

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX A
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-2451

DORA L. ADKINS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ROSSLYN SYNDICATE, LC,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Rossie David Alston, Jr., District Judge.
(1:25-cv-02117-RDA-WEF)

Submitted: March 26, 2026
Decided: March 30, 2026

Before RICHARDSON and BERNER, Circuit Judges,
and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dora L. Adkins, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in
this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Dora L. Adkins appeals the district court's orders denying her motion for leave to file a proposed emergency complaint, denying as moot her motion to expedite, denying her motion for an emergency injunction, cancelling a noticed hearing, and denying her motion for leave to file a proposed emergency amended complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. *Adkins v. Rosslyn Syndicate, LC*, No. 1:25-cv-02117-RDA-WEF (E.D. Va. Dec. 3 & 10, 2025).

Additionally, based on the numerous meritless appeals Adkins has pursued in this court, we previously warned her that further meritless or frivolous appeals could result in the court ordering her to show cause why it should not impose a prefiling injunction or other sanctions against her. *See Adkins v. Marriott Intl, Inc.*, No. 25-2427, 2026 WL 498089, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026); *Adkins v. Driftwood Special Servicing, LLC*, No. 25-2338, 2026 WL 226886, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026); *Adkins v. TW Tyson Corner LLC*, No. 25-2050, 2025 WL 3777055, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025); *Adkins v. Xenia Hotels & Resorts, Inc.*, No. 25-2021, 2025 WL 3459774, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025); *Adkins v. Best Buy Co.*, No. 25-2015, 2025 WL 3459773, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025); *Adkins v. Ur Smile Dental, P.C.*, No. 25-2014, 2025 WL 3451549, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 1, 2025). Adkins has not heeded these warnings. Upon review of the instant appeal and Adkins' litigation history in this court, we order her to show cause why this court should not impose a pre-filing injunction or other sanctions-including monetary sanctions-against her. We direct Adkins to resp-

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ond to this order to show cause no later than 30 days after the date of this opinion.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

[Filed: March 30, 2026]

No. 25-2451
(1:25-cv-02117-RDA-WEF)

DORA L. ADKINS

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ROSSLYN SYNDICATE, LC

Defendant - Appellee

JUDGMENT

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWI, CLERK

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APPENDIX B

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

[Filed: April 21, 2026]

No. 25-2451
(1:25-cv-02117-RDA-WEF)

DORA L. ADKINS

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ROSSLYN SYNDICATE, LC

Defendant - Appellee

ORDER

The court denies the motion to supplement the record, the motion for leave to file declaration in support of petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 40 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Richardson, Judge Berner, and Senior Judge Floyd.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

APPENDIX C

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division**

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-2117 (RDA/WEF)

DORA L. ADKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSSLYN SYNDICATE, LC,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on *pro se* Plaintiff Dora L. Adkins' Motion for Leave from the Court to File a Proposed Emergency Complaint (Dkt. 1), Motion to Expedite (Dkt. 3), and Motion for leave from Court to Request an Emergency Injunction (Dkt. 7) ("Motions"). Plaintiff is a serial filer of frivolous lawsuits. *See, e.g., Adkins v. American Service Center Associates, LLC*, No. 1:22-cv-956-LMB-WEF, Dkt. 3 (explaining that Plaintiff "has filed over 20 *pro se* frivolous complaints in this court since 1997, none of which survived a motion to dismiss" (citing *Adkins v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC*, 2022 WL 609554, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2022)); *see also Adkins v. CP/IPERS Arlington Hotel, LLC*, 293 Va. 446, 452 (2017) (reviewing 41 of Plaintiff's past cases and concluding that she has "a history of (1) filing duplicative vexatious lawsuits, (2) without any objective good faith basis, and (3) at the expense of the

court system and opposing parties”).¹ As a result, Plaintiff is subject to multiple prefiling injunctions in this District and the Court must screen Plaintiff’s Complaint.

On October 1, 2021, U.S. District Judge Anthony J. Trenga issued an order enjoining Plaintiff from filing without leave of Court “any action against . . . any [] company or individual that alleges under any legal theory injuries or damages arising out of alleged food or chemical poisoning, including, but not limited to, claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, assault, battery, or breach of warranty.” *Adkins v. Hyatt Corporation*, No. 1:20-cv-1410-AJT-MSN, Dkt. 41 at 4. On August 17, 2022, this District Judge enjoined Plaintiff from filing without leave of Court “any action against . . . any [] company or individual that alleges under any legal theory injuries or damages arising out of the use of her vehicle or any

¹ See, e.g., *Adkins v. Microsoft Corp.*, No. 1:25-cv-747, 2025 WL 1503580 (E.D. Va. May 2, 2025) (denying motion for leave to file proposed emergency complaint and to expedite), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 2231845 (4th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025); *Adkins v. H R B Tax Group*, No. 1:25-cv-574, 2025 WL 1279181 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2025) (same), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 2169984 (4th Cir. July 31, 2025); *Adkins v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc.*, No. 1:25-cv-670, 2025 WL 1279182 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2025) (same), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 2169985 (4th Cir. July 31, 2025); *Adkins v. Shell USA Virginia, Inc.*, No. 1:25-cv1112 (E.D. Va. July 9, 2025) (same); *Adkins v. 5 Star/Mar Y Mas*, No. 1:25-cv-237, 2025 WL 1905581 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2025) (same), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 1513625 (4th Cir. May 28, 2025); *Adkins v. Park Hotels & Resorts*, No. 1:24-cv-2280 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2025) (same), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 973016 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025); *Adkins v. Davidson Hotel Co.*, No. 1:24-cv-2241, (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2024), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 973012 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2025); *Adkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank*, No. 1:24-cv-894 (E.D. Va. Oct. 10, 2024) *aff’d*, 2025 WL 5200162 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024).

other form of transportation, including, but not limited to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, assault, battery, or breach of warranty.” *Adkins v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC*, No. 1:21-cv-419-RDA-JFA, Dkt. 24 at 2. On October 19, 2022, U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema issued an order directing the Clerk not to accept for filing “further motions for leave to file a complaint or other attempt to file a new civil action by plaintiff unless plaintiff first pays the required \$350 filing fee and \$52 administrative fee.” *Adkins*, No. 1:22-cv-956-LMB-WEF, Dkt. 3 at 5.

Here, Plaintiff seeks leave to file yet another frivolous Complaint, this time against Defendant Rosslyn Syndicate, LC. Dkt. 1-1. Like many of her other complaints, Plaintiff alleges that she has been discriminated against because she was “subjected to attempted food contamination and/or food poisoning and chemical poisoning.” *Id.* at 2. Indeed, Plaintiff herself lists eighteen separate lawsuits in which Plaintiff has raised similar claims and asserts “GOD is presenting Plaintiff at Plaintiffs best after performing 19 Devine [sic] Intervention[s] from DEATH.” *Id.* at 3. In sum, Plaintiff alleges that she was sold an out-of-order guest room that had not been properly cleaned and which did not have a working telephone. *Id.* at 6-7. Plaintiff asserts that the first hotel room had a chemical smell and that there was a dripping noise which Plaintiff reported to the front desk. *Id.* Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to correctly activate her key card to permit her to use the parking garage and that, on one occasion, someone attempted to enter Plaintiff’s room while a Do Not Disturb sign was present. *Id.* at 8-9. Plaintiff further alleges that hotel employees attempted to poison her based on the following: a hotel restaurant employee handed her an

empty food container; when the error was realized and the food container was replaced, the employee did not have on gloves, and Plaintiff subsequently said “no thanks” to the food. *Id.* at 10. With respect to the second hotel room to which she was moved following her complaints, Plaintiff asserts that the water was not hot and that neither the shower stream nor the toilet ran appropriately. *Id.* at 10.

On November 10, 2025, Plaintiff checked out of the second room. *Id.* At that time Plaintiff complained to housekeeping that the chemical smells in her room were coming from the cleaning of the adjoining room and that the “chemical had come through the walls from the Guest Room next door near the headboard as Plaintiff slept.” *Id.* at 13.

Based on these asserted facts, Plaintiff seeks to bring claims for negligence, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages and, although not listed as a count of the proposed complaint, asserts that Defendant has violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For these alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks \$16 billion in damages, including \$4 billion in negligence damages, \$4 billion in breach of contract damages, \$4 billion in infliction of emotional distress damages, and \$4 billion in punitive damages.

Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief. As a preliminary matter, the allegations therein mirror multiple prior fanciful and meritless complaints that Plaintiff has filed or sought to file in this court. *See, e.g., Adkins v. Park Hotels & Resorts, Inc.*, No. 1:24-cv-2280 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2024) (denying motion for leave to file complaint alleging “extreme filth and/or contamination inside a paid-for Guest Room”), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 973016 (4th Cir. Apr. 1,

2025); *Adkins v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc.*, 2025 WL 1279182 (E.D. Va. Apr. 24, 2025) (denying motion for leave to file complaint alleging “intentional infliction of emotional distress by, among other actions, maintaining an unsanitary Hilton Garden Inn at which plaintiff stayed for several months”), *aff’d*, 2025 WL 2169985 (4th Cir. July 31, 1025).

With respect to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, elements of a negligence action are “a legal duty on the part of the defendant, breach of that duty, and a showing that such breach was the proximate cause of injury, resulting in damage to the plaintiff.” *Al-Saray v. Furr*, 910 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Va. 2025) (quoting *Blue Ridge Service Corp. of Virginia v. Saxon Shoes, Inc.*, 271 Va. 206, 218 (2006)). “The proximate cause of an event is that act or omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and without which that event would not have occurred.” *Id.* (quoting *Beale v. Jones*, 210 Va. 519, 520 (Va. 1970)). Among other deficiencies, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to show that she suffered any injury or damages.

“In Virginia, the elements for a breach of contract claim are: (1) a legally enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s violation or breach of the obligation; and (3) an injury or harm to the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s breach.” *Cyberlock Consulting, Inc. v. Info. Experts, Inc.*, 939 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578 (E.D. Va. 2013) (citing *Ulloa v. QSP, Inc.*, 624 S.E.2d 43, 48 (Va. 2006)), *aff’d*, 549 F. App’x 211 (4th Cir. 2014)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a breach or damages.

Turning to Plaintiff’s third asserted claim, a defendant may be found liable for HED only if the wrongful conduct is “beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” *Russo v. White*, 241 Va. 23, 27 (1991). The conduct alleged here does not satisfy this rigorous standard.

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to rely on Title II of the Civil Rights Act to support a claim for subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s claim also fails. As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not appear to actually assert any count premised on Title II. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that any of the acts of which she complains were related to a protected characteristic. See *Blackstock v. Hartsville YMCA*, 2017 WL 3530524, at *2 (D.S.C. July 28, 2017) (to state plausible claim under Title II, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that he or she is (1) a member of a protected class, (2) attempted to exercise the right to full benefits and enjoyment of a place of public accommodation, (3) was denied those benefits and enjoyment, and (4) was treated less favorably than similarly situated persons who are not members of the protected class), *report and recommendation adopted*, 2017 WL 3500178 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2017). Plaintiff does not identify any protected characteristic, let alone attempt to plausibly allege that Defendant acted on the basis of such characteristic. Indeed, Plaintiff bases her claims on the alleged poisonings and acknowledges that the “core challenge for the Plaintiff will be to connect the alleged poisoning attempts . . . to a prohibited discriminatory ground.” Dkt. 1-1 at 4. Plaintiff apparently argues that Defendant—and every other hotel at which she has stayed—must be acting based on one of Plaintiffs unidentified protected characteristics because “Plaintiff is subjected to such actions at ‘EVERY hotel.” Dkt. 1-1 at 4. This is not sufficient to plausibly state a claim or to establish federal question jurisdiction.

Finally, the excessive damages sought in the proposed Complaint—\$16,000,000,000—is further indication of the meritless nature of Plaintiffs claims. See *Anderson v. Pollard*, 2020 WL 9349174, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 24, 2020) (dismissing complaint as frivolous partly on the basis of a *pro se* plaintiff seeking \$75,000,000 in damages).

Accordingly, having screened the proposed Complaint and finding that it fails to allege any plausible cause of action, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Motion for Leave from the Court to File a Proposed Emergency Complaint (Dkt. 1) is DENIED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Expedite (Dkt. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Leave from Court for a Request for an Emergency Injunction (Dkt. 7) is DENIED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing that Plaintiff noticed for Wednesday, December 10, 2025, at 0:00 a.m. is CANCELLED.

To appeal this decision, Plaintiff must file a written notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this Order. A notice of appeal is a short statement indicating a desire to appeal, including the date of the order Plaintiff wants to appeal. Plaintiff need not explain the grounds for appeal until so directed by the Court of Appeals. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal waives Plaintiff's right to appeal this decision.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff, who is proceeding *pro se*, and to close this civil action.

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It is SO ORDERED.

Alexandria, Virginia
December 3, 2025

/s/Rossie D. Alston, Jr.
Rossie D. Alston, Jr.
United States District Judge

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APPENDIX D

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA**

Alexandria Division

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02117 (RDA/WEF)

DORA L. ADKINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSSLYN SYNDICATE, LC,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on *pro se* Plaintiff Dora L. Adkins' Motions for Leave from Court for an Interlocutory Appeal. Dkts. 13, 14. On December 3, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiffs motion for leave to file an emergency complaint and motion for a emergency injunction. Dkt. 10. The Court further directed the Clerk of the Court to close the case and provided Plaintiff with a notice of appeal. *Id.* Plaintiff did notice an appeal (Dkt. 11), but has since filed withdrawn that notice (Dkt. 17). Nonetheless, Plaintiff seeks to appeal on an interlocutory basis. An interlocutory appeal is not appropriate and is unnecessary given that the Court has denied the filing of the complaint and has closed this case. Thus, the proper mechanism for Plaintiff to challenge this Court's decisions is simply an appeal (which she noticed) and not an interlocutory appeal.

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Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Motions (Dkts. 13, 14) are
DENIED.

The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to
Plaintiff.

It is SO ORDERED.

Alexandria, Virginia
December 10, 2025

/s/ Rossie D. Alston, Jr. _____
Rossie D. Alston, Jr.
United States District Judge