

No.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

WARDEN, MOSHANNON VALLEY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

ADOLPH MICHELIN

WARDEN, MOSHANNON VALLEY PROCESSING
CENTER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

ADEWUMI ABIOYE

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

D. JOHN SAUER
*Solicitor General
Counsel of Record*
BRETT A. SHUMATE
Assistant Attorney General
CURTIS E. GANNON
Deputy Solicitor General
FREDERICK LIU
*Assistant to the
Solicitor General*
SAMUEL P. GO
NICOLE P. GRANT
JOSEPH A. MCCARTER
Attorneys
*Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217*

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Equal Access to Justice Act's limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity in "any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)," 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), unambiguously and unequivocally encompasses petitions for writs of habeas corpus challenging immigration detention.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

In *Michelin*, petitioners (appellants below) are Warden, Moshannon Valley Correctional Center; Director, Philadelphia Field Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Director, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; and Attorney General, United States of America. Respondent (appellee below) is Adolph Michelin.

In *Abioye*, petitioners (appellants below) are Warden, Moshannon Valley Processing Center; Acting Field Office Director of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations Philadelphia Field Office; Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; and Attorney General, United States of America. Respondent (appellee below) is Adewumi Abioye.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (W.D. Pa.):

Michelin v. Oddo, No. 23-cv-22 (Aug. 26, 2024)

Abioye v. Oddo, No. 23-cv-251 (Sept. 26, 2024)

United States Court of Appeals (3d Cir.):

Michelin v. Warden, No. 24-2990 (Mar. 2, 2026)

Abioye v. Warden, No. 24-3198 (Mar. 2, 2026)

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No.

WARDEN, MOSHANNON VALLEY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

ADOLPH MICHELIN

WARDEN, MOSHANNON VALLEY PROCESSING
CENTER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

ADEWUMI ABIOYE

*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General—on behalf of the Warden of the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center and others—respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in these two cases. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 12.4, the government is filing a “single petition for a writ of certiorari” because the “judgments * * * sought to be reviewed” are from “the same court and involve identical or closely related questions.” Sup. Ct. R. 12.4.

OPINIONS BELOW

In both cases, the opinion of the court of appeals (App., *infra*, 1a-32a) is reported at 169 F.4th 418. In *Michelin*, the order of the district court (App., *infra*, 52a-72a) is available at 2024 WL 3937228. In *Abioye*, the opinion of the district court (App., *infra*, 33a-51a) is available at 2024 WL 4304738.

JURISDICTION

In both cases, the judgment of the court of appeals was entered on February 2, 2026. Petitions for rehearing were denied on March 2, 2026 (App., *infra*, 73a-128a). On May 26, 2026, Justice Alito extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including June 30, 2026. On June 22, 2026, Justice Alito further extended the time to and including July 30, 2026. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

The pertinent statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. 2412, is reproduced in the appendix to this petition. App., *infra*, 129a-137a.

STATEMENT

1. The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), Pub. L. No. 96-481, Tit. II, 94 Stat. 2325, “renders the United States liable for attorney’s fees for which it would not otherwise be liable, and thus amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity,” *Ardestani v. INS*, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991). As relevant here, EAJA provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party * * * fees and other expenses * * * in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) * * * brought by or against the United States * * * unless the court finds that the position of

the United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A).

2. a. Respondent Adolph Michelin is a citizen of Jamaica. App., *infra*, 5a. In 2010, he entered the United States on a temporary visa. 2023 WL 5044929, at *1. After he overstayed his visa, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings. *Ibid.* In 2017, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered Michelin’s removal to Jamaica, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed. *Ibid.* In January 2022, DHS detained Michelin under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6). 2023 WL 5044929, at *1-*2. DHS made arrangements for Michelin’s removal in March 2022, but before DHS could effectuate his removal, Michelin filed a motion with the Board to reopen his removal proceedings, and the Board granted a stay of removal. *Id.* at *2.

In February 2023, Michelin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, contending that his detention without a bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause. 2023 WL 5044929, at *3. The district court granted the petition, holding that due process entitled Michelin to a bond hearing. *Id.* at *6-*8. An IJ conducted a bond hearing and granted Michelin release on bond. App., *infra*, 6a.

In August 2024, the district court granted Michelin’s motion for attorney’s fees under EAJA. App., *infra*, 52a-72a. The court held that a habeas proceeding challenging immigration detention is a “civil action” under EAJA, *id.* at 56a-59a, and that the government’s position had not been “substantially justified,” *id.* at 59a-65a. The court ordered the government to pay \$15,841.60. *Id.* at 72a.

b. Respondent Adewumi Abioye is a native and citizen of Nigeria. 704 F. Supp. 3d 625, 628. In 2018, he

entered the United States on a temporary visa. *Ibid.* In 2020, after overstaying his visa, he was convicted of conspiring to commit wire fraud, in violation of federal law. *Ibid.* In May 2022, after Abioye finished serving his federal sentence, DHS initiated removal proceedings and detained him under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c). 704 F. Supp. 3d at 628-629. An IJ ordered Abioye’s removal to Nigeria, and the Board affirmed. *Id.* at 628. Abioye filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit, which stayed his removal. *Ibid.*

In October 2023, while his petition for review was pending, Abioye filed a habeas petition under Section 2241 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, contending that his detention without a bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause. 704 F. Supp. 3d at 629. The district court granted the habeas petition, concluding that due process entitled Abioye to a bond hearing. *Id.* at 632. An IJ conducted a bond hearing and granted Abioye release on bond. App., *infra*, 5a.

In September 2024, the district court granted Abioye’s motion for attorney’s fees under EAJA. App., *infra*, 33a-51a. The court held that a habeas proceeding challenging immigration detention is a “civil action” under EAJA, *id.* at 37a-40a, and that the government’s position had not been “substantially justified,” *id.* at 41a-47a. The court ordered the government to pay \$18,224.58. *Id.* at 50a.

3. The Third Circuit consolidated the government’s appeals in both respondents’ cases and affirmed the grant of attorney’s fees in each case. App., *infra*, 1a-32a. The court held that “[t]he phrase ‘any civil action (other than cases sounding [in] tort)’ in the EAJA unambiguously encompasses habeas challenges to immigration detention under [Section] 2241.” *Id.* at 7a. The court acknowl-

edged that because “[t]he EAJA’s fee award provision is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity,” “the phrase ‘any civil action’” must be construed “to exclude” habeas actions if the phrase is “ambiguous.” *Id.* at 8a. The court also acknowledged that “in some instances, the phrase ‘civil action’ does not cover habeas actions.” *Id.* at 7a. The court nevertheless concluded that “‘civil action’ in the EAJA clearly encompasses habeas challenges to immigration detention under [Section] 2241.” *Id.* at 17a. In so concluding, the court recognized that “[t]he Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held habeas proceedings are not clearly EAJA ‘civil actions,’” *id.* at 22a, but it declined to follow the reasoning of those other circuits, *id.* at 22a-24a.

4. The government petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was denied by the court of appeals. App., *infra*, 73a-128a. Judge Bove, joined by three other judges, dissented from that denial. *Id.* at 75a-125a. In their view, the court’s decision put the Third Circuit “on the wrong side of a Circuit split regarding the government’s sovereign immunity from EAJA fee awards in habeas proceedings initiated by aliens.” *Id.* at 79a. Judge Mascott also dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. *Id.* at 126a-128a. In her view, the “deep circuit split” on the issue “belies [the] clarity” necessary to find a waiver of sovereign immunity. *Id.* at 126a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The court of appeals held that EAJA’s limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity in “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),” 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), unambiguously encompasses petitions for writs of habeas corpus challenging immigration detention. App., *infra*, 7a. This Court has already granted certiorari in *Montoya Palacios v. Liggins*, No. 25-1223

(June 29, 2026), to consider whether that interpretation of EAJA is correct. The Court should accordingly hold this petition for a writ of certiorari pending its decision in *Montoya Palacios* and then dispose of the petition as appropriate in light of that decision.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be held pending this Court's decision in *Montoya Palacios v. Liggins*, cert. granted, No. 25-1223 (June 29, 2026), and then disposed of as appropriate in light of that decision.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER
Solicitor General
 BRETT A. SHUMATE
Assistant Attorney General
 CURTIS E. GANNON
Deputy Solicitor General
 FREDERICK LIU
Assistant to the
Solicitor General
 SAMUEL P. GO
 NICOLE P. GRANT
 JOSEPH A. McCARTER
Attorneys

JULY 2026

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Feb. 2, 2026)	1a
Appendix B — <i>Abioye</i> district court memorandum opinion (Sept. 26, 2024)	33a
Appendix C — <i>Michelin</i> district court memorandum and order (Aug. 26, 2024)	52a
Appendix D — Court of appeals order denying rehearing en banc (Mar. 2, 2026)	73a
Appendix E — Statutory provision: 28 U.S.C. 2412	129a

APPENDIX A

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT**

Nos. 24-2990 and 24-3198

ADOLPH MICHELIN

v.

**WARDEN MOSHANNON VALLEY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER; DIRECTOR PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
DIRECTOR UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; SECRETARY UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLANTS IN CASE 24-2990**

ADEWUMI ABIOYE

v.

**WARDEN MOSHANNON VALLEY PROCESSING CENTER;
ACTING FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL OPERATIONS PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE;
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED
STATES, APPELLANTS IN CASE 24-3198**

**Argued: Nov. 10, 2025
Opinion Filed: Feb. 2, 2026**

**Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania**

(District Court Nos. 3:23-cv-00022 and 3:23-cv-00251)
Magistrate Judges: Honorable Patricia L. Dodge and
Honorable Christopher B. Brown

OPINION OF THE COURT

Before: RESTREPO, MCKEE, and AMBRO, *Circuit Judges*

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been a civil action since before our law was our law. In the mid-eighteenth century, just before our Founding, William Blackstone observed that the law we were about to inherit had two “primary objects”: “the establishment of rights, and the prohibition of wrongs.” 3 William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* 1 (1772). There were two types of wrongs: “private wrongs, and public wrongs.” *Id.* at 2 (emphasis omitted). Public wrongs, he explained, “are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community considered as a community; and are distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and misdemeanors.” *Id.* (emphasis omitted). Private wrongs, by contrast, “are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries.” *Id.* (emphasis omitted). For public wrongs, the remedy came by a criminal action. For private wrongs, the remedy required the “application to . . . courts of justice . . . by civil suit or action.” *Id.* at 3.

One civil right, secured by civil action, was that of “personal liberty.” *Id.* at 119. When this right was vio-

lated, the prisoner could petition a court to “remov[e] the injury of unjust and illegal confinement,” *id.* at 137 (emphasis omitted), by “commanding” whomever held him in custody “to produce the body” and explain the “cause of his caption and detention,” *id.* at 131. And so, in listing the civil actions available for “the redress of private wrongs,” Blackstone lauded “the most celebrated writ in the English law,” *id.* at 129—the “great and efficacious writ” that would restore the captive to liberty, *id.* at 131—the writ of habeas corpus.

After we overthrew the English crown, we retained this framework from English common law. *See, e.g., Watson v. Mercer*, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88, 110 (1834) (distinguishing “civil proceedings[,] which affect private rights,” from “criminal proceedings[,] which impose punishments”); *Bradlie v. Md. Ins. Co.*, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 378, 402 (1838) (defining “proceedings of a mere civil nature” as those “to enforce private rights”). We also retained the recognition that habeas is a civil action. *See Holmes v. Jennison*, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 565-67 (1840) (holding “it is too plain for argument” that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a civil action under the Judiciary Act of 1789); *Ex parte Tom Tong*, 108 U.S. 556, 559-60 (1883) (“The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty.”).

Much has changed over the centuries. Not this. *See, e.g., Banister v. Davis*, 590 U.S. 504, 507 (2020) (“Ha-

beas proceedings, for those new to the area, are civil in nature.”).¹

Today the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) provides that the prevailing private party “in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)” brought by or against the United States is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs if the Government’s position was not “substantially justified” or “special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Adolph “Lee” Michelin and Adewumi Abioye prevailed in habeas actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging their immigration detentions. The District Courts found the Government’s positions were not “substantially justified” and awarded the detainees fees and costs. The main question these consolidated cases present is whether a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from immigration detention under § 2241 is an EAJA “civil action.”

We answer yes and thus affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

We begin with the facts of the two cases.

A. *Abioye*

Abioye, a Nigerian citizen, entered the United States in April 2018 on a tourist visa. In July 2020, he pled guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349. In May 2022—the day he completed his sentence—federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents took him into immigra-

¹ On the enduring authority of Blackstone’s account of the writ of habeas corpus, *see, e.g., Brown v. Davenport*, 596 U.S. 118, 128 (2022); *Ex parte Bollman*, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 97 (1807).

tion detention at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center.² An immigration judge ordered him removed to Nigeria. The next year, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. In June 2023, Abioye petitioned for review and a stay of removal from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. It stayed removal pending review of his petition.

In October 2023, after over 16 months in immigration detention, Abioye petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 challenging his detention without an individualized bond hearing as a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Government opposed his petition. The next month, the District Court granted the writ and ordered a bond hearing. In December an immigration judge released him on a \$5,000 bond.

Abioye moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under § 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA. The District Court found the Government’s position was not substantially justified and awarded him \$18,224.58.

B. *Michelin*

ICE agents arrested Michelin, a Jamaican citizen, in January 2022 and detained him at Moshannon. A year later, he was still detained—and had no bond hearing. Although he had petitioned the BIA to reopen his immigration case, it had not responded. So he too petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. It granted his petition, holding his prolonged detention

² From March to August 2023, Abioye was held at the Pike County Correctional Facility; otherwise, he was held at Moshannon.

without an individualized bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. An immigration judge released Michelin on a \$10,000 bond, and he rejoined his family in Philadelphia.

Michelin sought an award of attorneys' fees and costs per the EAJA. The District Court found the Government's position not substantially justified and awarded him \$15,841.60.

* * *

The United States appealed both decisions. We consolidated the appeals.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We have appellate jurisdiction to review fee awards under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether we have subject matter jurisdiction depends on the question at the heart of this appeal: whether the EAJA waives federal sovereign immunity to fee awards for habeas actions challenging civil immigration detention. Our review of legal questions is plenary. *Newmark v. Principi*, 283 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2002). We review for abuse of discretion a district court's finding that the Government's position was not substantially justified. *Cruz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, 630 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

The EAJA provides:

[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) . . . brought by or against the United States . . . unless the court finds that the po-

sition of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). These appeals concern whether a habeas challenge to immigration detention pursuant to § 2241 is a “civil action” under the EAJA. It is. The *Abioye* appeal also asks whether the Government’s position in that case was substantially justified. It was not.

A. The phrase “any civil action (other than cases sounding tort)” in the EAJA unambiguously encompasses habeas challenges to immigration detention under § 2241.

The “cardinal canon” of statutory interpretation is the “presumption that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.” *Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain*, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (cleaned up). On *Abioye*’s and *Michelin*’s reading, the EAJA means what it says: save torts, it covers all civil actions; hence, habeas is included. To the Government, it does not: the statute could mean only “purely,” “wholly,” or “garden-variety” civil actions, *Abioye* Opening Br. 25; habeas is excluded.

We agree with *Abioye* and *Michelin*. Habeas actions are civil actions. And the complete phrase—“any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)” —clearly encompasses them. We grant the Government this: in some instances, the phrase “civil action” does not cover habeas actions. But those situations are the exceptions, not the rule. And the EAJA cannot plausibly be read that way.

1. The sovereign immunity canon applies only if a statute is ambiguous after deploying the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation.

Before we go further, we pause to clarify what we are looking for where, as here, a statute implicates the sovereign immunity of the federal Government.

Generally, the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from awards of monetary relief. *FDIC v. Meyer*, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). However, the Government may waive sovereign immunity by statute. *Kirtz v. Trans Union LLC*, 46 F.4th 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2022). “[A] waiver of sovereign immunity must be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in statutory text.” *FAA v. Cooper*, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012) (quoting *Lane v. Peña*, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996)). Any ambiguity is “to be construed in favor of immunity,” *id.* (citing *United States v. Williams*, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995)), whether it concerns the existence of a waiver or the scope of one, *id.* at 291. The EAJA’s fee award provision is a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. *Ardestani v. INS*, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991). Accordingly, if the phrase “any civil action” is ambiguous between an interpretation that reaches habeas actions and one that does not, then we must construe the scope of the waiver to exclude them.

Still, “the clarity of each statute must be evaluated on its own terms.” *Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz*, 601 U.S. 42, 52 (2024) (cleaned up). What matters is whether the statute is ambiguous *after* exhausting the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, not before. *United States v. Rutherford*, 120 F.4th 360, 380 n.28 (3d Cir. 2024). *Cf. Sebelius v. Cloer*, 569 U.S. 369, 376-81 (2013) (holding provision unambiguous and declining to apply sovereign immunity canon after

considering text, structure, and purpose).³ If there is “no ambiguity left,” “[t]here is no need for us to resort to the sovereign immunity canon.” *Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff*, 553 U.S. 571, 590 (2008). Only if, after exhausting these tools, “there is a plausible interpretation of the statute that would not authorize money damages against the Government” do we “take the interpretation most favorable” to it. *Cooper*, 566 U.S. at 290-91.

2. Habeas challenges to immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 are civil actions.

“When interpreting a statute, we begin with the text.” *Lackey v. Stinnie*, 604 U.S. 192, 199 (2025). To repeat, the EAJA permits awards of fees and costs in “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort).” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The statute does not define “civil action.” In the absence of a statutory definition, we “start with the phrase’s plain meaning” in 1980, when Congress enacted it in 1980. *Clean Air Council v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 4 F.4th 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2021). It was “well settled” then that habeas corpus is a civil action. *Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill.*, 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978); *see also Stafford v. Briggs*, 444 U.S. 527, 543

³ We leave two tools—purpose and legislative history—in the toolbox. The Supreme Court has admonished that “no amount of legislative history can supply a waiver that is not clearly evident from the language of the statute.” *Kirtz*, 601 U.S. at 49 (cleaned up). And we take its directive to focus on “the language of the statute” in discerning the existence and scope of a waiver to caution against considering purpose as well. *Id.*; *see also Ardestani*, 502 U.S. at 138 (finding that “the broad purposes of the EAJA would be served by making the statute applicable to deportation proceedings,” but declining to “extend the EAJA to [them] when the plain language of the statute, coupled with the strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity, constrain us to do otherwise”).

(1980) (“Habeas corpus is a civil action.” (cleaned up)). Thus, we have acknowledged that the “plain meaning” and “literal scope” of the phrase “civil action” include habeas actions. *See Santana v. United States*, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir. 1996).

The same is true when we consider “civil action” as a legal term of art. When Congress enacted the EAJA, legal dictionaries defined “civil action” on broad terms that reached habeas proceedings. *See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary* 222 (5th ed. 1979) (defining civil actions as “[a]ction[s] brought to enforce, redress, or protect private rights” or as “all types of actions other than criminal proceedings”); *Radin Law Dictionary* 55 (2d ed. 1970) (defining a civil action as a “legal proceeding brought to enforce a civil right or obtain redress for its violation”); *Ballentine’s Law Dictionary* 202 (3d ed. 1969) (the phrase “comprehend[s] every conceivable cause of action, whether legal or equitable, except such as are criminal in the usual sense”).

No wonder then that, at the time of the EAJA’s enactment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure treated habeas proceedings as civil actions. Rule 1 provided that the Rules applied to “all suits of a civil nature . . . with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (1980). And Rule 81 specified the Rules “are applicable to proceedings for . . . habeas corpus . . . to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (1980). We know of no relevant statute or practice that would have negated the civil status of immigration challenges like this one. In any event, what matters most is that the Rules generally presumed habeas ac-

tions were civil actions, even if they were also distinctive ones. *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969).⁴

The common law history confirms habeas proceedings are civil actions. “When Congress uses a term with origins in the common law, we generally presume that the term ‘brings the old soil with it.’” *Kousisis v. United States*, 605 U.S. 114, 124 (2025) (quoting *Sekhar v. United States*, 570 U.S. 729, 733 (2013)); *see also Lackey*, 604 U.S. at 200. “Civil action” is one such term. As we described at the outset, the writ of habeas corpus has deep roots in that rich soil. *See* 3 Blackstone at 115-38; *see also Ex parte Yerger*, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 96 (1868) (holding the Supreme Court had the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, one of “the most important powers in civil cases of all the highest courts of England”); *Kurtz v. Moffitt*, 115 U.S. 487, 494 (1885) (“A writ of *habeas corpus* . . . is a civil suit or proceeding, brought by him to assert the civil right of personal liberty, against those who are holding him in custody[.]”).

The Government strains to deny habeas actions are civil. It acknowledges—as it must—that the Supreme Court and our Court have recognized habeas proceed-

⁴ Today, Rule 81 continues to provide that the Rules “apply to proceedings for habeas corpus” under almost identical conditions. *See* Rule 81(a)(4). That said, our holding is that a habeas petition under § 2241 challenging immigration detention is a “civil action” for purposes of the EAJA, not that such an action is a “civil action” for purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have no occasion to address the latter topic. In any event, some provisions would caution against reading every use of “civil action” that way. For instance, Rule 3 provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, yet a habeas action begins with what the statute dubs “an application,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. So we do not decide this issue.

ings are at least “technically” civil actions. *See Abioye* Opening Br. 21 (quoting *Schlanger v. Seamans*, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971)), 27 (quoting *Santana*, 98 F.3d at 754). Nonetheless, the Government insists habeas actions are “not wholly civil,” *Abioye* Opening Br. 31, but rather “unique, hybrid actions in a category of their own,” *Abioye* Opening Br. 11.

The “hybrid” theory raises a question: A hybrid of what and what? The Government avoids saying in its brief, because the answer exposes this argument as a dead end. To the extent habeas actions are hybrids, they are hybrids of civil actions and criminal ones. *See, e.g., Santana*, 98 F.3d at 754; *O’Brien v. Moore*, 395 F.3d 499, 505 (4th Cir. 2005); *see also Abioye* Opening Br. 8 (recounting that the Government told the District Court habeas actions were “hybrid criminal/civil proceedings”). The idea is that “to the extent that a habeas proceeding reviews a criminal punishment with the potential of overturning it, the habeas proceeding necessarily assumes part of the underlying case’s criminal nature.” *O’Brien*, 395 F.3d at 505.

