

No. 26 \_\_\_\_\_

IN THE  
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

---

Carol Ann McBratnie, *pro se*

— PETITIONER

v

Amazon.com, Inc

— RESPONDENT

---

APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME  
TO FILE A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

---



Carol Ann McBratnie, *pro se*

1130 Larkmoor Blvd

Berkley, MI 48072

248-546-5945

cammsnp@gmail.com

June 16, 2026

## APPLICATION

To the Honorable Brett Kavanaugh, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit Justice for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits:

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.5 and 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), Petitioner Carol Ann McBratnie respectfully requests a 60-day extension of the time within which to file a petition for writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in the above-captioned case.

1. The Sixth Circuit issued its opinion on March 6, 2026 (Attached at App. 1a-4a) and denied Petitioner's petition for panel rehearing *en banc* on April 29, 2026. (App. 5a-6a) Unless extended, the time to file a petition for certiorari will expire on July 28, 2026. This application is timely, as it is being filed more than ten days before a petition is currently due. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.5. The jurisdiction of the Court would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
2. Under Supreme Court Rules 13.5 and 30.1, if this application is granted, the deadline would become September 26, 2026.

Pertinent reasons for the requested extension:

3. The requested 60-day extension to file a certiorari petition is necessary both to allow the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to address a Motion to Reopen the case premised on the recent Supreme Court decision in *Flowers Foods, Inc., et al., v. Angelo Brock*, 608 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2026) [Decided May 28, 2026] (*Flowers Foods, Inc.*), which occurred after the decision in this instant case, and to accommodate a new Supreme Court Opinion rendered after the 6th Circuit rendered its' opinion into the petition for writ of certiorari.
4. *Flowers Foods, Inc., et al., v. Angelo Brock*, 608 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2026) decision upheld the decision in *Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 971 F.3d 904, 916-19 (9th Cir. 2020) (*Rittmann*) where Amazon Flex delivery drivers were determined to be FAA exempt as part of an unbroken chain of interstate commerce delivery drivers.
5. A similar argument like *Flowers Foods, Inc.* was made by Amazon in US District Court in this instant case, regarding how to “book end” delivery drivers, asserting that the Supreme Court decision in *Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon*, 596 U. S. 450 (2022) (*Saxon*) established the “book end” argument. Amazon’s argument in US District Court, Document ECF No. 25 pages 13 and 14 is attached at App. 7a-8a, argument focus starts at “...Second...” and confirms a similar “book end” argument as *Flowers Foods, Inc.*.

6. The decision in *Flowers Foods, Inc.*, just clarified conclusively, that McBratnie in this instant case, also an Amazon Flex last-mile Delivery driver (“intrastate leg of an interstate journey”), the same as the *Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 971 F.3d 904, 916-19 (9th Cir. 2020) case, is now herself conclusively FAA exempt, as Amazon Flex Delivery Drivers are a part of a “continuous journey” *Flowers Foods, Inc., et al., v. Angelo Brock*, 608 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2026) p.7:

“A shipment from one state to another under a contract for continuous carriage is interstate commerce, even as to so much of the journey as is within the limits of a single state” .

[...]

Though “a continuous carriage” may begin in one State and end in another, “much of the journey” can take place “within the limits of a single state.” Cyclopedic 548. And at least sometimes, a person can “take part,” be “employ[ed],” or be “involve[d]” in that continuous journey without leaving a State or touching vehicles that do. Black’s 661

7. The above decision was premised on *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. 557 (1871):

the Court put it, “[t]he fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one State, and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect affect the character of the trans-action.” Ibid. In other words, the steamer was “engaged in” interstate commerce even though it stayed in Michigan

8. Amazon Flex drivers are “engaged in interstate commerce even though it [the drivers of the last-leg of the journey,] stay[ed] in Michigan”. *Flowers*

Foods, Inc., et al., v. Angelo Brock, 608 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2026) p.8. Citing *The Daniel Ball*.

9. The pertinent part of the *McBratnie v Amazon* contract from ECF No. 25-7, PageID.733-734:

a. Section 11 (j)

Notwithstanding any provision in the AAA rules, the parties agree that a court of law must resolve any dispute concerning the validity and enforceability of the Agreement as a whole, the applicability of any exemption to the Federal Arbitration Act, and the validity, enforceability or interpretation of the provisions in subsections b) through i) of this Section 11. The arbitrator must resolve all other disputes, including the arbitrability of claims pursuant to such other provisions.

b. Section 12, for which the midsection is focus:

12. Governing Law.

The interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement is governed by the law of the state of Delaware without regard to its conflict of laws principles, except for Section 11 of this Agreement, which is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and applicable federal law.

If, for any reason, the Federal Arbitration Act is held by a court of competent jurisdiction not to apply to Section 11 of this Agreement, the law of the state of Delaware and the Delaware Uniform Arbitration Act, 10 Del. C. § 5701 et seq. will govern Section 11 of this Agreement, including without limitation the common law of contracts of such state **in the event that any statute could be interpreted as limiting the right of Amazon or you to arbitrate disputes** pursuant to Section 11 of this Agreement.

Nothing in this choice of law provision shall preclude the application of Delaware law to compel arbitration if a court of competent

jurisdiction is unable to determine the application of the Federal Arbitration Act without discovery.

10. By the above contract wording, Amazon just elevated itself and Delaware State Law above the Constitution (Article VI, Paragraph 2) and Federal Laws, which would require severing of this clause.

11. In this instant case, the US District Court favored Amazon's misinterpretation of *Saxon*, using similar if not identical logic expressed by *Flowers Foods, Inc.* Amazon sought to bypass the FAA in favor of Delaware State Law on Arbitration, which has no parallel Section 1 exemption.

12. This caused in this instant case, the US District Court to allow a State Arbitration Law to supersede the FAA Section 1 exemption and override Federal Law in violation of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, Paragraph 2).

13. A State Law cannot override a federal law due to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Article VI, Paragraph 2), which establishes that federal law is the "supreme law of the land." Any conflict between State and Federal law, demands that Federal law takes precedence:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,

any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

14. The status of last mile drivers were left sufficiently vague in *Saxon*. The Supreme Court decision in *Flowers Foods, Inc.* just corrected that vagueness.

15. The US District Court documented bypassing the FAA in favor of the State of Delaware Arbitration Law instead of wasting resources doing exactly what was accomplished by *Flowers Foods, Inc.* This was memorialized at ECF No. 49, PageID.1348:

In that motion, Amazon acknowledged McBratnie’s argument that her claims were covered by the Section One Exemption, but Amazon said that the Court did not need to reach that argument because the Contract allowed Amazon to compel McBratnie to arbitrate her claims under either the FAA or Delaware law. (See *id.*, PageID.630.) And Amazon explained that unlike the FAA, Delaware law does not have a “carveout for . . . transportation workers.” (*Id.*, PageID.631.)

**Thus, Amazon asserted, because the Court could compel arbitration under Delaware law “even if [McBratnie’s arbitration agreement was] exempt from the FAA,” “the Court ha[d] a straightforward path to compel arbitration without having to decide whether [McBratnie’s] agreement [was] exempt from the FAA.”** (*Id.*, PageID.631, 643.)

McBratnie opposed Amazon’s motion. In her response, she argued that she could not be compelled to arbitrate because (1) her claims were covered by the Section One Exemption and (2) Delaware arbitration law did not apply. (Resp., ECF No. 26, PageID.753.)

16. In this instant case, arbitration was ordered under Delaware Law. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals asserted the interlocutory nature of said arbitration order could not be appealed. The premise the order for arbitration was

ordered under (unknown FAA Section 1 exemption status), has now been clarified by *Flowers Foods, Inc., et al., v. Angelo Brock*, 608 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2026), activating that Federal law cannot be overridden by State laws.

17. The correct argument was made by McBratnie, but the vagueness of *Saxon* caused the US District Court to not recognize that a Federal law applied which circumvents the State law they acted upon at the time the decision was made. From the District Court Order (ECF No. 49, PageID.1357-1358):

other courts have held that where, as here, (1) the question of whether the Section One Exemption applies may be a difficult one, (2) state law provides an alternative basis for compelling arbitration, and (3) it is clear that arbitration should be compelled under state law,

a court may compel arbitration under state law without resolving the difficult question of whether the Section One Exemption applies.

(McBratnie disagreed with this last part as it modified contract terms)

18. The requested 60-day extension to file a certiorari petition is necessary to review the opinion in *Flowers Foods, Inc., et al., v. Angelo Brock*, 608 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2026) and allow the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals to consider reopening their case.

