v. Ill. Cent. R.R.*, 617 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2010). Young argues that the district court's order rejecting his post-judgment motion was "highly irregular" because the court did not "describe any of [his] allegations," "make any findings of fact," or explain why [his] first amended complaint failed to state any claims." But the court had already done all of this in its memorandum opinion and order dismissing his amended complaint; repeating the analysis would have been an "empty exercise." *Dupree v. Younger*, 598 U.S. 729, 737 (2023). Young does not show that the district court failed to review a pertinent argument or otherwise abused its discretion in its thorough order denying his repetitious post-judgment motion.

Young next challenges the district court's filing restrictions as overly broad. But they merely

require him to show the district court, before filing a new lawsuit, that the suit is not frivolous or brought for an improper purpose. *See Young*, 2025 WL 1348917, at *3. Given Young's history of vexatious litigation, and because the filing restrictions do not leave him "absolutely foreclosed from initiating an action in a court of the United States," *Ortman v. Thomas*, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996), the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Finally, Young argues that the district judge was biased against him, claiming that the first two pages of the court's opinion dismissing his amended complaint show "that the judge hates [him] personally." But the opinion did nothing more than accurately characterize Young's litigation history. It did not reflect "a deep-seated...antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible." *United States*

v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting *Liteky v. United States*, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

Five appellees—the Republican Party of Clark County, Kentucky, the Republican Party of Fayette County, Kentucky, Governor Andy Beshear, the Kentucky Democratic Party, and the Fayette County, Kentucky Democratic Party—move for monetary sanctions against Young for filing a frivolous appeal. They note that Young continues to file frivolous lawsuits and meritless appeals about these same issues. They observe that none of Young's arguments here have arguable merit. The defendants also note that several courts, both state and federal, have already sanctioned Young multiple times, imposing both filing restrictions and monetary penalties. Young counters that his statute-of-limitations and *Twombly* arguments have merit,

points out a citation error in one of the motions for sanctions, and argues that the motions are premature because they were filed before his appeal was decided.

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, "[i]f a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may...award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." "An appeal is frivolous if 'it is obviously without merit *and* is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or other improper purposes,'" *Larry E. Parrish. P.C. v. Bennett*, 989 F.3d 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting *Barney v. Holzer Clinic, Ltd.*, 110 F.3d 1207, 1212 (6th Cir. 1997)), or "if it is filed out of 'sheer obstinacy—when the only issues in the case clearly have been resolved against the appellant,'" *id.* at 457-58 (quoting *Anderson v. Dickson*, 715 F. App'x 481, 489 (6th Cir. 2017)). That

latter standard captures Young's appeal here. The district court's dismissal of his amended complaint was clearly correct, and his appellate arguments are groundless. Yet Young continues to litigate these same issues over and again without success. "This court does not take lightly the sanctioning of litigants, especially those who are *pro se*. But we have a duty to ensure that parties do not have to defend themselves in perpetuity simply because a litigant like [Young] refuses to take no for an answer." *Anderson*, 715 F. App'x at 490.

Thus, the appellees' motions for sanctions are well-taken. The moving appellees may file affidavits setting forth their reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred by this appeal no later than 14 days after the issuance of this order. Once the affidavits have been filed or the period to do so has run, Young

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has 14 days to respond.

Therefore, we **AFFIRM** the district court's judgment and **GRANT** the motion for sanctions. We retain jurisdiction pending resolution of sanctions on appeal.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

s/ Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

* * * * *

Appendix 4 – Entered on May 8, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG,)	Civil No. 3:23-cv-
Plaintiff,)	00024-GFVT
)	
)	MEMORANDUM
v.)	OPINION & ORDER
)	
ANDY BESHEAR, et al.,)	
Defendants.)	

Geoffrey Young has filed a litany of *pro se* lawsuits alleging conspiracies to rig elections against him. After the Court dismissed another of his federal complaints, he moved to vacate the Court's dismissal order. Because he fails to provide a reason for reconsideration, the Court will DENY his Motion [R. 68.]