But we are not reviewing habeas petitions for release from criminal detention. We are reviewing them for release from immigration detention. In that context, every element is civil. *See Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (recognizing immigration detention is “civil detention”); *INS v. Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (recognizing removal proceedings are civil). Even immigration actions subject to *sui generis* procedures, like removal proceedings before an immigration judge, are “purely civil.” *Lopez-Mendoza*, 468 U.S. at 1038. A hybrid of a civil action and a civil action is a civil action.

Resisting that conclusion, the Government offers two additional arguments that all habeas actions are in a category of their own. The first says habeas is “unique” because it seeks release from confinement. *Abioye* Opening Br. 31. But what settles its status is the right it seeks to vindicate, not the remedy. Habeas actions are civil because they protect the civil right to personal liberty. *See* 3 Blackstone at 115-38; *Santana*, 98 F.3d at 754 (citing *Ex parte Tom Tong*, 108 U.S. at 559). Second, the Government suggests habeas is not civil because it does not share every feature of archetypal civil actions. True enough. But it does not follow that habeas is not a civil action. Many civil actions—including ones expressly within the scope of the EAJA’s “civil action” provision—have unique rules of practice or procedure, like veterans’ benefits actions. *See Henderson v. Shinseki*, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011) (observing “[t]he contrast between ordinary civil litigation . . . and the system that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans’ benefits claims could hardly be more dramatic”); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A) (awarding fees in “any civil action” brought “in any court”), (d)(2)(F) (defining “court” to include “the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims”).

Finally, the Government argues habeas is something other than a civil action because, on rare occasion, courts have held habeas actions fall outside the scope of particular statutory references to “civil actions.” However, none of those decisions repudiated the centuries-long doctrine that habeas actions are civil. And none undermined the presumption Congress used the term in the EAJA with that history in mind. *See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC*, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (noting that when “nearly all of the relevant judicial decisions have given

a term or concept a consistent judicial gloss, we presume Congress intended the term or concept to have that meaning when it incorporated it into a later-enacted statute” (cleaned up)). All these decisions did was acknowledge reasons specific to those statutes to treat habeas differently there. They do not create any ambiguity here, much less change the nature of habeas.

Consider each of the cases. The Supreme Court once said in a footnote that Congress’s provision for nationwide service of process in “a civil action” in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) did not apply to habeas actions. *Schlanger*, 401 U.S. at 490 n.4. It once criticized “the label [‘civil action’] [a]s gross and inexact.” *Harris*, 394 U.S. at 293-94. And we have described habeas as “somewhat of a hybrid,” *Callwood v. Enow*, 230 F.3d 627, 632 (3d Cir. 2000), and held that “a civil action” in one provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) does not cover habeas actions, *Santana*, 98 F.3d at 754-56.

None of these decisions held habeas actions are not civil. In fact, each one reaffirmed that they are. *See Schlanger*, 401 U.S. at 490 n.4 (acknowledging “habeas corpus is technically ‘civil,’” even though it “is not automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil actions”); *Harris*, 394 U.S. at 293-94 (affirming habeas corpus is “characterized as ‘civil’” even though “the proceeding is unique” in that it “has conformed with civil practice only in a general sense”); *Callwood*, 230 F.3d at 632 (“A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature.”); *Santana*, 98 F.3d at 754-55 (describing habeas proceedings as, “in effect, hybrid actions,” but reiterating that “[h]abeas corpus proceedings are technically civil actions,” “independent civil dispositions of com-

pleted criminal proceedings”). That is why in *Callwood*, after calling habeas a hybrid, we reaffirmed it was a civil action. 230 F.3d at 632. We have just done so again, “hold[ing] that the phrase ‘civil action’ in [28 U.S.C.] § 1631”—a statute enacted just two years after the EAJA—“encompasses habeas proceedings,” even “though they are hybrid actions.” *Khalil v. President, United States of America et al.*, Nos. 25-2162 & 25-2357, 2026 WL 111933, at *5 (3d Cir. 2026). Even if (or when) habeas is a hybrid, that is a distinctive type of civil action, not a third category of proceeding beyond civil and criminal.

All *Schlanger*, *Harris*, and *Santana* held was that the particular provisions before them used “civil action” in a way that did not cover habeas. Each reached that conclusion by doing something we may not: overriding the plain meaning of statutory text with legislative history. *Schlanger* acknowledged “habeas corpus is technically ‘civil’” but reasoned the use of “civil action” in § 1391(e) did not cover it because “the legislative history of that section is barren of any indication that Congress extended habeas corpus jurisdiction.” 401 U.S. at 490 n.4; *see also Stafford*, 444 U.S. at 543 (observing *Schlanger* “recogniz[ed] that habeas corpus is a ‘civil action,’” but “turn[ed] to the legislative history to determine which ‘civil actions’ § 1391(e) governed”). *Harris* declined to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 to habeas actions despite the fact “that habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as ‘civil’” only after divining “the intent of the draftsmen.” 394 U.S. at 293-95. In *Santana*, we disregarded what we acknowledged was “the plain meaning” of the text and the PLRA’s express exclusion of habeas elsewhere, *id.* at 754-55, in significant part because of that statute’s legislative history, *id.* at 755, and precedents that took the same approach, like *Schlanger*

and *Harris*, *id.* at 754-55. We do not read statutes this way anymore, *Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media*, 588 U.S. 427, 436 (2019)—especially not waivers of sovereign immunity, *Kirtz*, 601 U.S. at 49.⁵

These decisions do not make it plausible that, in the EAJA, “civil action” excludes habeas actions. Each re-affirmed that they are civil. No surprise, for our law long has recognized that habeas “is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding,” *see Fisher v. Baker*, 203 U.S. 174, 181 (1906)—a line *Harris* cited, 394 U.S. at 293; *see also, e.g., In re Nwanze*, 242 F.3d 521, 526 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[H]abeas corpus petitions are technically civil actions[.]”); *Parrott v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands*, 230 F.3d 615, 620 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Because habeas proceedings are generally considered civil in nature, the term ‘civil action’ includes habeas petitions.” (citation omitted)); *Henderson v. Frank*, 155 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus is a civil proceeding[.]”).

All told, we cannot put it better than the Supreme Court did when Congress enacted the EAJA: “It is well settled that habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.” *Browder*, 434 U.S. at 269; *see also Stafford*, 444 U.S. at 543 (“Habeas corpus is a civil action.” (cleaned up)).⁶ Accord-

⁵ A panel of our Court once opined that a habeas challenge to criminal detention is not an EAJA “civil action.” *Daley v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 199 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2006). We are unpersuaded by this unexplained dictum in a not precedential opinion—not least because the case was an appeal by a *pro se* litigant who could not recover attorneys’ fees in the first place.

⁶ The Government also contends habeas is not an EAJA “civil action” because the enacting Congress would have had in mind the Supreme Court’s relatively recent decisions in *Harris* and *Schlanger*. Even if those decisions held habeas were not civil—which they did not—this argument would fail by its own terms, because *Browder*

ingly, we hold “civil action” in the EAJA clearly encompasses habeas challenges to immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

3. Even if “civil action” were ambiguous, “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)” clearly covers habeas challenges to immigration detention.

Unable to dislodge the centuries of authority establishing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a civil action, the Government retreats to the position that the EAJA is ambiguous between a meaning that includes habeas actions and one that does not. As we have discussed, even though the phrase “civil action” almost always covers habeas, there are rare exceptions when it does not. Emphasizing that fact, the Government contends that in isolation the phrase “civil action” might mean either all civil actions or only some subset of them, excluding the ones that are “unique,” *Harris*, 394 U.S. at 294, or “hybrid,” *Santana*, 98 F.3d at 754. And that, the Government would have us conclude, means the EAJA’s “civil action” provision is ambiguous.

However, we do not read statutes in isolation. “A statutory provision is not ambiguous simply because, by itself, it is susceptible to differing constructions.” *Hayes v. Harvey*, 903 F.3d 32, 41 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (cleaned up). “Rather, in examining statutory language, we take account of the specific context in which that language is used.” *Id.* (cleaned up).⁷

and *Stafford*—which expressly recognized habeas is civil—are years closer to the EAJA’s enactment.

⁷ For good reason: In isolation, almost anything can be ambiguous. “Mary had a little lamb” seems clear. But did Mary own a baby sheep or eat a piece of one for dinner?

Here, the most immediate context—the wording on either side of “civil action”—dispels any doubt the EAJA encompasses habeas actions. Zoom out one word, and we find the provision does not just say “civil action.” It says “any civil action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). On Abioye’s and Michelin’s interpretation, the word “any” matters: it conveys that the statute reaches civil actions “of whatever kind”—even variations like habeas proceedings. *See Cazun v. Att’y Gen.*, 856 F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)); *see also Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin*, 599 U.S. 382, 390 (2023) (emphasizing the significance of the Bankruptcy Code’s categorical abrogation of the sovereign immunity of “*any* governmental unit that might attempt to assert it” (emphasis in text)).

Their interpretation commands strong support. The Supreme Court has held the words “any civil action” unambiguously cover every civil action not expressly excepted. *Ex parte Collett*, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1949) (“The reach of ‘any civil action’ is unmistakable.” (footnote omitted)).

On the Government’s interpretation, the word “any” plays no role. The statute would have had the same scope if Congress had written “civil action” alone, applying only to “garden-variety civil actions.” *Abioye* Opening Br. 25. That will not do. “We are reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.” *Bufkin v. Collins*, 604 U.S. 369, 386 (2025) (quoting *TRW Inc. v. Andrews*, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)). If “any” means anything, it means “any civil action” encompasses habeas actions.

The Government responds that “[t]he adjective ‘any’ is indeed a broad term, but it cannot expand the reach of the noun it modifies.” *Abioye* Reply Br. 12-13 (quoting *San Francisco v. EPA*, 604 U.S. 334, 348 (2025)). True enough. But the point is not that “any” expands the scope of “civil action”: the word gives “civil action” its *complete* scope, including civil proceedings with unusual features. Even if habeas is a distinctive civil action, reading “any civil action” to encompass a habeas proceeding is not like reading “any mammal” to “encompass a bird or fish,” see *San Francisco*, 604 U.S. at 348, for the Government acknowledges “habeas corpus is technically ‘civil’,” *Abioye* Opening Br. 21 (quoting *Schlanger*, 401 U.S. at 490 n.4); see also *Abioye* Reply Br. 10 (“habeas proceedings may ‘technically’ be civil actions”), 13 (“they are ‘technically’ civil actions”). At most, it is like reading “any mammal” to encompass a platypus—technically a mammal, even though it lays eggs. See *Pugin v. Garland*, 599 U.S. 600, 623 (2023) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Then there are the words that follow “any civil action.” The EAJA continues with “(other than cases sounding in tort).” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). “When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, . . . [t]he proper inference . . . is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth.” *United States v. Johnson*, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000). Congress explicitly carved out torts. The “proper inference” is that Congress did not implicitly carve out habeas actions. The Government’s sole response is that because habeas is not a civil action, Congress did not have to exclude it expressly. But as we have shown, it is civil.

The wider context confirms our conclusion. Interpreting “any civil action” to include habeas actions is the only way to harmonize the EAJA with the rest of the U.S. Code. Interpreting “any civil action” to exclude them would render the EAJA an anomaly. We strive to construe each word “to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.” *W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey*, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991), *superseded by statute as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Products*, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994); *see also Lac du Flambeau Band*, 599 U.S. at 392-93 & n.3 (holding Bankruptcy Code’s abrogation of the sovereign immunity of “governmental units” extends to Indian tribes in part because “Congress has repeatedly characterized tribes as governments” in other statutes); *Burrage v. United States*, 571 U.S. 204, 212 (2014) (interpreting statute in light of how “courts regularly read” comparable language elsewhere in the U.S. Code); *Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.*, 590 U.S. 644, 791-92 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (observing that “longstanding and widespread congressional practice matters” in interpreting statutes). We do so because “it is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the *corpus juris*.” *W. Va. Univ. Hosp.*, 499 U.S. at 101.

Every time Congress has used “any civil action” or a cognate, the phrase encompasses habeas proceedings, save where Congress expressly excluded them. *See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008) (permitting the Government to move for a change of venue for a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which applies to “any civil action”); *German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding the district court had jurisdiction over a habeas

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which applies to “all civil actions”); *Hilborn v. United States*, 163 U.S. 342, 345 (1896) (holding a since-repealed statute covering “all civil actions” included habeas actions); *Reid v. Covert*, 351 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1957) (holding the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a grant of a habeas petition pursuant to a since-repealed statute authorizing direct appeals from “any civil action, suit, or proceeding” meeting certain requirements); 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (“[T]he parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in [a district] court . . . [must] pay a filing fee of \$350, except that on application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be \$5.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g) (defining the phrase “civil action with respect to prison conditions” as “any civil proceeding” meeting certain criteria except “habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement”).

The Government has not produced a single counterexample. Reading the EAJA consistently with the rest of the U.S. Code therefore requires reading “any civil action” to comprehend habeas actions, as we do everywhere else they are not carved out by name.

On the Government’s reading, the EAJA is one of a kind, and not in a good way: the only statute in the U.S. Code to use “any civil action” to implicitly exclude habeas actions. On Abioye’s and Michelin’s reading, the EAJA is part of a consistent, coherent body of law. That is one more reason to think the statute unambiguously covers habeas proceedings.

In sum, the Government advances a superficially instinctive argument: because “civil action” does not invariably cover habeas actions, the phrase must be ambiguous between an interpretation that does and an-

other that does not. However, in context—preceded by “any,” followed by a torts exception, and situated in a body of law where “any civil action” includes habeas save where explicitly excluded—the EAJA’s “civil action” provision clearly covers habeas actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

4. We hew closest to the Tenth Circuit’s approach.

Our specific issue has divided other courts. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held habeas proceedings are not clearly EAJA “civil actions.” The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held habeas challenges to immigration proceedings are. We find the Tenth Circuit’s opinion most persuasive. Still, we chart our own path.

Begin with the Fourth Circuit. In *O’Brien v. Moore*, it held the EAJA does not waive sovereign immunity to fee awards in habeas proceedings challenging criminal detention. 395 F.3d at 508. The statute’s use of “civil action,” the Court thought, was ambiguous between every civil action, which would include habeas actions, and every “wholly civil action,” which would not. *See id.* at 504-06. “[B]ecause habeas actions have both a criminal and civil nature,” it reasoned, “when a statutory provision regulates a ‘civil action,’ we can only conclude that it does not necessarily follow that it also regulates a habeas proceeding.” *Id.* at 505-06.

We do not follow *O’Brien* for four reasons. First, the decision ignored two crucial pieces of the statutory text: the “any” that precedes “civil action” and the torts exception that follows. Second, the decision largely neglected the deep common-law history of habeas as a civil action. Third, *O’Brien*’s reasoning does not extend to habeas challenges to civil immigration detention. As we have noted, the Fourth Circuit classified habeas cases

as hybrids because “to the extent that a habeas proceeding reviews a criminal punishment with the potential of overturning it, the habeas proceeding necessarily assumes part of the underlying case’s criminal nature.” *Id.* at 505. The habeas petitions before us review immigration detention—a civil matter—so there is no underlying criminal case whose nature they could assume. Fourth, *O’Brien* acknowledged this distinction, distinguishing cases where “the habeas corpus proceeding was filed in an immigration context” from the challenge to criminal detention before it. *Id.* at 507 (citing *Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery*, 62 F.3d 54, 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1995)). By its own terms, the case has little to say to us.

Four years ago, a divided panel of the same Court held the EAJA does not unambiguously cover habeas challenges to immigration detention, claiming “[t]his conclusion is required by” *O’Brien*. *Obando-Segura v. Garland*, 999 F.3d 190, 193 (4th Cir. 2021). The *Obando-Segura* Court brushed aside the distinction between challenges to criminal detention and civil, asserting—incorrectly—that *O’Brien* “did not differentiate” between them. *Id.* at 194. This time, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the EAJA covers “any civil action.” *Id.* at 196. But it disregarded “any” without weighing its consequences: “whatever we think of the possibility that the term ‘any’ can sufficiently disambiguate the term ‘civil action,’ that argument cannot survive *O’Brien*.” *Id.* And the Court again failed to take account of the torts exception. So we are not persuaded by *Obando-Segura* either.

Turn to the Fifth Circuit. Its brief decision in *Barco v. Witte*, 65 F.4th 782 (5th Cir. 2023), *cert. denied*, 144 S. Ct. 553 (2024), relies on *Obando-Segura* and shares its flaws. *Barco* also held “civil action” is ambiguous be-

tween all civil actions, which might include habeas, and “purely civil” actions, *id.* at 783, which would not be-
cause of the “hybrid nature” of habeas, *id.* at 785. So it,
too, held the EAJA does not waive sovereign immunity
for habeas challenges to immigration detention. *Id.*
Like *O’Brien* and *Obando-Segura*, *Barco* did not ana-
lyze whether the word “any” or the torts exclusion make
a difference. Like *Obando-Segura*, *Barco* deferred to
circuit precedent treating habeas actions as hybrids be-
tween criminal and civil actions. And it also did so with-
out explaining why challenges to civil detention have any
criminal component or reckoning with the historic civil
status of petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Conse-
quently, we find the Fifth Circuit’s decision no more con-
vincing than its Fourth Circuit predecessors.

The Second and Ninth Circuits reached the same re-
sult we do, but for reasons we decline to follow. The
Ninth Circuit held the EAJA’s fee award provision en-
compassed habeas petitions because that interpretation
would advance the statute’s purposes: providing a finan-
cial incentive for private parties to challenge Govern-
ment conduct and encouraging litigation to improve
public policy. *In re Hill*, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir.
1985). The Court barely considered the text. *See id.*
The Second Circuit held habeas challenges to immigra-
tion detention were EAJA “civil actions” because of “the
legislative history of the EAJA,” despite “the ambiguity
of the term ‘civil action[.]’ and the indeterminacy of the
existing precedent.” *Vacchio v. Ashcroft*, 404 F.3d 663,
669-72 (2d Cir. 2005). Unlike these courts, we stick to
the text and context read against the backdrop of our
legal history.

We have found the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision, *Daley v. Ceja*, 158 F.4th 1152 (10th Cir. 2025), illuminating. As do we, that Court held the EAJA waives federal sovereign immunity to fee awards for habeas challenges to immigration detention because “any civil action” unambiguously encompasses those actions. *See id.* at 1155, 1162, 1166. And the Court relied, in part, on an insightful evaluation of the historic civil status of habeas actions. *See id.* at 1157-60. But we part ways in one analytical respect. The *Daley* Court considered the EAJA’s purposes. *See id.* at 1162-64. We do not.

* * *

For these reasons, we hold the EAJA unambiguously applies to habeas challenges to immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Government’s position in *Abioye* was not substantially justified.

The Government detained Abioye for over 16 months without an individualized bond hearing before he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. When he filed his petition, the Government contested his right to a hearing. He prevailed, yet he had spent over 18 months in custody.

Under the EAJA, the Government’s position was substantially justified only if its conduct was “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” *Johnson v. Gonzales*, 416 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). The Government bears the burden of proving its position was justified. *Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala*, 989 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1993). “To satisfy this burden and defeat a prevailing party’s application for fees, the

government must . . . demonstrat[e] ‘(1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory it propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced.’” *Cruz*, 630 F.3d at 324 (quoting *Morgan v. Perry*, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir. 1998)). “[I]n immigration cases, the Government must meet the substantially justified test twice”: once for its underlying conduct and once for its decisions in the ensuing litigation about that conduct. *Johnson*, 416 F.3d at 210. We do not assume the position of the Government was not substantially justified simply because it lost. *William v. Astrue*, 600 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2009).

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) requires the Government to detain immigrants with certain criminal convictions pending removal without bond hearings. *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 206. The Supreme Court has held § 1226(c) is not facially unconstitutional. *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). But the Court “did so because it understood that the detention would last only for a ‘very limited time,’” *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 208 (quoting *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 529 n.12)—“roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases” and “about five months” if the immigrant appealed removal, *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 530. Accordingly, immigrants detained under § 1226(c) may bring as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of their detentions. *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 209. The longer they are detained without bond hearings, the more likely their detention abridges the liberty secured by the Due Process Clause. *See id.* at 209-10; *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). “When detention becomes unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a hearing.” *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 210 (cleaned up).

We have identified four “nonexhaustive” factors governing when detention is unreasonable: the length of detention, the likelihood it will continue, the reasons for delay, and how confinement conditions compare to criminal punishment. *Id.* at 211-12. “The most important factor is the duration of detention.” *Id.*

The Government had no reasonable basis in law for contesting Abioye’s petition for a bond hearing after over 16 months in detention without one. We have spoken clearly: “Detention becomes more and more suspect after five months.” *Id.* (cleaned up). To be sure, we have declined to impose a *per se* rule that any detention longer than a certain duration is unreasonable; the precise time may vary case to case. *Id.* Nevertheless, we have held “detention became unreasonable sometime between six months and one year” after it began. *Id.* (citing *Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison*, 783 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 2015), *abrogated in part on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)). Nothing in the facts here gave the Government a reasonable basis for arguing against a bond hearing after roughly double that length of time—and more than triple the length of time the Supreme Court assumed in *Demore* and we emphasized in *German Santos*. That is especially true because Abioye’s detention was likely to continue much longer because of his appeal to the Fourth Circuit. *See id.* at 212 (finding second factor “strongly supports a finding of unreasonableness” when detainee has pending appeal). That appeal continues to this day.

To be sure, the Government could reasonably have thought the third and fourth factors did not weigh against its position. The reasons for delay favored neither side. Although Abioye’s appeal of the order of his removal

prolonged his detention, we do “not hold an alien’s good-faith challenge to his removal against him, even if his appeals or applications for relief have drawn out the proceedings.” *Id.* at 211. Likewise, although the Government’s incorrect opposition to Abioye’s petition for a bond hearing compounded the delay, we do not “hold the agency’s legal errors against the Government, unless there is evidence of carelessness or bad faith.” *Id.*

The conditions of Abioye’s confinement did not clarify the matter either. On one hand, as the District Court noted, the conditions were not as obviously penal as those we held against the Government in *German Santos*. There, the detainee was held alongside convicted criminals. *Id.* at 212-13. Here, Abioye was held with other immigration detainees. The detainee in *German Santos* was confined to his cell for 23 hours a day. *Id.* at 213. Abioye was afforded several hours of recreation, and the rest of his day was spent in his “pod”—a group of cells—rather than just his own cell. On the other hand, District Courts in our Circuit have recognized the conditions at Moshannon are penal in nature. *See Grigoryan v. Jamison*, No. 25-1389, 2025 WL 1257693, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2025) (collecting cases).⁸ And Abioye attested the conditions he experienced there were worse than those he experienced in federal criminal custody. For our purposes, what matters is that even if this factor weighed against detaining Abioye any longer without a hearing, it did not weigh so heavily in that direction that the Government had no reasonable basis for contesting it.