Additional Reason for Certiorari:

19. Many other cases challenging the FAA Section 1 exemption, similar to *Flowers Foods, Inc.*, have also contained challenges that the at issue contracts have misclassified the workers as non-employees (Independent Contractors for Amazon, Franchisees for *Flowers Foods, Inc.*). These contracts appear written for the purpose of using the written contract to hold workers hostage to an illegal contract, implementing slavery by circumventing the FLSA and state employment protection laws, forcing those illegal contract cases into arbitration as a ‘cloaking shield’.

20. The second overriding certiorari issue is: whether an illegal worker misclassification contract can be enforced by sending it to arbitration without requiring the Court to first address if the contract misclassified the workers making the contract unenforceable. The 10th Circuit agrees:

“[a] court addressing a motion to compel arbitration . . . must first determine whether there exists an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.” *Brayman v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., Inc.*, 83 F.4th 823, 832 (10th Cir. 2023).

21. This would require the interpretation of “*illegal contract*” cases with:

*Jackson Purchase Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Loc. Union 816, Int’l Broth. Of Elec. Workers*, 646 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1981) and its’ underlying Supreme Court and 6th Circuit Opinions expressed in

- a. *Weil v. Neary*, 278 U.S. 160, 174, 49 S.Ct. 144, 149, 73 L.Ed. 243 (1929) (enforcement of an illegal contract is contrary to public policy) and

- b. *Gibbs and Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker*, 111 U.S. 597, 601, 4 S.Ct. 572, 574, 28 L.Ed. 534 (1884) and
- c. *Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 558 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1977) (on grounds of public policy clauses in a contract which violate statutory provisions are without legal effect);

22. An extension will allow for a complete and directed focus as to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sections 1-4, and where and when and what order both: illegal contracts and State Arbitration Laws, factor into the order of judicial analysis.

23. For illegal contracts: the question presented would be: if this is a first step to be performed through an independent judiciary decision, thereafter for that independent judiciary to review any severability clause language, before addressing any arbitration provision per *Brayman v. KeyPoint Gov't Sols., Inc. supra*.

24. If a judge refers an illegal contract to arbitration, that judge has taken a step blindly towards enforcing something that may be unenforceable.

25. The order of judicial analysis surrounding illegal contracts, for contracts with arbitration clauses, and severability clauses, is pertinent to many cases.


26. Necessary time to research and prepare a thorough petition that will meaningfully assist this Court and allow for seeking representation will benefit many.
27. At present, *Rittmann v Amazon* was last trying to determine how to define their FLSA class action class with Amazon asserting that newer workers were subject to their newer contract and Delaware Arbitration laws. A decision on this instant case as to whether State Arbitration laws can override the FAA Section 1 exemption would have benefit to the *Rittmann* class action and to ongoing Amazon Flex individual arbitration actions below.
28. It is estimated there are on average 5,000 Amazon Flex delivery drivers per state, premised on 15,000 arbitration claims outstanding across three select states, seeking wage correction (<https://fortune.com/2024/06/11/amazon-drivers-pay-arbitration-illinois-massachusetts-california/>).
29. A quarter of a million Amazon Flex delivery drivers were potentially misclassified per year. Inception of the Amazon Flex program was in 2013.
30. A Supreme Court decision identifying the process and order for addressing worker misclassification, arbitration laws, FAA Section 2's role (that asserts an arbitration clause is irrevocable "*save upon such grounds as exist at law*

or in equity for the revocation of any contract”), in conjunction with whether the Court or an Arbitrator gets to decide if a worker’s contract was for the illegal purpose of implementing slavery violating the FLSA, as well as whether the Court or the arbitrator gets to determine the effect of any severability clause to the contract, will benefit many cases.

31. This application will not create undue delay, nor unfairly prejudice Amazon.

32. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Petitioner respectfully requests that an order be entered granting a 60-day extension to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, to and including September 26, 2026.

33. McBratnie is aware that Mandamus to the 6th Circuit requesting their addressing the application of *Flowers Foods, Inc., et al., v. Angelo Brock*, 608 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2026) and Article VI, Paragraph 2 might be sufficient.

Respectfully submitted,  
  
Carol Ann McBratnie, pro se  
1130 Larkmoor Blvd  
Berkley, MI 48072  
248-546-5945  
cammsnp@gmail.com

June 16, 2026

## APPENDIX

Court of Appeals Opinion	1-4a
Court of Appeals Order denying petition for panel rehearing en banc	5-6a
US District Court Argument (similar to <i>Flowers Foods, Inc. “book ends”</i> )	7-8a

**NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION**

No. 25-1744

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

**FILED**  
Mar 6, 2026  
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

CAROL ANN MCBRATNIE,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff-Appellant,	)	
	)	
v.	)	ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
	)	STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
AMAZON.COM, INC.,	)	THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
	)	MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellee.	)	

**ORDER**

Before: NORRIS, BLOOMEKATZ, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.

This matter is before the court upon a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

After being terminated from her contract as an Amazon Flex Delivery Partner, Carol Ann McBratnie filed a breach of contract action and Fair Labor Standards Act against Amazon.com, Inc. Amazon moved to compel arbitration. McBratnie moved for a preliminary injunction, requesting immediate reinstatement and back pay with interest. On July 22, 2025, the district court granted the motion to compel arbitration, denied McBratnie’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and stayed the case pending the results of the arbitration. The district court also denied a motion for reconsideration. McBratnie filed a timely notice of appeal from the July 22, 2025, order.

Following the filing of McBratnie’s appellant brief, Amazon moves to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Amazon argues that the order compelling arbitration and staying the case is a non-appealable interlocutory order. It notes that, although the district court also denied McBratnie’s motion for a preliminary injunction—which is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292—McBratnie’s brief did not challenge that denial. McBratnie responded to the

No. 25-1744

- 2 -

motion to dismiss and has moved the court to take judicial notice of certain facts relating to the arbitration process.

Ordinarily, we have jurisdiction only over appeals from final decisions of a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), however, gives us interlocutory jurisdiction over a narrow set of arbitration-related decisions. *See United States ex rel. Dorsa v. Miraca Life Scis., Inc.*, 983 F.3d 885, 887-88 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16); *see also Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski*, 599 U.S. 736, 740 (2023). Under the FAA, a party may take an interlocutory appeal when a district court denies a party's motion to compel arbitration. *Coinbase*, 599 U.S. at 740. But while the Act provides for immediate appeals of orders denying motions to compel arbitration, it does not provide for immediate review of orders *granting* motions to compel arbitration. *Id.* As a result, the portion of the district court's July 22, 2025, order that granted Amazon's motion to compel arbitration is not appealable at this time. Nor is the district court's decision to stay the proceedings immediately appealable, whether under the FAA or otherwise. *See Preferred Care of Del., Inc. v. Est. of Hopkins ex rel. Hopkins*, 845 F.3d 765, 768-69 (6th Cir. 2017) (also rejecting 28 U.S.C. § 1292 as a basis for appeal); *cf. United States v. Contents of Accounts*, 629 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2011).

Our jurisdiction to review the appealed-from order is therefore limited to the district court's denial of McBratnie's motion for a preliminary injunction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Yet, as Amazon has pointed out, McBratnie's opening appellate brief makes clear that she is not pursuing an appeal of that aspect of the district court's decision. McBratnie's appellant brief makes no arguments relating to the propriety of that denial. Neither does her response to Amazon's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Rather, her response primarily argues the merits of her contract claims and alleges judicial bias. To the extent that she discusses the interlocutory nature of her appeal, she argues that the district court's order is "void" and that "[a] void order is a final decision" and that this court has jurisdiction because the district court failed to comply with Supreme Court precedent. McBratnie's only reference to the preliminary injunction points out that she not only requested injunctive relief but also requested certain pretrial hearings. Because "issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are

No. 25-1744

- 3 -

deemed waived,” *McPherson v. Kelsey*, 125 F.3d 989, 995 (6th Cir.1997), we conclude that McBratnie has waived her right to appellate review of any challenge to the denial of her preliminary injunction. And since that is the only challenge over which this Court presently has jurisdiction, affirmance is warranted.

For the foregoing reasons, Amazon’s motion to dismiss is **GRANTED in PART**. The appeal is **DISMISSED in PART** to the extent that it seeks review over the district court’s grant of Amazon’s motion to compel arbitration and accompanying stay of proceedings. The district court’s decision is otherwise **AFFIRMED**. McBratnie’s motion to take judicial notice is **DENIED** as **MOOT**.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT



---

Kelly L. Stephens, Clerk

**United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit**

**U.S. Mail Notice of Docket Activity**

The following transaction was filed on 03/06/2026.

**Case Name:** Carol McBratnie v. Amazon.com, Inc.

**Case Number:** 25-1744

**Docket Text:**

ORDER filed IT IS ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in PART. The appeal is DISMISSED in PART to the extent that it seeks review over the district court's grant of Amazon's motion to compel arbitration and accompanying stay of proceedings [7442215-2]. The district court's decision is otherwise AFFIRMED. McBratnie's motion to take judicial notice is DENIED as MOOT [7448660-2], AFFIRMED; Alan E. Norris, Rachel Bloomekatz and Whitney D. Hermandorfer, Circuit Judges.

