

No. 25-840

In the
Supreme Court of the United States

INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS FOR ETHICAL
CARE, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,

v.

BOB FERGUSON, GOVERNOR OF
WASHINGTON, ET AL.,
Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit

**BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL
HOMELESSNESS LAW CENTER AND
NATIONAL NETWORK FOR YOUTH AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS**

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INTERESTS OF AMICI¹

The National Homelessness Law Center (“NHLC”) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1989 and the only national legal advocacy organization dedicated solely to preventing homelessness. NHLC uses impact litigation, policy advocacy, and education to protect the rights of people experiencing or at risk of homelessness, and has long focused on the needs of unaccompanied youth, including LGBTQ+ youth, who are disproportionately represented among young people without a safe place to live. NHLC works with service providers, advocates, and young people across the country, including those who rely on licensed youth shelters, and it has a strong interest in preserving state laws that keep runaway and homeless youth safe, connect them to supportive services, and promote family reconciliation whenever possible.

National Network for Youth (“NN4Y”) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1974 by youth service providers to keep youth in crisis out of juvenile detention and child welfare systems and to connect them with comprehensive community-based services. NN4Y’s mission is to transform systems so that no young person in America experiences homelessness. It works in communities with youth who have

1. In compliance with U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, this brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by counsel for either party, and no person other than amici and amici’s counsel contributed monetarily to the preparation or submission of this brief.

experienced homelessness and with service providers to help accelerate progress in ending homelessness and human trafficking among young people through policy advocacy, training, and technical assistance.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioners ask this Court to open the federal courts to parents challenging state laws that impose no obligation on them, have never been applied to them, and will almost certainly never effect their families. They describe Washington’s runaway-youth shelter laws as a scheme to separate children from loving parents, conceal children’s whereabouts, and facilitate gender transitions behind parents’ backs. The laws do none of those things. They regulate licensed youth shelters and Washington’s Department of Children, Youth, and Families (“DCYF” or the “Department”). They change only *who* notifies a parent when a runaway youth seeking protected health care arrives at a licensed shelter—the Department rather than the shelter—and require the Department to offer voluntary family reconciliation services and behavioral health referrals.² They do not authorize the Department to take custody of any child, withhold information from parents, or provide gender-affirming care.³

Amici NHLC and NN4Y work with and on behalf of the young people these laws exist to protect.

2. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i), (3).

3. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.32A.082(3), 13.34.050, 13.50.100(7).

That experience, including providing legal services to homeless youth and young adults in Washington State, supplies a perspective missing from Petitioners' account. The youth who arrive at licensed shelters typically have nowhere else to go: whether they were asked to leave home or told not to come back, youth fleeing abuse and neglect, or youth whose families have been fractured by poverty, incarceration, death, or a caregiver's mental illness or substance use. For children whose parents want them home, the laws are designed to return them as quickly as possible. Once a parent asks for the child's return, a shelter cannot keep the child beyond a short window absent a court order,⁴ and the child's only practical alternative to going home is often the street.

Petitioners' standing theory depends on ignoring those realities. They posit that the law creates "concrete incentives" for their children to run away,⁵ but no Petitioner alleges that any child knows the law exists or has run away to a licensed shelter seeking gender-affirming care.⁶ Their alleged injuries arise only if a "convoluted series of events" occurs: a child runs away, reaches a licensed shelter, declines immediate reconciliation, tells a shelter worker they

4. See Wash. Rev. Code § 43.185C.265(4); *see generally* Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082.

5. Pet'rs' Br. 39.

6. Br. in Opp. 11 (hereinafter cited as "BIO"); *see* Pet'rs' Br. 3–4. Since the laws were passed, the Department has never been contacted about a runaway youth seeking gender-affirming care. *See* Wash. State Dep't of Children, Youth & Families, Licensed Homeless Shelters, <https://perma.cc/SSQ3-RTEA> (last visited Oct. 18, 2026).

are seeking gender-affirming care within the first 24-72 hours of arrival, receives and accepts a behavioral health referral from DCYF, and receives behavioral health care services.⁷ The Ninth Circuit unanimously held that this “enormity of ‘ifs’ and ‘shoulds’” cannot establish Article III injury.⁸ It was right.

Nor can Petitioners avoid that conclusion by declaring themselves the “objects” of the law.⁹ Unlike the policies in *Mirabelli v. Bonta*, 607 U.S. 492 (2026) (per curiam), which barred schools from telling parents about their children’s social gender transitions at school, this law does not aim to withhold information from parents. Amicus United States’s argument that Petitioners have a fundamental right to authority over every step related to their child’s health care¹⁰ would allow any parent to challenge any minor-consent law, which exist in most States.¹¹ Article III does not permit that result.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Petitioners lack Article III standing because they allege no actual or imminent injury. Petitioners are not the “objects” of Washington’s shelter laws, which regulate only licensed shelters and the Department and do not require parents to do or

7. See *BIO* 20 (citing Pet’rs’ App. 22a).

8. *Int’l Partners for Ethical Care Inc. v. Ferguson*, 146 F.4th 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2025). Plaintiffs “have not pled current or future injuries sufficient to confer Article III standing.” *Id.* at 844.

9. See Pet’rs’ Br. Part I.B.

10. U.S. Amicus Br. 2, 12.

11. *BIO* App. 15a–31a.

refrain from doing anything.¹² This Court’s object-of-the-law cases describe circumstances in which injury, causation, and redressability are ordinarily obvious; they do not dispense with the requirement of an actual or imminent injury.¹³ Unlike in *Mirabelli*, where school policy withheld certain information from parents whose children actually attended those schools, the laws here change only who notifies parents, and no Petitioner claims that their children ever entered a covered shelter. Nor do the laws regulate parents “through a ‘conduit.’”¹⁴ Petitioners’ asserted current harms are self-inflicted responses to hypothetical future harm, which do not establish standing. Petitioners’ theory of future risk depends on a speculative chain of contingencies, each turning on the choices of independent actors. Finally, Petitioners’ theory has no limiting principle: it would allow any parent to challenge any law concerning children based solely on discontent, worry, and uninformed conjecture. The judgment should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I. WASHINGTON’S SHELTER LAWS ARE A NARROW SAFETY NET FOR YOUTH WITH NOWHERE ELSE TO GO, AND THEIR OVERRIDING GOAL IS FAMILY REUNIFICATION.

12. See generally Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082.

13. *Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. EPA*, 606 U.S. 100, 114 (2025) (quoting *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992)).

14. Pet’rs’ Br. 23.

Each of Petitioners’ standing theories rests on incorrect assumptions about how these laws operate and whom they affect. The laws’ purpose, mechanics, and real-world operation show why Petitioners’ feared injuries are not imminent, likely, or plausible.

A. The Laws Protect Youth Who Have No Safe Home—Not Children Whose Parents Want Them Home.

Runaway and homeless youth laws exist to protect a specific, vulnerable population: young people who are homeless or have run away, who do not have a home to return to, or whose parents do not want them to return. They are not designed for, and in practice do not serve, children whose parents want them home. Approximately half of so-called “runaway” youth were in fact forced to leave home or not allowed to return,¹⁵ and at least a quarter of unaccompanied youth have experienced abuse and cannot safely return home.¹⁶

15. John Sciamanna, *HHS Releases New Study on Homeless Youth*, CWLA, [https://www.cwla.org/hhs-releases-new-study-on-homeless-](https://www.cwla.org/hhs-releases-new-study-on-homeless-youth/#:~:text=More%20than%20half%20of%20homeless%20youth%20become%20homeless%20for%20the%20first%20time%20because%20they%20are%20asked%20to%20leave%20home%20by%20a%20parent%20or%20caregiver%2C%20and%20more%20than%20half%20say%20they%20have%20tried%20to%20stay%20at%20a%20shelter%20but%20it)

[youth/#:~:text=More%20than%20half%20of%20homeless%20youth%20become%20homeless%20for%20the%20first%20time%20because%20they%20are%20asked%20to%20leave%20home%20by%20a%20parent%20or%20caregiver%2C%20and%20more%20than%20half%20say%20they%20have%20tried%20to%20stay%20at%20a%20shelter%20but%20it](https://www.cwla.org/hhs-releases-new-study-on-homeless-youth/#:~:text=More%20than%20half%20of%20homeless%20youth%20become%20homeless%20for%20the%20first%20time%20because%20they%20are%20asked%20to%20leave%20home%20by%20a%20parent%20or%20caregiver%2C%20and%20more%20than%20half%20say%20they%20have%20tried%20to%20stay%20at%20a%20shelter%20but%20it) (last visited Oct. 25, 2026).

16. Thresia B. Gambon, et al., *Runaway Youth: Caring for the Nation’s Largest Segment of Missing Children*, 145 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 2 (2020) (<https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article->

The consequences of failing to reach these young people are severe. Many spend extended periods on the street before entering shelter, one in three engage in survival sex,¹⁷ and one in three have attempted suicide.¹⁸ Suicide is the leading cause of death for unaccompanied youth without shelter, and children who experience homelessness are more likely to experience homelessness as adults.¹⁹ Among callers under 18 to the National Runaway Safeline, the reported drivers of running away include emotional or psychological abuse, physical abuse, neglect, and sexual abuse, as well as household substance use, witnessing violence, parental separation, caregiver mental illness, and a family member's incarceration.²⁰ In 2021, 24 percent of

split/145/2/e20193752/68225/Runaway-Youth-Caring-for-the-Nation-s-Largest).

17. Darla Bardine, *Consequences of Youth Homelessness*, NAT'L NETWORK FOR YOUTH (2008) (https://www.nn4youth.org/wp-content/uploads/Issue-Brief_Consequences-of-Youth-Homelessness.pdf).

18. Bahram Armoon, et al., *The Global Prevalence of Non-suicidal Self-injury, Suicide Behaviors, and Associated Risk Factors Among Runaway and Homeless Youth: A Meta-analysis*, 60 CMTY.MENTAL HEALTH J. 919 (2024) (<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10597-024-01245-y>).

19. NCSL, *Youth Homelessness Overview*, (updated May 28, 2025) (<https://www.ncsl.org/human-services/youth-homelessness-overview#:~:text=unaccompanied%20youth%20without%20shelter.%0AChildren%20who%20experience%20homelessness%20are%20also%20more%20likely%20to%20experience>).

20. National Runaway Safeline, *2024 Crisis Services & Prevention Report*, 19 (2024) (available at: https://www.1800runaway.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/NRS_2024-CSPR_FINAL.pdf).

unaccompanied youth staying in shelters were survivors of domestic violence, and nearly 8 percent were then fleeing it.²¹

Runaway and homeless youth laws respond to the reality that adolescents are at heightened risk of family conflict and dangerous behavior, and they provide a safety net for youth in difficult or unsafe situations.²² Most youth who run away avoid shelters and formal systems altogether.²³ Raising barriers to shelter does not send those youth home; it sends them to the street, producing the very harm Petitioners claim to fear—a child whose whereabouts are unknown and who is beyond any parent’s reach.

21. Meghan Henry, et al., *2021 Annual Homelessness Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress*, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (2023) (available at: <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2021-AHAR-Part-2.pdf>).

22. See Edith Fairman Cooper, *CRS Report for Congress: The Runaway and Homeless Youth Program: Administration, Funding and Legislative Actions*, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (updated Mar. 23, 2006).

23. See John A. Salois, *Exploring Due Process Rights and Litigation Strategies for Homeless Youth Under Federal Law*, MAINE L. REV., June 2025; see also, e.g., *Youth Who Experience Homelessness*, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, <https://www.nctsn.org/what-child-trauma-populations-risk/youth-who-experience-homelessness> [<https://perma.cc/D265-DY93>] (last visited Apr. 27, 2025); *What is Human Trafficking?*, NAT’L NETWORK FOR YOUTH, <https://nn4youth.org/learn/humantrafficking> [<https://perma.cc/K5YA-Y9PN>] (last visited Apr. 27, 2025); *Homelessness Among the LGBTQ Community*, NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, <https://nationalhomeless.org/lgbtq-homelessness> [<https://perma.cc/7KL7-YPL9>] (last visited Apr. 27, 2025).

B. Federal and State Law Work Together to Reunify Families.

The federal Runaway and Homeless Youth Act, 34 U.S.C. § 11201 *et seq.*, governs most programs assisting runaway and homeless youth. Congress found that “youth who have become homeless or who leave and remain away from home without parental permission, are at risk of developing, and have a disproportionate share of, serious health, behavioral, and emotional problems because they lack sufficient resources to obtain care.”²⁴ Accordingly, “many such young people, because of their age and situation, are urgently in need of temporary shelter and services....”²⁵ Congress found that such services should be developed to ensure a sense of safety and structure, belonging, self-worth and social contribution, independence and control over one’s life, and closeness in interpersonal relationships.²⁶ Programs funded under the Act include emergency shelter, street outreach, and transitional living programs for young people who cannot be reunited with their families, including those fleeing abuse and neglect.²⁷

Federal law provides a strong foundation, but providers and youth still confront logistical, legal, and practical obstacles to accessing shelter and services, and state law fills those gaps. Minor-consent and shelter-access laws are common, important tools that

24. 34 U.S.C. § 11201(1).

25. 34 U.S.C. § 11201(2).

26. 34 U.S.C. § 11201(3).

27. *See* 34 U.S.C. § 11212.

ensure youth can access community-based emergency shelter and services independent of the child welfare or juvenile justice systems.²⁸

Washington’s framework has always pursued one overriding objective: reunification.²⁹ Its laws have always reinforced the idea that “the experience and maturity of parents make them better qualified to establish guidelines beneficial to and protective of their children.”³⁰ The Legislature sought to increase children’s safety by preserving families and providing assessment, treatment, and placement services for children in need.³¹ The ultimate goal is to protect children whose behavior endangers themselves and to empower parents with assistance engaging with their children.³²

In 1995, recognizing the “need for services and assistance for parents and children who are in conflict,” the Legislature required anyone sheltering

28. See BIO App. 15a–31a.

29. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.32A.010 (“It is the intent of the legislature to: (1) Preserve, strengthen, and reconcile families experiencing problems with at-risk youth.”)

30. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.32A.010 (“The legislature further finds that it is the right and responsibility of adults to establish laws for the benefit and protection of the society; and that, in the same manner, the right and responsibility for establishing reasonable guidelines for the family unit belongs to the adults within that unit. Further, absent abuse or neglect, parents have the right to exercise control over their children. The legislature reaffirms its position stated in RCW 13.34.020 that the family unit is the fundamental resource of American life which should be nurtured and that it should remain intact in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary.”)

31. *Id.*

32. *Id.*

a runaway minor to report the child’s location to the parent, law enforcement, or the State.³³ The next year, it directed the State, upon receiving such a report, to “make a good faith attempt to notify the parent” and to “offer services designed to resolve the conflict and accomplish a reunification of the family.”³⁴ That duty, now held by DCYF, remains the centerpiece of the statute.³⁵ And the same 2023 legislation Petitioners challenge directs community support teams to “prioritize reunification between the youth and the youth’s family to the extent possible without endangering the health, safety, or welfare of the child.”³⁶

C. Washington’s Notification Framework Ensures That Parents Are Notified.

When a licensed overnight youth shelter takes in a child it knows is away from home without permission, it “must contact the youth’s parent within 72 hours, but preferably within 24 hours,” and the notice “must include the whereabouts of the youth, a description of the youth’s physical and emotional

33. 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 312, §§ 1, 34(1); *see* Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010 (“The legislature recognizes there is a need for services and assistance for parents and children who are in conflict. These conflicts are manifested by children who exhibit various behaviors including: Running away, substance abuse, serious acting out problems, mental health needs, and other behaviors that endanger themselves or others.”).

34. 1996 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 133, § 14(3).

35. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(a).

36. 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 151, § 5(1)(a).

condition, and the circumstances surrounding the youth’s contact with the shelter.”³⁷ Since 2013, if “compelling reasons” exist not to notify the parent—historically, circumstances indicating that notification would subject the minor to abuse or neglect—the shelter “must instead notify the department.”³⁸ The 2023 amendments, enacted as Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5599 (“ESSB 5599”), added a youth “seeking or receiving protected health care services” to that compelling-reasons category.³⁹

When the Department receives a shelter’s report, it “shall make a good faith attempt to notify the parent that a report has been received and offer services to the youth and the family designed to resolve the conflict including offering family reconciliation services and accomplish a reunification of the family.”⁴⁰ It must offer those services “as soon as possible, but no later than three days, excluding weekends and holidays, following the receipt of a report.”⁴¹ Before ESSB 5599 and Substitute House Bill 1406 (“SHB 1406”), there was no deadline at all.⁴² If a youth notifies the shelter that they are seeking protected health care, the Department must also “[o]ffer to make referrals on behalf of the minor for appropriate behavioral health services” and “[o]ffer

37. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i).

38. *Id.*; 2013 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 4, § 2; Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(2)(c); BIO 3–4.

39. 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 408, § 2; BIO 5–6.

40. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(a).

41. *Id.*

42. BIO 10.

services designed to resolve the conflict and accomplish a reunification of the family.”⁴³

Petitioners insist that there is “no guarantee when or if a parent will learn the fate of their runaway child.”⁴⁴ The statutory framework and Department’s policies show otherwise. Parents are notified either by the shelter upon the child’s arrival or by the Department when a compelling reason exists. The Department’s implementing memorandum requires caseworkers to contact the youth within twenty-four hours and to “[m]ake [a] good faith attempt to contact the youth’s parent or legal guardian”—at a minimum by asking the youth or shelter for parent contact information, contacting the parents, searching the agency’s FamLink records for prior contact information, and documenting those efforts.⁴⁵ Department policy further requires caseworkers to “[c]ontact the family within twenty-four hours of being assigned the case.”⁴⁶

Even when a youth refuses to provide contact information, other safeguards operate. Every licensed shelter must check the Washington State Patrol’s public missing-children information “[a]t least once every eight hours,” and if the youth is listed as missing, “must immediately notify the department” with a description of the youth’s condition and circumstances—regardless of whether the youth is seeking protected health care.⁴⁷ A parent who reports

43. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(b).

44. Pet’rs’ Br. 13–14.

45. BIO App. 2a–4a.

46. BIO App. 6a.

47. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(ii); BIO 7–8.

a child missing thus sets the system in motion toward reunification. The Department may withhold information about a minor's whereabouts and condition *only* upon determining that release "is likely to cause severe psychological or physical harm to the juvenile."⁴⁸ In short, the 2023 amendments "do[] not deny any information to parents"; they change "who notifies the parents."⁴⁹

D. Notified Parents Retain Every Right They Had Before.

Once notified by the shelter or the Department, a parent's rights are unchanged. Neither a shelter nor the Department can prevent a parent from taking the child home. Nothing in ESSB 5599 authorizes the Department to take custody of a minor because the minor seeks gender-affirming care; the Department may take custody *only* where a court finds "reasonable grounds to believe that removal is necessary to prevent imminent physical harm to the child due to child abuse or neglect."⁵⁰ The parent "remains free to pick up their child from a shelter at any time and the youth remains free to return home," whether or not anyone engages in reconciliation services.⁵¹

Nor can the Department require parents to accept services as a condition of bringing their child

48. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.50.100(7)(a); BIO 8.

49. BIO 8.

50. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.34.050, 13.34.060(1), 13.50.100(7); BIO 8.

51. BIO 9.

home. Family reconciliation services are, by the Department's own policy, "voluntary services designed to resolve problems related to family conflict."⁵² The statute requires only that the Department *offer* referrals and reconciliation services, which families "can accept or reject."⁵³ "[I]f youth and their parents elect not to undertake reconciliation services, the Department cannot make them."⁵⁴ And the laws neither direct nor permit the Department or any shelter to provide gender-affirming care.⁵⁵

E. The Statutory Design and Practical Realities Drive Youth Home, Not Away.

Petitioners' central premise that the laws make running away "attractive" ignores how the system actually works.⁵⁶ The policy goal and practical reality are the same: reunifying youth with their families as quickly as possible.⁵⁷

First, the statute's incentives point strongly toward quick reunification. A minor may authorize his or her own continued stay in a licensed shelter for up to 90 days in only two circumstances: when the

52. BIO App. 5a.

53. BIO 9; *see* Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(b).

54. BIO 9.

55. BIO 1, 9.

56. Pet'rs' Br. 39 (quoting Pet. App. 61a (Tung, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).

57. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010; *supra* n.36 (directing community support teams to "prioritize reunification between the youth and the youth's family").

shelter “is unable to make contact with a parent despite [its] notification efforts,” or when the shelter “makes contact with a parent, but the parent does not request that the child return home.”⁵⁸ A child cannot provide such authorization when the parent has been reached and wants the child home—or who has reported the child missing. Nothing in these laws prevents Petitioners, who emphasize that they love their children and want them home, from bringing them home.

Second, if a youth refuses to return home, a shelter cannot simply keep the child. Out-of-home placement beyond 72 hours is permitted only if “the parent has not requested that the child return home, a child in need of services petition has been filed, or an order for placement has been entered.”⁵⁹ The Department’s policy confirms that it seeks a court-approved out-of-home placement through a child in need of services (“CHINS”) petition only where, among other things, the youth “cannot return home,” no agreement has been reached, and the youth “has no suitable place to live other than [the] parent’s home.”⁶⁰ Absent abuse or neglect, that bar is high, and the shelter itself has no power to hold a child; only law enforcement or a court can intervene.

58. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i)(A)–(B).

59. Wash. Rev. Code § 43.185C.265(4) (as amended by 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 151, § 4).

60. BIO App. 8a–9a; *see also* Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.050 (permitting removal only upon a court finding that removal “is necessary to prevent imminent physical harm to the child due to child abuse or neglect”).

Third, these interventions are rarely quick and never immediate; unless the child returns home, the child is left without shelter until a court acts. The system leaves a youth no option but to return home unless the youth has been effectively abandoned or there is an allegation of abuse or neglect strong enough to warrant protective custody or immediate court intervention. In Amici's experience, young people forced into this corner often choose the street or other unsafe living situations rather than return home and await a court process or family services. That is the opposite of an "incentive" to seek shelter.

Fourth, as Amici know well, shelter systems are already strained by limited funding, staffing shortages, and difficult-to-navigate regulatory burdens. They are not designed for—and lack capacity to serve—youth who have concerned parents and a safe home. The young people who actually reach licensed shelters are those who truly have nowhere else to go, whether because of family poverty and homelessness; the loss of caregivers to death, jail, or deportation; flight from physical or sexual abuse; or home environments made unsafe by a caregiver's mental illness or substance use. Youth are unlikely to be aware of these laws, let alone to make decisions based on them. Petitioners do not allege otherwise.

F. The Legislature Added Protected Health Care to the “Compelling Reasons” Category to Keep Vulnerable Youth Off the Streets.

The Legislature’s reason for the 2023 amendment is stated on the face of the statute:

The legislature finds that unsheltered homelessness for youth poses a serious threat to their health and safety. The Trevor project has found that one in three transgender youth report attempting suicide. Homelessness amongst transgender youth can further endanger an already at-risk population. The legislature further finds that barriers to accessing shelter can place a chilling effect on exiting unsheltered homelessness and therefore create additional risk and dangers for youth. Youth seeking certain medical services are especially at risk and vulnerable. Therefore, the legislature intends to remove barriers to accessing temporary, licensed shelter accommodations for youth seeking certain protected health care services.⁶¹

The record before the Legislature confirmed the need. LGBTQ+ youth account for at least 40 percent of

61. 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 408, § 1.

youth experiencing homelessness in King County, Washington, reporting higher rates of abuse and mental health challenges.⁶² LGBTQ+ youth face a 120 percent higher risk of homelessness.⁶³ Legislators considered that, once transgender youth learned of the notification policy upon arriving at a shelter, fear of the shelters’ notification requirement previously caused some transgender youth to leave the safety of shelters or avoid them altogether.⁶⁴ The amendment responds to that documented risk by routing notification through the Department, which can pair notice with reconciliation services and behavioral health referrals addressing these difficulties to facilitate reunification “before youth disappear from shelters to the streets.”⁶⁵

Before ESSB 5599, a shelter had to notify the parents of transgender youth seeking or receiving gender-affirming care when such youth arrived at a shelter.⁶⁶ That notice included only the information described above. Parents thus learned their child’s location but received no services or assistance in addressing parent-child conflict over gender identity.

ESSB 5599 addressed that gap. Because the Department, rather than the shelter, now notifies parents, it can pair that notice with reconciliation

62. BIO 4–5 (citing Pub. Hr’g on ESSB 5599 Before the S. Hum. Servs. Comm. (Wash. Feb. 6, 2023)).

63. M. H. Morton et al., *Missed opportunities: LGBTQ youth homelessness in America*, CHAPIN HALL AT THE U. OF CHICAGO (2018).

64. BIO 5 (citing House Floor Debate on ESSB 5599 (Wash. Apr. 12, 2023) (remarks of Rep. Julio Cortes)).

65. BIO 1.

66. 1995 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 312, § 1.

services and behavioral health referrals to help address parent-child conflict.⁶⁷

Washington’s approach is also measured. It obligates the Department to offer behavioral health referrals together with conflict resolution aimed at reconciliation, which remains central even in these “compelling” circumstances. It does *not* provide for “gender-affirming care” as Petitioners imagine. Washington’s approach is working: the State has made significant progress in reducing and preventing youth homelessness.⁶⁸

II. PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE “OBJECTS” OF LAWS THAT REGULATE ONLY SHELTERS AND A STATE AGENCY.

Article III standing is a “bedrock constitutional requirement.”⁶⁹ A plaintiff must show an “injury in fact”—“an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”—that is fairly traceable to the defendant and likely redressable by the court.⁷⁰ A “threatened injury must

67. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(a)–(b).

68. See *Homelessness in Washington*, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF COM. (2025) (available at: https://app.leg.wa.gov/ReportsToTheLegislature/Home/GetPDF?fileName=CommerceReports_2024_HD_HomelessnessinWA_Final%20V2_2577a16d-374b-42d1-b363-00629bcca881.pdf).

69. *United States v. Texas*, 599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023).

70. *Lujan*, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); *FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med.*, 602 U.S. 367, 380 (2024).

be certainly impending,” and “[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.”⁷¹

Petitioners contend that “being the law’s object suffices” for standing.⁷² Neither *Diamond* nor *Mirabelli* so held. The Court has long recognized that standing is easier to show when a law “require[s]” or “forbid[s]” action by the plaintiff, and “substantially more difficult” when the plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s regulation of someone else.⁷³ Regardless, Petitioners must still “clearly allege facts demonstrating each element” of standing.⁷⁴ Justice Scalia’s observation that the “very object of a law’s requirement or prohibition” always has standing only underscores the point: it describes “the law bearing down upon the individual himself.”⁷⁵ These laws bear down on shelters and the Department—not on Petitioners.

Unlike the regulations in *Diamond*, which “explicitly s[ought] to restrict the use of gasoline,”⁷⁶ “ESSB 5599 doesn’t regulate parents at all[.]”⁷⁷ It directs licensed shelters to notify the Department and

71. *Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting *Whitmore v. Arkansas*, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

72. Pet’rs’ Br. 31.

73. *Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); BIO 25–26.

74. *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citation modified).

75. Pet’rs’ Br. 1 (quoting Antonin Scalia, *The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers*, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 894 (1983)).

76. *Diamond*, 606 U.S. at 114–15.

77. BIO 25.

directs the Department to offer voluntary services.⁷⁸ The statute's explicit purpose is to assist at-risk youth by removing barriers to shelter so that youth do not end up on the street.⁷⁹ Petitioners' "selective quotations of isolated legislators" cannot change that plain text.⁸⁰

Petitioners' reliance on *Mirabelli* also fails. The California policies there "prevent[ed] schools from telling [parents] about their children's efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school unless the children consent[ed] to parental notification."⁸¹ The Court concluded that parents protected by the injunction "very likely have standing because they are objects of the challenged exclusion policies."⁸² At least two parents in *Mirabelli* had actually been denied information under the policy.⁸³

None of that is true here. First, Washington's laws are not exclusion or nondisclosure policies. Shelters are not hiding information from parents. The laws merely shift who is responsible for notifying them. Second, the *Mirabelli* policies operated daily in schools that the plaintiffs' children were required to attend; here, no Petitioner alleges that any child has ever been in a licensed shelter subject to the

78. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(1)(b)(i), (3).

79. 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 408, § 1.

80. BIO 25; see *State of Wash., Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C.*, 43 P.3d 4, 9–10 (Wash. 2002) (where a statute's meaning is plain, courts give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent).