⁸ We have said the same about the conditions at Pike County Correctional Facility, where Abioye spent a few of his months in confinement. *See German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 212-13.

With that said, the Government also had no reasonable basis in law for thinking any ambivalence on the third and fourth factors could outweigh its decisive loss on the first two. Our conclusion remains that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Government was not substantially justified in detaining Abioye for so long, with no end on the horizon, in the absence of any distinctive reason to deny him a hearing. It should have known better.

The Government advances several counterarguments. None proves sound. The first is that the Supreme Court might one day endorse the Government's position that indefinite detention without a bond hearing under § 1226(c) is constitutional, full stop. Perhaps it will. In the meantime, we have held that indefinite detention without a bond hearing can violate the Due Process Clause and that as-applied challenges raising that claim are available. *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 209. And this appeal is not a proper vehicle for revisiting that question because the Government did not appeal the District Court's determination that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Abioye—only that Court's subsequent award of fees.

Second, the Government claims the District Court abused its discretion by applying a brightline rule that any detention longer than one year is unreasonable. But the Court did not do that. Instead, it correctly treated the reasonableness of detention as a fact-sensitive inquiry. Even if it had applied a brightline rule, “we may affirm on any ground supported by the record . . . even if the [D]istrict [C]ourt overlooked it or it involves an attack on the [D]istrict [C]ourt's reasoning.” See *Laurel Gardens, LLC v. Mckenna*, 948 F.3d 105, 116 (3d Cir.

2020). What’s more, for all the Government’s insistence that the length of detention must be assessed case by case, it offers no special reason to think more than 16 months of detention here—18 months by the time of Abioye’s release—was reasonable in this case.

Third, the Government asserts the District Court abused its discretion because the decision awarding fees did not revisit the *German Santos* analysis from the merits decision that Abioye’s detention was unreasonable. However, the Court had no obligation to recap its ruling. *See Morgan v. Perry*, 142 F.3d 670, 683 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting, without issue, that the District Court’s factual findings were recited in the merits decision but not the fee decision).

Fourth, the Government claims the length of detention could not support a finding its position was not substantially justified because the District Court described this factor as “a close call” when ruling on the merits of the habeas petition. *Abioye* Opening Br. 47-49 (quoting *Abioye* App’x 29). The Court violated the law of the case doctrine, as the Government sees it, by subsequently finding it had no reasonable basis for detaining Abioye that long. It offers no authority for the proposition that the Court’s offhand remark is subject to the law of the case doctrine. Even if it were, we could affirm on the ground that the record indicates the length of detention was not, in fact, “a close call”—because it was not.

Fifth, the Government argues its position was substantially justified because the District Court did not hold every *German Santos* factor cut against detention: the Court found the first two weighed in favor of Abioye, but the third was neutral and the fourth favored the Government. However, we have never held that the Govern-

ment's position is substantially justified just because a single factor weighs in its favor—and that argument is particularly implausible where, as here, the most important factor (duration) weighed against the Government and the second factor “strongly support[ed]” the same conclusion. *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 212.

In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining the Government failed to prove it was substantially justified in resisting Abioye's petition for an individualized bond hearing after detaining him for over 16 months without one, with no end to his detention then in sight.

* * *

The EAJA authorizes an award of attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party “in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)” brought by or against the United States if the Government's position was not “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). We hold this provision clearly covers petitions for writs of habeas corpus from immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and so it waives federal sovereign immunity to the fee awards issued here. Our rationale: Habeas actions are civil actions. They have been since before our Nation's Founding. As the Supreme Court and our Court have recognized, the plain and technical meanings of “civil action” encompass them. Even if “civil action” were ambiguous because it does not always cover habeas proceedings, “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)” is as clear as can be. “Any” extends coverage to all civil actions, no matter the type. And by expressly excluding torts, Congress ruled out any implicit exclusions.

We also hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Government’s position in *Abioye* was not substantially justified. After detaining Abioye for over 16 months, with reason to think he would remain in custody for months or years to come, the Government had no reasonable basis in law for fighting to deny him an individualized bond hearing.

We close by echoing the Supreme Court’s recent reflections on the historic role of the writ of habeas corpus. “When English monarchs jailed their subjects summarily and indefinitely, common-law courts employed the writ as a way to compel the crown to explain its actions—and, if necessary, ensure adequate process . . . before allowing any further detention. The Great Writ was, in this way, no less than ‘the instrument by which due process could be insisted upon.’” *Brown v. Davenport*, 596 U.S. 118, 128 (2022) (citation omitted) (quoting *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 555 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). It remains so today. With this history in mind, we affirm.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNSTOWN DIVISION

Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-0251

ADEWUMI ABIOYE, PETITIONER

v.

LEONARD ODDO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
WARDEN OF THE MOSHANNON VALLEY PROCESSING
CENTER, CAMILLA WAMSLEY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS ACTING FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS,
PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND
MERRICK GARLAND, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
RESPONDENTS

Filed: Sept. 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

¹ The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 636. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy. Due to the retirement of Judge Eddy, the case was reassigned to the undersigned.

CHRISTOPHER B. BROWN, United States Magistrate Judge

Before the Court is the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses Under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") filed by Petitioner Adewumi Abioye ("Abioye"). ECF No. 25. The motion has been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 27 and 31. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.

I. Background

This case arises from Respondents' detention of Abioye pending adjudication of his immigration removal proceedings. The pertinent facts can be simply stated:

Abioye is a citizen and national of Nigeria. ECF No. 1-4. He entered the United States on or about April 29, 2018, as a nonimmigrant visa entry/B2 visitor for pleasure. *Id.* He remained in the United States without authorization after his visa expired. In July 2020, Abioye pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1343. ECF No. 1, ¶ 22. On May 13, 2022, Abioye received a sentence of 27 months. ECF No. 25. On May 20, 2022, ICE served Abioye a Notice to Appear which stated that he was removable due to his conviction of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and that he had overstayed his B2 visa. ECF No. 1, ¶ 25. On the same day of his release from criminal custody, he was transferred to ICE custody and was civilly detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)

based on his conviction of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.²

Abioye retained Attorney Daniel Melo from Capital Area Immigrants' Rights (CAIR) Coalition, who appeared with Abioye at his preliminary hearing in the Cleveland Immigration Court on July 27, 2022.³ ECF No. 25, at 2. The Immigration Judge ordered Abioye removed to Nigeria. *Id.* The Board of Immigration Appeals denied Abioye's appeal on May 23, 2023. On June 22, 2023, Abioye, through counsel, filed a petition for review and a stay of removal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. *Id.*, at 3. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted a Stay of Removal during the pendency of his petition for review. *Id.* According to the public docket, oral argument on Abioye's appeal is tentatively scheduled during the appellate court's December 10-13, 2024, argument session. *See Abioye v. Garland*, No. 23-1663 (4th Cir.), <https://ca4-ecf.sso.dcn/cmecf/jsp/CaseSummary.jsp> (last reviewed 9/26/2024).

On October 12, 2023, Abioye filed in this Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

² Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien” who is inadmissible or deportable on the basis of enumerated categories of crimes and terrorist activities. *Id.* § 1226(c)(1). By its terms, § 1226(c) does not entitle detainees to a bond hearing. Release is authorized “only if the Attorney General decides . . . that release of the alien from custody is necessary” for witness-protection purposes “and the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the safety of others or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled proceeding.” *Id.* § 1226(c)(2).

³ CAIR Coalition is a 401(c)(3) nonprofit organization, which provides pro bono legal services. ECF 25, at 4.

challenging his continued detention without an individualized bond hearing as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 1. The Government opposed Abioye's request for a bond hearing. ECF No. 14. On November 29, 2023, applying the four-factor test set forth in *German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2020), the Court granted the writ and ordered that an immigration judge conduct an individualized bond hearing.⁴ ECF Nos. 17 and 23. That bond hearing was held on December 11, 2023. ECF No. 24. The immigration judge found Abioye was neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk and released Abioye on a \$5,000 bond. *Id.* Upon release, he had spent more than 18 months in civil detention. As of January 9, 2024, Abioye was residing in Silver Spring, Maryland. ECF No. 25-1, ¶ 1.

Now before the Court is Abioye's motion requesting an award of attorneys' fees and other expenses under the EAJA. ECF No. 25. In support, Abioye has submitted a number of documents including his own Declaration as well as the Declaration of Attorney Daniel Melo and the Order of the Immigration Judge entered December 11, 2023. ECF No. 25.

⁴ Those factors are: (1) the duration of the detention, which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has identified as the "most important factor;" (2) whether the detention is likely to continue; (3) the reasons for any delay; and (4) whether the conditions under which the alien is confined differ meaningfully from criminal punishment.

II. Discussion

The Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, provides, in relevant part:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Three of these provisions are at issue in this case: first, whether the underlying action is a “civil action” for the purposes of the EAJA; second, whether the position of the United States was substantially justified; and third, whether special circumstances make an award unjust.⁵ ECF No. 27.

A. Habeas Proceeding Challenging Immigration Detention Is A “Civil Action” Under The EAJA

As noted, the EAJA applies to “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). “On its face, the term ‘any civil action’ would seem to include habeas petitions, which ordinarily qualify as civil actions.” *Vacchio v.*

⁵ Respondents do not dispute that Abioye is the prevailing party in the habeas proceeding, or challenge the timeliness of the request for fees or the reasonableness of the fees and costs requested.

Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting, in a case stemming from a habeas petition challenging immigration detention, that “[t]he proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal”)). Notably, neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has addressed whether a civil habeas action challenging detention is a “civil action” under the EAJA. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, has adjudicated motions for attorneys’ fees in immigration habeas cases without questioning whether such cases fall outside the ambit of the EAJA. See *Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (considering the merits of a motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA in a habeas case filed by a noncitizen challenging the constitutionality of his immigration detention) and *German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility*, No. 19-2663 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) (docket entry 98) (approving the parties’ stipulation to award attorney’s fees in the amount of \$31,305.00 under the EAJA). Additionally, district courts within this Circuit have found that the EAJA applies to a § 2241 habeas action challenging immigration-related detention. See *Michelin v. Oddo*, Case No. 3:23-cv-22, 2024 WL 3937228 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2024); *Sisiliano-Lopez v. Lowe*, 448 F. Supp. 3d 419 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (granting in part motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA without questioning whether EAJA applies)); *Ildefonso-Candelario v. Lowe*, Case No. 3:16-2120, 2017 WL 4310078, *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2017) (stating “[t]his court has repeatedly found that the EAJA applies to a § 2241 habeas action challenging immigration-related detention.”) (citations omitted).

The courts of appeal that have addressed whether immigration habeas cases are “civil actions” under the

EAJA are divided. The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that an immigration habeas case proceeding is a “civil action” under the EAJA. *See Vacchio v. Ashcroft*, 404 F.3d 663, 670-72 (2d Cir. 2005) (“civil actions” under EAJA encompass immigration habeas proceedings), and *In re Petition of Hill*, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1985) (habeas action by an alien seeking admission to the United States compensable under the EAJA). In contrast, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that all habeas petitions, those challenging immigration detention and those challenging criminal detention, are “hybrid” in nature and for this reason do not fall under the EAJA’s “any civil action” provision. *See Obando-Segura v. Garland*, 999 F.3d 190, 192 (4th Cir. 2021) and *Barco v. Witte*, 65 F.4th 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2023), *cert. denied sub nom. Gomez Barco v. Witte*, 144 S. Ct. 553 (2024).

After a careful review of the various court decisions, including those Third Circuit decisions awarding fees without questioning whether the EAJA applies, this Court adopts the sound reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits, as well as recent district court cases that have held that immigration habeas cases are “civil actions” covered by the EAJA, and concludes that habeas civil immigration proceedings fall squarely within the EAJA’s “any civil action” provision. This conclusion is consistent with the recognition that immigration proceedings themselves are civil in nature. *See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting, in an immigration habeas case, that “[t]he proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal”); *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (“[R]emoval proceedings are civil in nature”); *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 211 (stating “[r]emoval proceedings are civil, not criminal”); *Xu*

Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Immigration proceedings, however, are civil, rather than criminal, in nature”). Moreover, the only type of “civil actions” that are outside the ambit of the EAJA are those “sounding in tort[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). As aptly noted by Judge Lynn Adelman, “If Congress had intended to exclude habeas actions from the EAJA, it would have done so as it excluded tort actions.” *Khol-yavskiy v. Schlecht*, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (E.D. Wis. 2007).

For these reasons, the Court agrees with Abioye that this immigration habeas case challenging the legality of his civil detention without a bond hearing qualifies as a “civil action” under the EAJA.

The Court now turns to whether Abioye is eligible to recover under the EAJA.

B. Eligibility To Recover Under The EAJA

In ruling on a request for fees and expenses pursuant to the EAJA, a court must determine whether the requesting party is eligible for fees and the amount of requested fees is reasonable. A requesting party is eligible for an attorney’s fee award where: (1) the requesting party is the prevailing party in a non-tort suit involving the United States;⁶ (2) the government’s position was not substantially justified; (3) the fee petition was timely filed; (4) the requesting party had a net worth of less

⁶ A prevailing party is one who demonstrates that he or she has achieved a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties” and a “judicial imprimatur on the change.” *Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res.*, 532 U.S. 598, 604-05 (2001).

than \$2 million when the case was filed;⁷ and (5) there are no special circumstances that would make the award of fees unjust. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A),(2)(B).

Here, it is not disputed that Abioye is a prevailing party, that his net worth has never exceeded 2 million dollars, and that the fee motion was filed in a timely manner. Respondents can avoid payment of fees only if they can show that their pre-litigation and litigation positions were “substantially justified” or that special circumstances exist that would make a fee award unjust.

The next task for the Court, therefore, is to determine whether the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

C. Respondents Were Not Substantially Justified In Their Litigation Position⁸

It is the government’s burden to show that its position had a reasonable basis both in law and in fact. *See Johnson v. Gonzalez*, 416 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)) (defining substantially justified as “justified in sub-

⁷ The EAJA defines “party” as “an individual whose net worth did not exceed \$2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).

⁸ Respondents “must meet the substantially justified test twice - once with regard to the underlying agency action and again with regard to its litigation position in the proceedings arising from that action.” *Johnson v. Gonzales*, 416 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing *Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 543, 545 (3d Cir. 2001)). Because the Court finds that Respondents’ litigation position was not “substantially justified,” the Court need not decide whether the position the government took during the underlying agency proceeding was “substantially justified.”

stance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person”). The Court “‘must not assume that the government’s position was not substantially justified simply because the government lost on the merits.’” *Johnson*, 416 F.3d at 210 (quoting *Kiareldeen*, 273 F.3d at 554).

Respondents argue that if the EAJA applies, the Court should deny Abioye’s request for attorneys’ fees and expenses because the Respondents’ litigation position was “substantially justified.” According to Respondents, their actions were compelled by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and justified because Abioye was subject to mandatory detention and ineligible for release under § 1226(c). They argue that “federal litigators are obligated to defend as-applied challenges to this statute” and that their position that Abioye had not met the four-factor test articulated in *German Santos* was reasonable. ECF No. 27.

The Court finds neither of these arguments to have merit. Although § 1226(c) provides for mandatory detention and the Supreme Court has determined that “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of” the removal process,” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that prolonged detention raises due process concerns. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed as-applied challenges to prolonged detention under § 1226(c) in *Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec.*, 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011), and *Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison*, 783 F.3d 469, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2015). In both, the appellate court held that “where detention becomes unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a hearing.” *See Diop*, 656 F.3d at 233; *Chavez-Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 474-75.

In *Diop*, the Court of Appeals considered whether a petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing nearly three years into his detention under § 1226(c). *Diop*, 656 F.3d at 223-26. The appellate court held that, “[w]hen detention becomes unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at which the Government bears the burden of proving that continued detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the detention statute.” *Id.* at 233. The Court of Appeals “noted that in rejecting a due process challenge by a § 1226(c) detainee in *Demore*, the Supreme Court emphasized that ‘mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c) lasts only for a ‘very limited time’ in the vast majority of cases,’ and concluded that the result in that case ‘may well have been different’ if the petitioner’s detention had been ‘significantly longer than the average’.” *Borbot v. Warden Hudson County Correctional Facility*, 906 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting *Diop*, 656 F.3d at 233 (quoting *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 529 & n.12)).⁹ And in *Chavez-Alvarez*, the Court of Appeals held that because petitioner’s year-long detention under § 1226(c) had become unreasonable, he was entitled to a bond hearing. *Chavez-Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 478. Noting that whether detention has become unreasonable is “highly fact-specific,” the Court of Appeals recognized that at a certain point continued detention without a bond hearing violates due process:

[D]ue process requires us to recognize that, at a certain point—which may differ case by case—the bur-

⁹ In *Demore*, the Supreme Court found that § 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision does not, by itself, violate due process, holding that “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 531 (citations omitted). The petitioner in *Demore* had been in civil detention without a bond hearing for five months.

den to an alien's liberty outweighs a mere presumption that the alien will flee and/or is dangerous. At this tipping point, the Government can no longer defend the detention against claims that it is arbitrary or capricious by presuming flight and dangerousness; more is needed to justify the detention as necessary to achieve the goals of the statute. As we said in *Diop*, section 1226(c) "implicitly authorizes detention for a reasonable amount of time, after which the authorities must make an individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary to fulfill the statute's purposes of ensuring that an alien attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose a danger to the community." *Id.* at 231. In *Diop*'s case we weighed the goals of the statute against the personal costs to his liberty resulting from his detention of roughly two years, eleven months, and concluded *Diop*'s detention was unconstitutional. *Id.*

Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 474-75. And the appellate court concluded that "beginning sometime after the six-month timeframe considered by *Demore*, and certainly by the time *Chavez-Alvarez* had been detained for one year, the burdens to *Chavez-Alvarez*'s liberties outweighed any justification for using presumptions to detain him without bond to further the goals of the statute." *Id.* at 478. Thus, the court determined that *Chavez-Alvarez* was entitled to a bond hearing. *Id.*

Here, Respondents were on notice that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, prior to *Abioye*'s detention, had found that due process entitles § 1226(c) detainees to a bond hearing at some point, with the exact time varying with the facts of the case. Any doubt that the Supreme Court's decision in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*,

583 U.S. 281 (2018),¹⁰ abrogated *Diop* and *Chavez-Alvarez* was removed in July 2020 when the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confirmed that as-applied due-process challenges to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) survive *Jennings*:

[E]ven though the [*Jennings*] Court foreclosed reading the statutory text [of § 1226(c)] as guaranteeing periodic bond hearings, it reserved the aliens’ constitutional claims for remand. *Jennings*, 138 S. Ct. at 851. One of those claims was that due process forbids prolonged confinement under § 1226(c) without a bond hearing. . . . *Jennings* thus left our framework for assessing as-applied constitutional challenges intact. . . .

Jennings . . . did not touch the constitutional analysis that led *Diop* and *Chavez-Alvarez* to their reading. That analysis stands. We are thus bound by *Diop* and *Chavez-Alvarez*’s decision that § 1226(c) is unconstitutional when applied to detain an alien unreasonably long without a bond hearing. See *Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cty. Corr. Facility*, 906 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing that *Diop* had a constitutional holding); *Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York Cty. Prison*, 905 F.3d 208, 222 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) (same).

¹⁰ The Supreme Court’s decision in *Jennings* abrogated *Diop* and *Chavez-Alvarez* to the extent those decisions construed § 1226(c) to contain an implicit “reasonable” time on the period for which detention without a bond hearing was statutorily authorized. However, *Jennings* did not call into question the constitutional holdings in *Diop* or *Chavez-Alvarez* that detention under § 1226(c) may violate due process if unreasonably long.

German Santos, 965 F.3d at 210 (citations omitted). *Diop*, *Chavez-Alvarez*, and *German Santos* were all decided *years* before Abioye was taken into detention in May of 2022.

Further, while the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not laid out a specific standard for district courts to follow, multiple district courts within this Circuit which have examined the question have noted a “growing consensus within this district and, indeed it appears throughout the federal courts, that prolonged detention of aliens under § 1226(c) raises serious constitutional concerns.” *Alli v. Decker*, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citations omitted), *rev’d in part, vacated in part*, 650 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2011). *See Clarke v. Doll*, 481 F. Supp. 3d 394, 397-98 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (detained for 20 months, ordering individualized bond hearing); *Sisiliano-Lopez v. Sabol*, No. 1:16-CV-1793, 2017 WL 3613982 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017), *report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Sisiliano-Lopez v. Lowe*, No. 1:16-CV-1793, 2017 WL 3602037 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2017) (detained for nearly two years; ordering individualized bond hearing); *Walker v. Lowe*, No. 4:15-CV-0887, 2016 WL 3165645 (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2016) (detained for approximately 3 years, ordering individualized bond hearing).

Here, Abioye was detained for over sixteen months without an individualized bond hearing, more than the year-long detention in *Chavez-Alvarez* and the fifteen-month detention in *German Santos*. *See Arias v. Choate*, No. 1:22-cv-02238-CNS, 2023 WL 4488890, at *7 (D. Colo. July 12, 2023) (“Respondents knew that courts in this District have repeatedly and unequivocally found detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an individu-

alized bond hearing unreasonable, and detention for approximately a year or more constitutionally unreasonable.”). Despite knowing prolonged confinement without an individualized bond hearing raises due process concerns, when Abioye requested a bond hearing sixteen months after initial detention, Respondents, in lieu of taking no position or agreeing to a bond hearing, opposed his request. Where, as here, there are multiple cases from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which have found that prolonged detention under § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing is unreasonable, and detention for approximately a year or more without an individualized bond hearing is constitutionally unreasonable, Respondents’ litigation position did not have a reasonable basis in both law and fact. Given this, the Court finds that Respondents have not shown that their litigation position was substantially justified.

D. No Special Circumstances Exist Which Make An Award Of Attorneys’ Fees Unjust

Respondents offer minimal briefing on the “special circumstances” element that would otherwise make the award of EAJA fees unjust. Basically, their position is that “the Attorney’s General’s hands are tied when it comes to defending the constitutionality of an Act of Congress” and “[t]he government should not be penalized under the EAJA for simply following its obligation to defend Acts of Congress and declining to exercise authority it does not have.” ECF No. 27 at 15, 16. In examining the record before it, the Court finds that there is nothing to suggest special circumstances exist which would make an award of EAJA fees unjust.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Abioye is eligible to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses under the EAJA.

E. The Fees And Expenses Sought Are Reasonable

The last task of the Court is to determine what fee award is reasonable. Abioye has requested \$18,224.58.¹¹ Abioye's counsel submitted records documenting the reasonable time spent working on the habeas petition and the instant motion. Respondents have not challenged the time spent by, or the hourly rates of, Abioye's counsel. The Court, therefore, finds that Abioye is entitled to an award in the total amount of \$18,224.58.

F. EAJA Award Payment

The EAJA directs the award of any attorney's fees directly to the prevailing party. 28 U.S.C. § 2414(d)(1)(A); *see Astrue v. Ratliff*, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that any fee award is subject to an offset to satisfy the litigant's pre-existing debt to the government. *Ratliff*, 560 U.S. at 597-98. However, under *Ratliff*, an award is payable to the attorney where the client has no outstanding federal debt and expressly assigned the right to receive fees to their attorney. *See Beattie v. Colvin*, 240 F. Supp.3d 294, 299, n.1 (D.N.J. 2017) (citing *Ratliff*, 560 U.S. 586) (stating, "where, as is the case here, there is an assignment agreement and the prevailing party owes no debt to the government, the Supreme Court has hon-

¹¹ Abioye originally sought \$14,847.08 in fees, which did not include the 14 hours of work spent on the Reply. Applying the hourly rate of \$241.45, the additional fee due is \$3,377.50, for a total of \$18,224.58. ECF No. 31.

ored that agreement and awarded attorney's fees directly to the prevailing party's counsel.").

Here, Abioye avers that, to the best of his knowledge, he does not owe any debt to the United States federal government and expressly states that he has assigned payment of any award of fees and costs to CAIR Coalition.¹² ECF No. 25-1. Accordingly, Respondents will be directed to pay Abioye's counsel the sum of \$18,224.58 in attorneys' fees and expenses.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court will grant Abioye's Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. Abioye is hereby awarded \$18,224.58 in attorneys' fees and expenses under the EAJA.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: September 26, 2024

BY THE COURT:

/s/ CHRISTOPHER B. BROWN
CHRISTOPHER B. BROWN
United States Magistrate Judge

cc: All Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)

¹² As part of his criminal sentence, Abioye was ordered to pay \$1,335,923.77 in restitution. *See* public docket *United States v. Abioye*, Criminal Docket No. 1:20-cr-0052 (Dist. of Maryland), <https://mdd-ecf.sso.dcn/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?476611> (last viewed 9/26/2020). To clarify, that amount is to be paid to the victims of his crime, not the federal government, and therefore does not qualify as a debt to the federal government.

50a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHNSTOWN DIVISION

Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-0251
ADEWUMI ABIOYE, PETITIONER

v.

LEONARD ODDO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
WARDEN OF THE MOSHANNON VALLEY PROCESSING
CENTER, CAMILLA WAMSLEY, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS ACTING FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS,
PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND
MERRICK GARLAND, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
RESPONDENTS

Filed: Sept. 26, 2024

ORDER

AND NOW, this 26th day of September, 2024, in accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby **ORDERED** that the Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses Under the Equal Access to Justice Act filed by Petitioner Adewumi Abioye is **GRANTED**. Respondents shall pay Abioye's counsel the sum of \$18,224.58 in attorneys' fees and expenses within thirty days of the date of this Order.

51a

BY THE COURT:

/s/ CHRISTOPHER B. BROWN
CHRISTOPHER B. BROWN
United States Magistrate Judge

cc: All Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Case No. 3:23-cv-22

ADOLPH MICHELIN, PETITIONER

v.

LEONARD ODDO, ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Filed: Aug. 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner Adolph Michelin’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (ECF 32.) For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Relevant Background

The Nationalities Service Center, a 501(c)(3) non-profit, represented Michelin *pro bono* in this habeas case. The Court summarized the relevant and undisputed factual background of it in its August 8, 2023 opinion granting Michelin habeas relief. (ECF 16.) As explained therein, Michelin was arrested by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in January 2022. He was detained at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center, which is located within the territorial boundaries of this Court. On or around March 25, 2022, Michelin filed

with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) a motion to reopen his immigration case. At that same time, he applied for an emergency stay of removal in which he asserted his eligibility for asylum based on his fear of persecution in Jamaica. The BIA granted Michelin a discretionary stay of removal on March 28, 2022, but his motion to reopen remained pending.

Almost one year later, in February 2023, Michelin filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The BIA still had not decided Michelin’s motion to reopen.¹ By that point, Michelin had been detained at Moshannon for more than one year without a bond hearing. In his petition, Michelin challenged the legality of his prolonged detention without a bond hearing. As relief, Michelin sought an order from this Court ordering his immediate release or that he receive an individualized bond hearing.

The Court ruled in Michelin’s favor on August 8, 2023, granting him habeas relief. (ECF 16, 17.) The Court so held because Michelin established that his prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court further held that Michelin also established that the two custody reviews conducted by the DHS that he did have (the first in January 2022 and the second in January 2023) did not provide him with adequate process such that no bond hearing would be required in his case. Ultimately, the Court

¹ As of the date of this writing the BIA still has not decided Michelin’s motion to reopen his immigration proceeding. Thus, the BIA granted Michelin an emergency stay of removal in March 2022, but the motion to reopen he filed at around the same time has been pending before the BIA for more than 28 months.

conditionally granted the writ and ordered that Respondents arrange for Michelin to have a bond hearing before an immigration judge in a fixed amount of time and that, if they did not, the writ would issue and Respondents would have to release Michelin to supervised release. (ECF 25.)

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court denied. (ECF 18, 24.) They then filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Respondents voluntarily withdrew that appeal in February 2024.

In the meantime, in accordance with this Court's order granting Michelin habeas relief, Michelin appeared before an immigration judge for a bond hearing on September 5, 2023. (Pet's Ex. A, ECF 32-1 at pp. 3-4.) The immigration judge ordered that Michelin be released from custody under a bond of \$10,000.00. (*Id.*) Michelin's family posted his bond. According to his counsel, since then Michelin has been living in Philadelphia with his family and complying with all conditions of his release. (ECF 32 at p. 2.)

Now before the Court is Michelin's Motion (ECF 32) requesting an award of attorneys' fees and other expenses under the EAJA. In support, Michelin has submitted, among other things, the declaration of one of his attorneys, Margaret Kopel (Pet's Ex. C, ECF 32-1 at pp. 7-9), as well as the time entries of Attorney Kopel and her colleagues with the Nationalities Service Center who also worked on this case (Attorneys Jonah Eaton, Whitney Viets and Lilah Thompson). (Pet's Ex. D, ECF 32-1 at pp. 10-17; ECF 39-1 at pp. 1-8.) Michelin's Motion is fully briefed. (ECF 34, 39.)

II. Discussion

“Congress passed the EAJA in response to its concern that persons may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the vindication of their rights.” *Sullivan v. Hudson*, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The EAJA, which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2412 and 5 U.S.C. § 504, was designed to rectify this situation by providing for a mandatory award of reasonable attorneys’ fees in some cases. *Comm’r, I.N.S. v. Jean*, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990) (“the specific purpose of the EAJA is to eliminate for the average person the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental actions.”) It “renders the United States liable for attorney’s fees for which it would not otherwise be liable, and thus amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States.” *Ardestani v. I.N.S.*, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991).

The EAJA provides, in relevant part, that:

[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party *in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action*, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, *unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.*

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).² The EAJA further provides that the “position of the United States” “means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based[.] *Id.*, § 2412(d)(2)(D).

A. The EAJA Applies Here

Respondents contend that a habeas action does not fall with the phrase “any civil action” under the EAJA and therefore Michelin cannot recover attorneys’ fees under it. The EAJA does not define the phrase “any civil action,” and neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has addressed whether a habeas action qualifies as one.³ Notably, however, the Third Circuit

² To be eligible for fees under the EAJA, an applicant also must: (1) be a prevailing party; (2) have submitted the motion for fees within thirty days of final judgment; and (3) have a net worth that is less than two million dollars at the time the civil action was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B)(i). Respondents do not dispute that Michelin satisfied these three conditions.

³ In support of its position that the EAJA does not apply to Michelin’s case, Respondents quote *Daley v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons*, 199 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2006), in which the Third Circuit observed that “the weight of authority indicates . . . that filing a § 2241 petition is not a ‘civil action’ for purposes of the EAJA.” 199 F. App’x at 121. Because *Daley* is an unpublished decision, it lacks precedential value. Additionally, *Daley*’s statement does not have persuasive value here because *Daley* concerned a former federal prisoner who had challenged in a habeas proceeding the date the Federal Bureau of Prisons transferred him to a community confinement center. It did not involve the civil detention of an immigration detainee. Additionally, none of the cases cited in *Daley* were habeas cases filed by an immigration detainee. Thus, neither *Daley* nor the cases cited by it are instructive on the issues presented by Michelin’s Motion.

has adjudicated motions for attorneys' fees in immigration habeas cases without questioning whether such cases fall outside the ambit of the EAJA. *Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (considering the merits of a motion for attorney's fees under the EAJA in a habeas case filed by a noncitizen challenging the constitutionality of his immigration detention).⁴ So too have district courts within the Third Circuit, which have in recent years granted EAJA fees to successful petitioners in habeas immigration proceedings. *See, e.g., Sisiliano-Lopez v. Lowe*, 448 F. Supp. 3d 419, 422 (M.D. Pa. 2020); *Ildefonso-Candelario v. Lowe*, 2017 WL 4310078, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2017); *Soriano v. Sabol*, 2017 WL 3268400, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2017).

The courts of appeals that have addressed whether immigration habeas cases are "civil actions" under the EAJA are divided. The Second and Ninth Circuits have recognized the distinction between different types of habeas cases and have held that an immigration habeas proceeding is a "civil action" that allows for attorneys' fees under the EAJA. *Vaccio v. Ashcroft*, 404 F.3d 663, 670-72 (2d Cir. 2005) (a habeas proceeding challenging immigration detention constitutes a "civil action" under

⁴ In this case, Michelin prevailed on his claim that, after weighing the factors set forth in *German Santos v. Warden Pike County Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020), the Court would conclude that his continued detention without a bond hearing violated his rights under the Due Process Clause. *German Santos* was an immigration habeas case that, like Michelin's, was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In 2021, the Third Circuit panel that decided *German Santos* entered an order in that case approving of the petitioner and government's stipulation to pay the petitioner's attorneys' fees under the EAJA. *See* Order in *German Santos v. Warden Pike County Corr. Facility*, No. 19-2663 (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2021).

the EAJA; such actions meaningfully differ from the criminal habeas petitions that courts have held cannot recover fees under the EAJA because they are “hybrid” criminal/civil actions); *In re Hill*, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1985) (the EAJA applied to a habeas action by noncitizens who sought admission to the United States). In contrast, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that all habeas petitions are “hybrid” in nature and thus are not “civil actions” under the EAJA regardless of whether the detention being challenged is civil immigration detention or criminal detention. *Obando-Segura v. Garland*, 999 F.3d 190, 192 (4th Cir. 2021) (habeas corpus proceedings are unique, hybrid proceedings, therefore making it ambiguous as to whether they fall under “any civil action” within the EAJA); *Barco v. Witte*, 65 F.4th 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2023) (adopting the *Obando-Segura* majority’s reasoning and also citing to cases about habeas petitions arising out of criminal cases to recognize the hybrid nature of habeas proceedings), *cert. denied* sub nom. *Gomez Barco v. Witte*, 144 S. Ct. 553 (2024).

The Court respectfully finds the reasoning of the Second and Ninth Circuits, as well as recent district court cases that have held that immigration habeas cases are “civil actions” covered by the EAJA, to be more persuasive. *See, e.g., Arias v. Choate*, 2023 WL 4488890, at *2 (D. Colo. July 12, 2023) (“immigration habeas petitions are included in the term ‘any civil action’ as used in the EAJA and the waiver of sovereign immunity applies.”); *Daley v. Choate*, 2024 WL 989397, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 7, 2024) (same), appeal pending No. 24-1191 (10th Cir.); *see also Kholjavskiy v. Schlecht*, 479 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (“[E]ven if the EAJA could be reasonably read as excluding habeas actions challenging criminal convictions, the same is not true of habeas ac-

tions challenging administrative detention.”). This conclusion is consistent with the recognition that immigration proceedings themselves are civil in nature. *See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting, in an immigration detention habeas case, that “[t]he proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal”); *Padilla v. Kentucky*, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (“[R]emoval proceedings are civil in nature”); *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 211 (instructing district courts to examine conditions of confinement in immigration habeas petitions because “[r]emoval proceedings are civil, not criminal.”); *Xu Long Yu v. Ashcroft*, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Immigration proceedings, however, are civil, rather than criminal, in nature; therefore the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective counsel does not attach.”); *see also Arias*, 2023 WL 4488890, at *3 (the petitioner’s immigration habeas case “bears no hallmark of a criminal proceeding that would render it a ‘hybrid’ or criminal action outside the ambit of the EAJA.”).

Moreover, the only type of “civil actions” that the EAJA excludes from its reach are those “sounding in tort[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). “If Congress had intended to exclude habeas actions from the EAJA, it would have done so as it excluded tort actions.” *Khol-yavskiy*, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 901.

Thus, the Court agrees with Michelin that this habeas case, which challenged the legality of his civil immigration detention without a bond hearing, qualifies as a “civil action” under the EAJA.

B. The Government’s Position Was Not Substantially Justified

Respondents contend that if the EAJA applies, the Court should nevertheless deny Michelin’s request for

attorneys' fees because the position the government took with respect to him was "substantially justified."⁵ 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (the court shall award a prevailing party attorneys' fees "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified[.]") It is Respondents' burden to establish that the government's position was substantially justified.⁶ *Pierce v. Underwood*, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).

To meet this burden, Respondents must show that the government's position was "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person. Put another way, substantially justified means having a 'reasonable basis in both law and fact.'" *Johnson v. Gonzales*, 416 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting *Pierce*, 487 U.S. at 565). Respondents "must show: (1) a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory it propounded; and (3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory advanced." *Morgan v. Perry*, 142 F.3d 670, 684 (3d Cir. 1998). The court "'must not assume that the government's position was not substantially justified simply because the government lost on the merits.'" *Johnson*,

⁵ The government can avoid having to pay attorneys' fees under the EAJA if it shows that "that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Respondents bear the burden of proving that special circumstances exist. *Brinker v. Guiffrida*, 798 F.2d 661, 668 (3d Cir. 1986). They do not argue that "special circumstances" exist here that would "make an award unjust."

⁶ The Supreme Court has recognized that although "[a]ny given civil action can have numerous phases," in judging the justification of a position, a court must treat the "case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items." *Comm'r, I.N.S. v. Jean*, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1990).

416 F.3d at 210 (quoting *Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001)).

Importantly, Respondents “must meet the substantially justified test twice—once with regard to the underlying agency action and then again with regard to [the government’s] litigation position in the proceedings arising from that action.” *Johnson*, 416 F.3d at 211. Thus, Respondents must show that the government’s pre-litigation position regarding Michelin was substantially justified, and if they do not satisfy that burden then he is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. *Id.*; *Morgan*, 142 F.3d at 684.

Respondents assert that the DHS’s pre-litigation position was substantially justified because a final order of removal had been issued in Michelin’s case and therefore, he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which contains no explicit bond hearing requirement. This argument is not persuasive because Michelin established as fact during the litigation of his habeas petition that up to his January 17, 2023 bond hearing *it was the position of the DHS that he was being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)*.⁷

⁷ As the Court recounted in its opinion granting Michelin habeas relief (ECF 16), Michelin proved that on January 27, 2022, which was soon after his arrest, the DHS issued in his case a Notice of Custody Determination. This Notice stated that Michelin was being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (§ 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)). (Pet’s Ex. E, ECF 4-1 at pp. 83-85.) Later, in an October 2022 email from Michelin’s attorney to his DHS deportation officer, Michelin’s attorney asked: “To clarify, is it ICE’s position that Mr. Michelin is detained pursuant to Section 236 of the INA [8 U.S.C. § 1226] and 8 C.F.R. 241.4(b)(1) since he has a pending motion to reopen?” (Pet’s Ex. F, ECF 4-1 at p. 87.) Michelin’s DHS deportation officer replied: “Yes.” (*Id.*)

(Pet’s Ex. E, ECF 4-1 at p. 83; Pet’s Ex. G, Veits’ Decl., ECF 4-1 at p. 90, ¶¶ 4-6; Pet’s Ex. F, ECF 4-1 at pp. 87-88.) Since Michelin had no qualifying criminal convictions that would render him detained under § 1226(c), his counsel reasonably determined that he was being detained under § 1226(a) and was thus eligible for a bond hearing. That is why Michelin’s counsel filed a motion for such a hearing, which the DHS did not initially oppose. (Pet’s Ex. G, Veits’ Decl., ECF 4-1 at p. 90, ¶¶ 6-7.)

Michelin’s bond hearing was scheduled for January 17, 2023. At the hearing, the DHS contended for the first time that Michelin was being detained under § 1231(a). (*Id.*, ¶ 8.) Based on DHS counsel’s explanation that Michelin was being detained under § 1231(a)(6), the immigration court did not conduct a merits-based discretionary hearing on bond. Instead, it held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Michelin’s bond motion. (*Id.*)

During this same hearing, DHS counsel advised Michelin’s attorney that the DHS had “just completed a custody evaluation” of him under the applicable regulations.⁸ (*Id.*, ¶ 9.) Michelin established that this was the first time his attorney was notified “of this custody eval-

⁸ As the Court previously explained, “the Third Circuit in [*Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison*, 905 F.3d 208, 227 (3d Cir. 2018)] observed that the regulations that implement the government’s detention authority under § 1231(a)(6) themselves raise serious constitutional concerns. Although [*Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 142 S. Ct. 1827 (2022)] abrogated the Third Circuit’s statutory analysis of § 1231(a)(6) and its application of the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Third Circuit’s discussion on why it was necessary to invoke that canon, including its concerns about the insufficient process afforded to noncitizens in the regulations, remains persuasive.” (ECF 16 at p. 16) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

uation, despite having been [his] counsel of record for nearly a year, having corresponded with [his deportation officer] about the custody evaluation just three months' prior, and having communicated on a near-constant basis with ICE officials at Moshannon Valley to coordinate calls with [Michelin] throughout 2022.” (*Id.*, ¶¶ 9-11.) Michelin’s attorney requested that DHS counsel notify ICE of her intention to submit documentation to ICE to support Michelin’s release. DHS counsel agreed to contact ICE as soon as possible. (*Id.*, ¶ 9.)

The next day, on January 18, 2023, a DHS officer called Michelin’s attorney and informed her that his custody evaluation had “already been completed” and “sent up the chain of command” at DHS. As a result, the officer stated, Michelin’s attorney would be unable to submit documentation in support of his release from detention. (*Id.*, ¶ 10.) One day later, on January 19, 2023, ICE issued a Decision to Continue in which it informed Michelin that it would not release him from custody because it expected to carry out his “removal in the reasonably foreseeable future should your Motion to Reopen and Stay of Removal be denied.” (Resp’s Ex. 4, ECF 8-4 at p. 2.)

By this time, Michelin had been detained more than one year without a bond hearing. The BIA had granted the emergency motion to stay his removal nine months earlier in March 2022, but it had not decided the motion to reopen that he had filed around the same time. Of course, the DHS had no control over when the BIA decided Michelin’s motion to reopen. But the DHS’s position that, although the BIA had granted Michelin an emergency stay of removal in March 2022, it could nevertheless detain him under § 1231(a)(6) indefinitely and without a bond hearing and also without providing him

with sufficient notice of or input in his January 2023 custody review was not “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” *Pierce*, 487 U.S. at 565.

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Respondents have not satisfied their burden of establishing that the DHS’s pre-litigation position with respect to Michelin’s custody was “substantially justified.”⁹

⁹ Because the Court finds that the government’s pre-litigation position regarding Michelin was not “substantially justified,” the Court need not decide whether the position it took during the litigation of this case was “substantially justified.” *See, e.g., Morgan*, 142 F.3d at 684; *Johnson*, 416 F.3d at 210. The Court notes, however, that in their answer to Michelin’s petition (ECF 8), Respondents did not contest the evidence that Michelin presented in support of his as-applied due process claim, counter most of arguments made in support of it, or request an evidentiary hearing on any issue. Rather, Respondents maintained that the government could subject Michelin to open-ended detention without that detention ever being subject to review by an independent adjudicator. The government could do so, Respondents asserted, because the government would have deported Michelin in March 2022 if he had not moved to reopen his immigration case and obtained an emergency stay of removal. In support of this position, Respondents cited unpublished decisions in which a court denied an immigration detainee’s requests for habeas relief when the delay of removal was caused by legal proceedings initiated by the detainee and not, as with each detainee in *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001), the government’s inability to find a country to accept the detainee. (ECF 8 at pp. 8-9.) Although Michelin’s as-applied due process claim presented novel and complex issues, Respondents should have addressed Michelin’s argument that, given the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 142 S. Ct. 1827 (2022), there was ambiguity as to the proper framework to analyze his as-applied due process challenge and that the proper framework the Court should apply was that which is set forth in *German Santos v. Warden Pike County Corr. Facility*, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020). The first time Respondents addressed that

Michelin is thus eligible to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses under the EAJA.

C. The Amount of the Fee Awarded

The Court's next task is to determine what fee award is reasonable. The EAJA authorizes fees not to exceed \$125 per hour, adjusted for inflation. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).

1. The adjusted hourly rate

The parties agree that in calculating the adjusted hourly rate the Court should refer to the following rate schedule proposed by Respondents.¹⁰ This schedule adjusts the hourly rate calculation for each of the months when Michelin attorneys state that fees were earned, using the consumer price index for consumers for that month as follows:¹¹

January 2023	\$240.18
February 2023	\$241.52
March 2023	\$242.32
April 2023	\$243.55
August 2023	\$246.49
September 2023	\$247.10

argument was in the motion for reconsideration they filed after the Court granted Michelin habeas relief and closed this case.

¹⁰ The inflation data is now available for the months of February and March 2024 and therefore the Court has updated the proposed table submitted by Respondents to reflect the inflation-adjusted hourly rate for those months. *See* <https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation-calculator.htm>.

¹¹ Respondents have established that Michelin calculated the adjusted hourly rate incorrectly in his Motion. (ECF 34 at pp. 11-13.) Michelin has acknowledged this and has conceded to the proposed rate schedule provided by Respondents. (ECF 39 at p. 6.)

