

No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RENE BRAVO,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a defendant's request for a lower sentence than that which was imposed preserves a substantive reasonableness challenge to the entirety of his sentence?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Parties to the proceeding include Rene Bravo (Appellant/Petitioner) and the United States of America (Appellee/Respondent).

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINION BELOW

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal, *infra*, is attached as Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal was entered on March 20, 2026. A Petition for Panel Rehearing was timely filed and denied on April 7, 2026. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED IN THE CASE

(a) Exceptions Unnecessary. Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary.

(b) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court--when the court ruling or order is made or sought--of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the party's objection to the court's action and the grounds for that objection. If a party does not have an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later prejudice that party. A ruling or order that admits or excludes evidence is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 103.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 51.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On March 20, 2024, a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, returned a one-count Indictment naming Mr. Bravo as the defendant. Count One charged that from on or about July 21, 2023, through on or about February 29, 2024, Mr. Bravo, using a facility and means of interstate

commerce, did knowingly attempt to persuade, induce, entice, and coerce an individual who the defendant believed had not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in sexual activity for which any person could be charged with a criminal offense, specifically: Florida Statute § 800.04(4)(a), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). On December 18, 2024, Mr. Bravo appeared before United States District Judge Carlos E. Mendoza and pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment. On April 29, 2025, a sentencing hearing was held, and Mr. Bravo was sentenced to 78 months imprisonment, followed by 10 years of supervised release with special conditions.

Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report, in which it set forth Mr. Bravo's offense conduct, which reflected that he had arranged a sexual encounter with an officer posing as a 13-year-old girl, and was arrested at the location established for the two to meet. According to the Probation Office, upon being arrested:

Bravo was advised that he was under arrest. Bravo then advised of his Miranda rights. Bravo subsequently gave a recorded interview to the law enforcement officers. During the interview, Bravo identified himself as a 57-year-old and admitted to traveling to the location to meet a 13-year-old girl and perform oral sex on the child. Bravo stated that he knew it was illegal to perform oral sex on a 13-year-old and that he drove approximately 50 minutes from his residence in Kissimmee, Florida, in order to meet a 13-year-old to engage in oral sex, with the intention of bringing the child back to his residence. Bravo admitted to using his cell phone, a Samsung SM-S928U1, to communicate with the notional 13-year-old girl he met on the Locanto application.

(District Court Docket Entry 98, at 8). According to the report, Mr. Bravo was a 58-

year-old military veteran receiving retirement benefits at the time of sentencing. *Id.* at 2, 14, 15.

Mr. Bravo advocated for a sentence of three years imprisonment followed by a term of probation. The court ultimately imposed sentence, stating as follows:

The Court has asked the defendant why judgment should not now be pronounced, and after hearing the defendant's response, the Court has found no cause to the contrary. The parties have made statements on their behalf or have waived the opportunity to do so, and the Court has reviewed the presentence report and the advisory guidelines.

All right. This is a very unusual case for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the Government is recommending --

First of all, I did a review of my own records because I always want to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. And in this type of case, the standard sentence is 10 years, and I can't find one that wasn't, and it's because what you did is so dangerous. And I understand that you're suffering from PTSD, but that's not an explanation for why you took all these steps to try and meet and have sex with a 13-year-old. That's not a response to PTSD. That's just somebody who is making some very dangerous and lawless decisions.

All right. Having said that, the Government filed and I granted document 107.

Your attorney has done a good job for you trying to make sure he can mitigate your damages. I'm not at 36 months. But I'll be honest with you, I'm not even comfortable with the range. I think what you did was terribly dangerous. I had my courtroom deputy -- she looked through every case I've had for over 10 years, and we cannot find a single enticement case where someone was granted a 5K. That doesn't mean you shouldn't get one because of your cooperation, but there's no point of reference for me. This is brand new uncharted territory.

How do you treat a situation involving a defendant who's attempted to commit I think one of the most heinous crimes a person could commit, and that's against a child, versus the other party who appears to be very dangerous in their own right?

