

No. _____


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Gabriel L'Ambiance Ingram,
Petitioner,

v.

United States of America,
Respondent,

APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT



To the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States and
Circuit Justice for the Fourth Circuit:

Petitioner Gabriel L'Ambiance Ingram, proceeding *pro se*, respectfully moves this Court pursuant to Rule 13.5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States for an extension of time to file a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari from the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit entered on September 15, 2025. The current deadline to file the petition is December 14, 2025, and this motion requests a 60-day extension, to and including February 12, 2026, for good cause shown as follows:

Good cause exists for this request. Two related motions to unseal Title III wiretap materials are still pending in the lower courts. One motion remains before the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, moving for the unsealing of the original Title III applications, orders, and supporting affidavits. The other is before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, asking that court to unseal the sealed volumes of the Joint Appendix that contain those same wiretap materials.

These records are central to one of the constitutional issues that will be raised in the forthcoming petition for a writ of certiorari. Because both lower courts relied on sealed wiretap information in their rulings, those materials must be reviewed before the petition can be finalized.

In addition, Petitioner is now proceeding *pro se*. Preparing the petition requires reviewing an extensive record, organizing numerous filings, and ensuring that all submissions comply with this Court's rules. Because Petitioner is incarcerated, communication and coordination are more difficult and time-consuming than under normal circumstances, making additional time necessary to complete the petition properly.

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner respectfully requests that the time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari be extended by 60 days, to and including February 12, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 13, 2025



Gabriel L'Ambiance Ingram
Petitioner, Pro Se
Inmate No. 33535-171
601 McDonough Blvd SE
Atlanta, GA 30315

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on November 13, 2025, I mailed a true and correct copy of this Application for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, properly addressed and postage prepaid, to the following:

Solicitor General of the United States

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Room 5614

Washington, DC 20530-0001

United States Attorney's Office

District of South Carolina

1441 Main Street, Suite 500

Columbia, SC 29201



Gabriel L'Ambiance Ingram

Petitioner, Pro Se

Inmate No. 33535-171

601 McDonough Blvd SE

Atlanta, GA 30315

UNPUBLISHED

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT**

No. 23-4447

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

CARL MICHAEL MANN, II, a/k/a Pike,

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 23-4448

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

GABRIEL L’AMBIANCE INGRAM, a/k/a Big Shot, a/k/a Big Shot Rock, a/k/a
Rock,

Defendant – Appellant.

No. 23-4630

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4448 Doc: 110 Filed: 06/04/2025 Pg. 2 of 6

v.

DARRELL LAROD CROCKETT, a/k/a Unc, a/k/a Croc,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (0:18-cr-00557-MGL-9; 0:18-cr-00557-MGL-3; 0:18-cr-00557-MGL-6)

Argued: May 9, 2025

Decided: August 4, 2025

Before QUATTLEBAUM, RUSHING, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: William Michael Duncan, DUNCAN & HEYDARY LAW, PLLC, Greensboro, North Carolina; Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina; Brian Michael Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellants. Andrea Gwen Hoffman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. **ON BRIEF:** Brook B. Andrews, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Carl Mann, II, Gabriel Ingram, and Darrell Crockett for their roles in a drug conspiracy and related offenses. The district court sentenced Mann to 300 months' imprisonment, Ingram to 260 months' imprisonment, and Crockett to 240 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Defendants jointly contest the district court's denial of their motion to suppress evidence and denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment. Mann also brings separate challenges to his convictions, and Ingram raises numerous additional objections to his convictions and sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

First, we consider Defendants' argument that the district court erred in denying their motion to suppress evidence obtained by a wiretap because the Government failed to demonstrate the wiretap was necessary. To receive authorization for a wiretap, the Government must submit an application containing "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). A district court may authorize a wiretap only if it determines that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." *Id.* § 2518(3)(c). We review determinations of necessity for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Wilson*, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007).

Defendants were members of a complex drug trafficking organization, and the Government sought permission to intercept communications on the phones of two members of the organization during its investigation. The Government, in the affidavit in

support of its wiretap application, explained at length the techniques that had been used up to that point in the investigation, including physical surveillance, controlled purchases, confidential sources, interviews, pen registers, and financial investigation. Those tools had failed to uncover the identity of all enterprise members and co-conspirators, including the sources of supply for the narcotics. The Government's affidavit explained why other techniques were unlikely to succeed and why a wiretap was necessary to identify the out-of-district sources of the drugs.

We conclude that the authorizing court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the Government had submitted sufficient facts to show the need for the wiretap. The Government carried its burden to “present specific factual information sufficient to establish that it ha[d] encountered difficulties in penetrating the criminal enterprise or in gathering evidence . . . [such that] wiretapping bec[a]me[] reasonable,” despite “the statutory preference for less intrusive techniques.” *United States v. Smith*, 31 F.3d 1294, 1298 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Defendants’ motion to suppress the wiretap evidence.

Second, we consider Defendants’ argument that the district court should have dismissed the indictment because of a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Mann and Crockett waived any right to dismissal because they did not “move to dismiss the charges before the start of trial.” *United States v. Henry*, 538 F.3d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 2008); *see* 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Ingram filed a timely motion to dismiss, but his objection fails on the merits.

The Speedy Trial Act instructs that the trial of a defendant charged in an indictment “shall commence within seventy days from the filing date . . . of the . . . indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). However, various delays are excluded from the seventy-day period, such as “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted . . . on the basis of [the court’s] findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” *Id.* § 3161(h)(7)(A). If the district court grants one codefendant’s motion to continue, that time generally is excluded as to all codefendants. *United States v. Shealey*, 641 F.3d 627, 632 (4th Cir. 2011); *see* 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6). We review a district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act de novo and its factual findings for clear error. *United States v. Pair*, 84 F.4th 577, 582 (4th Cir. 2023), *cert. denied*, 144 S. Ct. 2589 (2024).

Ingram takes issue with a continuance the district court granted from April 2022 to August 2022 based on the motions of two of his codefendants, Mann and Hemphill. Mann and Hemphill each requested a continuance because they had recently received new attorneys, who needed additional time to prepare for trial. On appeal, Ingram contends that the continuance was unreasonable and should not be excluded for Speedy Trial purposes because Hemphill’s motion was a result of the Government’s “inexcusable delay” in moving to disqualify Hemphill’s former counsel “years after it knew of the potential conflict.” Opening Br. 81. But Ingram does not contend that a similar defect afflicts the continuance sought by Mann’s new counsel, who was appointed for reasons unrelated to

the conflict or the Government's disqualification motion. Nor does Ingram otherwise object on appeal to the district court's determination that the ends of justice warranted the April to August delay so Mann's new counsel could prepare for trial. Because that determination independently supports the entire period of delay, Ingram's argument fails and the district court did not err in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.

Finally, we have also considered Ingram's and Mann's numerous other arguments on appeal. After reviewing the briefs and hearing oral argument, we find no reversible error.

AFFIRMED

FILED: August 4, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4447 (L), US v. Carl Mann, II
0:18-cr-00557-MGL-9

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Judgment was entered on this date in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please be advised of the following time periods:

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI: The time to file a petition for writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the judgment sought to be reviewed, and not from the date of issuance of the mandate. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the court of appeals, the time to file the petition for writ of certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the denial of the petition for rehearing or, if the petition for rehearing is granted, the subsequent entry of judgment. See Rule 13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States; www.supremecourt.gov.

VOUCHERS FOR PAYMENT OF APPOINTED OR ASSIGNED

COUNSEL: Vouchers must be submitted within 60 days of entry of judgment or denial of rehearing, whichever is later. If counsel files a petition for certiorari, the 60-day period runs from filing the certiorari petition. (Loc. R. 46(d)). If payment is being made from CJA funds, counsel should submit the CJA 20 or CJA 30 Voucher through the CJA eVoucher system. In cases not covered by the Criminal Justice Act, counsel should submit the Assigned Counsel Voucher to the clerk's office for payment from the Attorney Admission Fund. An Assigned Counsel Voucher will be sent to counsel shortly after entry of judgment. Forms and instructions are also available on the court's website, www.ca4.uscourts.gov, or from the clerk's office.

BILL OF COSTS: A party to whom costs are allowable, who desires taxation of costs, shall file a Bill of Costs within 14 calendar days of entry of judgment. (FRAP 39, Loc. R. 39(b)).

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN

BANC: A petition for rehearing must be filed within 14 calendar days after entry of judgment, except that in civil cases in which the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the petition must be filed within 45 days after entry of judgment. A petition for rehearing en banc must be filed within the same time limits and in the same document as the petition for rehearing and must be clearly identified in the title. The only grounds for an extension of time to file a petition for rehearing are the death or serious illness of counsel or a family member (or of a party or family member in pro se cases) or an extraordinary circumstance wholly beyond the control of counsel or a party proceeding without counsel.

Each case number to which the petition applies must be listed on the petition and included in the docket entry to identify the cases to which the petition applies. A timely filed petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc stays the mandate and tolls the running of time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. In consolidated criminal appeals, the filing of a petition for rehearing does not stay the mandate as to co-defendants not joining in the petition for rehearing. In consolidated civil appeals arising from the same civil action, the court's mandate will issue at the same time in all appeals.

A petition for rehearing must contain an introduction stating that, in counsel's judgment, one or more of the following situations exist: (1) a material factual or legal matter was overlooked; (2) a change in the law occurred after submission of the case and was overlooked; (3) the opinion conflicts with a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, this court, or another court of appeals, and the conflict was not addressed; or (4) the case involves one or more questions of exceptional importance. A petition for rehearing, with or without a petition for rehearing en banc, may not exceed 3900 words if prepared by computer and may not exceed 15 pages if handwritten or prepared on a typewriter. Copies are not required unless requested by the court. (FRAP 40, Loc. R. 40(c)).

MANDATE: In original proceedings before this court, there is no mandate. Unless the court shortens or extends the time, in all other cases, the mandate issues 7 days after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing. A timely petition for rehearing, petition for rehearing en banc, or motion to stay the mandate will stay issuance of the mandate. If the petition or motion is denied, the mandate will issue 7 days later. A motion to stay the mandate will ordinarily be denied, unless the motion presents a substantial question or otherwise sets forth good or probable cause for a stay. (FRAP 41, Loc. R. 41).

FILED: August 4, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4447 (L)
(0:18-cr-00557-MGL-9)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

CARL MICHAEL MANN, II, a/k/a Pike

Defendant - Appellant

No. 23-4448
(0:18-cr-00557-MGL-3)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GABRIEL L'AMBIANCE INGRAM, a/k/a Big Shot, a/k/a Big Shot Rock, a/k/a
Rock

Defendant - Appellant

No. 23-4630
(0:18-cr-00557-MGL-6)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

DARRELL LAROD CROCKETT, a/k/a Unc, a/k/a Croc

Defendant - Appellant

J U D G M E N T

In accordance with the decision of this court, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

This judgment shall take effect upon issuance of this court's mandate in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 41.

/s/ NWAMAKA ANOWI, CLERK

FILED: September 15, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4448
(0:18-cr-00557-MGL-3)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

GABRIEL L'AMBIANCE INGRAM, a/k/a Big Shot, a/k/a Big Shot Rock, a/k/a
Rock

Defendant - Appellant

O R D E R

The court denies the petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll under Fed. R. App. P. 40 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge Quattlebaum, Judge Rushing, and Judge Heytens.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk