No. _____

No. 25-3096

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTIED STATES

Office of the Clerk

MARK T. STINSON, Reg #29908-076

PETITIONER,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESPONDENTS.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Mark T. Stinson
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Pro Se

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. Whether the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals violated the Suspension Clause by holding that a veteran with severe service-connected PTSD is categorically barred from raising structural constitutional claims through *28 U.S.C. § 2241* – even mental disability rendered § 2255 "inadequate or ineffective" – contrary to *Boumediene v. Bush,* 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and the text of § 2255(e)?

II. Whether *Jones v. Hendrix*, 599 U.S. ___ (2023), permits a court of appeals to reject a § 2241 petition without reaching the merits of constitutional claims where the petitioner had no practical ability to raise such claims earlier?

III. Whether the Eighth Circuit's refusal to liberally construe a pro se veteran's filings violates this Court's decision in *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)?

LIST OF PARTIES

The Petitioner is Mark T. Stinson, Reg # 209908-076. A Respondent is the United States of America and the Eighth Circuit Justices RAYMOND W. GRUENDER, RALPH R. ERICKSON and L. STEVEN GRASZ.

RELATED CASES

Mark Stinson v. USA, Nos. 19-8493, 21-7757, 21-8013, 22-6213, 22-7591, 23-5105, 24M85.

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CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

This case from federal court and the opinion of the United States court of appeals appears at Appendix B to the petition and is unpublished.

The United States district court has no opinion and has not ruled.

JURISDICTION

The en banc decision of the Eight Circuit was entered on 11/20/2025. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on 11/20/2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

- U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Suspension Clause)
- 28 U.S.C. § 2241
- 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (Savings Clause)
- 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Mark T. Stinson, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Case No. 25-3096, entered 11/20/2025, in which the court, sitting en banc, affirmed dismissal of Petitioner's habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without addressing the merits of his constitutional claims.

Statement of the Case

Petitioner is a decorated and honorably discharged U.S. military veteran who suffers from chronic, severe PTSD resulting from service in the Gulf War. The Department of Veterans Affairs recognizes his PTSD as service-connected. On November 10, 2016, a federal grand jury in the Western District of Tennessee returned a thirteen-count indictment against Mark Stinson and Jayton Stinson, who were, at the time, husband and wife, charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States. (Criminal ("Cr.") ECF No. 3 (sealed).). On September 1, 2017, after Jayton Stinson had entered a guilty plea to Count 1, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Mark Stinson. (Cr. ECF No. 54 (sealed).). The superseding indictment charged Mark Stinson with two types of tax offenses, the first (Counts 1 through 11) arising from his operation of his wife's temporary staffing company and an individual income tax return filed by Mark Stinson's son.

Petitioner's wife and co-conspirator Jayton Stinson pleaded guilty to one count

of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. and was sentenced to 12 months in prison. She was made jointly and severally liable for the restitution, (R.107, Judgment, PageID 469-474).

The Petitioner was charged with thirteen counts relating to tax fraud: one count of conspiracy to defraud the U.S., five counts of failing to pay over employment taxes, five counts of filing false tax returns, one count of theft of government funds, and one count of aggravated identity theft, (R.55, Indictment, PageID 115-126). The Petitioner was made jointly and severally liable for the restitution with the co-conspirator ($2,834,000.71). The Petitioner proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty on all thirteen counts. On the Verdict form (Case 2:16-cr-20247-01-JTF Document 85 Filed 12/08/2017 Page 4 of 4 PageID 311), the Presiding Juror did NOT circle Guilty he circled Count 13, this was not presented previously with any motion and was overlooked by all three counsels.

After the trial the petitioner charge was illegally superseded and sealed, and the imprisonment form was not signed. *See Appendix A Designation of Relevant district and appellate court docket*

The trial attorney Quinn was instructed to file an appeal by the Petitioner, and he refused to appeal the trial. The Petitioner wasn't summoned to the grand jury hearing and was under an illegal R.I.C.O. The prosecutors made too many picks for jurors and gave two closing remarks, and

the defense made only one, the court allowed this to happen. The court violated the 6th Cir. R. P. 101(a), an email was given to the court, but it was Not entered into the trial exhibits, the court misread the jury instructions, the prosecutors coerced witnesses to lie under oath with bogus evidence, government committed a Brady violation, the indictment was bad, the government, court and attorneys committed fraud, conspiracy and did not give the Petitioner a fair trial.

Due Process Clause forbids a State from convicting a person for a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 155 L.Ed.2d 1046, 123 S.Ct. 2020 (2003). This was a malicious prosecution and continues to be. The government committed a Constitutional Error of admitting evidence that is totally without relevant. Nelson v. Brown, 673 F. Supp .2d 85 (2009).

The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. The loss of liberty is a severe form of irreparable injury. Ferrara v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2009); Barone v. United States, 610 F. Supp.2d 150 (D. Mass. 2009).

Petitioner, timely made the Court aware of the conflict of interest between himself and his attorney Quinn, and moved to fire the attorney but the court denied allowing the petitioner to fire the attorney and petitioner moved a second time to fire the attorney again the Court refused to allow petitioner to terminate the service of counsel and forced petitioner to continue to trial with the same attorney;

Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860 (9th Cir. 2006).

When counsel objected to potentially conflicted representation, the trial court has an opportunity to eliminate the possibility of an impact on counsel's performance through seeking a waiver from the defendant, appointing separate counsel, or taking adequate "steps to ascertain whether the risk [is] too remote to warrant separate counsel." Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173. If the trial court fails to make such an inquiry into the potential conflict, *REVERSAL IS AUTOMATIC.* Atley v. Ault, 21 Supp.2d 949 (S.D. Iowa 1998).

When a defendant raises a seemingly substantial complaint before trial regarding the defense attorney's conflict of interest or divided loyalty, the Supreme Court has been absolutely clear that the court must make a thorough inquiry into the matter. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 98 S.Ct. 1173 (1978). That inquiry should be on record and *MUST* be of the kind to ease the defendant's dissatisfaction, distraught or concerns. Smith, 923 F.2d at 1320. If trial court fails to make a sufficient inquiry, prejudice is presumed and *"REVERSAL IS AUTOMATIC."* Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488. Petitioners contend that his attorney actively represented conflicting interests, and an actual conflict of interest affected his attorney's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, Mannhait, 847 F.2d at 579, and U.S. v. Kliti, 156 F.3d 150 (2nd Cir. 1998).

Petitioner, contend that counsel's performance (1) Fell below an objective standard or reasonable competence and (2) That he was prejudiced by his

counsel's deficient performance [....] petitioner show prejudice, that it was in fact reasonably probable that but for the misadvise and the incompetence of his trial counsel he wouldn't have been convicted. James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662 (5th Cir. 1995). "The movant must demonstrate that "extraordinary circumstances" justify reopening a final judgment. Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 439 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2007)." Brown v. U.S., Case No. 5:00CV1650, 5:95CR0147, 7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 2008). The petitioner believes he has been denied counsel during a critical stage of his trial. Fusi v. O'Brien, 621 F.3d (1st Cir. 2010). "Bad lawyering, regardless of how bad" is insufficient. Scarp A, 38 F.3d at 13; Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636, 643 (1st Cir. 2002); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2070 citing U.S. v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).

Petitioner requests that this Court take Judicial Notice to his Military Record and his Military Medical Records. Counsel failure to argue the fact that petitioner, served in The United States Army where he suffered **[P.T.S.D.]** Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and was awarded a National Defense Service Metal, Southwest Asia Service Metal with three Bronze Stars and an Overseas Service Ribbon.

The petitioner's counsel failed to argue and file a motion to the effect that he suffered P.T.S.D. and that he could not be charged with any form of conspiracy due to the symptoms and treatment he had undergone. It was a

conflict of interest when counsel failed to argue PTSD defense on the conspiracy. [Competency Test]. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1990). It is undisputed that Stinson suffers from PTSD. It is also clear from the Military Records and other reports that petitioner suffered from this disorder both at the time of his offense and at the time of his trial. The counsel knew and still failed and refused to seek testimony or to argue for an evidentiary hearing, that in all probability, Stinson suffers from PTSD. What is more to the point is whether this disorder rendered Stinson, unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.

In this case the counsel's lack of investigation, after he had noticed of Petitioner's P.T.S.D. he did nothing to protect his mental status. This fell below reasonable professional standards. Thus, Stinson has met both prongs of the *Strickland* test and it is plain and clear that Stinson was denied effective assistance of counsel. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960); Becton v. Barnett, 920 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1990).

Counsel should have petitioned the Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the petitioner was competent to stand trial. That petitioner was being seen by a psychiatrist who had diagnosed the petitioner with PTSD. Few lawyers possess even a rudimentary understanding of Psychiatry. They therefore are wholly unqualified to judge the competency of their clients and must seek professional medical diagnoses. A defendant has a right to counsel at every critical

stage of a criminal prosecution. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Atty General For The State of Okla., 167 F.3d 1339, 1345 (10th Cir. 1999).

The counsel fails to make an argument about petitioner competency, U.S. v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164 (2nd Cir. 2010). The district court erred by misapprehending its statutory obligation under title *18 U.S.C. § 424(a);* Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979 (Central District of California 1998).

Petitioner [Stinson] claims his Constitutional Rights were violated because he was tried while incompetent. [And That] his Due Process Rights were violated when his trial attorney failed to request a competency hearing, and the trial court failed to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing.

The Court made it emphatically clear that a person proceeding against as a multiple offender has a Constitutional Right to the Assistance of Counsel. U.S. v. Garrett, 149 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 1998) [A]bused of its discretion by refusing to allow petitioner to fire his trial attorney who had a conflict of interest.

Additionally, the petitioner asserts that the attorney made little use, if any of the evidence garnered from the Government reports, which they didn't supply all the evidence, tended to substantiate his innocence. The failure to develop a strategy of any consequence and absenting themselves from crucial portions of the trial constitutes no representation at all. Given the totality of the circumstances, the ineffectiveness of trial counsel has been amply shown.

That co-conspirator Jayton Stinson entered into a plea agreement with the Government; she **didn't** admit to conspiracy. It must be noted that a Military person who suffers with PTSD is NOT responsible for any conspiracy after suffering from such disease during war time. Petitioner attorney failed to argue for a competency hearing knowing he had PTSD. It also must be noted that husband and wife cannot be convicted of conspiracy charges. Counsel failed to call The Veteran Administration Psychiatrist to testify at trial, where she recently diagnosed Stinson to be incompetent. Counsel failed to make a reasonable investigation into petitioner's Mental condition. Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d at 982. Becton v. Barnett, 920 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1991).

Counsel failed to call witnesses to testify on petitioner's behalf. Counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's intimidation of witnesses. He failed to properly cross examine an important government witness. The Sixth Amendment to the United States guarantees to a criminally accused the "right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. U.S. Const. amend VI; Strickland, 466 U.S. at. 685.

Quinn never retained a CPA, an accountant, a tax preparer, or a tax attorney, to testify regarding the responsibility of Stinson in the sole proprietorship owned by his wife or the corporations that were later incorporated. In fact, Quinn said the sole proprietorship was co-ownership. There is no co-ownership in the tax code.

The IRS and the Government broadly define a "responsible person." The key element in determining responsible person status is whether a "person has the statutorily imposed duty to make the payment." (O'Connor v. United States, 956 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1992)). For the purposes of Sec. 6672 a failure to remit trust taxes is willful if it is voluntary, conscious, and intentional, as opposed to an accidental act.

The petitioner made payments to IRS for years and did not receive an offer in comprise. *See generally 26 C.F.R. § 301.7122(a) and (g).* People v. Treadway, (2010) 182 Cal. App.4th 562 106 Cal. Rptr.3d 99 (conviction Reversed because the prosecution interfered with the defendant's ability to call a witness by conditioning his co-defendant's pleas on a blanket restriction not to testify, including for the defense, since this was "Governmental Interference violation of a defendant's Compulsory-Process Right."); *In re: Martin (1987) 744 F.2d 374, 391* ([a]defendant's right to present a defense, including, most importantly, the right to 'offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance, if necessary,' is at the very heart of our criminal justice system").

Prosecution misconduct of witnesses tampering. In the United States, the crime of witness tampering in federal cases is defined by statute at *18 U.S.C. § 1512*, which defines it as "tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant." United States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir. 2005) (reviewing courts will examine the extent to which "the government actor actively discourage[d] a

witness from testifying through threats of prosecution, intimidation, or coercive badgering."); United States v. Smith, 997 F.2d 674, 680 (10th Cir.1993). (Prosecutors must not intimidate a witness who is willing to testify truthfully for the defense); United States v. Crawford, 707 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1983).

When Quinn stated he was calling Young to testify, Brooks, prosecutor, said you need to tell him he needs to be read his Miranda rights. Brooks Tran. 898-901 Dec. 7, 2017. In United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding prosecution's refusal to grant immunity to defense witness who could contradicted prosecution's immunized witness was *GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL).*

Scales was granted immunity, but Young was denied immunity, which is Grounds For Reversal and a serious miscarriage of justice in the government's favor.

Cory Young was going to testify that Stinson had nothing to do with the preparation of Scales income tax return. Quinn told Young his testimony was ***Not*** needed, so Young left the courthouse.

Petitioner filed a § 2241 petition in the District Court, raising:

- constitutional challenges to his conviction;
- ineffective assistance of counsel under *Strickland v. Washington;*
- conflict of interest, government gave testimony immunity to their witness but not to the defense witness, and witness tampering;

- the Court did not allow the Petitioner to fire his trial attorney, twice;
- the Petitioner was not afforded a fair trial;
- actual innocence/legal innocence; and
- a denial of meaningful access to the courts due to PTSD, under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).

The district court did not respond to the petition filed and the appeals court dismissed the matter without addressing the merits of the case.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Eighth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's Suspension Clause precedents by foreclosing all avenues for constitutional review.

This Court has long held that the writ of habeas corpus must remain available when no other avenue of judicial review exists.

- Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779-92 (2008).
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305-06 (2001).

A statutory limitation cannot extinguish the constitutional right to challenge unlawful detention. *Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792.*

Here, the Eighth Circuit's interpretation leaves Petitioner with no forum at all – not § 2255, and not § 2241 – despite well-pled constitutional violations.

This Court has never held that Congress – or a court – may eliminate all remedies for constitutional claims.

II. The Eighth Circuit misapplied *Jones v. Hendrix* to bar claims *Jones* itself did not reach.

Jones addressed only statutory – interpretation claims involving "new rules of statutory law." It explicitly did not foreclose *§ 2241* for:

- constitutional claims;
- claims showing complete denial of judicial review; or
- situations where *§ 2255* is "inadequate or ineffective" for reasons unrelated to statutory interpretation.

See Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. ____, slip op. at 17-18 (2023) (preserving Suspension Clause limits).

Petitioner does not raise a statutory-interpretation claim. He raises constitutional violations that were never heard on the merits. Thus, the Eighth Circuit expanded *Jones* beyond recognition.

III. Other circuits allow *§ 2241* review of constitutional claims when *§ 2255* is "inadequate or ineffective," creating a direct circuit split.

Examples include:

- **Seventh Circuit (en banc):**

  Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1140 (7th Cir. 2015) (permitting *§ 2241* for constitutional claims not previously reviewable).

- **Ninth Circuit:**

  Allen v. Ives, 950 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2020).

- **D.C. Circuit:**

  In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

These circuits recognize that the Savings Clause applies where *§ 2255* is unavailable in practice, including due to mental disability.

The Eighth Circuit stands alone in declaring such claims categorically barred – even where a veteran's PTSD prevented timely filing.

IV. The Eighth Circuit ignored this Court's mandate to liberally construe pro se filings, especially for mentally disabled veterans.

This Court requires lower courts to grant special solicitude to filings of pro se prisoners:

- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

Further, prisoners are constitutionally entitled to meaningful access to the courts.

- Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)
- Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

Petitioner alleged – and provided evidence that the petition was timely filed.

Rather than interpret his petition liberally, the Eighth Circuit held him to the most demanding standards and then dismissed everything without reaching the merits.

This contradicts this Court's precedents and disproportionately harms disabled veterans. Petitioner also requests that the Court consider the need for reasonable procedural accommodations pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act *(42 U.S.C § 12131 et seq.).*

RELIEF REQUESTED

Petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable Court:

1. **Grant** the petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit;
2. **Reverse** the Eighth Circuit's en banc decision dismissing Petitioner's *28 U.S.C. § 2241* petition without reaching the merits;
3. **Hold** that the Suspension Clause, as interpreted by this Court in *Boumediene v. Bush, St. Cyr,* and related cases, requires that Petitioner be afforded an avenue – whether under *§ 2241* and *§ 2255*, or otherwise – to present his constitutional claims;
4. **Vacate and remand** with instructions directing the Eighth Circuit or the district court to adjudicate Petitioner's constitutional claims on their merits,

applying the liberal construction owed to pro se veterans under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and Bounds v. Smith, 43 U.S. 817 (1977);

5. **Alternatively, grant** any other relief this Court deems just, proper, and in the interest of justice, including relief under the Court's authority in *28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act),* should circumstances warrant; and
6. **Ensure** that Petitioner, a service – connected disabled decorated veteran diagnosed with **severe PTSD**, is afforded meaningful access to judicial review, consistent with the protections recognized by this Court for pro se litigants and individuals suffering from mental health impairments.

CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit's closed – door approach to habeas review eliminates the only avenue available to Petitioner to present his constitutional claims. This Court's review is urgently needed to clarify the reach of *Jones*, protect the Suspension Clause, and ensure that veterans with **severe PTSD** are not denied **meaningful access to justice.**

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be **granted.**

Respectfully submitted,

Mark T. Stinson
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November 21, 2025
Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME LIMITATION, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE STYLE REQUIREMETS

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the petition for a writ of certiorari contains 3364 words, excluding the parts of the petition that are exempted by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(d).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on November 21, 2025.

Mark T. Stinson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and exact copy of the writ of certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed as a veteran *in forma pauperis* was served upon all interested parties via the electronic filing system on the 21st day of November 2025 to:

Solicitor General
U.S. Department of Justice
Room 5614
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001
Ph: (202) 514-2217
Email: supremectbriefs@usdoj.gov

Mark T. Stinson

DESIGNATION OF RELEVANT DISTRICT COURT, SIXTH AND EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DOCUMENTS

Appellant, pursuant to Eighth Circuit Rules 28(a) & 30(a), hereby designates the following filings in the district courts and appeals court's record as entries that are relevant to this appeal:

DESCRIPTION OF ENTRY	DATE	RECORD ENTRY #	PAGE ID #
	W.D. Tenn. No. 2:16-cr-20247		
Jury Verdict	12/08/2017	85	308-311
Amended Judgment	03/08/2018	114	530-536
Notice of Appeal	03/15/2018	1	1-5
Appellant Brief No. 18-5272	07/23/2018	25	1-19
Gov't Response	09/14/2018	30	1-23
Order of USCA No. 18-5272	01/22/2019	44-1	1-6
	W.D. Tenn. No. 2:18-cv-02807		
Petition § 2241	11/20/2018	1	1-21
Gov't Response to § 2255 Petition	04/04/2019	9	32-52
Pro Se Motion	11/23/2020	19	129-152
Order	05/03/2021	23	165-187

Appendix A

W.D. Tenn. No. 2:21-cv-02065

Pro Se Motion	02/01/2021	1	1-22
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Motion to Disqualify Judge	02/06/2023	13	69-80
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Appellant's Brief with Exhibits	02/13/2023	7	1-34
Order and Judgment USCA No. 23-5105	09/26/2023	24-25	1-5
Petition for Rehearing En Banc	11/22/2023	26	1-7
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W.D. Tenn. No. 2:21-cv-02526

Pro Se Motion	08/16/2021	1	1-26

W.D. Tenn No. 2:22-cv-02575

Pro Se Motion & Exhibits	08/30/2022	1	1-54

E.D. Ark. No. 19-cv-00016

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E.D. Ark. No. 25-cv-00148

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Motion for Writ Of Mandamus	10/22/2025	5	1-5

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 25-3096

In re: Mark T. Stinson

Petitioner

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Delta
(2:25-cv-00148-JM)

ORDER

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

November 20, 2025

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No: 25-3096

In re: Mark T. Stinson

Petitioner

Appeal from U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Delta
(2:25-cv-00148-JM)

JUDGMENT

Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

Petition for writ of mandamus has been considered by the court and is denied. The motions to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis filed by Petitioner Mark T. Stinson are denied as moot. Mandate shall issue forthwith.

October 27, 2025

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

/s/ Susan E. Bindler

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, DC 20543-0001

COPY

July 3, 2025

Mark Stinson
#29908-076
777 NW 155th Lane, #911
Miami, FL 33169-6180

RE: Mark Stinson, Sr. v. USA
USCA6 No. 23-5105

Dear Mr. Stinson:

Due to the petitioner's repeated filings to this Court concerning the same lower court opinion, the Clerk's Office will no longer acknowledge future submissions regarding the same lower court opinion.

Your money order in the amount of $300.00 is herewith returned.

Sincerely,
Scott S. Harris, Clerk
By:

Pipa Fisher
(202) 479-3019

Enclosures

Appendix C