**The following document(s) are associated with this transaction:**

Document Description: Order

**Notice will be sent to:**

Ms. Carol Ann McBratnie  
1130 Larkmoor Boulevard  
Berkley, MI 48072

**A copy of this notice will be issued to:**

Ms. Kinikia D. Essix  
Mr. Michael E. Kenneally



**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT**

Kelly L. Stephens  
Clerk

100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540  
POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE  
CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988

Tel. (513) 564-7000  
[www.ca6.uscourts.gov](http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov)

Filed: April 29, 2026

Ms. Carol Ann McBratnie  
1130 Larkmoor Boulevard  
Berkley, MI 48072

Re: Case No. 25-1744  
*Carol McBratnie v. Amazon.com, Inc.*  
Originating Case No. 2:24-cv-12914

Dear Ms. McBratnie,

The Court issued the enclosed Order today in this case.

Sincerely yours,

s/Kelly Stephens  
En Banc Coordinator: Beverly  
Direct Dial No. 513-564-7077

cc: Mr. Michael E. Kenneally

Enclosure

enforcing arbitration agreements. But unlike the FAA, Delaware law has no carveout for any transportation workers. So Plaintiff's agreement is enforceable even if it is exempt from the FAA. For this very reason, courts have compelled Amazon Flex Delivery Partners to arbitrate under the state law identified in their agreements without needing to resolve whether the agreement is exempt from the FAA. *See, e.g., Melikyan v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. 21-cv-8715, 2023 WL 4505065, at \*3 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2023); *Harper v. Amazon.com Servs. Inc. (Harper II)*, No. 19-cv-21735, 2022 WL 17751465, at \*7 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2022). The Court can, and should, do likewise in this case.

Second, Plaintiff is not exempt from the FAA. Under binding Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, the FAA's exemption must be kept to a "narrow" scope. *Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC*, 601 U.S. 246, 256 (2024) (citation omitted); *Tillman Transp., LLC v. MI Bus. Inc.*, 95 F.4th 1057, 1062 (6th Cir. 2024). The exemption is therefore confined to classes of workers "actively engaged in transportation of those goods across borders via the channels of foreign or interstate commerce." *Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon*, 596 U.S. 450, 458 (2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Amazon Flex Delivery Partners, including Plaintiff, do not fit that description. Their activity is not transportation of goods across state or national borders, but the local delivery of goods, many of which are stocked within the same state at nearby Whole Foods Market locations or warehouses that support

same-day delivery for local customers. Plaintiff is not exempt from the FAA merely because the goods may have previously been transported by *other classes of workers* across state lines. *See, e.g., Pettie v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, No. CIVDS1908923, 2023 WL 4035015, at \*1 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 25, 2023) (holding that Amazon Flex drivers are not exempt from the FAA under the Supreme Court’s *Saxon* framework).

Thus, whether under state or federal law, the Court should compel Plaintiff to arbitrate as her agreement requires.

## **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

### **A. Amazon Flex and the Terms of Service**

Amazon’s affiliates sell products through a variety of channels, including the Amazon.com website, mobile applications, and retail locations like Whole Foods Market. *See* Declaration of Nick Jones (“Jones Decl.”), ¶¶ 4-5, 12. Through a smartphone application-based program called Amazon Flex, individual independent contractor “Delivery Partners” can sign up to become eligible to perform delivery blocks. *Id.* ¶¶ 3, 6. Amazon Flex Delivery Partners use personal vehicles to make deliveries of groceries, food, and other goods to customers within their local area. *Id.* ¶¶ 6, 11-21.

To sign up with Amazon Flex, prospective Delivery Partners must download the Amazon Flex app on their phone, create an account, select a local area in which

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on June 16, 2026 a copy of this document was served on Michael E. Kenneally ([michael.kenneally@morganlewis.com](mailto:michael.kenneally@morganlewis.com)), Amazon's Counsel in the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, by email as per the parties agreement.



---

Carol Ann McBratnie, *pro se*

1130 Larkmoor Blvd

Berkley, MI 48072

248-546-5945

[cammsnp@gmail.com](mailto:cammsnp@gmail.com)

June 16, 2026

**CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

A corporate disclosure statement is not required because McBratnie is not a corporation. See Sup. Ct. R.29.6.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Carol Ann McBratnie