October 2023	\$247.01
February 2024	\$249.14
March 2024	\$250.75

2. Exclusion of certain fees

The total award that Michelin seeks under the EAJA is \$21,392.51.¹² Courts may award only “reasonable” attorney’s fees and expenses under the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Michelin, as the fee applicant, “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to a reasonable award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” *Beattie v. Colvin*, 240 F. Supp. 3d 294, 296 (D.N.J. 2017) (citations omitted). “The Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘[c]ounsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.’” *Id.* at 296 (quoting *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). “A district court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate amount of a fee award.” *Id.* (citing *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 437); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(C) (“The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this subsection, or deny an award, to the extent that the prevailing party during the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy.”)

Respondents assert that the Court should reduce the amount of the award requested by Michelin because

¹² This amount was calculated under the table contained herein and also accounts for the additional 15.3 hours of work Michelin’s counsel spend on the reply (ECF 39).

they claim that: (a) many of his counsels' time entries are overly vague; (b) his counsel attempts to recover for clerical tasks that are not compensable under the EAJA; and (c) he cannot recover for fees incurred in connection with the September 5, 2023 bond hearing before the immigration judge.

(a) Alleged vague time entries

Respondents contend that the Court should reduce any fee award by almost \$5,000 for time entries that allegedly lack sufficient detail to determine whether the work is compensable. In evaluating this contention, the Court notes that Michelin's counsel are "not required to record in great detail how each minute of [their] time was expended." *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12. Counsel should, however, "at least . . . identify the general subject matter of [their] time expenditures." *Id.*

Respondents contend that many of counsel's time entries fail to meet that burden. They note that counsel's entries include time entries for "response to motion to reconsider," "research," "declaration," "fees motion," and "amended petition." They argue that these entries are vague and makes it impossible to determine if the time is compensable. Michelin disagrees, asserting that his counsel have adequately identified the general subject matter of the time entry.

Having reviewed these entries in the context of the legal work that was involved in this matter, the Court finds that these entries are sufficient. Accordingly, Respondents' request for a fee reduction for these entries will be denied.

(b) Alleged clerical tasks

Respondents object to Michelin's attempt to recover over \$600.00 in fees for work performed by Attorney Kopel for what they describe as "clerical tasks." *See, e.g., Torres v. Saul*, 2020 WL 4581825, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2020) ("clerical work that can be performed by non-attorneys is not compensable as attorney's fees under the EAJA.") Specifically, they assert that Michelin cannot recover fees to cover time that Attorney Kopel devoted to service of process (2.3 hours) and also for the time it took her to file the form indicating that Michelin consented to a Magistrate Judge presiding over the case (12 minutes).

Michelin counters that the Nationalities Service Center does not employ paralegals who assist attorneys with clerical tasks such as service of process. He also points out that Respondents' counsel declined Michelin's request to waive service. According to Michelin, "[t]his was a waste of time, but one that sits squarely on Respondents." (ECF 39 at p. 7.)

Given the fact that counsel for Michelin does not employ paralegals who could assist with tasks such as service, the Court concludes that recovery of these fees will be permitted.

(c) Time spent on the bond hearing

Michelin seeks fees for 22.5 hours of work (for a total of \$5,550.91) performed by Attorneys Viets and Thompson related to the September 5, 2023 bond hearing.¹³

¹³ Counsel worked 14.5 hours in August 2023 (\$3574.11) preparing for the bond hearing and worked 8 hours in September 2023 (\$1,976.80) preparing for that hearing.

Since the fees for that work was not “incurred” in this “civil action[,]” the EAJA’s provision at § 2412(d)(1)(A) does not apply. Thus, as Respondents point out and Michelin does not contest, he must be seeking an award of fees for that work under that part of the EAJA that is codified in the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) at 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). *Kabura*, 2020 WL 4747788, *5 (“the recovery of fees for agency adjudications like those conducted in Immigration Court are governed by 5 U.S.C. § 504.”)

Section 504(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that “an agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” An “adversary adjudication” is “an adjudication under section 554 of this title in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C)(i).

In *Ardestani v. I.N.S.*, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991) the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that administrative immigration proceedings do not fall ‘under section 554’ and therefore are wholly outside the scope of the EAJA.” Thus, the EAJA does not act as a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the September 5, 2023 bond hearing before the immigration judge, and Michelin cannot recover fees for work performed by his attorneys associated with it.¹⁴ *Kabura*, 2020 WL 4747788, *5 (concluding that

¹⁴ As Respondents point out, before the Supreme Court decided *Ardestani*, some courts had held “that EAJA fees may be awarded for administrative proceedings intimately tied to the resolution of

the government correctly objected to the petitioner's request for fees for representation before the immigration judge).

Accordingly, Michelin is not entitled to an award of fees for the 22.5 hours of work performed by Attorneys Viets and Thompson related to the bond hearing. The Court therefore will reduce Michelin's requested award by \$5,550.91, which accounts for the reduction of 22.5 hours of non-compensable time associated with the bond hearing. (See ECF 34 at pp. 17-18.)

the judicial action and necessary to the attainment of the results Congress sought to promote by providing for fees." *Nadarajah v. Holder*, 569 F.3d 906, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation omitted). This principle arose from the Supreme Court's decision in *Sullivan v. Hudson*, 490 U.S. 877, 888 (1989)). As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, however, "[s]ince *Ardestani*, *Hudson*'s holding has been narrowly applied and limited to post-litigation situations . . . where there was a court-ordered remand for further administrative proceedings and the agency representation was necessary to carrying out the court's order." *Nadarajah*, 569 F.3d at 920.

As the Eight Circuit has explained, "*Hudson* sets out specific and well-defined prerequisites" before it applies: "there must be a remand by the reviewing court and 'detailed provisions for the transfer of proceedings from the courts to the [agency],' which would implicate 'a degree of direct interaction between a federal court and an administrative agency alien to traditional review of agency action under the [APA],' [*Hudson*, 490 U.S. at 885], before the award of fees can be even considered." *Full Gospel Portland Church v. Thornburgh*, 927 F.2d 628, 632 (1991). None of those circumstances are present here. This Court did not remand this case to the immigration judge, nor did it retain jurisdiction over the matter. And Michelin would have been considered the prevailing party regardless of the outcome of the bond hearing before the immigration judge.

III. Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court concludes that Michelin is entitled to an award of \$15,841.60 in attorneys' fees and other expenses under the EAJA. This award was calculated as follows:

January 2023	9.5 hours x 240.18 = \$2,281.71
February 2023	12.8 hours x \$241.52 = \$3,091.46
March 2023	13 hours x \$242.32 = \$3,150.16
April 2023	.2 hours x \$243.55 = \$48.71
August 2023	9.7 hours x \$246.49 = \$2,390.95
October 2023	2 hours x \$247.01 = \$494.02
February 2024	2.2 hours x \$249.14 = \$548.11
March 2024	15.3 hours x \$250.75 = \$3,836.48

The Supreme Court has held that “a § 2412(d) fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes to the United States.” *Astrue v. Ratliff*, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010). An award is payable to the attorney where the client has no outstanding federal debt and expressly assigned the right to receive fees to his or her attorney. *See, e.g., Mathews-Sheets v. Astrue*, 653 F.3d 560, 565-66 (7th Cir. 2011) (interpreting *Ratliff* to suggest “that if there is an assignment, the only ground for insisting on making the award to the plaintiff is that the plaintiff has debts that may be prior to what she owes her lawyer. There is no indication of that in this case, so to ignore the assignment and order the fee paid to her would just create a potential collection problem for the lawyer”), overruled on other grounds by *Sprinkle v. Colvin*, 777 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2015); *Beattie v. Colvin*, 240 F. Supp. 3d 294, 299 n.1 (D.N.J. 2017) (“[I]n this case [which is governed by the EAJA], the legal work was performed *pro bono*, so there is no question of whether

fees should be directed to the client to reimburse him for any sums already paid to counsel. To the contrary, where, as is the case here, there is an assignment agreement and the prevailing party owes no debt to the government, the Supreme Court has honored that agreement and awarded attorney's fees directly to the prevailing party's counsel.")

Here, Michelin avers that, to the best of his knowledge, he does not "owe any debt to the United States federal government." (Pet's Ex. B, Michelin Decl., ECF 32-1 at p. 6, ¶ 7.) He also states that he has elected that any fees and costs that are awarded by the Court be issued directly to his counsel. (*Id.*, ¶ 5.) Therefore, the Court will do so.

ORDER

And now, this 26th day of August, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court grants in part and denies in part Michelin's Motion for Attorney's Fees (ECF 32). Respondents shall pay Michelin's counsel the sum of \$15,841.60 in attorneys' fees and expenses within thirty days of the date of this order.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ PATRICIA L. DODGE
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 24-2990 and 24-3198
District Court nos. 2:23-cv-00022 and 3:23-cv-00251

ADOLPH MICHELIN

v.

WARDEN MOSHANNON VALLEY CORRECTIONAL
CENTER; DIRECTOR PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT;
DIRECTOR UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; SECRETARY UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ATTORNEY
GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
APPELLANTS IN CASE 24-2990

ADEWUMI ABIOYE

v.

WARDEN MOSHANNON VALLEY PROCESSING CENTER;
ACTING FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL OPERATIONS PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE;
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED
STATES, APPELLANTS IN CASE 24-3198

Filed: Mar. 2, 2026

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, CHUNG, BOVE, MASCOTT, Circuit Judges and MCKEE* and AMBRO,* Senior Circuit Judges

The petitions for rehearing filed by the Appellants, Warden Moshannon Valley Correctional Center, et al., in the above-entitled cases having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petitions for rehearing by panel and the Court en banc, are denied.¹

BY THE COURT,

/s/ THOMAS L. AMBRO
Circuit Judge

Dated: March 2, 2026

Amr/Cc: All counsel of record

* The votes of the Honorable Thomas L. Ambro and Theodore A. McKee, Senior Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, are limited to panel rehearing.

¹ Judges Matey, Porter, Phipps, Bove, and Mascott would grant the petitions for rehearing by the en banc court. Judge Bove, joined by Judges Matey, Porter, and Phipps, files the attached dissent sur denial of rehearing. Judge Mascott files the attached separate dissent sur denied rehearing.

Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Correctional Center, Nos. 24-2990, 24-3198

BOVE, *Circuit Judge*, joined by PORTER, MATEY, and PHIPPS, *Circuit Judges*, dissenting sur denial of rehearing *en banc*.

The panel’s decision in these cases requires taxpayers to help fund aliens’ efforts to prolong their stay in this Country despite orders of removal. The panel held that the sovereign-immunity waiver in the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) permitted attorney-fee awards to Petitioners because the term “any civil action,” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), unambiguously included their habeas petitions. *See Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr.*, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 263483, at *3 (3d Cir. 2026).¹ Although the differing interpretations of the EAJA that have surfaced around the Country may ultimately require a nationwide solution, we should have reheard these cases *en banc* because the question is one of exceptional importance and required our Court to choose sides in a deep Circuit split.

Congress must use clear and unambiguous language to waive the government’s sovereign immunity. My disagreement with the outcome in these cases has roots in a simple question from the panel’s thorough and thoughtful opinion: “In isolation, almost anything can be ambig-

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, alterations, and subsequent history. Citations to a “Rule” or “Civil Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Citations to “Habeas Rules” are to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases in the United States District Courts, which are substantially similar with respect to the propositions for which they are both cited in this opinion.

uous. ‘Mary had a little lamb’ seems clear. But did Mary own a baby sheep or eat a piece of one for dinner?” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *7 n.7. The question had not previously crossed my mind, but I knew the answer immediately. Context from the rest of the poem makes the answer clear. See Sarah Josepha Hale, Poems For Our Children 6-7 (Marsh, Capen & Lyon ed. 1830). I do not know if Mary was a vegetarian, but I know she had at least one pet. In my mind, there is no ambiguity worth mentioning there. The government’s interpretation of the EAJA in these cases does not rest on anything that even approaches the type of manufactured hyper-textualist ambiguity suggested by the panel’s question. Instead, there is a real question, based on text, context, case law, and history, regarding whether the statutory language covers these habeas petitions.

In fact, there is significant tension between the panel’s holding that “any civil action” unambiguously includes habeas and our *en banc* decision in *United States v. Bendolph*, which flatly rejected the “premise that habeas cases and ordinary civil cases are indistinguishable.” 409 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). There are several cases from the Supreme Court and our Court with similar reasoning. There are also cases, cited by the panel, that characterize habeas as civil. The juxtaposition of these authorities demonstrates that § 2412(d)(1)(A) does not meet the “demanding” standard for a waiver because “there is a plausible interpretation of the statute that preserves sovereign immunity.” *Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin*, 599 U.S. 382, 388 (2023). One alternative interpretation, which I favor, is that “civil action” in the EAJA means the same thing as “civil action” in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The phrase is a term of art assigned a

fixed meaning by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act, and then defined in the Civil Rules. Congress transplanted the phrase into Title 28 in connection with the positive-law codification process—more than 30 times—accompanied by Reviser’s Notes citing the definition in the Civil Rules. Habeas proceedings are civil in nature, but they are not “civil actions” under the Civil Rules or the EAJA. Therefore, as discussed in Part I, the government did not waive sovereign immunity in connection with Petitioners’ applications for attorneys’ fees.

The fee awards in these cases were inappropriate for an additional reason. The government’s positions regarding Petitioners’ detention were “substantially justified” and “special circumstances” made the fee awards “unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The habeas petitions at issue relied on case law establishing a due process balancing test based on a non-exhaustive list of factors. The main cases creating that test involved lawful permanent residents who had developed connections to this Country—and, perhaps, corresponding due process protections—that Petitioners lack. When we create this kind of amorphous standard, it is to be expected that there will be times when a judge sees that balancing differently than the government. Then, the government loses. What is atypical, and what I do not think the record supported here, is for a court to find that the government’s balancing is so lacking in justification that a fee award is warranted.

Take, for example, the case of Petitioner Adolph Michelin. Michelin overstayed a tourist visa issued to him in 2010, and he was later convicted of a marijuana offense as well as resisting an officer in a separate incident. While remaining in the United States without au-

thorization, he was arrested several other times for offenses relating to narcotics, aggravated assault with a firearm, and aggravated battery on a pregnant woman. After DHS entered a final order of removal in 2018, but bailed Michelin while he challenged the order, he absconded. Following another narcotics arrest in 2021, and facing removal on March 31, 2022, the BIA granted Michelin's March 25, 2022 motion to reopen but decided to keep him detained during that process. A magistrate judge granted habeas relief, holding that this detention violated Michelin's due process rights because it was unreasonable for DHS to presume that he presented a flight risk and danger to the community. I do not see it that way for an alien with Michelin's history, lack of ties to the United States, rap sheet, and a documented instance of flight, but that was not my call to make. The magistrate judge later directed the government to pay Michelin's attorneys' fees relating to that litigation. I believe that was an abuse of discretion that led to an outcome Congress could not have intended.

The government pressed this issue on appeal with respect to the second Petitioner, Adewumi Abioye. Abioye also overstayed his visa, appears to have attempted to obtain citizenship through marriage fraud, and perpetrated a massive financial fraud in this Country that caused \$4.6 million in losses to more than 10 victims. He admitted that \$1.5 million of the fraud proceeds went to accounts he controlled. Abioye had not completed the supervised-release component of his sentence at the time he argued in habeas proceedings that his continued detention was unreasonable, and his sentence also included orders to pay millions of dollars in forfeiture and restitution. In effect, the fee award at issue directed the

government to pay him instead. In Part II, I explain why that ruling was an abuse of discretion.

I.

We are now on the wrong side of a Circuit split regarding the government’s sovereign immunity from EAJA fee awards in habeas proceedings initiated by aliens. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held, correctly in my view, that a § 2241 petition by an alien is not a “civil action” under the EAJA. *See Barco v. Witte*, 65 F.4th 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2023); *Obando-Segura v. Garland*, 999 F.3d 190, 195 (4th Cir. 2021).² Those cases emphasize authorities regarding the “hybrid” nature of habeas. 65 F.4th at 785; 999 F.3d at 195. I outline these and other supporting authorities in Part A.

On the other side of the split, the panel joined the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that an alien’s habeas petition is a “civil action.” *See Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *10; *Daley v. Ceja*, 158 F.4th 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2025); *Vacchio v. Ashcroft*, 404 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2005); *In re Hill*, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1985).

The panel rightly distanced itself from the Second and Ninth Circuits. *See Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *10. The Second Circuit conceded “ambiguity” with respect the question presented, 404 F.3d at 669, which is

² Consistent with *Barco* and *Obando-Segura*, the Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have held that habeas petitions by criminal prisoners are not “civil actions” under the EAJA. *See O’Brien v. Moore*, 395 F.3d 499, 508 (4th Cir. 2005); *Sloan v. Pugh*, 351 F.3d 1319, 1322-23 (10th Cir. 2003); *Ewing v. Rodgers*, 826 F.2d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1987); *Boudin v. Thomas*, 732 F.2d 1107, 1111-15 (2d Cir. 1984).

correct but means the government is entitled to sovereign immunity. See *United States v. Williams*, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995). Both the Second and Ninth Circuits relied on legislative history to find a sovereign-immunity waiver not clearly evident from the statutory text, which is impermissible for reasons the panel explained. See 404 F.3d at 669-70; 775 F.2d at 1040-41; *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *3 n.3. The panel instead aligned with the Tenth Circuit based in large part on an “evaluation of the historic civil status of habeas actions.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *10 (citing *Daley*, 158 F.4th at 1164). My disagreement with that historical evaluation, including the application of the “old-soil” principle and discussion of other pre- and post-enactment history, is set forth in Parts B through E.

A.

“The United States enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued without its consent.” *United States Postal Service v. Konan*, 607 U.S. ----, 2026 WL 501765, at *2 (2026). Sovereign immunity “ensures that elected officials, not judges, choose when to open the public purse.” *Doe 1 v. United States*, 37 F.4th 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2022). There is no dispute that Congress waived the federal government’s sovereign immunity in “any civil action” when it passed the EAJA in 1980. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see also *Ardestani v. INS*, 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991). These cases are about the scope of that waiver. The question is whether the government has waived sovereign immunity with respect to Petitioners’ § 2241 applications.

“[W]e must construe any ambiguities in the scope of a waiver in favor of the sovereign.” *United States v. Miller*, 604 U.S. 518, 532 (2025). “Importantly, even

when there is a statutory waiver of immunity, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.” *Giovanni v. United States Dep’t of Navy*, 906 F.3d 94, 118 (3d Cir. 2018). “It is the province of Congress, not the courts, to rewrite the statute to include proceedings that are not clearly within its scope.” *Clarke v. INS*, 904 F.2d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, courts usually give the government a wide berth in this space. *See, e.g., Libr. of Cong. v. Shaw*, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (holding that sovereign immunity barred recovery of interest despite statute “making the United States liable ‘the same as a private person’ for ‘costs,’ including ‘a reasonable attorney’s fee’”); *Cudjoe ex rel. Cudjoe v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.*, 426 F.3d 241, 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that sovereign immunity barred private lawsuit despite statute subjecting government to “substantive and procedural requirements” including “all civil and administrative penalties and fines”).

The panel conceded as much and noted, correctly, that “if the phrase ‘any civil action’ is ambiguous between an interpretation that reaches habeas actions and one that does not, then we must construe the scope of the waiver to exclude them.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *3. The panel concluded, however, that the EAJA “cannot plausibly be read” to exclude habeas from the term “any civil action.” *Id.* Suggesting otherwise is the fact that 17 Circuit judges, including a member of the panel, previously reached the opposite conclusion in a variety of settings. *See Barco*, 65 F.4th at 785; *Obando-Segura*, 999 F.3d at 195; *Daley v. BOP*, 199 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2006); *O’Brien*, 395 F.3d at 507; *Ewing*, 826 F.2d at 971; *Boudin*, 732 F.2d at 1111-15. While the weight of this authority is not dispositive,

the fact that there are opinions dating back over 30 years supporting the government’s sovereign immunity in this context is, at minimum, suggestive of a lack of clarity about what “any civil action” means in § 2412(d)(1)(A).

To evade those cases, the panel treated as roughly equivalent terms like “civil in nature,” “civil proceedings,” “civil matter,” and “civil status.” *See, e.g., Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *7-10. Too much of a stretch for me. Sovereign immunity is appropriate where “Congress could have more clearly authorized recovery.” *In re Lansaw*, 853 F.3d 657, 667 n.8 (3d Cir. 2017). That is true of the provision at issue, which is apparent upon examination of broader phrasing in different sections within the same Title of the U.S. Code. *See Babcock v. Kijakazi*, 595 U.S. 77, 83 (2022) (“This statute’s plain meaning becomes even more apparent when viewed in the broader statutory context.”). In contrast to “any civil action,” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), Congress has used broader phrases like “an action,” *id.* § 1292(d)(4)(A)-(B); “any case,” *id.* § 1292(c)(1); “any action or proceeding,” *id.* § 1355(a); “any action brought in a court of the United States or of a State,” *id.* § 1610(d); “any suit, action or proceeding,” *id.* § 1915(a)(1); “any action, suit or proceeding,” *id.* §§ 254, 1404(b), 2403(a); and “an action, suit or proceeding,” *id.* § 2107(a). Outside of Title 28, Congress used the term “suits of a civil nature.” 12 U.S.C. §§ 1789(a)(2), 1819(b)(2)(A), 2277a-7(4)(B); 47 U.S.C. § 33. These phrases are not synonymous. Many of them were on the books when the EAJA was passed, which suggests that Congress was aware of its options at that time. “We usually presume differences in language like this convey differences in meaning.” *Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States*, 585 U.S. 274, 279 (2018). “Any civil action” is narrower than the words Congress

chose in other areas that would have more easily reached habeas.

Modern § 2241 adjudications can be civil “in nature” with civil “characteristics,” as the panel demonstrated, without being EAJA “civil actions.” Using a civil “label” to characterize adjudication of a habeas petition is “gross and inexact.” *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969); *see also Brown v. Vasquez*, 952 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1991) (“While it is true that a habeas corpus proceeding is civil in nature, it is equally true that such a proceeding is dramatically different from any other type of civil action.”). Habeas proceedings are “elastic” and “fluid[.]” *Price v. Johnston*, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948). This makes habeas “unique.” *Harris*, 394 U.S. at 294. Thus, as the panel observed, courts have repeatedly referred to habeas as “hybrid.” *See Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *6; *see also, e.g., Parrott v. Gov’t of V.I.*, 230 F.3d 615, 620 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000); *Has-sine v. Zimmerman*, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998).

The panel sought to distinguish some of these cases by arguing that they were “hybrids of civil actions and criminal ones.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *5. This is a distinction without a difference. “There are not ‘criminal habeas writs’ and ‘non-criminal habeas writs’: there are just writs for habeas corpus.” *Obando-Segura*, 999 F.3d at 194. Several of the “hybrid” cases cited by the panel involved challenges to sentencing computations or conditions of confinement. *See O’Brien*, 395 F.3d at 501; *Sloan*, 351 F.3d at 1321; *Ewing*, 826 F.2d at 957; *Boudin*, 732 F.2d at 1109-10. Those petitioners were essentially challenging agency action by the responsible custodian, such as the Bureau of Prisons, which is an objective that lines up well with the relief

Petitioners sought here. And the fact that immigration proceedings are civil in nature does not mean that we are dealing with a situation where a “hybrid of a civil action and a civil action is a civil action” under the EAJA. *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *5. Immigration law has its own “specialized administrative procedure,” and immigration proceedings are not covered by the EAJA. *Marcello v. Bonds*, 349 U.S. 302, 308 (1955); *see also Ardestani*, 502 U.S. at 138-39. A hybrid between two specialized proceedings—immigration and habeas—does not transform the latter into enough of a “civil action” to require a sovereign-immunity waiver.

The panel also drew false equivalence between habeas and “civil actions” by contending that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “generally presumed habeas actions were civil actions, even if they were also distinctive ones.” *See Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *4. That is not correct. *See, e.g., Bracy v. Gramley*, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (distinguishing between a “habeas petitioner” and “the usual civil litigant in federal court” for purposes of discovery); *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770, 776 n.5 (1987) (acknowledging “differences between general civil litigation and habeas corpus proceedings”); *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 495-96 (1973) (distinguishing between “swift, flexible, and summary determination[s]” in habeas proceedings and “an original plenary civil action [under § 1983], governed by the full panoply of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).

A habeas proceeding is not a “civil action” under the Civil Rules, and I do not see any presumption to that effect. To illustrate the point, “[l]et’s count some of the ways in which habeas proceedings deviate from the Civil Rules.” *Banister v. Davis*, 590 U.S. 504, 528 (2020) (Alito,

J., dissenting). “There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 (1980). “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court,” and “[n]o other pleading shall be allowed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3, 7(a) (1980); *see also In re Teter*, 90 F.4th 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2024) (“As neither [debtor] nor the [Bankruptcy] Trustee filed a complaint, it is difficult to believe that this proceeding is the kind to which the EAJA applies.”). Habeas proceedings are commenced by an “application,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), which is also referred to as a “petition” under Habeas Rule 2.

The required contents of a petition under Habeas Rule 2 are different than the pleading standards for a complaint under Civil Rule 8. The Civil Rules do not provide for a screening procedure like the one in Habeas Rule 4, and the statutory version of that screening process applies to a narrower class of civil plaintiffs. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). There is no habeas analog to dismissal motions under Civil Rule 12 and, in the absence of defense motion practice, responsive pleadings are generally required as a default under the Civil Rules. That is not the case in habeas proceedings. *See Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill.*, 434 U.S. 257, 269 n.14 (1978); *see also* Habeas Rule 5. Under Habeas Rule 6, discovery procedures under the Civil Rules are only available upon a showing of “good cause,” and the party seeking discovery must “provide reasons” for each request. Habeas Rule 6(a)-(b). Discovery in a “civil action” is not so restrictive. The fact-finding procedures at the summary judgment and trial stages of a civil action are nowhere to be found in the Habeas Rules.

Despite these and other differences, the panel relied on the 1980 version of Rule 81(a) to assert that, “at the

time of the EAJA’s enactment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure treated habeas proceedings as civil actions.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *4. That is not quite right. *See AARP v. Trump*, 605 U.S. 91, 107 (2025) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]n accordance with Rule 81, we have acknowledged that some Federal Rules are inapplicable in habeas.”); *Schlanger v. Seamans*, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971) (“Though habeas corpus is technically ‘civil,’ it is not automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil actions.”). Rule 81 referred to habeas “proceedings” not “actions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2) (1980). If a habeas “proceeding” was a “civil action” for purposes of the Civil Rules, Rule 81(a) would be superfluous—that is, we would not need the reference to habeas in Rule 81(a) if it is as clear as the panel suggested that habeas is a “civil action.”

In 1980, Rule 81(a) stated that the Civil Rules applied only “to the extent that the practice in such proceedings [1] is not set forth in statutes of the United States and [2] has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions.” *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2) (1980). Those were big caveats. Habeas practice had been governed by “statutes of the United States,” *id.*, since the Judiciary Act of 1789. *See* Pub. L. No. 1-20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789). Distinct habeas procedures that differed from the Civil Rules were set forth in the Habeas Rules, which were approved by Congress prior to the enactment of the EAJA, as well as existing statutes. *See* Pub. L. No. 94-426, § 1, 90 Stat. 1334, 1334 (1976); *see also* 8 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (setting forth additional habeas procedures). Because “[t]he problems presented by these [habeas] proceedings are materially different from those dealt with in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” “reliance upon usage and the opaque language

of Civil Rule 81(a)(2) is transparently inadequate.” *Harris*, 394 U.S. at 300 n.7.

All of this context helps to explain why seven judges of this Court refused to treat habeas and “ordinary civil cases” as “indistinguishable” in *Bendolph*. See 409 F.3d at 166. While we have described habeas as “civil in nature,” that does not mean the § 2241 petitions at issue were “civil actions” under the EAJA. See *Long v. Wilson*, 393 F.3d 390, 402 (3d Cir. 2004) (“While civil in nature, habeas corpus cases are different from ordinary civil cases where only the interests of the parties are involved.”); *Santana v. United States*, 98 F.3d 752, 754 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[H]abeas corpus cases are, in effect, hybrid actions whose nature is not adequately captured by the phrase ‘civil action.’”); *Callwood v. Enos*, 230 F.3d 627, 632 (3d Cir. 2000) (“A suit seeking a writ of habeas corpus, although admittedly somewhat of a hybrid, is considered civil in nature.”); *Lee v. Johnson*, 799 F.2d 31, 40 (3d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that the Second Circuit’s holding in *Boudin* “certainly lends some support to the government’s proposed restrictive interpretation of the ‘civil action’ language in the [EAJA]”).

The panel described *Santana* as an instance where this Court “acknowledged that the ‘plain meaning’ and ‘literal scope’ of the phrase ‘civil action’ include habeas actions.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *4 (quoting *Santana*, 98 F.3d at 754). Those words appear in *Santana*, but they are qualified in the opinion by the phrase “[a]t first blush.” 98 F.3d at 754. The qualifier was necessary because *Santana* held that the term “civil action” in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), from the 1996 Prison Litigation Reform Act, “lacks a plain meaning” and does not include “habeas proceedings.” *Id.* at 755. We later ex-

tended that reasoning to the neighboring three-strikes provision, § 1915(g). *See Garrett v. Murphy*, 17 F.4th 419, 431 (3d Cir. 2021). Thus, *Santana* and *Garrett* provide strong precedential support for the government’s position here, as do *Bendolph*, *Long*, *Callwood*, and *Lee*.

Seven other Circuits have interpreted “civil action” in § 1915, as in *Santana* and *Garrett*, to exclude habeas proceedings.³ Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that “civil action” in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) does not include habeas. *See Schlanger*, 401 U.S. at 490 n.4. The panel cherry-picked from the discussion of *Schlanger* in *Stafford v. Briggs*, without noting the *Stafford* Court’s conclusion that “[t]he clear [import] of our statement in *Schlanger* is that Congress did not intend the phrase ‘civil action’ to be given the sweeping definition argued for it in that case.” 444 U.S. 527, 543 (1980).

The panel sought to distinguish *Schlanger*, *Harris*, and *Santana* by arguing that those opinions “reached that conclusion by doing something we may not: overriding the plain meaning of statutory text with legislative history.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *6. True, “[l]egislative history cannot supply a waiver that is not clearly evident from the language of the statute.” *FAA v. Cooper*, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012). I certainly share the panel’s view that, ideally, “[w]e do not read statutes this way anymore” because of the limited value that legisla-

³ *See Paige v. Bacarisse*, 80 F. App’x 299, 300 (5th Cir. 2003); *Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility*, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 1999); *Blair-Bey v. Quick*, 151 F.3d 1036, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1998); *Anderson v. Singletary*, 111 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997); *Naddi v. Hill*, 106 F.3d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1997); *Reyes v. Keane*, 90 F.3d 676, 678 (2d Cir. 1996); *Martin v. United States*, 96 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 1996).

tive history offers to the project of determining a statute's single, best meaning. *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *6; see also *Conroy v. Aniskoff*, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”). But *Schlanger*, *Harris*, and *Santana* are compelling because of the manner in which they explained that habeas is *sui generis*, not because of their legislative history analyses. There is no basis for casting aside the reasoning in those cases, which helps to explain why “any civil action” is ambiguous in the EAJA.

More broadly, in light of the case law construing § 1391(e), § 1915(b), and § 1915(g) to exclude habeas, I respectfully disagree that “[e]very time Congress has used ‘any civil action’ or a cognate, the phrase encompasses habeas proceedings, save where Congress expressly excluded them.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *9. The word “any” in “*any* civil action” cannot bear the weight placed upon it by the panel when making that assertion. *Id.* at *7-8. “Any” must be interpreted “narrowly” where “a broad reading . . . implicate[s] sovereignty concerns.” *Ali v. BOP*, 552 U.S. 214, 220 n.4 (2008). The *Ali* Court cited *Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota*, where the Supreme Court relied on sovereign immunity principles to conclude that “any civil action” in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) did not include claims against States, “even though nothing in the statute expressly excludes such claims.” 534 U.S. 533, 541 (2002). *Raygor*, in turn, cited *Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak*, where the Court held that “all civil actions” in 28 U.S.C. § 1362 did not include claims by Indian tribes against nonconsenting States. 501 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1991) (finding no sovereign-immunity waiver in the absence of “unmistakably clear” language from Congress);

see also *Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon*, 473 U.S. 234, 245-46 (1985) (holding that sovereign immunity barred recovery against State despite statute authorizing claims against “any recipient of Federal assistance”); *Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.*, 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) (explaining that federal sovereign immunity is “obviously the closest analogy” to state sovereign immunity). Thus, *Ali*, *Raygor*, *Blatchford*, and *Scanlon* are additional powerful authority supporting the government’s interpretation of the EAJA.

B.

The panel started with quotes from Blackstone and placed significant emphasis on the old-soil principle in concluding that “any civil action” unambiguously includes habeas. The reasoning does not hold up to close inspection. There is no indication that Congress looked to English common law or the nineteenth century when crafting the EAJA in 1980, and the panel erred by focusing on the common law treatment of habeas rather than the relevant statutory phrase.

1.

The old-soil principle permits an inference that when Congress chooses a term that was “obviously transplanted from another legal source,” Congress intended the term to have the meaning attributed to it in that other source. *Taggart v. Lorenzen*, 587 U.S. 554, 560 (2019). The panel jumped to the conclusion that “civil action” is “one such term.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *4. The Tenth Circuit opinion that the panel found “illuminating” adopted a similarly flawed approach with slightly more explanation. *Id.* at *10 (citing *Daley*, 158 F.4th 1152). The *Daley* panel contended that “[c]ivil

action’ was a common law ‘term of art in which was accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice.’” 158 F.4th at 1157 (quoting *Sekhar v. United States*, 570 U.S. 729, 733 (2013)). The single case cited in *Daley* for that purported tradition, *Sekhar*, was not about civil actions or habeas petitions. There, the Supreme Court addressed extortion, “one of the oldest crimes in our legal tradition.” 570 U.S. at 733.

The term “civil action” lacks a similar provenance and, thus, the panel’s old-soil logic faltered out of the gate. I am not suggesting that the phrase was unknown in the Colonies. But any soil around that term was rocky at best—barren, in my view—and insufficient to support a waiver of sovereign immunity. See *Kousisis v. United States*, 605 U.S. 114, 129 (2025) (“The old-soil principle does not apply in the absence of a well-settled rule.”); *Kemp v. United States*, 596 U.S. 528, 539 (2022) (reasoning that the old-soil “principle applies only when a term’s meaning was well-settled before the transplantation”).

In pre-Founding England, there was not a single form of civil action. Far from it. See *Ndungu v. AG*, 126 F.4th 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2025) (explaining that the Court has not “look[ed] to the common-law meaning” of “crime involving moral turpitude” “for good reason: it is not clear that the term had an established meaning prior to its inclusion in the immigration statute”). There were common law and equity courts with varied complex proceedings that bore little resemblance to the federal civil actions that existed when the EAJA was passed. See, e.g., 3 W. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* 23-24 (1768) (describing “several species of courts of justice” and “what injuries are cognizable, and how redressed, in each respective species of courts”).

This is noted in one of the dictionaries the panel cited, which included in the definition of “civil action” the fact that “former distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the separate forms of those actions and suits, have been abolished” under the Civil Rules. *Civil Action*, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979); *see also Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *4; *In re Teter*, 90 F.4th at 499 (“[W]ith respect to a federal civil action in particular, the manner of ‘action’ at issue here, Black’s understanding parrots that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 . . .”).

Founding-era authorities further undercut any suggestion of a single form of “civil action” sufficient to justify recourse to the old-soil principle. The Seventh Amendment refers to “Suits at common law,” not “civil actions,” in order to distinguish from “admiralty, vice admiralty, and chancery courts” that the British had abused to “evad[e] American juries.” *SEC v. Jarkesy*, 603 U.S. 109, 121 (2024). The Revised Statutes codified U.S. enactments prior to 1874, which referenced a wide variety of proceedings: “suits at common law,” “suits in equity,” “causes of action arising under the postal laws of the United States,” “civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” and “the writ of quo warranto.” Revised Statutes § 563 (2d ed. 1878). Appellate jurisdiction extended to several different types of “personal action[s],” “cause[s],” and “suits,” including “suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.” *Id.* §§ 629, 637, 640-641, 644. Perhaps some of these proceedings could be characterized as “civil in nature,” but they were not called “civil actions” at the Founding.

During this period, the admitted States’ procedures loomed large, as “nearly all federal court business con-

sisted of state-law diversity claims, while nearly all federal claims began and ended in state court.” *Stanford ex rel. Phillips v. Brandon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC*, 160 F.4th 118, 125 (5th Cir. 2025) (Oldham, J., dissenting). There was hardly any federal procedure to speak of. The Process Act of 1789 directed federal courts to follow established common-law procedures of the States in which they were located. *See* Pub. L. No. 1-21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (1789); *see also* Conformity Act of 1828, Pub. L. No. 20-68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 278-80 (1828); Conformity Act of 1842, Pub. L. No. 27-109, 5 Stat. 499, 499 (1842). There was also a separate Process Act for equity matters. *See* Process Act of 1792, Pub. L. No. 2-36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 275-76 (1792). Some believed federal courts’ application of state-law procedures led to “a mass of worthless pleadings and exceptions” that “serve[d] only to perplex the court, and impede the due administration of justice.” *Randon v. Toby*, 52 U.S. 493, 517 (1850); *see also* *McFaul v. Ramsey*, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1857) (explaining that the common-law system was “ruthlessly abolished in many of our States, who have rashly substituted in its place the suggestions of sciolists, who invent new codes and systems of pleading to order”).

In many respects, a deep dive in this area raises more questions than answers about the particulars of how trial courts functioned at common law and in the nineteenth century. In the relevant respect, however, it is clear that neither the panel’s British authorities nor the chaotic onset of private litigation in the United States supports the type of unambiguous interpretation of “civil action” that is necessary to find a waiver of sovereign immunity.

2.

The panel’s old-soil reasoning focused on the historical treatment of habeas, which is essentially backwards. The principle does not work by looking at what history tells us about whether a term that was not included in the statute (“habeas”) is within the scope of the term that made it into the enacted law (“any civil action”). See *Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas*, 596 U.S. 685, 718 (2022) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that the old-soil principle does not apply where statutory text “bears little resemblance” to historical comparator). We do not know if Congress thought about habeas at all when passing the EAJA, much less whether those elected officials adopted concepts of the writ from Blackstone or the nineteenth century. Because “habeas” did not make it through bicameralism and presentment in 1980, it is not appropriate to rely on the common law habeas soil to draw such strong inferences about the meaning of a different term that Congress actually chose.

In addition to this methodological flaw, the panel’s historical habeas authorities do not demonstrate that § 2241 petitions raising due process arguments like Petitioners’ were unambiguously “civil actions” at that time. There are “shortcomings in the historical record” regarding habeas because of serious gaps in common-law opinion reporting. *Boumediene v. Bush*, 553 U.S. 723, 752 (2008) (citing Paul D. Halliday, *et ano.*, *The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications*, 94 Va. L. Rev. 575, 588-90 (2008)). And the panel’s contrary suggestion “excessively simplifies a complex history.” *Harris*, 394 U.S. at 294 n.4.

We do know, however, that “the writ played only a procedural role,” and that a common law habeas proceeding was treated more like a summary matter than full-blown civil litigation. *DHS v. Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. 103, 144 n.2 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Maxwell Cohen, *Some Considerations on the Origins of Habeas Corpus*, 16 Can. B. Rev. 92, 110 (1938) (arguing that in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries “[e]very branch of the judicial process of the day knew of it as a ready device to compel the persons or parties to pleas, civil and criminal, to appear if the initial processes failed to achieve the purpose”). As in 1980 and the present, there were significant differences between habeas proceedings and private litigation in the common law system. See, e.g., *McCleskey v. Zant*, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991) (“At common law, *res judicata* did not attach to a court’s denial of habeas relief.”); *Sanders v. United States*, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (“[A]t common law habeas corpus judgments were not appealable.”).

Much of this was elided by the panel in favor of binary distinctions between rights and wrongs, private and public wrongs, and civil and criminal proceedings. See *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *1. The truth is, it was not that simple. See *Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.*, 492 U.S. 257, 271 (1989) (“Petitioners ultimately rely on little more than the fact that the distinction between civil and criminal law was cloudy (and perhaps nonexistent) at the time of Magna Carta.”). At common law, a violation of personal liberty had private and criminal implications, and habeas relief was separate from remedies to be pursued through lawsuits and prosecutions.

When Blackstone inventoried private wrongs, he drew a distinction between “injuries with and without force.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 119 (1768). A violation of personal liberty caused an injury with force. *See id.* Injuries with force were “something of the criminal kind, being always attended with some violation of the peace; for which in strictness of law a fine ought to be paid to the king, as well as private satisfaction to the party injured.” *Id.* at 118-19. Thus, when discussing the liberty interest that the panel focused on, Blackstone used language that is entirely consistent with courts’ subsequent descriptions of habeas as being a hybrid proceeding rather than a standalone civil action.

As an injury with force, a violation of the right of personal liberty gave rise to private remedies “of two sorts; the one *removing* the injury, the other *making satisfaction* for it.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 128 (1768); *see also id.* at 127 (explaining that a violation of personal liberty caused “the injury of false imprisonment,” which was a “heinous public crime” and also compensable by “removing the actual confinement for the present” and “private reparation”). With respect to the first type of remedy, Blackstone described four writs that functioned as “[t]he means of *removing* the actual injury of false imprisonment,” including the form of habeas writ relevant here: habeas corpus *ad faciendum, subjiciendum, et recipiendum*. *Id.* at 128-36. This remedy was accomplished, and the habeas process was “complete[d],” by “*removing* the injury of unjust and illegal confinement.” *Id.* at 137.

The panel used shorthand to describe these four categories of writs as “civil actions available for ‘the re-

dress of private wrongs.’” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *1. But the shorthand does not work. According to Blackstone, the “civil action” was distinct and to be pursued “after [confinement] is over, by subjecting the wrongdoer to a civil action, on account of the damage sustained by the loss of time and liberty.” 3 W. Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* 127 (1768). The “satisfactory remedy” for the injury was “an action of trespass” or false imprisonment, which was “almost unavoidably . . . accompanied with a charge of assault and battery” as well as a fine payable “to the king for the violation of the public peace.” *Id.* at 138. Therefore, while “the writ of habeas corpus has deep roots in that rich soil,” that soil does not support the panel’s conclusion. *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *4. Habeas was a procedural tool for putting an end to the intrusion on liberty. Civil actions for damages, and sometimes criminal prosecutions, followed separately.

Moving forward on the timeline, “the scope of habeas has been tightly regulated by statute” since the Founding. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 144 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). In the Judiciary Act of 1789, and continuing through the Revised Statutes, habeas was addressed in laws that were separate from those defining the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts. *See* Judiciary Act §§ 9-13, 1 Stat. at 76-81 (civil and criminal jurisdiction), *id.* § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82 (habeas); Revised Statutes chs. 3, 7, 11 (civil and criminal jurisdiction), *id.* ch. 13 (habeas procedure). As at common law, habeas was treated as “a special mode, and confined to a limited class of cases.” *Ex parte Parks*, 93 U.S. 18, 21 (1876); *see also Wight v. Nicholson*, 134 U.S. 136, 148 (1890) (“[T]he proposition is so clear that in a writ of habeas corpus nothing can be inquired into but the jurisdiction

of the court.”); *Ex parte Belt*, 159 U.S. 95, 100 (1895) (“The general rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue unless the court under whose warrant the petitioner is held is without jurisdiction, and that it cannot be used to correct errors.”); *Harlan v. McGourin*, 218 U.S. 442, 448 (1910) (“Upon habeas corpus the court examines only the power and authority of the court to act, not the correctness of its conclusions.”).

Regardless of whether habeas had civil characteristics, this statutory treatment led to habeas proceedings being handled expeditiously, summarily, and quite differently than other proceedings we now think of as “civil actions.” See, e.g., *Salinger v. Loisel*, 265 U.S. 224, 231 (1924) (explaining that Revised Statutes § 761, governing habeas procedure, “has been construed as meaning that each application is to be disposed of in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion guided and controlled by a consideration of whatever has a rational bearing on the propriety of the discharge sought”); *Nishimura Ekiu v. United States*, 142 U.S. 651, 662 (1892) (“A writ of *habeas corpus* is not like an action to recover damages for an unlawful arrest or commitment . . .”).

The panel’s citation to *Holmes v. Jennison*, 39 U.S. 540 (1840) only underscores the lack of a consensus on habeas minutia in the early days of the Republic. See *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *1. The *Holmes* Court was “so divided that no opinion [could] be delivered as the opinion of the Court.” 39 U.S. at 561. Chief Justice Taney and three other Justices believed it “too plain for argument” that a Vermont habeas proceeding was a “suit” that the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review “upon a writ of error” under § 25 of the Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. at 85-87. 39 U.S. at 545, 565-67. The Justices

said nothing about federal habeas proceedings under the existing relevant provision, § 14 of the Judiciary Act.

I do not mean to make too much of the citation to *Holmes*, as the panel cited other cases from that period that added force to their historical position about the civil characteristics of habeas proceedings. Not enough, though, to invoke the old-soil principle as a means of eliminating ambiguity in the scope of “any civil action.”

3.

Even if the panel selected the appropriate historical frame of reference, and even if habeas was the right focus for the old-soil inquiry—neither of which is true—the panel addressed habeas at a level of generality that is fatally untethered from the circumstances of these cases.

While habeas generally was available to review executive detention, Blackstone recognized that the King had exclusive authority to exclude aliens. *See Qatanani v. AG*, 144 F.4th 485, 507 (3d Cir. 2025) (Matey, J., dissenting). “The writ of habeas corpus known to the Framers was quite different from that which exists today.” *Felker v. Turpin*, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996); *cf. Ex parte Wilson*, 10 U.S. 52, 52-53 (1810) (“MARSHALL, Ch. J. after consultation with the other judges, stated that the court was not satisfied that a *habeas corpus* is the proper remedy, in a case of arrest under a civil process.”).

Immigration enforcement looked quite different too. “The right of a nation to expel or deport” aliens was as “absolute and unqualified[] as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.” *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893); *see also*

Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889) (“That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. . . . It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power.”). In the nineteenth century, it was believed that “[p]roceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.” *Wong Wing v. United States*, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896).

The due process rights of aliens who entered the Country without being formally admitted were limited to “those conferred by statute.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 131.

It [was] not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by congress, are due process of law.

Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660; see also *Pino-Porras v. AG*, 2025 WL 1752491, at *5 n.10 (3d Cir. 2025) (Matey, J., dissenting). Due process was backstopped by the protection principle; “grounded in tradition, the long-accepted rule that a sovereign’s laws and the privilege

of the sovereign’s protections extend only to ‘persons and things within its own territory according to its own sovereign will and public policy.’” *Robles v. AG*, 2025 WL 2924867, at *4 (3d Cir. 2025) (Matey, J., dissenting) (quoting Joseph Story, *Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic* § 22 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1834)).

So while there were habeas proceedings involving aliens in the nineteenth century, it is not at all clear that they looked anything like what Petitioners did in these cases. See *Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez*, 596 U.S. 573, 585 (2022) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]here is considerable historical evidence that the Due Process Clause does not apply to laws governing the removal of aliens.”); *Sessions v. Dimaya*, 584 U.S. 148, 211 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he notion that the Due Process Clause governed the removal of aliens was not announced until the 20th century.”). In fact, “the equivalent of the habeas relief Justice Story ordered in a case while riding circuit” in 1813 would be to release Petitioners “in the cabin of a plane bound for” their countries of origin. *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 119 (citing *Ex parte D’Olivera*, 7 F. Cas. 853, 854 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)). For all of these reasons, the old-soil principle does not support the waiver of sovereign immunity declared by the panel.

C.

For purposes of the question at hand, the relevant soil is more recent: the Rules Enabling Act (1934), the resulting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938), and the positive-law codification of Title 28 (1948). See *United States v. Castleman*, 572 U.S. 157, 176-77 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)

(reasoning that a “more accurate formulation” of the old-soil principle “is that when a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law *or other legislation*, it brings the old soil with it”). In my view, those enactments were “obviously” where Congress was looking when placing “any civil action” in the EAJA. *Id.*

Congress established the modern concept of a single “civil action” by passing the Rules Enabling Act in 1934. *See* Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934). The Act authorized the Supreme Court to “secure one form of *civil action* and procedure.” *Id.* (emphasis added). The Supreme Court appointed a committee to propose procedural rules and adopted the committee’s proposals, with changes, in 1937. *See* 4 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1004 (4th ed. 2025). The Attorney General submitted the committee’s report to Congress on behalf of the Court in 1938, and the Civil Rules became effective in September of that year. *See id.*

The first version of Rule 2 was similar to the 1980 and current versions: “There shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 (1938). The Civil Rules applied to habeas proceedings “on appeal” but “not . . . otherwise . . . except to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in actions at law or suits in equity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2) (1938). At the time, the “procedure to be followed” in habeas proceedings was codified at Chapter 13 of the Revised Statutes. *Holiday v. Johnston*, 313 U.S. 342, 350 (1941). Relying on the existing version of Rule 81, the *Holiday* Court rejected the use

of a special master under Civil Rule 53 by reasoning that “the practice in habeas corpus is set forth in plain terms in the Revised Statutes.” *Id.* at 353. *Holiday* is one of several pre-EAJA signals from the Supreme Court that, although some Civil Rules may apply in habeas proceedings, not all of them do because habeas procedure is codified elsewhere.

That continued to be the case following the 1948 codification of Title 28. *See* Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869 (1948). During that process, Congress modified the existing habeas statutes. *See id.* §§ 2241-2255; *see also* H.R. Rep. No. 80-308, at 7 (1st Sess. 1947) (“The habeas corpus chapter has been rewritten to conform with legislation pending in Congress and approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States.”). Some of the revisions were made to conform to “actual” and “existing practice” as well as to “clarif[y] existing law” and “practice.” H.R. Rep. No. 80-308, at A178 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242-2243); *id.* at A179 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2245-2246). Thus, as the *Holiday* Court had held with respect to the Revised Statutes, most habeas procedures continued to exist outside the Civil Rules after 1948. The “practice in such proceedings” under Rule 81(a) was largely set forth in separate statutes.

In the 1948 codification, Congress also adopted 31 proposals to insert the term “civil action” into Title 28, which the Reviser’s Notes explained was based on “Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Procedure.” *See, e.g.*, H.R. Rep. No. 80-308, at A105; *see also Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc.*, 495 F.2d 1183, 1186 (3d Cir. 1974) (explaining that “the legislators and drafters of the Judicial Code [in Title 28] emphasized that the

Reviser’s Notes explained all changes in the law”).⁴ One example was § 1404, which codified forum non conveniens in “any civil action.” The panel cited a case noting the “unmistakable” scope of “any civil action” in § 1404. *See Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *8 (citing *Ex parte Collett*, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1949)). A footnote in *Ex parte Collett* confirmed, however, that the term had been imported from the Civil Rules. *See* 337 U.S. at 58 n.6.

Rather than English common law, the Rules Enabling Act, Civil Rules, and Title 28 are the old soil bearing on the meaning of the phrase “any civil action” in the EAJA. Habeas is not a “civil action” under the Civil Rules, and Congress chose that phrase rather than other broader options for the EAJA. This soil inures to the benefit of the government in this interpretive exercise.

D.

In the decades after Congress copy-pasted “civil action” from the Civil Rules to more than 30 sections of Title 28, there were several developments that bear on the public meaning of that phrase in 1980 and caution against finding a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Prior to the enactment of the EAJA, habeas proceedings relating to criminal convictions exploded in a way that makes it hard to believe Congress was trying to incentivize more of them. Res judicata still did not foreclose successive petitions, and courts were cautious in applying the “abuse of the writ” concept that Congress

⁴ *Accord* H.R. Rep. No. 80-308, at A105, A110-11, A114-15, A118-21, A124-26, A128-32, A133-34, A145 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1292, 1331, 1332, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350, 1351, 1353, 1357, 1392, 1394, 1397, 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402, 1404, 1441, 1652 (1948)).

had introduced for federal petitions. See *McCleskey*, 499 U.S. at 477. In 1953, the Supreme Court, in essence, “decided that federal courts could grant a writ of habeas corpus simply because they disagreed with a state court’s judgment.” *Edwards v. Vannoy*, 593 U.S. 255, 278 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing *Brown v. Allen*, 344 U.S. 443, 463 (1953)). The “proliferation of new federal procedural rights, combined with a federal post-conviction mechanism that functioned like an ordinary appeal, soon yielded a giant haystack of habeas petitions.” *Id.* at 288-89 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that the number of habeas petitions by state and federal prisoners increased by over 347% between 1961 and 1980—when prisoners filed about 8,444 petitions.⁵

During that increase, the Supreme Court issued three decisions suggesting that a habeas proceeding was not a “civil action” under the Civil Rules. In *Harris*, the Court held that discovery under Civil Rule 33 was not available in habeas. See 394 U.S. at 292-98. The *Harris* Court noted that “[s]uch specific evidence as there is with respect to the intent of the draftsmen of the rules indicates nothing more than a general and nonspecific understanding that the rules would have very limited application to habeas corpus proceedings.” *Id.* at 295. In *Schlanger*, as noted above, the Court reasoned that the term “civil action” in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) did not include habeas. 401 U.S. at 490 n.4. The *Schlanger* Court explained that “[t]he procedure governing issuance of the writ is provided by statute.” *Id.* at 489. In 1978,

⁵ DOJ, Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Federal Review of State Prisoner Petitions Habeas Corpus* 2 (Mar. 1984), <https://perma.cc/CN7Z-5XTU>.

despite characterizing habeas as a “civil proceeding”—as opposed to a “civil action”—the Supreme Court noted “differences between general civil litigation and habeas corpus proceedings” and that Rule 81(a)(2) “recognizes the supremacy of the statutory procedures over the Federal Rules.” *Browder*, 434 U.S. at 268-69. The Court held that Rules 52 and 59 govern post-judgment relief in habeas proceedings based in large part on the “settled conformity of habeas corpus and other civil proceedings” with respect to that issue. *Id.* at 271. Nevertheless, the upshot of *Harris*, *Schlanger*, and *Browder* was that a habeas proceeding was not a normal “civil action.”

While habeas review of criminal convictions skyrocketed, habeas review relating to immigration detention was infrequent. At least in part because there was not much detention going on. In contrast to the 8,444 petitions filed by convicted prisoners in 1980 alone, there were only 318 petitions filed by aliens adjudicated between 1976 and 1980.⁶ INS’s approach prior to 1981 “was to release aliens on parole unless they were security risks or thought likely to abscond.” *Amanullah v. Nelson*, 811 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1987). Congress later rejected that approach because it “imposed more than a monetary cost on the Nation.” *Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003). Following the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Supreme Court noted that Congress had adopted the mandatory detention provision relied upon by the government in one of these cases, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), “against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by

⁶ INS, *Statistical Yearbook* 129 (1980), <https://perma.cc/T6M9-F2WN>.

aliens.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 518. That backdrop is an additional reason to doubt Congress was trying to create incentives in the EAJA for aliens to pursue release through habeas.

Also keep in mind that there was already a way for habeas petitioners to seek fees prior to the EAJA. In 1970, Congress authorized courts to appoint counsel for habeas petitioners in the “interests of justice.” Act of Oct. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-447, § g, 84 Stat. 916, 919 (1970) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3006A). Habeas Rule 8(c), enacted in 1976, also provided for appointments of counsel. *See* § 2(5)-(6), 90 Stat. at 1335. The availability of these appointments was “a marked difference from general civil practice” in civil actions. *Ewing*, 826 F.2d at 971. “The volume of habeas petitions processed in the federal courts together with the opportunity for court-appointed representation suggests that there [was] little, if any, economic deterrent in seeking review of the legality of criminal confinement.” *Id.* This is consistent with other textual and contextual indications that Congress did not have habeas in mind when it used the phrase “any civil action” in the EAJA.

Finally, when the EAJA was enacted, two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act stated that aliens could obtain counsel “at no expense to the government” in immigration proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(2), 1362 (1976). In that setting, Congress provided that the government would not pay for aliens’ lawyers. Two courts that improperly relied on legislative history in sovereign-immunity analyses have contended that §§ 1252 and 1362 led to a gap in representation in those immigration proceedings, which are distinct from habeas, that Congress wanted to fill through the EAJA.

See Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 670 (citing *In re Hill*, 775 F.2d at 1041). It is highly unlikely that Congress would have sought to limit the reach of the specific language from §§ 1252 and 1362 prohibiting attorneys’ fees in immigration proceedings by using an ambiguous reference to “civil actions” to permit fee awards in habeas challenges to those proceedings.

The Eleventh Circuit had the better read on the relevance of §§ 1252 and 1362. In a holding that the Supreme Court did not reach in *Ardestani*, *see* 502 U.S. at 139, that court reasoned that “[i]t would be unjust to allow such an [EAJA] award against the government since Congress specifically has determined that fees against the government are not available” in immigration proceedings. *Ardestani v. INS*, 904 F.2d 1505, 1513 (11th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit did not apply that reasoning to habeas proceedings, but extending the EAJA to immigration-related habeas would have created friction with §§ 1252 and 1362.

These developments plainly do not override clear statutory text, but they are part of the reason that I am not as sanguine as the panel that the phrase “any civil action” provides an unambiguous sovereign-immunity waiver in these cases.

E.

“[B]roader congressional context” reinforces my interpretation of the EAJA. *Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump*, 607 U.S. ----, 2026 WL 477534, at *63 (2026) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

Congress passed the EAJA in 1980, reenacted the statute with amendments in 1985, and amended it once more in 1992. Despite actively responding to other ju-

dicial and regulatory activity during that process, Congress did not address contrary authority regarding habeas. While I would not typically place much, if any, weight on congressional silence when interpreting a statute, the Supreme Court has already done so with respect to the EAJA. *See Ardestani*, 502 U.S. at 138 (reasoning that “Congress has twice expanded the EAJA’s definition of ‘adversary adjudications’” without addressing “administrative deportation proceedings”). We have too. *See Clarke*, 904 F.2d at 178; *see also Hashim v. INS*, 936 F.2d 711, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Congress has amended the EAJA explicitly to include certain previously uncovered administrative actions but has failed to include deportation proceedings.”). While this sort of reasoning may not be persuasive in de novo interpretation, I do not think we are free to reject it out of hand when considering the government’s arguments regarding the lack of an unambiguous sovereign-immunity waiver.

The 1980 version of the EAJA expired on October 1, 1984. *See* Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2321, 2329 (1980). In April of 1984, the Second Circuit held that a habeas proceeding relating to a felon’s conditions of confinement was not a “civil action” under § 2412(d)(1)(A). *See Boudin*, 732 F.2d at 1111-15. When Congress renewed the EAJA in 1985, it did not address *Boudin*’s “civil action” holding or habeas. *See* Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, §§ 6-7, 99 Stat. 183, 186-87 (1985).

Some might say that the silence takes on significance when viewed in context. In the 1985 reenactment, after hearings and input from interested parties as well as a veto by President Reagan of Congress’s first reenact-

ment attempt, Congress responded to other developments that reflect careful consideration of litigation developments relating to the EAJA. *See generally* H.R. Rep. No. 99-120 (1985); Sen. Rep. No. 98-586 (1984). For example, Congress clarified in Pub. L. No. 99-80 that the EAJA covered:

- “[J]udicial review of agency action.” § 2(a)(2), 99 Stat. at 184;
- Appeals in federal contracting disputes under Title 41. *Compare* *Fid. Constr. Co. v. United States*, 700 F.2d 1379, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1983), *with* § 1(c)(2), 99 Stat. at 184;
- Cases transitioned to the Court of Federal Claims (then known as the Claims Court) following the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. *See* § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. at 185; *Ellis v. United States*, 711 F.2d 1571, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
- Condemnation actions involving eminent domain. *Compare* *United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land*, 704 F.2d 800, 804 (5th Cir. 1983), *with* § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. at 185; and
- Social security claims. *Compare* 48 Fed. Reg. 45251 (1983) (HHS regulations), *with* § 3(2), 99 Stat. at 186.

Despite all of this, including a change to the statutory definition of “civil action,” Congress offered no legislative response to DOJ regulations asserting that the EAJA did not apply to INS proceedings. *See* 46 Fed. Reg. 48921, 48922 (1981). A House Report referenced *Boudin*’s holding about the meaning of the phrase “position of the United States.” *See* H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 12 n.21 (1985). But Congress was silent about the

availability of fees in habeas proceedings. *See, e.g., Learning Resources*, 2026 WL 477534, at *56 n.11 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (relying on congressional silence “not for determining the meaning of” a statute, “but rather to help show as an historical and factual matter that Members of Congress were aware of . . . the appeals court decision”).

Congress was also silent when it amended the EAJA in 1992 to clarify coverage for cases involving the Court of Veterans Appeals. *See Jones v. Principi*, 985 F.2d 582 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (unpublished). Before that amendment, the Tenth Circuit had followed *Boudin* and the Ninth Circuit came out the other way. *Compare Ewing*, 826 F.2d at 971, *with In re Hill*, 775 F.2d at 1040-41. Congress did nothing to address the 2-1 Circuit split regarding habeas in the 1992 amendments.

The 1992 amendments to the EAJA undermine the panel’s conclusion in another respect. The panel pointed to “veterans’ benefits actions” as a type of case with “unique rules of practice or procedure” for which fees were available under the EAJA. *Michelin*, 35 2026 WL 263483, at *5. But that was only clear after Congress explicitly expanded the statute’s coverage. The same is true for some of the 1985 expansions noted above. If “civil action” in the EAJA was broad enough to reach any matter with civil characteristics, there would have been no need for Congress to add “proceedings for judicial review of agency action” to § 2412. *See* § 2(a)(2), 99 Stat. at 184. The language seems to contemplate fee awards in cases filed directly in federal appellate courts pursuant to procedures that are not a perfect fit with the Civil Rules. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2342. Likewise for the 1985 expansion to reach appeals in Title 41 contracting dis-

putes, as those appeals do not commence with the filing of a complaint. The fact that Congress extended the express reach of the statute to categories of cases that are not “civil actions” under the Civil Rules, only in limited circumstances and while remaining silent regarding habeas, supports the government’s position.

* * *

In sum, the sovereign-immunity question presented in these cases is complex and exceptionally important. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(2)(D). There is a deep Circuit split, and the outcome has significant implications for taxpayer dollars. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 40(b)(2)(C). I respect the panel’s careful approach to the question, though I come out the other way. Text, context, case law, and history demonstrate that there is a square-peg-round-hole problem with trying to jam immigration-related habeas petitions into the EAJA in order to require the Executive Branch to pay for aliens’ lawyers.

II.

There was an alternative basis for rejecting Petitioners’ fee applications, which the government only pressed in the appeal relating to Abioye. In light of the uniquely egregious facts underlying his time in this Country, I am left with the “definite and firm conviction” that the magistrate judge “committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” *Morgan v. Perry*, 142 F.3d 670, 683 (3d Cir. 1998). Translation: The magistrate abused his discretion by finding that the government’s refusal to give Abioye a bond hearing was not “substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Furthermore, the equitable “special circumstances” exception plainly “make[s] an award unjust.” *Id.*

A.

The magistrate judges who addressed these issues in the District Court relied on abbreviated summaries of the facts relevant to Abioye, which skipped over some of the information that is relevant to this fact-intensive inquiry.

Abioye is a Nigerian national and Nigeria-barred attorney. He entered the United States in 2018 and overstayed his six-month tourist visa. Between January 2019 and January 2020, he participated in a wire fraud conspiracy that defrauded more than 10 victims of over \$4.6 million. Abioye personally obtained \$1.5 million of the fraud proceeds. During the course of the conspiracy, Abioye entered into what appears to have been a fraudulent marriage with a U.S. citizen. Abioye lived separately with a paramour, but his wife submitted an unsuccessful application for immigration benefits on his behalf in August 2019.

In January 2020, federal authorities arrested Abioye based on charges relating to the financial fraud. He consented to pretrial detention and remained detained following his July 2020 guilty plea. Abioye's plea agreement stated that he agreed to forfeit at least \$1 million and to pay at least \$3.3 million in restitution. In May 2022, a district judge sentenced Abioye to 27 months' imprisonment and 24 months of supervised release. The court also ordered Abioye to pay \$1,335,923.77 in restitution to victims and an additional \$1 million in forfeiture.

Abioye was released that month based on credit for time served, and DHS took him into custody because he had no status in the United States. DHS held Abioye principally at the Moshannon Valley Processing Center.

DHS charged Abioye with removability based on his aggravated felony conviction and visa overstay. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1227(a)(1)(B). After Abioye’s counsel obtained a six-week continuance, Abioye conceded removability on both charges and sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ denied Abioye’s CAT application in November 2022. The IJ found that aspects of his testimony “strained credulity” but declined to make an adverse credibility finding. A139. Abioye’s counsel obtained a three-week extension of the briefing schedule for his BIA appeal. In May 2023, the BIA dismissed the appeal. Abioye petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the BIA’s decision. At Abioye’s request, the Fourth Circuit entered an administrative stay followed by a stay of removal. Those proceedings remain stayed.

In August 2023, DHS notified Abioye that it had reviewed his custodial status and determined not to release him. *See* 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. DHS explained that Abioye posed a danger to the community in light of his fraud conviction, and noted that he was expected to be removed “in the reasonably foreseeable future,” pending resolution of the Petition For Review in the Fourth Circuit. DHS’s notice indicated that Abioye would be subject to another review if the Fourth Circuit’s stay of removal had not been lifted within a year.

Abioye did not wait to find out. In October 2023, a “Pro Bono Counsel” filed a “Petition For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus” on Abioye’s behalf in the Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A93, 115. In November 2023, a magistrate judge granted the petition and ordered that an IJ conduct a bond hearing within 30 days. In December 2023, an IJ decided that

Abioye did not pose a danger to the community— notwithstanding his multi-million-dollar fraud scheme— or a flight risk— notwithstanding his lack of status and failure to abide by the terms of his original entry.

Abioye moved for attorneys’ fees under the EAJA in February 2024. A magistrate judge granted the motion in September 2024, and ordered the government to pay Abioye \$18,224.58 in “attorneys’ fees and expenses” under the EAJA.

B.

After DHS reviewed Abioye’s detention status in August 2023 and concluded that he was still a flight risk, the government was substantially justified in opposing Abioye’s October 2023 habeas petition on the basis that his continued detention did not violate due process.

1.

This issue required a magistrate judge to assess whether the government’s opposition to a constitutional challenge to § 1226(c), based on a balancing test involving a non-exhaustive list of judge-made factors bearing on Abioye’s due process rights, was substantially justified. In light of the practical reality of such a test, the instances in which the answer to that question is “no” should be rare indeed. This case was not one of them.

“Substantial justification” under the EAJA means a “reasonable basis in both law and fact.” *Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala*, 989 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1993). “[A] court cannot assume that the government’s position was not substantially justified simply because the government lost on the merits.” *Williams v. Astrue*, 600 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2009). “[A] legal position is substantially justified if it relates to an unsettled or close

question of law, but not if it clearly offends established precedent.” *Russell v. Heckler*, 814 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1987).

We look to the positions of the agency and the government litigators, but here they were the same. The government’s position was that Abioye was properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Getting the government off to a good start, that statute says that the Attorney General “shall” detain an alien subject to removal for an offense like Abioye’s financial fraud. *Id.* § 1226(c)(1)(B). This mandatory detention provision has survived a facial constitutional challenge. *See Demore*, 538 U.S. at 531. Section 1226(c) “does not on its face limit the length of the detention it authorizes.” *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018); *see also id.* at 305-06 (“§ 1226(c) mandates detention of any alien falling within its scope and that detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is released for witness-protection purposes.”). For these reasons, at least as a statutory matter, the government was on solid footing in law and fact because § 1226(c) is explicitly mandatory and Abioye has a qualifying conviction.

The closer question relates to Abioye’s as-applied constitutional challenge to § 1226(c). He argued that continued detention violated due process, as applied to him, under *German Santos v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility*. 965 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2020); *see also Black v. Decker*, 103 F.4th 133, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2024). Though binding in this Circuit, *German Santos* is not without detractors. *See Banyee v. Garland*, 115 F.4th 928, 932 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2024); *see also Black v.*

Almodovar, 156 F.4th 171, 181-91 (2d Cir. 2025) (Menashi, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing *en banc*).

German Santos described “a nonexhaustive list of four factors to consider in assessing whether an alien’s detention has grown unreasonable.” 965 F.3d at 211. This EAJA litigation was not the place to reconsider that precedent in light of *Banyee* and the *Black* dissents, and the government did not ask this Court to do that. At the same time, the complexity of the issues presented, arising in part from the ongoing judicial debate, presented novel and close questions relating to a statute that the government was “duty-bound to defend.” *Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001); see also *Grace v. Burger*, 763 F.2d 457, 458 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[S]ituations in which the government’s defense of the constitutionality of a federal statute fails the ‘substantially justified’ test should be exceptional.”); *Vacchio*, 404 F.3d at 675. We should not take lightly the suggestion that the government lacks a substantial justification in carrying out that duty.

Courts adjudicating EAJA fee battles also must be sensitive to the fact that this type of litigation under *German Santos* takes place in the context of a “grand balancing test in which unweighted factors mysteriously are weighed,” resulting in risks that “‘equality of treatment is . . . impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired.’” *June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo*, 591 U.S. 299, 348 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Antonin Scalia, *The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules*, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1182 (1989)); *Qatanani*, 144 F.4th at 512 n.20 (Matey, J., dissenting) (urging that discussion of “that notoriously vague

phrase [due process] requires precision”). The risks presented by such a standardless standard are apparent in these cases, and even the magistrate judge who issued Abioye’s fee award felt that “the Third Circuit has not laid out a specific standard for district courts to follow.” A16.

It is difficult to understand how the government’s position in such a setting could be unreasonable. We presume the government acts in good faith, and I am aware of no suggestion to the contrary. Therefore, while precedent requires application of law to fact, the *German Santos* factor test should not be a fertile field for fee awards benefitting aliens.

2.

The question presented by Abioye’s habeas petition, under *German Santos*, was whether the government denied him due process by continuing to “presume that detention is needed to prevent flight or danger to the community.” 965 F.3d at 209. The due process issue required a “highly fact-specific inquiry.” *Id.* at 210. The question presented by Abioye’s fee application under the EAJA was whether the government was substantially justified in arguing that there was no due process violation within the context of that highly fact-specific inquiry. For that issue, characteristics and factual considerations that distinguished Abioye’s case from *German Santos* were highly relevant to determine whether the government’s position was colorable. Thus, before addressing the four factors identified in *German Santos*, it is necessary to consider extenuating circumstances that weighed strongly in the government’s favor.

Unlike in *German Santos*, Abioye is not a lawful permanent resident. *See* 965 F.3d at 206; *Chavez Alvarez*

v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2015). Abioye overstayed his visa without authorization in violation of U.S. law. *See* 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(B), 1202(g). There are strong indications in the record that he attempted to perpetrate a marriage fraud in order to obtain status and prolong his illegal stay. *See* 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c); 18 U.S.C. 1546.

Within a year of getting here, Abioye commenced a multi-million-dollar fraud. He victimized U.S. nationals during the course of that crime. In the criminal case, Abioye presented indicia of flight risk and danger to the community that were so strong that he consented to detention for approximately 27 months. *See* 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142-3143. He had not even completed the supervised release component of his sentence when he filed his habeas petition.

Collectively, these circumstances strongly suggest that Abioye's due process rights secured him nothing more than § 1226(c) offered, which is what "Congress has provided by statute." *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 140. He never made a valid entry, and he failed to demonstrate the types of allegiance to the sovereign that merit additional protection under our Constitution. *See Robles*, 2025 WL 2924867, at *4 (Matey, J., dissenting); *Qatanani*, 144 F.4th at 517-20 (Matey, J., dissenting). Instead, he affirmatively caused a great deal of harm here. Based on these material distinctions between Abioye and the petitioner in *German Santos*, I disagree with the panel that "[n]othing in the facts here gave the Government a reasonable basis for arguing against a bond hearing." *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *11. Rather, the facts make *German Santos* and related author-

ities distinguishable in relevant respects that justified the government's position.

3.

The government also had reasonable arguments under the four *German Santos* factors:

Length Of Detention. Abioye's 16 months of administrative detention compared favorably with our relevant decisions. *See German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 212 (30 months); *Chavez Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 472 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015) (20 months); *Leslie v. AG*, 678 F.3d 265, 266 (3d Cir. 2012) (48 months); *Diop v. DHS*, 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (35 months).

The magistrate judge who granted Abioye's habeas petition stated that this first *German Santos* factor was "concededly a close call." A29. Being on the wrong side of a close call should not result in an EAJA fee award. The magistrate judge who awarded the fees understood that the "exact time" allowable for administrative detention "var[ies] with the facts of the case," but failed to explain why he did not feel the issue was debatable. A15. Whereas the panel characterized "close call" as an "offhand remark," it looks to me like a finding. *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *12. Regardless, characterizing the magistrate judge's statement as an offhand remark did not provide license to excuse the second judge's failure to explain why he departed from it. *See Williams v. Runyon*, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine does not limit the power of trial judges to reconsider their prior decisions," but "the court must explain on the record the reasoning behind its decision to reconsider the prior ruling"); *Fagan v. City of Vine-land*, 22 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Although [law-of-the-case doctrine] does not limit the power of trial

judges from reconsidering issues previously decided by a predecessor judge from the same court or from a court of coordinate jurisdiction, it does recognize that as a matter of comity a successor judge should not lightly overturn decisions of his predecessors in a given case.”).

In concluding that the length of detention was indefensible, the panel cited *German Santos* and *Chavez Alvarez* for the proposition that “we have held detention became unreasonable sometime between six months and one year after it began.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *11. The panel’s reasoning established something very close to the type of “bright-line threshold” we previously disavowed. *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 211; *Chavez Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 474 n.7. We seem to have a different threshold for the constitutional speedy-trial rights of presumed-innocent criminal defendants. See, e.g., *Conroy v. Leone*, 316 F. App’x 140, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2009) (480 months’ pretrial detention); *United States v. Taylor*, 469 F.2d 284, 285 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1972) (21 months’ pretrial detention); *United States v. Sodano*, 592 F. App’x 114, 115-16 (3d Cir. 2014) (20 months’ pretrial detention). In any event, the portion of *German Santos* cited by the panel expressly acknowledged the lawful permanent resident status of the petitioner in *Chavez Alvarez*. See 965 F.3d at 211. That petitioner completed his criminal sentence more than 10 years prior to the start of his 20 months of administrative detention. See 783 F.3d at 471. Thus, the timeframes discussed in *German Santos* and *Chavez Alvarez* did not foreclose the government’s position regarding Abioye, who lacked status, had committed serious crimes much more recently, and was still serving his sentence.

We have instructed District Courts that the goal here is to identify the “tipping point” when it is no longer reasonable for the government to “presume that detention is needed to prevent flight or danger to the community.” *German Santos*, 965 F.3d at 209. If that is so, I find it hard to quibble with the government’s assertion that, for Abioye, his lack of immigration status, criminal conduct, and incomplete criminal sentence warranted a longer presumption of flight risk and danger than was appropriate for the petitioners in *German Santos* and *Chavez Alvarez*.

Likelihood of Continued Detention. The government filed its opposition to Abioye’s habeas petition on November 14, 2023. Abioye completed briefing in support of his Petition For Review in the Fourth Circuit prior to that filing, on November 9. Argument in the Fourth Circuit had been scheduled for December 12, 2024. Thus, I do not agree that, when the government took the contested legal position by opposing the habeas petition, “detention was likely to continue much longer because of his appeal to the Fourth Circuit.” *Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *11.

Reasons For The Delay. The government was not unreasonable in taking the position that Abioye bears more of the responsibility for delaying his removal.

This factor did not weigh against the alien in *Chavez Alvarez*, where “the legal questions were complex and unusual” because the parties were forced to grapple with the application of immigration laws to violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Not true here. The issues are straightforward, and the proceedings following the completion of briefing on the habeas petition are telling. The magistrate judge granted the petition

on November 29, 2023. Two weeks before his oral argument in the Fourth Circuit, Abioye convinced the government and the court to hold the appeal in abeyance so that he can search for “what he contends is material new evidence to the BIA via a motion to reopen.” Gov. Br. 6 n.2. Over a year later, that search appears to be ongoing. Abioye’s delays appear to be strategic, and they should not be weighed in favor of the government cutting him a check.

This Court has recognized that “[a]n argument could be made that aliens who are merely gaming the system to delay their removal should not be rewarded with a bond hearing that they would not otherwise get under the statute.” *Chavez Alvarez*, 783 F.3d at 476; *see Black*, 156 F.4th at 186 (Menashi, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing *en banc*) (“The fact is that ‘an alien detained under § 1226(c) has the keys in his pocket and can end his detention immediately by ‘withdrawing his defense and returning to his native land.’” (quoting *Banyee*, 115 F.4th at 933)). “[T]he legal system . . . is replete with situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow, and, even in the criminal context, there is no constitutional prohibition against requiring parties to make such choices.” *Demore*, 538 U.S. at 530 n.14. These delay tactics are Abioye’s choices to make, but he should shoulder any resulting costs instead of the government.

Conditions Of Confinement. The magistrate who resolved Abioye’s habeas petition found that “this factor weighs in favor of” the government because his conditions of confinement were significantly different than those faced by the petitioner in *German Santos*. A32. The panel agreed that the government’s position re-

garding this factor was substantially justified, but they felt it was not dispositive of the due process claim. *See Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at *12.

I do not think the conditions issue is dispositive either, but it is quite clear that Abioye faced circumstances that were very different than the petitioner in *German Santos*. By my count, each of the four *German Santos* factors at least arguably favored the government. It necessarily follows that the government's position was substantially justified.

C.

Although the government failed to press the point on appeal, Abioye was not entitled to attorneys' fees for the additional reason that "special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). "Courts which have found special circumstances have done so on the basis of [1] novel legal issues, or on [2] the equitable basis of a prevailing party's unclean hands." *Brinker v. Guiffrida*, 798 F.2d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1986). This case presents both circumstances.

Many of the same factors bearing on whether the government's position was substantially justified are relevant to the "novel legal issues" prong of the "special circumstances" exception. In addition, "all the circumstances" are relevant to "whether under the facts of this case the equitable considerations dictate an award should not be made." *Taylor v. United States*, 815 F.2d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 1987). Abioye's visa overstay, attempted marriage fraud, and actual wire fraud are exactly the type of special circumstances that should bar recovery.

Abioye "would not have been incarcerated in the first place but for his notorious and repeated violations of

United States immigration law.” *Oguachuba v. INS*, 706 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 1983). In his plea agreement, Abioye agreed to forfeit “at least \$1 million” and pay “at least \$3,300,000” in restitution to his victims. A269-70. But the fee award at issue requires, in substance, the government to pay Abioye. See *Astrue v. Ratliff*, 560 U.S. 586, 591-93 (2010). “It is plainly inequitable to allow [petitioner] to flout American law in this fashion and then to require the public fisc to support his legal bills to terminate his detention” *Oguachuba*, 706 F.2d at 99. The EAJA should have functioned as “a ‘safety valve’ directed at protecting the good faith advancement of novel legal theories.” *Brinker*, 798 F.2d at 668; see also *Kiarelddeen*, 273 F.3d at 549-50.

* * *

The need for courts to review and potentially disagree with the government’s *German Santos* balancing is a natural consequence of the test that our precedent has created. The habeas relief in these cases is unchallenged, even if not unquestionable. Yet it is still true that “proper respect for the political branches’ plenary power over immigration has repeatedly moved the courts against second guessing their judgment.” *Qatanani*, 144 F.4th at 520 n.40 (Matey, J., dissenting). Invasive second-guessing of the government’s litigation positions regarding balancing tests, in the context of EAJA applications, is not a path courts should find themselves on very often—if ever. In addition to sovereign immunity, this is another issue that merited *en banc* review by our Court.

MASCOTT, *Circuit Judge*, dissenting sur denial of rehearing *en banc*.

The panel opinion here essentially determines that two individuals charged with a cumulative total of at least eight crimes between them, and each subject to a final removal order, should receive attorneys' fees from the government for the due process claims they filed against continued detention while appealing their removal. *See Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr.*, --- F. 4th ---, 2026 WL 263483, at *3 (3d Cir. 2026). *See also* A19, A37, A248-49, A267, A273-75, A452-460. Respectfully, I dissent from the denial of *en banc* rehearing in these cases.

In addition to a number of grounds thoughtfully raised by colleague Judge Bove and joined by Judge Matey and Judge Phipps, the *en banc* court should rehear these cases for three principal reasons. First, as Judge Bove's opinion underscores, U.S. Supreme Court precedent instructs that we are to interpret statutes to waive federal sovereign immunity only if such a waiver is clear from the statutory text. *See Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin*, 599 U.S. 382, 387-88 (2023) ("This clear-statement rule is a demanding standard. If 'there is a plausible interpretation of the statute' that preserves sovereign immunity, Congress has not unambiguously expressed the requisite intent."). The deep circuit split over the question whether a habeas challenge to immigrant detention is a "civil action" meriting government attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) belies such clarity. *Compare Barco v. Witte*, 65 F. 4th 782, 785 (5th Cir. 2023), *Obando-Segura v. Garland*, 999 F.3d 190, 195 (4th Cir. 2021), *with Daley v. Ceja*, 158 F. 4th 1152, 1164

(10th Cir. 2025), *Vacchio v. Ashcroft*, 404 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2005), and *In re Hill*, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1985).

Second, the implications of the panel opinion here, and the awarding of attorney’s fees in such detention challenges, are weighty and significant. The potential of receiving thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees creates a powerful incentive for detained, illegally present individuals to perpetuate and further extend their stay in the United States through the filing of habeas claims. In the four weeks since the panel opinion issued, already at least two district court judges within this circuit have affirmatively encouraged detainees to consider filing for such fees. *See, e.g., Cova v. Rose*, No. 3:26-CV-101, 2026 WL 376921, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2026); *Aguirre-Guevara v. Oddo*, No. 3:26-CV-70, 2026 WL 376846, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 11, 2026).

Third, the panel opinion is a backdoor, inadvertent extension of circuit precedent, expanding the category of cases in which courts within this circuit may now conclude that the government’s position in immigration detention due process habeas challenges is not “substantially justified,” *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The key past precedent analyzed by the panel in evaluating whether the government’s detention position in these cases was “substantially justified” involved a due process challenge where a lawful permanent resident had been detained. *See Michelin*, 2026 WL 263483, at **11-13 (evaluating the German Santos factors contributing to whether the government’s position is “substantially justified” and therefore not meriting the penalty of attorney’s fees). *See also German Santos, v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility*, 965 F.3d 203, 206, 210 (3d

Cir. 2010). Such individuals may have due process expectations that illegally present individuals lack. *See* Opinion of Bove, J., *supra* at 3, 47-52. The individuals awarded attorneys' fees in these instant cases, in direct contrast, had received the opposite adjudication of lawful status and were subject to final orders requiring removal, making their claims for constitutional rights to additional process on U.S. soil more attenuated. *See id.* at 3. And yet, after the panel opinion for which this court has denied *en banc* review, the government's continued detention of such individuals while they file additional challenges, must be affirmatively "substantially justified" to avoid an attorney's fees burden. This extension should be reviewed now, before being cemented as circuit precedent. These cases readily merit *en banc* consideration.

APPENDIX E

28 U.S.C. 2412 provides:

Costs and fees

(a)(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. A judgment for costs when taxed against the United States shall, in an amount established by statute, court rule, or order, be limited to reimbursing in whole or in part the prevailing party for the costs incurred by such party in the litigation.

(2) A judgment for costs, when awarded in favor of the United States in an action brought by the United States, may include an amount equal to the filing fee prescribed under section 1914(a) of this title. The preceding sentence shall not be construed as requiring the United States to pay any filing fee.

(b) Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under

the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.

(c)(1) Any judgment against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity for costs pursuant to subsection (a) shall be paid as provided in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title and shall be in addition to any relief provided in the judgment.

(2) Any judgment against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity for fees and expenses of attorneys pursuant to subsection (b) shall be paid as provided in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title, except that if the basis for the award is a finding that the United States acted in bad faith, then the award shall be paid by any agency found to have acted in bad faith and shall be in addition to any relief provided in the judgment.

(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

(B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this

subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.

(C) The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to be awarded pursuant to this subsection, or deny an award, to the extent that the prevailing party during the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy.

(D) If, in a civil action brought by the United States or a proceeding for judicial review of an adversary adjudication described in section 504(a)(4) of title 5, the demand by the United States is substantially in excess of the judgment finally obtained by the United States and is unreasonable when compared with such judgment, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the court shall award to the party the fees and other expenses related to defending against the excessive demand, unless the party has committed a willful violation of law or otherwise acted in bad faith, or special circumstances make an award unjust. Fees and expenses awarded under this subparagraph shall be paid only as a consequence of appropriations provided in advance.

(2) For the purposes of this subsection—

(A) “fees and other expenses” includes the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees (The amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United States; and (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of \$125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.);

(B) “party” means (i) an individual whose net worth did not exceed \$2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, or (ii) any owner of an unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed \$7,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, and which had not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed; except that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3)) exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of such Code, or a cooperative association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act (12 U.S.C. 1141j(a)), may be a party regardless of the net worth of such organization or cooperative association or for purposes of sub-

section (d)(1)(D), a small entity as defined in section 601 of title 5;

(C) “United States” includes any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity;

(D) “position of the United States” means, in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based; except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings;

(E) “civil action brought by or against the United States” includes an appeal by a party, other than the United States, from a decision of a contracting officer rendered pursuant to a disputes clause in a contract with the Government or pursuant to chapter 71 of title 41;

(F) “court” includes the United States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims;

(G) “final judgment” means a judgment that is final and not appealable, and includes an order of settlement;

(H) “prevailing party”, in the case of eminent domain proceedings, means a party who obtains a final judgment (other than by settlement), exclusive of interest, the amount of which is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property involved that is attested to at trial on behalf of the property owner as it is to the highest valuation of the property involved

that is attested to at trial on behalf of the Government; and

(I) “demand” means the express demand of the United States which led to the adversary adjudication, but shall not include a recitation of the maximum statutory penalty (i) in the complaint, or (ii) elsewhere when accompanied by an express demand for a lesser amount.

(3) In awarding fees and other expenses under this subsection to a prevailing party in any action for judicial review of an adversary adjudication, as defined in subsection (b)(1)(C) of section 504 of title 5, or an adversary adjudication subject to chapter 71 of title 41, the court shall include in that award fees and other expenses to the same extent authorized in subsection (a) of such section, unless the court finds that during such adversary adjudication the position of the United States was substantially justified, or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

(4) Fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection to a party shall be paid by any agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation or otherwise.

(5)(A) Not later than March 31 of the first fiscal year beginning after the date of enactment of the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recreation Act, and every fiscal year thereafter, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States shall submit to Congress and make publicly available online a report on the amount of fees and other expenses awarded during the preceding fiscal year pursuant to this subsection.

(B) Each report under subparagraph (A) shall describe the number, nature, and amount of the awards, the claims involved in the controversy, and any other relevant information that may aid Congress in evaluating the scope and impact of such awards.

(C)(i) Each report under subparagraph (A) shall account for all payments of fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection that are made pursuant to a settlement agreement, regardless of whether the settlement agreement is sealed or otherwise subject to a nondisclosure provision.

(ii) The disclosure of fees and other expenses required under clause (i) shall not affect any other information that is subject to a nondisclosure provision in a settlement agreement.

(D) The Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States shall include and clearly identify in each annual report under subparagraph (A), for each case in which an award of fees and other expenses is included in the report—

(i) any amounts paid under section 1304 of title 31 for a judgment in the case;

(ii) the amount of the award of fees and other expenses; and

(iii) the statute under which the plaintiff filed suit.

(6) As soon as practicable, and in any event not later than the date on which the first report under paragraph (5)(A) is required to be submitted, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States shall create and maintain online a searchable database con-

taining, with respect to each award of fees and other expenses under this subsection made on or after the date of enactment of the John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recreation Act, the following information:

(A) The case name and number, hyperlinked to the case, if available.

(B) The name of the agency involved in the case.

(C) The name of each party to whom the award was made as such party is identified in the order or other court document making the award.

(D) A description of the claims in the case.

(E) The amount of the award.

(F) The basis for the finding that the position of the agency concerned was not substantially justified.

(7) The online searchable database described in paragraph (6) may not reveal any information the disclosure of which is prohibited by law or a court order.

(8) The head of each agency (including the Attorney General of the United States) shall provide to the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States in a timely manner all information requested by the Chairman to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (5), (6), and (7).

(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any costs, fees, and other expenses in connection with any proceeding to which section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 applies (determined without regard to subsections (b) and (f) of such section). Nothing in the preceding sentence shall prevent the awarding

under subsection (a) of this section of costs enumerated in section 1920 of this title (as in effect on October 1, 1981).

(f) If the United States appeals an award of costs or fees and other expenses made against the United States under this section and the award is affirmed in whole or in part, interest shall be paid on the amount of the award as affirmed. Such interest shall be computed at the rate determined under section 1961(a) of this title, and shall run from the date of the award through the day before the date of the mandate of affirmance.