

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DAVID JOSEPH PITTMAN,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION

CAPITAL CASE

DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: September 17, 2025, at 6:00 p.m.

To the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States:

The State of Florida has scheduled the execution of Petitioner David Pittman
for Wednesday, September 17, 2025, at 6:00 pm ET. Pursuant to the Supreme Court
Rule 23 and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f), Mr. Pittman respectfully requests a stay of execution

pending the disposition of his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari accompanying this application.

STANDARDS FOR A STAY OF EXECUTION

The standards for granting a stay of execution are well established. *Barefoot v. Estelle*, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983). There ““must be a reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court’s decision; and there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed.”” *Id.* (quoting *White v. Florida*, 458 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1982) (Powell, J., in chambers)).

PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED A STAY OF EXECUTION

The questions raised in Pittman’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari are sufficiently meritorious for a grant of a writ of certiorari. The underlying issues present significant, compelling questions of constitutional law and a stay is necessary to avoid Pittman being executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. *Panetti v. Quarterman*, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), *Ford v. Wainwright*, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and *Madison v. Alabama*, 139 S. Ct. 718 (2019).

It is indisputable Pittman will be irreparably harmed if his execution is allowed to go forward, and the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of a stay. Florida’s interest in the timely enforcement of judgments handed down by its courts must be weighed against Pittman’s continued interest in his life. See Ohio Adult

Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (“[I]t is incorrect . . . to say that a prisoner has been deprived of all interest in his life before his execution.”)(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). Florida has a minimal interest in finality and efficient enforcement of judgments, while Pittman has a right and significant interest in ensuring that his execution comports with the Constitution. In addition, the irreversible nature of the death penalty supports granting a stay. “[A] death sentence cannot begin to be carried out by the State while substantial legal issues remain outstanding.” *Barefoot*, 463 U.S. at 888. Should this Court grant the request for a stay and review of the underlying petition, Pittman submits there is a significant possibility of the lower court’s reversal. This Court’s intervention is urgently needed to prevent Pittman’s imminent execution despite the protections from the death penalty provided by the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the State of Florida runs the imminent risk of executing an intellectually disabled person, contrary to the provisions of the Eighth Amendment.

Pittman’s case presents two significant constitutional issues, which need to be fully addressed by this Court free from the extreme time constraints set by the warrant signed on August 15, 2025. Pittman’s execution is scheduled for September 17, 2025. Pittman respectfully requests this Court enter a stay of execution.

As detailed in Pittman’s contemporaneous petition for writ of certiorari, due to Florida’s erroneous interpretation of federal law, and its insistence on placing a time bar on intellectual disability claims, the State of Florida will execute an intellectually disabled defendant, in violation of the United States Constitution. Mr. Pittman, due

to the arbitrary bars and changing interpretation of federal law by the Florida's Supreme Court, Mr. Pittman, a man with a significant history of intellectual disability will be executed. Further Mr. Pittman was denied due process by being unable to fully demonstrate and prove his intellectual disability contrary to *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) and its progeny.

CONCLUSION

“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” *Armstrong v. Manzo*, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Pittman’s meritorious issues cannot possibly be heard in a meaningful manner with just days left until his execution. The important constitutional issues presented by Pittman’s case require a full appellate review that is not truncated by his imminent execution.

For the foregoing reasons, Pittman respectfully requests that this Court grant his application for a stay of Pittman’s execution scheduled for September 17, 2025, to address the compelling constitutional questions in his case on the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Julissa R. Fontán
Julissa R. Fontán
Florida Bar #0032744
Assistant Capital Collateral
Counsel
Law Office of the Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel –
Middle Region
12973 N. Telecom Parkway
Temple Terrace, FL 33637

(813)558-1600
fontan@ccmr.state.fl.us
support@ccmr.state.fl.us
Counsel of Record

/s/ Megan M. Montagno

Megan M. Montagno
Florida Bar #118819
Assistant Capital Collateral
Counsel
Law Office of the Capital
Collateral Regional Counsel –
Middle Region
12973 N. Telecom Parkway
Temple Terrace, FL 33637
(813)558-1600
montagno@ccmr.state.fl.us
support@ccmr.state.fl.us

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PROOF OF SERVICE

DEATH WARRANT SIGNED
Execution Scheduled: September 17, 2025, at 6:00 p.m.

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that on this date, September 10, 2025, as required by Supreme Court Rule 29 I have served the enclosed MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION, PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, and APPENDIX on each party to the above proceeding or that party's counsel, and on every other person required to be served, via FedEx Overnight Shipping, and also submitted the enclosed documents to the Court's electronic filing system.

The names and addresses of those served are as follows:

- 1) **Timothy Freeland**, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,
3507 East Frontage Road, Suite 200, Tampa, Florida 33607, (813)-287-7900;
timothy.freeland@myfloridalegal.com and capapp@myfloridalegal.com.
- 2) **Michael Mervine**, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General,
3507 East Frontage Road, Suite 200, Tampa, Florida 33607, (813)-287-7900;
Michael michael.mervine@myfloridalegal.com and capapp@myfloridalegal.com.
- 3) **The Florida Supreme Court**, warrant@flcourts.org.

I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on September 11, 2025

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Julissa R. Fontán

Julissa R. Fontán
Florida Bar #0032744
Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel
Law Office of the Capital Collateral
Regional Counsel - Middle Region
12973 N. Telecom Parkway
Temple Terrace, FL 33637
(813)558-1600
fontan@ccmr.state.fl.us
support@ccmr.state.fl.us
Counsel of Record

/s/ Megan M. Montagno

Megan M. Montagno
Florida Bar #118819
Assistant Capital Collateral Counsel
Law Office of the Capital Collateral
Regional Counsel - Middle Region

12973 N. Telecom Parkway
Temple Terrace, FL 33637
(813)558-1600
montagno@ccmr.state.fl.us
support@ccmr.state.fl.us

September 11, 2025
Dated