

AUG 11 2025

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Case No. **25A189**

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**In the  
United States Supreme Court**

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Mawule Tepe,

*Plaintiff—Applicant,*

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, ET AL.,

To the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh, the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court  
Of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit

Application from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit USCA6: 25-5585, 25-5588, & 25-5589

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**EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION RELIEF PENDING THE  
RESOLUTION OF THE EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF  
CERTIORARI/MANDAMUS WHICH IS UNDER REVIEW TO BE DOCKET**

**IMMEDIATE RELIEF REQUESTED**

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

## **I           QUESTIONS PRESENTED**

1.       Whether Applicant is not only entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining the proceeding pending before the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Tennessee (or EDTN) but also, whether he is entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining Respondents from unconstitutionally removing any of his cases from Bradley County Civil Circuit Court of State of Tennessee to the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Tennessee because they are not eligible to practice law at EDTN and because of EDTN's bias against Applicant.
2.       Did the courts below err in not enjoining the unconstitutional proceedings and thereby subject Applicant to a here-and-now injury that cannot be remedied after the proceeding is over?

## **II. INTRODUCTION**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), Applicant Mawule Tepe (or Tepe), respectfully files this motion to enjoin Respondents OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C., and its employees-attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow (counsels of Whirlpool Corporation), to stop unconstitutionally removing any of his cases from Bradley County Civil Circuit Court of State of Tennessee to the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Tennessee and to stop litigating the cases that are pending before EDTN since they are not eligible to practice law at EDTN.

Besides this, Applicant would like an order from this honorable court enjoining EDTN to stop exercising jurisdiction over his cases due to the unlawful practice of law of Respondents OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C., and its employees-attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow.

Moreover, Applicant would like an order from this honorable court enjoining EDTN to stop the implementation of sanctions and restrictions against him, and to enjoin EDTN to stop assigning, his cases to any of EDTN's Judges who are parties in the case *Mawule Tepe v. Clifton L Corker, et al.*, No. 3:23-cv-00423-RJC-DCK, including Hon. U.S. District Judge Clifton L Corker and Hon. U.S. District Judge Curtis L Collier as well as the U.S. Magistrate Judge Christopher Steger.

In support of this motion, Plaintiff states the following:

## **III. JURISDICTION**

Injunctive relief may also be sought from an Appellate Court under the All

Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). See, e.g., *FTC v. Dean Foods Co.*, 384 U.S. 597 (1966).

#### IV. PROVISIONS

**5<sup>TH</sup> Amendment:** No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

**The U.S. Const. amend. VI:** The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to obtain evidences, to confront and to challenge the opposing parties, and to equal access to the court.

#### V. BACKGROUND

On around November 2, 2020, Applicant filed Workers Compensation Retaliation Complaint and Discrimination Claims based on National Origin before Bradley County Civil Circuit Court of State of Tennessee against WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION. To defend itself, Defendant WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION retained, as a counsel, the Law Firm OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART PC that appointed its employees Attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, and William Stewart Rutchow who removed the case to EDTN despite the fact that they are not admitted to practice law at EDTN. See State Court case *Tepe v. Whirlpool*

*Corporation et al.*, case no. V-20-00523 docketed as *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al.*, no. 1:20-cv-00332-TRM-CHS at EDTN.

Besides this, on around April 24, 2022, Applicant filed a separate complaint against WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION before Bradley County Civil Circuit Court of State of Tennessee on the ground that, after his wrongful termination, WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION unlawfully confiscated his Health Saving Account Balance, and made unlawful salary Overpayment disclosure to INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE without justification. To defend itself, Defendant WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION retained, as a counsel, the Law Firm OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART PC that appointed its employees Attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, and William Stewart Rutchow who removed the case to EDTN despite the fact that they are not admitted to practice law at EDTN. See State Court Case *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation*, case no. V-22-173 docketed as *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al.*, no. 1:22-cv-00136-TRM-CHS at EDTN.

Apart from this, on around June 26, 2023, Applicant filed a Wrongful Termination and breach of employment contract claims before Bradley County Civil Circuit Court of State of Tennessee against Whirlpool Corporation, Patton Joshua Musick, Dakia Taylor, Mark Jones, Monica Jill Culpepper, Danny Bradley, Cynthia Morrison, Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, and Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C.. On July 21, 2023, attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, and Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. unlawfully removed the case to EDTN despite the fact they are not eligible to

practice law at EDTN. See State Court Case *Tepe v. Patton Joshua Musick et al.*, case no. V-23-00390 docketed as *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00161-DCLC-CHS at EDTN.

Moreover, around May 27, 2023, Applicant filed a Workers Compensation Claims before Bradley County Civil Circuit Court of State of Tennessee against WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION. On June 28, 2023, attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Steward Rutchow, of the law firm Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. unlawfully removed this latest case to EDTN despite the fact they are not eligible to practice law at EDTN. See State Court Case *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation*, case no. V-23-00356 docketed as *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00144-DCLC-CHS at EDTN.

Moreover, around September, 2024, Plaintiff filed a separate lawsuit before Bradley County Civil Circuit Court of State of Tennessee against Connor McCarthy Blair, Erik Halvorson, Frankie Neil Spero, BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP, Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C., Derek Wayne Mullins, Justin Michael Sveadas, BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ P.C., WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, DAKIA TAYLOR, MARK JONES, PATTON JOSHUA MUSICK, MONICA JILL CULPEPPER, CLEVELAND HIGH SCHOOL, CLEVELAND CITY, and JONE DOE. See State Court Case *Tepe v. Blair et al.*, case no. V-24-00520 docketed as *Tepe v. Blair et al.*, no. 1:24-cv-00338-DCLC-CHS at EDTN. On October 14, 2024, attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Steward Rutchow, of the law firm Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. including others counsels unlawfully removed this latest case to EDTN despite the fact they are not eligible to practice law at EDTN.

Moreover, around in May, 2025, Applicant filed a Workers Compensation Claims before Bradley County General Sessions Court of State of Tennessee against WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION. On May 19, 2025, attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Steward Rutchow, of the law firm Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C. unlawfully removed this latest case to EDTN despite the fact they are not eligible to practice law at EDTN. See State Court Case *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation*, case no. 2025-cv-1595 docketed as *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation., case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD* at EDTN. They have also failed to provide a notice of removal to Applicant. Parties have attended the Trial on May 23, 2025 at Bradley County General Sessions Court, where Attorney William Steward Rutchow informed Applicant and Hon. General Sessions Judge Andrew B. Morgan that he and Lucille Lattimore Nelson have removed the case to EDTN. Hon. General Sessions Judge Andrew B. Morgan was obliged to stay the case's proceeding pending the remanding of the case back to the General Sessions Court. On the day of May 23, 2025, once the hearing was adjourned, Mr. William Steward Rutchow, the counsel of WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, sent a Notice of Case's removal to Applicant via an email.

As presented, there is a same pattern of fraud, unethical, unlawful, and unprofessional conduct among the counsel of WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION to prevent the State Court from exercising jurisdiction over Applicant's cases. It appears that these latest counsels conspired with their clients against the State court and Applicant to impede justice. Their wrongful collusion has forced Applicant to incur

necessary costs.

These latest Respondents are fraudulently inducing their respective clients and Applicant into a protracted litigation and forcing them to incur necessary countless costs. Applicant has unsuccessfully asked EDTN to remand above referenced cases back to the State court, but EDTN has denied Applicant's requests.

Applicant has filed appeals before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to enjoin EDTN cases' proceeding and to compel the remanding of cases Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation., case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD, Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation., case no. 1:23-cv-00144-DCLC-CHS, and Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al., case no. 1:23-cv-00161-DCLC-CHS, by filing the respective appeals USCA6 No. 25-5585, 25-5588, and 25-5589. However, the Deputy Clerk Kelly L. Stephens, who is not a Judge, issued an **UNPUBLISHED** orders and Judgments dismissing the respective appeals including the Application for Injunctive Relief. See **Appendix 3, 4, & 5**. This is not the first time the Deputy Clerk Kelly L. Stephens, who is not a Judge, is issuing such unpublished orders/judgments. This type of issue is currently under review of this court.

Now, Applicant would like an order from the U.S. Supreme Court enjoining EDTN to stop exercising jurisdiction over cases Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation., case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD, Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation., case no. 1:23-cv-00144-DCLC-CHS, and Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al., case no. 1:23-cv-00161-DCLC-CHS and to remand them back to the State Courts for further proceedings.



Beside this, Applicant would like Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Dakia Taylor, Mark Jones, Patton Joshua Musick, Monica Jill Culpepper to be enjoined from removing Applicant's cases to EDTN as their respective counsel are not admitted to practice law at EDTN.

On December 12, 2022 Applicant filed a motion to challenge the qualification of attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, Emily Louise Nenni, and Frankie Neil Spero to practice laws at EDTN and/or to disqualify them for unlawful practice of laws at EDTN. Applicant requested these latest attorneys to disclose their respective oath of office along with the certificate of admission to the federal bar of EDTN. However, they have failed to produce the requested documents.

Despite the fact that attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, were not able to prove their eligibility to practice law at EDTN, Honorable U.S. District Chief Judge Travis R. McDonough issued a statement in his ruling that these latest attorneys are admitted to practice law at EDTN. **See Appendix 1.** He stated the following:

"Tepe has also filed motions to challenge the qualifications of the attorneys who are representing individuals and entities he has sued.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, Tepe seeks to disqualify attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, Emily Louise Nenni, and Frankie Neil Spero based on "lack of proof of admission and/or lack of attorneys' pro hac vice status authorization." (See, e.g., Doc. 107, at 3.) Nelson was admitted to practice in this Court in 2018, Rutchow was admitted in 1995, Nenni was admitted in 2016, and Spero was admitted in 2014. Accordingly, Tepe's motions to disqualify these attorneys from practicing before this Court are DENIED."

See *Tepe v. United States et al.*, case no. 1:22-cv-00275-DCLC-CHS, ECF No. 73.

As presented, despite the failure of attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, to justify their qualification and admission to the federal bar of EDTN, they were declared eligible without justification.

According to ABA Rule 2.9(C) (on Ex Parte Communications): A judge shall not investigate facts in a matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may properly be judicially noticed.

The rationale of Rule 803(8) is to allow reliable, non-hearsay evidence. Also, in considering whether admissibility extends to conclusions or opinions contained in a public record, the US Supreme Court held "[t]hat portions of investigatory reports otherwise admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) are not inadmissible merely because they state a conclusion or opinion. As long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it should be admissible along with other portions of the report." *Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey*, 488 US 153 (1988).

As presented, the statement made by Honorable U.S. District Chief Judge Travis R. McDonough is a hearsay, not admissible and not reliable. Applicant has requested these latest attorneys to disclose their respective Oath and their certificate of admission, and they have failed to disclose it. It is not therefore, the responsibility of any Judge to prove any matter on behalf these latest attorneys. Thus, these latest attorneys must be disqualified, and EDTN must be enjoined to stop its unlawful usurpation of subject matter jurisdiction.

Moreover, Applicant would like an order enjoining EDTN to stop usurping

jurisdiction, and to enjoin OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C., Lucille Lattimore Nelson, to stop litigating the respective cases they are assigned to at EDTN, and to stop removing cases from Bradley County Civil Circuit Court.

Furthermore, it appears that Applicants has filed a lawsuit, before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, against various Defendants including Hon. U.S. District Judge Clifton L Corker and Hon. U.S. District Judge Curtis L Collier as well as the U.S. Magistrate Judge Christopher Steger. See *Mawule Tepe v. Clifton L Corker, et al.*, No. 3:23-cv-00423-RJC-DCK. A case management is yet to be scheduled and Applicant is reaching out to the U.S. Supreme Court to compel the lower court to schedule a case management conference and/or to allow an amendment of the case. Despite the fact that Hon. U.S. District Judge Clifton L Corker and the U.S. Magistrate Judge Christopher Steger have a case pending against them, it appears that EDTN has assigned to the cases *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD, *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00144-DCLC-CHS, and *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00161-DCLC-CHS to them in violation of the due process clause. It is well established that No man can be a judge at his own trial. According to the due process under the 5<sup>th</sup> amendment, a fair case's proceeding required a recusal of the presiding judge. See *In re Murchison*, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (955). Thus, Applicant respectfully requests an order enjoining EDTN to stop assigning Hon. U.S. District Judge Clifton L Corker and the U.S. Magistrate Judge Christopher Steger since they have a case pending against them, and to enjoin them to stop presiding over the cases *Tepe v.*

*Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD, *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00144-DCLC-CHS, and *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00161-DCLC-CHS, and to compel EDTN to remand these latest cases back to the State Court.

## VI. LEGAL STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy. *Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway*, 489 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1974). No injunction will issue if there is an adequate remedy at law. See *Matthews v. Rodgers*, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932); *Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch*, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); *Porto Rico Telephone Co. v. P.R. Communications Auth.*, 189 F.2d 39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951). Irreparable injury is an essential prerequisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. *County of Santa Barbara v. Hickel*, 426 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 499 (1971). Temporary loss of income or other alleged injury involving only the loss of money is not irreparable injury. *Sampson v. Murray*, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974). The injury alleged must be immediate and non-speculative. *Louisiana Environmental Society, Inc. v. Coleman*, 524 F.2d 930, 933 (5th Cir. 1975). There must be a convincing showing of irreparable injury, and mere litigation expense will not suffice. *Sierra Club v. Morton*, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Even if there will be irreparable injury, the granting of a temporary injunction is not a matter of right and may be refused in the exercise of judicial discretion.

In considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, courts weigh the following four factors: (1) whether the movant has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer

irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued; (3) whether the injunction will cause substantial harm to others if it is issued; and (4) whether granting the injunction will serve the public interest. See *Tenn. Scrap Recyclers Ass'n. v. Bredesen*, 556 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009); see also *Denver Area Meat Cutters and Employers Pension Plan ex rel. Clayton Homes, Inc. v. Clayton*, 120 S.W.3d 841, 857 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). The factors to be weighed in considering whether to grant a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are the same. See *Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner*, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008).

#### **A. THE APPLICANT AS THE MOVANT IS LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS**

In order to succeed on its request for a preliminary injunction, movant must make a clear showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits. *Nanoexa Corp. v. Univ. of Chi.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95688, at \*8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010).

In a typical case, the court would require a movant to show that he is more likely than not to succeed on the merits. *SEC v. Banc de Binary, Ltd.*, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232 (D. Nev. 2013).

Whether a claim on the merits is strong enough depends on the balance of harms: the more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff's claim on the merits can be while still supporting some preliminary relief. *Colo. River Indian Tribes v. DOI*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182548, at \*99 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2015).

At an irreducible minimum, the moving party must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the merits or questions serious enough to require litigation. *Guzman v.*

*Shewry*, 552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009).

Serious questions refers to questions that cannot be resolved one way or the other at the hearing on the injunction and as to which the court perceives a need to preserve the status quo lest one side prevent resolution of the questions or execution of any judgment by altering the status quo. *EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146991, at \*21–22 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2010).

Serious questions are substantial, difficult, and doubtful, so as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation. Serious questions need not promise a certainty of success, nor even present a probability of success, but must involve a fair chance of success on the merits. *EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co.*, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146991, at \*22 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2010).

As presented above, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C., Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, keeps unlawfully removing Applicant's cases from Tennessee State Court to EDTN even though they are not admitted to practice law at EDTN. Applicant has repeatedly asked EDTN to vacate the respective cases proceeding as void and to remand them, but EDTN is not willing to do so depriving Applicant of due process, speedy trial, and justice.

Applicant is deprived of his due process rights for five (5) years now as his first case was filed in May 2019 (See *Tepe v. Whirlpool Customer Experience Center et al.*; case no: 1:c19-cv-00158), and he keeps suffering of constitutional harms and financial injuries because attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, are not eligible to practice law at EDTN but they were allowed to litigate the respective

cases' they are assigned to. Applicants has loss countless resources, money and time throughout these 5 years of litigation. Without the U.S. Supreme Court's intervention, Applicant will keep being deprived of his due process rights, and the cases resolution will be unreasonably delayed even more. Applicant has filed an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and motion to vacate and to remand before EDTN and the 6<sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeals (SCCA) with an immediate relief request. However, EDTN and SCCA have refused to meet Applicant's demand. See **Appendix 3, 4, & 5**. They have also failed to prevent unlawful cases' removal and have denied the injunctive relief request. See *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD, ECF No. 7 & 8.

Since EDTN and SCCA have failed to stop the unlawful cases' removal as well as its unconstitutional usurpation of subject matter jurisdiction, Applicant would like this honorable court to issue an order enjoining Respondents from litigating the respective case at EDTN, and to prevent EDTN from usurping jurisdiction, and to request EDTN to remand Applicant's cases back to State Court without delay.

As we can see, Workers Compensation claims, and Breach of contract are State Laws Claims and not meant to be litigated before a federal court, and Applicant has not filed above mentioned respective cases before EDTN. Applicant has properly filed them before Bradley County Civil Circuit Court but, they were unlawfully removed to EDTN.

At the current stage, Parties are not disputing the merit of cases. Applicant has attempted to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of EDTN, and that is where



the issue has begun as EDTN keeps allowing attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, and Williams Stewart Rutchow, to represent their respective client unlawfully.

Applicant is likely to succeed on the merit of the case. Applicant has filed the case *Tepe v. United States et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-00275-DCLC-CHS as collateral attack on his pending cases to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of EDTN and to vacate his respective cases' proceeding as void and null. Bases on the evidences provided in the Appendix Applicant will win on the merit. The cases' proceeding needs to be vacated for want of jurisdiction, and Applicant will be compensated if justice is properly served. As presented, Applicant will succeed on the merit in this case. Thus this Application should be granted.

#### **B. APPLICANT IS SUFFERING AND WILL KEEP SUFFERING IRREPARABLE HARM IN ABSENCE OF A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

A court cannot grant an injunction unless the movant has shown that irreparable harm is likely; the possibility of harm is insufficient to meet the movant's *Burden. Small v. Avanti Health Sys., LLC*, 661 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011).

Irreparable harm is traditionally defined as harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages. Because intangible injuries generally lack an adequate legal remedy, intangible injuries may qualify as irreparable harm. *Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer*, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014).

Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury that is sufficient to



warrant granting a preliminary injunction. *Disney Enters. v. Vid Angel, Inc.*, 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2016).

To support injunctive relief, harm must not only be irreparable, it must be imminent; establishing a threat of irreparable harm in the indefinite future is not enough. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief. *Amylin Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 456 F. App'x 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2011).

To demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must proffer probative evidence that the threatened injury is imminent and irreparable. Conclusory affidavits are insufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm. *Rubin ex rel. NLRB v. Vista Del Sol Health Servs., Inc.*, 80 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1100-01 (C.D. Cal. 2015).

As presented, Applicant is already suffering irreparable harm as not only he is deprived of his due process rights under the 5<sup>th</sup> amendments but also, he is denied access to the court, and he is prevented from challenging and confronting the opposing Parties. He is also deprived of speedy trial. In addition, Applicant is forced to spend financial resources to file Petitions with SCCA and with the U.S. Supreme Court. He is also inflicted cases' resolution delay. It is well established that "Justice delayed is Justice Denied." As presented, Applicant is denied justice by EDTN and SCCA; thus the U.S. Supreme Court must intervene to remediate the situation by stopping the unlawful usurpation of jurisdiction of EDTN and the unlawful cases' removal from the State Court to EDTN. Applicant is also under unlawful restriction

and Applicant prays this honorable court to issue an order to stop the implementation of the sanction and restriction by demanding EDTN to vacate and/or to remand Applicant's cases back to Bradley County Civil Courts. See **APPENDIX 2**, A copy of Sanctions issued by Hon. U.S. District Judge Clifton L Corker and Hon. U.S. District Chief Judge Travis R. McDonough. Applicant respectfully requests an order enjoining the implementation of these latest sanction since it violates the 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment. The rights to access the court and to confront the opposing Parties is guaranteed under the 6<sup>th</sup> Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court makes it clear that regardless how "unruly a Party is", his right to access to the court cannot be denied. In *Illinois vs. Allen Court*: U.S. Date published: Mar 31, 1970, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), 90 S. Ct. 1057, the U.S. Supreme Court makes it clear that: (Party's) Applicant's Sixth Amendment right to attend his own trial was so "absolute" that, regardless of how unruly his conduct, he could never be held to have lost that right so long as he insisted on it." As presented, Applicant never waives his rights under the Sixth Amendments. Thus, this court must enjoin EDTN to stop the implementation of sanctions against Applicant. Allowing the sanctions to keep preventing Applicant to freely litigate his cases implies denying to Applicant an access to EDTN without cause. The 5<sup>th</sup> Cir. Court of Appeals has ruled that the right of access to the Courts is basic to our system of government, and it is well established that it is one of the fundamental rights protected by the constitution. Citing: *Ryland vs. Shapiro*, 708 F.2D 967, (5TH Circuit, 1985). Thus, Applicant cannot be denied access to the court. Thus, this honorable court must enjoin EDTN to stop the implementation of those sanctions and to vacate

them as void.

### C. THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES TIPS IN THE APPLICANT'S FAVOR

In assessing whether the Applicant have met this burden, the court has a duty to balance the interests of all parties and weigh the damage to each. *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F.3d 1109, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009). The relative size and strength of each enterprise may be pertinent to this inquiry. *Gold Club-SF, LLC v. Platinum SJ Enter.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134379, at \*37 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 18, 2013). The court must evaluate the interim harm the respondents/Defendants are likely to sustain if the injunction is granted and compare it with the harm the plaintiff is likely to suffer if an injunction does not enter. *De Vico v. United States Bank*, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155622, at \*22 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2012).

The real issue is the degree of harm that will be suffered by the plaintiff or the defendant if the injunction is improperly granted or denied. *Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp.*, 315 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2002). If the balance of hardships tips strongly in a defendant's favor, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate a stronger likelihood of success on the merits. *Mitchell v. Cate*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87274, at \*28 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2014). If an applicant can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the applicant's favor and the other two Winter factors are satisfied. *Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.*, 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in

original).

As presented above and the Appendixes, none of the leading attorneys and the respective counsels OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C., Lucille Lattimore Nelson, and William Stewart Rutchow, are admitted to practice law at EDTN; therefore, they cannot remove the State Court Cases to EDTN to impede justice. As Applicant wants to litigate his cases before the States, these latest attorneys and counsels need to be enjoined to stop litigating cases at EDTN due to unlawful practice of law, and as the subject matter jurisdiction of EDTN was never properly invoked.

In above mentioned cases, none of the leading Attorneys and/or respondents will suffer an appreciable injury if this request is granted because they are not supposed to take part or to lead the respective cases at the first place, and the rule is strict about this issue. The injunctive order will make them comply with laws moving forward. Unlawful practice of law is a criminal activity and it not authorized in Tennessee. Thus, they must be enjoined to stop the unlawful practice of law.

EDTN needs to be asked to remand the cases *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD, *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00144-DCLC-CHS and *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00161-DCLC-CHS back to the State Court, and the presiding Judges needs to be asked to recuse themselves due to conflicts of interests and impartiality.

#### **D. THE INJUNCTION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST**

As argued above, the remaining questions are largely moot because of the

substantial likelihood that Applicant will prevail on his claims. For example, how can a workers compensation claims, and breach of contract claims be removed from State Court to Federal Court by a non-eligible attorney? And how can EDTN refuse to remand the cases back to the State Court? The public is losing confidence in Federal Court system because of the unlawful usurpation of subject matter jurisdiction by EDTN, and the unlawful practice of law of attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, and William Stewart Rutchow.

The public interest is served by the granting of the injunction because the public "as a whole has a significant interest in ... protection against usurpation of subject matter jurisdiction by EDTN. Pro Se Parties and the public will be reassured through the court's ruling that they can legally have justice served if the opposing Parties unlawfully represent themselves. Issuing this injunction will serve Applicant's interest and the interest of the Public since it will prevent EDTN and the respective leading Attorneys from infringing upon U.S. Citizens fundamental rights. It will also demonstrate to the Public that No men can prevent a State Court from exercising its jurisdiction over cases that it is meant to try. As presented, Applicant prays this honorable court to issue the injunction to protect him and the public.

#### **E. COURT BOND.**

Under 28 U.S. Code § 1651, the applicant for an injunction must provide a bond for the payment of costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any person who would have been wrongfully enjoined. The bond is an issue for the court to determine. See *Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus.*, 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995)

(courts "possess discretion over whether to require the posting of security.").

A bond is unnecessary and, in fact, does not make sense. The bond is to be set in the amount of "costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any person who is found to have been wrongfully restrained or enjoined." There are no costs and damages that could result. Applicant is not suing over money at this stage through this Application/motion. Indeed, Applicant is not asking for any compensatory damages through this Application for injunctive relief. This Application only seeks injunctive relief so EDTN can stop usurping jurisdiction and to stop infringing upon the fundamental rights of the Applicant. It is over 3-5 years that despite the fact that attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, and William Stewart Rutchow are not admitted to practice law at EDTN, the District Court keeps wrongfully allowing them to practice law before it. They have wrongfully colluded to deprive the State Court of its legitimate right to try Applicant's cases. Entering an injunction will fix the jurisdictional defect issues and will restore Applicant into his constitutional rights. Enjoining EDTN to stop the implementation of the restrictions and sanctions will permit Parties to litigate properly the cases.

## **VII. RELIEF REQUEST AND CONCLUSION**

Wherefore, Applicant, Mawule Tepe, respectfully requests this honorable court:

- (1) To enjoin EDTN to seize its usurpation of subject matter jurisdiction,
- (2) To enjoin EDTN to stop the implementation of sanctions and restriction against Applicant and to vacate them,

(3) to Remand the cases *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:25-cv-00164-CLC-MJD, *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00144-DCLC-CHS, and *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation et al.*, case no. 1:23-cv-00161-DCLC-CHS back to Tennessee State Court for further proceeding,

(4) To enjoin attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, and their law firm Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart P.C., to stop removing Applicant's from State Court Cases to EDTN, and to prohibit them from practicing law at EDTN unlawfully and to stop litigating any cases pending before EDTN moving forward, and

(5) To enjoin EDTN to stop assigning, to cases, any of EDTN's Judges who are parties in the case *Mawule Tepe v. Clifton L Corker, et al.*, No. 3:23-cv-00423-RJC-DCK, including Hon. U.S. District Judge Clifton L Corker and Hon. U.S. Magistrate Judge Christopher Steger, and to compel the recusal of these latest judges.

Dated: August 11, 2025

Respectfully submitted,



Mawule Tepe

#### **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

I Mawule Tepe hereby certify that the accompanying Application for Injunctive Relief complies with the word count limitations which are 5770 words. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Applicant Mawule Tepe hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing

Application is served upon U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Tennessee, The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART P.C., Lucille Lattimore Nelson, and William Stewart Rutchow electronically.

Dated: August 11, 2025

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mawule Tepe', with a stylized, cursive script.

Mawule Tepe

3403 Peerless RD NG Apt# G

Cleveland, TN 37312

Tel: +1 423 994 3805



# APPENDIX 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
AT CHATTANOOGA

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:19-cv-158
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
WHIRLPOOL CUSTOMER	)	
EXPERIENCE CENTER	)	
	)	
<i>Defendant.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:20-cv-332
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:21-cv-40
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
JAVITCH BLOCK, LLC, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-111
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA, <i>et al.</i>	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-136
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendant.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-231
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendant.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-252
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
LUCILLE LATTIMORE NELSON, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

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MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-261
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., <i>et al.</i>	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-264
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
EMILY LOUISE NENNI, <i>et al.,</i>	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-275
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, <i>et al.</i>	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

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**ORDER**

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Since 2019, Plaintiff Mawule Tepe, proceeding pro se, has initiated ten different lawsuits against various individuals and entities. His complaints, however, appear to center around two

primary issues: (1) his employment and eventual termination by Whirlpool Corporation; and (2) circumstances surrounding payment of credit card debt owed to Bank of America. Although all of his cases are related to these issues, Tepe's lawsuits name as defendants Whirlpool and Bank of America, as well as individual employees at Whirlpool, law firms and attorneys that have represented Whirlpool and Bank of America in litigation, and, in his most recent lawsuit, judges who have presided over his cases.

In December 2022, all of Tepe's lawsuits were reassigned to the undersigned. There are currently numerous motions pending across Tepe's ten cases, including numerous dispositive motions. Other motions, however, are identical motions filed in some or all of his cases and motions filed in a single case that relate to issues affecting all of his cases. On February 15, 2023, the Court held a hearing to discuss certain pending motions, as well as to discuss case management and scheduling. For the reasons set forth below, and for reasons stated during the hearing, the Court hereby **ORDERS** as follows:

**I. TEPE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE ELECTRONICALLY SIGNED ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS AND MOTION TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DISTRICT'S ELECTRONIC CASE FILING RULES AND PROCEDURES**

In his most recently filed action, Tepe argues that all orders and judgments previously entered by United States District Judges Curtis L. Collier and Katherine A. Crytzer, as well as United States Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee, must be set aside because the judges applied electronic signatures, instead of handwritten signatures, to their orders and judgments. (Doc. 30 in Case No. 1:22-cv-275). Specifically, Tepe contends that the judges' use of electronic signatures renders their orders and judgments unsigned, unauthenticated, and void. (*Id.*) Tepe has also filed a motion to challenge the constitutionality of the district's electronic case-filing rules and procedures, because it does not require judges to sign their judgments and orders by

handwritten signature. (Doc. 39 in Case No. 1:22-cv-275.) Instead, the district's case-filing rules and procedures provide that "[a]ny order or other court-issued document filed electronically without the handwritten signature of a judge or clerk has the same force and effect as if the judge or clerk had signed a paper copy of the document and it had been entered on the docket in paper form." Rule 11 of the Eastern District of Tennessee Electronic Case Filing Rules and Procedures.

In support of his argument that the judges' previously entered orders and judgments must be set aside, Tepe cites 28 U.S.C. § 1961, which provides that "[a]ll writs and process issuing from a court of the United States shall be under the seal of the court and signed by the clerk thereof." This section, however, applies only to "writs" and "process" that issue from the district court, "not orders and judgments." *See United States v. Dawes*, 161 F. App'x 742, 745 (10th Cir. 2005); *Davalos v. HSBC Bank, N.A.*, Case No. 21-10005-DJC, 2021 WL 916215, at \*2 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2021). Tepe has not demonstrated that a handwritten signature is required on the Court's orders and judgments, and he has not demonstrated that application of electronic signatures to orders and judgments entered in his cases violates his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Tepe's motion to set aside the orders and judgments entered by Judge Collier, Judge Crytzer, and Judge Lee (Doc. 30 in Case No. 1:22-cv-275) and his motion to challenge the constitutionality of the Court's electronic-case-filing rules and procedures (Doc. 39 in Case No. 1:22-cv-275) are **DENIED**.

## II. MOTIONS TO CHALLENGE ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS

Tepe has also filed motions to challenge the qualifications of the attorneys who are representing individuals and entities he has sued.<sup>1</sup> Specifically, Tepe seeks to disqualify attorneys Lucille Lattimore Nelson, William Stewart Rutchow, Emily Louise Nenni, and Frankie Neil Spero based on “lack of proof of admission and/or lack of attorneys’ pro hac vice status authorization.” (*See, e.g.*, Doc. 107, at 3.) Nelson was admitted to practice in this Court in 2018, Rutchow was admitted in 1995, Nenni was admitted in 2016, and Spero was admitted in 2014. Accordingly, Tepe’s motions to disqualify these attorneys from practicing before this Court are **DENIED**.

## III. MOTIONS FOR HEARING AND FOR SCHEDULING ORDER

In several of his cases, Tepe has filed a motion for hearing and for the Court to enter scheduling orders.<sup>2</sup> Tepe’s motions for hearing are **GRANTED** to the extent the Court held a hearing on February 15, 2023, to address issues related to his cases. Tepe’s motions for entry of scheduling orders are **GRANTED IN PART**. As discussed at the hearing, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting certain cases for trial to begin on August 28 and August 29, 2023.

## IV. MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND AMENDING COMPLAINT AS A MATTER OF COURSE UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15

In several of Tepe’s cases, he has not filed substantive responses to Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Nonetheless, he filed a motion for extension of time to respond to “pending motions,” citing his desire for the Court to rule on his motions to disqualify attorneys and his

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<sup>1</sup> Doc. 107 in Case No. 1:19-cv-158; Doc. 27 in Case No. 1:20-cv-332; Doc. 58 in Case No. 1:21-cv-40; Doc. 53 in Case No. 1:22-cv-111; Doc. 34 in Case No. 1:22-cv-136; Doc. 21 in Case No. 1:22-cv-231.

<sup>2</sup> Doc. 54 in Case No. 1:21-cv-40; Docs. 28, 30 in Case No. 1:22-cv-252; Doc. 20 in Case No. 1:22-cv-261; Doc. 31, in Case No. 1:22-cv-275.

motions to set aside the Court's previously entered orders and judgments before being required to respond. (*See, e.g.*, Doc. 108 in Case No. 1:19-cv-158.)<sup>3</sup>

Tepe's motions for extension of time are **GRANTED IN PART** and **DENIED IN PART**. The motions are **GRANTED** to the extent Tepe is ordered to substantively respond to the following motions on or before **March 1, 2023**:

- Javitch Block LLC's motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-111 (Doc. 16);
- Lucille Lattimore Nelson and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.'s motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-252 (Doc. 14);
- Bank of America, N.A.'s motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-261 (Doc. 8).

Additionally, at the hearing, Tepe represented that, in Case Nos. 1:22-cv-264<sup>4</sup> and 1:22-cv-275, rather than substantively respond to pending motions to dismiss, he intended to file an amended complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1). Tepe also indicated that he may seek to "roll up" or "consolidate" allegations and claims from previously-filed cases into his most recently filed cases, because, in Tepe's words, he "will lose" motions to dismiss those claims if he does not. For example, Tepe indicated that he may seek to include his claims against Javitch Block LLC in Case No. 1:22-cv-111 in his amended complaint against Javitch Block LLC in Case No. 1:22-cv-264. Javitch Block LLC has had a motion to

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<sup>3</sup> Doc. 108 in Case No. 1:19-cv-158; Doc. 28 in Case No. 1:20-cv-332; Doc. 57 in Case No. 1:21-cv-40; Doc. 52 in Case No. 1:22-cv-111; Doc. 33 in Case No. 1:22-cv-136; Doc. 20 in Case No. 1:22-cv-231.

<sup>4</sup> Tepe initiated this action on October 18, 2022 (Doc. 1), and, on October 20, 2022, Javitch Block LLC and Emily Nenni moved to dismiss his complaint (Doc. 4). On October 27, 2022, United States District Judge Curtis Collier stayed this case, noting that "a substantial part of the factual basis of [Tepe's] complaint involves the Court's denial of [Tepe's] motion to strike in Case No. 1:22-cv-111," which, at that time, was before the court of appeals because of Tepe's interlocutory appeal. (Doc. 12.) The Sixth Circuit has since resolved Tepe's interlocutory appeal, and Tepe has moved to lift the stay in this case. (Doc. 22.) Tepe's motion to lift the stay (Doc. 22 in Case No. 1:22-cv-264) is **GRANTED**.



dismiss pending in Case No. 1:22-cv-111 since June 15, 2022 (Doc. 16 in Case No. 1:22-cv-111), to which Tepe has not substantively responded. The Court will not permit Tepe to further delay or escape substantively responding to that motion to dismiss simply by reasserting the same allegations and claims in a subsequently filed case. Accordingly, Tepe is hereby put **ON NOTICE** that any amended complaints filed in Case Nos. 1:22-cv-264 and 1:22-cv-275 **SHALL NOT** include claims previously asserted against any of the defendants in previously-filed actions. Tepe is also hereby put **ON NOTICE** that his amended complaints **SHALL NOT** seek to relitigate matters already decided by the Court, including but not limited to, attempting to reassert claims that the Court has previously dismissed with prejudice. To the extent Tepe intends to file an amended complaint in Case Nos. 1:22-cv-264 and 1:22-cv-275, he is **ORDERED** to do so on or before **March 9, 2023**.<sup>5</sup>

**SO ORDERED.**

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

**TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH**  
**UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**

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<sup>5</sup> If Tepe elects to not file amended complaints in Case Nos. 1:22-cv-264 and 1:22-cv-275, he is hereby **ORDERED** to respond to the following motions to dismiss on or before **March 9, 2023**:

- Javitch Block LLC and Emily Nenni's motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-264 (Doc. 4);
- Javitch Block LLC and Emily Nenni's motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-275 (Doc. 6)
- Whirlpool Corporation, Patton Musick, Mark Jones, Dakia Taylor, Monica J. Culpepper, Lucile Lattimore Nelson, and Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.'s motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-275 (Doc. 8)
- Bank of America, N.A.'s motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-275 (Doc. 35); and
- United States District Judge Curtis L. Collier, United States District Court Judge Katherine A. Crytzer, and United States Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee's motion to dismiss in Case No. 1:22-cv-275 (Doc. 67).

# **APPENDIX 2**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
CHATTANOOGA DIVISION

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	1:19-CV-00158-DCLC-CHS
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
WHIRLPOOL CUSTOMER	)	
EXPERIENCE CENTER,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	1:22-CV-00231-DCLC-CHS
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	1:22-CV-00261-DCLC-CHS
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	1:22-CV-00264-DCLC-CHS
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
EMILY LOUISE NENNI, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	1:22-CV-00275-DCLC-CHS
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	1:23-CV-00093-DCLC-CHS
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
TRUIST FINANCIAL CORPORATION,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

### ORDER

Having determined that Plaintiff, Mawule Tepe, had displayed a pattern of repetitive and vexatious litigation, Chief Judge Travis R. McDonough permanently enjoined Tepe from filing any new lawsuit in this Court without first obtaining leave and detailed the required procedure to obtain such leave [*See* Doc. 74, 1:22-CV-275]. Pursuant to the Order of Recusal and Reassignment and in accordance with Standing Order 18-04, Chief Judge McDonough referred to the

undersigned consideration of whether the imposition of additional restrictions were appropriate given Tepe's history of repetitive, vexatious, and frivolous filings [*See* Doc. 86, 1:22-CV-275]. Upon review, the undersigned found that additional restrictions and injunctive measures were appropriate and stayed each of Tepe's pending cases until further order of the Court [*See* Doc. 87, 1:22-CV-275]. Additionally, the undersigned ordered that, during the stay, the parties were not to file any additional motions without prior leave of Court [*Id.*].

Thereafter, Tepe's lawsuit against Truist Financial Corporation was removed to this Court from Bradley County Circuit Court [*See* Doc. 1, 1:23-CV-93] and assigned to the undersigned. On May 15, 2023, Tepe attempted to amend the Complaint in that case to add claims against the undersigned, a "Jane Doe" Clerk's Office employee, and the attorneys of the Defendant [*See* Doc. 32, 1:23-CV-93]. The Court held that Tepe could not circumvent the injunction by adding various unrelated claims and defendants to a currently pending action and ordered the Amended Complaint stricken from the record due to Tepe's failure to comply with the required procedure outlined in the injunction [*See* Doc. 35, 1:23-CV-93].

Despite the Court's warnings and injunctions, Tepe has continued to submit frivolous and vexatious filings in his various cases. Having expended valuable time and resources handling Tepe's vexatious filings, the Court finds additional injunctive measures are necessary. Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED** that Tepe's lawsuit against Truist Financial Corporation (1:23-CV-93) is **STAYED** along with each of the above-captioned actions, pending further order of the Court. During this stay, unless explicitly ordered by the Court, the parties shall not file any motion or document without first seeking and obtaining the Court's permission. This filing restriction is supplemental to the Court's injunction and does not modify or supplant that injunction in any way [*See* Doc. 74, 1:22-CV-275].

To obtain the Court's permission prior to filing any motion or document in the above-captioned action, the parties **MUST** submit to the Court:

1. A copy of the proposed document to be filed.
2. A "Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File," which must include as exhibits:
  - a. A copy of this Order;
  - b. A declaration which has been prepared pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, or a sworn affidavit, stating that:
    - i. The document raises a new issue which has never been previously raised by the party in this or any other court;
    - ii. The claim or issue is not frivolous; and
    - iii. The document is not filed in bad faith.

The Clerk is instructed to reject any proposed filings by the parties that do not contain the required Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File and the required exhibits. The Court may deny any motion for leave to file if the proposed motion or document is frivolous, vexatious, or harassing, or otherwise fails to comply with this Order. If the motion for leave to file is denied, the document shall not be filed and will be returned to the party.


Additionally, the Clerk's Office is instructed to refrain from issuing any new subpoenas in these cases, including the issuance of blank subpoenas, until further order of the Court. The Clerk's Office should specifically reject any request to issue any subpoena in these cases and shall provide the party with a copy of this Order upon rejection.

The Court may strike any document inadvertently filed by the Clerk's Office that has not been approved for filing pursuant to this Order. A failure to comply with this Order may lead to

further sanctions. The stay and the restrictions imposed herein shall automatically apply to any cases filed by Tepe that may be removed to this Court before this stay is lifted.

It is further **ORDERED** that Tepe's Objection, Emergency Motion to Lift the Stay, and Emergency Motion to Set a Hearing [Doc. 134, 1:22-CV-158; Doc. 44, 1:22-CV-231; Doc. 63, 1:22-CV-264; Doc. 88, 1:22-CV-275] and the United States Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 71, 1:22-CV-264] are **DENIED** due to the failure to comply with this Court's order requiring prior leave of Court to file any motions [See Doc. 87, 1:22-CV-275].

**SO ORDERED:**

  
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
AT CHATTANOOGA

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:19-cv-158
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
WHIRLPOOL CUSTOMER	)	
EXPERIENCE CENTER	)	
	)	
<i>Defendant.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:20-cv-332
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:21-cv-40
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
JAVITCH BLOCK, LLC, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---



MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-111
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA, <i>et al.</i>	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-136
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendant.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-231
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendant.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-252
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
LUCILLE LATTIMORE NELSON, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-261
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., <i>et al.</i>	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-264
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
EMILY LOUISE NENNI, <i>et al.</i> ,	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

---

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	Case No. 1:22-cv-275
<i>Plaintiff,</i>	)	
	)	
v.	)	
	)	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, <i>et al.</i>	)	
	)	
<i>Defendants.</i>	)	

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**ORDER**

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Mawule Tepe filed suit against Whirlpool Corporation and related parties in May of 2019. *Tepe v. Whirlpool Customer Experience Center, et al.*, No. 1:19-cv-158 (E.D. Tenn. May

24, 2019). Since that time, Tepe has filed four additional lawsuits against Whirlpool Corporation and related parties, all of which are related to the original lawsuit.<sup>1</sup> Tepe also filed suit against Bank of America and related parties in March of 2021. *Tepe v. Javitch Block LLC, et al.*, No. 1:21-cv-040 (E.D. Tenn. March 03, 2021) (dismissed without prejudice for failure to effectuate service). Since that time, Tepe has filed five additional lawsuits against Bank of America and related parties, all of which are related to the original lawsuit.<sup>2</sup>

Beginning as early as January 2020, Tepe was recognized by the Court as a “prolific filer of motions and discovery requests....” *Tepe v. Whirlpool Customer Experience Center, et al.*, No. 1:19-cv-158, Doc. 60 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 23, 2020). The Court has repeatedly warned Tepe about his filing conduct. *See Tepe v. Nelson, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-252, Doc. 17, pp. 6-7 (Oct. 25, 2022) (outlining previous warnings by Court).

Tepe’s prolific filings have continued to increase unnecessarily. Seven of Tepe’s lawsuits were filed in 2022, five of those being within the same thirty-day period. The lawsuits duplicate allegations made in earlier lawsuits and collaterally attack orders entered in earlier lawsuits. Additionally, Tepe has begun to sue the attorneys representing the Defendants in the earlier lawsuits. *Tepe v. Nelson, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-252 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2022) and *Tepe v. Nenni, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-264 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 18, 2022). Due to the onslaught of lawsuits and

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<sup>1</sup> *See Tepe v. Whirlpool Corp., et al.*, No. 1:20-cv-332 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2020) (dismissed, with prejudice, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim); *Tepe v. Whirlpool Corp., et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-136 (E.D. Tenn. May 25, 2022) (dismissed without prejudice for failure to effectuate service); *Tepe v. Nelson, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-252 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 2022); and *Tepe v. United States, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-275 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 08, 2022).

<sup>2</sup> *Tepe v. Bank of America, et al.*, 1:22-cv-111 (E.D. Tenn. May 09, 2022); *Tepe v. Bank of America, et al.*, 1:22-cv-231 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 09, 2022); *Tepe v. Bank of America N.A., et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-261 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 14, 2022); *Tepe v. Nenni*, No. 1:22-cv-264 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2022); and *Tepe v. United States, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-275 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 08, 2022).

motions therein, both the Bank of America Defendants and the Whirlpool Corporation Defendants have moved for protective orders against Tepe. *See Tepe v. Nelson, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-252, Doc. 17 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 2022) and *Tepe v. United States, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-275, Doc. 38 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 01, 2022) (“Short of entry of a Vexatious Litigant Order, there is no end in sight to Plaintiff’s dilatory, duplicative, and bad faith conduct. Plaintiff continues to abuse the federal court system by harassing BANA, its counsel . . . with frivolous litigation, discovery requests, and filings.”). Accordingly, pursuant to Standing Order 18-04 (Aug. 2018), the Court referred Tepe to Chief Judge Travis R. McDonough for consideration of whether to implement a filing injunction against Tepe. *Tepe v. United States, et al.*, No. 1:22-cv-275, Doc. 10 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 15, 2022) (Order).

On February 15, 2023, the Court held a hearing in Tepe’s cases. At the hearing, Tepe represented that he is considering filing additional lawsuits, including a potential lawsuit against judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit based on that court’s dismissal of his appeals in Case Nos. 1:21-cv-40 and 1:22-cv-111. Moreover, Tepe also indicated that he intends to continue his practice of including allegations and claims from previously-filed cases, many of which are still pending before the Court, in new lawsuits or amended complaints in more recently-filed lawsuits to avoid substantively responding to pending motions to dismiss, or, alternatively, to attempt to revive claims already dismissed by the Court. In other words, Tepe has made clear that he intends to continue taxing the Court’s resources with his filings absent Court intervention.

The Court has the authority to restrict prolific litigants from repeatedly filing frivolous matters without first obtaining leave of court. *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 43-50 (1991); *Jones v. Kolb*, 91 Fed. Appx. 367, 369 (6th Cir. 2003). The Sixth Circuit has determined

that restricting prolific litigators from filing any document without prior approval by the Court is a proper method for handling the complaints of prolific litigators. *Filipas v. Lemons*, 835 F.2d 1145, 1145 (6th Cir. 1987); *Feathers v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.*, 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998). “A prefiling review requirement is a judicially imposed remedy whereby a plaintiff must obtain leave of the district court to assure that the claims are not frivolous or harassing” and such a requirement is appropriate when a litigant has demonstrated a pattern of repetitive or vexatious litigation, particularly where “a litigant is merely attempting to collaterally attack prior unsuccessful suits.” *Raimondo v. United States*, No. , 2022 WL 3581144 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2022)

Here, Tepe has shown a pattern of repetitive and vexatious litigation as well as a pattern of attempting to collaterally attack prior unsuccessful suits. Considering Tepe’s history, the Court finds that nothing less than an injunction will likely be adequate to prevent future frivolous and vexatious filings in this Court.

Accordingly, Mawule Tepe is hereby permanently **ENJOINED** from filing any new lawsuit in this Court without first seeking and obtaining the Court’s permission to file.<sup>3</sup> To obtain the Court’s permission to file, Tepe **MUST** submit to the Court:

1. A copy of the proposed petition or complaint to be filed.
2. A “Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File,” which must include as exhibits:
  - a. A copy of this Order;

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<sup>3</sup> At this time, the Court’s injunction is limited to enjoining Tepe from filing new lawsuits without permission from the Court. Tepe’s filing history, however, includes numerous instances of frivolous motions practice, including, but not limited to, seeking to disqualify opposing counsel from appearing in his cases premised on his baseless assertion that opposing counsel are not admitted to practice before this Court. If Tepe continues to engage in frivolous motions practice that detracts from addressing the underlying merits of his claims, the Court will consider whether additional restrictions are appropriate.

- b. A declaration which has been prepared pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, or a sworn affidavit, certifying that:
  - i. the petition or complaint raises a new issue which has never been previously raised by him in this or any other court;
  - ii. the claims asserted in the petition or complaint are not frivolous; and
  - iii. the petition or complaint is not filed in bad faith.
- c. A statement that lists:
  - i. the full caption of each and every suit which has been previously filed by him or on his behalf in any court against each and every defendant named in any new suit he wishes to file, and
  - ii. the full caption of each and every suit which he has currently pending.

The Clerk is instructed to reject any proposed filings by Tepe that do not contain the required Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File and exhibits. The Court may deny any motion for leave to file if the proposed document is frivolous, vexatious, harassing, or otherwise fails to comply with this Order. If the motion is denied, the proposed document shall not be filed and will be returned to Tepe.

The Court may dismiss any action initiated by the inadvertent filing by the Clerk's Office of any petition or complaint submitted by Tepe that has not been approved for filing pursuant to this Order. A failure to comply with this Order may lead to further sanctions.<sup>4</sup>

**SO ORDERED.**

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

**TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH**  
**UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**

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<sup>4</sup> In several of his cases, named defendants have filed motions for protective order or for sanctions based on Tepe's repetitive filings. (See Doc. 115 in Case No. 1:19-cv-158; Doc. 16 in Case No. 1:22-cv-252; Doc. 24 in Case No. 1:22-cv-252; Doc. 20 in Case No. 1:22-cv-261; Docs. 6, 37 in Case No. 1:22-cv-275). Those motions for protective orders are **GRANTED** to the extent they are consistent with the Court's filing injunction and are otherwise **DENIED**.

