APENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS for the FIFTH CIRCUIT J UDGES CLEMENT, ENGELHARDT and DOUGLAS ruling APPEAL CASE 24-20296 filed 05/15/2025.

UNITED STATES SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT, for HOUSTON DIVISION, J UDGE HANEN ORDER CASE 4:24-CV-0852 filed 06/05/2024

PETITIONER RE-HEARING EN BANC BRIEF REDUCED FILED 08/19/2025

UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS for the FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk letter issued Mandate and Order copy Affirming District Court Order.

SCOTUS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 15, 2025
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk

No. 24-20296
Summary Calendar

DIANA I. REISMANN SEXTON,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

MARGARET ROLLINS, *in her official capacity as Manager of the Robert Cizick Eye Clinic*; UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MCGOVERN MEDICAL SCHOOL, ROBERT CIZICK EYE CLINIC,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:24-CV-852

Before CLEMENT, ENGELHARDT, and DOUGLAS, *Circuit Judges*.

PER CURIAM:*

Diana I. Reismann Sexton, a dual citizen of the United States and Argentina, appeals the district court order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss her claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

* This opinion is not designated for publication. *See* 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.

She argues that the dismissal of her claims was erroneous because her factual allegations were sufficient to state a claim.

As an initial matter, this court will not consider new factual allegations or evidence presented for the first time on appeal. *See Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson*, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999). Nor will this court permit a party to present a new theory of relief on appeal. *See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co.*, 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Therefore, we will not consider any of the new allegations or claims raised in Sexton's briefs.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, courts are to consider "the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto." *Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter*, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. "Dismissal is proper when a plaintiff fails to allege any set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief, or if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief." *Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, "accept[ing] all well-pleaded facts as true" and "construing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." *Hernandez v. W. Tex. Treasures Est. Sales, L.L.C.*, 79 F.4th 464, 469 (5th Cir. 2023). Although the court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, a complaint's legal conclusions are not presumed to be true. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

Sexton's Supremacy Clause argument is unavailing. *See* U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Neither treaty Sexton relies upon is self-executing. *See* International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), *opened for signature* Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), *opened for signature* Dec. 21, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; *see also* 138 Cong. Rec. 8071 (1992) (ICCPR declaration by U.S. Senate), *cited in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004); 140 Cong. Rec. 14326 (1994) (ICERD declaration by U.S. Senate). Therefore, they do not provide Sexton with an independent cause of action. *See Alvarez-Machain*, 542 U.S. at 735. Sexton's assertion that the claims against Margaret Rollins were brought against Rollins in her personal capacity are belied by the record. Outside of this allegation, Sexton does not in any meaningful way challenge the reasons underlying the district court's determination that Rollins and the University of Texas (UT) clinic were entitled to sovereign immunity. *See Brinkmann v. Abner*, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Consequently, Sexton has abandoned any challenge to the district court's conclusion that Rollins and the UT clinic were entitled to sovereign immunity. *Id.* Finally, review of Sexton's filings shows that she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination under Title VII. *See Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.*, 574 F.3d 253, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2009); *see also Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678–79; *Collins*, 224 F.3d at 498.

AFFIRMED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

DIANA I. REISMANN SEXTON, *Plaintiff*,	§	
v.	§	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-0852
MARGARET ROLLINS and UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS McGOVERN MEDICAL SCHOOL, ROBERT CIZIK EYE CLINIC, *Defendants*.	§	

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original Complaint filed by Defendants The University of Texas Health Science Center ("UTHealth") and Margaret Rollins ("Rollins") (collectively, "Defendants"). (Doc. No. 9). Plaintiff Diana I. Reismann Sexton ("Plaintiff") has filed a response in opposition to which the Defendants have replied. (Doc. Nos. 10, 15). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a second document she titled as a response. (Doc. No. 19). Defendants have moved to strike this pleading as an improper sur-reply. (Doc. No. 24). The Court, considering the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding *pro se*, overrules the Motion to Strike and will consider the pleading as a sur-reply. Having considered the Complaint, the briefings (including the sur-reply), and the applicable law, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. Factual Background

As noted above, Plaintiff is acting *pro se*, which is her right. That being the case, however, her pleadings are both factually and legally less than precise. This factual background comprises a combination of allegations gleaned from all of the pleadings, not just the Complaint. The Court will confine its rulings in this motion to dismiss scenario to the Complaint as it must under the law. However, even considering all of the pleadings, the Court has been supplied with very few

facts that pertain to the actual alleged causes of action. Apparently, Plaintiff was a certified ophthalmic technician and optometrist and optician in her country of origin, Argentina. (Doc. No. 1 at 18, 43). She worked at the UT Health Ruiz Department of Ophthalmology and Visual Science in its Robert Cizik Eye Clinic (the "Clinic") as an Ophthalmic Assistant. (*Id.* at 43). Defendant Rollins was the practice manager at the Clinic. Rollins is a Certified Ophthalmic Medical Technologist—a certification that Plaintiff is seeking here in the United States. (Doc. No. 19 at 26–27). According to Plaintiff, Rollins holds a higher certification (at least in the United States) than she herself does. (*Id.*).

Plaintiff's Complaint, while lengthy, does not plead facts that neatly fit the necessary elements of each of the causes of action she has pleaded. What is clear is that the management at the Clinic did not find her treatment of patients or her interactions with coworkers to comply with the Clinic's standards. Eventually, the Clinic parted ways with Plaintiff. In this action, Plaintiff contends she was wrongfully terminated and she alleges causes of action based upon national origin discrimination (Count 1), Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (Count 2), violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count 3), libel under § 73.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (Count 4), and an unspecified violation of Title VI (Count 5). (Doc. No. 1 at 38).

II. Legal Standard

A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). The court is not bound to accept legal conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678–79. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court assumes their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. *Id.* The court may also consider documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss, if the documents are "referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the] claim." *Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter*, 224 F.3d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 2000); *see also Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA*, 999 F. Supp. 2d 919, 926 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (Lynn, J.).

Courts generally hold the pleadings filed by *pro se* plaintiffs to a more lenient standard than those filed by lawyers. *Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin*, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). Nevertheless, "*pro se* litigants must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the speculative level." *Id.* (citing *Taylor v. Books a Million, Inc.*, 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002).

III. Analysis

Defendants accurately point out that Plaintiff's Complaint seems to be a combination of several different documents which are at times difficult to synthesize. The heart of Plaintiffs allegations are that Plaintiff, a woman from Argentina, claims that the Defendants wrongfully terminated her and she seeks recovery under multiple pathways. Her causes of action include: (1) national origin discrimination under Title VII, (2) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), (3) equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, (4) libel under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 73.001, and (5) an undescribed claim under Title VI. Plaintiff seeks both money damages and injunction relief. Defendants attack all five counts—some on general grounds and some on more specific grounds. The Court will address the latter first.

A. Sovereign Immunity bars Plaintiff's Libel, ADEA, and Equal Protection Actions

The Defendants claim that they cannot be sued for several of Plaintiff's claims, including libel, age discrimination under the ADEA, and equal protection violations, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Court agrees. First, as to libel, Texas has not waived its sovereign immunity for intentional torts. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.021 allows state governmental units to be sued only in certain circumstances. Libel is not one of these circumstances. In fact, § 101.57 makes it clear that state entities and their employees cannot be sued for any intentional torts (including libel). *See e.g.*, *Wagner v. Texas A&M Univ.*, 939 F. Supp. 1297 (S.D. Tex. 1996); *Rivera v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Examiners*, 431 Fed. App'x 356 (5th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the Court finds that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's libel claims against all Defendants.

Second, as to the alleged ADEA violations, neither Texas nor Congress has waived Texas's sovereign immunity from ADEA claims. Thus, none of the Defendants may be sued under the ADEA. *Chhim*, 863 F.3d at 469; *Sullivan v. Univ. of Texas Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston Dental Branch*, 217 Fed. App'x 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2007).

Third and finally, though Plaintiff does not classify her claims for equal protection violations as § 1983 claims, the Court will treat them as such. *See Hearth, Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare*, 617 F.2d 381, 382–83 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that § 1983 is the means that Congress has provided for plaintiffs seeking relief against state officials who violate the Constitution). As with the libel and ADEA claims above, states and state entities have engaged Eleventh Amendment immunity for § 1983 claims, which can be the only vehicle for Plaintiff's equal protection claim. *Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose*, 496 U.S. 356, 394 (1990); *Baldwin v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch at Galveston*, 945 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (S.D. Tex. 1996). Consequently, these three claims (libel, ADEA, and § 1983) are hereby dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants.

B. Plaintiff's Title VII and Title VI Claims Against Margaret Rollins

Defendants also move for dismissal of Margaret Rollins on the remaining two causes of action (brought under Title VII and Title VI) because she is an improper defendant. Ms. Rollins is sued in her capacity as practice manager of the Clinic. In other words, she is sued in her "official" capacity. When a plaintiff sues both the employer and an individual in their official capacity for employment discrimination under Title VII, the claims are considered redundant, and the individual employee should be dismissed. *Zeng v. Texas Tech Univ. Health Sci. Ctr. At El Paso*, 836 Fed. App'x 203, 208 (5th Cir. 2020). The court in *Zeng* makes it clear that Title VII claims against an individual should be dismissed when the employer is also sued. Finally, only public and/or private entities (*not* individuals) can be held liable under Title VI. *Price ex rel. Price v.*

Louisiana Dep't of Educ., 329 Fed. App'x 559 (5th Cir. 2009); *see also Shotz v. City of Plantation*, 344 F.3d 1161, 1171 (11th Cir. 2003) ("It is beyond question ... that individuals are not liable under Title VI.") That being the case, Plaintiffs Title VII and Title VI claims against Rollins are hereby dismissed.

Since this Court has dismissed the libel, the ADEA, and the equal protection claims in their entirety, and has dismissed Rollins from the Title VII and Title VI actions, Rollins is hereby completely dismissed from this lawsuit with prejudice.

C. Plaintiff's Title VII and Title VI Claims Against UTHealth

The Court finds that the Defendants' complaints about the remainder of Plaintiff's pleadings (concerning Title VI and VII claims) have merit. Therefore, Plaintiff's national origin discrimination claims under Title VI and Title VII complaints are hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Nevertheless, the Court also notes that Plaintiff is appearing *pro se* and has set out various elements of her national origin discrimination claims albeit in a confusing way and with some critical omissions. Plaintiff is hereby given leave to file a First Amended Complaint if she does so by June 30, 2024. This complaint should **not** include Margaret Rollins, as the Court has dismissed her, nor should it include the libel, the ADEA, or the equal protection claims that have also been dismissed with prejudice. The new complaint should be drafted in such a manner as to plead facts—not conclusions—that support each element of each alleged Title VI and Title VII claims. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint by June 30, 2024, this dismissal order will become final, and the case will be considered dismissed in its entirety. If Plaintiff does timely file an amended complaint, Defendant UTHealth shall have until July 31, 2024, to file an answer or other form of response.

IV. Conclusion

The Court denies Defendant's Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 24) and grants the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 9) in its entirety. For the reasons above, Margaret Rollins is dismissed with prejudice. The claims against UTHealth based upon libel, violations of the equal protection clause, and the ADEA are also dismissed with prejudice.

The Title VI and VII claims against UTHealth are dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff is given leave to file a First Amended Complaint asserting the Title VI and Title VII claims against UTHealth for discrimination based on national origin if she does so by June 30, 2024. Otherwise, this Court will dismiss those claims with prejudice as well.

SIGNED this 4th day of June 2024.

Andrew S. Hanen
United States District Judge

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT
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August 22, 2025

Mr. Nathan Ochsner
Southern District of Texas, Houston
United States District Court
515 Rusk Street
Room 5300
Houston, TX 77002

No. 24-20296 Sexton v. Rollins
USDC No. 4:24-CV-852

Dear Mr. Ochsner,

Enclosed is a copy of the judgment issued as the mandate and a copy of the court's opinion.

Sincerely,

LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
Amanda M. Duroncelet
By: _____
Amanda M. Duroncelet, Deputy Clerk

cc: Mr. Martin Arroyo Jr.
Ms. Diana I. Reismann Sexton (letter only)

Gmail Diana Reismann <dianareismann@gmail.com>

Attached Petition for rehearing en banc reduced 3900 words

1 mensaje

Diana Reismann <dianareismann@gmail.com> 19 de agosto de 2025 a las 0:31
Para: pro_se@ca5.uscourts.gov, Martin Arroyo <Martin.Arroyo@oag.texas.gov>

Good night, Attached Petition for rehearing en banc reduced 3900 words.
My apologies for the time.

Diana Reismann
+1 346-479-5453
Linkedin
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CASE 24-20296 PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC REDUCED TO 3900 WORDS.pdf
396K

Gmail Diana Reismann <dianareismann@gmail.com>

Automatic reply: Attached Petition for rehearing en banc reduced 3900 words

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CA5 Pro Se <pro_se@ca5.uscourts.gov> 19 de agosto de 2025 a las 0:32
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Activity in Case 4:24-cv-00852 Reismann Sexton v. Rollins et al USCA Order

2 mensajes

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U.S. District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

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Case Number: 4:24-cv-00852
Filer:
Document Number: 38

Docket Text:
Order of USCA; Judgment issued as mandate 8/22/25 re: [29] Notice of Appeal ; USCA No. 24-20296. IT IS ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED, filed. (edg1)

4:24-cv-00852 Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Diana I Reismann Sexton   dianareismann@gmail.com

Martin Arroyo , Jr   martin.arroyo@oag.texas.gov, sarah.orr@oag.texas.gov

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U.S. District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

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Case Number: 4:24-cv-00852
Filer:
Document Number: 39

Docket Text:
Order of USCA Per Curiam re: [29] Notice of Appeal ; USCA No. 24-20296. AFFIRMED, filed. (edg1)

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Diana I Reismann Sexton   dianareismann@gmail.com

Martin Arroyo , Jr   martin.arroyo@oag.texas.gov, sarah.orr@oag.texas.gov

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REFERENCES:

I- **General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI),** International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2 (1966):

Article 2

1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

II- **Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, TIAR o Rio Treaty (1947)**

The Rio Treaty is a "special treaty" within the meaning of Article 29 of the OAS Charter. Among other things, it defines the measures and procedures governing a collective response by the other States party when a State party suffers an armed attack or an aggression that is not an armed attack.

The Treaty was activated for the first time on 15 September 2001, after the tragic events of 11 September 2001.

https://unterm.un.org/unterm2/en/view/2e72117a-f842-42de-ad12-da7caba99d4b

III- **Monroe Doctrine (1823)**

The Monroe Doctrine was articulated in President James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. The European powers, according to Monroe, were obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere as the United States' sphere of interest.

In 1962, the Monroe Doctrine was invoked symbolically when the *Soviet Union began to build missile-launching sites in Cuba*.

https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine

IV- **USMC, MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND, Law Of War/ Introduction To Rules Of Engagement, B130936**

Positive Identification" (PID) is required for applies for some purposes of mission accomplishment (e.g., engaging a declared hostile force), but not in cases of self-defense (e.g., force used in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent). Self-defense arises from a hostile act (e.g., you are actually shot at) or a hostile intent (e.g., you are about to be shot at) that then creates a 100% certainty you now have a military target (i.e., the person trying to kill you). To use force in self- defense against this HA or HI threat does NOT require PID as to the identity of who is targeting you. The threat (i.e., a lawful military target), could be a bona fide uniformed enemy combatant, a terrorist, or other unlawful combatant (e.g., child-soldier). To engage such a threat in self-defense all that is required is to use the force necessary to stop the threat and, as military circumstances permit, minimize collateral damage to civilian objects and incidental injury to civilian persons. Even though PID is not required for HA or HI self-defense situations, you may see it listed in your ROE as a further restraint or control on your ability to engage enemy forces. This restraint or control may be based on military or political reasons. PID can be a very useful tool to help minimize collateral damage when non-declared hostile fighters or insurgents are mixed in among an innocent civilian population.

V- **American Navy Captain David Jewett, (June 17, 1772 – July 26, 1842)** was an American-born Brazilian naval officer known for his role in the sovereignty dispute between the United Kingdom and the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata (the predecessor state of Argentina) over the Falkland Islands.

Service to the United Provinces On June 22, 1815, Jewett

and to aid and assist such as require it to obtain a supply with the least trouble and expense. As your views do not enter into contravention or competition with these orders, and as I think mutual advantage may result from a personal interview, I invite you to pay me a visit on board my ship, where I shall be happy to accommodate you during your pleasure. I would also beg you, so far as comes within your sphere, to communicate this information to other British subjects in this vicinity. I have the honour to be, Sir Your most obedient humble Servant, Signed, Jewett, Colonel of the Navy of the United Provinces of South America and commander of the frigate Heroína.[8]

Many modern authors report this letter as the declaration issued by Jewett.[10] *Jewett's ship received Weddell's assistance in obtaining anchorage off of Port Louis, and, according to Weddell, "In a few days, he took formal possession of these islands for the patriot government of Buenos Ayres, read a declaration under their colours, planted on a port in ruins, and fired a salute of twenty-one guns."*[8] *Weddell also linked the ceremony to Jewett's claim to the wreck of the Uranie and comments that it was calculated to make an impression on the masters of ships in the area.*[11] *Weddell stated that some ship-masters were alarmed by Jewett's appearance, fearing being robbed or captured and said that one contemplated an armed response.*[11] *Weddell was able to convince him Jewett was no danger and after being introduced to Jewett, he overcame his fears.*[11]

Based upon Jewett's statements in 1820, some researchers assert that he was ordered to claim the islands by Argentine authorities;[12] *others assert there is no documentary evidence to support a specific order.*[11] *Jewett did not mention the claim in his 13-page request for resignation to the government of Buenos Aires,*[13][14] *nor did the government gazette the sovereignty claim in the Gazeta de Buenos Ayres. 1820 was one of the most anarchical years in Argentine history, where there was twenty-four Governments in one year; three in one day.*[11] *Other factors cited include the roundabout route Jewett took to the islands (he was eight months into the voyage when he arrived)*[11] *and the fact that the declaration was only reported in Argentina as a foreign news story after being reported in the Salem Gazette in 1821.*[11] *The article was also reproduced in The Times of 3 August 1821.*

1. *Da Fonseca Figueira, José Antonio (1985). David Jewett; una biografía para la historia de las Malvinas. Sudamericana-Planeta. p. 180. ISBN 950-37-0168-6.*
2. *"Fragata Piranga" (in Portuguese). Poder Naval.*
3. *"Silas Talbot Collection (Coll. 18)". Mystic Seaport. 20 May 2016. Archived from the original on 9 June 2013. Retrieved 22 January 2014.*
4. *United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801).*
5. *DANFS*
6. *Allen, Gardner Weld (1909). Our naval war with France. Houghton Mifflin. pp. 190.*
7. *Da Fonseca Figueira, José Antonio (1985). David Jewett; una biografía para la historia de las Malvinas. Sudamericana-Planeta. p. 58. ISBN 950-37-0168-6.*
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Jewett

VI- **WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WT/DS400/16/Add.7 WT/DS401/17/Add.7 DS400-401 (2015):**
European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds400_e.htm

VII- *Section 312 of the INA requires that naturalization applicants demonstrate an ability to read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English language and have a knowledge and understanding of U.S. history and government (civics). To meet these requirements and become naturalized citizens, applicants must pass an English test (which includes understanding, speaking, reading, and writing) and a civics test.*

https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship-resource-center/naturalization-statistics