So I don't know what to do. So I'm going to rely on the attorneys, and I think their arguments are reasonable. While I'm not at 36 months and I'm not even comfortable with the guideline range, I do think that it's hard to measure what prevention means. Did you stop something from happening? Well, it didn't happen, so did it not happen because you stopped, or was it not going to happen anyway? I don't know that. But I do think that you put yourself in harm's way with what you did to benefit the safety of another, and that weighs heavily on the Court.

If you would be kind enough to stand. I'm ready to impose the sentence.

Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 3551 and 3553, it is the judgment of the Court that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 78 months.

Upon release from imprisonment, you shall serve a 10-year term of supervised release. While on supervised release, you shall comply with the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court in the Middle District of Florida, which can be found in section 5D1.3(a) and (c) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

In addition, you shall comply with the following special conditions:

You shall participate in a mental health treatment program, outpatient and/or inpatient, and follow the probation officer's instructions regarding the implementation of this directive. Further, you shall contribute to the costs of these services not to exceed an amount determined reasonable by the probation office's sliding scale for mental health treatment services.

You shall participate in a mental health program

specializing in sexual offender treatment and submit to polygraph testing for treatment and monitoring purposes. You shall follow the probation officer's instructions regarding the implementation of this directive. Further, you shall contribute to the costs of such treatment and/or polygraphs not to exceed an amount determined reasonable by the probation officer, based on your ability to pay or availability of third-party payment and in conformance with the probation office's sliding scale for treatment.

You shall register with the state sexual offender registration agency in any state where you reside, visit, are employed, carry on a vocation, or are a student, as directed by probation.

The probation officer shall provide state officials with all information required under Florida sexual predator and sexual offender notification and registration statutes and/or the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection Safety Act of 2006, and may direct the defendant to report to these agencies personally for required additional processing, such as photographing, fingerprinting, and DNA collection.

You shall have no direct contact with minors – a minor is someone under the age of 18 -- without the prior written approval from your probation officer and shall refrain from entering into any area where children frequently congregate including, but not limited to: Schools, day care centers, theme parks, playgrounds.

You are prohibited from possessing, subscribing to, or viewing any images, videos, magazines, literature, or any other materials depicting children in the nude and/or in sexually explicit positions.

Without prior written approval from your probation officer, you're prohibited from either possessing or using a computer, and including, but not limited to, a smartphone, hand-held computer device, a gaming console, an electronic device that is capable of connecting to an online service or an internet service provider. This prohibition includes a computer at a public library, an internet cafe, your place of

employment, or an educational facility.

You are also prohibited from possessing an electronic data storage medium, including, but not limited to, a flash drive, compact disc, floppy disk, or using any data encryption technique or program. If approved to possess such a device, you must permit routine inspection of the device, including the hard device and any other electronic data storage medium, to confirm adherence to this condition. The United States Probation Office must conduct the inspection in a manner no more intrusive than necessary to ensure compliance with this condition. If this condition might affect a third party, including your employer, you must inform that third party of this restriction, including the computer inspection provision.

You shall submit to a reasonable search of your person, residence, place of business, any storage units under your control, computer, or vehicle, conducted by the United States Probation officer at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, based upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of a condition of release. You shall inform any other residents that the premises may be subject to a search pursuant to this condition. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation.

You shall provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information.

Having been convicted of a qualifying felony, you must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by probation.

The mandatory drug testing requirements of the Violent Crime Control Act are suspended; however, you must submit to random drug testing not to exceed 104 tests per year.

Based on the financial status of the defendant, the Court will waive the imposition of a fine.

Any filed forfeiture matters will be finalized with the judgment and sentence.

It is further ordered the defendant shall pay a special assessment of \$100, which shall be due immediately.

And based on the defendant's representation situation, the Court will find the defendant is indigent and will not order the special assessment pursuant to 18 U.S. Code, Section 3014.

After considering the advisory sentencing guidelines and all the factors identified in Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 3553(a)(1) through (7), the Court finds the sentence imposed is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing.

(District Court Docket Entry 122, at 25-31). The standard conditions of supervised release imposed upon Mr. Bravo included the provision that:

You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10 days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

(District Court Docket Entry 111, at 4).

Mr. Bravo appealed to the 11th Circuit, and argued that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because there was no explanation for the requirements that Mr. Bravo seek and/or maintain full employment while on supervised release, that Mr. Bravo submit to polygraph testing for treatment and monitoring purposes, nor for why Mr. Bravo should be prohibited from contact with all minors.

The 11th Circuit affirmed, concluding that Mr. Bravo's argument was not preserved and was therefore reviewed only for plain error, which was a standard the court concluded he could not meet. According to the 11th Circuit, an objection to the length of a defendant's sentence does not preserve a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court.

This Petition follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO ESTABLISH THAT A DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR A LOWER SENTENCE THAN THAT WHICH WAS IMPOSED PRESERVES A SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS CHALLENGE TO THE ENTIRETY OF HIS SENTENCE.

At issue in this Petition is whether a defendant’s request for a lower sentence than that which was imposed preserves a substantive reasonableness challenge to the entirety of his sentence, and this Court should establish that it does so.

In *Holguin-Hernandez v. United States*, 589 U.S. 169, 140 S. Ct. 762, 206 L. Ed. 2d 95 (2020), this Court explained:

By “informing the court” of the “action” he “wishes the court to take,” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 51(b), a party ordinarily brings to the court's attention his objection to a contrary decision. See Rule 52(b). And that is certainly true in cases such as this one, where a criminal defendant advocates for a sentence shorter than the one ultimately imposed. Judges, having in mind their “overarching duty” under § 3553(a), would ordinarily understand that a defendant in that circumstance was making the argument (to put it in statutory terms) that the shorter sentence would be “‘sufficient’” and a longer sentence “‘greater than necessary’” to achieve the purposes of sentencing. *Pepper*, 562 U.S. at 493, 131 S.Ct. 1229 (quoting § 3553(a)). Nothing more is needed to preserve the claim that a longer sentence is unreasonable.

Holguin-Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 173–74, 140 S. Ct. at 766.

A defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is “greater than necessary” has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.

Holguin-Hernandez, 589 U.S. at 174–75, 140 S. Ct. at 766–67.

Here, Mr. Bravo advocated for a sentence of three years imprisonment followed by a term of probation. (D-122, at 21). As in *Holguin-Hernandez*, Mr. Bravo’s request for a term of imprisonment followed by probation, communicated to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence – one which included supervised release provisions – was greater than necessary and thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in his appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. *See, Id.*

The 11th Circuit pointed to *United States v. Zinn*, 321 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that more is required to preserve a substantive reasonableness challenge to conditions of supervised release, but it is rudimentary that the 11th Circuit is bound by decisions of this Court. *See, James v. City of Boise, Idaho*, 577 U.S. 306, 307, 136 S. Ct. 685, 686, 193 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2016) (“The Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or federal court, is bound by this Court’s interpretation of federal law.”). Crucially, as stated *supra*, in *Holguin-Hernandez*, this Court concluded that “[a] defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” *Holguin-Hernandez*, 589 U.S. at 174–75, 140 S. Ct. at 766–67. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), “The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (emphasis added). Accordingly, because supervised release is a part of the

sentence, by advocating for a particular sentence, Mr. Bravo communicated to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence, *i.e.*, one containing supervised release provisions, was greater than necessary and thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in his appeal challenging the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. *See, Holguin-Hernandez*, 589 U.S. at 174–75, 140 S. Ct. at 766–67. Accordingly, the 11th Circuit erred by reviewing Mr. Bravo’s sentencing challenge for plain error, as he was entitled to have his sentence reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. *See, Holguin-Hernandez*, 589 U.S. at 173, 140 S. Ct. at 766 (“If the trial court follows proper procedures and gives adequate consideration to these and the other listed factors, then the question for an appellate court is simply, as here, whether the trial court’s chosen sentence was reasonable or whether the judge instead abused his discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported the sentence imposed.”)(citations and quotations omitted).

Effectively, the 11th Circuit concluded, contrary to *Holguin-Hernandez*, that a defendant must raise a specific objection to the specific supervised release provisions at issue to preserve a substantive reasonableness challenge for review. However, as *Holguin-Hernandez* makes clear, by advocating for a sentence that did not include any form of supervised release, Mr. Bravo relayed to the court that including supervised release provisions as part of his sentence was a punishment which was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing, and thus nothing more was required to preserve his substantive reasonableness challenge for review. *See, Holguin-Hernandez*, 589 U.S. at 173–74, 140 S. Ct. at 766.

Simply put, this Court’s intervention is necessary, as the 11th Circuit has effectively limited the holding in *Holguin-Hernandez* to substantive reasonableness challenges concerning the length of a defendant’s incarceration, but incarceration is only one portion of a defendant’s sentence, and *Holguin-Hernandez* did not limit its holding to only the incarcerative portion of a defendant’s sentence. Instead, its holding applies to the entirety of ***the sentence***. See, *Holguin-Hernandez*, 589 U.S. at 174–75, 140 S. Ct. at 766–67 (“A defendant who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge his view that a longer sentence is “greater than necessary” has thereby informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the substantive reasonableness of ***the sentence***.”)(emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court should take this opportunity to establish that the holding in *Holguin-Hernandez* applies to ***the sentence***, not merely the incarcerative portion of the sentence. See, *Id.*; See also, *United States v. Duran*, No. 23-2075, 2024 WL 4471668, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024) (“Defendant argued against any supervised release, so she sufficiently preserved her procedural unreasonableness argument for purposes of this case.”)

Consequently, this Court should grant Mr. Bravo’s Petition, establish that the holding in *Holguin-Hernandez* applies to ***the sentence***, not merely the incarcerative portion of a defendant’s sentence, reverse the Judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, and remand Mr. Bravo’s case to the Eleventh Circuit to conduct a review of his substantive reasonableness challenge under the proper standard of review. See, *Holguin-Hernandez*, 589 U.S. at 173, 140 S. Ct. at 766 (“If the trial court follows

proper procedures and gives adequate consideration to these and the other listed factors, then the question for an appellate court is simply, as here, whether the trial court's chosen sentence was reasonable or whether the judge instead abused his discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported the sentence imposed.”)(citations and quotations omitted).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should grant Mr. Bravo's Petition, establish that the holding in *Holguin-Hernandez* applies to ***the sentence***, not merely the incarcerative portion of a defendant's sentence, reverse the Judgment of the Eleventh Circuit, and remand Mr. Bravo's case to the Eleventh Circuit to conduct a review of his substantive reasonableness challenge under the proper standard of review.

Respectfully Submitted,



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APPENDIX A

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-11502
Non-Argument Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RENE BRAVO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:24-cr-00066-CEM-RMN-1

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rene Bravo appeals the district court's imposition of a standard condition of supervised release that requires him to work full-

time and special conditions that require him to submit to polygraph testing and have no direct contact with minors, as part of his sentence for attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity. Bravo contends the district court's imposition of these supervised release conditions rendered his sentence substantively unreasonable because the court did not explain why it imposed these arbitrary conditions. He asserts the full-time employment condition was arbitrary because he receives retirement income and will be eligible for social security benefits upon his release from prison, the polygraph condition is arbitrary because he did not commit a crime of dishonesty, and the prohibition of direct contact with all minors is arbitrary because his offense did not involve male minors.

Section 5D1.3(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines lists standard conditions of supervised release, including as relevant: “[t]he defendant shall work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses the defendant from doing so.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2)(G). A district court may also order special conditions of supervised release so long as each condition: (1) is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for adequate deterrence, the need to protect the public, and the need to provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or correctional treatment in an effective manner; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of deterrence, protecting the public,

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and rehabilitation; and (3) is consistent with any pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1)–(3), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(1). It is not necessary for a special condition to be supported by each § 3553(a) factor, but rather, each factor is an independent consideration to be weighed. *United States v. Tome*, 611 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 2010).

In *United States v. Zinn*, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to a term of incarceration followed by supervised release, subject to the special condition that, “[he] shall have no direct contact with minors under the age of 18 without the written approval of the probation officer and shall refrain from entering into any area where children frequently congregate including schools, day care centers, theme parks, playgrounds, et cetera.” 321 F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 2003). He challenged, for the first time on appeal, the no contact with minors special condition of supervised release, and we concluded the district court did not err and affirmed without further discussion. *Id.* at 1088. He also challenged the special condition that he submit to polygraph testing, which we affirmed on the basis that he had severe psychological problems, and this condition was reasonably related to his offense and personal history. *Id.* at 1089-90.