# APPENDIX 3





No. 25-5585

- 2 -

pending appeal. Whirlpool moves to dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Tepe has filed a motion to strike the motion to dismiss and to have Whirlpool's counsel disqualified.

As with Tepe's prior appeal, we lack jurisdiction. Tepe's notice of appeal is untimely, as no orders have been filed since the March 1, 2024, order staying the case. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). Compliance with the filing deadline in § 2107(a) is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite that this court may not waive. *See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi.*, 583 U.S. 17, 25-27 (2017); *Bowles v. Russell*, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

It is therefore ordered that Whirlpool's motion to dismiss is **GRANTED** and the appeal is **DISMISSED**. Tepe's motion for an injunction pending appeal is **DISMISSED** as **MOOT**. Tepe's motion to strike and for disqualification is **DENIED**.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

**United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit**

**U.S. Mail Notice of Docket Activity**

The following transaction was filed on 08/01/2025.

**Case Name:** Mawule Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation

**Case Number:** 25-5585

**Docket Text:**

ORDER filed: It is ordered that Whirlpool's motion to dismiss [7377112-2] is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED. Tepe's motion for an injunction pending appeal [7375215-2] is DISMISSED as MOOT. Tepe's motion to strike and for disqualification [7379188-2] is DENIED. No mandate to issue, decision not for publication. Eric L. Clay, Circuit Judge; David W. McKeague, Circuit Judge and Amul R. Thapar, Circuit Judge.

**The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:**

Document Description: Order


**Notice will be sent to:**

Mr. Mawule Tepe  
3403 Peerless Road, N.W.  
Apartment G  
Cleveland, TN 37312

**A copy of this notice will be issued to:**

Ms. Lucille Lattimore Nelson  
Mr. William Stewart Rutchow  
Ms. LeAnna Wilson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT



No. 25-5585

MAWULE TEPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

**JUDGMENT**

THIS MATTER came before the court upon consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

**ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT**

Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

# APPENDIX 4



No. 25-5588

- 2 -

lack of jurisdiction. Tepe has filed a motion to strike the motion to dismiss and to have counsel for the defendants-appellees disqualified.

As with Tepe's prior appeal, we lack jurisdiction. Tepe's notice of appeal is untimely, as no orders have been filed since the March 1, 2024, order staying the case. *See* Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). Compliance with the filing deadline in § 2107(a) is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite that this court may not waive. *See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi.*, 583 U.S. 17, 25-27 (2017); *Bowles v. Russell*, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

The motion to dismiss is **GRANTED** and the appeal is **DISMISSED**. Tepe's motion for an injunction pending appeal is **DISMISSED** as **MOOT**. Tepe's motion to strike and for disqualification is **DENIED**.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

**United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit**

**U.S. Mail Notice of Docket Activity**

The following transaction was filed on 08/01/2025.

**Case Name:** Mawule Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation, et al

**Case Number:** 25-5588

**Docket Text:**

ORDER filed: The motion to dismiss [7377115-2] is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED. Tepe's motion for an injunction pending appeal [7375218-2] is DISMISSED as MOOT. Tepe's motion to strike and for disqualification [7379192-2] is DENIED. No mandate to issue, decision not for publication. Eric L. Clay, Circuit Judge; David W. McKeague, Circuit Judge and Amul R. Thapar, Circuit Judge.

**The following documents(s) are associated with this transaction:**

Document Description: Order


**Notice will be sent to:**

Mr. Mawule Tepe  
3403 Peerless Road, N.W.  
Apartment G  
Cleveland, TN 37312

**A copy of this notice will be issued to:**

Ms. Lucille Lattimore Nelson  
Mr. William Stewart Rutchow  
Ms. LeAnna Wilson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT



No. 25-5588

MAWULE TEPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

**JUDGMENT**

THIS MATTER came before the court upon consideration of defendants' motion to dismiss.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

**ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT**

  
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk



# APPENDIX 5

**NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION**

No. 25-5589

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT**FILED**

Aug 1, 2025

KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

MAWULE TEPE,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff-Appellant,	)	
	)	ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v.	)	STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
	)	THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,	)	TENNESSEE
	)	
Defendant-Appellee.	)	

**ORDER**

Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

This matter is before the court upon a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Mawule Tepe was discharged by Whirlpool Corporation. Since 2019, he has filed at least five suits against Whirlpool. This case was filed in Tennessee state court in May 2025 and removed to federal court by Whirlpool. On May 22, 2025, the district court entered case-management orders relating to depositions, motions to dismiss, and the sealing of confidential information. The same day, the district court stayed the case per an injunction in another one of Tepe's cases that permanently enjoined him from filing any complaint or document without first seeking and receiving approval of the district court. *See In re Tepe*, No. 1:23-mc-25 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 11, 2024). On June 20, 2025, Tepe filed a notice of appeal seeking to challenge "any orders and/or judgments by the District Court." He has moved in this court for an injunction pending appeal. Whirlpool moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Tepe has moved to strike the motion to dismiss and to have Whirlpool's counsel disqualified.

This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial*

No. 25-5589

- 2 -

*Indus. Loan Corp.*, 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). Case-management orders are neither final nor amenable to interlocutory appellate review. *In re Korean Air Lines Co.*, 642 F.3d 685, 701 (9th Cir. 2011); *Torres v. Puerto Rico*, 485 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2007). And an order staying the proceedings is not immediately appealable. *See Swanson v. DeSantis*, 606 F.3d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court’s decision to grant or deny a stay of its own proceedings ‘is not ordinarily a final decision for the purposes of § 1291.’” (quoting *Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.*, 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11, (1983))).

It is therefore ordered that the motion to dismiss is **GRANTED** and the appeal is **DISMISSED**. Tepe’s motion for an injunction pending appeal is **DISMISSED** as **MOOT**. Tepe’s motion to strike and for disqualification is **DENIED**.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

  
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

**United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit**

**U.S. Mail Notice of Docket Activity**

The following transaction was filed on 08/01/2025.

**Case Name:** Mawule Tepe v. Whirlpool Corporation

**Case Number:** 25-5589

**Docket Text:**

ORDER filed: It is ordered that the motion to dismiss [7377119-2] is GRANTED and the appeal is DISMISSED. Tepe's motion for an injunction pending appeal [7375219-2] is DISMISSED as MOOT. Tepe's motion to strike and for disqualification [7379199-2] is DENIED. No mandate to issue, decision not for publication. Eric L. Clay, Circuit Judge; David W. McKeague, Circuit Judge and Amul R. Thapar, Circuit Judge.

**The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:**

Document Description: Order

**Notice will be sent to:**

Mr. Mawule Tepe  
3403 Peerless Road, N.W.  
Apartment G  
Cleveland, TN 37312

**A copy of this notice will be issued to:**

Ms. Lucille Lattimore Nelson  
Mr. William Stewart Rutchow  
Ms. LeAnna Wilson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

**FILED**  
Aug 1, 2025  
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

No. 25-5589

MAWULE TEPE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

**JUDGMENT**

THIS MATTER came before the court upon consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

**ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT**

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk