IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. ___

RICHARD HERSHEY,

Applicant,

v.

CITY OF BOSSIER CITY; BOBBY GILBERT, individually and in his capacity as Deputy Marshal; DANIEL STOLL; DAVID SMITH; TYSHON HARVEY; EUGENE TUCKER,

Respondents.

APPLICATION TO THE HON. SAMUEL A. ALITO JR.
FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME WITHIN WHICH TO FILE
A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13(5), Richard Hershey hereby moves for an extension of time of 30 days, to and including May 13, 2026, for the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. This case involves an unusual procedural history—in particular, a denial of panel rehearing (on January 13, 2026) after an earlier denial of en banc rehearing (on December 18, 2025) that creates some uncertainty concerning the precise date on which a petition is due. Petitioner believes that the relevant date is the January 13, 2026, denial of panel rehearing. On that understanding, unless a 30-day extension is granted to and including May 13, 2026, the deadline for filing the petition for certiorari will be April 13, 2026. *See* Sup. Ct. R. 13(3). To the extent Mr. Hershey's time to file a petition for certiorari runs instead from the Fifth Circuit's denial of en banc rehearing on December 18, 2025, as opposed

to its later denial of panel rehearing, Mr. Hershey alternatively requests an extension of 30 days to and including April 17, 2026. Otherwise, the petition would be due on March 18, 2026.

In support of this request, Applicant states as follows:

1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision on October 7, 2025 (Exhibit 1). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

2. This case concerns a glaringly obvious denial of First Amendment rights—specifically, the forcible removal of a peaceful distributor of religious leaflets on a public sidewalk. While the Fifth Circuit recognized that the actions here violated the First Amendment and gave rise to a potential claim under *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Fifth Circuit managed to excuse the officers involved based on the view that the rule laid down in *Hope v. Pelzer*, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), that some constitutional rights are sufficiently obvious to eliminate the need for on-point precedent, was somehow limited to the Eighth Amendment context. That decision is obviously wrong and plainly certworthy. This case is being remanded for a trial on the *Monell* claim and the claims against the officers should be part of that remand. Accordingly, the case for this Court's intervention at this juncture is particularly strong.

3. The question presented here is whether public officials are entitled to qualified immunity despite obviously violating one of the most basic First Amendment rights—namely, an individual's right to distribute religious leaflets on a

public sidewalk. When it comes to such issues of "religious speech," the First Amendment is "doubly" protective. *Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.*, 597 U.S. 507, 523 (2022). "Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, whether communicative or not, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious activities." *Id.* That is "no accident." *Id.* "[I]n Anglo–American history, ... government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed *precisely* at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince." *Id.* (quoting *Cap. Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette*, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995)). And, of course, "[t]he First Amendment reflects a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues," including religion, "should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," *Snyder v. Phelps*, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)—a commitment that is perhaps at its zenith on public sidewalks, which "occupy a special position in terms of First Amendment protection because of their historic role as sites for discussion and debate," *McCullen v. Coakley*, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014). To that end, spreading one's religious beliefs by "[l]eafletting" on a public sidewalk is one of the most "classic forms of speech that lie[s] at the heart of the First Amendment" and thus receives robust protection. *See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network*, 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997); *Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization*, 493 U.S. 378, 385-86 (1990) ("[S]preading one's religious beliefs … through distribution of religious literature … is an age-old type of evangelism with a[] high … claim to constitutional protection.").

4. Understanding those well-settled principles, Richard Hershey—a senior citizen from Missouri—set out on February 28, 2020, to distribute leaflets on behalf of his religious community near Brookshire Grocery Arena (formerly CenturyLink Center) in Bossier City, Louisiana. CA5.ROA.97-98, 232. Like many other religious observants, Mr. Hershey has a religious duty to evangelize by sharing his faith with others in a peaceful manner. CA5.ROA.232. February 28 presented an ideal time to both exercise his free-speech rights and his religious duty by leafletting on the public sidewalk surrounding the Arena because a Christian rock concert (Winter Jam) was being held at the Arena. CA5.ROA.99.

5. The Arena itself is publicly owned by Bossier City and managed by a private entity. CA5.ROA.158. There is, however, no formal application or written policy regarding leafletting on the public sidewalks surrounding the Arena. CA5.ROA.98. Instead, the area immediately surrounding the Arena consists of public land and recreational space, including sidewalks open to the public. CA5.ROA.98-99. And the manager of the Arena is on record stating that any member of the public is "free" to "engage in … peaceful protests or distribution of pamphlets … so as long as it does not interfere with the safe ingress or egress of guests." ROA.158. Accordingly, Mr. Hershey began distributing his leaflets and spreading the good news of his enlightenment by simply walking onto the public sidewalk and peacefully handing out his literature. CA5.ROA.99-100. Mr. Hershey "did not create a disturbance or interfere with pedestrian or vehicular traffic." CA5.ROA.233. Indeed, to ensure his own safety and the safety of passersby, Mr. Hershey kept clear of staircases and the

Arena's parking lots. *Id.* At least one other person was also distributing literature—commercial advertisement cards for an internet radio station—on the public sidewalk outside the Arena, near Mr. Hershey. *Id.*

6. Not long after he began peacefully handing out his religious leaflets, Mr. Hershey was approached by Respondents Bossier City Deputy Marshall Bobby Gilbert, police officer Daniel Stoll, and Arena security officer Tyshon Harvey. CA5.ROA.100. Officer Gilbert approached Mr. "Hershey from the rear and made unwanted physical contact with [him]," while officer Stoll demanded that Mr. Hershey leave the public park. *Id.* Officer Gilbert also waived his handcuffs at Mr. Hershey and told him that if he did not stop distributing his religious leaflets in the public park, he would be taken to jail. *Id.* While Mr. Hershey attempted to explain that he had a constitutional right to distribute his religious leaflets on the public sidewalk, officer Gilbert would have none of it. CA5.ROA.101. According to officer Gilbert, the public sidewalk was actually private property; he repeated that if Mr. Hershey did not leave, he would be arrested. *Id.*

7. Fearing imprisonment, Mr. Hershey attempted to leave the area but was blocked by officer Gilbert. *Id.* It was then that Respondents security officers David Smith and Eugene Tucker came onto the scene to help enforce Mr. Hershey's removal from the public space. *Id.* With now four other officers at his back, officer Gilbert chided Mr. Hershey for not leaving the sidewalk immediately. *Id.* Mr. Hershey responded that he would forfeit the exercise of his rights and leave the premises if officer Gilbert stepped aside, which the officer did shortly thereafter—but

only while informing Mr. Hershey that if he ever returned to distribute his religious leaflets, he would be promptly arrested and taken to jail. *Id.* As he was leaving, Mr. Hershey inquired as to why he was being forced to leave while another individual was free to distribute commercial literature advertising an internet radio station, Power 927 FM. *Id.* Officer Harvey responded that he did not know if the commercial literature had been approved for distribution near the Arena, but that he knew that Mr. Hershey's religious literature had not been approved. CA5.ROA.102. Mr. Hershey then left the public park near the Arena without handing out any more leaflets and has not returned for fear of arrest and imprisonment. *Id.* The other leafletter continued to hand out her commercial literature without interference from any of the officers. *Id.*

8. Based on that unfortunate series of events, Mr. Hershey sued Bossier City, and the five police and security officers involved, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to peacefully distribute religious leaflets on a public sidewalk and of 42 U.S.C. §1983, because the City's failure to train its employees caused the constitutional violation, *see Monell*, 436 U.S. 658. CA5.ROA.94-110. The City and the two police officers moved to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Hershey's complaint failed to plead a constitutional violation, that it failed to identify any written policy or longstanding custom sufficient to state a *Monell* claim against Bossier City, and that in all events, officers Gilbert and Stoll were entitled to qualified immunity as they had not violated Mr. Hershey's clearly established rights. *See* Dist.Ct.Dkt.19. The three security officers filed a separate motion to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Hershey

had failed to plead how they violated his rights and that, regardless, they are not state actors subject to liability under §1983 for the alleged constitutional violation. *See* Dist.Ct.Dkt.28.