In *United States v. Taylor*, the defendant pleaded guilty to using the internet “to transmit information about a minor with the intent to entice, encourage, offer, or solicit any person to engage in [criminal] sexual activity with the minor” and to possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon. 338 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). As part of his sentence, the court imposed a polygraph testing provision, which Taylor challenged. *Id.* at 1283. We rejected his challenge, determining the polygraph testing was reasonably related to his conviction, was not vague, and did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. *Id.* at 1283-83. The court also imposed the special condition of supervised release that he have no direct contact with minors without his probation officer’s written approval and that he “refrain from entering into any area where children frequently congregate, including schools, day care centers, theme parks, playgrounds, etc.” *Id.* at 1286. He challenged that condition, and, on appeal, we held the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the condition, citing *Zinn* and two out-of-circuit cases. *Id.* (citing *United States v. Paul*, 274 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir. 2001); *United States v. Gallo*, 20 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1994)).

We also found there was no plain error in imposing a special condition prohibiting the defendant’s contact with minors because the defendant’s argument was foreclosed by our prior decisions in *Zinn* and *Taylor* and the special condition promoted rehabilitation and protected the public. *United States v. Moran*, 573 F.3d 1132, 1140 (11th Cir. 2009). We added “the district court was entitled to find that a restriction on [the defendant’s] affiliation with children was justified based on previous incidents involving minor victims.” *Id.*

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As an initial matter, the standard of review for Bravo's claim is plain error because he did not object to the district court's imposition of his conditions of supervised release.¹ See *Zinn*, 321 F.3d at 1087 (stating where a defendant fails to "clearly" object to the conditions of supervised release in the district court, we review for plain error). Bravo has not shown plain error because he has not cited any authoritative precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court holding a district court errs by imposing conditions of supervised release that require sex offenders to work full-time, submit to polygraph testing, and have no contact with minors. See *United States v. Kushmaul*, 984 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating without explicit, on-point language in the relevant statute, "there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or us directly resolving" the issue (quotation marks omitted)). Bravo has not shown any case law that abrogates this Court's precedent in *Zinn* or *Taylor* that upheld a sex offender's polygraph condition, or any case law that abrogates this Court's precedent in *Zinn*, *Taylor*, and *Moran* that upheld a sex offender's condition of no contact with minors. See *Zinn*, 321 F.3d at 1088-90; *Taylor*, 338 F.3d at 1283, 1286; *Moran*, 573 F.3d at 1140; see also *United States v. White*,

¹ Although Bravo frames his claim on appeal as one of substantive reasonableness, this Court has held that a defendant's failure to object to his conditions of supervised release at his sentencing hearing subjects such claims to plain error review when raised for the first time on appeal. *Zinn*, 321 F.3d at 1087. Bravo's reiteration of his objection to his sentence's length, which he raised prior to the court's imposition of his conditions of supervised release, therefore does not preserve his claims on appeal. See *id.*

837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining we are bound to adhere to our prior panel precedent unless that precedent has been abrogated by this Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court).

Bravo argues his full-time employment condition of supervised release is arbitrary because he receives retirement income and will be retirement age for social security purposes when released from prison, but he does not contest that he had no assets and over \$60,000 of liabilities. *See United States v. Ridgeway*, 319 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating when the condition imposed is clear, and undisputed facts contained in the presentence investigation report support the condition, there is no error). He contends the full-time employment condition is also arbitrary because no fine was imposed or restitution ordered, but disregards the fact the court waived his fine and special assessment because it found he was indigent—which he does not contest. While Bravo correctly asserts the district court did not specifically find his retirement benefits and social security benefits were insufficient to sustain him financially, such a finding is unnecessary because he has not contested the PSI’s assertion that he had no assets and \$60,000 in liabilities, or the court’s finding that he was indigent. *See id.*

Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in imposing conditions of supervised release requiring Bravo to work full-time, submit to polygraph testing, and have no contact with minors.

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-11502

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RENE BRAVO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:24-cr-00066-CEM-RMN-1

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Panel Rehearing filed by Appellant Rene Bravo is DENIED.