I

Geoffrey Young is a perennial candidate for state and national office. [R. 14.] According to him, various defendants have unlawfully rigged elections against him for the past decade. *Id.* He seeks monetary relief against Governor Beshear, Circuit Judge Jeremy Mattox, Kentucky Educational Television (KET), Representative Andy Barr, and various political parties. *Id.*

Mr. Young's claims are not unfamiliar to this

Court. In 2017, this Court dismissed another of Young's "election-rigging" complaints. *See generally Young v. Overly*, No. 3:16-CV-00062-GFVT, 2017 WL 4355561 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2017), *aff'd*, No. 17-6242, 2018 WL 5311408 (6th Cir. July 2, 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1178 (2019). In dismissing that action, this Court cautioned:

Young should be wary of being sanctioned himself. As Young is a pro se litigant and is without formal training in the law, the Court does feel compelled to extend a word of caution on filing claims in federal court when there are no factual circumstances to support the causes of action he alleges. It is simply not the case that anyone who pays the Court's filing fee may air any grievance in federal court, no matter how speculative or whether such grievances are grounded in fact. Federal substantive and procedural laws contain provisions that can cause plaintiffs alleging baseless claims to be sanctioned by the court or to be responsible for paying the attorneys' fees of the adversary that was

wrongfully hauled into court. It has been long recognized that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs and permits sanctions by the Court when the asserted action is frivolous or without evidentiary support.

Id. at *5.

But "[t]his warning clearly fell on deaf ears[.]"

Young v. Edelen, No. 2019-SC-000625-I, 2020 WL 1291421, at *4 (Ky. Feb 20, 2020). Less than three years later, the Supreme Court of Kentucky had occasion to caution him again:

Young has wasted more than his fair share of judicial resources filing numerous complaints with no legal basis over the last five years. It would therefore be well within this Court's discretion to enjoin Young from filing any cases against KET, or any of its employees or representatives, in any Kentucky court without prior court approval.

Id. In total, KET advises that Young has filed 11

similar lawsuits and 40 related appeals—all of which have been dismissed. [R. 15-1; R. 15-2.] The Court previously dismissed Young's 46 Count Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. [R.67.] It also directed Young to show cause within the next 30 days why he should not be placed on pre-filing restrictions. *Id.* Rather than show cause, Mr. Young filed a Motion to Vacate the Court's Dismissal Order. [R. 68.]

II

At the outset, the Court recognizes that Mr. Young is proceeding *pro se* and construes his filings liberally. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Though it is not entirely clear, he appears to bring his motion to vacate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. As a threshold issue, "Rule 59(e), by its own language, governs 'motion[s] to alter or

amend a judgment,' and no judgment has been entered in this case." *Trimboli v. Maxim Crane Works, L.P.*, No. 3:18-CV-00346, 2020WL 3546810, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. June 30, 2020). Nevertheless, a Rule 59(e) motion filed before the entry of judgment can be construed as a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order. *Hestle v. United States*, No. CIV. 05-40245, 2005 WL 1981301, at *1 (E.D. Mich. August 16, 2005). In accordance with its duty of liberal construction in this case, the Court construes Mr. Young's Motion as a request to reconsider an interlocutory order under Rule 54(b).

A federal district court has the authority to reconsider interlocutory orders under both the common law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). *Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborer's Health & Welfare Fund*, 89 F. App'x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). Courts

reconsider interlocutory orders only "when there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent a manifest injustice." *Id.* A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order is not an invitation for the parties to relitigate the issue. *See Hazard Coal Corp. v. Am Res. Corp.*, No. 6:20-CV-010-CHB, 2022 WL 18638743, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 9, 2022).

A

First, Young takes issue with the Court's dismissal of his time barred allegations of election rigging conspiracies occurring from 2014 to 2022. [R. 68 at 1.] He states as follows: "that finding is a bald-faced lie. Since 2015, I have always alleged that there is only one ongoing, primary-election-rigging conspiracy against me....This Court intentionally and

maliciously misrepresented my central allegation in order to make it impossible for me ever to receive a fair trial." *Id.* at 1-2. Young goes on to cite portions of his amended complaint, as well as a source concerning federal criminal law. *Id.* He asserts that the statute of limitations should run from the date of the last overt act of the conspiracy, which, according to him, is May 16, 2023. *Id.* In support, he reiterates his conclusion that the singular conspiracy remains ongoing. These conclusory allegations do not demonstrate an error of law and are insufficient to warrant reconsideration.

B

Next, Mr. Young takes issue with the Court's dismissal of his non-time barred claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). [R. 68 at 3-6.] In particular, he challenges the Court's finding that

Kentucky Educational Television enjoys immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. However, he fails to identify an error in the Court's reasoning. He further erroneously asserts that the Court failed to apply the *Twombly* standard. However, the Court did apply the *Twombly* standard, *see, e.g.*, [R. 67 at 3], and Young provides no reason to reconsider its previous ruling.

C

Next, he challenges the Court's dismissal of his claims under Kentucky Revised Statute § 118.105(1). [R. 68 at 6.] He asserts that this Court and various other courts are misinterpreting the statute. *Id.* But he again fails to explain how his allegations state a claim under this provision.

D

Mr. Young further disputes the Court's

determination that Count 46 failed to state a conspiracy claim. [R. 68 at 7.] There, the Court found that "to the extent Count 46 purports to sue Governor Beshear and the KDP, [] Young does not explain how those defendants were involved in the purported conspiracy." [R. 67 at 7.] He rehashes allegations from the complaint and states that "Because Andy Beshear was the main beneficiary of KET's violation of my First Amendment rights in 2023, I obviously alleged that Beshear was involved in the ongoing conspiracy. This Court's 'finding' that I didn't explain that was another bald-faced **LIE**." [R. 68 at 8.] But as the Court previously explained, KET is entitled to immunity and, in any case, Young's allegations fail to state a claim, True, Young makes conclusory allegations that Governor Beshear benefited from an alleged conspiracy. But a court

"need not accept as true legal conclusions of unwarranted factual inferences." *Gregory v. Shelby Cnty.*, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, Young again fails to provide a reason for reconsideration.

E

Finally, Mr. Young has not been responsive to the Court's Order that he "show cause within the next thirty (30) days as to why he should not be placed on pre-filing restrictions." [R. 67 at 8.] In that Order, the Court warned Mr. Young that a failure to show cause could result in pre-filing restrictions. *Id.* It further explained that "Mr. Young has already been placed on pre-filing restrictions by the Fayette Circuit Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals. [R. 15-6; R. 15-7]." *Id.* It also cautioned Young "that further frivolous filings can and will result in the

imposition of monetary sanctions." *Id.*

Here, filing restrictions are appropriate. *See Mischler v. Bevin*, No. 3:17-CV-00066-GFVT, 2018 WL 1526333, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2018), *aff'd*, No. 18-5665, 2019 WL 2644639 (6th Cir. May 8, 2019) ("Though an absolute bar from further litigation is too broad, a Court may impose pre-filing restrictions for matters with historically repetitive litigation."). It appears that, "without some sort of deterrent, [Young] will only continue h[is] attempts to re-litigate these issues." *Id.* His repetitive litigation has "consume[d] the finite resources of the courts and force[d] defendants to pay attorneys to litigate meritless actions." *Id.*; *see Anderson v. Dickson*, 715 F. App'x 481, 489 (6th Cir. 2017). Mr. Young has been on notice of the potential for pre-filing restrictions. He has failed to comply with the

Order to Show Cause why he should not be placed on restrictions. Accordingly, this Court will join the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Fayette Circuit Court in restricting Young's ability to file.

III

Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby **ORDERED** as follows:

1. Mr. Young's Motion to Vacate [R.68] is **DENIED**;
2. Mr. Young is **ORDERED** to seek permission from this Court before filing any future litigation, demonstrating that the claim(s) he intends to assert are not frivolous and that the suit is not brought for an improper purpose;
3. Mr. Young is again **WARNED** that future frivolous litigation will result in monetary sanctions;

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4. This matter is **DISMISSED** and **STRICKEN**
from the Court's active docket; and

5. The Court will enter a corresponding
Judgment.

This the 7th day of May, 2025.

s/ Gregory F. Van Tatenhove
United States District Judge

* * * * *

Appendix 5 – Entered on May 8, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG,)	Civil No. 3:23-cv-
Plaintiff,)	00024-GFVT
)	
v.)	JUDGMENT
)	
ANDY BESHEAR, et al.,)	
Defendants.)	

Consistent with the Memorandum Opinion

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and Order entered this date and on August 28, 2024,
and pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 58,
it is hereby **ORDERED** and **ADJUDGED** as
follows:

1. Plaintiff Young's Motion to Vacate **[R.68]** is
DENIED;
2. Judgment is **ENTERED** in favor of the
Defendants;
3. This action is **DISMISSED** and **STRICKEN**
from the Court's docket;
4. Mr. Young is **ORDERED** to seek permission
from this Court before filing any future litigation,
demonstrating that the claim(s) he intends to assert
are not frivolous and that the suit is not brought for
an improper purpose;
5. Mr. Young is again **WARNED** that future
frivolous litigation will result in monetary sanctions;

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and

6. This is a FINAL and APPEALABLE Judgment
and there is no just cause for delay.

This the 7th day of May, 2025.

s/ Gregory F. Van Tatenhove
United States District Judge

* * * * *

Appendix 6 – Entered on August 28, 2024

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT

GEOFFREY M. YOUNG,)	
Plaintiff,)	Civil No. 3:23-cv-
)	00024-GFVT
)	
v.)	MEMORANDUM
)	OPINION & ORDER
ANDY BESHEAR, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
Defendants.)	

Geoffrey Young has filed a litany of *pro se*

lawsuits alleging conspiracies to rig elections against him. Now, he is back with another federal complaint. It is with a distinct sense of deja vu that the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [R. 15; R. 19; R. 20; R. 23; R. 33; R. 38] are **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**.

I

Geoffrey Young is a perennial candidate for state and national office. [R. 14.] According to him, various defendants have unlawfully rigged elections against him for the past decade. *Id.* He seeks monetary relief against Governor Beshear, Circuit Judge Jeremy Mattox, Kentucky Educational Television (KET), Representative Andy Barr, and various political parties. *Id.*

Mr. Young's claims are not unfamiliar to this Court. In 2017, this Court dismissed another of

Young's "election-rigging" complaints. *See generally* *Young v. Overly*, No. 3:16-CV-00062-GFVT, 2017 WL 4355561 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2017), *aff'd*, No. 17-6242, 2018 WL 5311408 (6th Cir. July 2, 2018), *cert. denied*, 139 S. Ct. 1178 (2019). In dismissing that action, this Court cautioned:

Young should be wary of being sanctioned himself. As Young is a pro se litigant and is without formal training in the law, the Court does feel compelled to extend a word of caution on filing claims in federal court when there are no factual circumstances to support the causes of action he alleges. It is simply not the case that anyone who pays the Court's filing fee may air any grievance in federal court, no matter how speculative or whether such grievances are grounded in fact. Federal substantive and procedural laws contain provisions that can cause plaintiffs alleging baseless claims to be sanctioned by the court or to be responsible for paying the attorneys' fees of the adversary that was wrongfully hauled into court. It has been long recognized that Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs and permits sanctions by the Court when the asserted action is frivolous or without evidentiary support.

Id. at *5.

But "[t]his warning clearly fell on deaf ears[.]"

Young v. Edelen, No. 2019-SC-000625-I, 2020 WL 1291421, at *4 (Ky. Feb 20, 2020). Less than three years later, the Supreme Court of Kentucky had occasion to caution him again:

Young has wasted more than his fair share of judicial resources filing numerous complaints with no legal basis over the last five years. It would therefore be well within this Court's discretion to enjoin Young from filing any cases against KET, or any of its employees or representatives, in any Kentucky court without prior court approval.

Id. In total, KET advises that Young has filed 11 similar lawsuits and 40 related appeals—all of which

have been dismissed. [R. 15-1; R. 15-2.]

II

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." *Directv, Inc. v. Treesh*, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). However, a court "'need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.'" *Id.* (quoting *Gregory v. Shelby Cnty.*, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

In other words, "[t]he factual allegations, assumed to be true, must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show *entitlement to relief*." *League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen*, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555).

A

Mr. Young's Amended Complaint asserts 46 Counts against the various defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [R. 14.] Counts 1 to 41 allege election-rigging conspiracies occurring from 2014 to 2022. *Id.* at 1-90. Counts 42 to 46 allege similar conspiracies occurring in 2022 and 2023. *Id.* at 90-103.

Counts 1 through 41 are time-barred. *See*

Robinson v. Butler Cnty., No. 4:18-CV-00172-JHM-HBB, 2020 WL 7389740, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 16, 2020) ("[I]n § 1983 actions, courts apply the relevant state statutes of limitations to determine whether the claim is timely filed."); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 413.140; *Collard v. Ky. Bd. of Nursing*, 896 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[S]ection 1983 actions in Kentucky are limited by the one-year statute of limitations found in section 413.140(1)(a)."). Footnote 1:

Young filed his lawsuit in April 2023, and his Amended Complaint in September 2023.")

And to the extent those counts attempt to assert violations of state law (which may, in theory, be subject to different statutes of limitations), § 1983 is not an appropriate vehicle for those claims. *See West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) ("To state a claim

under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the *Constitution and laws of the United States*, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss those counts with prejudice.

B

The final four counts are not necessarily time barred. Nevertheless, they fail to state a claim.

1

Count 42 and 43 allege that Kentucky Educational Television conspired "to rig [] primaries against me" in 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2023. [R. 14 at 91.] Young appears to take issue with KET's "unconstitutional" fundraising threshold requirement to participate in a primary debate. Of course, some of those allegations are also time

barred. But to the extent Counts 42 and 43 address non-time barred complaints, those claims are barred by immunity. Footnote 2:

To the extent Counts 39 through 41 could be generously construed as falling within the statute of limitations, they are also barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and, in any event, fail to state a claim.

Defendant KET (operated by the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television) is an agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, meaning that it enjoys immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. *See Grinter v. Knight*, 532 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2008); *Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168.030 (establishing the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television as an agency of the Commonwealth of Kentucky); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

168.010 (establishing that the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television shall manage and control the educational television network); *see also* *Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. Holiday*, No. 3:14-CV-00063-GFVT, 2017 WL 4355553, at *5 n.3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2017), *aff'd*, 907 F.3d 941 (6th Cir. 2018) (KET employees considered public officials for the purpose of qualified immunity). The Eleventh Amendment offers broad protection; states and their agencies enjoy immunity from all claims, "whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief[.]" *Thiokol Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury*, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993); *see also* *McCormick v. Miami Univ.*, 693 F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012).

And because KET (and the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television) are not state officials for purposes of *Ex Parte Young*, none of the

exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply.

See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908)

(explaining that "individuals who, as officers of the

state" are violating or threatening to violate the

Constitution "may be enjoined by a Federal Court of

equity from such action"). Footnote 3:

Young has also filed a "Motion for a Preliminary Injunction against KET." [R. 43.] The Motion appears to concern the monetary criterion for participating in debates. Again, because KET is immune under the Eleventh Amendment, the Court will deny the request. Even if KET were not immune, Young has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. *See, e.g., Holiday*, 907 F.3d at 947.

KET is also immune from Young's state law claims. Under the Kentucky Constitution, state agencies "operating under the direction and control of the central state government" are immune from suit (absent explicit waiver). *Stratton v.*

Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 516, 519 (Ky. 2006). As one of these agencies, KET (operated by the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television) enjoys immunity from suit for its governmental functions. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 168.030 (establishing the Kentucky Authority for Educational Television as "[a]n independent agency and instrumentality of the Commonwealth"). Because KET is being sued in connection with its governmental duties (planning and establishing parameters for primary debates) it enjoys complete immunity from Young's state law claims as well. *Yanero v. Davis*, 65 S.W.3d 510, 519-20 (Ky. 2001).

Finally, to the extent Counts 42 and 43 purport to sue other defendants in connection with KET's monetary requirement, Young does not explain how those defendants have any connection to

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the monetary requirement.

2

Young's 44th Count states that "[t]he KDP and Andy Beshear violated KRS 118.105(1) on March 25, 2023, and thereby illegally rigged the 2023 Democratic Primary for Governor against me." [R. 14 at 93.] But as the Sixth Circuit, this Court, and Kentucky Courts have repeatedly explained to Young, Kentucky Revised Statute § 118.105(1) "merely directs that political parties nominate all of their candidates." *Young v. Beshear*, No. 2015-CA-000669-MR, 2016 WL 929653, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016); *see also Young v. Overly*, No. 17-6242, 2018 WL 5311408, at *3 (6th Cir. July 2, 2018); *Young v. Overly*, No. 3:16-CV-00062-GFVT, 2017 WL 4355561, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2017). Young appears to complain that the Kentucky Democratic

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Party's (KDP) governing body muted him during a zoom meeting, preventing him from "talk[ing] about my platform." [R. 14 at 93-98.] He states that the "muting" coupled with the KDP's endorsement of Beshear amounted to a "rig[ging]" of the 2023 democratic primary. *Id.* These allegations fail to state a claim under the statute, which simply provides that political parties should nominate their candidates.