81. *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 492–93.

82. *Id.* at 498 (citing *Diamond*, 606 U.S. at 114).

83. *Mirabelli*, 607 U.S. at 499.

challenged provisions.⁸⁴ Third, the *Mirabelli* policies concerned schools' own facilitation of a social transition; neither shelters nor the Department provide gender-affirming care, and the laws authorize neither to do so.⁸⁵ Fourth, nothing in these laws is compulsory as to parents: they do not "requir[e] them to do or refrain from doing anything."⁸⁶

Parents who want their children home are given every opportunity to bring them there. They receive notice from the shelter in ordinary cases and from the Department in compelling-reasons cases.⁸⁷ The statutory framework contemplates no circumstance in which a parent goes un-notified; the Department must make a documented good-faith effort in every case.⁸⁸ Parents are offered resources and support: family reconciliation services that may include conflict management and referrals for suicide prevention and other care.⁸⁹ Laws that offer parents a pathway to help do not make parents the targets of regulation.

Petitioners also claim they have been "demoted to the same legal category as abusive or neglectful parents."⁹⁰ But the compelling-reasons provision is not a finding about parents; it is triggered by a youth's circumstances. The amendment reflects the Legislature's judgment that youth seeking protected

84. *Supra* Part I.

85. *Id.*

86. BIO 29 (quoting *All. for Hippocratic Med.*, 602 U.S. at 374).

87. *Supra* Part I.C.

88. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(a); BIO App. 3a–4a.

89. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.030(12).

90. Pet'rs' Br. 38.

health care face a heightened risk of harm—including suicide and unsheltered homelessness—beyond ordinary family conflict.⁹¹ It does not alter the legal treatment of those youths’ parents or brand them neglectful or abusive. Such parents are still notified, still free to bring their children home, and still offered services designed for reunification.⁹² The only changes are who delivers the notice, added services, and a deadline for the Department to act.⁹³

Indeed, the Department’s role cuts in parents’ favor. The Department must notify parents and offer reconciliation services as soon as possible and no later than three days after the shelter’s report.⁹⁴ Its policy requires contact with the youth within twenty-four hours and a good-faith effort to reach the parent.⁹⁵ Neither the Department nor the shelter can dictate what a parent can or cannot do; they merely provide resources to help families reunify.⁹⁶

Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025), is distinguishable for the same reason. There, parents whose children would “inevitably” be exposed to required curricular materials could show that, when teachers followed the school board’s “clear and undisputed instructions,” the burden on their religious exercise “will occur.”⁹⁷ Here, by contrast, the laws come into play only through a “complicated and

91. *Supra* Part I.F; see 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 408, § 1.

92. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(b)(ii).

93. BIO 8, 10; see Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(a).

94. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.082(3)(a).

95. BIO App. 2a–4a.

96. BIO 9.

97. *Mahmoud*, 606 U.S. at 560; BIO 26.

specific pathway” that no Petitioner alleges has begun.⁹⁸

Diamond also observed that the government may “indirectly target a product or service ‘through a conduit,’” as when it bans hot dog sales in stadiums or prohibits bookstores from selling certain publishers’ books.⁹⁹ Nothing comparable happens here. The shelters and the Department are not intermediaries through which Washington restricts anything parents do. Parents are not told what they may say, how they may raise their children, or what care they must permit.¹⁰⁰ Whether any parent is ever affected depends instead on “the individualized choices of children in individualized family circumstances,” which “do not follow similarly predictable rules or principles.”¹⁰¹ That is precisely the “speculation about the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts” that cannot support standing.¹⁰²

Nor does *Diamond*’s reliance on “commonsense economic principles” help Petitioners.¹⁰³ The common sense in removing a regulatory barrier to increase fuel purchases has no analogue in adolescent behavior. Properly informed common sense points the other way: the youth who arrive at shelters are overwhelmingly youth who were pushed out or are

98. Pet’rs’ App. 21a; BIO 26–27.

99. *Diamond*, 606 U.S. at 115–16.

100. Pet’rs’ App. 17a.

101. BIO 24.

102. *All. for Hippocratic Med.*, 602 U.S. at 383 (quoting *Clapper*, 568 U.S. at 415 n.5).

103. *Diamond*, 606 U.S. at 116.

fleeing harm, not children of concerned parents choosing a shelter over home.¹⁰⁴ And if those youths' parents want them home, ESSB 5599 poses no barrier.

III. PETITIONERS' ASSERTED "CURRENT" INJURIES ARE REPACKAGED FEARS OF SPECULATIVE FUTURE EVENTS.

Petitioners assert five "current harm[s]" arising from "actions the laws caused them to take to minimize the risk of future harm."¹⁰⁵ Each derives from a feared future event that is not certainly impending. A plaintiff "cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending."¹⁰⁶

FEC v. Cruz supports this.¹⁰⁷ There, the challenged provision had already been applied to the plaintiffs, who were "subject to" it and would "face genuine legal penalties if they d[id] not comply."¹⁰⁸ The "problem" in *Clapper*, the Court explained, was that the plaintiffs "could not show that they had been or were likely to be subjected to [the challenged] policy in any event."¹⁰⁹ That is precisely Petitioners' problem. No provision of Washington law requires

104. *Supra* Parts I.A, I.E.

105. Pet'rs' Br. 38.

106. *Clapper*, 568 U.S. at 416; *see also Pennsylvania v. New Jersey*, 426 U.S. 660, 664 (1976) (per curiam) (party cannot complain of damage "inflicted by its own hand").

107. *FEC v. Cruz*, 596 U.S. 289 (2022).

108. *Id.* at 297.

109. *Id.*

them to do anything, and no penalty awaits them for any parenting choice.¹¹⁰

**A. The Laws Have Not Deprived
Petitioners of Any Legal Protection.**

Petitioners first claim that the laws “deprived them of legal protections they once had.”¹¹¹ But Petitioner’s legal positions have not changed: parents are notified, retain custody, and may bring their children home. The cases Petitioners cite are inapposite. In *Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors v. City of Jacksonville*, the plaintiffs were “able and ready to bid” on contracts in an ongoing procurement and were barred from competing on equal footing.¹¹² Petitioners, by contrast, have no transaction with Washington—and no rights to assert against it—while their children remain at home.

**B. The Laws Create No “Concrete
Incentives” for Petitioners’
Children to Run Away.**

Petitioners next contend that the laws “create concrete incentives for Petitioners’ children to run away and trigger the laws’ full effects.”¹¹³ An

110. BIO 18; *cf. All. for Hippocratic Med.*, 602 U.S. at 374 (no standing to challenge regulation that did “not requir[e] [plaintiffs] to do or refrain from doing anything”).

111. Pet’rs’ Br. 38.

112. *Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville*, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993).

113. Pet’rs’ Br. 39 (quoting *Diamond*, 606 U.S. at 120).

incentive cannot operate on someone who does not know it exists, and Petitioners do not allege that any of their children are aware of these laws. Nor is there any evidence that youth generally know about Washington's shelter-notification rules or make decisions based on them.¹¹⁴

More fundamentally, the incentives run the other way. For the child of a parent who wants the child home, a shelter offers a very short stay. The 90-day self-authorization pathway is unavailable once a parent requests the child's return, and continued out-of-home placement requires a court-supervised CHINS process with a high bar.¹¹⁵ Youth faced with that structure do not view shelter as an escape route; those who refuse to go home are more likely to disappear onto the street, which these laws were enacted to prevent. For a hypothetical runaway, the amendments ensure that a trained Department caseworker, rather than shelter staff alone, reaches out to both youth and parent and offers reconciliation. That is an incentive toward home, not away from it.

Petitioners also point to Washington's 1985 law permitting adolescents to consent to outpatient mental health treatment.¹¹⁶ That law applies whether or not a youth is in a shelter, has stood for four decades, and mirrors the laws of more than thirty States.¹¹⁷ It cannot transform shelter laws into an inducement to run away.

114. *Supra* Part I.E.

115. *Supra* Part I.E.

116. Pet'rs' Br. 40 (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.530).

117. 1985 Wash. Sess. Laws 1231 (ch. 354, § 1); BIO 10–11; BIO App. 14a–32a.

C. The Laws Do Not Strain the Parent-Child Relationship or Subvert Parental Authority.

Petitioners claim the laws “strain[] the parent-child relationship and subvert[] parental authority—as an always-present sword hanging over parents,” and that “hinder[ing]’ the parent-child relationship is enough to cause constitutional injury.”¹¹⁸ The word “hinder” comes from *Prince v. Massachusetts*, which explained that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest” and that “neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”¹¹⁹

The “sword” Petitioners describe is not wielded by Washington. The laws do not regulate how Petitioners parent, and any strain Petitioners experience flows from their own apprehension of what their children might someday do.¹²⁰ If anything, Amici’s experience teaches that laws keeping a path open to shelter, notification, and reconciliation services protect families: a parent who adjusts to navigate a teenager’s difficult years with less conflict is not injured by the State, and a parent whose child does leave is far better off when the child is in a licensed shelter, with services and family supports, than when the child is on the street.

118. Pet’rs’ Br. 41 (quoting *Quilloin v. Walcott*, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)).

119. *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (quoted in *Quilloin*, 434 U.S. at 255).

120. Pet’rs’ App. 15a–16a.

D. Fear of Speculative Future Events Is Not a Cognizable Injury.

Petitioners allege that the laws cause them fear “about what could happen to their child, their relationship with their child, and their ability to parent.”¹²¹ This Court has never held that fear of a remote contingency constitutes Article III injury. In *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, the Court expressly took “no position on whether or how such an emotional or psychological harm could suffice for Article III purposes,” noting that the plaintiffs had not presented evidence of any such harm.¹²²

Petitioners’ reliance on *Gerber v. Herskovitz* fares no better.¹²³ *Gerber* involved “extreme emotional distress,” a harm long actionable at common law that requires “mental suffering or emotional anguish” evidenced by conduct and observed by others.¹²⁴ Petitioners allege nothing of the kind. Worry about what a child might someday do cannot be bootstrapped into a present injury; permitting that maneuver would collapse the distinction between imminent harm and the “generalized grievances” that the Court has consistently rejected.¹²⁵

121. Pet’rs’ Br. 42.

122. *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 594 U.S. 413, 436 n.7, 437 (2021).

123. *Gerber v. Herskovitz*, 14 F.4th 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2021).

124. *Id.* (quoting *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. 247, 263–64 & n.20 (1978)).

125. See *Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War*, 418 U.S. 208, 225–27 (1974).

**E. The Laws Do Not Chill Petitioners’
Speech or Compel Changes in Their
Parenting.**

Finally, some Petitioners allege that the laws “chill their speech at home and change their parenting strategy.” However, “the Statutes do not regulate speech,” and “they have no bearing on whether and to what extent [Petitioners] are permitted to speak about topics, such as gender, with or around their children.”¹²⁶ The Court has repeatedly held that “the ‘chilling effect’ associated with a potentially unconstitutional law being ‘on the books’ is insufficient to ‘justify federal intervention’ in a pre-enforcement suit,” no matter which constitutional right is allegedly chilled.¹²⁷

The First Amendment cases Petitioners invoke involved laws that operated directly on the plaintiffs. Washington’s laws impose no burden on parents and do not even apply unless their children arrive at a licensed shelter under very specific and rare circumstances. And Petitioners’ complaint that the law excludes them from “important decisions” does not establish that any injury is imminent.¹²⁸ Indeed, the one Petitioner child alleged to have received mental health treatment without parental consent did so outside any shelter, and the complaint does not tie that episode to the challenged provisions.¹²⁹

126. Pet’rs’ App. 17a.

127. *Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson*, 595 U.S. 30, 50 (2021) (quoting *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 50–51 (1971)).

128. Pet’rs’ Br. 44–45.

129. Pet’rs’ App. 18a–19a.

IV. PETITIONERS' THEORY OF INCREASED FUTURE RISK RESTS ON A SPECULATIVE CHAIN OF CONTINGENCIES.

A plaintiff may bring a pre-enforcement suit so long as the plaintiff faces “a credible threat of enforcement.”¹³⁰ And “a person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial.”¹³¹ Petitioners satisfy neither standard. There is nothing to “enforce” against them: the laws direct shelters and the Department, not parents, and the risk Petitioners posit is neither imminent nor substantial.

Before any Petitioner could be affected, a Petitioner’s child would have to (1) have a gender identity different from the child’s sex; (2) run away from home; (3) seek refuge at a licensed shelter; (4) actually inform a shelter worker that they are seeking protected healthcare in the first 72 hours at the shelter;¹³² and (5) accept a behavioral health referral from DCYF (which they can already access on their

130. *First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport*, 608 U.S. 174, 183 (2026).

131. *TransUnion*, 594 U.S. at 435–36 (citing *Clapper*, 568 U.S. at 414 & n.5; *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).

132. Runaway youth typically do not speak openly about their circumstances. See James Ulager et al., *Why should I tell you? Homeless youth share what it takes for professionals to earn their trust*, J. OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH, 36, 133–34 (2005).

own).¹³³ Petitioners have not alleged that any link in that chain has been forged. Some do not allege that any child is transgender, that any child is seeking gender-affirming care, or that any child has threatened to run away.¹³⁴ No Petitioner alleges a child has ever sought refuge at a licensed shelter subject to the challenged provisions.¹³⁵ Their pleadings instead rest on contingencies: “if 1C were to run away,” “should [2D] run away to a shelter,” “if 5C runs away again.”¹³⁶

This Court has repeatedly rejected standing built on such a “speculative chain of possibilities.”¹³⁷ The Court has expressed particular “reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.”¹³⁸ Every link in Petitioners’ chain depends on such actors—their own children, shelters, the Department, and health care providers.

Amici’s experience compounds the speculation. The decision of an adolescent to leave home is driven by abuse, neglect, rejection, poverty, or family breakdown—not by the details of a shelter-notification statute.¹³⁹ Even if a Petitioner’s child did run away, the overwhelming likelihood is that the child would avoid shelters altogether or be reunited

133. BIO 20; Pet’rs’ App. 22a.

134. BIO 20 (citing Pet’rs’ App. 70a–76a).

135. BIO 20–21.

136. BIO 33–34 (quoting Pet’rs’ App. 72a–77a).

137. *Clapper*, 568 U.S. at 413–14; see Pet. App. 30a (district court rejecting Petitioners’ “speculative chain of possibilities”).

138. *Clapper*, 568 U.S. at 414.

139. *Supra* Parts I.A, I.E.

quickly through notification and reconciliation services. No child has yet availed themselves of Washington's new laws, and Petitioners give no reason why theirs would be the first.¹⁴⁰ Petitioners' theory requires the Court to assume the least likely outcome at every step.

V. PETITIONERS' THEORY WOULD OPEN THE FEDERAL COURTS TO ANY PARENT WHO DISAGREES WITH ANY LAW CONCERNING CHILDREN.

Under Petitioners' theory, if a parent is the "object" of any law that might someday apply to the parent's child, and if a parent's fear of that possibility and voluntary changes in parenting constitute present injury, then every parent in a State has standing to challenge every law potentially affecting children. That includes the minor-consent statutes for mental health treatment in more than thirty States;¹⁴¹ child-abuse reporting and child-welfare laws; school health and counseling programs; and the federal and state programs that fund emergency shelter, street outreach, and transitional living services for homeless youth. Any parent who disagrees with such a law, and who fears that a child might someday invoke it, could sue immediately.

This Court has rejected such theories and should likewise reject amicus United States' argument that standing should be relaxed. A "desire to make a drug less available for others does not

140. *Supra* n.6.

141. BIO App. 14a–32a.

establish standing to sue.”¹⁴² Petitioners’ desire to make shelter or mental health care less accessible to youth is no different. Standing doctrine exists to ensure that federal courts do not become “forums for the ventilation of public grievances” that belong in the democratic process.¹⁴³

The cost of Petitioners’ theory would fall hardest on the youth Amici serve. Laws that keep a path open from the street to a licensed shelter—and from the shelter back to the family—are the product of hard-won experience about what keeps vulnerable young people alive. Similarly, the importance of laws that allow certain older minors to consent to some limited healthcare cannot be overstated. Studies have found that homeless youth have mortality rates up to ten times those of their housed peers and suicide rates anywhere from five to fifteen times those of housed youth.¹⁴⁴ An analysis of Homelessness Management Information System data found that unhoused LGBTQ youth had over twice the rate of early death.¹⁴⁵ Exposing every such minor-consent law to immediate facial challenge by any parent who fears it would invite the very barriers that the Washington Legislature found “create additional risk and dangers

142. *All. for Hippocratic Med.*, 602 U.S. at 374.

143. *Valley Forge*, 454 U.S. at 473; BIO 16.

144. Colette L. Auerswald, et al., *Six-year mortality in a street-recruited cohort of homeless youth in San Francisco, California*. PEERJ 4:e1909 (2016) (<https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27114873/>).

145. *Supra* n.63.

for youth.”¹⁴⁶ Article III does not require, or permit, that result.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners are not the objects of Washington’s shelter laws, their asserted present harms are self-inflicted, and their feared future injuries rest on a speculative chain of contingencies. Because Petitioners lack Article III standing, the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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146. 2023 Wash. Sess. Laws, ch. 408, § 1.