9. The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, who issued a report and recommendation advising the district court to grant both motions to dismiss. CA5.ROA.231-54. The magistrate first noted that "[t]here is no doubt that … peaceful picketing and leafleting are expressive activities involving 'speech' protected by the First Amendment," that Mr. Hershey's complaint demonstrated that the public park and sidewalks outside the Arena were a traditional public forum where the government is "strictly limited in its ability to regulate private speech," and that the officers had "engaged in viewpoint discrimination" against Mr. Hershey's protected speech. CA5.ROA.234-41 (quoting *United States v. Grace*, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983)). But it ultimately advised that the district court grant qualified immunity to the officers because there is not "a single decision from any court that has held, before or after the date of this incident, that an officer violated the rights of a leafletter who was removed from a similar arena premises." CA5.ROA.243. The magistrate also recommended dismissal of Mr. Hershey's *Monell* claim for failure to train against the City because Mr. Hershey had apparently failed to allege that the violation was a result of deficient training as opposed to the officers' mistake or misbehavior, or that the City was deliberately indifferent. CA5.ROA.247. Separately, the magistrate recommended dismissal of Mr. Hershey's claims against the three security officers because their conduct was not "fairly attributable" to the City. CA5.ROA.279-89. The

district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendations in full. CA5.ROA.277, 296.

10. A majority of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of qualified immunity for the two police officers and dismissal of the three security guards but reversed the district court's dismissal of the *Monell* claim against Respondent Bossier City for failure to train. Ex.1 at 1-2. The Fifth Circuit published that decision in a three-sentence per curiam order that contained no legal analysis. *Id.* Instead, each judge on the panel issued a separate opinion concurring in full or concurring in part and dissenting in part.

11. Judge Ho concurred in full. He emphasized that "[t]he First Amendment protects not just the right to pray, but to preach" and "to witness," and that the "right to exercise … religion includes the right to evangelize." Ex.1 at 3. On that basis, he agreed to "remand Hershey's claim against the City of Bossier for failing to train its officers to respect the constitutional rights of its citizens." Ex.1 at 3, 10-11. Judge Ho stated that "if it were up to [him]," Mr. Hershey's "claims against the individual police officers and security guards would proceed to trial as well" because they acted under color of state authority, and their violation of Mr. Hershey's "right to evangelize on a public sidewalk" was so obvious that it should not require Mr. Hershey to even identify factually indistinguishable case law. Ex.1 at 3-6. He explained that, in the normal course, a plaintiff defending against a defendant's assertion of qualified immunity must demonstrate not only that his rights were violated but that his rights are "clearly established" by past circuit precedent with

sufficiently similar facts. *Id.* at 8. Of course, this Court held in *Hope v. Pelzer*, 536 U.S. at 741, that "general statements of the law ... may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has not previously been held unlawful," and reiterated in *Taylor v. Riojas*, 592 U.S. 7, 8-9 & n.2 (2020), that the "obviousness" of a constitutional violation can be enough to overcome qualified immunity even without factually indistinguishable precedent. But Judge Ho said that the Fifth Circuit had already held that *Hope* and *Taylor*'s "obviousness exception" is applicable only in Eighth Amendment cases involving incarcerated individuals and "should not apply to obvious violations of the First Amendment." Ex.1 at 7 (quoting *Villarreal v. City of Laredo*, 94 F.4th 374, 395 (5th Cir. 2024)). And while this Court vacated *Villarreal*, the Fifth Circuit subsequently "reinstated it." Ex.1 at 8 (citing *Villarreal v. Alaniz*, 145 S. Ct. 368 (2024) & *Villarreal v. City of Laredo*, 134 F.4th 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2025)). Accordingly, because Mr. Hershey did not identify a factually indistinguishable case establishing the right to distribute religious leaflets in an arena-adjacent public form, Judge Ho "reluctantly concur[red] in affirming the grant of qualified immunity, as compelled by [the court's] (mistaken) circuit precedent." Ex.1 at. 3, 7-9, 11.

12. Judge Dennis concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with Judge Ho that "the district court erred in dismissing Hershey's *Monell* failure to train claim" because Mr. Hershey "sufficiently pleaded facts to show the City was deliberately indifferent to the violation of his First Amendment rights when it provided no training whatsoever as to an officer's duties under the First

Amendment." Ex.1 at 13-16. Judge Dennis dissented, however, from the grant of qualified immunity to the police and security officers. According to Judge Dennis, not only did "Hershey plausibly allege[] that the security guards acted under color of state law when they exercised the public function of policing," but "the law clearly established Hershey's right to leaflet in a traditional public forum without viewpoint discrimination," such that "qualified immunity is inappropriate." *Id.* at 13, 16-20. In short, Judge Dennis reasoned that "[q]ualified immunity does not protect blatant viewpoint discrimination," and "[a]ny reasonable officer would have understood that ejecting Hershey while permitting another leafleteer to remain violated the First Amendment." Ex.1 at 18-19.

13. Finally, Judge Richman concurred in part and dissented in part. According to Judge Richman, the district court's decision should have been affirmed in its entirety. To that end, she departed from Judges Ho and Dennis on Mr. Hershey's *Monell* claim, submitting that the panel's decision to allow that claim to proceed "radically expands *Monell* municipal liability." Ex.1 at 22, 38-47 (footnote omitted). As to qualified immunity, Judge Richman agreed with Judge Ho's ultimate position to affirm the district court's grant of immunity because Mr. Hershey had "not cited decisions that clearly establish that the conduct of" the officers "violated First Amendment rights." Ex.1 at 33-38.

14. Respondent Bossier City petitioned for rehearing en banc on the panel majority's decision to revive Mr. Hershey's *Monell* claim, but the en banc Fifth Circuit denied the City's petition on December 18, 2025 (Exhibit 2). At the request of one of

its members, the court was polled: Seven judges voted in favor of rehearing and ten voted against. Ex.2 at 2.

15. Judge Ho issued a separate opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc. *Id.* at 3-23. He reiterated his position that "[g]overning precedent does not … foreclose municipal liability under *Monell*" in this case. *Id.* at 4. As to qualified immunity, he recounted the Fifth Circuit's erroneous (but binding) circuit precedent that, in his view, cabined *Hope* and *Taylor*'s obviousness exception to qualified immunity to Eighth Amendment cases. *Id.* at 6. He also highlighted the "[n]umerous religious liberty organizations and other public interest groups" that have criticized the Fifth Circuit's approach to qualified immunity "for refusing to apply the obviousness exception to the First Amendment." *Id.* at 10-12. In the end, Judge Ho made clear that he voted to deny en banc rehearing because the City's petition was "solely about *Monell*," not about qualified immunity. *Id.* at 14. To the extent the en banc court, or the panel, was willing to either re-think or narrowly construe its past precedent, he would "vote for rehearing" and declare that "the obviousness exception of *Hope* and *Taylor* applies to the First Amendment." *Id.* at 14.

16. Judge Oldham, joined by Judges Jones, Smith, Richman, Duncan, Engelhardt, and Wilson, issued a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc. *Id.* at 24-35. According to that group, the four opinions issued by the three-judge panel in this case require a "Venn diagram[] to understand," and for that reason alone the case requires en banc review. *Id.* at 25. The dissenting judges also disagreed with the panel's splintered decision to allow Mr. Hershey's *Monell*

claim to proceed past the pleadings stage. *See Id.* at 26-29. As to qualified immunity, the dissenting judges would have granted en banc review to make clear that pre-existing Fifth Circuit precedent does not, as Judge Ho found, "forever and for all reasons reject obviousness as a ground for denying qualified immunity" in the First Amendment context. *Id.* at 30. "But insofar as" the Fifth Circuit's precedent "held what Judge Ho says it held, that is *all the more reason* to go en banc and to do so immediately." *Id.* at 32. Accordingly, the dissenters chided Judge Ho for arguing that the Fifth Circuit has adopted an erroneous approach to qualified immunity in the First Amendment context but declining to "go en banc to fix it." *Id.* at 29-31. The dissenters "would have granted en banc rehearing to" settle the circuit's application of qualified immunity in the First Amendment context, among other issues. *Id.* at 35.

17. After the denial of the City's en banc petition, the panel sua sponte considered and denied panel rehearing on January 13, 2026 (Exhibit 3). Judge Ho issued a separate opening now dissenting from the denial of panel rehearing. He "would have granted panel rehearing, and taken the en banc dissental"—which Judge Richman joined—"at is word, regarding [the] sudden and profoundly surprising change of heart on qualified immunity." Ex.3 at 2. In his view, "[p]anel rehearing would have given [Mr.] Hershey the opportunity to brief the qualified immunity issues that the [en banc] dissental purportedly welcomed him to present." *Id.*

18. Based on the various opinions on the issue of qualified immunity published during the rehearing process, Mr. Hershey subsequently filed a motion to

file an out-of-time petition for en banc rehearing on the question whether the Fifth Circuit's precedent cabining *Hope* and *Taylor*'s obviousness exception to Eighth Amendment cases should be reconsidered in light of the fact that "eight judges of th[e] Circuit … indicated they are interested in resolving th[e] confusion and specifically in this very case." CA5.Dkt.121 at 6. After hearing from the City and its two police officers, CA5.Dkt.133, the en banc court denied the motion on February 5, 2026, without comment, CA5.Dkt.136.

19. It is Applicant's understanding that his petition for writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit is due on April 13, 2026—90 days from the denial of panel rehearing on January 13, 2026. *See* Sup. Ct. R. 13.3. While Applicant is still working with newly retained appellate counsel to formulate that petition, he anticipates filing a petition that highlights how the Fifth Circuit's decision below to grant the Respondent officers qualified immunity is in direct conflict with this Court's cases. Under *Hope* and *Taylor*, public officials are not entitled to qualified immunity when they violate the Constitution in obvious ways. *See Hope*, 536 U.S. at 741; *Taylor*, 592 U.S. at 9. The obvious violation may be "inherent" in the act, *Hope*, 536 U.S. at 745, or "a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful." *Id.* at 741 (quoting *United States v. Lanier*, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). That makes perfect sense. "[S]ometimes the most obviously unlawful things happen so rarely that a case on point is itself an unusual thing." *Browder v. City of Albuquerque*, 787 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2015)

(Gorsuch, J.). Accordingly, "it would be remarkable if the most obviously unconstitutional conduct should be the most immune from liability only because it is so flagrantly unlawful that few dare its attempt." *Id*. at 1082-83.

20. Here, Respondents officers Gilbert, Stoll, Smith, Harvey, and Tucker obviously violated Mr. Hershey's First Amendment rights when they forced him (and only him) off of a public sidewalk at the threat of imprisonment if he ever returned to distribute his religious leaflets. "Any reasonable officer would have understood that ejecting [Mr.] Hershey" for his religious leafletting "violated the First Amendment"—especially considering they singled out his religious leafletting "while permitting another [commercial] leafleteer to remain." Ex.1 at 18-19 (Ho, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As this Court observed nearly a century ago, "[t]he hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism—as old as the history of printing presses." *Murdock v. Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943). So anyone who is "rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion"—a right that obviously "extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word." *Jamison v. Texas*, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943). The Fifth Circuit's grant of qualified immunity to the Respondent officers ignores the obviousness of the officers' Constitutional violation, and all because Fifth Circuit precedent has purportedly treated *Hope* and *Taylor*'s obviousness exception as mere "dicta," *Morgan v. Swanson*, 659 F.3d 359, 373 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc), or otherwise cabined it to the Eighth Amendment context, *see*

pp.8-10, *supra.* But nothing in this Court's decisions supports either theory. Indeed, multiple other circuits have rightfully applied *Hope* and *Taylor* beyond the Eighth Amendment context, denying qualified immunity in the First Amendment context on obviousness grounds. *See, e.g.*, *Bailey v. Wheeler*, 843 F.3d 473, 484-85 (11th Cir. 2016); *MacIntosh v. Clous*, 69 F.4th 309, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2023).[1] The "oddity" of the Fifth Circuit's contrary approach—which ultimately "treat[s] claims from incarcerated criminals more favorably than law-abiding citizens," Ex.2 at 6 (Ho, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc)—cries out for this Court's attention.

21. So too does the exceptional importance of the question presented. As this Court has already made clear, "[t]here can be no doubt that the First Amendment protects the right to pray"—even in the absence of a case so holding. *Sause v. Bauer*, 585 U.S. 957, 959 (2018) (per curiam) (reversing grant of qualified immunity to police officers who harassed someone kneeling in prayer). The same must be true for the right to evangelize in the public square, which "has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years," as people of faith "carry the Gospel to thousands upon thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations to win adherents." *Murdock*, 319 U.S. at 108-09. That form of speech is so obviously important to our constitutional order that it "occupies the same high estate under the

[1] *See also, e.g.*, *Diaz-Bigio v. Santini*, 652 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2011) (indicating that the standards articulated in *Hope* and its progeny apply in the First Amendment context); *Nagle v. Marron*, 663 F.3d 100, 115-116 (2nd Cir. 2011); *McGreevy v. Stroup*, 413 F.3d 359, 366 (3rd Cir. 2005) (same); *Tobey v. Jones*, 706 F.3d 379, 391 & n.6 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); *Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills*, 832 F.3d 785, 798 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); *Frasier v. Evans*, 992 F.3d 1003, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 2021) (same).

First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits." *Id.* at 109. Yet without this Court's intervention, public officials who feign ignorance of that right are entitled to qualified immunity for obviously violating it. That is an unacceptable reality, especially considering nearly 20% of all cases of qualified immunity in this country involve First Amendment claims. *See* Jason Tiezzi et al., Inst. for Just., *Unaccountable: How Qualified Immunity Shields a Wide Range of Government Abuses, Arbitrarily Thwarts Civil Rights, and Fails to Fulfill Its Promises*, 4, 18 (Feb. 2024), perma.cc/KSV8-BMCU.

22. Applicant's counsel, Paul D. Clement, was not involved in the proceedings below before the panel or the en banc court and was only recently retained. Applicant's counsel requires additional time to review the record, prior proceedings, and the governing precedent relevant in this case in order to prepare and file a petition for certiorari that best presents the arguments for this Court's review.

23. Mr. Clement also has substantial oral argument and briefing obligations between now and both March 18 and April 13, 2026, including oral argument in *Ninth Inning Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, Inc.*, No. 24-5493 (9th Cir.) on March 9, 2026; a petition for writ of certiorari in *Fairfield Sentry Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Citibank NA London*, No.___ (U.S.) due March 13, 2026; oral argument in *In re: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints*, No. 25-4068 (10th Cir.) on March 17, 2026; an opening brief in *AACS v. Dep't of Educ.*, No. 25-11303 (5th Cir.) due March 23, 2026; oral argument in *Doe v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints*, No. CV-25-0213

(Ariz. Sup. Ct) on March 24, 2026; a response brief in *Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP v. Executive Office of the President, et al.*, No. 25-5277 (D.C. Cir.) due March 27, 2026; and a principal and response brief in *Centripetal Networks, LLC, fka Centripetal Networks, Inc. v. Palo Alto Networks, Inc.*, Nos. 25-1167, 25-1168, 25-1359 (Fed. Cir.) due April 1, 2026.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Applicant requests that an extension of time, to and including May 13, 2026 (or alternatively April 17, 2026), be granted within which Applicant may file a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,



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