3

Next, Young's 45th Count alleges that the KDP and Fayette County Democratic Party and "have been rigging primaries against me for at least six years by blocking me out of Facebook groups and refusing to give me any information whatsoever." *Id.* at 98. To the extent these allegations can be construed as falling within the one-year statute of

limitations for § 1983 actions, they also fail to state a claim under Kentucky Revised Statute § 118.105(1). Again, that provision simply directs political parties to nominate candidates.

Finally, Count 46 states that KET participated in a "conspiracy to rig the 2023 Democratic Primary for Governor against me." *Id.* at 98. Again, KET is entitled to immunity. In any event, these allegations again fail to state a claim. And to the extent Count 46 purports to sue Governor Beshear and the KDP, the Young does not explain how those defendants were involved in the purported conspiracy. Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss Young's Amended Complaint. Footnote 4:

Mr. Young has also filed a motion entitled "Motion for Order to Transfer Entire Case to Judge who Respects and

Obeys the Law: Claria Horn Boom." [R. 58.] In his filing, Young laments the fact that this Court dismissed his previous Complaint in 2017. *Id.* He asserts that the Court "knowingly and maliciously lied" in dismissing his suit under Rule 12(b)(6). *Id.* Young goes on to accuse Judge Van Tatenhove of being "devious[,] "100% biased and corrupt" and violating the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. *Id.* He further requests that Judge Van Tatenhove "resign from his powerful position[] and abandon his license to practice law[.]" *Id.* However, the time to revisit this Court's 2017 orders has passed. And Mr. Young's disagreement with this Court's rulings is not a reason for recusal. *See United States v. Hoffa*, 382 F.2d 856, 861 (6th Cir. 1967) ("There is an obligation upon a Judge not to recuse himself when there is no occasion."); *Scott v. Metro. Health Corp.*, 234 F. App'x 341, 354 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[A]s the late Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, 'a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified.'" (quoting *Laird v. Tatum*, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972))); *see also id.* ("[T]he judge need not recuse himself based on the subjective view of a party."). Accordingly, the Court will

deny Mr. Young's Motion to Transfer.

C

Finally, the Court will address the Defendants' request for filing restrictions, attorney fees, and sanctions. "Though an absolute ban from further litigation is too broad, a Court may impose pre-filing restrictions for matters with historically repetitive litigation." *Mischler v. Bevin*, No. 3:17-CV-00066-GFVT, 2018 WL 1526333, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Mar 28, 2018), *aff'd*, No. 18-5665, 2019 WL 2644639 (6th Cir. May 8, 2019).

Here, filing restrictions may be appropriate. It appears that, "without some sort of deterrent, [Young] will only continue h[is] attempts to re-litigate these issues." *Id.* State courts have reached a similar conclusion: Mr. Young has already been placed on pre-filing restrictions by the Fayette

Circuit Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals.

[R.15-6; R. 15-7]; *see also Granader v. Pub. Bank*, 417 F.2d 75, 82-83 (6th Cir. 1969) ("Federal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record." (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court will order Mr. Young to show cause why he should not be placed on filing restrictions in this Court.

Defendants further request that the Court impose attorney fees and monetary sanctions. *See generally* 28 U.S.C. § 1927; Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The Court will decline to do so at this time. However, it will warn Mr. Young that further frivolous filings can and will result in the imposition of monetary sanctions. *See Mischler*, 2018 WL 1526333, at *9.

III

Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby **ORDERED** as

follows:

1. The Defendants' Requests to Dismiss Young's Claims are **GRANTED**;
2. All claims by Mr. Young against all Defendants are **DISMISSED** with prejudice;
3. The Defendants' Requests for Monetary Sanctions and Attorney Fees are **DENIED**;
4. Mr. Young's Request to Transfer and Request for an Injunction are **DENIED**;
5. All other pending motions are **DENIED as moot**; and
6. Mr. Young is directed to show cause within the next **thirty (30) days** as to why he should not be placed on pre-filing restrictions.

This the 27th day of August, 2024.

s/ Gregory F. Van Tatenhove
United States District Judge